## Testing the LATE Assumptions

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# Review of "Textbook" Instrumental Variables (IV) Model

#### Observed


- ightharpoonup Y = Outcome (Wage)
- ► *D* = Treatment (Attend Uni)
- ightharpoonup Z = IV (Live Nearby)

#### Unobserved

ightharpoonup U = Confounders (Ability)

### Assumptions

- ▶ Model:  $Y = \alpha + \beta D + U$
- ▶ Relevance:  $Cov(Z, D) \neq 0$
- ightharpoonup Exogeneity: Cov(Z, U) = 0



## A Relevant, Exogenous Instrument Identifies $\beta$

Assumptions

$$Y = \alpha + \beta D + U$$
,  $Cov(Z, D) \neq 0$ ,  $Cov(Z, U) = 0$ 

OLS

$$\beta_{\mathsf{OLS}} = \frac{\mathsf{Cov}(D,Y)}{\mathsf{Var}(D)} = \frac{\beta \mathsf{Var}(D) + \mathsf{Cov}(D,U)}{\mathsf{Var}(D)} = \beta + \frac{\mathsf{Cov}(D,U)}{\mathsf{Var}(D)} \neq \beta$$

IV

$$\beta_{\mathsf{IV}} = \frac{\mathsf{Cov}(Z,Y)}{\mathsf{Cov}(Z,D)} = \frac{\beta \mathsf{Cov}(Z,D) + \mathsf{Cov}(Z,U)}{\mathsf{Cov}(Z,D)} = \beta + \frac{\mathsf{Cov}(Z,U)}{\mathsf{Cov}(Z,D)} = \beta$$

```
library(mvtnorm)
library(tidyverse)
set.seed(587103)
n < -1e4
sims \leftarrow rmvnorm(n, sigma = matrix(c(1, 0.5,
                                       0.5, 1), 2, 2, byrow = TRUE)
U <- sims[,1]
V <- sims[.2]
Z \leftarrow rbinom(n, size = 1, prob = 0.3)
D \leftarrow (-0.5) + 0.3 * Z + V
beta <-(-0.3)
Y \leftarrow 1 + beta * D + U
c(OLS = cov(D, Y) / var(D), IV = cov(Z, Y) / cov(Z, D),
  truth = beta) > round(2)
```

## OLS IV truth ## 0.20 -0.28 -0.30

## Which assumptions are testable in the textbook IV model?

#### Instrument Relevance

- ▶ Since D and Z are observed, directly estimate Cov(D, Z).
- Beware of weak instruments!

### Instrument Exogeneity

- ▶ Since U is unobserved, can't directly estimate Cov(Z, U).
- Could we use the IV residuals?

#### Simulation with a Bad Instrument

It has a direct effect on Y separate from its effect on D!

```
library(mvtnorm); library(tidyverse); library(broom); library(AER)
set.seed(587103)
n < -1e5
sims \leftarrow rmvnorm(n, sigma = matrix(c(1, 0.5,
                                      0.5, 1), 2, 2, byrow = TRUE))
U <- sims[.1]
V <- sims[,2]
Z \leftarrow rbinom(n, size = 1, prob = 0.3)
D < -0.5 + 0.3 * Z + V
beta <- 0
Y <- 1 + beta * D - Z + U # Instrument isn't excluded!
```

### Bad Instrument Is Uncorrelated with IV Residuals!

```
iv_results <- ivreg(Y ~ D | Z)
tidy(iv_results) |> knitr::kable(digits = 2)
```

term	estimate	std.error	statistic	p.value
(Intercept)	-0.72	0.04	-17.31	0
D	-3.45	0.10	-35.90	0

```
cov(residuals(iv_results), Z)
```

```
## [1] -1.534378e-16
```

### Z Is Uncorrelated with the IV Residuals By Construction

▶ Let *U* be the **structural error** and *V* be the **IV residual**:  $V \equiv Y - \alpha_{IV} - \beta_{IV}D$ .

$$\beta_{IV} = \frac{\mathsf{Cov}(Z,Y)}{\mathsf{Cov}(Z,D)} = \beta + \frac{\mathsf{Cov}(Z,U)}{\mathsf{Cov}(Z,D)}, \quad \alpha_{IV} = \mathbb{E}(Y) - \beta_{IV}\mathbb{E}(D).$$

 $V = U \iff Z$  is exogenous: the only way to obtain  $\beta_{IV} = \beta$  and  $\alpha_{IV} = \alpha$ .

$$Cov(Z, V) = Cov(Z, Y - \alpha_{IV} - \beta_{IV}D) = Cov(Z, Y) - \beta_{IV}Cov(Z, D)$$
$$= Cov(Z, Y) - \frac{Cov(Z, Y)}{Cov(Z, D)}Cov(Z, D) = 0.$$

► Cov(Z, V) = 0 by construction even when  $Cov(Z, U) \neq 0$ 

### Multiple Instruments and Over-identification

### Assumptions

- $Y = \alpha + \beta D + U$
- $ightharpoonup \operatorname{Cov}(Z_1,D) \neq 0$ ,  $\operatorname{Cov}(Z_2,D) \neq 0$
- $\triangleright \mathsf{Cov}(Z_1,U) = \mathsf{Cov}(Z_2,U) = 0$

### **Implications**

- **b** Both IVs identify *same* effect:  $\beta$
- ▶ If not, at least one is endogenous

### Over-identifying Restrictions Test

Test of null that all MCs identify same parameters.

$$eta_{IV}^{(1)} \equiv rac{\mathsf{Cov}(Z_1,Y)}{\mathsf{Cov}(Z_1,D)} = eta + rac{\mathsf{Cov}(Z_1,U)}{\mathsf{Cov}(Z_1,D)}$$

$$\beta_{IV}^{(2)} \equiv \frac{\mathsf{Cov}(Z_2, Y)}{\mathsf{Cov}(Z_2, D)} = \beta + \frac{\mathsf{Cov}(Z_2, U)}{\mathsf{Cov}(Z_2, D)}$$

$$\beta_{IV}^{(1)} - \beta_{IV}^{(2)} = \frac{\mathsf{Cov}(Z_1, U)}{\mathsf{Cov}(Z_1, D)} - \frac{\mathsf{Cov}(Z_2, U)}{\mathsf{Cov}(Z_2, D)}$$

### Beyond the Textbook IV Model

#### Heterogenous Treatment Effects

- $Y = \alpha + \beta D + U$  implies that everyone has the same treatment effect:  $\beta$ .
- In reality, treatment effects differ across people.

#### Overidentifying restrictions?

Out the window! Different instruments may identify different causal parameters.

### Local Average Treatment Effects (LATE) Model

▶ What does IV tell us when treatment effects are heterogeneous?

#### Review of the LATE Model

► Suppose that both *D* and *Z* are binary

$$\beta_{\mathsf{IV}} \equiv \frac{\mathsf{Cov}(Z,Y)}{\mathsf{Cov}(Z,D)} = \frac{\frac{\mathsf{Cov}(Y,Z)}{\mathsf{Var}(Z)}}{\frac{\mathsf{Cov}(D,Z)}{\mathsf{Var}(Z)}} = \frac{\mathbb{E}[Y|Z=1] - \mathbb{E}[Y|Z=0]}{\mathbb{E}[D|Z=1] - \mathbb{E}[D|Z=0]} \equiv \mathsf{Wald} \; \mathsf{Estimand}$$

### Intent-to-treat Effect: $\mathbb{E}[Y|Z=1] - \mathbb{E}[Y|Z=0]$ (ITT)

- ► E.g. randomized experiment with treatment **offer** Z and treatment **take-up** D
- **Non-compliance** / randomized encouragement design: D may not equal Z
- In this setting the ITT is the ATE of offering treatment.

#### The Wald Estimand

- lacktriangle ITT is "diluted" by people who are offered (Z=1) but do not take up (D=0)
- ▶ Divide ATE of offer on outcome  $Z \to Y$  by that of offer on take-up  $Z \to D$ .
- ► Under what assumptions does this give us a meaningful causal quantity?

### Decomposing the ITT Effect

- ► Example: moving to opportunity (MTO) experiment randomly offered housing vouchers to encourage families to move to a more affluent neighborhood.
- $\blacktriangleright$  50% of offered families (Z=1) moved; 20% of non-offered families (Z=0) moved

$$Y = (1-D)Y_0 + DY_1, \quad p_z \equiv \mathbb{P}(D=1|Z=z)$$

 $ightharpoonup \mathbb{E}[Y|Z=1]$  is a *mixture* of  $Y_0$  and  $Y_1$  for different types of families:

$$\mathbb{E}[Y|Z=1] = \underbrace{(1-p_1)}_{\approx 0.5} \mathbb{E}[Y_0|Z=1, D=0] + \underbrace{p_1}_{\approx 0.5} \mathbb{E}[Y_1|Z=1, D=1]$$

 $ightharpoonup \mathbb{E}[Y|Z=0]$  is a *mixture* of  $Y_0$  and  $Y_1$  for different types of families:

$$\mathbb{E}[Y|Z=0] = \underbrace{(1-p_0)}_{\approx 0.8} \mathbb{E}[Y_0|Z=0, D=0] + \underbrace{p_0}_{\approx 0.2} \mathbb{E}[Y_1|Z=0, D=1]$$

## Compliance "Types" in the LATE Model

Catalogue all possible treatment take-up "decision rules"

```
Never-taker: T = n \iff D(Z) = 0
Always-taker: T = a \iff D(Z) = 1
Complier: T = c \iff D(Z) = Z
Defier: T = d \iff D(Z) = (1 - Z).
```

#### In the MTO Example

- Never-takers: families that refuse to move with or without a voucher
- Always-takers: families that will move with or without a voucher
- Compliers are families that will only move if given a voucher
- Defiers are families that will only move if **not** given a voucher

#### Assumption 1 - Unconfounded Type

For all compliance types  $t \in \{a, c, n, d\}$ 

$$\mathbb{P}(T=t)=\mathbb{P}(T=t|Z=0)=\mathbb{P}(T=t|Z=1).$$

Assumption 2 - No Defiers:  $\mathbb{P}(T = d) = 0$ 

#### Assumption 3 - Mean Exclusion Restriction

For all compliance types  $t \in \{a, c, n, d\}$ 

$$\mathbb{E}[Y_0|Z = 0, T = t] = \mathbb{E}[Y_0|Z = 1, T = t] = \mathbb{E}[Y_0|T = t]$$

$$\mathbb{E}[Y_1|Z = 0, T = t] = \mathbb{E}[Y_1|Z = 1, T = t] = \mathbb{E}[Y_1|T = t]$$

Assumption 4 - Existence of Compliers:  $\mathbb{P}(T=c)>0$ 

#### Lemma 1: Assumptions 1–2 $\Longrightarrow$

$$\mathbb{P}(D=1|Z=1) = \mathbb{P}(T=a) + \mathbb{P}(T=c)$$
 $\mathbb{P}(D=0|Z=1) = \mathbb{P}(T=n)$ 
 $\mathbb{P}(D=1|Z=0) = \mathbb{P}(T=a)$ 
 $\mathbb{P}(D=0|Z=0) = \mathbb{P}(T=c) + \mathbb{P}(T=n)$ 

#### Lemma 2: Assumptions 1−3 ⇒

$$\mathbb{E}[Y|D = 1, Z = 1] = \frac{\mathbb{P}(T = a)\mathbb{E}[Y_1|T = a] + \mathbb{P}(T = c)\mathbb{E}[Y_1|T = c]}{\mathbb{P}(T = a) + \mathbb{P}(T = c)}$$

$$\mathbb{E}[Y|D = 0, Z = 1] = \mathbb{E}[Y_0|T = n]$$

$$\mathbb{E}[Y|D = 1, Z = 0] = \mathbb{E}[Y_1|T = a]$$

$$\mathbb{E}[Y|D = 0, Z = 0] = \frac{\mathbb{P}(T = n)\mathbb{E}[Y_0|T = n] + \mathbb{P}(T = c)\mathbb{E}[Y_0|T = c]}{\mathbb{P}(T = n) + \mathbb{P}(T = c)}$$

### The LATE Theorem: Wald = ATE for Compliers

Theorem: Assumptions 1–4  $\Longrightarrow$ 

$$\frac{\mathbb{E}(Y|Z=1) - \mathbb{E}(Y|Z=0)}{\mathbb{E}(D|Z=1) - \mathbb{E}(D|Z=0)} = \mathbb{E}\left[Y_1 - Y_0|T=c\right]$$

#### Proof

▶ Algebra and of Iterated Expectations, using the two lemmas. (See lecture notes)

### MTO Example

- ▶ ITT is the average treatment effect of *offering* a housing voucher.
- ▶ Wald = LATE is the average treatment effect of *moving to opportunity* for families who can be induced to move by a housing voucher.
- ▶ Different IV ⇒ different compliers ⇒ different LATE. It's a local effect!

### Are the LATE Assumptions Testable?

#### LATE Assumptions

- 1. Unconfounded Type
- 2. No Defiers
- 3. Mean Exclusion Restriction
- 4. Existence of Compliers

#### At Least One is Testable!

- ▶ Assumptions 1–3  $\implies \mathbb{P}(T=c) = \mathbb{E}[D|Z=1] \mathbb{E}[D|Z=0]$
- ▶ Thus, Assumption 4 is just **instrument relevance**, hence testable.
- What about the others?

### Even Nobel Laureates Make Mistakes

### Angrist & Imbens (1994)

Part (i) is similar to an exclusion restriction in a regression model. It is not testable and has to be considered on a case by case basis.

### Pearl (1995)

exogeneity . . . can be given an empirical test. The test is not guaranteed to detect all violations of exogeneity, but it can, in certain circumstances, screen out very bad would-be instruments.

#### This Lecture

► Testable implications LATE assumptions from above: Huber & Mellace (2015)

### Closely-related Work

- ► Kitagawa (2015)
- ► Mourifié & Wan (2017)

# Huber & Mellace (2015) – The Big Picture

- ▶ Assumptions 1–3 imply four inequalities:  $\theta_1 \le 0$ ,  $\theta_2 \le 0$ ,  $\theta_3 \le 0$ ,  $\theta_4 \le 0$
- $\theta \equiv (\theta_1, \theta_2, \theta_3, \theta_4)$  depend only on (Y, D, Z); we'll define them shortly.
- ▶ If any element of  $\theta$  is *positive* at least one of Assumptions 1–3 must be false.
- ▶ In practice: compare estimate  $\widehat{\theta}$  to appropriate standard errors.
- lacktriangle Not all violations of the LATE assumptions lead to a positive value for heta
- Necessary but not sufficient for validity of LATE assumptions.
- ▶ The four inequalities come in *pairs*. We'll look at each pair in turn.

# Example: Card $(1995)^1$

 $ightharpoonup Y = \log(Wage), D = \text{College}, Z = \text{Live Nearby}$ 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Using geographic variation in college proximity to estimate the return to schooling

## IV Estimate is Implausibly Large

	OLS	IV
D	0.23	2.27
	(0.02)	(0.55)

Remember: this is on the log scale!

## Example of the Huber & Mellace (2015) Approach

► Suppose that all of the LATE assumptions hold and define:


$$r \equiv rac{\mathbb{P}(T=n)}{\mathbb{P}(T=c) + \mathbb{P}(T=n)} = rac{\mathbb{P}(D=0|Z=1)}{\mathbb{P}(D=0|Z=0)}$$
 (by Lemma 1)

- ▶ Distribution of Y|(D=0,Z=0) is a mixture of  $Y_0$  for compliers and never-takers.
- ▶ The mixture contains  $r \times 100\%$  never-takers and  $(1 r) \times 100\%$  compliers.
- Let's calculate r in the Card (1995) example:

## [1] 0.9115626


# Density of Y|(D=0,Z=0) from Card (1995)

# Density of Y|(D=0,Z=0) from Card (1995)



- $\triangleright$  This is the density of  $Y_0$  for a mix of never-takers and compliers.
- ▶ The mix contains 91% never-takers. But we don't know where they are.
- ▶ Dashed red line: 9th %-tile of the density.
- ▶ If all never-takers are at the top of the distribution, they're above this line.

# Density of $Y_0$ for a mixture containing 91% never-takers, 9% compliers



- If all never-takers are at the top of the distribution, they're above the red line.
- ▶ Mean of all observations above red line bounds  $\mathbb{E}[Y_0|T=n]$  from above
- ▶ But Lemma 2 shows that  $\mathbb{E}(Y_0|T=n) = \mathbb{E}(Y|D=0,Z=1)$ .
- If this contradicts the upper bound **something must be wrong**.

### Contradiction ⇒ LATE Assumptions Fail

This contradicts the upper bound! Something must be wrong!

```
Previous Slide: \mathbb{E}(Y_0|T=n) < \mathbb{E}(Y|D=0, Z=0, Y>y_{1-r})
card1995 > filter(D == 0, Z == 0) >
  summarize(ninth percentile = quantile(Y, 1 - r),
             upper_bound = mean(Y[Y >= ninth_percentile])) |>
  pull(upper bound)
## [1] 6.154926
Lemma 2: \mathbb{E}(Y_0|T=n) = \mathbb{E}(Y|D=0,Z=1)
card1995 |> filter(D == 0, Z == 1) |> summarize(mean(Y)) |> pull()
## [1] 6.254177
```

# First Pair of Inequalities

Define:  $F_{11}(y) \stackrel{\cdot}{\equiv} \mathbb{P}(Y \leq y | D = 1, Z = 1)$  and

$$y_q \equiv F_{11}^{-1}(q), \quad y_{1-q} \equiv F_{11}^{-1}(1-q), \quad q \equiv \frac{\mathbb{P}(D=1|Z=0)}{\mathbb{P}(D=1|Z=1)}$$

Under Assumptions 1–3:

$$\mathbb{E}(Y|D=1,Z=1,Y\leq y_q)\leq \mathbb{E}(Y|D=1,Z=0)\leq \mathbb{E}(Y|D=1,Z=1,Y\geq y_{1-q})$$

### **Key Points**

- ▶ Lemma 1  $\implies \mathbb{E}(Y|D=1,Z=0) = \mathbb{E}(Y_1|T=a)$  so now we have two partial identification bounds as well.
- Why care? Overidentifying Restrictions
- At most one of the pair can be violated.

# Second Pair of Inequalities

Define  $F_{00}(y) \equiv \mathbb{P}(Y \leq y | D = 0, Z = 0)$  and

$$y_r \equiv F_{00}^{-1}(r), \quad y_{1-r} \equiv F_{00}^{-1}(1-r), \quad r \equiv \frac{\mathbb{P}(D=0|Z=1)}{\mathbb{P}(D=0|Z=0)}.$$

#### Under Assumptions 1–3:

$$\mathbb{E}(Y|D=0,Z=0,Y\leq y_r)\leq \mathbb{E}(Y|D=0,Z=1)\leq \mathbb{E}(Y|D=0,Z=0,Y\geq y_{1-r})$$

### **Key Points**

- ▶ Lemma  $1 \implies \mathbb{E}(Y|D=0,Z=1) = \mathbb{E}(Y_0|T=n)$  so now we have two partial identification bounds as well.
- Why care? Overidentifying Restrictions
- At most one of the pair can be violated.

## Theorem: Assumptions 1–3 $\Longrightarrow$

$$\begin{bmatrix} \theta_1 \\ \theta_2 \\ \theta_3 \\ \theta_4 \end{bmatrix} \equiv \begin{bmatrix} \mathbb{E}(Y|D=1,Z=1,Y\leq y_q) - \mathbb{E}(Y|D=1,Z=0) \\ \mathbb{E}(Y|D=1,Z=0) - \mathbb{E}(Y|D=1,Z=1,Y\geq y_{1-q}) \\ \mathbb{E}(Y|D=0,Z=0,Y\leq y_r) - \mathbb{E}(Y|D=0,Z=1) \\ \mathbb{E}(Y|D=0,Z=1) - \mathbb{E}(Y|D=0,Z=0,Y\geq y_{1-r}) \end{bmatrix} \leq \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

Where: 
$$F_{11}(y) \equiv \mathbb{P}(Y \leq y | D = 1, Z = 1)$$
,  $F_{00}(y) \equiv \mathbb{P}(Y \leq y | D = 0, Z = 0)$ , and

$$y_q \equiv F_{11}^{-1}(q), \quad y_{1-q} \equiv F_{11}^{-1}(1-q), \quad q \equiv \frac{\mathbb{P}(D=1|Z=0)}{\mathbb{P}(D=1|Z=1)}$$
  
 $y_r \equiv F_{00}^{-1}(r), \quad y_{1-r} \equiv F_{00}^{-1}(1-r), \quad r \equiv \frac{\mathbb{P}(D=0|Z=1)}{\mathbb{P}(D=0|Z=0)}.$