

Kyber

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1 Exercício 2 - grupo 6 - Ana Margarida Campos (A85166) , Nuno Pereira (PG42846)

O segundo exercício tinha como objetivo a implementação de duas versões, IND-CPA e IND-CCA, do protótipo **Crystalis Kyber** que foi candidato ao concurso *NIST-PQC*, neste caso da terceira ronda. De seguida, são apresentadas em duas seções (Kyber CPAPKE e Kyber CCAKEM) os resultados da resolução deste exercício acompanhado de uma explicação detalhada de cada função implementada. Este, foi desenvolvido tendo por base o documento *kyber.pdf*.

1.1 Kyber CPAPKE

Esta versão permite obter uma segurança do tipo IND-CPA, isto é, segurança contra ataques Chosen Plaintext Attacks. Numa primeira fase foi necessário implementar algumas funções auxiliares, sendo estas:

- ***parse***: recebe como *input* um conjunto de *bytes* e retorna o polinómio correspondente a esse conjunto;
- ***XOF***: corresponde a uma função do tipo *extendable output function*, utilizando *SHAKE-128*;
- ***PRF***: corresponde a uma função do tipo *pseudorandom function*, utilizando o *SHAKE-256*;
- ***G***: função de *hash* através de *SHA3-512*;
- ***encode***: recebe um polinómio como argumento e, como resultado, retorna um *byte array*;
- ***decode***: contrário do ***encode***, ou seja, recebe um *byte array* e retorna o polinómio correspondente;
- ***compress***: comprime um polinómio e retorna os *bytes* correspondentes;
- ***decompress***: função oposta ao ***compress***, isto é, descomprime *bytes* e retorna o polinómio correspondente;
- ***transposta***: efetua a transposta de uma matriz.

As funções principais centram-se na geração de chaves, cifragem da mensagem passada como parâmetro e posterior decifragem do texto cifrado, obtendo deste modo, a mensagem original:

- ***gerar_chaves***: com recurso às funções anteriormente apresentadas, ocorre a geração das chaves pública e secreta. A primeira é essencial para a cifragem da mensagem e a segunda para a decifragem do criptograma;

- **cifragem**: tem como objetivo principal a cifragem de uma mensagem. Desta forma, recebe como parâmetros a chave pública, a mensagem e *coins* (*bytes* aleatórios) e dá como *output* o texto cifrado;
- **decifragem**: tem como objetivo decifrar um criptograma, obtendo como resultado o texto limpo correspondente. Recebe como argumentos a chave secreta e o criptograma.

Para além destas, recorreremos à função **NTT** disponibilizada pelo docente.

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[1]: # imports necessários para a resolução
import os
import random as rn
from sympy import ntt
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
import numpy
from sympy import intt
import gzip
import struct
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[2]: class NTT(object):
    #
    def __init__(self, n=128, q=None):
        if not n in [32,64,128,256,512,1024,2048]:
            raise ValueError("improper argument ",n)
        self.n = n
        if not q:
            self.q = 1 + 2*n
            while True:
                if (self.q).is_prime():
                    break
                self.q += 2*n
        else:
            if q % (2*n) != 1:
                raise ValueError("Valor de 'q' não verifica a condição NTT")
            self.q = q

        self.F = GF(self.q) ; self.R = PolynomialRing(self.F, name="w")
        w = (self.R).gen()

        g = (w^n + 1)
        xi = g.roots(multiplicities=False)[-1]
        self.xi = xi
        rs = [xi^(2*i+1) for i in range(n)]
        self.base = crt_basis([(w - r) for r in rs])

    def ntt(self,f):
        def _expand_(f):
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        u = f.list()
        return u + [0]*(self.n-len(u))

    def _ntt_(xi,N,f):
        if N==1:
            return f
        N_ = N/2 ; xi2 = xi^2
        f0 = [f[2*i] for i in range(N_)] ; f1 = [f[2*i+1] for i in
↪range(N_)]
        ff0 = _ntt_(xi2,N_,f0) ; ff1 = _ntt_(xi2,N_,f1)

        s = xi ; ff = [self.F(0) for i in range(N)]
        for i in range(N_):
            a = ff0[i] ; b = s*ff1[i]
            ff[i] = a + b ; ff[i + N_] = a - b
            s = s * xi2
        return ff

    return _ntt_(self.xi,self.n,_expand_(f))

    def ntt_inv(self,ff):
        return sum([ff[i]*self.base[i] for i in range(self.n)])

    def random_pol(self,args=None):
        return (self.R).random_element(args)

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[3]: # constantes do Kyber
n = 256
q = 343576577
T = NTT(n,q)
k = 2
n1 = 3
n2 = 2
du, dv = 10, 4

# criação dos anéis necessários
_Z.<w> = ZZ[]
R.<w> = QuotientRing(_Z ,_Z.ideal(w^n - 1))

_Q.<w> = GF(q)[]
Rq.<w> = QuotientRing(_Q , _Q.ideal(w^n + 1))

# obtenção do tamanho necessário para o decompress
def tamanho(stringB, numberS):
    count = 10
    auxCount = 1

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i = 0
while i < len(stringB):
    if numberS == auxCount:
        i = i + 10
        while (i < len(stringB)) and (stringB[i] != 31 or stringB[i + 1] !=
↪139 or stringB[i + 2] != 8 or stringB[i + 3] != 0 ):
            count = count + 1
            i = i + 1
            auxCount = auxCount + 1

        i = i + 1
        if (i + 10) < len(stringB) and (stringB[i] == 31 and stringB[i + 1] ==
↪139 and stringB[i + 2] == 8 and stringB[i + 3] == 0 ):
            auxCount = auxCount + 1
            if auxCount > numberS:
                break
    return count

# recebe como input um conjunto de bytes e retorna o polinômio correspondente a
↪esse conjunto;
def parse(str_bytes):
    result = []
    for i in str_bytes:
        result.append(i)
    return Rq(result)

# extendable output function, utilizando SHAKE-128
def XOF(p,i,j):
    digest = hashes.Hash(hashes.SHAKE128(int(32)))
    digest.update(p)
    digest.update(bytes(i))
    digest.update(bytes(j))
    r = digest.finalize()
    return r

# pseudorandom function, utilizando SHAKE-256
def PRF(s,b):
    digest = hashes.Hash(hashes.SHAKE256(int(32)))
    digest.update(s)
    digest.update(bytes(b))
    r = digest.finalize()
    return r

# função de hash através de SHA3-512;
def G(d):
    digest = hashes.Hash(hashes.SHA512())
    digest.update(bytes(d))

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    r = digest.finalize()
    return r

# recebe um polinômio como argumento e retorna um byte array;
def encode(poly):
    byt=b''
    aux=1
    countX=0
    for j in poly:
        if(j>255):
            aux=2
        if (j > 65025):
            aux = 3
        if (j > 16581375):
            aux = 4
        if (j > 4228250625):
            aux = 5
        byt = byt+ int((_Z(j))).to_bytes( aux, 'big')
        byt = byt + "/-n-/" .encode()
        countX =countX +1
    return byt

# recebe um byte array e retorna o polinômio correspondente;
def decode(byt):
    listaCoef = []
    byteAux = b''
    listAux = []
    desc=0
    while desc <byt.__len__():
        if byt[desc] == 47 and byt[desc+1]==45 and byt[desc+2]==110 and
        ↪byt[desc+3]==45 and byt[desc+4] == 47 :
            desc = desc+4
            listaCoef.append(int.from_bytes(byteAux, 'big'))
            byteAux = b''
        else:
            byteAux = byteAux + bytearray([int(_Z(byt[desc]))])
            desc = desc+1
    return listaCoef

# comprime um polinômio e retorna os bytes correspondentes;
def compress(polinomio):
    polinomioB= encode(polinomio)
    compress = gzip.compress(polinomioB)
    return compress

# descomprime os bytes e passa para polinômio
def decompress(compress):

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    unpack = gzip.decompress(compress)
    return Rq(decode(unpack))

# calcula a transposta de uma matriz
def transposta(matrix):
    zipped_rows = zip(*matrix)
    transpose_matrix = [list(row) for row in zipped_rows]
    return transpose_matrix

# geração das chaves pública e secreta
def gerar_chaves():
    d = bytearray(os.urandom(32))
    p = G(d)[:32]
    teta = G(d)[-32:]
    N = 0
    A = [[ 0 for x in range(k-1)] for y in range(k-1)]
    for i in range(0,k-1):
        for j in range(0,k-1):
            A[i][j] = parse(XOF(p,i,j))
    s = []
    for i in range(0,k-1):
        s.append(parse(PRF(teta,N)))
        N = N + 1
    e = []
    for i in range(0,k-1):
        e.append(parse(PRF(teta,N)))
        N = N + 1
    s1 = Rq(T.ntt(s[0]))
    e1 = Rq(T.ntt(e[0]))
    t = A[0][0].lift() * s1.lift() + e1.lift()
    pk = encode(t) + p
    sk = encode(s1)
    return pk, sk

# cifragem de uma mensagem
def cifragem(pk, m, coins):
    N = 0
    t2 = pk[:len(pk)-32]
    t= decode(t2)
    p = pk[-32:]
    A = [[ 0 for x in range(k-1)] for y in range(k-1)]
    for i in range(0,k-1):
        for j in range(0,k-1):
            A[i][j] = parse(XOF(p,i,j))
    AT = transposta(A)
    r = []
    for i in range(0,k-1):

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        r.append(parse((PRF(bytearray(r),bytearray([N])))))
        N = N + 1
    e1 = []
    for i in range(0,k-1):
        e1.append(parse(PRF(bytearray(r[i]),bytearray([N]))))
        N = N + 1
    e2 = parse(PRF(bytearray(r[0].list()),N))
    r1= Rq(T.ntt(r[0]))
    u= Rq(T.ntt_inv(A[0][0].lift()*r1.lift()))+e1[0]
    v = Rq(T.ntt(Rq(t).lift() * r1.lift())) + e2 + decompress(m)
    c1 = compress(u)
    c2 = compress(v)
    c = c1 + c2
    return c

# decifragem do criptograma
def decifragem(sk, ciphertext):
    u = decompress(ciphertext[:tamanho(ciphertext,1)])
    v = decompress(ciphertext[-tamanho(ciphertext,2):])
    s1 = Rq(decode(sk))
    m = compress(v.lift() - (T.ntt_inv(s1.lift()*Rq(T.ntt(u)).lift()))
    return m

```

De seguida são apresentados os resultados obtidos com recurso às funções anteriores. Neste caso, estamos a considerar uma mensagem fixa. Note-se que houve uma dificuldade acrescida nesta implementação pelo que, deparamos-nos com alguns erros não identificados que impossibilitam o correto funcionamento do programa.

```

[4]: pk, sk = gerar_chaves()

m = Rq([1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1,
↪0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1,
        0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0,
↪1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1,
        1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1,
↪1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1,
        1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1,
↪0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1,
        1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1,
↪1, 1])

print("Mensagem = ", compress(m), "\n")
coins = bytearray(os.urandom(32))
ciphertext = cifragem(pk, compress(m),coins)
print("Texto cifrado = ", ciphertext, "\n")
texto = decifragem(sk, ciphertext)
print("Texto limpo = ", texto)

```

Mensagem = b'\x1f\x8b\x08\x00#]\x99`\x02\xffc\xd4\xd7\xcd\x3\x5g\x00\x93\x8cD\x90\x0cD\x88 \x8bc\x92\xa4\x9a\xc6@\xa2\x0bq\xe9b\xa0\xd8w\xe4\x99\xc9H\x96\x1f\x19(\x88\x17\x06\x12}DL<R+m\x10\xef\x1eJH\xda\x99\xc3@AH\x92\xe7Z\x06\xbcy\x8a\x91J\x9f\x8b\x91\xaa\$\x03Y9\x8e\x92\xd4\xc80J\x92E\x02\x00\xbb\xcfD]\x00\x06\x00\x00'

Texto cifrado = b'\x1f\x8b\x08\x00#]\x99`\x02\xff5VyP\xd5U\x14\x86\xb7\xf1x,\x8f\xc7\xf6\x08c\x93MB V\xc5\xd4\x80bqiH6\x85,@t#\x96\x02e3\x98!\x1d\x10\x11\x06\x90M\x82\x80\x0c\x02\t\x97\xd8T\x02\xc2\$\r4\x91@\x86Mx(\x08\xa5 B\x0e\x9bh3\xbf\x3\xbd\xbf\xde7\xe7\xde{\xcew\xbe\x3\xfd\xee}l\x8b\xf1T+\x8b(\x0b+\x19AZ\xe5/\x84TS78\x12\x923\xd9:\xca \x8e\xce7\x89\x14\xe2\x7f\x8C'!\xf9\x18\xee\xbf\x84D\x9a\xde:\x84\x14\xcd\xedB\x19\xc4\x16\x9b, \xef\xcc\x84\x88\x90\xda\xdd\x83\x7f1\xc8x\x0f\x2+\x9d\xe8\xa5\xb4<\xe1\xca\x1c\x85\x94\xdf\x8cE \xff\x9ap\r\x842\xaa=\x18\xc4\xf5s3B\xae\xfe\xacV\x06\xe9\x89\x0e1\xbf\x85\x93\xf9\xc4To-\x93\x01\xb2\x92\xee\xff@\xaa\x7f\x0e\x5\x8dN\xdb\x89\xde\xe0\xde&\x06\xa8n\x93A\x8d\xdc\x6\x1e\x06}Y\xa3\x00r\xa3+\xbf\xa2\xe7\xe1o\x9d\xa8-zb9\x03X\xb7>\x98\xa6D\xbf\x9d>\x07\xdd\x0b\xa1\xaaT8\xa95\x81B\xc2\xcd\xe7\xc6@!\x9e;D\x07[6\xbeM!\x15\xd5\xe6@\xda7\xe8\xbd\x84]\x7f\x874R\xd6\x18\xff\x7f(\xa4\xf0(\x14\xc9\x04\x0f\x7w\xa0\x8b\x82\xa5- }9\xf7\rV\xc5w>\xa1\x022\x83\xee\$\x84\xc4\xcc\x1e\xfb_\x04{b\x9e\x9f79\x1b!s{\xc6=\xb4\x99\xbd\x92G<\xea,I\x01NK\xbb5\xaa\x1fo\xfc\x1d\x9f9#\xba\xa7H\xe7\xed\xcd\x4[0\xbf\t\x3\x7fZu\x8bB\x99k\x4[\xfdL>\x966\x17\x82\x9fJb\x208h\x08\xbe\x82b9\xfa\x4\x11\xbb\xady\x03\x91_\xac\xc4I5vX\x11\xadM\x3\xb3d\xa5u\xf4\xe7\x89_i\r\x190\x96\xf3\x9af\xc5\xf6\xf0\xad\x85\xe41\xf7u\xb1=\xdc\xb2\x02H\xcd\xbb\x01\xb9rav5\r\xc7\x02J\x11_q\x02'\xa7\xc2\xc9\xc4\xecKe\x018\xf8\x9f\x9dH\x08mjSB\x0e\xc8,\xdb\x8fP\xd3\x90\x0fT\xaa\xcb\x9bFG7\x0f\x84!V\x9d\xaf\x84\xce\x93]\x0b\x89v\x93\x99\x1f\x5<\xbcN.b\x9b\x97I\xcdsv@:\xe6\x9d\xeb0p\xd0\xc7\x93\xc6\xc0\xd3\x9dK\x06G\xef#g\xb0\xe8\xe2\xaf\x0es\x06\x04\xbc0\x4t\xcc\x5\x08\x8c\xa7nC\x03\x8d\xe1R\x03\xba\xba\xb7QM\x5@t\xed\xe2\x19\x94am\xba\xefg\xa0\xb4\x9b\xf0\x8c\x92\x9c\x1f\x9b\x90\xba\xde\xf7\xb7Q\xdd(\x98\xe4\xe3\xceFiA\xc7\xc2\xe5U4\x1c\xbdk\x04\x1d\xf8X\xd6\xd04/\x0e\x86\xe0d\x95\xe1g\xe0\xed\x7f\x1a\n\x17\x1fe\x03I\xc2\xe0E\xe5\x03\xfb\x1c\x90\xc4\x81E:\xcb\x16\xa7\x9f\x03\xa5\xa3\x9f\xf61Hd"u^\xd0p=R\xd4qT\x10\xeb\xba\x8e\x16\x04\xe3KhA4;\xff\x18\xe6\xf3\xbdH\xdf=\xab\xa2bY\x9a\xe4e\x1c\x92\xd4\xdb\x05\x83\xe5!\xdee|;g\x13*1\xef2\x1bs\$\x89p|\tJ*69\x0c\xea\x1d\xa5k\xcfx-\x85XG\rh\x10\xd8T\xa4\x0c1\x16\xde\x82\xc8\x1f\xef\xfe\x1ae\xdc&v@=\xed\xddMX}\x0f\x8f\xaa\xabw\xc1`\xf2\x97\x82\x0c\xa0\xb7\xd6\x0b8RQlm-\xfd\x80\xfdq\x0f\xcbi\xa6B\x0fat\x06\xc9,\xbcM\x0e\xe3\xa4\xbcK\x08Y\xdc\x13\xe8`d\xcfq&\xd0\xb8S\r\xce\x9c\x9d7\r\xd0\xb0e\xb7\$J\`!\xd1\xc5\xfc\x05\x8b}~8p\xf8\x9e\xf4\xba\x0eX\x7f\x80\xd8\xb35\t\x94\xeaI?\x89U\xf3\xf6\x1f\xc915\xce%X\xdcS\xae\x0f\x8e\xcdIW\x11\xcb\x1b:\xa8^x12\xa8\x951\x96\x1b9n\xe0\x14ZC\x9d\xb2\xbaL\xa4\x8e\xed\xa8\xe7\x13M\xad^x1e}#\xce\xab\xae\x0cH\xeb\x87\x11\x94\xc4W\xe1/\x85\xd7\xda\xb1\$\xc2\x93\x16S\x10;\xbfp\x8a\xdaE"c\$\xed,\xf4\x85\x8eGX_\xa0)\x1b\x7f\xb8I\xed\xb9\xa0\r\x89\x83\xei\x1f\xe7\xe9H\x1e\x16S\x8b\xfc\x90n\x9f\x18\xbdP\xec\x8f*\xff\x04\xff\xd5\xf1y\xe4\x9d0\$\x89\xd8\x17J\xdeA\x01\xcd\xe3\xb8\xfcywMq\xbf\xab\xd8\x66@\x07\x8b\x9d\xc8\xcb7\xa9B\x92\xeb\x8d\xb0\x85\xa0\x13\xf7-\xb7\xe7\xa7\xbd\x04\xfc\xed\xdbI\x972\x05\x01\x0e\xee\xf3\xa4M\xacz\xb3kh\xbeE\x8c\xf7@\xf4]\xed\x0c\x9a\xef\xf6\xa2\x0b1\xc8\x060\xb9 c\x07=\x7f\\\x07\x17XA\xd83\xc2\x02\xed\xb0\xeaY\x88k\x9b7N\xdb\xdes\xc6\xc3\xa9xCY\x1b\xba,>K\x022\x8f\x85\x8bD\xe3:T\xfd\xf4\x95(\xa4=%\x88fP\x0

2\x07\xaf;\xbfT\x8e\x1e\x04vy\xa4\x07T\x9f\x14dP\xc8\xa8p+\x18v\x9c\xa4\xfb%\xb6
\x1b\xbe\x94\x7f8\xfd\x07\xd6\xbc\x02\xddQY\x18\xef\x02\xaa)&6\xe0\xe0\x89}\rq\x1
8\x8eB\x1y\xe9\xa56z\xed\x18:\xa9\xc8\xea\x01\xc7+\x86\xf8?#\n8C\x0f\x12\xb7 \x
d2\x8a\x94}\xd5}\nb\xaf0\x89\x81\x1e[\xa2\xaa\xea\x01WhA9\x8e\x8f\xabLml\x17\xbd
\xef\x02\xd9!\xbd\xe4\xa5!;|\xd8rY\x1c\xba\x00\xfe\x07\xcf\x06\xed\x9b\t\x00\x0
0\x1f\x8b\x08\x00#]\x99`\x02\xff5V{8\xd5w\x18w\x1c\xe7\xee8\xee\n5\xe3\xc9"\xe7\
xd1\xd0\x93\xcb\xa3\x8cnXS\x8f\x8e\x8cR.\x85m\x14\x13\xed\t\x93\x89D\xe5RL\xad\x
cd-\xce\x06\x06.%\xcd}r9\xb3\t\xd34\xa5X\xf5\xb81\x19f\xc3\x88=\xcf\xef\xfd\xfc\
xfe:\x9f\xe7\xf7\xbe\xdf\xf7\xfd|\xde\xf7\xfd\xbe\xdf\xa3\xc6\x9f\x98\xce\xb0\x9
5G\xcbm\xd5tU~\x81\x0c\xd20\xda\xd3J\x9f\$N\xc3\xa5\x844wDj\x11\xd2?\xb6\x10Dns\x
f5\xc18\x99\xa1\xa5CH\xab~\xc2\x98A\xea\x8e\xbe%\xf4I\xd8\x1a\xbf\x95\x90\xd4\x
d\xce\x81A\x1c\x07\xd5}\xf2\xda?\xe9J6Y\xbaU"2\xfd\xec\xac\x0e\x7f\xf7\xd24B:J\x
af\\Bb\xf3+\xc9\xb0zf{\x11\x0f\xeb\xf6z\n{\xed\xf5\xf7@\xc3\xc6\xe4\x03\xa0\xb14
\x15yU\x96\t\x90\xaa\xa3\xc3\x8d\x90\xe8\xc8\xc1"\x90\xbc\xff\xc5;\x84\x04oE|\x0
f\xf1\xb5\xbb\xfa\ti\xd7\x8c|\x07ks\x95\x0f\xac\xb9\xa5_B\xbd"\x9cJ\xc3M>q\x13Y\
xcdg\xed\x816GZ\xc1-\xa4\x7f\x85A|\xab\x80Z\xc4\x10\x1e\x18\x81\x98\x98\xe9\x9d\
x0c\xe2U\xdf\xfe\x1au\xe0\xb4?\x03a\x85\xd3\x1fP\xbf\xe6\xc5\xbf\xb0F\xbb\x12\x
d,\xd3F\xd4\xc89!\x10a+8M\x10\xa8\x16z\x0f\xfe\xa1\xdd\x87 \xf5\x8eK\x1e\x83\xa2
\x1c\x8f\xc1+\xe9\x91\''!~[\x957P\xb1\xf7-*\xea\x8c0\x18\x92\xfb\xdd5!\xa4\x17rQ\
x0e\xb7F\xcbA\xd4\xe8\xc8h!)\x18\xfc\xfb\x1a\x95\x83\xf7\xfc\x12u\xb9(\xa6\x1a58
\xad\xb3\x86AmE\xee\x14}k\x88\x07\xf9\xe4\xcb\xb3\x91f\xfd\xba*p.H\xb4&\xe3\xe2\
xa3}\x10\xa9\xd80\xbd\xe6k\x07\x9d\xc3}'\xd1\xd2s\xf2\xd2*\xa1\xc1\xe4\x16\xe6\x
90\x8d[z\x9c\xe4\xf4\xf5\xf4\xd1\x87\xd02\xaa\x070\xbb\xd7\x88\x08H\n\x0c!J\xb5\
xe9GL\xb8T\xf9\n\x18\x94\xf4|\xb8\x1aI\x0f\x87@\xe8\xc1\x9c\$\x06\xc9~\t\xa7\xa0!
\x11p\x97\x1d~\x01\xa1\xc9\xf7\x8c1\x00\xa5\xeb\x8fB\xd8\x81\xa3=\xb0\xba\xac\x
f6\xc2\x89\xb6\xed\xe3D\xde\x7f\x19\x9f\x84uN\xa3\xc8d\x10A\xd7D\x1a\x18\xc7\x0e
\xe7\xbb\xeeP\xfd\xfe\x04\x87\x08\xe6\x99\xf1\x06\xfc\x95\xd9\x970\x01\x12E8\xac
\xfe\x03/\x81NF\xd9\xe1\xecd\xdc\x05\xa8j\xe9\xd3\xc4\x89\xa4.\xcc\xa9\xaci-Z*\x
db\x9d\xa8\x02\xf5\xe6\x01}0\x88n\x80D\xcd\xa6\xd6\x16Dv87\x03\xeb\xdcW\xd8\x12\
x82\xbb\xd9\xe71"gn\xcdR\xa9\r~\xea"\K}* \x8e\xa6\x9d\xc7m\x93.\xf4/\x93[B\x1b&U
<\x13\x80\x1eK}~\xa7U\xa3n5\x7f\x05'\xf9Y\t\xd4J\xb9\x02\xdc\xc4\xa6e\x98cA\x8e
`\x11'\x03o\xb0\xd3\$\x97\x17\xc2:\x98\xc2\xc1\xb7\xb0\xa6n\nb\xfa\x80-\xbf\xef{
\x16\x94j!M\x01/e\x0,\xcbC\xf49b\x84m\xf8\x93\xe8:\xae\xda\xc8\x80r\xe5\x1d\x14
5E\xccN\xeb\xed\xd8J\xa0M\rXtZ+\x93\x9f!SJ-\x95\x8d\xc39\x19\x80\x0er\xf7\xb5\xb
0U\x93\x82\xa3\xde.;d\x17\x8a\xb5V3\xc8e\xc3N\xa4\xfaix\x9eB4\xce}\x84\x10\xafN\
xa0i\x92\x9a\xd8\v5\xe8aSk^5\xc2\xb0\xe8\xeeU\x1b\xa6\xc5\xd8\xe3\x81\xb6H\xa2\
xb6A\x9dx\xdc\x04\x1f\xd9\x1f\xaeLcPq3\x17\xb6\xda\x13XZ\xc2\t\xfdS\x94}\xd1\x82
u\xf7+\xff\x0b\x99\x8e/aPd\x0e\xdeY(\x9f\xa6\xc8\x02A\xd6\xfe\x00\x89B\xaaU\xcd\
xe1lz>=\x19\x1a^[\xdc\xd9\x9d\x19{\n\x07\xac0wP\xa7\xcc\xf2\xfc\x18\xe0\xedw\x16
\xf1sS\xeb\xb1\x7f\x9f9#\x91\xe1CjJj\x08\xb4\xe9\x07m\xa1\xb2p\x06zcq\xce\xde\xa
8\x02i\xb6g\x9aQp\xcb0\x11*[\xec\x08\xbd\x92)\xfb1\x10\x9c\xca;\x83\xf8~\x97\xe9
}Q\xf7p\xa5\xa5\xebc\x18\xc9>r=\x99\xa0<|h7\xa5L\xa9"=|7#\x1b:\xd6kF\xd7\x9e\xf7
\$\xe05\xd4\x8b7\xc2\x9e\x8b\x1b\nE\xc2\x9a%1\x0cQ\xcdX\x17\xe8\xd4\xad\xa2\x8b\x
a5~]L\x9b\x8bg?\xf0\x1f\xfa\xdc\x8aA\x92v\xfb\x15\xe8\xfb\xce\xf4!\x9a\xf9\x00
\x12\xac\x8f\xed\xbf\xa1J[\xc9\xf1p\x0bL\xaeR\xbbx17\x9d\x00hc|\x0c\x1a\xfd\xf8\
xb2\x1ab\xec\xa8N\x01\x8f1\xbd\x01p\xdb\xac\x10b\xb6\xc7\xaf\xe3\xd1\x97\xa4\xaf
\x9b\xa2\x9e\xfc\xfa\x94\xed\xc9\xdb0\xb0W\xc4\xbcHLU\xf1\xd3\xc2 \xa0\xf9\x06\x
bc\xd8\xfc\x0J\xdc\x7f\xd9~\xae%\x831\n!F;;\n\xe4\xa4\xb6\x0f\x8a\x81\xceN`j\xa

5\xca\xa4\x8b\xa0t\xa3\xa5\x1c\'TF\xd4\x84\xbe!\xbaE\xbc\x8f\x7f\xd3 \xd0\x99\x19\xc8\xc6j\xc6&W^\xa0\x15\xc1m5\xa0f\xf02:\x0b\xa0\xa8C\xb3\x9dj\x16\xaf\x81\xd1\x95\x04\x97\xd1\x0e\xaeK{\x13\x83d\xebF/\x96\x86\xb0#\x1f=Q5a\xc3\t\x0c\x14\xec\x02\x1e\xfd\x14\xff\x00t\xc2\xf7^\xef\x88\xc4Vt\x1f\>\xa1_~l\x05\x95\xf5\xf7q=\x13\xe5\xa3\t\x00\x00'

Texto limpo = b'\x1f\x8b\x08\x00#]\x99^\x02\xff5V{P\xd4U\x14f\xd9]\x16\x16vA\x96\x96\x18nE\x1e\xf2ZX\\\xb1,\xe2%ND,P8\x10\x0fa1\xde\x81(\xb9F\x89\x08\xcb\x8e\xae<F%\x08\xc8H\xc5\xc8\x89\x08\x0c,\x04Dd \x81E\xf2\x11M\xf1\xd8\x18\x8a\x00\x15\xc8\xc7\x90\xa0\xcd\xfc\xce\xc7_\xfb\xcd\xbd\xbf{\xbe\xef|\xe7\xdcsw\xcfT\xdb\xff\xd0C\xb2G\xe2\xa1g\xaaJ\xcd"\xc4\xab\x16\x7f\x03\x14u+\x9d\x90\x90=\x150\xc8\xb0\xc0Z\xc0 n\xa8b\x1eG\xef\xaa0\x132{i\xd3\xc7\x84Lb\xee\x17\xe3h\xc4\xd25\xecjY\\\x06\xe9\xff5\xdf\xc3\x00V}\xf9v\xecu\xcau\xb4W\xec\xbf\x00\xa6\x86\x0b\x96\x84\x0c\x8e\xcbDxKr-\x13\xe2\xb3*n\x102:\xdbt\x96\x90y1\x825!A\x86\xcf\xab\xc4\xe0\x1b\x07\x1d\xeb\x16#l\xc1\x15Sp\x00\xca\'t\xa006\xdf\xa2C\xb8\xd6\x18%v\xbf\xce\xa9G\xe0\xad\xfcvX\xf2\xb0p\x03N\xe4\x19v\x90\x11#]\xb1\x0c\x08\xfa"\x99\xf9e\xd7\x06\xc9\x89\xdcN\xebG\x9f\xc4Lr"\x81\x0f\x0f\xeeFR\xddud\$;\xba\xae\x1f\x84vm\x08.\xda\x13ZA\xc8b\xf3\xea[8:\xe5\xaa\xc2n\6\xe4\x18\x0e\xc8\xdd!15\xf3.\x12=\x92\x06gLF\xa5T\x18\xfd\x93cS0\x86\x9f\x12\x07\xb2\xe8\xa1\x1ad\xec\x9aN\x1e\x1bWC\xccH\xaf\xce\xe7\x01\xaa7\xec\xed\x86\xccu3\x14\x96\xab\xadn\xc4\x1b7\xbbQn\xa3\x96J5\xccM\x94\xa6\x82j\xba0\x16\xbb\xbfk\x8fC\xe5\x89\x1c?\xd0\xaf\xff\xe3\x17\xe8M8\xf0\x0c\x14\x8f1\xad@\xbb\xe8\x84\xbcLZ*.c\xcd\xda\x1a\xe5\xb0\xc81\x1eG<-P\x19\xcaQ=[\xc0 1\xd7\x9cdz\r\xc1V\xc3\xac\x80G\x0c\xe2\xb8\xef\x1a\x80\xa2\xd8\xf2\x10JyK\x881\x84?\xcf\x8f\xa4\x83\xcb\xdd\x1b\xa1\xb1[\xf9\' \x94)\x8a\x8eQI\xbdz\xb1\$\x1c?\x7f\x01\x9b\xd9a`2\xb9\xac;\x81\xea\xd6\xf8\x1d\xc4\x9a\x9b\xa7/\x15!` \xba\x89\x081\x1b}\x18\x90\xf0\xec\x10\xbe9j\xf3\n\x12\x8a\xe4\x9d\x86-3\x7f\xe3"\x18k\x1c\x9a`i~\xe2\x97P\x9b\xe4\x1c\r\x91~\xaf\xa1\x19\x84\xeb?qb\x90R*\x81Q2o)\xe2F\\\x84\x8d\x16\xdbW\xb6!ZY\xe0)0\xe8\xd4\xd4\xc2,\xa7\xf6wq\xa0\xe4\xfa\xa7\xf8\xcc"\x07W\xc84\xde\x11WY\xa8\xb7\x1cH\xfe\xa5\x05\x17\x92\xb7\x05\xad7\xd1\x9d\xee9\x1e\xbd4\xe4!\xd1"\xbf\xf0]\xbf"X\x83>KRR.\x9c\xeb\x9e\xd4\xe1\xe2\x95{\x14\xb3\xf4\x89\x0b\xbe\xa9\x17\xbd\x83|5\\;\xf8\xe2\xd3\x99GZ\xf3=. \xd1\xf7\xc7\x8a\xcf \xbaS\xf40\xa8y\xdb=1\xd669\x19"\xc6\xeaF\x92_\x11\xec\x896X\xdf\xfd\x0f\xd0d<]\x15\x96Y\xef\x19\xb4yV\x00\x03\xc6E\x98s\x06W\xae\x9dG\$\xce\xcb0\xa9\xa6sW>#\xb0Y\xe5\x03/#\x1dN\xa2/\xd4;\x15\x14\xf3\xaaB\x00\x9a\xfdK\xef\x03%\x9d\xd6#\xf5\xba[\xab\xc86Q~G\xd4\xcd\x03k%\xb2\x9fXDB\xb9VI@\xca\x15*=K\xb3/\x83\x1c\x14[\xd0\x9c\xe6\xd6\x0b\x83P>\x9b\xfe(\n?\xe2RJ_\x1b\x08\x1e\xc3Ai\x19e\xc6NN\'k\xd8=\x12odV\xf6\x18}\xcb\xcf\xfd\x0f\xdd\xc1\xb3j\xd8\x8f\xa8\xbb\x1dX\xc8\xb2\xaf\x85:\x96\xb54\xaf\xa1\x18\x8bJ4\x8c\t\xaf\x02S\x95\x1f\x9a\xdd\x80tS\xf6\xe1\xa1\xe1r5\xdd\xc7\xdax\xd0\x18\xa2\x89:\x9e\xa0\xc5\xc2\xdc\xbe\xa2T\xfa\x04\x94%7\xe7\x06\x9dd\xcfkil\xb3\xab~\xa8\xc2\xd76\x9ew\x18\$,\xc7]1\xd2,\xecD\x96\x1d\xb7\x9fb\x8d\xd7\xbc\x97B\x95\x8e6\x93acW\r\xc0\\\xa5\x7fgm\x1e\x17\xa5@\xbf\xa3\x1d\x86\x99\xd0h\x07={1\x05\x07\xedd\xf1\x06?\x17\xe4\xd2 \)\xf3\t_X+\x9a\x13\xd7\xa2r\x85\x9ex\x95\xcc6,\xce\x81"\xa1\xcc\x1fgy\x93t\xa7"\x1f\\\$\x1b\xede[\xc1\xeeey(\x1f\xda\xf8,\xca\x93sXN\x16T\x05\x7f\x8e-u~\xfa\xc2|\xb4\xd9\x88\$N\xd9~\xcb\x00\x03\x87A\x1a+\x96\xf5\xe8\x18a\xf89z\xd1\xd9\xb1\xe9?b\xe9_9\xa6?\x7fj/\$\x0bk>Bu\xf9/\xbaV\x93c\x97d#` \x1c\xce\x10\xaf=\xe8CTqV\xedo\xb8\x0f\xcf\x17\xe0\xebM\xbb14iDa)\x04v\x1e^A\xd2\xef9\xa7\xc1\x88\xef\xa7\xc3(\x84\xff\x07\xad(\x92\xb0w\x94A~\x93x]\xcc\xa4G2a\x89ZV\x08\x7f\xb7\xf1\xd6F

```
\x96$1\x16'\xa3Tl\x12\xeb\x92W\x89\xda\x0f\x9e\xa2\xbaq\x1d\xad\x11_X1[\x8d\x18
?0\x96\x90\xda\xde7E\tty-\xdb0\x10\x0c\xed9\n\xa0v\xce0\x83&\xf4\xf0\x14\xf2\x1b\
xe3fH\xf4\x0b\xe2\x02\xfc}QB\xcd\xba\xda8\x92"\xa0\xae\x96H0FvaZ\n\x02G\xf0\x86\x
1b\xfb\x9e\xa3"\xe9\x1f\x9d\x03\xa5(K\xa5\x01z\xda31\x19\xfe|\xda7C\x13\xfc\x7fW\x
88\xc0\xc9\xa1\t\x00\x00'
```

1.2 Kyber CCAKEM

A segunda implementação consistiu no desenvolvimento de funções que permitissem uma segurança IND-CCA, ou seja, segurança contra ataques *Chosen Ciphertext Attacks*. Tal como anteriormente, tornou-se necessário, numa primeira fase, a implementação de funções auxiliares. São utilizadas algumas das funções criadas previamente mas com a adição de novas funções que possibilitam a implementação com KEM. Estas são as seguintes:

- **H**: função de *hash* que recorre ao *SHA3-256*;
- **KDF**: função do tipo *key-derivation function* que utiliza *SHAKE-256*.

Como funções principais temos:

- **gerar_chaves_KEM**: tem como objetivo a criação das chaves pública e secreta que vão ser importantes na cifragem e decifragem respetivamente;
- **cifragem_KEM**: recebe como *input* a chave pública, calcula o *hash* de um *m* e ciframos este de modo a obter o encapsulamento. Retorna o criptograma e a chave partilhada. Utiliza como recurso as funções da implementação anterior;
- **decifragem_KEM**: recebe como argumentos o criptograma e a chave secreta e, após uma série de cálculos, retorna a chave partilhada caso não ocorra erros.

```
[5]: # função de hash com recurso a SHA256
def H(pk):
    digest = hashes.Hash(hashes.SHA256())
    digest.update(pk)
    r = digest.finalize()
    return r

# key derivation function com SHAKE256
def KDF(b):
    digest = hashes.Hash(hashes.SHAKE256(int(32)))
    digest.update(b)
    r = digest.finalize()
    return r

# geração da chaves pública e secreta
def gerar_chaves_KEM():
    z = bytearray(os.urandom(32))
    pk, sk1 = gerar_chaves()
    sk = sk1 + pk + H(pk) + z
    return pk, sk
```

```

# cifraagem e encapsulamento do m
def cifraagem_KEM(pk):
    m = bytearray(os.urandom(32))
    m = H(m)
    k1 = G(m + H(pk))[:32]
    r = G(m + H(pk))[-32:]
    c = cifraagem(pk, compress(m), r)
    k = KDF(k1 + H(c))
    return c, k

# decifragem e obtenção da chave partilhada
def decifragem_KEM(c, sk):
    pk = sk + bytearray.fromhex('{:0192x}'.format(12*k*(n//8)))
    h = sk + bytearray.fromhex('{:0192x}'.format(24*k*(n//8))) + bytearray(os.
    ↳urandom(32))
    z = sk + bytearray.fromhex('{:0192x}'.format(24*k*(n//8))) + bytearray(os.
    ↳urandom(64))
    m1 = decifragem(sk, c)
    k1 = G(m1+h)[:32]
    r1 = G(m1+h)[-32:]
    c1 = cifraagem(pk,m1,r1)
    if c==c1:
        return KDF(k1+H(c))
    else:
        return KDF(z + H(c))

```

De seguida são apresentados os resultados obtidos com recurso às funções anteriores.

```

[6]: pk, sk = gerar_chaves_KEM()
    c, k2 = cifraagem_KEM(pk)
    print("Criptograma = ", c, "\n")
    shared_key = decifragem_KEM(c,sk)
    print("Shared Key = ", shared_key)

```

Criptograma =

```

b'\x1f\x8b\x08\x00$'\x99`\x02\xff5VyP\x94u\x18\x86\xbd\xf8v\x81oq\x17\x876\x0eS
\x8ea\xe3\x8aC9\x86\xa2\xc4D\xb2\xa9\xe1\x98\x98B\xb0H\x94(\x10E\x16DH\x92\x0c2\
x12GNK`\x9dI\x0cL\x84 D49\xc4\xc0\x03%\x12\x05\x16\x87c\xc0\x00\x95s8\x84f\x6}\
xbe\xbf\xf6\x99\xdf\xef{\xaf\xe7y\xdf\xf7\xb7\xbc\x05\x8b#\x8e\xca8\xa5\xa3\x8et
\xa7\x897!6J\xddAH\xdc\xdc39A\xc8\xc0\xdf&\x94\x10\x93|=\x9e\x901\xd9I\x08[\x8b\x
f8\x93\x84\xe4\x9a\xc9\x11\xdc\x16*j\xaf1\xb7s\xaf\x16-}>\x8a;\x8d\xcf%B\x860\x1
b\xdf"d4\x184\x0bo\xf9\x9e\xc7\xb5H71\xe0G-(\x9e\xd7h\x7f\x05\x9a\x88\x0cx\x18JN
\x02\xb2d\x7f\x1d1"~\xcdt\x0f\\\x8d\xff\xb5\x19\xee;\x02\xfd\x91D\xb6F\x87\x90\x
e\xfe[wP(\xef\xd7j\n\x14\xac\xf2"\x0c\x12\x9b,~\xe0\xdb5\x833\xdbG\xe7P\xdd\xce\
x8c\x9f\x10"D\xe7\x06\xceL7QrB0\xeb\n:Z\xd7=~\t\xd3}i(T./\x03\x952\xdf\xb3J2\xc8
\xf56\xc0g\x05j;B\xa2\xe9$]-\xe2?\x9e$o\xfc\xea\xb6\x8dP#r|\t\xce\xd6\xe6\\\xc0\

```


9\x01\xd0p\xf20\xc1\xe9XV.q\xb4o\x9f\xc2`\x1a\xf7/A\x18\xb9\xa7\x16a\xeb\xb9J\xa7*\xdej%\x94\x807\xf8\x03\x81\x94\xd9\xa3\x14\xe1\xbdY9\x0b\x9a\xa7\xda\x11|.Z1\xd0c\r\x89\xa0\xea\xb5l\x0f\x12q7\x8c\x88\xf4\xd6\xb0z2\xad;d\xfa5\x10\x87\xb9\xba\x8b \x0e?\xee\x0cu\xce\xd7\xef\x86\x8a\x1e\x9f\x0f@\xf7\xb2R\xf6\xe2t\xf6\x8d\x12\xd4P\xbc\xb0\x8fFa\xe2;F\xfa\xfe3\xef\xe1\x10\xc7\xd5\x8c\xc3H\xe5<\xad\x03w\xaf>4H\xbbU\xb2\x15\xad\x8du\x9a@Xn\x901\x88\xb8\x8d\xb8\xa3\x867\xa9w\xd0!}q*\xfc\x8a\x1c\xc6\xe0\xa7\x96.B\xe4Q\xddW\xe8\xdfZX\x1a\xa8\xfb\xe7\x7f\x82\xbb\x7f\x8b\x8d0HUz\xafY\xa0j\xbd\xaa\x07\x98\xb2\xaa\xdf.\xb8e\x1c\xa0\xb62K{ e~\xe8kzDj\xdd\x8b\xc1\xf0\x8f\xack\xa3Rgd\x17PMU\x99\x07\xb8-\x1c\x95\xa2j\xb5\xb1\x15p\x8b{\x1f\xd2\x12\xcao\x04!\xc83\x0e\xde\x83z{<\x1f\x9d\xf8\xcac\x1dZ}+Q\x13\xe2\xdfkcJ\x94\x04\x81;(k\xc1#\x92\x05\x13\xf1\xd2\x8d,\xfe\x11\xf3\x04\x92\xc2\xf0nu\xa2\xbc\xbd\x18n\x9a\x932\x826\x15(\x14~\x96\xdf\x86\x8aMo\xdb\xbd\x05\x96\xb1(\\xc8\xcc\x9\x07\xba\xdeE\x0b\x8c\x91X\x1e\x84\x90\xeb\x8ah\xb3F\x8aM\x96\xa3\x16\x8a\x86\xeb\x9\xa6Yd\xc7\xc4\xa0\xcc\x7f\xa3\xa1~\xf1J%\x04\xaa9\xe9fN\xc3\x98\x7f\x86.k\x19\xac7\xc7\x853\x8dX\x1d\xc2B\x1fz\x9a\x1c\x8b9\x08I\xac\x9b\x8a\x0b\xeaF\xfe?\x81\x87\xbc\xbe\x82*pU\x85*D.\xcb\x02\xd0\xad\x08\x84\xde\x8b\xbf\x07@\xc6\xa2\x80\x8b(\x9e\xf7\xb6a\x94E#\xdbd\xc8\xa9\xaf_H\xe2\xcd\xfc\xd0\x96\xc0\xe4\xef\x16d<\x80\x0f\xcf\x1\x5e\xea\xca_Mx\x96#\x15\x918\x8bo\xa5U\xce\x91&\x95"\x9d\x99\xbb\xa3\xa2\x03k<t\x80\xfb.\x96\x94\xb8vb\x10\xc8>\xb5\x13hcy \xe8\x0c\xc5\xde\x83\xedI2\xb6\xb4P\xf9\xc5Y\xd8|d\xb42\x98\xcc\x9*T\x1b5\xdb\x90h\xaf-\xe5\xd1\xd9\xd7\xf2\x9d8;=\x95\rq\x94J10\xe1\x96\xbb\xe8\x85\xc8\xd8\xaf\x98n\xfa*[B\xfa\xfa5%\xc8\x94j\x82\xe7(\xb4\x17|\xaaX8.\xf8.\tN\x1d.\x83\xcd\xfa0\xfewPB\xfa0\xd4\x0e\x8d\xb4\x93\xfa0\x99\xb0\x0b\x94\xe0\xc2\xa4\x0f\xad\x15\x11\xb3\x02\x8c\xd3\xfa8"\x94`SK\x1bQ\xed\xca2=\xfc\xf37\xc7\x91\xbb\xef\x92\x1c\x05\xd8\x06h \xba\xa3\xca%p\x1c\xfb\x8f-\xa6sR\n\xbd\x08\xceY\xd2\xb3W}RBd\x99`\x93.\x0c\xef\xa1\xe2%\xee\xfaF\xa1\x11\xde\xb0\x15\xe5\xde\xe4\x10\x87:\xe4k\xb4\x92\x94\xe5\x9e\xfa8\x88\x88\\xab\x9bAhZ\x82\xfd\xaaQ\xef\xd7j\$\xfefiB\\xf5\xc1\x01\xb4@3\xb9\x1b\xd4\x84\xb1!\xd8p\x9a\xfd/\xb11\xf8\xd9\xa51h\xd0\tz\x82*\xb2\x85\xdf\x88\xe4B\x9b9\x04\xb4\x03\x95\xb1\xf8\xcf\x1cC\xbd\x85\xbd\xdf\x03\xf5w\xd1\x1b\x8e\xb3\x041\xcd\xa5\xa0U\$1\xbbJ\x88\xf98\x8b\x9e\xa6\x8a\xa1\xc7I|U\xfa2h\xe2\xccS\x87\x9a\xff\xd7.f\xca\xef\xfa8\xe2\x1c\xca\xcdyLD9\xea\xa7C\xc8\x7f\xfb8Z\xa1}\'\xeao\x94]\xbe:\x8a\x01\xfa\x1e!q1\xf9\xdf\xd2\xf6U=~@\xcb\x8c\x19\xd7\xc3\x02\x12h\xd8\xe1\xf9\xea1\xcc\xc6\x0e\xe5\xb5\xffc\x04\xfa3\t\xfa4\x87\xc0x\x95Q3\x99E\xf1-|\xc b'\xeah\x1e\xfa36\xfa8e\xd0\xaa\xdc\x1eMN_\xb6\xed\x83\xa9e3-\xae\xe6-\xa4\x9d\xfa f\x00\x17\xce<\x94\x9f\t\x00\x00'

Shared Key =

b"\xe1x\xe5e1)\xc6\xef\xe4'\xc46\xe5\x8d1tq,\xe8\xaf5|T\xfa5\\@W\xa5J\xe3\xdeC"