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ÚSTAV INTELIGENTNÍCH SYSTÉMŮ

## **AUTOMATIC SECCOMP SYSCALL POLICY GENERATOR**

AUTOMATICKÝ GENERÁTOR POLITIKY SYSTÉMOVÉHO VOLÁNÍ

**BACHELOR'S THESIS**

BAKALÁŘSKÁ PRÁCE

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## Abstract

This bachelor's thesis has been developed in collaboration with Red Hat, Inc.

## Abstrakt

Do tohoto odstavce bude zapsán výtah (abstrakt) práce v českém (slovenském) jazyce.

## Keywords

seccomp, libseccomp, strace, optimizer, clustering, C++, policy generator

## Klíčová slova

seccomp, libseccomp, strace, optimalizátor, zhukovaniem C++, generátor politík

## Reference

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# Automatic Seccomp Syscall Policy Generator

## Declaration

Hereby I declare that this bachelor's thesis was prepared as an original author's work under the supervision of Ms. Ing. Lenka Turoňová (FIT BUT) and by Mr. Bc. Daniek Kopecek (Red Hat, Inc.). The supplementary information was provided by Security Engineering team. All the relevant information sources, which were used during preparation of this thesis, are properly cited and included in the list of references.

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Marek Tamaškovič  
April 18, 2018

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# Contents

<b>1</b>	<b>Introduction</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>System Calls and Monitoring Tools</b>	<b>4</b>
2.1	System Calls . . . . .	4
2.2	Monitoring . . . . .	5
2.2.1	Strace . . . . .	5
2.2.2	Ptrace . . . . .	6
2.2.3	Ftrace . . . . .	6
2.2.4	Dtrace . . . . .	7
2.2.5	SystemTap . . . . .	7
2.2.6	Autrace . . . . .	7
<b>3</b>	<b>Security Facilities in Linux</b>	<b>9</b>
3.1	Systrace . . . . .	9
3.2	Seccomp . . . . .	9
3.3	Berkeley Packet Filter and Seccomp . . . . .	10
3.4	Libseccomp . . . . .	11
<b>4</b>	<b>Solution Design</b>	<b>12</b>
4.1	Requirements . . . . .	12
4.2	Architecture . . . . .	13
4.2.1	Parser . . . . .	14
4.2.2	Intermediate Data Structure . . . . .	14
4.2.3	Optimizer . . . . .	15
4.3	Parsing Expression Grammar . . . . .	18
<b>5</b>	<b>Development of strace2seccomp</b>	<b>20</b>
5.1	Input . . . . .	20
5.1.1	Configure Strace to Produce Expected Input . . . . .	20
5.1.2	Strace grammar . . . . .	21
5.2	Intermediate Representation . . . . .	21
5.3	Output . . . . .	21
5.3.1	libseccomp . . . . .	21
5.3.2	eBPF . . . . .	21
5.3.3	C/C++ template . . . . .	21
5.3.4	Go template . . . . .	21
5.4	Heuristics and Optimizations . . . . .	22
5.4.1	Minimax . . . . .	22

5.4.2	Strict . . . . .	22
5.4.3	Smart . . . . .	22
<b>6</b>	<b>Software Verification</b>	<b>23</b>
6.1	Module Testing . . . . .	23
6.1.1	Params Testing . . . . .	23
6.1.2	StraceParser Testing . . . . .	23
6.1.3	Algorithms . . . . .	24
6.1.4	Optimizer . . . . .	24
6.1.5	Output . . . . .	24
6.2	System and Acceptance Testing . . . . .	24
6.2.1	Testing on real app . . . . .	24
6.2.2	USBGuard . . . . .	24
6.3	Static analysis . . . . .	24
6.4	Test Requirements . . . . .	25
6.5	Results . . . . .	25
	<b>Bibliography</b>	<b>26</b>
<b>A</b>	<b>Comparison of libseccomp and raw BPF filtering</b>	<b>28</b>
A.1	BPF . . . . .	28
A.2	libseccomp . . . . .	29
<b>B</b>	<b>other appendix</b>	<b>30</b>

# Chapter 1

## Introduction

Nowadays, when malicious code or malware is becoming more and more sophisticated and pressing security risk, it is really needed to control a program behaviour and monitor what the program is doing in a system. Monitoring program behaviour can be done in many ways and one of the easiest ways is to use Intrusion Detection System (IDS). IDS is an out-of-the-box solution which can monitor i.e. where program wrote or read something and it is not allowed. After that, IDS is reporting this violation.

Another way is to monitor and block system calls (syscalls). Monitoring is performed using tools mentioned in the next chapter. The actual blocking can be performed with mandatory control access (MAC) (Apparmor, SELinux), sandboxing (seccomp) or others mechanisms. MAC refers to a type of access control by which the operating system constraints the ability of a subject or initiator to access or generally perform some sort of operation on an object or target. Seccomp is a Linux kernel module which allows a process one-way transition to secure a state where the process can only use four syscalls. When the process tries to call another syscall then one of the four member's sets is terminated with SIGKILL. The set of allowed system calls can be extended using seccomp-bpf. This extension allows filtering system calls using a configurable policy implemented with Berkley Packet Filter (BPF) rules. This last part is an area on which I would like to focus in my thesis.

I aim to design and develop a tool which helps developers using libseccomp and seccomp-bpf. I plan to create policies for a specific program in a format readable by libseccomp or seccomp-bpf.

Chapter 2 describes syscalls and how to monitor them. In the next chapter of the thesis, I will illustrate how security facilities in Linux, such as systrace and seccomp, work. After the theoretical part, the design and development of a tool will follow. In conclusion, methodology how this tool was tested is described.

## Chapter 2

# System Calls and Monitoring Tools

In this chapter, I will describe a term system call and make an overview of tools which can monitor the system calls. We will focus in detail on a strace tool which will be used as an input to my tool. The other applications are described briefly not as detailed as the strace tool.

### 2.1 System Calls

In computer terminology, the term syscall is a way in which a computer program requests a service of the operating system on which is executed on. In other words, the system calls are functions used in the kernel itself. The system call appears to a standard developer as a C function call. This design is typical for monolithic kernels. We can find them on every UNIX system. The system calls are generated using interruption, i.e., on Linux/i86 with an interruption no. 0x80 or with a system call named `syscall()` or `sysenter()` and these syscalls are handled by the kernel in a privileged mode. When a user invokes a system call, an execution flow is as follows:

- Each syscall is vectored through a stub in libc. Some syscalls are more complicated than others because of a variable length of the arguments, but the entry point and the end point of syscall are still the same.
- In libc, the number of the syscall is then set to an `eax` register, and the stack frame is also set up.
- An interrupt number 0x80 is called and transferred to the kernel entry point. The entry point is the same for every system call.
- In the table of interrupts, a pointer to interruption handler is found. After that, the execution of the interrupt handler follows which stores the content of the CPU registers and checks if a valid syscall is called.
- The handler finds the corresponding offset in the table of interrupts `_sys_call_table`, where a pointer to the syscall service is stored.
- Control is transferred to the syscall service.
- Syscall returns a value to the register `EAX` on a 32-bit architecture or `RAX` on a 64-bit architecture.




Figure 2.1: Interruption handling in Linux

- At the end of the syscall, `_ret_from_sys_call` is called. This call is done before returning to userspace. It checks if the scheduler should be run, and if so, it calls it.
- Immediately after return from the system call to interrupt handler, `syscallX()` macro checks for a negative return value from the syscall, if so it puts a positive copy of a return value to a global variable `_errno`, for accessing from code like `perror()`.

This procedure is illustrated in Figure 2.1.

## 2.2 Monitoring

The most used and conventional method for monitoring is tracing, in other words watching what a program is doing during the execution. Tracing involves a specialized logging to record information, useful for debugging, about a program's execution. This can be done in multiple layers, from tracing which lines in the program was executed to individual instructions run on a CPU. Collecting this information can be done with various tools, i.e., `strace`, `ftrace` and a lots of more.

### 2.2.1 Strace

`Strace` [5] is a simple diagnostic, instructional and debugging tool. You can monitor every syscall or signal made by the program you are tracking. Using this tool is possible to log what an observing program demanded from the kernel. The individual recorded operations



can be, i.e., an attempt to open a file or delete a content of CPU caches. The strace also shows arguments for the called syscall. The developer can perform a fault injection for the specified set of syscalls as well, to simulate the program in faulty test cases. The next feature is that the Strace can trace child processes of the observing program. The log on the output will contain the system calls from the primary process and its child processes.

The main advantage of Strace tool is that it does not need any source codes. The observing program has not to be compiled with extra flags nor object files. Also, it does not matter if the application is statically or dynamically linked. This is useful because we only need to execute it binary. These features are helpful for my tool, but this will be more described in another chapter. Strace tool is straightforward, i.e., when one wants to run `ls` with strace he types in a command line:

```
>$ strace ls
```

In this case, the strace executes the `ls` command, and on the output, it occurs which system calls were called. An example of the strace output is in the next figure.

```
execve(„/usr/bin/ls“, [„ls“], 0x7ffd0cf4ba60 /* 59 vars */) = 0
open(„/etc/ld.so.cache“, O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC) = 3
fstat(3, { st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=202163, ...}) = 0
mmap(NULL, 202163, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, 3, 0) = 0x7fd781293000
close(3)
```

### 2.2.2 Ptrace

Strace is using a `ptrace` [4] system call. The `ptrace` is used to implement debuggers and other tools for process monitoring. Basically, the strace call `ptrace` and `attach` to a tracee (monitored process). When the connection is established the tracee is halt before and after syscall. Now the tracer (strace) can observe and control the execution as well as inspect memory and registers of (tracee). With this information, strace can determine which syscall was called. With the second halt after syscall, the strace can get information of return value from syscall.

### 2.2.3 Ftrace

Ftrace [3] is an internal tracer which traces events in the kernel. It is designed for developers to examine kernel events. The main feature of this tool is to measure latencies and find issues that take place outside of the user-space. Ftrace is typically considered as a function tracker, but it is a framework of several different tracing utilities. One neat feature of ftrace is measurement of latency among interrupts, the lag between the time when the task is woken up and time when the task is scheduled in. Another frequent use of ftrace is event tracing. In the kernel, there is a massive amount of static event points that can be enabled with a `tracefs` file system. The event points provide an interface to observe what is going on in the various parts of the kernel.

#### 2.2.4 Dtrace

DTrace [2, 16] (shortcut for Dynamic Tracing) is a performance analysis and a troubleshooting tool. It is included in various operating systems, such as FreeBSD, Mac OS, Solaris and Linux. This tool instruments all software, not just user-level software but also operating system kernel and device drivers. It supports dynamic tracing which means dynamically patching while running instructions with an instrumentation code. Static tracing is supported as well, but it needs to add tracepoints to the code. DTrace provides a scripting language called 'D' for writing scripts and one-liners. It is similar to C with AWK elements. With this script, you can create filters and summarize data in the kernel before passing to user-space. This design can decrease the overhead in performance of sensitive systems.

For our purposes, DTrace is too complicated to setup or gather the information about syscalls. You need to write some scripts to define which syscalls you want to be informed with and in our use case, we need every system call.

#### 2.2.5 SystemTap

SystemTap [7] is a tracing and probing tool that allows to gather information from probes injected into the kernel. It is similar to Dtrace. It started as a clone of Dtrace because it has incompatible licence for using in GNU Linux. One of the common thing with Dtrace is that both tools use some type of scripting language. In this case it is named SystemTap. With this language you can specify what happens when some event occurs in the kernel.

SystemTap works as daemon which communicates with a stap program. Stap is a small program that translates the SystemTap script to a kernel module. It is done in a few steps. At first it runs semantic analysis on the script. After that, stap tries to translate it into a C code. The next step is to compile it as a kernel module and load it into the kernel. After load it is working and doing the useful part. When you send a signal to terminate the stap program it will unload the kernel module and stop working.

Similar as Dtrace the SystemTap is too complicated to work as system call monitor and it is not flawless. The Systemtap can not dereference the pointer address in the system call but the strace tool can.

#### 2.2.6 Atrace

The Linux Auditing System helps system administrators to create an audit trail. Every action on workstation or server is logged into a log file. This tool can track security-relevant events, record the events and detect misuses or unauthorised activities by inspecting the audit log. You can also set which actions should or should not be reported.

Audit System is composed of two main parts. The first one *autrace* is a kernel component which intercepts system calls, records events and sends these audit messages to the next part. The second component is an audit daemon. This part is collecting the information emitted by a kernel component. Emitted data is then stored as entries in a log file. As you can see this tool is not for monitoring one specific program, but it is designed to monitor the whole system. In the output, there is specified who and when executed the syscall, current working directory, uid, gid, etc. Above specified functionality is useful for server administrators but not for our work.

Entry example in a log file:

```
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1434371271.277:135496): arch=c000003e syscall=2
success=yes exit=3 a0=7fff0054e929 a1=0 a2=1fffffffffff0000 a3=7fff0054c390
items=1 ppid=6265pid=6266 auid=1000 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0
egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts0 ses=113 comm="cat"
exe="/usr/bin/cat" key="sshconfigchange"
```

## Chapter 3

# Security Facilities in Linux

This chapter describes security facilities in GNU Linux operating system. First we mention an old tool named Systrace [20]. Later we will mention a secure computing module named Seccomp [18]. The next topic will be Berkley Packet Filter (BPF) because it is used in seccomp-bpf. The seccomp-bpf is an extension to basic seccomp. This extension can better describe the behavior of seccomp. In the end, there will be a description of libseccomp which is an easy to use library to the kernel syscall filtering.

### 3.1 Systrace

Systrace is security facility which limits an application's access to the system. It is similar to a newer tool named seccomp-bpf which will be described later. The limitations are provided via system call blocking. The policy is generated interactively. Operations not covered by the defined policy raise the alarm. When an alarm is raised the user can refine the current policy. Systrace provides an option to generate policies automatically which can be immediately used in sandboxing (Sandbox is a security mechanism for separating programs, usually in an effort to mitigate system failures or software vulnerabilities from spreading.)<sup>1</sup>. It is not flawless, so it sometimes needs minimal manual post-processing.

This tool provides cybersecurity by providing intrusion prevention. One of the uses is that you run systrace on the server. The systrace monitors all running daemons (daemon is a computer program that runs as a background process, executed on system start up) and can generate a warning when some incident occurs. These alerts can be sent to a system administrator and can provide information what happened.

### 3.2 Seccomp

A large number of syscalls are exposed to user space of a process. Many of this syscalls are unused for the entire lifetime of the process. This generates small possibility to misuse some syscalls to corrupt the process itself. A particular subset of applications benefits from a reduced set of syscalls by reducing exposed kernel surface to process. The filtering is done by seccomp. Seccomp filtering provides a means for a process to reduce the set of syscalls available to the process [8].

In most contemporary distribution, a kernel module named Seccomp [18] is enabled. Sec-comp stands for the shortcut of Secure Computing Mode. This module provides one

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<sup>1</sup>[https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Sandbox\\_\(computer\\_security\)](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Sandbox_(computer_security))

way transition to a secure mode which restricts a thread to a few system calls `read()`, `write()`, `exit()`, `sigreturn()`. If the thread tries to call another system call then the one from the four-member set, the whole process is terminated with signal `SIGTERM`. The drawback of this solution is that these four system calls are not enough for application to run correctly.

### 3.3 Berkeley Packet Filter and Seccomp

The seccomp filter mode allows developers to write BPF programs that determine if a given syscall will be allowed or not. That allowance can be based on a system call number or specific syscall argument values. Only the passed values are available, as any pointer are not dereferenced by the BPF. Filters can be installed using `seccomp()` or `prctl()`. The BPF program should be constructed first, then installed in the kernel. After that, every system call triggers the filter code. The installed filter cannot be removed or modified. Another property of applied filter is that the filter is inherited from a parent process to every child process when using `fork(2)` or `exec(2)`.

A BPF language came in 1992 for a program called `tcpdump` which is a monitoring tool for network packets. The volume of packet can be colossal, so it makes the transfer to user-space expensive. The BPF provides a way to do filtering in the kernel and the user space only handles those packets which is interested in.

The seccomp filter developers realised that they wanted very similar task. After that, the BPF was generalized to allow system call filtering. After the update, there is a tiny BPF virtual machine in the kernel space that interprets the BPF instructions.

The next update of BPF was to eBPF which stands for extended BPF. This update was released in Linux Kernel 3.18 for tracepoints later in 3.19 for raw sockets and in 4.1 for performance monitors. The eBPF brought the performance improvements and new capabilities.

The eBPF virtual machine is widely used in the kernel for various filtering:

- eXpress Data Path (XDP) *is a high performance, programmable network data path in the Linux Kernel*
- Traffic control,
- Sockets,
- Firewalling *xpf\_bp module*,
- Tracing,
- Tracepoints,
- kprobe *dynamic tracing of a kernel function call*,
- cgroups.

**eBPF - Specification** The eBPF virtual machine has a 64-bit RISC architecture designed for one to one mapping to 64-bit CPUs. Instructions are similar to classic BPF for simple conversion to eBPF. The old format had registers A and X instead of current 11 registers, grouped by function as described below [22].

- R0 exit value for eBPF
- R1 - R5 function call arguments to in-kernel functions
- R6 - R9 callee-saved registers preserved by in-kernel functions
- R10 stack frame pointer (read only)

So far 87 internal BPF instructions were implemented. Opcode field has a room for new instructions. Some of them may use 16/24/32 byte encoding.

Same as the original BPF (the new format runs within controlled environment) is deterministic and the kernel can easily prove that. The safety of a program can be verified in two steps. First step does depth-first-search to forbid loops and CFG<sup>2</sup> validations. The second step starts from first instruction and descends all possible paths in CFG. It simulates execution of every instruction and examines the state of registers and a stack [22].

**eBPF - Instruction Encoding** An eBPF program is a sequence of 64-bit instructions. All eBPF instructions use the same design of instruction encoding which is shown in Figure 3.1. As you can see in the figure, there are 5 parts that are opcode (operation code), dst (destination), src (source), offset, immediate [22].




Figure 3.1: eBPF instruction encoding

## 3.4 Libseccomp

Libseccomp [19] is easy to use library which provides a platform-independent interface to the Linux Kernel's syscall filtering. The libseccomp API is designed to abstract an user from underlying BPF based syscall filtering and present a more conventional function-call based filtering interface. The interface should be more familiar to and quickly adopted by application developers. The comparison of libseccomp and raw BPF filter is shown in Figures A.1 and A.2.

One of the advantages of libseccomp is that it has a permissive mode in which every syscall violation is reported to the user. This feature can be helpful if you want to obtain information which syscalls was called. This use case is really similar to the syscall monitoring. But it is really tough to depend on this output because it is in development.

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<sup>2</sup>Control flow graph

# Chapter 4

## Solution Design

This chapter will describe, the technical part of the thesis. We will discuss requirements and particular parts, its architecture and issues, we have to deal with.

### 4.1 Requirements

We will require from the application to fulfill the following requirements:

1. Application will have only CLI<sup>1</sup>.
2. The application will be implemented in C++17 [10].
3. Application will be designed with consideration of good OOP.
4. Application will consist of these main parts:
  - (a) parser
  - (b) optimizer
  - (c) policy generator
  - (d) logger
5. Parser will be implemented using PEG<sup>2</sup> [6] design.
6. Optimizer will have at least three optimizing methods:
  - (a) strict - without used of advanced methods, with an interpretation of internal structure,
  - (b) minimax - possibility to count an interval interval between minimum and maximum value found in a set of arguments,
  - (c) advanced - combination of above methods.
7. Policy will be generated with libseccomp [19] syntax as C language [12] code.

---

<sup>1</sup>Command Line Interface

<sup>2</sup>Parsing Expression Grammar

## 4.2 Architecture

The architecture of this application is based on architectural patterns. In this case *Pipe-and-Filter* [13] architectural pattern was used. This pattern best fits our problem. A big inspiration came from compilers. They are very similar to this application. They break down the processing required for input into separate components (or filters), each performing a single task. By normalization the format of the data that each component produces, this component can be arranged as a pipeline. The pattern is good for possibility of changing or adding components and reduces duplicate code. But in this case this pattern is slightly modified. The data in pipeline is processed as whole batch.

The similar components with compilers are: parser, optimizer, output generator. As you can see the component is dependent on a component before. They have got parser, optimizer, output generator as well and every component is dependent on a component before. There are two main cases as shown in Figure 4.1.




Figure 4.1: Architecture of strace2seccomp

**Without Optimizer** In this case, optimizer is not in the pipeline, a raw input is translated into libseccomp commands. This pipeline is shown in Figure 4.1 (path: a., 1., b. in Figure 4.1). There are no optimizations when optimizer is turned off.

The main problem of not using an optimizer is not proper working system call filter. There is a possibility that any minor change in system call parameters can result in a program termination. In a complex program, there is no way to be definitely sure whether every syscall was caught. That can be a big problem in programs which use seccomp. That is the main reason why this option is not recommended.

However, there are some users which may not want to optimize the trace. The reason for not running the optimizer is that their application does not have variable parameters in system calls. Every syscall is the same on any running instance of the application. Attentive readers may notice that this option can be used only in small applications which have some limited functionality.

The main disadvantage of this solution is that it is too robust to place it in a code and is very strict. It can kill a program even in a false positive case when a user changes some of the parameters that were not covered in strace input files.



**With Optimizer** In this case when optimizer is turned on (*path: a., I., II., b. in Figure 4.1*), we can specify which type of optimization we want. As mentioned in Section 4.1, there are two optimization variants. Those variants can be switched with runtime arguments in CLI.

The pitfalls of this case is allowing program to continue even in inappropriate circumstances. Invalid circumstances can be defined as a bad syscall argument treated as a valid. It can happen when you allow a set of arguments for specific syscall. This is not secure however it is more suitable for work than the case without optimizer.

You can minimize these pitfalls by providing a lot of strace input files. The best case is when you provide strace files from every major complex test case (with big prime path coverage).

#### 4.2.1 Parser

The parser is crucial part of the whole application because it will put everything in a IR (intermediate representation). Input to the parser is a output from a **Strace** tool. The output was described in Section 2.2.1 and correct configuration of strace to generate valid output for **strace2seccomp** will be described in Section 5.1.1. As you can see the output is in a structured form and has an unambiguous syntax which means that no error should occur during the parsing part. When syntax error occurs, the program should inform where the error is located in the input file. Next step should be a proper exit. Parser should have an option to identify all errors in the input file which can be helpful for identifying more errors on once. Another feature is that the parser can print structured parsed data.

#### 4.2.2 Intermediate Data Structure

One of the main parts of **strace2seccomp** is intermediate data structure (IDS) in which the individual system calls are stored. The main idea of this abstract data type (ADT) is to be simple, readable with smallest redundancy possible. This can be done only with good abstraction and good design.

IDS is represented as a tree structure. In this structure, there are different information about syscall represented on a different level in the tree. The root node has child elements which represent an individual system calls. In this case, we are naming these nodes as a system call node (SCD). In SCD, information about a system call number is stored and it have multiple children. The *n*th level represents the *n*th argument of a specific system call. The whole system call (including arguments) can be read as a path from the root node to the leaf node. The IDS representation is shown in Figure 4.2.




Figure 4.2: Visualized IDS as a tree

### 4.2.3 Optimizer

Optimizer is the main part of this tool. This part will reduce the intermediate data structure (IDS). There are three approaches of reducing IDS (strict, advanced, weak).

**Strict** optimization is defined as 1:1 to strace input file. It means that it will interpret every record in strace as a strict rule. So only that one case is only possible to run. Every minor change in system call will kill the process.

---

#### Algorithm 1: Weak optimization

---

**Input:** intermediate data structure IDS  
**Output:** list of rules rules

```

1 foreach syscall sc in the IDS do
2   foreach argument arg in the syscall sc do
3     num_arg ← get_num_args(p);
4     for lvl ← 0 to num_arg do
5       | intervals.append(get_minmax(arg, lvl));
6     end
7     rules.append(sc, intervals);
8   end
9 end

```

---

**Weak** optimization is the most basic one of this set of optimizations. The weak optimization is based on finding minimum and maximum from set of arguments. The main idea is to find minimum and maximum for each argument of each syscall.

So the abstracted algorithm follows as this:

1. For each syscall find extremes on every argument position.

---

**Algorithm 2:** Weak optimization

---

**Input:** intermediate data structure IDS

**Output:** list of rules rules

```
1 foreach syscall sc in the IDS do
2   foreach argument arg in the syscall sc do
3     num_arg ← get_num_args(p);
4     for lvl ← 0 to num_arg do
5       intervals.append(get_minmax(arg, lvl));
6     end
7   rules.append(sc, intervals);
8 end
9 end
```

---

**Clustering** is learning algorithm from family of unsupervised machine learning. It is a bunch of numerous operation focused on decomposition of informations. When we decompose information then we can classify it by classifiers. One of them is clustering. Clustering has many definitions, e.g. in book about data mining from Carlo Verrellis is clustering defined as *"clustering models is to subdivide the records of a dataset into homogeneous groups of observations, called clusters, so that observations belonging to one group are similar to one another and dissimilar from observations included in other groups."* [1]

The goal of this method is to find subsets (clusters) in given set. Cluster is defined by Paolo S. R. Diniz and group as *"In describing a cluster, most researchers consider internal homogeneity and external separation, i.e., patterns in the same cluster should be similar to each other, while patterns in different clusters should not. Similarities and dissimilarities both should have the potential to be examined in a clear and meaningful way."* [15]

The classification of raw data can be done in multiple ways. Some basic methods are:

- partitioning,
- hierarchical,
- density based clustering,
- fuzzy clustering,
- DBSCAN clustering, (this is interesting for us),
- Model-based clustering.

**Advanced** optimization is defined as combination of both strict and weak optimizations. In some specific cases it will use only the exact values and in other cases it will use weak optimizations. This combination should be more strict than the weak optimization and weaker than the strict optimization.

In this case is used DBSCAN clustering method[21]. The model introduced by DBSCAN uses a simple minimum density level estimation. It defines a threshold for the number of neighbors (minPts) within the radius  $\epsilon$ . Objects with more than threshold neighbors within  $\epsilon$  are treated as core points. The intention of DBSCAN is to find all areas, which satisfy at least the minimum density separated by areas with lower density (noise). Every point in  $\epsilon$  radius is part of the same cluster as a core point. If any neighbour is again a core

point, their neighbourhoods are transitively included to a core point. This is very simple and basic algorithm as you can see later in this section. The strength and weakness of DBSCAN clustering is that it does not require a number of output clusters.




Figure 4.3: Illustration of DBSCAN cluster model

Figure 4.4 illustrates the model DBSCAN. In this illustration are defined parameters:

- $\text{minPts}$  is 4
- $\epsilon$  is indicated by circles

In this picture you can see multiple points and four of them named A, B, C, N. Arrows indicate direct density reachability. Points A, B, C are density connected and B, C points are border points. N is not density reachable (it is not in any  $\epsilon$  radius). Any point as N is considered as noise point.

The abstracted algorithm is:

1. find neighbors in  $\epsilon$  radius of every point, and find core points with more that minimum neighbours ( $\text{minPts}$ )
2. find connected core points on the graph and merge them into clusters.
3. assign every non-core point to a core point if that non-core point is in  $\epsilon$  radius of that core-point else assign it to noise.

The whole algorithm is:

---

**ALGORITHM 1:** Pseudocode of Original Sequential DBSCAN Algorithm

---

```

Input:  $DB$ : Database
Input:  $\epsilon$ : Radius
Input:  $minPts$ : Density threshold
Input:  $dist$ : Distance function
Data:  $label$ : Point labels, initially undefined

1 foreach point  $p$  in database  $DB$  do                                // Iterate over every point
2   if  $label(p) \neq undefined$  then continue                        // Skip processed points
3   Neighbors  $N \leftarrow RANGEQUERY(DB, dist, p, \epsilon)$         // Find initial neighbors
4   if  $|N| < minPts$  then                                           // Non-core points are noise
5      $label(p) \leftarrow Noise$ 
6     continue
7    $c \leftarrow \text{next cluster label}$                                 // Start a new cluster
8    $label(p) \leftarrow c$ 
9   Seed set  $S \leftarrow N \setminus \{p\}$                             // Expand neighborhood
10  foreach  $q$  in  $S$  do
11    if  $label(q) = Noise$  then  $label(q) \leftarrow c$ 
12    if  $label(q) \neq undefined$  then continue
13    Neighbors  $N \leftarrow RANGEQUERY(DB, dist, q, \epsilon)$ 
14     $label(q) \leftarrow c$ 
15    if  $|N| < minPts$  then continue                                // Core-point check
16     $S \leftarrow S \cup N$ 

```

---

Figure 4.4: Illustration of DBSCAN cluster model

### 4.3 Parsing Expression Grammar

Parsing expression grammar was introduced by Ford in 2004. PEG is a type of analytic formal grammar which describes a formal language in terms of a set of rules for recognizing strings in the language. This type of grammar is really similar to a top-down parsing languages. As well it looks very similar to context-free grammars.

Parser that parses the PEG is named a packrat parser. Packrat parser can be easily constructed for any language described by an  $LL(k)$  or  $LR(k)$  grammar, as well as for many languages that require unlimited lookahead and therefore are not LR. Packrat parsers are also much simpler to construct than bottom-up LR parsers, making it practical to build them by hand. It can directly and efficiently implement common disambiguation rules such as *longest-match*, *followed-by*, and *not-followed-by*, which are difficult to express unambiguously in a context-free grammar or implement in conventional linear-time. Finally, both lexical and hierarchical analysis can be seamlessly integrated into a single unified packrat parser.

The main disadvantage of packrat parsing is memory consumption. The worst case asymptotic computational complexity is very similar to the conventional algorithms (linear in the size of the input).

The one of the many problems with right to left parsing algorithm is that it computes many results that are never needed. Other inconvenience is that we must carefully determine the order in which the results for a particular column are computed. *Packrat parsing* is a lazy derivation of a tabular algorithm that solves both of these problems. It computes

results only when they are needed, in the same order as the original recursive descent parser would. [9]

Additive	$\leftarrow$	Multititve '+' Additive   Multitive
Multitive	$\leftarrow$	Primary '*' Multitive   Primary
Primary	$\leftarrow$	'(' Additive ')'   Decimal
Decimal	$\leftarrow$	'0'   ...   '9'

Table 4.1: Example of a grammar for a trivial language

## Chapter 5

# Development of strace2seccomp

### 5.1 Input

As an input was used output from strace tool. As I mentioned earlier strace tool was chosen because it is easy to use system call monitoring tool. It can monitor what observed program demanded from kernel. With strace tool it is possible to trace child processes. The main advantage of strace tool is that it doesn't need any of the source code files, program has not to be compiled with extra flags or without any library or it does not have to be statically linked.

#### 5.1.1 Configure Strace to Produce Expected Input

The output from strace tool has to be normalised before processing with strace2seccomp. The normalization is done by providing a few runtime arguments to strace tool. Example:

```
$ strace -s 0 -xx -yy -o dataset -ff nautilus
```

I would like to describe what they are doing in the first place.[\[5\]](#)

**-s** is a string size. We are setting a string size to zero because the libseccomp does not have the ability to work with strings. It does not know how long is the string or if it is really a string. By this option the filenames are not affected. They are printed in full length.

**-xx** this option will switch the format of strings to hexadecimal format. It is much easier to parse strings in this format. It affects the filename as well. This option is used because sometimes can occur a non ascii (UTF-8) character in filename.

**-f** trace children processes.

**-yy** will print protocol specific information associated with socket file descriptor. It is here for future enhancements of strace2seccomp tool.

**-o** is used for specifying the output file.

**-ff** is helpful when you are tracing a multiprocess program. In this case it will create a multiple files in format NAME.PID where NAME is a provided filename in option **-o** and PID is a process id.

### 5.1.2 Strace grammar

Strace produces structured output. Simplified version in extended Backus–Naur form (eBNF)[11] you can see in Figure 5.1.

```

<grammar>  |= <system_call> | <signal> | <exit_line>
<system_call> |= <sc_name> "(" {<argument>} ")" "=" <digit>
<signal>    |= "+++ killed with" <signal_name> "+++"
<exit_line> |= "+++ exited with" <digit> "+++"

```

Figure 5.1: Strace output grammar in eBNF

As you can see the grammar is composed of main parts that are *system\_call*, *signal* and *exit\_line*. For us are interesting the first one (*system\_call*). The system call is composed of a name of syscall, arguments and return code. The argument can occur in a sequence and it is made of som atomic types (value, constant, structure, array, string, address and there can be find comments as well). The string is in program represented as a place in memory but strace can dereference this address and show it in analysis. This is the reason I mentioned it explicitly.

## 5.2 Intermediate Representation

How it looks and why?

### 5.3 Output

Chapter about creating output from IDS to libseccomp or eBPF.

#### 5.3.1 libseccomp

Something about using libseccomp.

#### 5.3.2 eBPF

Maybe extension?

#### 5.3.3 C/C++ template

Add it in appendix.

#### 5.3.4 Go template

Add it in appendix.



## 5.4 Heuristics and Optimizations

Something about heuristics in global

### 5.4.1 Minimax

findin min and max for every arg. position.

### 5.4.2 Strict

input  $\rightarrow$  output

### 5.4.3 Smart

we should use clustering ...

### Clustering

What is clustering?

### Clustering algorithms used

There are a lots of clustering algorithms. Find them ....

- K-means
- DBSCAN[14]

## Chapter 6

# Software Verification

This chapter will describe activities used to assure quality control of the developed tool. First, I want to introduce on which aspects we will focus. One of the aspects is *module testing*. The main purpose of module testing is to detect errors in submodules, in communication among them, in passing data through data structures. Another aspect of verification is *system testing* merged with *acceptance testing*. In this type of testing we will check if the strace2seccomp tool has valid architectural design. Next aspect which will be checked is *static analysis*. Static analysis is type of testing which does not requires run the program but requires a source code of the tool. The static analyzer will analyse the source codes with different heuristics and produces a analysis of detected errors.

### 6.1 Module Testing

Module testing is part of whole quality control process. This testing can provide us how functional are particular components and if they meet the requirements. Table 6.1 shows us the description of module's test suits.

Module / Component	Test description
Params	Validity of recognized runtime arguments
StraceParser	Syntax testing, validity of parsed data, correct error handling

Table 6.1: Test plan

#### 6.1.1 Params Testing

about using params class in custom test set and manually check if the correct flags was omitted.

#### 6.1.2 StraceParser Testing

StraceParser module is responsible for parsing the strace output and translates it to intermediate data structure. Testing of this module can be done with various techniques. First one which is used is fuzzy testing or fuzzing described in section above 6.1.2. AFL fuzzer was used in the process.

## Fuzzing

The term fuzzing was first used by professor Barton Miller who used fuzzing to test robustness of UNIX applications in 1989 [23, 17].

- AFL write something about every fuzzer you mentioned
- Bunny the Fuzzer
- Honggfuzz
- Radamsa
- oss-fuzz

## Fuzzing results

Show some results from afl.

## Grammar testing

If you got time write grammar tester. or find one .. dunno

### 6.1.3 Algorithms

How should we test if algorithms?

### 6.1.4 Optimizer

how should we test this adapter?

### 6.1.5 Output

Testing correctness of a Output generator

- C/C++
- Go

## 6.2 System and Acceptance Testing

### 6.2.1 Testing on real app

### 6.2.2 USBGuard

## 6.3 Static analysis

Any bugs?

## **6.4 Test Requirements**

## **6.5 Results**

Which bugs have you found.

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## Appendix A

# Comparison of libseccomp and raw BPF filtering

### A.1 BPF

```
1 int myapp_seccomp_raw_start(void)
2 {
3     struct sock_filter filter[] = {
4         BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, 4),
5         BPF_STMT(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64, 0x00, 0x12),
6         BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, 0),
7         BPF_STMT(BPF_JMP+BPF_JGE+BPF_K, 0x40000000, 0x10, 0x00),
8         BPF_STMT(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_open, 0x0e, 0x00),
9         BPF_STMT(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_close, 0x0d, 0x00),
10        BPF_STMT(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_read, 0x00, 0x0d),
11        BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, 20),
12        BPF_STMT(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, 0, 0x00, 0x0b),
13        BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, 16),
14        BPF_STMT(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, 0, 0x00, 0x09),
15        BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, 28),
16        BPF_STMT(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, 0, 0x00, 0x02),
17        BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, 24),
18        BPF_STMT(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, 0, 0x05, 0x00),
19        BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, 36),
20        BPF_STMT(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (SSIZE_MAX >> 32), 0x00, 0x02),
21        BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, 32),
22        BPF_STMT(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (SSIZE_MAX & 0xffffffff), 0x01, 0x00),
23        BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
24        BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL),
25    };
26    struct sock_fprog prog = {
27        .len = (unsigned short)(sizeof(filter)/sizeof(filter[0])),
28        .filter = filter,
29    };
30    if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) < 0)
31        return -errno;
32    if (prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog) < 0)
33        return -errno;
34    return 0;
35 }
```

Listing A.1: Using raw BPF filtering

## A.2 libseccomp

```
1 int myapp_libseccomp_start(void)
2 {
3     int rc;
4     scmp_filter_ctx ctx;
5     ctx = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_KILL);
6
7     if (ctx == NULL)
8         return -ENOMEM;
9
10    rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(open), 0);
11
12    if (rc < 0)
13        goto out;
14
15    rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(close), 0);
16
17    if (rc < 0)
18        goto out;
19
20    rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(read), 3, SCMP_A0(
        SCMP_CMP_EQ, STDIN_FILENO), SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_NE, 0x0), SCMP_A2(SCMP_CMP_LT,
        SSIZE_MAX));
21
22    if (rc < 0)
23        goto out;
24
25    rc = seccomp_load(ctx);
26
27 out:
28    seccomp_release(ctx);
29    return rc;
30 }
```

Listing A.2: Using simpler libseccomp wrapper



Appendix B

other appendix