

Malware Variants Identification in Practice

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SBSEG 2019

Agenda

- 1 Motivation
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- 2 Challenges & Alternatives
 - Challenge 1
 - Challenge 2
- 3 Experiments
 - Evaluation
- 4 Concluding Remarks
 - Limitations
 - Conclusions

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Malware at Scale!




Figure: **Source:** <https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/360k-new-malware-samples-every-day/>



Figure: **Source:** <https://money.cnn.com/2015/04/14/technology/security/cyber-attack-hacks-security/index.html>

Current Approaches.




Figure: Function-based, Graph Modeling.

Challenge 1

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Challenge 1

Same-Behavior Function Replacement




Figure: Original sample's CG.




Figure: Variant sample's CG.




Figure: Behavioral graph from both samples.

Challenge 1

Behavioral Classification

- Compression
- Cryptography.
- Debug.
- Delay.
- Environment.
- Escalation.
- Exfiltration.
- Fingerprint.
- File System.
- Interference.
- Internet.
- Modularity.
- Monitoring.
- Registry.
- Evidence Removal.
- Side Effects.
- System Changes.
- Target Information.
- Timing Attacks.

Challenge 1

Behavior-based Graph.




Figure: Behavior-based graph for a given sample.

Challenge 2

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Challenge 2

Malware Embedding



Figure: **Sample 1.** The original sample.




Figure: **Sample 2.** Variant sample embedding the original one.

Challenge 2

Matching Metrics

Definition

The similarity of two malware, represented as sets, A and B , of vertices or edges of two graphs, is defined as:

$$Sim(A, B) = \frac{|A \cap B|}{|A \cup B|} \quad (1)$$

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The similarity of two malware, represented as sets, A and B , of vertices or edges of two graphs, is defined as:

$$Sim(A, B) = \max \left(\frac{|A \cap B|}{|B|}, \frac{|B \cap A|}{|A|} \right) \quad (2)$$

Challenge 2

Continence Results

Table: Continenence of Sample 1 in Sample 2.

CG	A	B	C
I	0.66	0.52	0.64
J	0.75	0.49	0.50
K	0.42	0.80	0.44

Table: Continenence of Sample 2 in Sample 1.

CG	A	B	C
I	0.57	0.56	0.43
J	0.33	0.51	0.44
K	0.76	0.65	0.44

Table: Maximum continence of Sample 1 and Sample 2.

CG	A	B	C
I	0.66	0.56	0.64
J	0.75	0.51	0.50
K	0.76	0.80	0.44

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The Whitelisting Effect.




Figure: Evaluating whitelisting effect. Similarity scores are higher when using the whitelist-based approach.

Advantages of the Behavioral model.




Figure: Function vs. Behavior-based approaches. Scores are higher when considering behavioral patterns.

Evaluating Metrics.




Figure: Proposed metric. Scores are higher when using it in comparison to the usual one.

Solutions Comparison.




Figure: Mimail's sample similarity. Our solution's scores are higher when compared to other ones.

Domain Transformation and Similarity Measures.




Figure: Threshold evaluation. This should be higher than 80% in order to proper label the cross dataset.

Real World Experiments (1/2)

Table: Identified variants among unknown, wild-collected samples.

Family	Sample	Hash	Label
1	A	c2ef1aabb15c979e932f5ea1d214cbeb	Generic_vb.OBY
	B	747b9fe5819a76529abc161bb449b8eb	Generic_vb.OBO
	C	39a04a11234d931bfa60d68ba8df9021	Generic_vb.OBL
2	A	96d13246971e4368b9ed90c6f996a884	Atros4.CENI
	B	e23588078ba6a5f5ca1c961a8336ec08	Atros4.CENI
	C	31a2b6adc781328cb1d77e5debb318ff	Atros4.CENI

Real World Experiments (2/2)




Figure: Study case: variant identification. Our approach outperforms others even on low coverage scenarios.

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Matching Complex Behaviors is Challenging!



Figure: DLL injection functions among other function calls.



Figure: Proposed DLL injection class.

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Conclusions

Challenges & Lessons

- Anti-disassembly breaks CG extraction.
- Transparent, dynamic tracing is a viable alternative.
- Same-Function Replacement breaks malware clustering.
- Behavior-based clustering is a viable alternative.
- Dead code breaks similarity metrics.
- Continenence metric is a viable alternative.

Questions & Comments.

Contact

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Additional Material

- <https://github.com/marcusbotacin/Malware.Variants>