Among Viruses, Trojans, and Backdoors

Fighting Malware in 2022

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Who Am I?

- PhD. in Computer Science (2021) - Federal University of Paraná (UFPR), Brazil
  - Thesis: *"On the Malware Detection Problem: Challenges and new Approaches"*
- MSc. in Computer Science (2017) - University of Campinas (UNICAMP), Brazil
  - Dissertation: *"Hardware-Assisted Malware Analysis"*
- Computer Engineer (2015) - University of Campinas (UNICAMP), Brazil
  - Final Project: *"Malware detection via syscall patterns identification"*

Malware Detection
How have we been doing?

How have we been doing? (Malware Specifics)

The good side

Figure: **Source:** https://apnews.com/article/europe-malware-netherlands-coronavirus-pandemic-7de5f74120a968bd0a5bee3c57899fed

The bad side

Figure: **Source:** https://thehackernews.com/2021/06/droidmorph-shows-popular-android.html

Malware Detection: What have we been doing?

The State-of-the-art in Malware Detection & Prevention

Steps

1. Collection
2. Triage
3. Sandbox Analysis
4. Threat Intelligence
5. Endpoint Protection

Distributed Processing

- Collection

Cloud Processing

- Analysis and Intelligence steps

Limited Processing

- Endpoint

Collection

How to find new malware samples?

- Searching “dark web” forums.
- Crawling software repositories.
- Leveraging honeypots.
- Checking spam traps.
- Downloading Malware repositories.
- Scrapping blocklists.

The result

Figure: **Source:** `https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2021/09/29/google-play-warning-200-android-apps-stole-millions-from-10-million-phones/`

Triage

Why how many new malware samples?

- Variations from the same source code.

Implications

- Increase processing costs and response time.

How to solve this problem?

- Identify and cluster similar samples.

The Statistics

Figure: **Source:** https://www.kaspersky.com/about/press-releases/2020_the-number-of-new-malicious-files-detected-every-day-increases-by-52-to-360000-in-2020

Sandbox Analysis

Goals

- Uncover hidden behaviors.

Method

- Trace sample execution.

Challenge

- Handle evasion attempts.

Solution 1

Figure: `https://blog.virustotal.com/2019/05/virustotal-multisandbox-yoroi-yomi.html`

Solution 2



Figure: `https://blog.virustotal.com/2019/07/virustotal-multisandbox-sndbox.html`

Threat Intelligence

Goal

- Identify trends and predict attacks.

How?

- Data analytics over analyzed samples.

Challenges

- Look to a representative dataset.

We should look to:

Figure: **Source:** `https://www.computerweekly.com/news/252504676/Ransomware-attacks-increase-dramatically-during-2021`

Endpoint Protection

Goal

- Protect customers in their machines.

How?

- Moving the **viable** analyses to the endpoint.

Challenges

- Performance and usability constraints.

Is there a “best”?

Figure: **Source:** `https://www.av-test.org/en/antivirus/home-windows/`

Enhancing Malware Tracing

Publication



Figure: **Link:** `https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11416-017-0292-8`

Software-based Sandbox



Figure: **System Architecture.** Analysis VMs.

Publication

RESEARCH-ARTICLE

Enhancing Branch Monitoring for Security Purposes: From Control Flow Integrity to Malware Analysis and Debugging

Authors: Marcus Botacin, Paulo Lício De Geus, André Grégio Authors Info & Claims

ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security, Volume 21, Issue 1 • January 2018 • Article No.: 4, pp 1–30 • https://doi.org/10.1145/3152162

Published: 02 January 2018

Figure: **Link:** `https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3152162`

Hardware-based Sandbox

Monitoring Steps

1. Software executes a branch.
2. Processor stores branch address in memory page.
3. Processor raises an interrupt.
4. Kernel handles interrupt.
5. Kernel sends data to userland.
6. Userland introspects into this data.



Figure: **System Architecture.**

Key Insight: Branches define basic blocks



Figure: **Identified branches and basic blocks.**



Figure: **CFG Reconstruction.**

From Tracing to Threat Intelligence

Publications


RESEARCH-ARTICLE

One Size Does Not Fit All: A Longitudinal Analysis of Brazilian Financial Malware

Authors: Marcus Botacin, Hojjat Aghakhani, Stefano Ortolani, Christopher Kruegel, Giovanni Vigna, Daniela Oliveira, Paulo Lício De Geus, André Grégio Authors Info & Affiliations

Publication: ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security • January 2021 • Article No.: 11 • https://doi.org/10.1145/3429741

Figure: **Link:** `https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3429741`


RESEARCH-ARTICLE

The Internet Banking [in]Security Spiral: Past, Present, and Future of Online Banking Protection Mechanisms based on a Brazilian case study

Authors: Marcus Botacin, Anatoli Kalysch, André Grégio Authors Info & Claims

ARES '19: Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security • August 2019 • Article No.: 49 • Pages 1–10 • https://doi.org/10.1145/3339252.3340103

Figure: **Link:** `https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3339252.3340103`

Brazilian Financial Malware on Desktop



Figure: **Passive Banker Malware for Santander bank** waiting for user's credential input.

Figure: **Passive Banker Malware for Itaú bank** waiting for user's credential input.

Brazilian Financial Malware on Mobile



Figure: **BB's Whatsapp chatbot.**



Figure: **Bradesco's Whatsapp chatbot.**

More about Brazilian Malware



Figure: **Link:** `https://www.usenix.org/conference/enigma2021/presentation/botacin`

From Threat Intelligence to Endpoint Protection

Publication

Figure: **Link:**
`https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167404821003242`

Drawback: Real-time monitoring performance penalty



Figure: **AV Monitoring Performance.**



Figure: **In-memory AV scans worst-case and best-case performance penalties.**

Publication

Figure: **Link:** `https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9034972`

SMC-Aware Processor

Figure: **Sample Profiling.**



Figure: **System Overview.**

Publication

Figure: **Link:** `https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11416-020-00348-w`

SMC-Aware Processor



Figure: **Modified Cache.**



MMU-based SMC detection mechanism.

Figure: **Modified MMU.**

Publication



Figure: **Link:**
`https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0957417422004882`

A first idea: Hardware features as signatures



Figure: **Two-level branch predictor.** A sequence window of taken (1) and not-taken (0) branches is stored in the Global History Register (GHR).



Figure: **Branch patterns coverage.**

Solutions Availability

Code: The BranchMonitoring Project



Figure: **Link:** `https://github.com/marcusbotacin/BranchMonitoringProject`

Service: Corvus Platform



Figure: **Link:** `corvus.inf.ufpr.br`



Figure: **Corvus'** Threat Intelligence.

Current Research: Malware Decompilation

Publication



REVENGE is a dish served cold: Debug-Oriented Malware Decompilation and Reassembly

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Figure: **Link:** `https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3375894.3375895`

Decompilation Execution Example 1

Data Extraction

- Debugging with GDB.

Decompilation

- Lifting with Python.

Recompilation

- Using GCC.

```
(gdb) revtest
(RevEngE) Starting Revenge...
(RevEngE) Defining main breakpoint
Ponto de parada 1 at 0x4004da
(RevEngE) Getting things to decompile
(RevEngE) 4004da main movl $0x1 -0xc(%rbp)
(RevEngE) 4004e1 main movl $0x1 -0x8(%rbp)
(RevEngE) 4004e8 main mov -0xc(%rbp) %edx
(RevEngE) 4004eb main mov -0x8(%rbp) %eax
(RevEngE) 4004ee main add %edx %eax
(RevEngE) 4004f0 main mov %eax -0x4(%rbp)
(RevEngE) 4004f3 main mov -0x4(%rbp) %eax
(RevEngE) 4004f6 main pop %rbp
(RevEngE) 4004f7 main retq
(RevEngE) Failed to Create Instruction -- Trace affected
(RevEngE) Time to Decompile
int
main (void)                         //no args were passed
{
//Probably local vars
  int var2;
  int var1 = 0x1;
  int var0 = 0x1;
  var2 = var1 + var0;
  return var2;
}
(RevEngE) Compiling...
(RevEngE) SSA form OK.
---Type <return> to continue, or q <return> to quit---
(RevEngE) ---------- STATISTICS ----------
(RevEngE) The trace has 9 instructions
(RevEngE) ---------- STATISTICS ----------
(RevEngE) SUCCESS. Expected: 2 Received: 2
(gdb)
```

Publication

Figure: **Link:** `https://arxiv.org/abs/2109.06127`

Decompilation Execution Example 1

```c
int main()
{
        clock_t t0 = clock();
        sleep(SLEEP_TIME);
        clock_t t1 = clock();
        if((t1-t0)>SLEEP_CLOCKS)
        {
                mal();
        }else{
                good();
        }
        return 0;
}
```

Figure: **Malware Source-Code.**

```c
int angr_global_var = 0;
clock_t clock(void)
{
    angr_global_var = angr_global_var + 1;
    if (angr_global_var == 1)
    {
        return 0x0;
    }
    if (angr_global_var == 2)
    {
        return 0xb;
    }
}
gcc sleep_patch2.c -shared -fPIC -o sleep2.so
```

Figure: **Generated Patch.**

Machine Learning: The Latest Trend

Malware Evasion Competition

Figure: **Source:** `mlsec.io`



Figure: **Source:** `https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/07/29/attack-ai-systems-in-machine-learning-evasion-competition/`

Adversarial Machine Learning

Adversarial Machine Learning: trend in recent years, as everybody knows



Figure: **Source:** `https://github.com/marcusbotacin/Talks/tree/master/Waikato`

Adversarial Malware



Figure: **Dropper Strategy.**



Figure: **Data Appendix Result.**

Challenge Results

Model	# of Bypasses
secret (our model)	162
A1	193
kipple	231
scanner_only_v1	714
model2_thresh_90	734
submission 3	1840

Figure: **Defenders Challenge.**

Challenge Results

Nickname	Total Best Score per User	Total API Queries	Average
secret	196	600	3.06
amsqr	167	3004	17.98
rwchsfde	114	55701	488.61
vftuemab	113	3772	33.38
qjykdxju	97	3302	34.04
nomnomnom	86	14981	174.19
pip	74	534	7.21
dtrizna	68	4085	60.07
vxcuwzhg	13	108	8.31
fysvbqdq	12	773	64.41

Figure: **Attackers Challenge.**

What's Next?

Thanks!

Questions? Comments?

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