MODEL PERSONNEL SELECTION PROCESS FOR PODULAR,

DIRECT-SUPERVISION NEW GENERATION JAILS

Ben A. Menke

Associate Professor and Director
Criminal Justice Program
Department of Political Science
Washington State University

Linda L. Zupan

Graduate Research Assistant
Criminal Justice Program
Department of Political Science
Washington State University

Nicholas P. Lovrich

Professor and Director
Division of Governmental Studies & Services
Department of Political Science
Washington State University

Captain Don Manning

Jail Commander
Spokane County Sheriff
Spokane, Washington

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION

The importance of personnel selection processes for any type of social service organization cannot be overstated. The persons who are responsible for dealing with the challenges of client service and management--be they teachers, police off **leers,** social workers or correctional officers-are faced with demanding and personally taxing work worthy of the status of "professional" standing. The importance of personal **suitability** for the work at hand is particularly evident in the case **of** NEW GENERATION JAILS operated on the basis of podular architectural design and **direct** inmate supervision. Just as it is clear that "not everyone is cut out for the life of a teacher (or police officer, or social worker, **etc.),"** so is it evident that not everyone is cut out for the demands of the New Generation Jail workplace.

How *to* determine which **job** applicants are the most well suited *for* the work to be done by a correctional officer in a New Generation Jail is the **subject** of this brief report. In the **course** of spelling out a MODEL PERSONNEL SELECTION PROCESS it will **be** clear that the identification of job related criteria will **be** the primary concern throughout. Developments in the legal rights of applicants **for** public positions over the past decade necessitate a sincere attempt on the part of public sector hiring authorities to make all personnel decisions--particularly those relating to initial hire--on the basis of work related, **objectively** determined qualities of persons being considered for employment or promotion. In **accord** with this legal mandate, then, the model personnel selection process which follows is founded upon **a** careful determination of the specific work related skills and predispositions demonstrably connected with successful performance in the role **of** correctional officer in a New Generation Jail. The **results** of research reported here come from the study of supervisors and employees in several existing New

Generation Jails (Spokane County, Washington; Multnomah County, Oregon; Clark County, Nevada; Pima County, Arizona; and Contra Costa County, California); taken in AGGREGATE, these findings suggest the dimensions of **job** related skills and predispositions which are generally associated with successful performance in the role of correctional officer in such facilities. These dimensions are common to all the facilities studied, although the specific importance attached to each and the particular behaviors associated with each dimension necessarily differ from facility to facility depending upon each New Generation Jail's operating procedures, organizational norms, training and orientation content, etc. The model personnel selection <u>process</u> set **out** below, consequently, serves as a JOB RELATED STARTING POINT for any New Generation Jail manager facing the difficult problem of developing a useful and legally appropriate personnel selection process for their facility. The dimensions of employee behavior **most** essential to the successful operation of your pods are herein identified on the basis of systematic surveys conducting among several existing **New** Generation Jails, and the most noteworthy personnel selection practices which have been developed on the **basis** of actual experience in these facilities are **assembled** here for your careful consideration.

<u>The Three Phases of Personnel Selection</u>

The personnel selection process entails three distinct phases, each of which is an Important pate of the total task of appropriate employee hiring. The first phase is commonly referred to as PRESCREENING, and relates to the collection of pertinent background information to determine if the person applying for a corrections position meets the existing legal and ethical standards required for the position in question. While law enforcement and criminal **justice** agencies tend co differ considerably from jurisdiction to

jurisdiction on the specific **standards** and requirements to **be** met with respect co criminal records, character references, previous applicable work experience, etc., nearly **all major** jurisdictions require some type of background evaluation of applicants for correctional officer positions.

The second phase of personnel selection is typically referred to as the **ASSEMBLED** EXAMINATION phase, most usually entailing the administration of two types of formal, scored tests--1) a <u>written</u> civil service examination and 2) a <u>physical</u> fitness examination. Both forms of personnel testing are wisely constructed to **be job related** and maximally nondiscriminatory with respect to protected types of applicants (e.g., ethnic and racial minorities, women, the handicapped).

The third phase of personnel selection Is widely known as the INTERVIEW stage, wherein a broad of interviewers typically makes the final determination on hiring--either on the basis of the consideration of some fixed number of finalists from a civil service register or on the **basis** of a final hire or reject decision on applicants who have passed all other background and assembled examination hurdles. This phase of the personnel selection process, as well as the others, **is subject** to the possibility of close scrutiny for the **use** of job related criteria in the making of hiring decisions.

In the pages to follow, this report **considers** each of these areas in some detail. For example, in the PRESCREENING phase there is considerable agreement on the wisdom of conducting thorough background checks on all qualified applicants, **but** there is much less agreement on the relative merits of investing in <u>psychological screening</u> for **jobs** in correctional facilities. Given the remarkable liability exposure of jail facilities in every state and local jurisdiction, concern for avoidance of negligence in hiring and

training is quite high. In this regard, then, two primary questions arise with respect to the question of psychological screening in corrections: 1) can psychological screening serve as a RELIABLE tool in the personnel selection process; and 2) can the psychological screening tests employed in the law enforcement field be applied with equally beneficial results in the case of New Generation Jails. Both of these questions are discussed in some **detail below,** with the recommendation that psychological screening be incorporated in the Model Personnel Selection Process for **New** Generation Jails.

In the area of ASSEMBLED EXAMINATIONS, another section of the report takes up the consideration of two noteworthy developments resulting from the experience of operating New Generation Jail facilities. From the Clark County setting (Las Vegas, Nevada), an innovative age/gender norm graduation scored physical examination serves as a very inventive means of dealing with the often disadvantageous consequences for protected classes of common physical fitness tests. Similarly, from the Pima County setting (Tucson, Arizona), the use of videotaped workplace vignettes incorporated into the written test process serves as an excellent method of insuring the inclusion of **job** related content into the written examination.

In the final area of SELECTION INTERVIEW, the report sets forth the arguments supporting the adoption of a SITUATIONAL INTERVIEW process. This is a personnel technique which relies upon employee and supervisor participation in the process of Identifying the critical elements of a particular **job,** and making note of behavior which typifies excellent, acceptable and inadequate levels of response to situations wherein these critical elements are present. The surveys conducted among the several New Generation Jails provide the basis for the identification of both the critical dimensions of

the correctional officer position in New Generation Jails, and for the specification of actual observable behaviors characterizing good and poor performance of important tasks. This empirical evidence provides not only the basis for developing questions to be posed in the formal selection inter-view, but also specifies outstanding, average and unacceptable behavioral responses to problem situations which are likely to be encountered by correctional officers in New Generation Jail facilities.

Given the cardinal importance of job related criteria throughout the personnel selection process, particularly with respect to the assembled examination and interview stages, it is essential that some space in this report be devoted to the description of the methods employed to discover the job related performance dimensions and task behaviors associated with the correction officer position in New Generation Jail facilities. The well-developed and relatively widely employed analytical framework known as the "critical incident technique" serves as the **basis** for the determination of job related performance criteria **and associated** workplace behaviors reported in this report. The following section of this Model Personnel Selection Process monograph sets forth both an account of the methodology of the critical Incident technique employed here, and describes the actual steps taken in the collection of employee and supervisor job perceptions in the several New Generation Jails studies. In addition, this section will identify the general dimensions of job performance common to the jails studied, and list the specific behaviors associated with those dimensions of the correctional officer role.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF JOB RELATED SELECTION CRITERIA

The first stage in the development of any comprehensive personnel process--be it recruitment, selection, training or evaluation--requires that the important elements of a **job** be identified through a systematic job analysis. The most common form of **job** analysis focuses on the enumeration of job-specific   tasks. The major criticisms, however, of traditional task-based **job** analyses are that they do not take into account the full complexity of a job or how tasks are successfully performed. Behaviorally-based **job** analyses, on the other hand, focus on the actual **behaviors** necessary for effective **job** performance. Not only do behaviorally-based **job** analyses identify the critical **job** casks but they describe the behaviors required for the successful completion of tasks.

The critical incident technique, a behaviorally-based **job** analysis method developed **by** Flanagan (1954) and commonly used in personnel-related research (Latham, et al., 1980; Latham and Wexley, 1981), was **used** in this research to identify correction officer behaviors which are crucial for the effective Implementation of **direct** supervision inmate management. Each respondent **was asked** to describe **actual** incidents of both effective and ineffective correction officer **job** performance observed within the past 60 to 12 months. They were asked to **describe,** in detail, 1) the situation, circumstances or background of the incident, 2) the effective or ineffective behavior exhibited by the officer, and, 3) the outcome of the Incident or why the behavior was an example of effective or ineffective behavior. The advantage of the critical incident technique over other methods of **job** analysis is that it provides behaviorally-based information **about what** correction officers are actually **doing** and what they should be **doing,** and

focuses on the behaviors associated with successful or unsuccessful task performance.

At each facility, subjects were selected from the following groups: 1) correction officers with more than one year of experience in a podular/direct supervision facility, 2) officers identified by supervisors as particularly effective in performance of their job ("waterwalkers"), and 3) first line supervisors. Eighteen interviews (12 officers, 3 waterwalkers, 3 supervisors) were conducted at Las Vegas Detention Facility while ten (6 officers, 2 waterwalkers, 2 supervisors) were conducted at Pima County Detention Center. In addition to the interviews, a sample of officers from each facility were given detailed instructions and asked to provide examples of critical incidents and behaviors in writing. Twenty-three off leers in Las Vegas and 28 in Pima County provided written incidents and behaviors. A total of 346 incidents were collected; 177 from interviews and 169 self-reported.

After all the incidents were collected, those that were similar, if not identical, **were grouped** together **and ambiguous** Incidents were eliminated. In this stage, the incidents were synthesized into 70 **behavioral** items. The items were then **categorized** according to the similarities in the effective and Ineffective behavior exhibited by the officer. The analysis yielded seven descriptive categories or dimensions of critical correction officer **behavior,** each associated with 6 to 15 behavioral items. The seven dimensions represent the universe or totality of the podular/direct supervisor correction officer's **job. The** items **associated** with the dimensions are the behaviors defined by practitioners as critical to effective direct super vision correction officer **job** performance.

Content analysis of the items and dimensions was **assessed by** withholding 10% of the incidents prior to the editing stage (Latham and Wexley, 1981).

These incidents were examined after development of the dimensions and were **found** to describe behaviors already represented in the established items and dimensions.

A final analysis was conducted **to assess** the degree to which the behaviors and dimensions were common to both facilities. A problem associated with conducting a **job** analysis at two different locations is that the differences between facilities may produce behaviors or dimensions which are specific to only one of the facilities. To address this **issue,** the original 346 Incidents were redistributed amongst the dimensions and **tabulated as to** the source of the incident. The results of such a sorting indicate that these behaviors are uniformly distributed between the two facilities. The results indicate that none of the seven dimensions are specific to only one of the facilities.

THE CRITICAL DIMENSIONS OF CORRECTION OFFICER PERFORMANCE

The following section presents the seven critical dimensions of podular/ direct supervision correction officer **job** performance, a formal description of the dimensions, and the critical behaviors **associated** with the dimensions. For each dimension a brief discussion **illustrates** why the behaviors are critical co the effective implementation **and** operation of the podular/ direct supervisor philosophy.

Dimension 1: Managing the Living Unit to Assure a Safe and Humane Environment - The extent to which the correction officer used observation and communication to maximize compliant inmate **behavior** and minimize the occurrence of disruptive inmate behavior in the living unit; clearly **communicated** facility rules and expectations

co inmates and immediately responded to all incidents

of inmate misbehavior.

Three types of behavior were emphasized by officers as vital to the day **to** day management of inmates In the module. First, they emphasized the need for a proactive (preventative) approach to inmate supervision in contrast to the traditional reactive approach where, in general, the officer responds to threats to order after they have escalated into serious incidents. In one sense, proactivity referred to the continuous and active observation of all inmates and their activities. Moving amongst inmates within the module, listening attentively engaging them in casual conversation, observing their actions, asking questions were activities the officer engaged in to gather information about what was occurring in the module, to gauge sources of conflict or tensions, and, above all, to identify and react to situations before they escalated into serious problems. Ignoring inmates, sitting behind one's desk reading a book or newspaper, isolating oneself from the activities of Inmates were described as ineffective behaviors which often 'resulted in Inmate problems. **For** example, one officer described a situation involving a group of Inmates who were playing cards for 5 to 6 hours a day. The officer ignored the situation and sat at his desk reading a book. The ineffectiveness of his behavior was later revealed when It was discovered that the inmates were gambling for commissary goods and that cheating and extortion were part of the game.

Another type of proactivity concerned the recognition of potential problems and the necessity for prompt intervention before they escalated. An officer described a situation where two inmates were arguing over the seating arrangement at dinner. **At** the first indication of the argument, the officer intervened and ordered both inmates to their Individual rooms. This was

described as effective proactive **behavior because** It stopped an argument before it progressed to a more serious altercation. On the same line, an example of ineffective behavior occurred when an officer allowed two inmates to continue an argument over which television show to watch. The argument erupted into a physical fight. Instead of dealing with two inmates exchanging heated words, the officer was forced to intervene between two battling Inmates, risking Injury to himself and to other inmates.

A third type of proactivity concerned the need to **act** upon every violation of a facility rule. While officers had the discretion to deal with minor inmate rule violations in a number of ways, the consensus was that every rule violation, no matter how minor, **must be addressed** and, at the least, brought to the attention of the offending inmates. Allowing a rule violation to go without acknowledgment was viewed as a signal to inmates to test other rules.

A second group of behaviors emphasized as necessary for day to day module management focused on the need to communicate official facility rules and policies to the Inmates and explain personal expectations. Effective communication of rules and expectations was performed In a number of ways that ranged from: an initial viewing of a videotape upon arrival to the facility; meeting with inmates upon their arrival to the module; holding daily meetings with inmates; casually discussing issues when the Inmates were gathered together at meal time. Officers **viewed** these behaviors as effective because they reinforced facility rules, altered inmates to officer expectations, and explicitly defined the bounds of acceptable behavior. Failure to communicate rules and expectations was seen as an Invitation for inmate misbehavior and was believed co result in inmate hostility and tension over disciplinary action.

A final 'group of behaviors defined as crucial to the **daily** operation of the module concerned the vigilant guarding of officers' authority to prevent encroachment by inmates. The direct supervision philosophy of inmate management is predicated on the notion that the officer can be the only leader in the module (National Institute of Correction, 1983). This is in direct contrast to many traditional facilities which formally or informally use and-tolerate inmate leaders to maintain a semblance of order. Authority, when grant to or usurped by an inmate, becomes a coercive weapon **used** to manipulate others, including the officer. Several incidents were described where an inmate assumed **duties** that were the sole responsibility of the officer. In one situation an officer assigned an inmate to supervise the clean-up duties of other Inmates. The inmate was free to **use** the situation to his own benefit. Other inmates viewed the action as "playing- favorites." Hostility and tension developed between the supervising inmate and other inmates. The situation deteriorated to the point of potential violence against the supervising inmate and disruption of the module. By retaining one's authority the officer could have prevented the situation from occurring.

The critical behaviors associated with Dimension One are:

When observing a pattern of minor rule violations the officer calls a living unit meeting to **discuss** the problem.

Never delegates authority to an inmate.

Maintains an informal written record of Important Information about inmates.

Initiates frequent discussions of facility rules and expectations with inmates.

Explains to inmates facility rules, personal expectations and answers inmates questions **about those issues.**

Aside from appropriate emergency restrain techniques the officer never shoves, grabs, pushes, hits or physically touches an inmate.

Responds to all incidents of inmate rule violations regardless of their seriousness.

Makes certain that Inmates have timely and complete access to formal grievance procedures.

Recognizes medical emergencies (e.g., mental, medical) and is prompt in calling for appropriate assistance.

At the beginning of each shift the officer solicits information from inmates, makes announcements, explains schedule and shares information.

Closely monitors the **behavior** and conditions of an inmate with special problems (e.g., suicidal, mental, medical).

Engages in continual visual observation of inmates and investigates any activities or changes in inmate behavior appearing out of the ordinary.

Gathers as much information as possible (records, conversation) about inmates in order to effectively supervise them.

Continually moves throughout the living unit observing, listening to and talking with inmates.

Is quick to recognize potential problems between Inmates and moves swiftly to resolve them.

Dimension 2:   Handling Inmate Discipline - The extent to which **an** officer responded fairly and effectively when disciplining Inmates for disruptive behavior or rule violations.

The process of disciplining inmate misbehavior **takes** on **added** importance within the direct supervision facility. Discipline consists of a complex structuring of a range of penalties designed co achieve the overriding goal

of an orderly module and compliant Inmate behavior. The purpose of disci-
pline is the maintenance of an orderly environment rather than the punishment
of any particular inmate.

The process through which the officer disciplines an inmate for viola-
tion of facility rules was repeatedly illustrated in the critical incident
interviews. Two major behavioral themes emerged: 1) **use** of progressive
discipline, and 2) the application of fair and consistent disciplinary
measures.

Progressive discipline required officers **to** make a distinction between
minor and serious rule violations and between occasional and repeated
violations, and to take disciplinary action based on these judgments. The
informal disciplinary means *most* often mentioned **by** officers *were* counseling
or discussion with the offending inmate (discussing the rule violated by the
inmate, the reason for the rule, determining why the **rule** was violated and
explaining the consequences of repeated rule violation), a verbal warning or
reprimand, and/or sending the inmate to his/her room. Informal discipline
was **viewed** as an effective way to **deal** with rule violations too minor to take
official disciplinary action and where the purpose of the discipline was co
put a stop to the misbehavior without removing the inmate from the module.
The effectiveness of informal discipline depended on the officer's willing-
ness to follow through on warnings (or promises) to discipline continued
misbehavior.' Formal disciplinary options available to officers **included**
extended lockdown of the inmate within his/her room or transfer to a segre-
gation unit (a traditional maximum **security** module located within the
facility).

The second theme emphasized the fair and consistent application of
discipline. Officers described situations where *inmate* perception **about**

inconsistent and unfair disciplinary action led to unrest and hostility, a breakdown of order in the module, stimulation of further inmate misbehavior, disruption of staff/inmate relations, and arousal of tension amongst staff members. Among the most effective behaviors for insuring fair and consistent discipline were : 1) disciplining only offending inmate(s) rather than all inmates in the module, 2) disciplining an inmate in private rather than in the presence of other inmates, 3) explaining the reason for the disciplinary action to the **inmate,** in particular, identifying the rule the inmate violated, and 4) providing the inmate with an opportunity to explain the circumstances of his/her misbehavior.

In contrast to the discipline process in the direct supervision facility, the structure of traditional facilities (intermittent supervision) precludes fair and consistent disciplinary action. Because of the alternating presence and absence of the officer, discipline for rule infractions is differentially distributed and results from an officer's chance observation of misbehavior or from Inmate snitches. Thus, in a traditional detention facility, an officer's ability to control inmate behavior is structurally compromised and his/her authority **is subject** to manipulation **by inmate** groups.

The critical behaviors associated with Dimension Two are:

Consistently enforces facility rules.

Follows all rules (hearings, grievance procedures, written reports) when formally disciplining an Inmate (lock down, segregation, etc.).

When administering discipline to **Inmates** who violate a facility rule, the officer explains to the inmate the rule he/she **violated** and the reason for the discipline.

Evaluates reasons for rule violations to insure that inmates are not unjustly disciplined.

Delivers on warnings to discipline inmates for
misconduct or rule violations.

When an inmate **violates** a minor facility rule,
the officer warns the inmate once before taking
disciplinary action.

Recognizes the difference between minor and
serious rule violations; repeated and occasional
violations, and takes corrective action accord-
ingly.

When responding to inmates' misbehavior, the
officer disciplines only the responsible inmate
rather than all inmates in the living unit.

Punishment or counseling of an inmate is handled
"One-to-one" rather than in front of other **inmates.**

When disciplining an inmate for misbehavior the
officer provides the inmate with the opportunity
to explain his/her conduct.

Dimension 3:   Responding to Inmate Requests - The extent to which an

officer effectively responded to inmate requests and

demands in a fair and balanced fashion; avoided inmate

manipulation.

In the direct supervision facility, the module officer is the most
direct contact the inmate has with the facility's administration, other
components of the criminal justice system and with the outside world. As a
consequence, officers face a daily barrage of questions, requests for
information, and complaints from inmates. How an officer deals -with these
questions and requests directly influences the degree of anxiety, hostility
and isolation felt by inmates.

Several behavioral themes were discerned from the interviews. First was
the need to acknowledge and respond to every inmate request even when the
response was to deny the request. Several officers with experience in
traditional jails highlighted the importance of this theme when they

recounted how officers in these facilities, **because** of their intermittent contact with inmates, developed strategies to **deal** with inmate requests **by** lying about what they would do in response to the requests or **by** ignoring the requests **.** These survival strategies promoted further inmate isolation and hostility, led to increased tension and disorderliness within the facility and resulted in a tendency for the officer to avoid those inmates to whom promises had been made and not kept.

Other themes included responding **to** inmate requests in a polite and courteous manner, equal treatment of all requests, and fulfilling all promises made to inmates. One officer provided this example of ineffective behavior. An inmate requested a supply item provided by the jail to indigent inmates. The officer's response was to remind the inmate that he was in jail and should not even get the air to breathe. The officer was faced not only with the hostility of the inmate but the hostility of all inmates in the module when the comment was circulated.

The critical behaviors associated with Dimension Three are:

The officer never grants inmate privileges out of fear.

The officer says "No" to inappropriate inmate requests.

Whenever appropriate the officer responds to inmate requests for information in writing.

In response to an inmate request, an officer never makes a promise he/she cad t keep.

When responding to an inmate request, the officer always indicates: 1) that he/ she doesn't know; 2) will find out and get back; or 3) refers inmate to appropriate **source.**

Treats all inmate requests the same, does not play favorites with inmates **by** fulfilling some requests and denying similar ones.

In response to inmate requests for information the officer links the inmate to specialists or sources (lawyers, etc.) who have the answers.

> The officer, while acknowledging all requests does not run every Inmate errand.
>
> When an inmate makes a request the officer always explains in a courteous fashion what action he/she will take in response to the request.

Dimension Four :   Building Positive Rapport and Personal Credibility With Inmates - The extent to which the correction officer created an environment of mutual respect by demonstrating consistency and a courteous manner.

The officer, as the leader in the module, is expected to cake responsibility for setting a positive tone for interaction amongst Inmates and staff. If officers dehumanize, belittle or degrade Inmates or are unable to control their emotions, the message communicated is chat negative, antisocial and uncivil behavior is the norm.   Inmate compliance and cooperation thus become problematic.   If the officer's behavior reflects a mature, polite and civil demeanor, the message that Incivility is intolerable is reinforced.

The need to create a module environment of mutual respect was accomplished by demonstrating consistency in day to day interactions with the Inmates, maintaining a courteous demeanor, using common courtesies such as "please" and "thank you," and remaining emotionally controlled in contacts with inmates, regardless of the situation or circumstance.   Several incidents were described In which officers were called derogatory names by inmates. Overwhelmingly, the officers agreed that retaliation against inmates by calling them derogatory names or taking excessive disciplinary action in an emotional fashion produced even greater inmate hostility and misbehavior.

The critical behaviors associated with Dimension Four are:

> In daily contacts with Inmates, the officer avoids doing or saying anything which degrades or belittles the inmates.

In day to day communications with inmates the officer is polite and courteous but firm.

When dealing with inmates the officer never swears.

Demonstrates common courtesy by using "please," "thank you ," and by being an active listener.

Treats all inmates the same regardless of race, gender, appearance, or the offense for which they are in jail.

Except In emergency situations, the officer never communicates with an inmate by yelling across the living unit.

Dimension Five: Supervising In a Clear, Well-Organized and Attention-Getting Manner - The extent to which the officer exhibited effective skill in organizing, supervising and motivating inmates in their activities.

The principles of effective supervision, irrespective of the organizational setting, require specific skills and abilities. The officers reiterated and elaborated on these general principles. Effective supervision of inmate task performance depended on the ability of the officer to: 1) clearly communicate orders, requests and requirements of a task; 2) assign tasks equitably and consistent with inmate abilities; 3) motivate inmate compliance through praise and constructive criticism; 4) insure that inmates were able to comply with orders; 5) provide continual feedback to inmates on their performance; and, 6) follow up on inmate compliance. The importance of effective supervisory skills was illustrated in several incidents. Two examples were given where inmates ignored officers' orders. In one situation, instead of insuring that the inmate complied, the officer gave the same order to another inmate, hoping that this inmate would obey the command. In the other situation, the officer performed the task assigned to the inmate. These behaviors were labeled ineffective because they demonstrated the

officers' inability co exercise authority. It was predicted that both officers would be confronted with mass inmate disobedience in the future.

In the direct supervision facility officers rely on effective supervisory techniques co insure inmate compliance and accomplishment of daily tasks. In contrast, in traditional facilities the staff often rely on inmate leaders or "tank bosses" to supervise completion of daily inmate tasks. This creates several problems; the correction officer's authority is compromised and inmate manipulation of other inmates is facilitated to the detriment of facility order.

The critical behaviors associated with Dimension Five are:

Whenever appropriate the officer consults with inmates before making changes in work routines.

Gives prompt feedback to inmates which allows self assessment and self correction.

Employs a variety of techniques (e.g., praise, granting of privileges, humor) to motivate and reward inmate compliance and cooperation.

When giving an order the officer sees to it that the inmate carries it out.

When giving an order or making a request, the officer makes sure that the circumstances permit the inmate to comply and chat the Inmate understands the directions.

Evaluates inmates work performance promptly.

Issues orders in a polite and courteous manner.

Assigns inmate work tasks in an even-handed manner to avoid the appearance of favoritism.

Dimension Six: Resolving Inmate Problems and Conflicts - The extent to
which correction officers provided guidance for the
solution of inmate problems; recognized the steps involved
in resolution of inmate conflicts; dealt with inmates in
confrontational   situations.

Within the close confines of any detention facility, conflicts and
disputes will arise amongst inmates and between inmates and the correctional
staff.   The officers recognized the potential for escalation of these minor
daily conflicts to large scale disruptive events. They argued that the
effective officer was proactive and dealt with these conflicts at the first
sign of disharmony.

The behaviors described under this dimension focused on officers'
conflict management and problem-solving abilities.   The officers described
generally accepted principles of conflict resolution. They pointed out that
the effective officer separated inmates in a dispute by sending them co their
rooms co calm down; gathered information about causes of disputes; offered
alternatives ; and, negotiated agreements.   In addition, the officers
discussed the importance of a patient and calm demeanor and the use of
innovative and creative solutions.

The officers provided a number of examples of conflict situations. In
one situation inmates were arguing over the use of the telephone.   Several
inmates needed to make "life threatening" telephone calls at the same time.
An argument ensured.   To deal with the potentially volatile situation, the
officer arranged a row of chairs by the telephone.   Inmates were instructed
to take a seat and, when the telephone was available (each call was limited
to 10 minutes), move forward one seat.   Although the situation appeared
overly simplistic, the droll manner in which the officer offered the solution

broke the tension and ended the arguing. Thus, the officer was prompt and innovative in his actions and averted a situation that was almost certain co erupt into a major conflict.

The critical behaviors associated with Dimension Six are:

When resolving disputes between inmates, the officer separates the Inmates by ordering both co their rooms and then speaks with each individually.

Gathers as much Information as possible about inmate problems **or** confrontations before taking action.

Holds a meeting with **all** inmates in the living unit to resolve misunderstandings or tensions between the officer and inmates.

Whenever possible offers inmates face-saving alternatives to resolve problems.

Negotiates agreements to solve inmate problems.

Recognizes that inmate problems are different and initiates innovative actions **co** solve them.

When dealing with an irate inmate, the officer asks the inmate to go **co** his/her room to allow the inmate to calm down before discussing the matter.

Exhibits patience when resolving problems with inmates.

Uses casual conversation to calm agitated inmates.

When called an obscene name **by** an inmate, the officer remains calm and la control while dealing with the behavior.

When responding to inmate problems, an officer explains the alternatives **to** the inmate in resolving the problem.

When confronted by an **agitated inmate,** the officer talks with the inmate in a calm and controlled manner.

Dimension Seven: Maintaining Effective Administrative and Staff Relations -
The extent to which the correction officer had knowledge
of and consistently applied facility rules and procedures;
coordinated activities with co-workers; supported the
authority of staff members; communicated with supervisors
and ocher administrators.

In traditional j ails, staff-administrative relations are often mistaken-
ly assumed to effect only the organizational dynamics and the job'
satisfaction of individual employees. It became clear in our interviews that
these relations are important for the achievement of an orderly module and
for facility security. In contrast to correction officers in a traditional
jail, the module officer is a crucial, if not the most important, organiza-
tional member.

The officers emphasized their role in maintaining effective relation-
ships amongst staff and between staff and administration. Of critical
importance was their emphasis on consistency between officers in dealing with
inmates. In particular, consistency was demanded between module officers on
different shifts. The rules enforced on one shift must be the same rules
enforced on the other shifts. Several behaviors were described as effective
in maintaining consistency between officers including holding regular and
informal meetings with all shift officers assigned to a module, providing
pertinent information to relieving shift officers, refraining from expressing
criticism of another officer in the presence of inmates, verifying inmate
claims with the appropriate staff, and supporting the appropriate efforts of
other officers in their dealings with inmates.

Providing appropriate Information to the facility administration in a
timely manner was also reported to be important.   One officer recounted

asituation in which an inmate confessed to having committed a homicide to an officer. The officer, believing that the Inmate was lying (he was in jail or different charges) did not related the information to his supervisor. The inmate later confessed to the crime in court and told the judge that he had advised an officer of the crime. Not surprisingly, the officer faced disciplinary actions for his failure to report the confession to his super visor. As illustrated in this example open channels of communication between officers and supervisors and amongst officers is vitally important for module order, facility security and protection of the individual officer.

The officer's knowledge of and adherence to facility policies and procedures was mentioned as a vital component of effective staff-administrative relations. The officers argued that the policy and procedures manual was, in effect, "the Bible." By behaving in ways consistent with policies and procedures, the officers avoided inmate manipulation and promoted consistency in module management. In addition, officer practices consistent with official policy created a communication system where feedback and change in formal operating procedures was accomplished in a legitimate fashion.

The critical behaviors associated with Dimension Seven are:

> Promptly reports critical information (e.g., confessions to a crime, plans for escape, inmate set up) to appropriate staff members.

> Refrains from expressing criticism of another staff member in the presence of Inmates.

> Maintains consistency of the living unit supervision by regularly consulting with other shift officers.

> Supports the appropriate efforts of ocher officers in dealing with inmates.

> Promptly calls for emergency back-up when necessary to prevent the escalation of inmate disturbances or protect own safety.

> Coordinates with other staff on specific inmate discipline matters.

Supports the rules and regulations of the facility by not criticizing them in the presence of inmates.

Follows all facility rules and procedures even when inconvenient or when it makes the job more difficult.

Verifies with the appropriate staff all inmate claims for special privileges or assignments.

Provides pertinent information to relieving shift officers.

Concluding Remarks

Human resource development for podular/direct supervision detention facilities remains in its infancy. Direct supervision personnel systems such as job analyses, selection and performance appraisal processes have been developed on a site by site basis and are designed to **meet** the unique environmental and operational needs of the specific facility. Our goal in this project was to identify critical correction officer behaviors required for successful implementation of the direct supervision philosophy regardless of environmental and operational variates. By using a behaviorally-based method of job analysis at two, on-line, direct supervision facilities with reputations for excellence, an effective link has been established between the podular/direct supervision philosophy and the actual, day to day, implementation of the philosophy by correction officers in the modules. Thus, we believe that the results of the job analysis are generalizable, with some limitations, **to** other podular/direct supervision facilities.

While we are confident that the results of this job analysis describe the Important elements of the podular/direct supervision correction officer job, facilities are cautioned in using them without careful **and** thorough review. For on-line **direct** supervision facilities this review may include a supplemental job analysis and/or an iteration survey.

To ensure that all critical elements of the correction officer job have been identified, the facility can undertake a supplemental job analysis. To accomplish this, we recommend that facilities use the critical incident technique described above, and interview approximately 10 "waterwalkers" (both correction officers and first line supervisors) employed within the facility. The data gathered through this job analysis can be compared to our findings to identify unique behaviors.

'To account for any unique environmental or operational features, the facility can conduct an "iteration survey" using the behaviors and dimensions reported here (See Latham and Wexley, 1981). The self-administered survey, distributed to a sample of supervisory and line personnel, consists of two major sections (See "Correction Officer Critical Incident Survey" in APPENDIX A). In the first section, respondents are asked to evaluate the relative importance of each performance dimension by distributing 70 points across the dimensions. The second section asks respondents to evaluate the importance of the behaviors to overall success of correction officer performance and to indicate which performance dimension the behavior is associated with. The results are then analyzed as to agreement about performance dimensions and behavior importance.

Once these two steps have been completed, dimensions and behaviors can be added, deleted or modified. Facilities are cautioned, however, in assuming that differences in the job analysis presented here and their own review findings are the product of environmental and operational uniqueness. Instead, the differences may be the result **of** problems with the facility's training or operating procedures. Careful attention must **be** focused on why differences occur and whether the unique feature of the facility which

produced &he difference is consistent or inconsistent with the New Generation philosophy.

Facilities still in the planning stages may wish to use these results as a general guide in the development of their human resources. The dimensions and behaviors should, however, be reviewed by a facility's personnel specialist for their applicability in a specific instance.

MODEL PROCESS PRESCREENING PRACTICES

Introduction

One of the most essential functions of the prescreening step in any personnel selection process is the detection of persons possessing serious disqualifying characteristics. Persons with a criminal past, those with on-going associations with criminal elements, those with a history of untrustworthy conduct, those with seriously deficient work histories, those with **serious** mental disorders affecting interpersonal relations--these and other similar background traits are the customary foci of the prescreening stage of personnel evaluation. Correctional facilities, New Generation and otherwise, vary considerably in the content and practices making up their prescreening stage. Most, however, engage in a quite lengthy process of formal investigation of applicants because it is not uncommon for criminal elements to seek access to the criminal justice process by means of the employment in correctional facilities.

The model prescreening process, then, entails the full list of practices normally engage in-e.g., checking details of the employment application against school, military service and previous employer **records;** checking all official sources for a criminal record; interviewing references identified by job applicants; checking with past employers or military service units where

perceptions of the applicant's workplace behavior can be checked and veri-fied. While these practices are widely used and raise little controversy in their adoption, less consensus exists concerning the use of psychological testing in the prescreening process. The following section briefly discusses recent developments in the area of psychological screening in the criminal justice field, focusing attention on the implications raised for personnel selection processes in New Generation Jails of the podular, direct super-vision type.

Developments in Occupational Psychological Screening in Criminal Justice

For a number of years now the process of the professionalization of the criminal justice field has brought with it a deeper concern for methods of selection of persons particularly well-suited to the life of service to society through the management of those in trouble with the law. The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (1973) recommended that law enforcement and correctional agencies should develop personnel selection processes which "should include a written test of mental ability or aptitude, an oral interview, a physical examination, a PSYCHOLOG-ICAL EXAMINATION, and an in-depth background examination." [Emphasis added]. While the law enforcement field has been quick to respond to this and ocher calls for the adoption of pre-entry psychological testing, the corrections field has been quite slow to do so. The Manual for Accreditation of Adult Correctional Facilities of the Commission on Accreditation for Corrections does not prescribe pre-hire psychological screening of correctional officer applicants. At this point fewer than ten states have enacted legislation mandating pre-entry psychological evaluation of correctional officer appli-cants--a number far behind that for law enforcement applicants.

Notwithstanding the relative novelty of such psychological testing in the corrections field, a good deal is known concerning the validity and practicality of the several screening protocols in most common use. The rather detailed technical report on psychological screening instruments attached as Appendix B contains a full discussion of the diverse instruments and tests available for use, with a careful analysis of the psychometric and legal standards applying to their employment. On the basis of considerable research and in-the-field experience it is quite evident that the ability of such tests to isolate those with a high potential for inappropriate behavior in the correctional officer role increases geometrically with the use of a multiple testing protocol. The author of the technical report argues that, on the basis of research on scale reliability and record of correct classification of normal and abnormal applicants, the combination of the California Psychological Inventory and the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory produces a "powerful assessment tool." Roth of these psychological tests are lengthy and require the professional interpretation of a trained psychologist, but such persons are not exceedingly difficult to find and employ for this important undertaking. THESE TESTS CANNOT BE ADMINISTERED AND INTERPRETED BY THE LAY PERSONNEL PRACTITIONER.

While this combination of formal tests constitutes a powerful assessment package, it is important to note that a clinical interview is also to be included In the psychological testing process. The author of the technical study commissioned for this report argues convincingly that the previous evaluation of the results of the California Psychological Inventory and the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory will prepare the consulting psychologist with the background information necessary to conduct a clinical interview in which suspected areas of questionable make-up can be detected

for closer scrutiny by a trained observer. Inwald, Levitt and Knatz (1982) report a race of acceptance of 88% with the use of this type of combination test/clinical interview format with a sample of 1,023 correctional officer applicants in New York. It is interesting to note that New York is a state which requires such testing for correctional officers, but it also provides for an automatic appeal to an independent board for those not passing the psychological screening exam. Of the appeals filed, only one-in-three resulted in a reversal of the original psychological assessment. [An appeal entails the submission of a separate, privately obtained evaluation from a psychologist or psychiatrist being filed with the independent board. See the excellent account of this process and how it has worked in the State of New York in Franzese, 1984).

Recommendation Favoring Use of Psychological Screening

Given the added responsibilities assigned to the correctional officer in the podular, direct supervision New Generation Jail it seems especially important that great care be taken in the prescreening of applicants for psychological fitness. Since most of the work done in the New Generation Jail setting occurs in the context of a correctional officer working his/her pod ALONE, it is important that individuals hired for such a job can handle the mental pressure associated with isolation among the incarcerated popula-tion. The evidence of the widespread successful use of psychological tests in the law enforcement field would seem to indicate that with the further development of professionalization in the field of corrections will come the widespread adoption of such testing in corrections as well. New Generation Jails should, given their high dependence upon the lone pod officer, lead the forces of change toward the institutionalization of psychological screening of correctional officers. The psychological research and the results of

field application seem to suggest that a MODEL PSYCHOLOGICAL **SCREENING** TEST would entail the use of a combination of the California Psychological Inventory and the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory as a source of pre-clinical interview background information.

MODEL PROCESS ASSEMBLED EXAMINATIONS

Introduction

Nowhere is more close attention paid to the WORK RELATED character of selection criteria than in the assembled examination stage. Especially in the area of criminal justice employment--typically the chief source of employment opportunities for minorities and women in municipal and county government--written examinations and physical tests of qualification have come under extremely close scrutiny. Where selection processes generate a rate of selection of protected classes less than 80% of that of the most successful group, a challenge can nearly never be withstood without the convincing demonstration of the work related character of criteria employed in intermediate and final selection decisions. Since two areas where such problems arise most glaringly for the corrections field are those of the physical examination (for women and those over 40 years of age) and the written test (for minorities), this model personnel process contains specific recommendations in both of these areas-recommendations stemming from the **successful** operation of innovative practices already employed in on-line New Generation Jails of the podular, direct supervision type.

Innovation In Physical Qualification Testing

Of particular importance in the area of challenges to criminal justice employment practices have been those of height and weight limits--with most

such standards having been reduced significantly in the interest of providing fairer employment opportunities to women and some minorities (particularly Asian-Americans and Mexican-Americans). More recently, physical fitness tests have come under the same kind of close judicial examination, with the result chat such tests are now typically required to meet the twin goals of work relatedness and minimum disadvantage to protected classes. Most physical fitness examination sequences in **use** now are likely to meet the first desired trait better than in the past, but the nature of the impact of such tests particularly on women and men over 40 years of age typically remain less positive than might be hoped. In those cases where previous gender barriers in corrections have been removed--that is, in those situations where women and men are assigned to supervise male inmate living areas--the problem of recruiting a sufficient number of qualified women is magnified **by** high washout rates in the physical fitness qualification phase.

Faced with this kind of dilemma on a fairly significant scale, the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (hiring authority for the county jail facility for Clark County, Nevada) has instituted an innovation in physical fitness testing worthy of widespread attention. The system of assessment of fitness qualification employed is based upon the following logic: 1) the test applied to all candidates must be THE SAME (1.5 mile run, flexibility sit and reach, sit ups and push ups) and must reflect the level of physical condition required for successful employment in the criminal **justice** "street level" positions of patrolman and corrections officer; 2) the standard against which all are judged must be THE SAME-In this case the norm estab lished in large-scale pretesting of the dimensions of physical fitness; and 3) the norms themselves DIFFER across age and gender groups. Replicated below are the norms and the gradations applying to age and gender groupings.

AGE GROUP	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+
MALE					
1 1/2 MILE RUN	12:00	12:30	13:00	14:30	16:15
FLEXIBILITY	15.0"	14.5"	12.5"	10.5"	10.5"
SIT UPS	34	31	26	20	18
PUSH UPS	20	17	13	13	13
FEMALE					
1 1/2 MILE RUN	15:54	16:30	17:30	19:00	19:30
FLEXIBILITY	18.5"	16.5"	15.5"	15.5"	15.0"
SIT UPS	30	24	15	14	14
PUSH UPS	14	12	9	6	6

The experience of the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department has been that the use of this logic in the physical fitness testing process produces both physically fit candidates **and** a high passing rate for women and those males over 40 years of age who apply for employment. Personnel officials in the New Generation Jail facility in Las Vegas report no problems in receiving **candidates** for correctional officer positions in the jail from the Police Department with respect to their physical fitness for the work to be done. [Appendix C contains information on this testing process. Contact Robert W. Burd, Personnel Bureau for further information.]

Innovation In the Written Examination Process

In the area of written examination the most, common form of job related content is that of questions dealing with on-the-job hypotheticals. Job applicants are often asked to indicate how they might assess this or that situation, interpret and apply a particular **rule** or law, or make judgments

about the relative importance of objects and behaviors to be monitored in a given setting. Most such written tests have produced, unfortunately, quite poor rates of predictability of subsequent success on the job. While many reasons may account for this, one commonly held argument among personnel specialists is that job applicants have seldom experienced the situations they are asked to assess, they have little or no familiarity with the rules in action they are asked to apply, and they have seldom if ever seen the settings wherein they are to make judgments as to the relative importance of specific objects and behaviors.

In an attempt to bridge this gap between job related test content and applicant understanding of the context of questions being asked the staff of the Pima County New Generation Jail facility has made exceptionally good use of the video tape medium to provide the link between context and written examination work related written test items. This linkage is established by means of the use of video taped vignettes produced within the facility itself, giving applicants a visual sense of the context in which the work related questions are to be answered. The four vignettes depict what could be described as typical correction officer encounters with inmates. After viewing each vignette, testees ace asked a series of questions designed to tap different skills and abilities. Overall, the four vignettes and accompanying written quest ions tap applicants' observational and memory skills and written and oral communication skills. '[For further information concerning the video tape, contact Alton W. Henton, Corrections Training Sergeant, Office of Sheriff of Pima County, Arizona.]

It should be noted that in Pima County job applicants are provided written material as *to* the OPERATING PHILOSOPHY of New Generation Jails before engaging in the written examination. This material adds further to

applicants' knowledge of the context within which their examination questions are to be placed. Included in Appendix D is the supplemental information given to correctional Officer applicants, including excerpts from "The Jail and It's Operation and Management," U.S. Bureau of Prisons (1977) and "Principles and Dynamics of Jail Management Essential to New Generation Jails" prepared by Ray Nelson of the Jail Division of the National Institute of Corrections (1983). A substantial portion of. the balance of the written examination then pertains to the ideas set forth in those two sources of background information on correctional facilities generally, and on the operating philosophy of the New Generation Jail facility in which the applicants are seeking employment.

Recommendations Regarding Model Process Assembled Examinations

The innovations in physical fitness testing and written examination formats devised for use in the New Generation Jail facilities of Las Vegas, Nevada and Tucson, Arizona seem most appropriate for the management of two common problems in assuring that work related criteria guide the personnel selection process without disadvantaging protected classes of applicants. The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department physical fitness testing program appears to meet the test of producing both fit candidates for the Las Vegas New Generation Jail facility and assuring chat facility of a fair rate of female and 40+ aged candidates. The Pima County facility's innovative use of state-of-the-art technology in the personnel evaluation and training field-- i.e., purposefully constructed video tape vignettes for group and individual testing-stands out as an accomplishment from which other New Generation Jail facilities stand to benefit. In recommending physical fitness testing and written examination practices for the MODEL ASSEMBLED EXAMINATIONS PROCESS the authors of this report commend the accomplishments of these two agencies,

and urge other New Generation Jail managers and personnel specialists to make use of these innovative practices in their own settings. Particularly in those many circumstances wherein protected classes are being sought out for employment and challenges on the work related content of written examinations are to be anticipated, the use of the graduated norms of physical fitness keyed to gender and age and the use of state-of-the-art personnel technology in the written examination sequence **would** seem advantageous.

MODEL PROCESS SELECTION INTERVIEW

While most organizations, public or private, utilize some form of oral interview in their selection process, the content and format of these interviews are as varied as they are numerous. The most important distinction in how organizations interview **job** applicants focuses on whether the interview is structured in that the questions are asked of each applicant, or unstructured in that there is no set procedure and questions are tailored to the particular applicant. **A wide** range of errors and **abuses,** however, are typically associated with the unstructured interview format. The two most critical errors are the inclusion of legally prohibited questions which are discriminatory in nature and the inclusion of questions focusing on applicant personality or temperament traits which are unrelated to job performance.

To avoid these two common errors associated with unstructured selection interviews, **the** MODEL PROCESS SELECTION INTERVIEW **for** use in New Generation Jails provides a structured format and standardized questions with benchmarked answers. To ensure that the content of the interview is job-related and addresses the important elements of the correction officer's job, questions and benchmarked answers were developed directly from the dimensions of correction officer job performance defined in the job analysis

described above. The following section delineates the methodology used in the development of the interview questions and answers and presents the results of the project.

Situational interview questions and benchmarked answers for each of the seven dimensions were developed by personnel at three podular/direct super vision facilities. Participants included one lieutenant, sergeant and correction officer at Las Vegas Detention Center; one captain, lieutenant and sergeant at Pima County Detention Center; and, one director and deputy chief at Contra Costa Detention-Center. All of the participants had experience working as or supervising direct supervision correction officers and most had experience interviewing correction officer job applicants. The inclusion of administrators, supervisors and line personnel ensured that a variety of perceptions and perspectives were represented in the interview questions and answers.

The questions and benchmarked answers for each dimension were constructed through a three stage, group process developed by Latham, et al. (1980:422-427). At each stage, group discussion and debate were encouraged to facilitate group consensus.

In the first stage, the participants independently reviewed the dimensions and associated behaviors and selected three behaviors which they believed best exemplified each dimension. Each participant read their selections to the group and explained the rationale for their choices. Through group discussion, one behavior was elected for each dimension.

Participants were next asked to describe actual situations they had observed in which &he correction officer exhibited the critical behavior selected for each dimension. Through discussion and modification, the group selected one situation which best illustrated the critical behavior of each

dimension. Once consensus was reached, the group translated the situation into a question.

The following is an example of the process as followed by the group in Las Vegas in development of a situational question for the dimension "Managing the Living Unit to Assure a Safe and Humane Environment:"

Stage One: The behavior agreed to by the group was: "Explains CO inmates facility rules, personal expectations and answers inmate questions about these issues."

Stage Two: The group selected the following incident to illustrate the behavior: "An Inmate fails to make his bed which is in violation of the facility's rules. The correction officer ignores the violation."

The incident was translated by the group into the question: "On an inmates first day in your module, he fails to make his bed which is in violation of the facility's rules. What would you do?"

To formulate the benchmarked answers, each member of the group was asked to describe how correction officers who are outstanding, mediocre, and poor on the job would respond to the situation. Each benchmarked answer was discussed by the group until consensus was reached. For some situations, the group agreed that two responses were necessary for a benchmark. In these cases, both answers were included. Outstanding answers were assigned a score of 5; mediocre answers assigned a score of 3; and, poor answers assigned a score of 1. The benchmarked answers agreed upon by the Las Vegas group for the above situation were: (5) Because it was the inmate's first day in the module, I would explain the rule to the inmate, give him a verbal warning, document the violation and ensure chat he complies in the future, (3) I would order the inmate to make his bed (interviewee gives no indication that he

would explain the 'rule or the violation to the inmate) OR (3) I would tell the inmate that I would let it pass this one time-after all, he is new to the module (interviewee gives no indication that he would explain the rule or the violation to the inmate), (1) I would ignore the rule violation-after all, he is new to the module, OR (1) I would punish him (interviewee indicates some excessive form of punishment such as lockdown).

To ensure that neither the questions or the benchmarked answers were so specific and job-related that they would exclude job applicants with no previous correction institution experience, the group was reminded throughout the development process of the purpose of the interview questions and the audience to whom the questions would be addressed. At the conclusion of Stages Two (question development) and Three (benchmarked answer development), the group was asked to review the question and answers to ensure that no previous correction experience was required to successfully answer the questions. In cases where the group indicated problems, the situations were modified to include a more clearly defined situation or a new situation was selected.

Presented below are the situational interview questions and benchmarked answers developed for each of the seven dimensions. Although an attempt was made to develop three distinct questions for each dimension (one from each of the three research facilities) only two of the dimensions have three or more questions. The development of ambiguous situations or benchmarked answers and similar, if not identical, situations selected by the groups resulted in the deletion of some questions and reduced the number of unusable questions. In addition, problems at two facilities in taking group members from their job for a substantial period of time prevented question development for all seven dimensions.

The Situational Interview Questions and Benchmarked Answers

Prior to asking the situational interview questions it is strongly recommended that subjects be shown a diagram of a module and that one member of the interview board explain the general layout of the module. In addition, it can be explained to the subject that the correction officer is stationed in the module for the duration of his/her shift (with the exception of breaks) and is responsible for supervising all inmate activities and actions within the module. Other information such as the number of inmates assigned to the modules, the daily routine of the module, etc., may also be provided.

Not only does this brief discussion prepare the applicant for consideration of the situational questions but it also provides the applicant with further information about the correction officer's job. If earlier stages of the recruitment and selection processes have not acquainted the applicant with the nature of the job, the introduction to the situational interview would clarify any misconceptions the applicant had about the job and allow the applicant to voluntarily withdraw from the selection process if the job was not what he/she had envisioned.

Dimension 1: Managing the Living Unit to Assure a Safe and Humane Environment

Question #l: On an inmate's first day in your module, he fails to make his bed which is in violation of the facility's rules. What would you do?

  5 = Because it was the inmate's first day in the module, I would explain the rule to the inmate, give him a verbal warning, document the violation and ensure that he complies in the future.

  3 = I would order the inmate to make his bed (interviewee gives no indication that he would explain the rule or the violation to the inmate).

OR

  3 = I would tell the inmate that I would let it pass this
    one time-after all, he is new to the module (interviewee
    gives no indication that he would explain the rule or the
    violation to the inmate).

  1 = I would ignore the rule violation--after all, he is new
    to the module.

<div align="center">**OR**</div>

  1 = I would punish him (interviewee indicates some excessive
    form of punishment such as lockdown).

Question #2: (Show the interviewee a diagram of the module and
  briefly explain the layout of the module). Your responsibility
  is to supervise 46 inmates within this living unit. You must
  ensure that inmates do not violate any of the facility's rule,
  that inmates do not harm themselves, each ocher or jail
  property, and that the module is kept clean. How would you
  position yourself within the module to effectively know what's
  going on amongst inmates?

  5 = Continually walk around the module observing, talking
    with and listening to inmates.

  3 = At the desk except when required to make periodic
    rounds of the module or in the case of an emergency.

  1 = Stay at the desk where most of the module can be observed--
    if inmates have any problems or questions they can came
    to the desk.

Dimension 2: Handling Inmate Discipline

Question #1: Inmates in the module you supervise are committing
  numerous minor rule violations. For example, they are not
  keeping the module clean, they are slow co get up in the
  morning, etc. How would you correct these minor violations?

  5 = Hold a meeting with all inmates in the module. Communicate
    your expectations. Advise them of the consequences of
    continued problems.

  3 = Communicate your dissatisfaction with only a few
    inmates-they will pass the word to other inmates.

  1 = Discipline all inmates in the module for these rule
    violations.

Question #2:   An inmate in your module has been sentenced to 15
     years in prison.   He was expecting only 3 years.   When he
     returns from court he begins to swear and shove chairs within
     the module.   What would you do?

     5 = Talk with the inmate in private.   Discuss the inmate's
         behavior with him rather than punishing him for it.
         Find out why the inmate is acting like he is.

     3 = Take disciplinary action against the inmate.   Do not
         inquire into the reasons for the inmate's misbehavior.

     1 = Ignore the situation and hope that the inmate cools down.

Question 83:   Your facility has a rule that no inmate is allowed to
     leave the dining tables until all inmates are finished eating.
     During dinner a module worker (an inmate who has proven to be
     reliable and who has been assigned special work duties within
     the module) gets up and gets a drink of water.   The correction
     officer in the module does nothing.   Seconds later, another
     inmate who is not a module worker gets up to get a drink of
     water and the officer disciplines him by locking him in his
     room for 4 hours.   Explain how this is effective or ineffective
     behavior by the officer.

     5 = The correction officers behavior is ineffective because
         it is unequal and inconsistent treatment of inmates
         and because it excessively punishes the second inmate.

     3 = The correction officers behavior is ineffective behavior
         because it is inconsistent (interviewee does not
         recognize that it is also excessive punishment).

     1 = The correction officers behavior is effective.   The module
         worker has earned the extra privilege where the second
         inmate has not.   (Interviewee recognizes neither the
         inconsistency or excessiveness of the officer.)

Dimension 3:   Responding to Inmate Requests

Question #1:   You are having extremely busy day in your module and
     have to complete an important assignment by the end of your
     shift.   You don't think you'll have time to complete everything
     you have to do.   An Inmate, who is continually badgering you
     with questions asks you to explain a facility rule. You are
     not totally familiar with the rule and do not have time to look
     it up.   How would you respond to the inmate?

     5 = Tell the inmate in a clear and precise manner what you
         will do in response to the question; make a commitment
         to the inmate that you will find an answer to his
         question; and give the inmate a specific time that you'll
         get back with him.

3 = Tell the inmate that when you get a chance you'll find out and get back to him; do not mention <u>when</u> you'll get back to the inmate.

1 = Ignore the inmate's question; tell his you don't have time; make excuses.

or

Provide him with an answer you think is right without checking to ensure that it is.

Question #2: A facility rule states that inmate telephone calls are limited to LO minutes. An inmate in your module has been on the telephone talking with his girlfriend for 15 minutes. Other Inmates are waiting Impatiently to use the telephone. When you order him to hand up he asks to see a supervisor before he will do so. What do you do?

5 = Say "no" to the inmate's request to see the supervisor, AND explain the facilities rule limiting the duration of telephone calls and why the rule is necessary.

3 = Negotiate with the inmate (example - "If you get off the telephone, I'll call the supervisor).

1 = Call the supervisor as the inmate requests, allow him to continue the call until the supervisor arrives.

<u>OR</u>

Let the inmate continue with his conversation; do nothing.

Question #3: Your facility requires that a supervisor approve all special requests made by inmates. These requests are submitted in writing by the inmate. An inmate in your module has been making several written requests requiring your supervisor's attention. Your supervisor is upset with you about the volume of requests and cells you to deal with the inmate. What would you do?

5 = Sit down with the inmate and discuss the issue. Determine the reasons for the numerous special requests. Determine whether the inmate's problems can be dealt with in other ways.

3 = Continue to pass the inmate's requests to your supervisor- after all, that's part of the supervisors job.

1 = Throw away the inmate's requests; do not pass them to the supervisor.

Questions 14 :   your facility has a rule which states that inmates shall receive only one cup of coffee with each meal.   After dinner you notice that there are several cups of coffee left in the container.   A module worker (an inmate who has proven to be reliable and has been assigned special duties in your module) asks you for a second cup.   How would you handle the request?

5 = Tell the inmate "no, if wouldn't be fair to the other inmates."

3 = Tell the inmate "no" without an explanation as to why.

1 = Allow the inmate the second cup of coffee ("after all, he's earned it")

OR

Tell the inmate that even though you think he deserves it, he can't have it.   Provide excuses by blaming it on the facility's rules ("I don't make them, I just enforce them").

Dimension 4:   Resolving Inmate Problems and Conflicts

Question #l: It is clothing exchange day in your module. This is when dirty inmate clothes are traded for clean clothes. An inmate who has complained to you in the past about having to wear a certain color of clothes, approaches you in an angry and demanding manner.   He says that he was given a pair of ripped pants.   The inmate throws the pants down and demands that you get him new ones.   You suspect that he deliberately ripped the pants because he didn't like the color. What would you do?

5 = Assess the validity of the inmate's claim (find out if it's a legitimate complaint).   Calmly discuss the inmate's angry manner with him and advise him how he should approach you with a problem in the future.

3 = Tell the inmate it's "not my fault--this is the color you have to wear."   Hide behind the rules of the facility or blame it on others (e.g., facility administrators, laundry, etc.).

1 = Yell back at the inmate; throw the pants at him; tell him it's too bad; assume the same demeanor as the inmate.

Dimension 5:   Supervising in a Clear, Well-Organized and Attention-Getting Manner

Question #1:   One of your responsibilities is to ensure that inmates keep the module clean.   It is 1:00 p.m. and you want inmates to thoroughly clean the module by 4:00 p.m.   How would you accomplish this cask?

5 = Designate which inmates will clean the module; describe to inmates how to clean it; define your expectations of what "clean" is; ensure that they have the necessary equipment to clean it; tell them when it is to be cleaned by; follow up to ensure that they completed the job according to your expectations and Instructions.

3 = Order inmates to clean module; designate who will do what; allow them to decide how to clean it.

1 = Give the order to clean the module with no direction as to how to clean It, who will clean it, when it will be cleaned by, etc.

Question #2:   Your supervisor tells you chat their cells need to be cleaned by the end of your shift? You have 4 hours to clean the 10 cells.   How would you organize the task?

5 = Plan (gather appropriate materials), organize inmates (make clear assignments as to who will do what; communicate specific instructions), and follow up (to ensure that inmates have completed the job CO your expectations).

3 = Assign inmates to complete the job and check back later to ensure that it has been completed.

1 = Tell inmates to clean the cells by 4:00 p.m. (no assignments, instructions, supervision or follow up).

OR

Clean the cells yourself.

Dimension 6:   Maintaining Effective Administrative and Staff Relations

Question #l: A facility rule states that inmates will be out of bed at 7:00 a.m. in the morning. In making your morning inspection of the module you notice that an inmate is still in bed.   When you order him to get up he states that an officer on another shift has given him permission to stay in bed because he has a cold. What would you do?

5 = Verify the claim of the inmate by looking for documenta-
tion (paperwork) <u>OR</u> contacting the officer.

3 = Call your supervisor and ask him/her whether it's okay
for the inmate to say in bed <u>OR</u> ask him/her what to do.

1 = Follow the rule of the facility without checking on the
inmate's claim (make him get up);

<u>OR</u>

Don't verify the claim and allow the inmate to say in bed.

<u>Question #2</u> :   An Inmate tells you in confidence that another officer
gave him an inappropriate order which he was forced to carry out.
In listening to the inmate, it's clear that the officer's order
was inappropriate.   This is one of many complaints you've heard
about this officer from inmates.   What would you do?

5 = Bring the complaint to the attention of the ocher officer
and your supervisor to ensure that the problem is worked
out.

3 = Ignore the inmate's complaint (he's probably lying; you
must protect a co-worker).

1 = Tell the inmate that the officer's order was inappropriate
and that you've heard other inmates complain about the
officer (berate the officer to the inmate).

Dimension 7:   Building Positive Rapport and Personal Credibility
With Inmates

<u>Question #1</u>:   An inmate in your module who has been charged with
rape of a LO year old girl asks to speak with you in private.
When you meet he tells you that other inmates have threatened
him and that he fears for his safety. What would you do?

5 = Verify the claim; communicate and demonstrate a
willingness to protect the inmate. Remove him from
the module if necessary.

3 = Tell the inmate that you'll keep an eye open to any
signs of trouble but wait until something actually
happens before taking action.

l = Ignore the inmate or lie to him (tell him you'll watch
out for any trouble but then ignore him. After all,
he deserves whatever he gets).

Question #2 : The inmates are in a common activity area watching television, playing cards and talking (interviewer points out the activity area on the diagram). Two of the inmates get into a loud argument over which T.V. show to watch. What do you do?

5 = Assess the situation (who is Involved? have they fought before?). Clear the area of non-involved inmates by ordering them to their rooms. In a firm voice order the arguing imates to separate and stop arguing. Remain calm. After the situation is in control investigate the reason for the argument.

3 = Call for back-up and wait until it arrives before doing anything.

OR

Do nothing. Allow the inmates to work it out.

1 = Run over to the arguing inmates, yelling and screaming. Try to physically step between the inmates or physically subdue them.

It is recommended that interviewees be asked one question from each dimension. Because the dimensions represent the important elements of the correction officers job, one question from each dimension would ensure that all important aspects of the job are touched on during the interview.

Typically, the situational questions make up only a part of the oral interview. The interview would also include: 1) interviewer requests for further information and/or clarification of what the job applicant provided in the written application, and, 2) interviewee questions concerning the job, the work environment, benefits, etc.

To reduce the possibility of interviewer rating errors or inconsistencies, it is strongly recommended that all members of the oral interview board undergo training prior to implementing the situational interview questions. Content of the training should include: 1) discussion of how the questions and benchmarked answers were developed and what they are designed to assess; 2) proper sequence of questions; 3) how to evaluate an applicant's answers;

and, 4) common rater errors such as leniency, strictness, central tendency, and halo. Finally, board members should be given ample opportunity to practice their Interviewing skills and the situational interview questions within the classroom.

A Cautionary Note

For facilities wishing to include these questions and benchmarked answers in their selection interviews, a note of caution is warranted. It has yet to be established that the situational interview questions accurately and consistently assess a candidate's job performance potential. Only through repeated application of the questions at the variety of facilities and after a lengthy analysis of the findings, can we be assured that they meet the legal standards for test validity and reliability. Until this validation process has been completed, we recommend that facilities use these questions to structure the content of their oral selection interview rather than to grade applicants on their responses. It is our experience that while most facilities utilize some form of an oral interview in their selection process, many interviews are unstructured and conducted without a formal, standardized set of questions. In most cases, board members devise their own questions based on their areas of concern or expertise. The situational interview questions presented here can provide more structure to these interviews ad can act to stimulate discussion between board members when deciding on how applicants should be rated or ranked. By using the situational Interview questions the interview board members will, at the least, be asking all candidates the same questions which provides a basis for comparing candidate responses.

CONCLUSIONS

Increased attention has recently been focused on the modern organization's "search for excellence" in its personnel. Organizations arc realizing that as they grow more complex in their technologies and operations, and as the external environment in which they function grows more complex, they become more dependent on their employees for success. Increased environmental complexity and intra-organizational dependency require critical attention to the selection of qualified and competent personnel.

The podular/direct supervision jail is an Illustrative example of growing technological and operational complexity within correctional institutions. The podular/direct supervision jail presents not only a major revision In the architectural design of the traditional jail facility, but entails the introduction of an inmate management style which demands considerable interpersonal skills on the part of the correctional staff. The nascent literature on the podular/direct supervision concept indicates that the effectiveness of this type of jail's operation depends largely upon the ability of the correctional staff to successfully implement the innovative management philosophy.

While considerable attention has been directed toward issues relating to the architectural design of podular/direct supervision jails, and to the cost-benefit analysis of their construction and maintenance, the critical process of employee selection has been less well developed. Jail administrators anticipating the transition to a podular/direct supervision facility are faced with a serious problem--namely, while the uniqueness of the jail's architecture and management philosophy makes the established selection process of traditional jails inadequate, the absence of personnel programs

designed specifically for the New Generation jail facility leaves administrators with little or not guidance.

The MODEL PERSONNEL SELECTION PROCESS presented in this report is designed to assist administrators of podular/direct supervision facilities in developing an effective correction officer selection process. First, the findings of the comprehensive correction officer job analysis provides the foundation on which other personnel processes such as selection instruments, training content, evaluation criteria, can be developed. Second, a review of the literature on psychological screening of correction officer applicant's provides recommendations as to the development of an effective screening package for use in the New Generation facility. Third, a review of the personnel systems developed at two New Generation facilities presents an innovative approach to the physical fitness examination used by Las Vegas Detention Center and an unique job-related video examination used by Pima County Detention Center. Finally, using the results of the job analysis and the input of "experts," questions and benchmarked answers for Inclusion in the oral selection interview were devised for use in the selection of correction officers in podular/direct supervision facilities. While facilities are invited to utilize the MODEL PERSONNEL SELECTION PROCESS presented here in Its original form (with some precautions), further depth and breath can be given this process through "fine-tuning"--tailoring the process to the unique environment and operations of the facility within which it will be used.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

FLANAGAN, J.C. (1954) "The Critical Incident Technique." _Psychological Bulletin._ 7:327-355.

FRANZESE, P.F. (1984) "NYPD Psychological Services: An Historical Perspective." Paper delivered to 92nd Annual American Psychological Association Convention, Toronto, Canada.

INWALD, R.E., D.B. LEVITT, and H.F. KNATZ (1982) _Pre-Employment Evaluation as a Predictor of Correction Officer Job Performance._ National Institute of Corrections: Washington, D.C.

LATHAM, G.P., L.M. SAARI, E.D. PURSELL and M.A. CAMPION (1980) "The Situational Interview." _Journal of Applied Psychology_ 65(4):422-427.

LATHAM, G.P. and K.N. WEXLEY (1981) _Increasing Productivity Through Performance Appraisal._ Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Sample Correctional Officer Critical

Incident Survey Form

Correction Officer Critical
Incident Survey
(1985)

Last year Captain Don Manning, Commander of the Spokane County, Washington Jail asked us (Researchers at Washington State University) to assist him in developing a personnel selection and performance appraisal system for their new generation detention facility. In July of this year a representative sample of correction officers and supervisors from several new generation facilities generated a list of critical incidents they observed which had positive or negative consequences on the management of inmates. These Incidents were used to generate behavioral items which have the potential of distinguishing between an effective and ineffective correction officer.

To minimize sampling bias, a new representative group of officers and supervisors is being contacted to assist in the next phase of evaluative Instrument development. Your involvement will help assure a credible set of evaluation criteria. Completing the questionnaire, both PARTS I and II, should take approximately forty minutes. The directions are straight forward for each part.

Please do not write your name anywhere on the questionnaire. We want to assure you complete anonymity to encourage you to be perfectly candid in expressing your opinion. There is only one piece of personal information we require for data analysis purposes: your job title.

Please return your questionnaire in the attached, stamped envelope <u>within one week</u>. Our sample is small. We are counting on your response.

Thank you, in advance, for your willingness to assist us and for taking the time to complete the questionnaire.

MAILING ADDRESS :   Dr. Ben Menke
Director, Criminal Justice Program
Washington State University
Pullman, WA 99164-4880

Your Position: (Check one)
_____ Correction Officer
_____ Sergeant
_____ Lieutenant or above
_____ County in which facility is located

*NOTE: Questions appear on both the front and back of each page, Please *ensure* that you answer the questions on both sides of the page.

PART I: Which Performance Dimensions of a Correction Officer are More
         Important?

Instructions:

1.   Distribute 70 points across all 7 dimensions in a manner which reflects the
     relative weight you believe each dimension should have in determining the
     effectiveness of a correction officer.

2.   Assign each category at least 1 point. Do not use fractions of a point.
     Check to see that your total - 70 points.

3.   For example, if you believe each performance dimension should be given equal
     weight, you would assign 10 points to each dimension.

Weighting Dimensions of Correction Officer Performance
(Points
Assigned)

_____   1.   Resolving Inmate Problems and Conflicts: The extent to which
              correction officers provide guidance for the solution of inmate
              problems; recognizes the steps involved in resolution of inmate
              conflicts; deals with inmates in confrontation& situations.

_____   2.   Building Positive Rapport and Personal Credibility With Inmates:
              The extent to which the correction officer creates an environment
              of mutual respect by demonstrating consistency and a courteous
              manner.

_____   3.   Maintaining Effective Administrative and Staff Relations: The
              extent to which the correction officer has knowledge of and
              consistently applies facility rules and procedures; coordinates
              activities with co workers; supports the authority of staff
              members; communicates with supervisors and other administrators.

_____   4.   Managing the Living Unit to Assure a Safe and Humane Environment:
              The extent to which the correction officer uses observation and
              communication to maximize compliant inmate behavior and minimize
              the occurrence of disruptive Inmate behavior in the living unit;
              clearly communicates facility rules and expectations to Inmates
              and immediately responds co all incidents of inmate misbehavior.

_____   5.   Responding to Inmate Requests: The extent to which an officer
              effectively responds to inmate requests and demands la a fair and
              balanced fashion; avoids inmate manipulation.

_____   6.   Handling Inmate Discipline: The extent to which an officer
              responds fairly and effectively when disciplining inmates for
              disruptive behavior or rule violations.

_____   7.   Supervising in a Clear, Well-Organized and Attention-Getting
              Manner: The extent to which the officer exhibits effective
              skill in organizing, supervising and motivating inmates in
              their activities.

PART II: Behavioral Items Related to Correction Officer Performance

Instructions: The following behavioral item list was generated from a repre-sentative group of supervisors and correction officers as potential criteria for distinguishing between effective and ineffective correction officers. YOU are asked to assist with the next phase of our efforts by helping us identify the performance dimension each item should belong to and how important you believe the behavior is.

Respond to each of the following two questions, recording your response in the appropriate column, before moving on to the next behavioral item.

Question 1:   Categorize the behavioral item under its most appropriate performance dimension.   Write the number (1-7) of the performance category to which the behavioral item most appropriately belongs.   Refer to PART I for a complete description of all seven performance dimensions.

Question 2:   How important (critical) is this behavior relative to other behaviors associated with being an effective correction officer? Use the scale below:

1 = unimportant   4 = very Important
2 = minor importance   5 = critical
3 = important

	Performance Dimension (1-7)	Importance (1-5)	COMMENT
1. Consistently enforces facility rules.			
2. The officer never grants inmate priviledges out of fear.			
3. The officer says "No" to Inappropriate inmate requests.			
4. Follows all rules (hearings, grievance procedures, written reports) when formally disciplining an inmate (lock down, segregation, etc.).			
5. Promptly reports critical information (e.g. confession to a crime, plans for escape, inmate set up) to appropriate staff members.			

IMPORTANCE SCALE
1 = unimportant
2 = minor importance
3 = important
4 = very Important
5 = critical

	Performance Dimension (1-7)	Importance (1-5)	COMMENT
6. When administering discipline to inmate who violates a facility rule, the officer explains to the inmate the rule he/she violated and the reason for the discipline.			
7. In daily contacts with inmates, the officer avoids doing or saying anything which degrades or belittles the inmates.			
8. Evaluates reasons for rule violations to insure that inmates are not unjustly disciplined.			
9. Delivers on warnings to discipline inmates for misconduct or rule violations.			
10. When an Inmate violates a minor facility rule, the officer warns the inmate once before taking disciplinary action.			
11. Refrains from expressing criticism of another staff member in the presence of Inmates.			
12. Whenever appropriate the officer responds to inmate requests for information in writing.			
13. Maintains consistency of living unit supervision by regularly consulting with other shift officers.			
14. Supports the appropriate efforts of other officers in dealing with Inmates.			

IMPORTANCE SCALE
1 = unimportant
2 = minor Importance
3 = important
4 = very important
5 = critical

		Performance Dimension (1-7)	Importance (1-5)	COMMENT
15.	Promptly calls for emergency back-up when necessary to prevent the escalation of inmate disturbances or protect own **safety.**			
16.	Recognizes the difference between minor and serious rule violations; repeated and occasional violations, and takes corrective action accordingly.			
17.	In response to an inmate request, an officer never makes a promise he/she can't keep.			
18.	When responding to an inmate request, the officer always indicates, 1) that he/she doesn't know; 2) will find out and get back; or 3) refers inmate to appropriate source.			
19.	Treats all inmate requests the same, does not play favorites with inmates by fulfilling some requests and denying similar ones.			
20.	In response to inmate requests for information the officer links the inmate to specialists or sources (lawyers, etc.) who have the answers,			
21.	When resolving disputes between inmates, the officer separates the Inmates by ordering both to their (rooms) and then speaks with each individually.			
22.	Gathers as much information as possible about inmate problems or confrontations before taking action.			

IMPORTANCE SCALE
1 = unimportant
2 = minor importance
3 = important
4 = very important
5 = critical

		Performance Dimension (1-7)	Importance (1-5)	COMMENT
23.	Coordinates with other staff on specific inmate discipline matters.			
24.	Holds a meeting with all inmates in the living unit to resolve misunderstandings or tensions between the officer and **inmates.**			
25.	The officer, while acknowledging all requests does not run every inmate errand.			
26.	Whenever appropriate the officer consults with inmates before making changes in work routines.			
27.	Whenever possible offers inmates face saving alternatives to resolve problems.			
28.	Negotiates agreements to solve most inmate problems.			
29.	When observing a pattern of minor rule violation the officer calls a living unit meeting to discuss the problem.			
30.	Never delegates authority to an inmate.			
31.	Recognizes that Inmate problems are different and initiates innovative actions to solve them.			
32.	When dealing with an irate Inmate, the officer asks the inmate to go to his/her room to allow the Inmate co calm down before discussing the matter.			

IMPORTANCE SCALE
1 = unimportant
2 = minor importance
3 = important
4 = very important
5 = critical

	Performance Dimension (1-7)	Importance (1-5)	COMMENT
33. Exhibits patience when resolving problems with inmates.			
34. In day to day communications with inmates the officer is polite and courteous but firm.			
35. Uses casual conversation to calm aggitated inmates.			
36. When called an obscene name by an inmate, the officer remains calm and In control while dealing with the behavior.			
37. When responding to inmate problems, an officer explains the alternatives available to the inmate in resolving the problem.			
38. When confronted by an aggitated inmate, the officer talks with the inmate in a calm and controlled manner.			
39. When dealing with inmates the officer never swears.			
40. Gives prompt feedback to Inmates which allows self assessment and self correction.			
41. Employs a variety of techniques (e.g., praise, granting of privileges, humor) to motivate and reward inmate compliance and cooperation.			

IMPORTANCE SCALE
1 = unimportant
2 = minor importance
3 = important
4 = very important
5 = critical

	Performance Dimension (1-7)	Importance (1-5)	COMMENT
42. When giving an order the officer sees to it that the inmate carries it out.			
43. Demonstrates common courtesy by using 'please', 'thank you' and by being an active listener.			
44. When giving an order or making a request, the officer makes sure that the circumstances permit the inmate to comply and that the inmate understands the directions.			
45. When an inmate makes a request the officer always explains in a courteous fashion what action he/she will take in response to the request.			
46. Evaluates inmates work performance promptly.			
47. Issues orders in a polite and courteous manner.			
48. Assigns inmate work tasks in an even-handed manner to avoid the appearance of favoritism.			
49. Supports the rules and regulations of the facility by not criticizing them in the presence of inmates.			
so. Treats all inmates the same regardless of race, gender, appearance, or the offense for which they are in jail.			

IMPORTANCE SCALE
1 = unimportant
2 = minor importance
3 = important
4 = very important
5 = critical

	Performance Dimension (1–7)	Importance (1–5)	COMMENT
51. When responding to inmates misbehavior, the officer disciplines only the responsible inmate rather than all Inmates in the living unit.			
52. Follows all facility rules and procedures even when incovenient or when it makes the job more difficult.			
53. Maintains an informal written record of important information about inmates.			
54. Punishment or counseling of an inmate is handled "one-to-one" rather than in front of other inmates.			
55. Initiates frequent discussions of facility rules and expectations with inmates.			
56. Explains to inmates facility rules, personal expectations and answers Inmates questions about those issues.			
57. Aside from appropriate emergency restraint techniques the officer never shoves, grabs, pushes, hits or physically touches an inmate.			
58. Responds to all incidents of inmate rule violations regardless of their seriousness.			
59. Makes certain that inmates have timely and complete access to formal grievance procedures.			

IMPORTANCE SCALE
1 = unimportant
2 = minor importance
3 = Important
4 = very important
5 = critical

	Performance Dimension (1-7)	Importance (1-5)	COMMENT
60. Recognizes medical emergencies (e.g., mental, medical) and is prompt in calling for appropriate assistance.			
61. At the beginning of each shift the officer solicits information from inmates, makes announcements, explains schedule and shares Information.			
62. Closely monitors the behavior and condition of an inmate with special problems (e.g., suicidal, mental, medical).			
63. Except in emergency situations, the officer never communicates with an inmate by yelling across the living unit.			
64. Verifies with the appropriate staff all inmate claims for special priviledges or assignments.			
65. Engages in continual visual observation of Inmates and investigates any activities or changes in inmate behavior appearing out of the ordinary.			
66. Gathers as much information as possible (records, conversation) about inmates in order to effectively supervise them.			
67. Continually moves throughout the living unit observing, listening to and talking with the inmates.			
68. Provides pertinent information to reliving shift officers.			

IMPORTANCE SCALE
1 = unimportant
2 = minor importance
3 = important
4 = very important
5 = critical

	Performance Dimension (1-7)	Importance (1-5)	COMMENT
69. When disciplining an inmate for misbehavior the officer provides the inmate with the opportunity to explain his/her conduct.			
70. Is quick to recognize potential problems between Inmates and moves swiftly to resolve them.			

ADDITIONS?

71.

72.

APPENDIX B

Psychological Screening for New Generation

Jails: Psychologist's Summary Study

PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT OF CORRECTIONAL OFFICER APPLICANTS:

CONSIDERATIONS FOR STAFFING IN NEW GENERATION JAILS

Michael Russell,
Doctoral Candidate
Washington State University

Table of Contents

<u>Summary</u> of <u>Purpose</u>:

This manual is designed to aid in the psychological evaluation of applicants for police or correction officer positions. Sections discuss the purpose of such evaluations, the role of the psychologist in the criminal justice system, various psychometric devices frequently used in such evaluations and the predictive validity of these tests.

It is intended as a primer for the mental health professional who already possesses a grounding in the use and application of psychological tests, and discusses and reviews the literature on the application of specific material in the testing situation. This manual does not attempt to explain the basics of, nor and theory behind, testing devices commonly used by mental health professionals. 'Persons not qualified or experienced in the use of such material are cautioned not to attempt to apply this manual blindly in a testing situation.

Rios, Parisher and Reilly (1978) conducted a survey of 174 urban police departments,' assessing for perception of need and actual utilization of psychological services. The vast majority of responding departments (79%) rated psychological screening of new applicants as a major need. Psychological screening was also listed as the primary duty of psychologists already working in police departments. This can be taken as an indication that screening is not only a major responsibility at the present time, but a likely area for continued growth as well.

As indicated in the Rios, Parisher and Reilly study, in many areas screening is not only something desired by the department, but is a legal necessity as well. It was recommended by the 1967 President's Advisory Commission on Law Enforcement (Murphy, 1972), and again by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice (1973).

The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice standards and goals published recommended standards for the selection of police officers in 1973 (Spielberger, 1979). The Commission's report states that every police agency should: "employ a formal process for the selection of police applicants. This process should include a written test of mental ability or aptitude, an oral interview, a physical examination, a psychological examination, and an in-depth background examination." (pp. 337-341).

The Commissions' recommendation had a fairly rapid effect on several large metropolitan police departments which had avoided

adopting psychological screening for cost reasons. The New York City Police Department, for example', added psychological screening in late 1974. Their selection process now requires applicants to qualify in four areas: Physical, Medical, Characterological and Psychological (Franzese, 1984). Elan (1983) observes that the success of law suits charging negligence in police selection forced most departments to adopt psychological evaluation.

This movement has affected corrections as well, but more slowly. Goldstein (1975) polled state correctional agencies nationwide, and 42 out of 46 responding states indicated that they screened applicants "to identify those emotionally or psychologically unfit for correction work." (Pg.2). However, in the corrections area, no standard has been adopted for screening. The Manual for Accreditation of Adult Correctional Facilities of the Commission on Accreditation for Corrections does not require pre-hire psychological screening of officer job applicants (Morgenbesser, 1983). As a result, a wide variety of methods (such as a "probationary period" after hiring) have been considered by the responding states as constituting psychological screening.

It is likely that Goldstein's survey results might give the casual observer a false sense of security regarding the screening process correctional officers undergo. A more realistic impression might be drawn from figures supplied by Morgenbesser (1983). As of 1983 only five states had enacted legislation authorizing pre-hiring psychological evaluation of correctional officer applicants--a number far behind that for police.

The interface of clinical psychology with law enforcement agencies can be an uneasy one (Hilgren & Jacobs, 1976). This unease has been attributed to a number of reasons, notable among them a clash of values and mutual mistrust. As Archibald (1984) put it "police officers often see the world as 'us' and 'them'; as a civilian, the police psychologist may very well be seen as 'them'." We see no reason to assume the situation is better in the correctional field. Clarification of common expectations and accepted practices in this area of psychological screening for police and correction applicants can be used by the worker in this area to prevent such conflict.

The challenge is to build an unbiased method of selection, that is both task-relevant and department-relevant. One which weathers legal challenges, and gains support both within the department and community.

[Specifying the "Police Personality"]

In this manual, we will frequently cite research done with police officers as valuable in understanding the personality dynamics of corrections officers. Ideally, it might be best to consider the two professions separately. However, corrections has been neglected to a large extent by psychologists (or perhaps, considering that few correctional facilities utilize psychological screening it might be more accurate to say that psychology has been neglected by corrections). Thus the vast majority of large sample, rigorous research projects conducted have been aimed not at corrections, but police populations. A more compelling justification might exist for utilizing police data in the study of effective assessment methodology for corrections, and New Generation facilities in particular: There appears to be a common set of personality variables predicting success in both fields, and police and correctional officers appear to share many personality variables, values, and attitudes in common. This profile is what is known as the "police personality."

The research literature on the existence of a "police personality" is mainly anecdotal and until recent years tended to be based upon psychoanalytic formulations that suggested people attracted to police work would be authoritarian, cynical, rigid and homosexually inclined. Neiderhoffer (1967) finds very little evidence to support these assertions. Others, such as Roe (1956), take a middle of the road position saying that although

the evidence is not extensive there nevertheless seems to be no doubt that some specialized occupations, at least, do attract persons who resemble each other in regard to certain personality characteristics. If this is the case in criminal justice careers, it would be useful to know what type of people are attracted and if these characteristics are beneficial or negative ones in the unique situation in which the officer finds himself.

Rokeach, in common with the Psychoanalytic theorists, argues that there is a "value gap" between officers and the community and further argues that this occurs prior to becoming an officer. According to Rokeach, "evidently the police force is not the primary or even a secondary socializer of the police" (Rokeach, Miller & Snyder, 1971, pg. 166). Some psychologists have argued that even with police applicants scoring within the normal range on psychological tests such as the MMPI, they do so with patterns and profile elevations that are significantly distinguishable from non-police subjects--and further, that these patterns can be significantly predictive of later job performance (Saccuzzo, Higgins & Lewandowski, 1974)

This may indeed be an extreme evaluation. A cluster of studies (Spaulding, 1948; Cole 1962; Matarazzo 1964; and Wilson 1969) using measures of vocational aptitude and interest have consistently found police profiles to be most similar to, and sharing interests with, those in social service occupations. There is even some question as to the relevance of a construct of shared personality variables which differentiated police officers from the public.

The "police personality" has been studied primarily through

measures of dogmatism and authoritarianism.   Early work in dogmatism by Milton Rokeach, has been influential in this area. In the early 1960's Rokeach evaluated a large sample of Washington State police officers with his Dogmatism Scale (Rokeach, 1960).   Findings at that time, and with that scale, supported his thesis of a dogmatic and authoritarian outlook among police officers.   As is true with his later work, Rokeach labelled this phenomena the result of differential attraction to police work by individuals already possessing these attributes.

In direct opposition to this, Neiderhoffer (1967) argues "there is no self-selection among authoritarian personalities prior to appointment.   It is the police system, not the personality of the candidate, that is the most powerful determinant of behavior and ideology" (pg. 119).

Although he disagrees as to the source of police authoritarianism Neiderhoffer nevertheless agrees with the assumption that they are, in fact, more dogmatic. He reports a study on a sample of New York City police officers which at first glance appears to give some credence to the authoritarian position.   The researcher used an authoritarianism scale, found scores increased to about mid-career, leveled off and dropped suddenly just before retirement.   This was interpreted to mean that as older officers looked forward to imminent retirement and a return to life as a civilian they became less authoritarian to integrate themselves back into the community.   Neiderhoffer was not considering the possibility of cohort effects in the interpretation of this data.   His sample was a cross section of

officers hired over a thirty year span, during which numerous changes in hiring and selection practices had been implemented. It is difficult to support an interpretation of this cross sectional analysis as representative of the stages experienced in by individual officers.

The view of police as authoritarian or dogmatic has been severely criticized by a large body of research that shows college police science students, academy recruits, students who wish to make a career in law enforcement score lower on dogmatism and authoritarianism scales than a random sample of typical college students (Bennett, 1975; Regoli, 1978; Regoli 1977). Poland (1978) argues that "the popular stereotypic conception of the police officer described in sociological survey data is totally invalid."

Hogan (1971) describes the typical police officer from Q-Sort ratings as follows:

1. Prefers action to contemplation.
2. Is masculine in his style and manner of behavior.
3. Is natural; free from pretense: unaffected
4. Has a narrow range of interests
5. Gets along well in the world as it is; is socially appropriate in his behavior; keeps out of trouble.

Modern psychological research (Hogan and Kurtines, 1975) tends to dismiss the early, primarily sociological, research and views the typical police officer as an individual of "unusual personal soundness and effective social functioning." Tiemann (1973), using Rokeach's Dogmatism scale and other measures on a large sample of Colorado Highway Patrolmen could find little evidence to suggest that the patrolmen differed significantly from a random sample of men with a comparable educational level.

In conclusion, it appears that while for the sociologist, the evidence would tend to supportthe view of the police as more cynical, conservative, hedonistic, impersonal and hostile than the general public (Rokeach, 1973; Teahan, 1975), Psychologists now have the opposite viewpoint in effect (Hogan and Kurtines, 1975)!

In view of the controversial and often contradictory results obtained from these studies, psychologists should use caution when approaching the whole area of what a "typical" officer candidate is, or should be. It is clear that we do not yet know, and thus must use caution when providing any judgment on the suitability of a candidate based on less than evidence of significant psychopathology.

There exists much less research on the matter of correctional officers. Generally speaking, it appears the level of professionalization amongst correctional facility personnel falls below that of police. For correctional personnel, turn over rate is higher. Pay is usually lower. Less time is spent in training. Psychological screening is less common. Hiring standards are lower. (Knatz & Inwald, 1980; Goldstein, 1983; Russell, 1986). These factors lead us to expect that today's average correctional officer may be equivalent to type of police officer recruited in the 1930's and 40's.

This type of individual may be suitable for the traditional correctional facility, where much less emphasis is placed on individual initiative, and social interaction is largely regulated by the customs of the facility. However, the recent trend in corrections toward the "new generation, podular/direct

supervision" facility [an open dayroom area in which the prisoners are allowed to mingle with the guard force] would seem to be asking for the same qualities we have observed in the police research: Little authoritarianism, reasonably intelligent, and similar in profile to individuals in the social service professions.

The direct evidence on correction officers does not support making any distinction between the two occupations in terms of pre-selection screening. In her short article "Is the 'Police Personality' Unique to Police?", Murrell (1978), finds no support for making a distinction between police, corrections and private security personnel in terms of their personality profiles. She holds that all of these groups tend to have a similar pattern. While not specifically attempting to explore this issue, Regoli and Schrink (1977) failed to detect any significant differences between police and correctional oriented students on measures of Dogmatism. Selection instruments billed as suitable for police and corrections officer (e.g. The Inwald Personality Inventory) do not draw distinctions between the two professions. Since our goal is to screen out those individuals who "would either disorganize under stress and become immobilized, or, conversely, overreact and precipitate a crisis" (Knatz and Inwald, 1980), a similar screening format would seem reasonable for both professions.

<u>The Purpose</u>

The purpose of the psychological evaluation of an applicant can be a sticky issue. Psychologists are frequently faced with a "Who is the Client?" paradox (APA, 1980). Does the psychologist act in the best interests of the individual being tested, for the department who has hired him, for the community, or for society as a whole? The multiplicity of potential clients to be served causes confusion and conflict for the psychologist conducting evaluations. Mann (1983) termed this conflict "role strain."

The merit process under which civil service selection operates in the United States is dedicated toward the goal of choosing the candidate best able to perform the responsibilities of the position being filled. Consideration of applicant "personal" variables, such as need for the position, are antithetical to such a system. From the perspective of the correction department candidate characteristics such as loyalty and obedience will likely be stressed. Concerned community members, hoping to see better community relations, may call for more sensitive or "positive" characteristics in their officers. Sociologists and psychologists offer diverse opinions on the important qualities of the 'corrections officer.

An individual's personality plays a vital role in the way he perceives his/her world, his/her ability to handle stress in an adaptive manner, and his/her objective performance at a given task or profession. The present author proposes a selection strategy based largely on pragmatics and the legal and ethical restraints the psychologist will find himself/herself in when

13

asked to provide input into the future careers of a collection of human beings.

The job is an important one, and one that has been largely ignored by the social sciences in terms of serious and objective research (Hogan, 1971). Although evidence shows police officers to be among the healthiest groups of individuals when they begin their careers, they have a very significant rate of pre-mature death from stress related causes (Fell, 1980). Police work also ranks in the top 3 of 130 occupations for suicide. Correctional officers are subject to conditions of sustained stress and ambiguity (Brodsky, 1977) and consistently meet or exceed police in rates of stress related death and suicide (Feli, 1980; Neicerhoffer, 1967).

From the agencies point of view, the hiring of unstable individuals can be disastrous and expensive. Even assuming that no tragic results transpire, police personnel receive extensive and expensive training (estimated at approximately $30,000 per candidate) making the cost of a "mistake" too expensive to afford (Spielberger, 1979). In corrections the costs can be equally high: A staff Which can handle stress and crisis situations effectively is less likely to precipitate violent incidents which result in property damage and injury or death within the correctional facility.

A "mistake" would be considered a person unable to perform to the standards of the academy, unable to effectively handle stress, unstable emotionally, dishonest, or a high risk for substance abuse. Roberts (1983) points out an additional "mistake" which is probably the most costly of all: Most

agencies provide extremely good medical benefit and disability retirement plans. Medical disabilities, many functional [having a significant psychological component] have been increasing astronomically in recent years, and threaten to bankrupt some systems. It is important, maintains Roberts, to weed out people susceptible to conversion disorders--particularly "low back" cases.

In as much as is possible , it is the psychologist's duty to assist in the selection of individuals well suited to the rigors and responsibilities of their work, and who are unlikely to abuse the power inherent in their position.

One last benefit and purpose of psychological screening was raised by the Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction in 1982. In their State Civil Service Commission Report they outlined the following as one of their conclusions: "Perhaps the greatest value of psychological screening is that if high risk individuals are aware that they must undergo this screening, they may never apply for the job."

<u>Moral</u> <u>and Legal</u> <u>Issues</u>

Rokeach (1971) observes a "value gap between the police and the policed"--pointing out that police often have personality characteristics different from those of the general population. Relating the findings to his own value survey, Rokeach finds twenty one out of thirty-six measured values showing consistent differences between the police and whites in the general public matched on age and education. This "value gap", particularly in the areas of conservatism and obedience to authority, is responsible, Rokeach maintains, for a good deal of police/community friction.

Rokeach makes a plea to "weed out" applicants with "undesirable" value patterns (those already typical of police officers) to restore a balance between police and the community. To quote Rokeach, "We can, for example, ill afford to accept recruits who rank too high on such values as <u>obedience</u> and too low on such values as <u>equality</u> and <u>forgiving</u>." (Rokeach, 1971).

If such recommendations were to be implemented for both police and corrections, we would be adopting a policy of selection that could be termed "fine tuning": Selecting not for obvious pathologies that would serve to make a poor police officer, but for <u>values</u> such as a belief in forgiving, or even "A World of Beauty" (Rokeach, 1973). Making this particularly difficult is the fact that Rokeach would have us be cognizant of what values hallmark a successful police officer, and deliberately select <u>against</u> these values in favor of a hypothetical state of desirable outlook or enlightenment--a

somewhat questionable approach to be taken by the applied psychologist. This idea may have sounded more reasonable in 1973, at a time of considerable police/student unrest and tension. But there are formidable barriers to such an approach even if one felt the desire to try it.

.

<u>Why Not Fine Tune</u>?

1. It <u>won't work</u>

Costello (1981) concluded his study of 1,119 San Antonio police recruits in a <u>post hoc</u> longitudinal design spanning a decade, this way: "At no time did average [MMPI] profiles suggest psychopathology, or a clinically relevant approach to the test. This implies that the MMPI or any other clinical instrument will be useful only to detect those applicants so disturbed that they are unable to conform their test behavior to fit ordinary broad performance standards."

This type of finding has been the general rule for selection outcome studies. The closer one cuts to the median performance of a test, the more false positives for exclusion will be obtained, and the more difficult it will become to demonstrate the relevance of the screening process.

There are few enough data for the psychologist to take into court when eliminating the most bizarre applicant. It would seem impossible to develop effective selection devices without reasonably definite criteria. These criteria should be relevant to job performance, and easily testable. Harrison Gough put it this way: "What one wants is a forecast that identifies persons who will stay on the job, do well in the job, and whose mode of behavior complies with humane and informed notions about how the work should be carried out." (Gough, 1984).

2. <u>You Can't</u>

The Duke Power Company maintained a power generating facility at Draper, North Carolina, known as the Dan River Steam

Station. The station employed 95 people in 1964, divided into j departments. The lowest paid department was called Labor, and the highest paying position in this department paid less than the lowest paying position in any of the other department. The station employed 14 blacks that year, all working in the Labor Department.

Promotion within a department was by seniority, but transfers to other departments required a high school diploma. At that time, this requirement effectively prohibited blacks from working in any department but Labor. A reform instituted in 1965 allowed transfer with either high school diploma or passage of two psychological aptitude tests.

The tests employed where the Wonderlic Personnel Test and the Bennett Mechanical Comprehension Test. These are general aptitude measures: not designed to measure directly the ability to perform a specific job. The passing grade was set as the median for high school graduates.

The black employees filed a class action suit against their employer, charging that the company's requirement of a high school education or passing scores in intelligence tests for selection or promotion within the company where discriminatory and violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Shafritz, Hyde and Rosenbloom, 1981). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (U.S. Congress, 1972) Section 703(a) reads: "It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer...(2) to limit, segregate or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual

of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely effect his status as an employee, because of such individuals, race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." (Thompson, 1979)

The interpretation of Title VII had been to allow the use of ability and aptitude testing, as long as there was no intent to discriminate. However, the Supreme Court in 1971 in a unanimous vote, found infavor of the black employees. They ruled that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 'proscribes not only overt discrimination, but also practices which are discriminatory in operation." (U.S. Supreme Court 401 U.S. 424 (1970)). The ruling has been widely interpreted to mean that if a test cannot be shown to be directly related to job performance, the practice is prohibited. Justice Burger, representing the majority, wrote that tests for employment practices "must measure the person for the job, and not the person in the abstract." Subsequent court decisions (U.S. vs Georgia Power Company 1973, Albemarle Paper Company vs. Moody 1975) have struck down extensive job testing and validation procedures because they could not demonstrate job relevance.

At the present time there exists the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures. These were drafted by the U.S. Civil Service Commission and the departments of Labor and Justice in 1976. These Guidelines detail minimum standards for validation and document evidential requirements for demonstration of validity. It is the opinion of Stratton (1985) that no psychological test has been shown to meet these requirements, should their use be challengedin a court of law.

Clearly, the more a selection process is "fined tuned" [the

less pathological the record must be before rejection], the greater the probability of false positives for exclusion, and the more difficult it will become to demonstrate job relevance of psychological evaluations.

In regards to minority employment, the "80 percent rule" is in effect. The "80 percent rule" stipulates that if the selection rate for any group is less than 80 percent of that for other groups, this constitutes evidence of adverse impact in the selection device. Such devices can still be used, but the weight of the evidence is placed on such a test to demonstrate it's validity.

In the area of employment screening it is therefore important to bear in mind that direct relevance to the position applied for, rather than "measurements in the abstract" are called for, and that intent to discriminate is not a requirement for the testing to be ruled illegal. All examining tools may now be challenged as discriminatory in effect. Therefore, much more than a philosophical feeling about the desirability of certain personality characteristics, philosophy, values or outlook on life is required before a person can be denied employment. Direct evidence supporting the position that the values will translate into measurable job performance criterion is required. Under these conditions, it is difficult to see how such feelings as those expressed by Rokeach could be meaningfully included in a psychological examination procedure.

Another limitation on the screening process is sheer volume of applicants that are often processed. As Franzese (1984) has

pointed out, the typical New York City police officer list can include 25,000 candidates to be screened.

Lastly, governing legal statutes often specifically call for exclusion based on lack of capacity to perform the job.

Both police and corrections is a traditionally male field. Increasingly, females are entering this profession--often encountering resistance from their male co-workers. Johns (1979) supported the popular perception that traditional sex roles influence the way in which female officers are viewed and judged by their coworkers. Spielberger, et al, (1979) found a higher termination rate for female applicants in the Florida Police Standards project.

Most studies which have considered the matter find that women officers do not receive supervisory ratings equal to their objective measures of performance and tested abilities (wood, 1980, Inawald & Shusman, 1984, Beutler, et al, 1985).

The above data would have us wonder if either screening or supervisory practices are valid for females as well as males. Inwald and Shusman (1984) conducted a study to support this area, using a large sample of New York correctional officer applicants. They found that on both the IPI and MMPI female correctional officers admitted to more emotional and behavioral difficulties than did their male counterparts. This was particularly true for measures of anxiety and interpersonal difficulty. Whether this is an accurate measure of females entering a non-traditional role, or whether the tests scores have been influenced by either greater candor or naivete on the part of females is unclear.

Objective measures of performance in this study, however, revealed that female correctional officers where less likely to

have been working before obtaining their position, and were more likely to have children. Female officers evidenced nearly twice the number of absences and latenesses than did males, but their supervisors where less likely to discipline them.

It appears from this study that, perhaps because males have a wider range of job opportunities open to them, they are more likely to resign if the job proves unsatisfactory. Dissatisfied females appear to stay on the job longer, but show passive resistance through coming to work late or not at all.

Predictive equations were developed using the MMPI and IPI to predict job tenure for males and females. It appears that extroverted, assertive females are less likely to remain a corrections officer over a year's time. This seems to support other research which indicates the importance of traditional sex roles in positive perception of a worker's behavior.

The Instruments

The following sections point out special data regarding the use of the most popular psychometric devices for the correctional and law enforcement population. It is assumed that the reader has some familiarity with personality testing.

A general issue to be considered first is whether or not to use psychometric devices. Stratton (1983), a psychologist in charge of new applicant screening for the Los Angeles Police Department, believes them to be of limited value in this situation. This opinion is shared by Roberts (1983). Their objections center around the time involved in taking, scoring and interpretating a test such as the MMPI balanced against the information obtained from that test. It is their belief that a comparable amount of information could be gathered in fifteen minutes of clinical interview.

We share with Stratton some reservations, in that a law of diminishing returns may occur at some point as more tests are heaped onto the screening battery. The critical questions appear to be: 1) whether the examination is more effective with formal assessment measures? 2) which approach is more time effective? 3) which approach is more legally defensible? The access to computer scoring eliminates the time objection to a degree, and if it can be said that a carefully chosen assessment device can help direct the interview by focusing the areas in need of exploration, then it could be time effective in this sense as well. In the area of legal challenges, it behooves the assessing

25

psychologist to be as rigorous as possible in the assessment of an applicant, and to have as much objective data, such as test protocol, supporting his or her position as is feasible in the case of an objection by a rejected evaluatee. There is a need to select devices carefully, as many have already been deemed unsuitable for this application. Those psychologists arguing against psychometric testing appear to be in the minority at this point, and have not really provided support for their claims.

General Testing Strategy

A typical approach to applicant assessment involves administration of a <u>test</u> <u>battery</u>, followed by a clinical interview. The battery in some cases is quite battering (Elam, 1983). The use of such batteries have been justified on the grounds that certain popular tests have areas of insensitivity which should be supplemented with additional data collection (Spielberger 1979; Dahlstrom and Welsh 1975; Buros 1978).

An example can be used with the system employed by Department of Rehabilitative Services for King County, Washington. This large urban correctional facility requires each applicant to undergo a complete psychological examination before hiring. Their routine has an applicant complete the MMPI, CPI, and Edwards Personality Inventory at one sitting-- prior to a psychological interview. This situation, with the application of elementary arithmetic, can be seen to require the applicant to respond to 1,566 True False questions in a single sitting! It may be difficult to interpret the response pattern to the <u>last</u> scale in this stack. It is possible that profile disturbances may be obtained, and critical items may be endorsed, due to fatigue factors alone.

Intelligence

Even in current research, some psychologists have used measures of intelligence as part of a battery to predict officer performance (Beutler, et al 1985). However, the direct measurement of the IQ of correction applicants is less directly relevant at the present time than in past eras (Poland, 1978). This is a fortunate result of the professionalism movement in correctional agencies and the spread of civil service statute. At one time, intelligence of applicants was a very serious issue. Terman (1917) was one of the first psychologists employed in the screening of police applicants. His sample averaged an IQ of 84 on the Binet Simon. Terman set a lower limit of the IQ of an effective police officer, recommending that applicants with an IQ rating below 80 be eliminated from the application process. (The Binet Simon used a standard IQ distribution with an adult mean score of 100 and a standard deviation of 16. This study indicated that his average police officer of 1917, scored one standard deviation below the population average.)

The work of Terman contains a good example of what is wrong with using IQ as a predictor variable, and why it is no longer easy to convince a court of its value. A psychologist wishing to use this research to support cutting scores of police applicants would need to separate the research findings of Terman's from his eugenics society statements about the organic inferiority of the Mexican and Latin American intellects in light of present day policies on such matters. (Garcia, 1982)

Thurstone (1922) measured 358 Detroit police officers at

various stage in their careers. Their Army Alpha IQ scores revealed an interesting phenomena: While the average patrolman was not terribly bright (IQ 74) he was significantly better off than his superiors. The average sergeant tested had an IQ of 54.71 and Lieutenants 57.80! Thurstone concluded that the brightest men who enter the police service leave in favor of other occupations where their intelligence and abilities are better appreciated. There existed a strong negative relationship between the length of service in the Detroit police department and IQ.

It is difficult to imagine a modern police or corrections officer being able to cope with their required technological apparatus with an IQ in the dull normal range. Fortunately, this is no longer a problem psychologists need be terribly concerned about.

The reason this is not a problem for the screening psychologist is that most civil service examinations used to select applicants, whatever their relevance to police work, have the unintentional attribute of being fairly good tests of general intelligence. Blum (1964) found that a civil service exam to select sheriff deputies correlated .70 with the Otis Intelligence Test. McDonough and Monohan (1975) found the correlation to be slightly higher, at .74. Not surprisingly, Matarazzo (1964) found a mean Weschler Adult Intelligence (WAIS) IQ of 113 on his sample of police applicants passing the civil service examinations.

This is probably a fortunate occurrence for psychologists,

29

as it spares them the burden of becoming involved in a task that almost guarantees controversy. IQ tests have come under fire from several sources, and consistently violate the "80 percent rule." Racial differences on standard intelligence tests to the order of one standard deviation (15-16 points) is a common finding in intelligence research (Anastassi, 1982). The protestations of Jensen (1981) aside, there is considerable debate on the meaning of these testing differences, and the U.S. Supreme court has ruled invalid any such discrimination based upon I.Q. unless the direct relevance of that construct can be demonstrated. As Chief Justice Warren Burger (U.S. Supreme Court, 1972) has written:

"Practices, procedures or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior of prior discriminatory employment practices. . ..Basic intelligence must have the means of articulation to manifest itself fairly in a testing process. Because they are Negroes, petitioners have long received inferior education in segregated schools... What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment, when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of race or other impermissable classification."

Measures of basic intelligence as a selection criteria have been specifically ruled an invalid discriminator in numerous court tests, and as such their use must be approached with extreme caution.

Given the current high regard the public holds for civil

service positions, and the dramatic increases in pay and benefits associated with police positions there is usually no dearth of applicants for such openings. Given merit selection of candidates based upon civil service exams which are basically a measure of intelligence, a novel problem appears: If anything, there is sometimes the problem of having individuals overqualified for the job in which they are applying. This could be especially true in selection for corrections positions. There is good evidence that I.Q., per se, is not always a positive factor in a given job situation. For example, IQ affects tolerance for boredom and tenure in low paying positions. The high turnover rate experienced at many correctional institutions may be one unintentional fallout of selecting people for blue collar positions with a technology developed for office personnel. People selected via this method tend to find other, more attractive, offers and depart. This high turnover rate is expensive to the hiring agency in terms of selection, evaluation and training, which compounds the problem.

The above standard is of great concern to public personnel analysts, but raises legal and moral conundrums when the basis for exclusion is that the person is "too good." More practical objections to extreme high IQ's in the selection process, and objections that can be shown to be job related, come in the evidence of increased distractibility, lower tolerance for boredom and rote tasks among higher IQ individuals. McDonough and Monohan (1975) found a negative relationship between college attendance and officer's ratings on loyalty and ability to deal

with authority. There appear to be greater risks for discipline problems in a situation where the officer feels himself/herself to be more knowledgeable than his/her superior officers.

These issues are raised because it is felt that there are certain "societal imperatives" (Sarason, 1982) which operate unspoken in our evaluation processes. One commonly held by academicians is that intelligence, per se, is a good thing. This is demonstratively not the case in certain situations, and in the present situation we therefore urge an "ecological approach" to selection (Kelly, 1961). That is, a good person/environment fit in which neither the candidate selected or the job they are selected for suffers from the selection process.

Typical Police Recruit MMPI

N=1,112
AFTER COSTELLO (1981)

Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory

The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) is the single most popular personality assessment device in the world today. As such, it is likely that clinicians working in this area will be most familiar with the MMPI. A survey of state and local police agencies by Murphy (1972) found the MMPI to be the most popular measure in use at that time.

Insert Figure III About Here

   Typical police and corrections Applicant MMPI

Objection to the antiquated item pool and published norms of · the MMPI are lessening the favor the MMPI once enjoyed by researchers in the field. A major program to develop a standard police selection battery for the State of Florida, with possible nationwide implementation, was conducted by Spielberger, et al (1979). As he wrote "An objective multidimensional personality test was considered essential. ..based on the review of the literature on police selection, two tests appeared suitable for this purpose: The MMPI and the CPI... A pilot study conducted... led to the selection of the CPI, primarily because a number of subjects objected to the wording of MMPI items." This and several other recent decisions to supplant the MMPI with the CPI in recent, large scale controlled research projects, with good criterion measures, is giving the CPI major gains in terms of the supportable database of recent research. This will be

discussed further in the next section.

The MMPI is oriented toward the detection of pathology. Designed for assistance in diagnosis of hospitalized psychiatric patients, it has, unfortunately, not shown itself to be a reasonable predictor of job performance--even when using the controversial "research scales" (Buros, 1978). This is also the position of Inwald (1982), although supporting data is not supplied in her article. McDonough and Monohan did not find any significant correlation between MMPI profile and any of four outcome measures for performance of police officers once accepted into the department, although significant results were found for CPI scales, interview scores, the Rorschach, demographic variables, Otis IQ and civil service scores. The problem with the MMPI is largely attributed to the inability of its item pool to sample positive behaviors. This is not surprising, as the MMPI scales where not developed with this purpose in mind. This difficulty has prompted some prominent MMPI experts to suggest the "marriage" of the MMPI and the CPI for job performance applications (Dahlstrom & Welsh, 1974). Gottesman (1975) has suggested that the MMPI is inappropriate for the screening of police applicants because the published norms for the MMPI are not representative for this population.

The MMPI, at 566 items, is one of the longest self report inventories on the market today, and there are questions about the validity of its criterion sample and applicability across ethnic groups. The research scales, used with increasing frequency, are criticized for their often inadequate development

34

and validation for clinical purposes. Despite all this, the MMPI is still, by far, the most popular personality inventory in the United States. Millions have been administered to every conceivable group of people. Over 10,000 books and articles have been written concerning the MMPI (Graham, 1981, Buros, 1978). It is this database of collected information and validation data which makes the venerable MMPI, with all it's flaws, a valuable instrument. As one recent reviewer in <u>Mental Measurements Yearbook</u> put it, "There is blood in the old turnip yet" (Buros, 1978).

There may be blood in the turnip, but one must be careful in applying it. Hargraves (1983) finds questionable racial discrimination from the MMPI. It violates the EEOC "80 percent" rule by differentiating at the 27-35% level (Sex made no difference in this study). This does not legally prevent the use of the MMPI, but does place it under more stringent requirements to demonstrate validity.

Fortunately, Hargraves gives us some supporting data for the use of the MMPI. In an unrestricted sample entering the police academy 16-38% of accepted candidates would have been disqualified if the MMPI had been a selection criteria. Therefore the MMPI does provide new information. 45% of the candidates the MMPI would have called questionable withdrew from training. Only 14% of the MMPI acceptable candidates dropped out. There was no significant race by MMPI interaction. Therefore, it appears that the MMPI was not only a valid predictor in this study, but valid across race as well.

Restrictions of Use:

The MMPI requires a reading ability at the sixth grade level or better for successful completion. As this would usually be assessed in civil service examinations, it is not a major limitation for the use of the MMPI in this application. The subject must also not be showing severe anxiety or agitation, and must possess a reasonable attention span for successful administration of the MMPI (Graham, 1981). Assuming that the test is given under controlled conditions the inability to complete an MMPI, and a knowledge of why this was, would likely be as useful as the completed MMPI itself, at least for the application of pre-employment screening.

Typical Results

The vast body of literature is in agreement that the MMPI record of a typical police officer will demonstrate a 4-9 profile with few values above a T score of 65 (Hook and Krause, 1971). This same statement can be said of psychologists. Aggregate scores of recruits and candidates closely follow this profile (Costello and Schoenfield, 1981). As police candidates are typically a normal group of people, the best descriptive phrase for this profile would be along the lines of "generally energetic and with little neurotic inhibition."

A high degree of defensiveness is to be expected among candidates. As they tend to be a rather intelligent group, this will typically manifest itself mainly in the K scale, which will often cross above "the line" of T=70.

At least from later career performance, one would have trouble making a case for any adverse results from a defensive approach to test taking. The value of this subtle defensiveness scale has been shown to be a statistically significant discriminating variable in a study of success in police officers as judged by becoming successful sergeant candidates (Hook and Krause, 1971)--with successful candidates manifesting an average T value of 60, vs. the average officers T value of 53. The two other discriminating MMPI scales in this study where scale 6-- higher for successful candidates--and 0--lower for successful candidates.

This does not hold true of the L scale crude defensiveness measure. It has been shown to correlate negatively with education, (Dahlstrom and Welsh, 1985), and likely many things correlated with education, such as intelligence. Gettys (1983) found the L scale to be a significant discriminator between successful hostage negotiators and a control group of officers (Negotiators X=3.6, Control X=5.1). Also reaching significance in this study were scales 1, 3, 6, and 8, although unfortunately with the successful negotiators rating higher on every clinical scale but social introversion. Most startling was a clear 8 spike for the "superior" negotiator group! This bizarre finding (Elevation of scale 8 is not usually associated with positive personality variables) is compounded by these same officers CPI profiles. Their CPI profiles gave a general indication that the negotiators were better adjusted than controls on every single scale. The authors agreed with the CPI findings, saying

"whoever selected the negotiators was doing a good job" (Elam, 1983). These results probably are once again reflecting the relative insensitivity of the MMPI clinical scales to the prediction of positive behaviors, but support the MMPI validity scales as useful measures in these applications.

The ancient psychodynamic theories holding that candidates for police positions would be prone to have strong unconscious homosexual needs are not supported by MMPI profiles of recruits or officers. Hathaway and McKinley (1956) designed scale 5--once called "Mf" for Masculinity-Femininity--to identify personality trends associated with homosexuality. While samples of police and corrections officers often display above average scores on scale 5, they are entirely in line with males matched for age, intelligence and education. One study on this subject (Murrell and Lester, 1979) found the Mf scale to be at $t=58.5$ for police officers, a $t=62.7$ for a comparison group of male college students. Of course, the MMPI 5 scale has not proven itself to be all that good a barometer of homosexual inclination--not surprising when attempting to measure a diverse group (Greene, 1980). Extreme elevations might be diagnostic, but moderate elevations, such as found in the police samples, indicate less inclination toward traditional "macho" stereotypical thinking. As such, these results probably indicate a fair degree of intelligence, education and sensitivity among the officers tested, rather than any abnormal sexual desires.

There is some indication that it is difficult to support selection of good candidates via examining code type distributions (profile scatter). There are indications that the

general pathology of the record is the most significant factor, this as manifested by elevation of any clinical scale above a T score of 70 (Hook and Krause, 1971). This finding was supported by Beutler, et al, (1985) who found the likelihood of an officer being suspended was related to their overall psychological distress as indicated by mean MMPI elevations.

Instrumentation Decay

The MMPI has recently been the subject of much criticism. The pathological nature of many MMPI items, which police candidates are not likely to identify with and will perceive as "crazy" (i.e. cough up blood daily) is one such problem cited. Also mentioned is the antiquated nature of some items, the meaning of which are lost to most modern readers (i.e. I liked to play "drop the handkerchief when I was a child"). This latter criticism leads to the possibility of time related changes in response to the MMPI which could be termed "instrumentation decay."

This hypothesis, if supported, would have implication for the use of cutting scores for disqualification. Costello and Schoenfield (1981) analyzed 1,119 MMPI profiles for age, cohort and time related effects for academy recruits between 1964 and 1975. There were no significant cohort effects found, and neither age when tested nor year of birth appeared to affected average MMPI responses. Of course there was restriction in range both in cohort (one decade) and ages tested (not much more than a decade), but this data does support the continued

usefulness of MMPI research from earlier decades.

Conclusion

In conclusion, we can state that the MMPI does not appear to possess the ability to predict positive personality elements that will produce a "good" officer, but has been shown to have utility as a screening device to remove undesirable traits which would produce a "bad" one. No single code type is to be preferred, although the 4-9 profile is the most common. Generally, it is the overall pathology of the record which seems to matter, as demonstrated by any clinical scale with a score above t=70, and this probability of failure increases with each additional scale scoring in this range. Overall, successful officers demonstrate a normal profile. The MMPI discriminates between ethnic groups, but what research has been done on this issue supports the predictive ability of the test.

The California Psychological Inventory

While the MMPI is still the most popular personality psychometric in the testing area, strong gains in popularity and a great deal of work is being done with the California Psychological Inventory (CPI). The nations largest police department, New York City, added the CPI to its assessment procedure in 1980, citing "the fact that the [MMPI's] association with a hospital population needed a counterbalance in cases of civil litigation seeking to discredit the screening process" (Franzese, 1984). Developed by Harrison Gough at the Institute of Personality Assessment and Research (University of California, Berkeley), the CPI has several advantages over the MMPI:

1. While *very* similar in format (test booklet and machine coded true/false answer sheet) it's 480 items make it 86 items shorter than the MMPI, which reduces test taking time by up to one half hour for the average applicant. A new revision of the CPI (Gough, 1986) is planned for release in 1986 and has been shortened even further, to 462 items. The manual for the 480 item CPI test taking time at 45 minutes to one hour (Gough, 1975). MMPI test taking time "for persons of average or above average intelligence, without complicating factors" is typically between 1 and 1 1/2 hours (Graham, 1981). Harrison Gough indicates that police and correctional applicants will take longer than average to complete these tests, and suggests budgeting 90 minutes for corrections officers (Gough, personal communication, 1984)

2. The stated orientation of the CPI is measurement of personality characteristics which have a "wide and pervasive applicability with human behavior" (Gough, 1975)

3. The items are more acceptable to the applicant, and thus may trigger less defensiveness. The new version of the CPI removes sexist language, and makes questions easier to read due to updating of the items (Gough, 1986).

4. Repeated research finding which consistently demonstrate "the California Psychological Inventory was clearly superior to the other major group administered psychological test, the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory as a predictive assessment device." (McDonough and Monohan, 1975).

5. The CPI has recently added new scales with direct relevance to job performance, and these have already been normed on police and corrections officers (Gough, personal communication, 1984).

Insert   Figure:Typical police and corrections
                          CPI
About Here

Some of the above listed advantages can also be seen as contributing to disadvantages for the present application of the CPI. The orientation of the CPI is different from the MMPI. Elevations on CPI scales indicate positive attributes; CPI profiles are less directly translatable into psychopathological diagnostic statements.   This positive attribute orientation of

42

the CPI makes it more likely to be able to predict job performance, but may be less advantageous when one desires merely to weed out the abnormal.

If disqualification of candidates for unfitness to perform the duties of the job is the selection criteria, rather than a ranking of which candidate might perform the job most efficiently, it might well be useful to know a "schizophrenia" scale is elevated (even if this scale loads on 6 or more distinct personality traits) rather than knowing they have a high capacity for status or will achieve better in situations that call for conformity than independence.

This is not the position of the author of the CPI. A portion of a letter rebutting Stratton's objections to the MMPI/CPI, and stressing the advantage of the CPI is presented below:

"..It has been my experience that when people refer to MMPI/CPI studies of anything they usually know something about the MMPI literature, but nothing, or next to nothing about the CPI. On use of tests for selection, one must ask what are the alternatives? It is not a case of perfect selection versus no selection, but highly imperfect and sometimes deleterious selection practices in place, with validities (if computed) of r=.10 or less, which could be improved in accuracy and also improved psychologically by putting more emphasis on desirable personal qualities. A good selection device or battery will function well within the selected sub-sample, contrary to the dreary and pessimistic conclusions offered by statisticians on the basis of purely theoretical assumptions." (Gough, personal communication 1984)

The issue of evaluating positive traits in the selection equation aside, in the selection process it has been shown that most people tend to put their best foot forward when approaching a psychometric like the MMPI or CPI, and it is here that most damaging problem with the employment of the CPI is found. The

43

After Megargee, 1975

California Psychological Inventory

— — — — Fake Good

_____ Fake Bad

After Megargee, 1975

Random Responses

California Psychological Inventory

CPI is felt to be more to subject to dissimulation than the MMPI. It lacks straightforward validity scales. Gough is of the impression that attempting to fake a psychological test is less common than most assume, and that the CPI is not easy to fake due to the subtly of its item structure (Gough, 1975). However, in a situation where powerful reinforcers are contingent upon "looking good", a defensive response pattern to test taking is the rule rather than the exception.

Three scales of the CPI are designed to assist in the detection of subjects providing invalid records:

GI Good Impression

WB Well Being

CM Communality

The present author expresses the opinion that the CPI is better at detection of malingering and "fake bad" profiles than its converse. Both the WB and CM scales will drop severely in a "Fake Bad" situation.

_____

Insert Figures IV & V About Here

> Faking Good CPI
> Random Response CPI

_____

.

Good Impression as a clinical scale characterizes high scorers as "Cooperative, enterprising, outgoing, sociable, warm and helpful..." (Gough, 1975) Normally, GI fluctuates only moderately. GI scores over T=60 are indicative of those attempting to make a good impression. Scores near T=70 are

44

considered suspect. It should be noted that of the 48 occupational groups tested for the CPI manual, policemen were by far the highest on this scale, with an average score of 24 (S.D. 5.8), a T score of 58, and thus a reasonable percentage (16%) would reach this GI cut off (Figure III).

Table IV is the average record of 50 males asked to "fake good" on the CPI (Gough, 1975). Even when the attempt at dissimulation is overt and conscious, it is apparent that it may be difficult to distinguish an honestly good candidate from someone falsifying a record.

These limitations often have CPI users searching for additional validity information. As mentioned above, the Florida Police Standards Research Project (Spielberger, et al, 1979) chose the CPI over the MMPI, but felt the need to add the 15 item "L" scale of the MMPI to the 480 item CPI for additional validity data.

Aware of the problem, Gough has revised the new CPI to have an improved algorithm for detection of dissimulation. Gough writes "I would guess that invalidity of protocols is as well detected on the CPI as on any test published, including the MMPI." (Gough, 1986).

Clinical Prediction

In general "up is good" on the CPI. The Spielberger, et al, Florida police standards research project (1979) found 13 of the 18 CPI scales significantly predicted the performance of recruits in the police academy, some for males but not females, and vice

45

versa. Despite lower numbers in each cell, females showed more statistically significant difference between successful and unsuccessful candidates. The striking finding is that across gender, and at least for whites, the differences on every single scale was in a positive direction for the successful candidates.

CPI Scale Discriminating Candidate Performance:

	Caucasian Males		Females	
	Successes n=147	Failures n=21	Successes n=33	Failures n=10
CPI				
Dominance	57.3	51.1*	58.9	51.7*
Capacity Status	48.1	43.1*	49.7	39.6*
Sociability	52.4	45.4*	54.5	46.9*
Well Being	47.0	43.9	51.0	32.4*
Responsibility	44.8	39.6	48.3	37.7*
Self control	47.2	46.8	49.8	40.2*
Tolerance	45.6	40.5*	50.1	30.0*
Good Impression	48.8	47.2	51.8	39.9*
Communality	49.8	47.2	50.6	42.6*
Conformance	51.4	45.2*	53.5	41.4
Independence	48.2	45.8	53.8	39.9*
Intellectual Ef.	46.2	39.7*	51.3	34.6*
Psychological Mindedness	53.5	50.5	57.5	49.6*

* Significant

From Spielberger,(1979)

Hogan and Kurtines (1975) expanded on Hogan's (1971) work

with further analysis of a large west coast sample of police officers as measured by the CPI. Their findings are consistent with what we have come to expect. While the unsuccessful group did not look bad, in terms of CPI profile:

"The Oakland police sample and the unsuccessful applicants were significantly different on nine of 19 CPI scales. Relative to the unsuccessful applicants, the police sample was more assertive (dominance); had more potential for social mobility (capacity for status), more social poise and self confidence (social presence), a more pronounced sense of self worth (self-acceptance), more need for autonomous achievement (achievement via independence), more functional intelligence (intellectual efficiency), and more psychological mindedness (Psychological mindedness); was more masculine (femininity); and possessed greater social acuity (empathy). ..the police sample presented a picture of unusual personal soundness and effective social functioning. They scored above (and often considerably above) the adult mean on 16 of 19 scales." (Hogan and Kurtines, 1975).

Tiemann (1973) also found a significant positive relationship between Do *scores* and service performance ratings in a sample of 346 Colorado Highway Patrolmen.

Using peer performance ratings on Maryland State Trooper cadets vs. CPI ratings, Hogan (1971) found considerable variability across groups. By far the most powerful scale in this study was Intellectual Efficiency, with correlations up to $r=.51$ with the criterion variables. Intellectual Efficiency is a stable predictor across gender in the Spielberger, et al, study as well. Mills and Bohannon (1980) support these findings.

The Intellectual Efficiency scale is again supported by Gettys (1983) and Elam (1983) in differentiating successful hostage negotiators from control officers. Also showing small, but significant, differences were Dominance, Capacity for Status, and the Achievement Scales.

Hogan and Kurtines (1975) seem to have concluded that the

three scales most predictive of performance are <u>intellectual</u> <u>efficiency</u>, <u>capacity for status</u> and <u>achievement via independence</u>.

In keeping with the pragmatic orientation of this manual, we would like to summarize these findings as concretely as possible, and attempt to synthesize the above research projects to explain their apparent minor inconsistencies. The studies were performed on different populations. Overall, the higher the CPI profile the better risk a candidate appears to be. Dominance (DO) has been a stronger variable in studies of academy cadets. Therefore DO might best be considered a positive element to predict graduation. Studies of veteran officers generally find that Achievement via Independence (AI) is a valuable asset. Survival in the academy, and survival on the job are not identical tasks, and the best predictor variables are equally unlikely to be identical. Intellectual Efficiency (I.E) and Capacity for Status (CS), are the closest to universal predictors of success.

For the specific goal of predicting performance of new generation jail correctional officers, we need to add an additional factor. Gough is convinced that there is an additional set of requirements for the superior correctional officer:

"The correctional officer must be a resourceful, resilient, courageous person, able to deal with danger and crisis, just as the police officer must. But the daily routine of the correctional officer is, if not prototypically boring, routine, and fixed, always with a hint of crisis, but usually with nothing

different or exciting occurring. There is much more variety and change in the daily routine of the police officer, and the log book of rules governing what to do when, where, and how is much less complete in its coverage. The fact that Hogan found the Ai scale to take on a significant positive weight is therefore reasonable. In equations for correctional officers I experimented with, the Ai scale seldom, if ever, appeared on the list of selected scales." (Gough, 1986)

Therefore, it is Gough's opinion that ability to work independently is not a major factor for correctional officers, but tolerance of boredom perhaps is.

New Scales

The new scales now out for the CPI are quite attractive. The most important for the present application is the Work Orientation (WO) scale (Gough, 1985). Development of new scales is a departure for the author of the CPI, who had long advocated the development of regression equations from existing scales rather than new scales. This position has resulted in the development of considerably less research scales for the CPI than its competitor MMPI.

The WO is a practical innovation for selection work. As this is a new scale and not yet widely available, we will discuss it in detail here. The scoring key is in Appendix I.

Selected Means and Standard Deviations for the

Work Orientation Scale

(Abbreviated)

49

Males

Rank	Sample	N	M	SD
1.	Bank Managers	49	34.67	3.00
5.	police officers	84	33.99	4.06
14.	corrections officers	221	32.27	4.89
18.	Psychology Graduate Students	623	31.43	4.02
23.	Basic Normative Sample	1,000	28.96	5.68
28.	Prison Inmates	196	25.90	6.07

The WO scale is 40 items taken from the standard 480 item CPI. It is designed to assess commitment and obligation to work. Person who score highly on this scale might be described as being conscientious, punctual, dependable and self-disciplined and having a high respect for rules: Essentially, this scale measures the Protestant Work Ethic. The WO scale was partially developed by comparison of job effectiveness ratings on a sample of 221 California correctional officers, and all items composing the scale have correlation with supervisory ratings. The mean score of corrections officers on WO is 32.27, with a standard deviation of 4.89. WO seems highly correlated with other CPI scales--notably Well Being, Achievement via Conformance and Managerial Potential, however, the author feels that WO measures distinct variables useful in assessing future work performance. As this scale is quite new, extensive research is still in the future, but it exists as a promising development.

The 1986 revision of the CPI, when released, will be radically different in its presentation--including a global personality rating which will rate individuals on "levels of competence". No data is yet published on how these new scales will be useful in predicting officer performance.

Cookbooking the CPI

Hogan (1971) surveyed five different groups of Maryland police officers and candidates, using the CPI correlated against various performance ratings. Step wise regression equations were eveloped for the best possible fit, and a weighted equation was produced that Hogan calculated would have a multiple r of .42.

The formula in question is as follows: Supervisor's Ratings for police Performance)= 20.21 - .47 (Social Presence) +.68 (Self Acceptance) + .33 (Achievement via Independence) + .68 Intellectual Efficiency). For this sample a distribution with a mean of 50, and a standard deviation of 10 was produced. This is a bit higher prediction of variance than the findings of Baehr, urcon and Froemel (1968) using from four to six variables.

Several workers have tried Gough's (1969) _Leadership_ _quation_ in predicting officer performance. Hogan (1978) found this equation to correlate .60 with coaches ratings for leadership on a college football team, and Mills and Bohannon .980) decided to try it on Maryland State Police Officers. The equation is determined by (leadership)= 14.130 +.372 dominance · 696 self acceptance + .345 well being - .133 good impression + 274 Achievement via Independence. The Maryland sample was above average on this, at 54.69, but the equation did not gnificantly relate to any success measure for police. In this study, the Hogan (1971) formula was again a significant edictor of police success, and produced a stable rating of r=.45 significant to p=<.01. That the Hogan scale is closely

related to the Gough leadership equation is clear, since they correlate at r=.43. Most encouraging was the finding that the direction and magnitudes of differences were stable across race. In conclusion, it appears that Hogan has developed a significant and stable multiple regression equation for prediction of recruit success.

The Jackson Personality Research Form

The Jackson Personality Research Form (PRF) is probably one of the most carefully constructed psychometric personality inventories in popular use today. Its modern era of development permitted the use of techniques for item selection, and scale organization, probably impossible to have performed before the advent of high speed computers (Anastassi, 1978). The scales are derived from factor analysis, and are uncommonly reliable (Buros, 1978). Hogan (1978) called it "marvelously constructed."

A couple of advantages in design worth mentioning are the extremely low correlations between the scales (as opposed to either the CPI or MMPI which overlap to a great extent), and the low social desirability loading of each item. Both of these factors were explicit in the item selection process (Jackson, 1974).

There are actually several versions of the PRF available--they measure between 15 to 22 normal personality traits, based upon the work of Henry Murray. Most people will probably use the newest version (Form E) which assesses the full 22 traits, at an impressive 16 questions per scale.

Structurally, it appears to possess the advantages of both the CPI and MMPI and few of the disadvantages. It is shorter than either, possesses good validity scales, and assesses for both positive and negative traits.

Unfortunately, it is hard for a new test to crack the already saturated personality assessment market. Little

attention has been paid to the Jackson, and at the present time we have no police or corrections norms to present here. Jackson himself has done little to alleviate this problem. As Hogan (1978) points out "the manual contains little evidence regarding the relationship between PRF scales and real life criteria. Moreover, there is no discussion of profile interpretation--and no rationale for the manner in which the scales have been grouped on the profile sheet." On a purely statistical and normative basis it would be an easy test to defend, but there are no predictive outcome studies that hold the Jackson suitable for making hiring decisions, which there are for both the MMPI and CPI. In light of this, it is not well supported as an exclusive indicator. However, several jurisdictions have adopted this measure as part of their selection battery based upon its fine psychometric qualities. Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction (1982) issued a statement supporting the PRF: "It is the psychological test which we believe has the best chance of having validity in a personnel selection setting. The test is intended for a normal population... The PRF is similar to the Edwards Personality Preference Scale which is used in screening police officers and corrections officers in other jurisdictions."

The Inwald Personality Inventory

Developed by Robin E. Inwald, the INWALD Personality Inventory (IPI) is one of the first multi-dimensional personality measures developed expressly for determining hiring suitability of correction enforcement officers. Normed on 2,500 correctional officer applicants, the IPI is a 310 question multi-dimensional measure which yields 27 scales, including one validity scale. Inwald is obviously aware of the limitations of other personality measures on the market, and stresses the strength of IPI by pointedly mentioning that the IPI ."..is couched in the contemporary idiom and deals with familiar lifestyle and experiences. As a consequence, the IPI is more timely, and less 'dated' than many other widely used tests" (Inwald, 1982).

The appropriateness of 27 scales deriving from a 310 question item pool is questionable in light of factor analytic findings on the use of the IPI (Inwald, 1982). The IPI test manual reports that 58% of the predictable variance in the IPI was clustered in one single factor. This factor was labelled "acting out behavior" for males, and "anxious, suspicious and phobic behavior" for females. However, it is important to remember that a factor analysis only informs of a factor's presence, and does not provide information as to it's meaning. The IPI is not subtle--the meaning of each item is directly stated. The questions were not empirically derived and relate directly to the willingness to endorse items related to specific

areas of problem behavior. It is therefore quite possible that the large factor obtained is simply reflective of willingness to express pathology.

Our major problem in evaluating the use of the IPI lies in its newness, and the lack of independent corroboration or validation demonstrating the IPI as a superior screening measure to the better documented MMPI and CPI. Although Dr. Inwald has an impressive background in the assessment of New York police and correctional officer applicants, reported at 14,000, (Inwald and Shusman, 1984a), the IPI is only two years old, and virtually all research done with the IPI has been conducted by Inwald or others affiliated with the publisher, Hilson Research Incorporated (Inwald and Shusman 1984a, Inwald and Shusman, 1984b).

The IPI test manual lacks the usual bibliography found in most accepted psychological measures, and independent reviews have yet to have been published in Mental Measurements Yearbook.

A major criticism the present author has with the IPI relates to the fact that many of the scales, although expressed in traditional "t" values, (with a mean of 50 and score in the t=70 or above range considered clinically elevated) do not possess a large enough item sample to validly be expressed in this manner. For instance, the TP "Treatment Program" scale is designed to "identify persons who have had past psychological counselling, substance abuse treatment and/or medication for nervous conditions." It contains three items. Predictably, these items inquire of the applicant whether they have had psychological counselling, substance abuse treatment, or medication for nervous disorders! Endorsement of no items (Raw

56

score 0) on this scale produces a "T Score" of 45. Presumably endorsing any of the three questions will give a t score above 70. Leaving aside the possible objections some may have to equating seeking psychological counselling with attending a drug rehabilitation center, the expression of single item responses in this manner--lumping together three "critical items" and calling it a scale--would seem to lend a false sense of precision and solidity to the results.

Clearly, the scale authors are attempting to avoid legal criticism of the Inwald by insuring that they do not rely upon untestable or, in any way abstract, psychological constructs. The practical fallout from this philosophy is that the questions are very behavioral, very concrete, and depend upon the willingness of the applicant to endorse them. A positive endorsement to the question "Have you ever been in a drug treatment program?" in itself is a legally defensible basis for rejection of an applicant--the person has confessed to something on the test that would likely have eliminated him/her previously if he/she had admitted it on his/her application, during background inquiries or at an oral interview--but this will do nothing to detect or prevent the hiring of a potential or current drug addict who is determined not to mention this character flaw.

The naive psychologist might use the Inwald to guide his/her interview, as Inwald (1983) suggests, and read the computer report statement to the effect that "This person does not appear to be a drug user, and denies habitual drug use" (actual IPI narrative report text, 1984) and ignore exploration

of this area in interview--not realizing this statement is based upon the endorsement of a single, and very transparent, item. A more subtle approach suggested by the MacAndrews scale of the MMPI, or a configural pattern of the CPI, will include more False Positives than the IPI, precisely because these scales can become elevated without the applicant being forced to baldly admit they have had a drug problem.

The written psychological exam is usually viewed as a device to generate hypothesis to be tested in the clinical interview. In this approach a sensitive instrument with the ability to indicate possibilities is more useful than a cruder instrument which collects evidence. As a method for screening intelligent, defensive people, the IPI approach strikes the present author as being too naive.

Other Scales

The following is a listing of other, less popular, scales which have been used in applicant situations, and which the reader might wish to consider. Research findings that have been obtained for each:

Allport-Vernon-Lindzey Study of Values (Allport, et al, 1960): Successful police sergeant candidates scores did not differ significantly from those of normal males. (Hooke and Krause, 1971).

Army General Classification Test

Going way back to a 1949 study, this test was a good predictor of academy performance--likely as a measure of IQ (Dubois and Watson 1949).

Bender Gestalt

Used by Beutler, Storm, Kirkish, Scogin and Gaines (1985) in a study of police officer performance as a measure of ones ability to organize time and respond to time requirements. The Bender yielded scores which where interpreted as reflecting either perfectionistic tendencies versus impulsivity. The Bender was administered under both stressed and unstressed conditions, and was actually one of the better predictors employed. The Bender was significantly related to ratings of officers technical proficiency, departmental reprimands, suspensions, and referrals to counselling.

Bennett Mechanical Comprehension Test

Going way back to a 1949 study, this test was used as a supplement to the Army General Classification Test as an applied measure which raised the reliability of the prediction to the .60 level (Dubois and Watson 1949).

Clinical Analysis Questionnaire

Used by Psychological Resources Incorporated in their automated testing process. The clinical analysis questionnaire is a personality and psychopathology inventory of the self report type. Validity data on this scale is not available. (Green, 1982).

Culture Fair Intelligence Test

Used by Psychological Resources Incorporated in their automated testing process. The Culture Fair Intelligence Test is said to give IQ data without violating the EEOC 80 percent rule (Green, 1982).

Cornell Index

Used in New York police screening process since 1974. The Cornell Index has survived legal challenges (Franzese, 1984).

Draw A Person

Used by San Mateo County Sheriff, 1959-1975. Draw A Person was found to produce no significant correlation to any demographic variable tested for (McDonough and Monohan, 1975).

Detroit Police Questionnaire

Used in New York police screening process since 1974, the Detroit Police questionnaire has also survived legal challenges

(Franzese, 1984).

Elam, Gettys and Smouse Incomplete Sentence Blank

This incomplete sentence blank was used in a study to differentiate successful police negotiators from a police control group. It was later dropped from the study for lack of scoring system (Smouse, 1983, Elam 1983).

A Ten Minute Essay On "Why I Want To Be A Deputy Sheriff"

Used by San Mateo County Sheriff, 1959-1975. The Essay was used to help structure a clinical interview by psychologists. No specific scoring system. (McDonough and Monohan, 1975).

The Eysenck Personality Inventory

The lie scale and personality dimensions introversion-extroversion and neuroticism-anxiety were used as predictor variables in the Beutler, Storm, Kirkish, Scogin and Gaines (1985) study of police officer performance. Only the lie scale was predictive (of reprimands), with a correlation of .28.

F Scale

Used by San Mateo County Sheriff, 1959-1975, the F scale was found to produce no significant correlation to any demographic variable tested for (McDonough and Monohan, 1975).

Fundamental Interpersonal Relationship Orientation-Behavior

FIRO-B): Beutler, Storm, Kirkish, Scogin and Gaines (1985) used this scale in a study of police officer performance. It was significantly related to measures of the officers interpersonal ability as measured by supervisory ratings.

61

FIRO-B was also used in a study to differentiate successful police negotiators from a police control group with no significant findings (Smouse, 1983, Elam 1983).

Gough Adjective Check List (Gough, 1952)

Successful police sergeant applicants give responses on the Adjective Check List that are conventional and socially desirable: capable, cooperative, dependable, practical (Hooke and Krause, 1971).

House-Tree-Person Drawings

The House-Tree-Person drawing task has been used in New York police screening process since 1974. (Franzese, 1984).

Johnson Temperament Analysis

Perdue (1964) compared top rated Virginia correctional officers with other officers. No one received scores outside of the normal range.

MPI L Scale (Hathaway and McKinley, 1943)

The MMPI L Scale was used in the Florida Police Standards Research Project as an additional validity measure with the CPI. (Spielberger, et al, 1979).

Nelson-Denny Reading Test

Used in the Florida police standards research project, it correlates highly with the California Test of Mental Maturity, and is best considered a test of mental abilities. It was found to be predictive of police academy grades. Academy staff commented favorably on the test. Vocabulary, Comprehension Total

62

Score and Reading rate were all successful predictors of academy performance for males, however, only Comprehension and Total Score were significant for Females. (Spielberger, Spaulding Jolley, Ward, 1979).

Otis I.Q.

The Otis I.Q. test was used by the San Mateo County Sheriff, 1959-1975. It was found to be significantly related (as was civil service score) to promotions and in best vs worst officer comparisons. (McDonough and Monohan, 1975).

Otis IQ was also used in New York police screening process in the original 1974 configuration. It had to be dropped due to legal challenges (Franzese, 1984).

Personal History Index (Baehr, Furcon & Froemel, 1968)

Developed by the above authors, it uses demographic variables to predict performance. In the pilot study it correlated .46 with criterion measures.

In a subsequent study (Leitner and Sedlacek, 1976) it was also a significant predictor.

Rokeach Value Survey

Rokeach (1973) reports on extensive research regarding the value systems of police vs several other occupational and ethnic groups. It may show promise although the reliability has been criticized (Buros, 1978). Due to it's short length, it makes an interesting addition to a battery.

Rokeach Dogmatism Scale

Used by Tieman (1973) no relationship was found between performance evaluation and measures on this scale.

Rorschach

The Rorschach projective personality test was used in San Mateo County from 1959-1975. It was found to be a significant predictor of fired vs retained employees, and resigned vs retained Deputy sheriffs. (McDonough and Monohan, 1975).

Blum (1964) produced low (below .20) but still significant correlations between Rorschach test results and several outcome measures.

Shipley Institute of Living Scale

The Shipley Institute of Living Scale is an instrument providing an estimate of intelligence and intellectual efficiency dating from the 1940's. It was used as a predictor variable in the Beutler, Storm, Kirkish, Scogin and Gaines (1985) study of police officer performance. It had one significant relationship to a performance variable (suspensions), but was not one of the best scales utilized.

Sixteen PF (Cattell, 1967)

Used by Psychological resources of Atlanta, Georgia, in their automated testing and screening report services. The 16 Pf has been extensively criticized and is not in high repute as a personality measure. Eysenck has called it a "meaningless" test (Eysenck, 1974).

The State Trait Anxiety Inventory was used in the Florida Police Standards Research Project, on the assumption that anxiety may affect ability to constructively deal with stress. No significant difference were observed between successful and non successful recruits for either males or females. (Spielberger, Spaulding Jolley, Ward, 1979).

It was also used in a study to differentiate successful police negotiators from a police control group. Indicated lower anxiety for negotiators as compared to controls. (Gettys, 1983).

Strong Campbell Interest Inventory

The Strong Campbell Interest Inventory was a device used in the Florida police standards research project. Successful caucasian male candidates were more like Army officers in terms of interests than unsuccessful candidates. No significant differences on the police officer scale scores. The Strong Campbell showed little potential for discriminating female officers. (Flint, 1979; Spielberger, Spaulding Jolley, Ward, 1979).

SPY Scale (Spielberger, Kling and O'Hagen, 1978)

The SPY Scale was an experimental Measure of sociopathy, used in Florida Police Standards Research Project. (Spielberger, Spaulding Jolley, Ward, 1979).

The Symptoms Checklist

The Symptoms Checklist is a 90 item self report symptom inventory used by Beutler, Storm, Kirkish, Scogin and Gaines (1985) in a study of police officer performance. It was unique

in this study in that it was found to produce no significant
relationship to any performance variable (meaning it was not very
good).

The Problem With Multiple Regression Equations

As we have seen, few scales can do an adequate job of predicting success in and of themselves. Successful selection would seem to require clinical judgment in weighing a collection of data on each candidate. This situation calls for what Paul Meehl termed, "a good cookbook" (Meehl, 1956) or multiple regression equation approach.

Unfortunately, although formulas have been developed, none are viewed as reliable enough to be accepted as a standard. Several regression equations have been reported for the selection of police and corrections officers. The danger of attempting to utilize such regression equations, such as Spielberger, et al, (1979), is that when used we can be confident they will be less effective than reported in the study.

A regression equation developed on the group being tested will usually fit the data for that group quite well. Part of what is being measured in the equation is the true contribution of each test, while part is error variance. When an equation is applied to a different group, this error variance will tend to attenuate the predictive power of the equation.

It is only by repeated application and renorming that an optimal combination of variables can be located. This simply has not been done.

Conclusions On Testing

As Stratton (1983) points out, it is important to remember that statistically significant differences in research projects may have very little relationship to practical significance in the field. It is easy, especially with large groups, to obtain significance with a one point difference between groups, giving an extremely large overlap of both false negatives and positives. It may be, as Eiseberg and Reinke (1973) observe, that one particular test may be valid for one particular group in one particular situation, but most tests are not valid for most groups in most situations.

If only a single test is to be employed, the California Psychological Inventory appears the measure of choice. However, thought should be given to obtaining additional validity data--possibly by extraction of L scale from the MMPI. If time and budget permits a battery to be assembled, the MMPI/CPI combination makes a powerful assessment tool.

Our best supporting data comes from the use of these measures combined. For example, Elam (1983) maintains the combination works--as he says, "at least in Oklahoma."

Other tests can not be justified on either psychometric or legal grounds. It is hoped that future research can justify employing the very promising Jackson scales.

The Clinical Interview

Typically, the psychological interview is the last hurdle an applicant must cross before acceptance into a department. Because of monetary and priority factors, obviously unsuitable applicants are weeded out at earlier stages by civil service examinations, preliminary background checks (done in seconds by use of the National Crime Information Center Database and other facilities such as the state or regional crime database computers, oral examination boards, and other fairly cost effective methods of ruling out the obviously unsuitable (Stratton, 1983).

Not all departments will interview every applicant. New York, for example, operating under tight budgets and a massive work load, saw only 30-90% of the applicants, screening the rest on the basis of written tests alone. This situation is changing in New York, and as of July 1984, all applicants will be interviewed, the majority by psychology technicians with Master's degrees in the behavioral sciences.

Actually, the evidence is not good that much is gained by the clinical interview over simply applying a well developed test battery. McDonough and Monohan (1975) did not find that the psychiatric interview made a significant prediction on any of their criterion events (termination, tenure, promotion, resignation). They believe this to be representative of the literature on the matter, and advocate continuing such contact only as rapport building and informative exercises rather than for the purpose of screening.

Perhaps this is not a surprising finding, considering where in the screening process the psychiatric interview usually takes place. Our own model is much more structured and "data driven" than a traditional psychiatric interview, and thus hopefully more accurate. The psychologist should have a wealth of information available to him or her to assist in directing the inquiry of the interview. It is customary to have the psychological test results scored before the interview. Few writers advocate "blind" examinations; citing the need to collect the most relevant information as rapidly as possible (Knatz and Inwald, 1983; Stratton, 1983).

It is very unlikely that gross psychosis and severe neurosis will be seen at this stage. The target traits are hostility, immaturity, passive aggressiveness, resentment of authority, and impulsiveness, as well as the risk of somatization or disability claims (Franzese, 1984; Roberts, 1983).

The psychological interview is different from the normal therapy interview, points out Knatz and Inwald, (1983), as it is designed "to determine certain facts for selection purposes, rather than to help an individual with his or her personal adjustment." Knatz and Inwald (1980) spoke of the psychologists' task as being to "encourage maximum cooperation in what is essentially an 'adversary situation'." They have done this by adopting a rather low key format which as "removed as possible from the traditional 'doctor' or 'investigator' roles." Budgeting only 15-30 minutes per applicant for an interview, they tend to focus on particular problem areas suggested by previous

testing. They have advocated a style which they believe encourages this cooperation: ."..being non-judgmental, and even enthusiastic about the applicants' interests, even though some may be judged as anti-social" is suggested as a means of generating a willingness to talk.

Different approaches can be taken in interviewing potential applicants. An interview is a sample of behavior, and some interviewers deliberately attempt to make it as stressful as possible to view how the applicant will act and react under stress (Berberich, 1984, Personal Communication). Other interviewers adopt a matter of fact history taking approach apparently similar in intent to a background interview.

Knatz and Inwald (1983) point out that "many applicants represent, by and large a 'naive' population, antagonistic to psychology... The interviewer encounters both an exaggerated guardedness and a surprising innocence about the implications of responses."

To get past such defensiveness, they advocate a variety of methods:

--rapid paced questions that don't allow time for careful answers.

--oblique questions presented in a non-logical manner to obscure their purpose.

--Surprise questions to startle or put the candidate off balance.

(e.g. "When were you last in a fist fight? Tell me about it.")

The Rejection

Generally the hiring authority would like a firm answer from the psychologist: Yes or No. Small departments can afford the luxury of detailed reports, which point out strengths and weaknesses of each applicant, largely leaving it to the personnel officer to interpret the meaning of the testing. Larger facilities demand a standardized rating system. Some departments rate candidates on a four point scale from excellent to unsuitable (Elam, 1983). New York adopted a flat Accept/Reject criteria (Franzese, 1984).

However it is couched, disqualification of a candidate on psychological grounds is one of the most likely to be appealed. Many departments, realizing this to be a weak link, will often "back down" when challenged. Others have set up a formal Psychological Appeals Board, which can often perform this process more gracefully. Inwald, Levitt and Knatz (1982) report a 88% "acceptable" rate on psychological screening with a sample of 1,023 correctional applicants. One third of the remaining 12% were eventually hired.

In New York, this board is an independent pool of psychologists and psychiatrists. A privately obtained psychologist or psychiatrist re-interviews the appellant, and submits the findings to the board, after which the board can either accept of overturn the police screening evaluation. If the original decision is supported the appellant has no further recourse (Franzese, 1984). This multi-level evaluation system is felt to be needed for the screening to withstand the myriad of

72

legal challenges to which it has been subjected.

Conclusions

With a carefully selected battery of tests, and a careful interview, psychological screening has been shown to be effective in predicting a candidates future performance. Inwald finds the bottom third of her evaluation sample is twice as likely to receive negative evaluations from the police academy. Leitner and Sedlacek produced a predictive equation with an impressive overall correlation of $r=.79$ in their selection study. In another study, Inwald, Levitt and Knatz (1982) found significantly higher rates of absenteeism, tardiness and negative performance reports for "questionable" candidates eventually hired by the New York City Department of Corrections.

These findings are particularly impressive when it is considered that it tends to be the "best of the worst" who can eventually overcome a negative psychological screening and be hired. That these individuals, who would have a clean background and work history, still have significantly more problems on the job than those who pass the psychological evaluation is a good testament to the effectiveness of such screening. This kind of screening, although with a significant false positive for rejection, can save a department a great deal of time, wasted effort and money.

Psychological screening _is_ effective, and it _does_ work.

APPENDIX I

The Work Orientation (WO) Scale for the 480 item CPI:

Trues (n=10) 126, 165, 180, 245, 263, 276, 283, 314, 392, 475

False (n=30) 26, 48, 74, 77, 92, 93, 132, 151, 178, 190, 192,

232, 237, 252, 257, 267, 264, 299, 309, 351, 353, 366, 390, 398,

405, 422, 435, 459, 463, 465.

References

Adlam, K.R. (1982). The Police Personality: Psychological consequences of being a police officer. <u>Journal</u> <u>of</u> <u>Police</u> <u>Science and Administration.</u>, <u>10</u>, 344-349.

Archibald, E. (1984). Evaluating Police Officers: Viewpoint of a Psychologist, Civilian, Woman. Paper delivered to 92nd Annual American Psychological Association Convention, Toronto, Canada.

Bartol, Curt R. (1982). Psychological Characteristics of Small Town Police Officers. <u>Journal</u> <u>of</u> <u>Police</u> <u>Science</u> <u>and</u> <u>Administration.</u>, <u>10</u>, 58-63.

Beaber, R.J. (1983) The Validity of the Polygraph. <u>Bulletin of The American Academy</u> <u>of</u> <u>Forensic Psychologists</u>, <u>4,1</u>, 1-6.

Bennett, R. & Greenstein, T. (1975). The Police Personality: A test of the predisposition model. <u>Journal</u> <u>of</u> <u>Police Science and Administration</u>, <u>3</u>, 439-445.

Bernstein, I.H., Schoenfield, L.S., Costello, R.M. Truncated Component regression, Multicolinearity and the MMPI's use in a Police Officer selection setting. <u>Multivariate Behavioral Research</u>, <u>17</u>, 99-116.

Beutler, L.E., Storm, A., Kirkish, P., Scogin, F., Gaines, J.A. (1985) Parameters in the Prediction of Police Officer Performance. <u>Journal</u> <u>of</u> <u>Professional Psychology.</u>, <u>16(2)</u> 324-335.

Beutler, L.E. (1980) Psychological Screening of Police Candidates. <u>Police Chief</u>, <u>August</u>, 38-40.

Brodsky, C.M. (1977) Long Term Work Stress In Teachers and Prison Guards. <u>Journal</u> <u>of</u> <u>Occupational Medicine</u>, <u>19</u>, 133-138.

Costello, R.M. (1981). Time Related Effects on MMPI profiles of Police Academy Recruits. <u>Journal</u> <u>of</u> <u>Clinical Psychology</u>, 37, 518-522.

Costello, R.M. (1982). Police Applicant Screening: An analogue study. <u>Journal</u> <u>of</u> <u>Clinical Psychology</u>, <u>38</u>, 216-221.

Covino, V., Beverly, J.L., Bercik, J.R., Lilek, P.J. (1979). Community Mental Health and the Police: Intervention in domestic disturbances. Paper Presented at American Psychological Association Convention.

Downey, R.N. & Signori, E.I. (1958). The selection of prison guards. <u>Journal</u> <u>of</u> <u>Criminal Law,</u> <u>Criminology,</u> <u>and</u> <u>Police Science.</u> <u>49</u>, 234-236.

DuBois, P.H., & Watson, R.I. (1949). The Selection of Patrolmen. Slam, J. (1983a). Psychologists and Law Enforcement. Paper

Presented at 91st American Psychological Association Annual Convention, Anaheim.

Elam, J. (1983b). Personality Profiles of Successful Hostage Negotiators. Paper delivered to 91st Annual American Psychological Association Convention, Anaheim, California.

Fell, R. (1980). Psychological Job Stress and the Police Officer. Journal of Police Science and Administration, 8, 139-144.

Flanagan, C.L. (1984). The role of psychological consultant to New York City Police Department. Paper delivered to 92nd Annual American Psychological Association Convention, Toronto, Canada.

Franzese, P.F. (1984). NYPD Psychological Services: An Historical Perspective. Paper delivered to 92nd Annual American Psychological Association Convention, Toronto, Canada.

Gettys, V.S. (1983). National Survey--Negotiator Selection and Hostage Negotiation Activity. Paper delivered to 91st Annual American Psychological Association Convention, Anaheim, California.

Gough, H.G. (1985). A Work Orientation Scale for the California Psychological Inventory. Journal of Applied Psychology, 70(3), 505-513.

Gough, H.G. (1984a) Personal Communication.

Gough, H.G. (1984b) Personal Communication.

Hillgren, J. & Jacobs, P. (1976). The Consulting Psychologist's Emerging Role in Law Enforcement. Professional Psychologist, 3, 10-21.

Hogan, R. (1971). Personality Characteristics of Highly Rated Policeman. Personnel Psychology, 24, 679-686.

Hogan, R. & Kurtines, W. (1975). Personological correlates of police effectiveness. The Journal of Psychology, 91, 289-295.

Holland, T.R., Heim, R.B. & Holt, N. (1976). Personality patterns among correctional officer applicants. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 32, 786-791.

Hooke, J.F. & Krause, H.H. (1971). Personality characteristics of successful police sergeant candidates. The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, 62, 104-106.

Knatz, H & Inwald, R. (1980) Interview Procedures for Screening Correction Officer Candidates. Delivered at the American Psychological Association Annual Convention, Montreal, Canada 1980, Available through the National Institute of Corrections Information Center.

wald, R.E.Shusman, E.J. (1984). Personality and Performance Sex Differences of Law Enforcement Officer recruits. Journal of Police Science & Administration, 12(3), 339-347.

wald, R.E.Shusman, E.J. (1984). The IPI and MMPI as predictors of Academy Performance for Police Recruits. Journal of Police Science and Administration, 12(1), 339-347.

Inwald, R.E., Levitt, D.B., & Knatz, H.F. (1982) Pre-Employment Evaluation as a Predictor of Correction Officer Job Performance. National Institute of Corrections Information Center.

Leitner, D.W. & Sedlacek, W.E. (1976). Characteristics of Successful Campus Police Officers. Journal of College Student Personnel, 17, 304-308.

McDonough, L.B. & Monahan, J. (1975). The Quality Control of Community Caretakers: A Study of Mental Health Screening in a Sheriffs Department. Community Mental Health Journal, 11, 33-43.

Merian, E.M., Stefan, D., Schoenfield, L.S., Kobos, J.C. (1980). Screening of police applicants: A 5-item MMPI research index. Psychological Reports., 47, 155-158.

Regenbesser, L. (1983) NY State Law Prescribes Psychological Screening for CO Job Applicants. American Association of Correctional Training Personnel, Winter, 1983.

Mills, C.J. & Bohannon, W.E. (1980). Personality Characteristics of effective state police officers. Journal of Applied Psychology, 65, 680-684.

Murphy, J.J. (1972). Current practices in the use of psychological testing by police agencies. Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science, 63, 570-576

Murrell, M.E. (1978). Is the "police personality" unique to police? Psychological Reports, 15, 298.

Murrell, M.E. & Lester, D. (1979) Masculinity in police officers. Psychological Reports, 44, 14.

Neiderhoffer, A. (1967). Behind the Shield. Garden City: Doleday.

Perdue, W.C. (1964) Screening of applicants for custodial work by means of a temperament test. American Journal of Correction, 6 14-19.

Poland, J. (1978). Police selection Methods and the prediction of Police Performance. Journal of Police Science and Administration., 6, 374-387.

e oli, R.M. & Schrinck, J. (1977). Dogmatism among law

enforcement oriented, corrections oriented, and criminology oriented students: An extension. Journal of Police Science and Administration., 5, 232-235.

Regoli, R.M. & Poole, E.D. (1978). Specifying Police Cynicism. Journal of Police Science and Administration., 6, 98-104.

Rios, B., Parisher, D. & Reilly, R.R. (1978). Need for Psychological Services as Perceived by Urban Police Departments. sychological Reports, 43, 126.

Rokeach, M., Miller, M.G. & Snyder, J.A. (1971). The Value Gap Between the Police and Policed. Journal of Social Issues, 27, 155-171.

Saccuzzo, D.P., higgins, G. & Lewandowski, D. (1974). Program for psychological assessment of law enforcement officers: Initial Evaluation. Psychological Reports, 35, 651-654.

Saxe, S.J., Reiser, M. (1976). A comparison of Three police applicant groups using the MMPI. Journal of Police Science and Administration., 4, 419-425.

Scrivner, E. (1984) Screening Techniques For Special Units: An Alternative To Psychological Testing. Paper delivered to 92nd Annual American Psychological Association Convention, Toronto, Canada.

Smouse, A.D. (1983). Psychometric Profiles of Hostage Negotiators. Paper delivered to 91st Annual American Psychological Association Convention, Anaheim, California.

Spielberger, C.D., Spaulding, H.C., Jolley, T.J., Ward, J.C. (1979). Selection of effective law enforcement officers: The Florida Police Standards Project. In C.D. Spielberger (ed.) Police Selection and Evaluation: Issues and Techniques. Washington D.C.: Hemisphere Publishing Corporation, 1979.

Teahan, J.E. (1975) A Longitudinal Study of Attitude Shifts among Black and White Police Officers. Journal of Social Issues, 31, 47-56.

Tiemann, H.A. (1973). Characteristics of highway patrolmen: Basis for description and prediction of performance. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO.

VanMannen, J. (1975) Police Socialization: A longitudinal examination of job attitudes in an urban police department. Administration Science Quarterly, 20, 207-228.

Name _____ Age _____ Date Tested _____

Other Information _____

Notes:

MALE NORMS

Mol. Norms

Note it is
Difficult to
distingvish
FAKE GOOD FROM
GOOD!

--- Fake
Good

— FAKE BAD

PROFILE SHEET FOR THE California Psychological Inventory: MALE

Name _____ Age _____ Date Tested _____

Other Information _____

Notes:

RANDOM
Responses

Standard Scores

MALE NORMS

Do Cs Sy Sp Sa Wb Re So Sc To Gi Cm Ac Ai Ie Py Fx Fe

Male Norms

Standard Scores

The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory

Starke R. Hathaway and J. Charnley McKinley

Scorer's Initials _____

F
Female

Name _____

Address _____

Occupation _____ --Date Tested.

Education _____ - - A g e _____

Marital Status _____-Referred by____ _____

NOTES

Female

| TorTc | ? | L | F | K | Hs+.5K 1 | D 2 | Hy 3 | Pd+.4K 4 | Mf 5 | Pa 6 | Pt+1K 7 | Sc+1K 8 | Ma+.2K 9 | Si 0 | TorTc | For Recording Additional Scales |

Raw Score __ __ __ __ __ __ __ a __ __ __ __ __

K to be added ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___

Raw Score with K ___ ___ ___

(Ψ)

The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory

Starke R. Hathaway and J. Charnley McKinley

Male

Name

Address

Occupation ___ Date Tested ___ Age ___

Education ___ Referred by ___

Marital Status

NOTES

Typical Police Recruit — Average of 1,112 San Antonio Cadets

M
Male

Scorer's Initials ___

For Recording Additional Scales

Raw Score ___

K to be added ___

Raw Score with K ___

9 187618

Signature

Date

PI minibibliography: Police tnd **law** tnforctmtnt **officers**

Elam, J. **D.** (1983). **Minnesota Multiphasic Per-**
● orulitp Inventory and California Psychological **Inventory as** predictors of performance for a **municipal** and **state** police tgtncy. **Disserta-tion Abstracts International,** **47**(2-B), 636.

Bettys, V. S., & Elam, J. D. (1985). Validation **demystified:** Personnel selection techniques **that work.** The Pollct Chief, **52**(4), **41-43.**

logan, R. (1971). **Personality characteristics** of highly rated policemen. Personnel Psychology, 24, 679-686.

logan, R., **& Kuritines,** W. (1975). Ptrsonologlcal **correlates** of police **effectiveness.** Journal of **Psychology,** **91,** **289-295.**

Horstman, P. **L.** (1977). Assessing the California Psychological **Inventory for predicting** police **performance.** **Dissertation** Abstracts inter-national. **37(B-12),** 6387.

James, S. **P.**, Campbell, I. **M., &** Lovegrove, S. A. (1984). Personality differentiation **In** a **pollee**-selection interview. **Journal of** Applied **Psychology,** 69, 129-134.

Leitner, D. **W., & Sedlacek,** W. **E.** (1976). Char-' ● cterlstlcs of **successful campus police offi-cers.** Journal of College **Student Personnel,** **17,** 304-308.

Mills, c. **J., & Bohannon, W. E.** (1980). **Person-** ● litr **characteristics** of **effective state police** officers. Journal of Applied **Psychology** **65,** **680-684.**

Drpen, C. (1982). **Effect** of job involvement on the wrk-leisure **relationship:** **Correlational study** among **bank clerks** and pollct officers. Psychological Reports, **50,** 355-364.

Reiser, M. (1982). Paychologlcal assessment of **barricaded suspect** and hostage negotiator. In **M. Reiser,** Police **psychology:** Collected papers (pp. **116-123).** **Los Angeles: LEHI** Publishing Co.

Spielberger, C. D., Spaulding, H. C., **Jolley, M.]** **& Ward, J.** C. (1979). Selection **of tfftctivt law** enforcement **officers: The** Florida Police **Standards Research** Project. In C. D. Spitlbergtr (Rd.), Police selection and evalu-ation: **Issues** and techniques (pp. 231-251). Washington, D. C.: **Hemisphere** Publishing **Corporation.**

Thurber, S. (1981). CPI variables In relation to **the** polygrtph **performance** of police officer candidates. Journal of Social **Psychology,** **113,** 145-146.

Tiemann, H. **A.,** Jr. (1974). Characteristics of hlghvay patrolmen: **Bases for description** snd prediction of ptrfomanct. **Dissertation Abstracts International,** **34**(10-B), 5239-5240.

253. When prices **are** high **you can't blame a** person for getting all he **can get while** the **getting is** good.

253. When prices **are high you can't** blame people for **getting all** they **csn while** the getting is good.

288. As s youngster I **was** suspended from school one **or more** times for cutting up.

288. **As** s child I vss suspended **from** school one or **more** times for **disciplinary** reasons.

290. **I** hsvt never been in trouble because of my **sex** behavior.

dropped

304. **When** the **community** makes s decision, it Is up to s person **to** help carry It out even if he **had** been **against it.**

306. **When** the **community** makes **a decision,** it **is up to a** person **to** help **carry** it out even If he or **she** hsd been sgslnst It.

312. Any **man** vho Is able **and** villing to **work** hsrd **has** s good **chance** of succeeding.

312. Anyone vho 18 able **and** villing to vork hard **has a** good **chance of** succeeding.

339. **I** hsve **been in trouble one or more times because of my sex behavior.**

dropped

369. If **a person is clever enough to chest someone out of s large sum** of **money, he ought to be allowed to** keep it.

369. **If** s person is clever enough to chest someone out of **a** large sum **of** money, he or she should be **allowed to** keep it.

350. A person should **not** be expected to do anything for his **community** unless he Is paid for it.

350. People should not be expected to do anything for their **community** unless they **are** paid for It.

354. A strong person **will** be sble to **make** up his mind even on the most difficult questions.

356. A strong person **will** be able to **make** up his or her mind even on the most difficult questions.

360. It 18 impossible for **an** honest **man** to get ahead in the vorld.

360. It is **impossible** for snhonest person to **get** shesd in the wrld.

368. I have **had** no difficulty **starting** or holding my urine.

dropped

607. **I** have **had no** difficulty in starting or **holding my bowel** movement.

dropped   . . . .

631. As a **youngster** in school I used **to give** the **teachers** lots **of trouble.**

631. **As a** child in school I used to give the teachers lots of trouble.

457. **A** person is better off if **he** doesn't **trust** anyone.

637. A person **is** better **off** not to trust **anyone.**

460. A strong person doesn't shov his emotions **and** feelings.

660. **Strong** people do not **show** their **emotions** or feelings.

670. If s person doesn't get a fev lucky breaks in life It just **means** that he hasn't been keeping his eyes open.

367. If people don't get s ftv lucky breaks in lift it **just means** that they haven't been keeping their eyes open.

Also dropped: the repeated **items,** 326, 360, 362. 367. 357. 371, 377, 600, 626, 627, 662, and 651.

The 20 Folk Concept Scales of the California Psychological Inventory

Scale name	Intended implications of higher and lower scores
Do (dominance)	**Higher:** confident, assertive, dominant, task-oriented **Lower:** unassuming, not forceful
Cs (capacity for status)	**Higher:** ambitious, wants to be a success, independent **Lower:** unsure of self, dislikes direct competition
Sy (sociability)	**Higher:** sociable, Likes to be with people, friendly **Lower:** shy, feels uneasy in social situations, prefers to keep in the background
Sp (social presence)	**Higher:** self-assured, spontaneous; a good talker; not easily embarrassed **Lower:** cautious, hesitant to assert own views or opinions; not sarcastic or sharp-tongued
Sa (self-acceptance)	Higher: has good opinion of self; sees self as talented, personally attractive, **Lower:** self-doubting; readily assumes blame when things go wrong; often thinks others are better
In (independence)	**Higher:** self-sufficient, resourceful, detached **Lower:** lacks self-confidence, seeks support from others
Em (empathy)	**Higher:** comfortable with self and well-accepted by others; understands the feelings of others **Lower:** ill-at-ease in many situations; unempathic
Re (responsibility)	Higher : responsible, reasonable, takes duties seriously Lower: not overly concerned about duties and obligations; may be careless or lazy
So (socialization)	Higher: comfortably accepts ordinary rules and regulations; finds it easy to conform **Lower:** resists rules and regulations; finds it hard to conform; not conventional
Sc **(self-control)**	Higher: tries to control emotions and temper; takes pride in being self-disciplined **Lower:** has strong feelings and emotions, and makes little attempt to hide them; speaks out when angry or annoyed.
Gi (good impression)	**Higher:** wants to make a good impression; tries to do what will please others **Lower:** insists on being himself or herself, even if this causes friction or problems
Cm (communal ity)	Higher: fits in easily; sees self as a quite average person **Lower:** sees self as different from others; does not have the same ideas, preferences, etc., as others
Wb (well-being)	Higher: feels in good physical and emotional health; optimistic about the future Lower : concerned about health and personal problems; worried about the future
To (tolerance)	Higher: is tolerant of other's beliefs and values, even when different from or counter to own beliefs **Lower:** not tolerant of others; skeptical about what they say
Ac (achievement via conformance)	Higher: has strong drive to do well; Likes to work in settings where tasks and expectations are clearly defined **Lower:** has difficulty in doing best work in situations with strict rules and expectations
Ai (achievement via independence)	**Higher:** has strong drive to do well; likes to work in settings that encourage freedom and Individual Initiative **Lower:** has difficulty in doing best work in situations that are vague, poorly defined, and Lacking in clear-cut methods and standards
Ie (intellectual eff iciency)	Higher: efficient in use of intellectual abilities; can keep on at a task where others might get bored or discouraged **Lower:** has a hard time getting started on things, and seeing them through to completion

<u>Scale</u> name	Intended implications of higher and lower acmes
Py (psychological- mindedness)	**Higher**: more interested in why people do uhat they do than in what they do; good judge of hw people feel and what they think about, things **Lower**: more interested in the practical and concrete than the abstract; Look more et what people do than what they feel or think
Fx (flexibility)	Higher : flexible; likes change and variety; easily bored by routine Life and everyday experience; may be impatient, and even erratic Lower: not changeable; Likes a steady pace and well-organized life; may be stubborn and even rigid
Fe (femininity)	**Higher**: sympathetic, helpful; sensitive to criticism; tends to interpret events from a personal point of view; often feel.8 vulnerable **Lower**: decisive, action-oriented; takes the initiative; not easily subdued; rather unsentimental

APPENDIX C

Physical Fitness Examination

of Las Vegas Metropolitan

Police Department

Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department

400 EAST STEWART AVENUE
LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101
PHONE 702/386-3111

JOHN MORAN, *Sheriff*

ERIC **S.** COOPER, *Undersheriff*

•

LARRY L **KETZEN**
Assistant Sheriff
Staff Operations

DAN **STOPKA**,
Assistant Sheriff
Line Operations

LARRY **C.** RDLDE
Deputy Chief
Technical Service

THOMAS W. RIG
Deputy Chief
Administrative S

JOHN L **SULLIVA**
Deputy **Chief**
Investigative Ser

STEVE WAUGH,
Deputy Chuf
Uniform Field **Se**

GORDON F. YAC
Director
Detention Servi

LOIS **ROETHEL**,
Business Manag
Fiscal Affairs **Bu**

Dear Applicant:

Thank you for your interest in our Department. The following facts about the area and the Department are presented for your information.

The name "Las Vegas" means the "meadows" in Spanish. The Las Vegas springs were a convenient stopping place on the Spanish Trail in the **1800's.** The original settlers of the valley were members of the -Paiute Indian Tribe and their predecessors. The first traces of human settlement date from 15 - 20,000 years ago. The first white settlers were Mormon miners and farmers from Utah in the middle and late **1800's.** The town itself came into existence in 1905 when the Union Pacific Railroad sold homesites and business property in a massive land auction. The town grew slowly until 1931 when gambling was legalized. At the time tremendous growth of the area began and is continuing today. Today the permanent population of the area is approximately one half million people.

Las Vegas has a healthful, semi-arid desert climate. The sun shines 86% of the time; the average high temperature is 80 degrees, the average low is 51. The temperature may reach in excess of 115 in the summertime and fall into the **20's** in the winter time at night. Yearly rainfall averages less than 4 inches and the average relative humidity is less than 20%.

In addition to the permanent population, Las Vegas is visited by more than **12,000,000** visitors annually. The community is served by 15 major airlines and numerous regional and commuter air carriers, with over **400** flights daily from all over the world. There are 113 public schools, plus both private and

parochial schools. Both the University of Nevada and Clark County Community College have in excess of 10,000 students. There are more than 200 churches, B hospitals, 11 banks with numerous branches, 5 television stations plus cable and **satelite** service, 3 daily newspapers and a number of specialty and County parks and a convention center with one million square feet of floor space.

Recreational opportunities abound in the area, ranging from year-round water sports at Lake Mead and the Colorado River to winter skiing at Mount Charleston, all less than a one hour drive from the city. In **addition,** there are several golf courses, and numerous bowling alleys, swimming pools, tennis courts, baseball diamonds, football fields and theme parks in the area.

On July **1,** 1973 the former Las Vegas Police and Clark County Sheriff's Departments were merged by Nevada legislative **action** and became the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department - a separate political entity administered by an elected Sheriff.

This agency serves the residents of the City of Las Vegas and the unincorporated areas of Clark County (over 400,000 people) plus the annual influx of visitors. Our jurisdictional responsibility covers 7,792 square miles bordered by Nevada's Nye and Lincoln Counties and the neighboring states of Arizona and California.

The Department employs approximately 1,500 people in at least 100 different job categories, making it one of the top 20 in the nation in size. The Department operates under a system of Civil Service with more than 97% of all positions falling within the system. Our organization is functional and is divided into five divisions. The Sheriff is the Department Head and we have an Undersheriff, two Assistant Sheriffs, a Director of Detention and two Assistant Directors, four Deputy Chiefs, and four Commanders. In addition, the Department has the ranks of Captain, Lieutenant, Corrections Lieutenant, Sergeant, Corrections Sergeant, Police Officer, Corrections Officer, and numerous civilian supporting positions. We have approximately 1,000 commissioned personnel (including police and corrections) and the balance are civilian classifications. In addition, we employ approximately 140 seasonal school crossing guards. We operate 6 substations within the metropolitan area of the county and resident substations strategically located throughout the county.

There are many opportunities for careers within the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department. The major areas are, of course, police and corrections. Other significant career areas include criminalistics, communications, various clerical positions, and many others. Salaries are determined on a competitive basis in local and regional job markets. Position requirements are reviewed on a continual basis to assure that they are reasonable and valid. The Department offers employee benefits which we believe are excellent. They include:

1. The Department pays the total cost of employee life, medical, and vision care insurance. -Dependent life and medical coverage is available at group rates, partially supplemented by the Department.

2. The Department pays the total cost of employee retirement under the State of Nevada Public Employees Retirement System. In general, commissioned employees can retire after 20 years of service at the age of 50 and civilian employees after 30 years of service at the age of 55, although many options are available. Employees vest in the system after 10 years and, at retirement, receive 2.5% of the average of their highest 36 months pay for each year to a maximum of 75% at 30 years.

3. Uniforms, leather gear, and weapons are furnished by the . Department at no expense to the employee. The **Department pay** a yearly cash allowance for uniform maintenance. **Plain** clothes officers are given a yearly cash clothing allowance.

4. Shift differential is paid for other than day shift.

5. Patrol, traffic, and some other areas work 4 ten hour days; other areas of the Department work 5 eight hour days.

6. Employees receive 3 weeks of vacation from the first through the fifteenth year and 4 weeks thereafter. In addition, employees earn 104 hours per year of sick leave.

7. Overtime is paid at the rate of **1½** times normal hourly rate.

8. A number of assignments are paid incentive steps. Examples: field training officers, canine officers, motorcycle officers, resident officers, helicopter pilots, fixed wing pilots, and others.

9. The Department does not have the classification of "detective". Rather, those officers in investigative plain-clothes assignments are paid additional incentive steps.

10. Department employees receive 12 paid holidays per year plus any additional days granted by the governor.

In an attempt to answer frequently asked questions, the following information is provided:

1. The Department does not accept lateral transfers for commissioned positions.

2. For most of the positions which attract a significant number of out-of-town applicants, we attempt to set up a testing procedure which requires only one trip for the applicant to complete. This requires that candidates stay longer, however, so plan on being in Las Vegas 4 to 7 days.

3. The Department does not pay expenses for applicants testing for positions'nor relocation expenses for those hired.

4. Eligibility lists are certified by the Civil Service Board for 6 months for open competitive positions. These lists can be extended to a maximum of 12 months with the approval of the Civil Service Board. Persons who are not hired by the time a list expires must go through the entire testing procedure if they are interested in being on a future list.

5. The Department's policy is promotion from within whenever possible. Promotions for police and corrections positions **are** made following a strict set of guidelines approved by the Civil Service Board. Officers are eligible to test for Sergeant after 4 years; Sergeants for Lieutenant after 2 years; Lieutenant for Captain after 1 year. The ranks of Commander and above are appointed by the Sheriff.

6. All newly hired police and corrections officers are required to complete their respective academies during probation. Academies are conducted by the Department's training staffs. The academies do not require candidates to "live in", and they are conducted at the **LVMPD** training facilities in Las Vegas.

7. Newly hired police officers will be assigned to patrol for a minimum of 2 years before being eligible for other assignments.

8. New employees are on probation for either 6 or 12 months, with the majority of positions having a 12 month probation. Probation can be extended to a maximum of 18 months, with the approval of the Civil Service Board.

9. Probationary employees are eligible for one step merit increases (4%) at 6 months and 12 months and annual merit in-*creases* annually thereafter. Each job classification has **8** merit steps. Cost of living raises are negotiated with employee associations periodically. Under current contracts costs of living raises will be granted each July.

10. The Department pays longevity pay beginning after 5 years of service. Longevity pay is $\frac{1}{2}$ of 1% of base pay for each year of service, with a maximum of 15%.

11. There are two recognized bargaining units in the Department; the Police Protective Association for commissioned employees and the Police Protective Civilian Employees' Association for civilian employees. Membership is optional in the association. In addition, employees can belong to the Sheriff's . Protective Association, which is primarily social. Included in the membership fees of all of these organizations is additional insurance coverage and other benefits.

We hope that the information presented here answers most of your questions about our Department and the Las Vegas area. If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact us.

Sincerely,

JOHN MORAN, SHERIFF

By: RICHARD L. MEYERS,
DIRECTOR
PERSONNEL BUREAU

The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department is looking for qualified individuals interested in a career in Corrections. The entry level position for beginning this type of career with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department is Corrections Officer I.

The work of a Corrections Officer is demanding and involves a great deal of inter-personal skill in the supervision and management of inmates incarcerated in the Clark County Jail. Corrections Officers are not involved in law enforcement or Police work per se; that work has already been completed by the time an individual is placed in the custody of the jail. The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department emphasizes that point, because we are attempting to establish a professional career service in Corrections.

As a part of that effort, the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department has established salaries for Corrections Officers which place **compensationo** for this kind of work in the top five percent in the country. In addition to establishing professional compensation schedules, the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department has established a professional selection procedure to select the most qualified candidates for the position of Corrections Officer I.

This selection process consists of a written exam, physical fitness exam, oral exam, and psychological profile. Further testing will include a medical exam and background investigation, which may include a polygraph exam. Each phase of the selection process is designed to measure to what degree an individual possesses the knowledges, skills, and abilities necessary to perform the job of Corrections Officer.

The written exam is designed to assess reading **and** writing skills. Candidates are not expected to know how the jail functions, but they are expected to be able to read and write at a level that will allow them to be successful in the academy where job knowledges are taught.

The physical fitness exam is designed to measure the basic physical fitness level of the candidate to insure that he is capable of performing basic safety functions within the jail without causing injury to himself or endangering the lives of inmates or his fellow officers. The physical fitness exam will measure the basic level of fitness as well as insuring the **candidat**e is ready to take part in the physical training component of the academy. (Please see attachment "Physical Fitness **Exam")**

The oral exam is designed to measure the verbal communication skills, motivation, and background of the candidates. These components have been identified as critical requirements for a Corrections Officer if he is to be successful in controlling inmate behavior.

If you feel you can meet the demands of the job and the testing, we strongly encourage you to apply for Corrections Officer.

Dear Applicant:

The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department has recorded the time you have requested to take the written test for Corrections Officer I. Enclosed in this packet is the following:

    Application, EEO Information Card, Test Notification Cards
    Map of the Las Vegas area.
    Information letter regarding the Las Vegas area
    Information sheet (READ)
    Physical fitness test information

Please see the orange postcard attached to the **application** to verify the time you have requested to begin the testing process. <u>YOU MUST BRING THIS CARD WITH YOU TO THE TEST IN ORDER TO GAIN ENTRANCE TO THE TESTING ROOM. Bring your **completed** aoolication with you to the written test. APPLICATIONS WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED PRIOR TO THE TIME YOU TAKE THE TEST.</u> REMEMBER! ARRIVE 15 MINUTES EARLY FOR EACH PORTION OF THE TEST.

<u>WRITTEN TEST:</u> This test will consist of 100 multiple choice questions. You will **have 2½ hours** to complete the test. Each part of the test requires a passing grade of 70 or higher and you will be informed whether you passed or failed immediately upon completion. Please arrive at least 15 minutes prior to your time for testing. Once all applicants are in the room and the orientation procedure has begun, no candidates will be' allowed to enter the room. The written test accounts for 50% of your total score.

    TEST SITE: **Cashman** Field, 850 Las Vegas Blvd.
    TEST DATE: July 27, 1985
    TEST TIME: 0800 hours

<u>**NOTE:** TEST PREPARATION SEMINARS ARE FREQUENTLY **CONDUCTED** FOR THIS EXAM. PLEASE CONTACT THE PERSONNEL BUREAU IF YOU WISH TO Al-TEND AND ARE NOT ALREADY SCHEDULED.</u>

<u>PHYSICAL FITNESS TEST:</u> This test consist of a 1.5 mile run, sit ups and pushups. See enclosed information regarding the events and suggested exercises to prepare for the test. Wear clothing suitable for activity and running shoes. This is a PASS/FAIL test and you will be allowed to take the test only once. If you successfully complete the physical fitness test, you will be given a day and time to report for the oral board interview.

    TEST SITE: **Cashman** Field, **850** Las Vegas Blvd.
    TEST DATE: July 27, 1985
    TEST TIME: You will be given your time after you pass the written exam

PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILE: The written portion of the psychological exam. Could take up to 6 hours to complete.

TEST SITE: Valley High School, corner of Eastern and Vegas Valley (one block south of Sahara)
TEST DATE: **July** 28, **1985**
TEST TIME: 1000 hours

ORAL BOARD INTERVIEW: You will be interviewed by a board comprised of three individuals for approximately 20 to 30 minutes. They will be evaluating your knowledges, skills, and abilities for the position of Corrections Officer with the LVMPD. You must attain a score of 70 or higher to pass the oral board. This phase of the testing accounts for 50% of your total score.

TEST SITE: Clark County Courthouse - 200 South Third - 4th floor
TEST DATE: Boards will begin on July 29, 1985
TEST TIME: You will be assigned a time when you pass the physical fitness test.

The following tests are PASS/FAIL and will not determine standing on the eligibility **list.** CANDIDATES MUST PASS ALL OF THE FOLLOWING TO BE **PLACED ON THE ELIGIBILITY LIST.**

BACKGROUND INTERVIEW: For the background interview, be prepared to show the interviewer originals or copies of the following documents:

Birth Certificate
Driver's License
High School Diploma or GED
Name Change/Adoption Documents
Divorce Decree
Military (DD214)
Naturalization Paper (if applicable)
Bankruptcy Documents
College Transcripts

Interviews with the background investigators will begin on July 29, **1985.** You will be interviewed if you have passed all phases of the testing.

POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION: Those candidates who have successfully passed all of the tests to this point will be scheduled for a polygraph examination. Further testing will be recommended or denied at this point.

PHYSICAL EXAMINATION: Those candidates who have successfully passed all of the tests to this point will be scheduled for a physical examination. (Recommendation to place your name on the eligibility list will be made at this time.)

Those candidates who are successful in all phases of testing will be notified by mail of their final test **score** and standing on the eligibility list.

Successful candidates who are offered a position will be required to terminate their current employment.

THIS SEQUENCE **OF** TESTING **ENCOMPASSES SEVERAL DAYS: THEREFORE OUT-OF-TOWN** CANDIDATES **SHOULD PLAN** THEIR SCHEDULES **ACCORDINGLY. (Minimum of four days – as many as six days)**

PHYSICAL TESTING STANDARDS

The PUSH-UP begins while lying on the stomach, hands flat on the surface, shoulder width apart. The toes and palms remain on the floor. The body and head are aligned and straight, and the body is raised until the arms are straight.   The body is then lowered to the point where the back is lower than the elbows of both arms, and the front side of the body is not touching the ground.   When executed correctly, this movement equals one repetition.   Candidates will have one minute to complete as many push ups as they can.

The SIT-UP begins while **lying** on the backside with legs bent at the knees at approximately a 45 degree angle. Hands clasped together behind the head, and to remain in the clasped position. The upper body is then raised in a roll up type movement to an upright position, then lowered back to a lying position. One repetition will be counted using this procedure; no jerking is allowed. If the hands break apart, the sit-up will not count. Candidates will have one minute to complete as many sit-up as they can.

The FLEXIBILITY SIT AND REACH is accomplished by sitting on a plywood plank with shoeless feet placed flatly against a portion of a 2 x 4. The legs must be touching the plywood, the knees locked - absolutely no bending. The feet and legs are to remain side by side. The measuring plane is the closest point to the examinee, this zero point is 15 inches.   Three attempts are allowed and the best measure is recorded. The examinee places one hand over the other to form **a** wedge. A yard . . stick is then placed perpendicular to the measuring plane (at the 15 inch mark).   Bend forward as much as possible along the yardstick, the farthest point to be recorded.   The farthest point is the culmination of forward bending before retreat.- (NOTE: A jerk motion usually begins with a wind-up retreat movement, thus not allowed as it discontinues a continuous forward motion).

The 1.5 MILE RUN will be performed in running shoes and appropriate clothing. This test may be run or completed in a combination of walking and running. The test begins at the designated starting line and concludes after the examinee crosses the designated finish line. The examinee will be measured in minutes and seconds the time it takes to complete 1.5 miles (6 laps on a ¼ mile track).

NOTE: As in all portions of the test candidates should arrive 15 minutes before their designated start time.

Restroom and drinking facilities are limited at the test site so please act accordingly. Wear appropriate clothing including running shoes, shorts, and warm ups as necessary.

The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department makes every attempt to schedule testing in a manner that is reasonably convenient for applicants. However, we deal with very large groups of people which does cause some delays and waiting time. It is the candidate's responsibility to be on time, properly equipped, and prepared for the various parts of the testing procedure.

LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT

The following is a list of the most common reasons why the LVMPD denies employment to applicants for the position of Police Officer or candidates who are not successful after being hired.

1. <u>Falsification of Background Information</u> either by lying or ommission of **material** facts resulting in the applicant appearing more acceptable than is actually the case.

2. <u>Arrest History</u> - While an arrest, in and of itself will not automatically disqualify any candidate, the facts surrounding the incident(s) will be closely-investigated and reviewed.

3. <u>Drug **Usage**</u> - A history of illegal drug usage. This is not only criminal behavior but brings the appl **icant's** credibility into question.

4. <u>Unstable Work History</u> - A candidate whose employment record indicates numerous job changes for no apparent reason; several terminations, etc., may lead to the conclusion the candidate is only looking for a job and is not career minded.

5. **<u>Immaturity</u>** - As demonstrated by a lack of social experiences **and/or an unsettled** life style such as a poor driving record and/or poor credit history.

6. <u>Lack of Preparation</u> - The candidate who does not have any idea what Police work entails will become disillusioned and will either have poor job performance or leave the Department.

7. Weight not proportionate to height (see attached chart).

These are several of the reasons why applicants are not successful in seeking employment with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department. Review them carefully in an effort to determine if any or all apply to you. If they do, you should think about your request for employment. You will be given a polygraph examination to assist in the background investigation.

PHYSICAL FITNESS EXAM

The physical fitness exam is designed to measure the physical fitness of the candidates to ensure that they are capable of participating in the physical training components of the Police **Officer** Academy which is designed to prepare them for the physical demands of the job of Police Officer.

Physical fitness is defined as including the following components; strength, cardiovascular endurance, power, speed, agility, balance, and flexibility. Therefore, the physical fitness test is composed of exercises designed to measure ability in these areas. Individuals are considered physically fit and are acceptable to the Department if they can perform the required exercises at a level that is at least average for their age and gender. The chart on the bottom of the page depicts the actual parts of the exam with their accompanying passing scores broken down by age and gender.

Preparation for this examination should include such things as:

    stretching, to increase flexibility
    running, to improve cardiovascular endurance
    push ups and bench presses to increase upper body strength
    sit ups, to increase torso strength.

Other exercises designed to improve the components of physical fitness; as defined here, would also be appropriate.

It is strongly recommended that applicants undergo a medical exam before undertaking any program of physical training. REMEMBER TO DRESS APPROPRIATELY FOR THIS EXAM.

ICAL FITNESS	PASSING SCORE					SCORE	PASS/FAIL	STAF INITI
E GROUP	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+			
MALE								
MILE RUN	12:00	12:30	13:00	14:30	16:15			
BILITY	15.0"	14.5"	12.5"	10.5"	10.5"			
IPS	34	31	26	20	18			
UPS	20	17	13	13	13			
FEMALE								
MILE RUN	15:54	16:30	17:30	19:00	19:30			
BILITY	18.5"	16.5"	15.5"	15.5"	15.0"			
IPS	30	24	15	14	14			
UPS	14	12	9	6	6			

DESIRABLE WEIGHT RANGES

	MALES				FEMALES		
Heipnt	Small Frame	Medium Frame	Large Frame	Heinht	Small Frame	Medium Frame	Large Frame
5' 4"	117 - 138	123 - 149	131 - 163	5' 0"	96-114	101 -124	109 - 138
5' 5"	120 - 142	126 - 153	134 - 167	5' 1"	99-118	104 - 128	112 - 141
5' 6"	124 - 146	130 - 157	138- 173	5' 2"	102 - 121	107 - 131	115 - 144
5' 7"	128 - 151	134-163	143-178	5' 3"	105 - 124	110. 195	118 - 149
5' 8"	132 - 155	138 - 167	147-183	5' 4"	108 - 128	113 - 139	121 - 152
5' 9"	136-161	142 - 172	151 - 187	5' 5"	111 - 132	117-144	125 - 156
5'10"	140 - 165	146-177	155-193	5' 6"	114 - 135	120 - 149	129 - 161
5'11"	144 - 169	150 - 183	160 - 198	5' 7"	118 - 140	124 - 153	133-165
6 '	148-174	154 - 188	164-204	5' 8"	122 - 144	128 - 157	137 - 169
6'1"	152 - 179	158-194	169 - 209	5' 9"	126 - 149	132 - 162	141 -174
6'2"	156-184	163 -199	174 - 215	5'10"	130 - 154	136-166	145 - 179
6'3"	160-188	168 - 205	178 - 220	5'11"	134 - 158	140 - 171	149 - 185
6' 4"	169 - 198	178 - 216	188 - 231	6' 0"	138 - 163	144 - 175	153 - 190
6' 5"	174-204	182 - 222	192-238				

1. _____

    (Examine&s Name)

2. Examinee's frame is   ☐ small   0 medium   0 large

3. Considering the above weight table, the examinee's frame, and other individual physical characteristics, I consider his/her

    present weight   ☐ Satisfactory   0 Excessive

4. Under proper medical supervision, employee should lose _____ pounds

Remarks: _____

_____

_____

                                      Signature of Medical Examiner

                                                Date

APPENDIX D

SUPPLEMENTAL JOB INFORMATION PRESENTED TO APPLICANTS

FOR THE **PIMA** COUNTY DETENTION CENTER

THE PRINCIPLES AND DYNAMICS OF JAIL MANAGEMENT
ESSENTIAL TO NEW GENERATION JAILS

INTRODUCTION

The design and management style of some new jails during the past decade has departed dramatically from traditional practice. Because of the significance of this departure, these nek facilities have been referred to as "New Generation Jails."

However, the term "New Generation Jail" is a general one that can legitimately be applied to any jail which differs significantly from jails of the past. To develop a more precise definition of the term for the purposes of this discussion, the approximately 1,000 jails that have been constructed during the past decade have been classified into three basic architectural/management categories.

1. LINEAR/INTERMITTENT SURVEILLANCE

2. PODULAR/REMOTE SURVEILLANCE

3. PODULAR/DIRECT SUPERVISION

Most jails built during the past decade have. been Linear/Intermittent. The architectural style is linear, i.e., the inmate housing areas consist of rows of individual or multiple occupancy cells at right angles to the surveillance corridors. Since the patrolling officer can seldom observe more than several cells at a time, the term "intermittent surveillance" is used to describe the management approach imposed by the 1inear

architectural style. This category is not only the predominant style of the past decade, but represents the traditional jail and prison design of the past two centuries.

An innovation of the past decade, however, was the "podular" architectural style. The term podular was coined to describe facilities in which the inmate housing areas are divided into manageable units composed of approximately 50 single occupancy cells grouped around a common multipurpose area in an easily surveillable arrangement. The podular architectural style facilitated improved inmate surveillance and supervison. The result has been reduced incidents of inmate violence.

The podular architectural style has been adapted to two distinctively different management approaches: remote surveillance and direct supervision.

The fundamental distinction of the podular/remote surveillance category is that inmates are observed from a remote, secure observation compartment and the officer has no direct contact with the inmates. The cell doors are electronically controlled from this station and communication with inmates is over an intercom system. The fixtures, furnishings, and finishes are of the vandal-proof. security variety. The standard housing unit of around 48 beds is usually subdivided into three 16-bed units or four 12-bed units. When negative inmate 'behavior is detected by the officer in the control room, additional officers are summoned to take the necessary corrective action.

The remote surveillance management approach is reactive. There is an implied assumption that inmates behave in a predictably violent and destructive manner, and management initiatives are designed to react to this aberrant behavior. Costly vandal-proof materials are installed as a reaction to anticipated destructive behavior. The subdivision of the housing units is to facilitate tne suppression of violent inmate behavior by staff.

In contrast, the management approach in the podular/direct supervision architectural management category is pro-active. A staff member is stationed within each standard 48- bed housing unit. It is the role of this officer to directly supervise inmates in order to prevent negative behavior. It then becomes unnecessary to install costly vandal-proof fixtures, furnishings, and finishes. The cost of subdividing the standard 48-bed units into smaller 16-or 12-bed units is also avoided. The principle management strategy is to elicit desired responses from inmates by the direct interventions of the unit officer.

Fodular/remote survei11ance has generally been chosen over podular/direct supervision as the alternative of preference to the linear style Jail. The reason for this preference is most probably rooted in the reactive management approach. The

remote/surveillance model is a structural and technological response to the specific operational problems and deficiencies that have plagued linear jails over the past 200 years. And, relatively speaking, the response has been somewhat successful in reducing these problems.

The underlying assumption in podular/direct supervision jails, on the other hand, is that the negative inmate behavior characteristic of linear jails is to a large degree the direct result of circumstances arising from the management and supervision techniques imposed by the linear architecturai style. The podular architectural style is seen as obviating these circumstances and freeing management from the necessity of functioning under the assumption of negative inmate behavior.

Since podular/direct supervision facilities rely on effective staff supervision to achieve management objectives,. it is essential to i denti'f y the critical inmate management practice5 that have proven successful in the institutions. that have utilized this approach over the past eight year s. A thorough knowl edge of the principles and dynamics involved in these practices is essential for those jail practitioners embarking on such an operation.

Not all jails that were designed as podular/direct supervision facilities experienced positive rccompl i shment of their management goals. Several encountered such extreme difficulties with their initial operations that extensive modif ication of their physical plants and furnishings was necessary. These negative experiences as well as the positive ones have contributed to tha formulation of a set of principles and dynamics which go beyond 1 ocol practice and represent concepts which are considered essential to the success of a podular/ direct supervision facility.

These principles and dynamics may be employed in any jail with effective results; however, a jail that has been built to facilitate this management approach will achieve the best results and also reap the benefits of reduced construction and operating costs. The design. characteristics of the traditional linear/intermittent surveillance and the podul ar/remote surveillance categories may impose severe impediments to the implementation of some of these principles and dynamics.

THE PRINCIPLES AND DYNAMICS OF NEW GENERATION JAIL MANAGEMENT

PRINCIPLE I. -- EFFECTIVE CONTROL

A jail, by definition, is a control led environment for detention of those who are charged with a crime, awaiting a disposition, or serving a short sentence. Therefore, effective control of inmates is one of the primary objectives of any jail.

1. Total Control

The managers of podular/direct supervision jails must be in total control of their jails at all times. Control should never be shared with inmates. When inmates are even temporarily unsupervised, they are in effect left in control of each other. Whenever an officer is reluctant to enter any part of the jai 1, the inmates in effect can be said to be in control of that part of the jail, if even temporarily.

2. Sound Perimeter Security

The physical security of the podular/direct supervision facility is concentrated on the perimeter. A strong perimeter security permits greater flexibility of internal operating procedures and increases staff safety. Staff in contact with inmates should never have the ability to cause the release of an inmate.

3. Population Divided Into Controllable Groups

Dividing the jail population so that the jail administration will not have to deal with more than 50 inmates at any one time will facilitate their ability to remain in control. The administrator may very well wish to manage l arger groups Of inmates when it is considered ● ppropri ate; however, this opti on should be discretionary and not dictated by design.

4. Easily Surveillable Areas

The supervi sing officer shoul d always be in a position to easily observe the area he controls. This should be facili tated by the design of the unit. The concept of "protectable space" which was developed in the environmental design of public housing and other public spaces vulnerable to theft and vandalism can be very effectively employed in an inmate housing unit.

5. Maximize Inmates' Inner Controls

One of the most significant elements of the principle of Effective Control is to structure the inmate's environment so that his inner controls will be maximized. Just as most inmates havf the capacity for negative behavior in order to achieve their ends, they also have the capacity to conform their behavior to the desires of the administration if that wi 11 serve to meet

their needs. Many '*street wise" inmates learned at an early age to manipulate their environment to their best advantage. In the traditional jail or prison environment violent and destructive behavior is one of the means usually employed by inmates to effectively achieve their needs.

A pro-act i ve management approach to this problem is to manipulate the inmate's environment so that his critical needs are best achieved through compliant behavior and his negative deeds will consistently result in frustration. In such a custodial setting the inmate has a significant investment in remaining in the general population.

One should not be deceived by the resulting display of responsible behavior from inmates. Their basic belief system has not miraculously changed. They are merely manipulating the environment in which they find themselves to their best advantage. They will quickly revert to their more familiar negative "modus operandi" whenever it appears to be in their best anterests. However, our mission in a detention setting is not to cause basic personality change, but to control inmate behavior, ensure staff and inmate safety, and protect public property.

PRINCIPLE II -- EFFECTIVE SUPERVISION

Direct staff supervision of inmates is requisite for the achievement of effective control. Effective supervision involves more than visual surveillance: it includes the use of all the human senses, as well as extensive personal interaction between staff and inmate. The elements of supervision proven effective in other human enterprise also can be productively applied in a detention setting.

1. Staff-to-Inmate Ratio

The military has struggled with the concept of supervision ratios for centuries. While there are still no precise figures or absolute rules, past practice indicates that a platoon of approximately 44 men is a manageable group. for military purposes. The experience of the past eight years in podular/direct supervision detention facilities indicates that an officer can effectively supervise JO inmates. There is some evidence indicating that the group of inmates being supervised by one officer may even exceed 50, but it is still too early to determine the validity or reliability of this data. However, at the present time there is sufficient experience to establish' the one-to-50 ratio as a reliable benchmark for detention facility design.

As one would reasonably assume, smaller groups are easier to supervise. However, the cost effectiveness of a lesser ratio has to be token into consideration, since it could represent a

considerable increase in annual operating cost for large Institutions. On **the other hand,** small **er** institutions, e.g.. under 200, may not be able to achieve the one- to-50 ratio because of mandatory classification groupings.

When inmates are divided into groups of 16 *or* 12 as in *the* standard podular remote/surveillance facility, the separations *serve* as a severe impediment to direct supervision. TO attempt to staff each of *the* subdivisions with an officer would result in an operating cost few communities could afford.

2. Officer in Control of Unit

Effective supervision depends on the officer's being in control of his unit. If an inmate challenges an officer's authority by failing to comply with verbal commands, the offending inmate must be removed from the unit.. The inmate should only be returned when there is a clear understanding that he agrees to comply wrth all orders given by the officer. The inmate may only need removal for a brief time if it appears that he is responding to counseling and is prepared to accept the officer's direction. On the other hand, the inmate may need to be placed in administrative segregation to await a disciplinary hearing. In either case, the unit officer should not be expected to contend with an inmate on his unit who is not agreeable to promptly obeying all lawful orders.

The officer should not be hesitant to exorcise his authority, particularly in maintaining the sanitation and orderliness of the unit. The officer should, of course, be careful not to abuse his authority and place his superiors in a position of not being able to support him. All of the staff lose in a situation of that kind.

The principle that an officer must have the authority commensurate wrth his responsibility must not be confused with .the old axiom that "the officer is always right." An institution must be managed by a clearly defined and understood set of Policies and procedures, along with a good measure of common sense. When these are violated, management must promptly respond in an inteiligent and equitable way.

3. The Officer's Leadership Role

One of the major *sources* of inmate violence is the struggle to assert leadership when a leadership void exists. This is a natural group response to such a situation *in* any segment of society. However? the struggle for leadership or 'the dominant role in an inmate group is usually violent and brutal. Inmate. rapes, for example, are often tactics employed by inmates to exert their dominance over others.

In order to avoid this situation, the officer must fill this leadership void and protect his role jealously. There is only room for one leader on a unit during any on@ shift and that must be the officer. Management's responsibility is to structure the unit environment to ensure that the officer remains the undisputed 1 eader. Any inmate who vies for the 1 eadership role has to be dealt with effectively, even if that involves his removal from the group.

4. Frequent Supervision By Management

Management must actively assume the responsibility for assuring that staff are successful in fulfilling their inmate supervisory responsibilities.' This is achieved principly through the high visibility of managers in the housing units. The supervi sor must ensure that the officer is performing his duties correctly, is achieving the desired results, and can be fully supported ⊦ management.

4. Techniques of Effective Supervision and Leadership

A considerable body of knowledge has been collected and verified concerning effective supervision and leadership in al l forms of human endeavors. These principles are also applicable to supervision and leadership in a podular/direct supervision facility. Mastery of these techniques will enable the officer to accomplish' his objectives skillfully and with a sense of professional competence.

The officer who practices the correct techniques of supervision and leadership on a daily basis will soon become expert in skills that are hi ghl y transferable. These skills will prove invaluable to the entire organization when the unit officer is eventual 1 y promoted to a supervisory position in his organization. All too of ten officers are promoted from the ranks to supervisory *positions* without the proper training and skills for the job. One of *the* residual benefits of a podular/direct supervi sion facility which practices the accepted techniques of effective supervision and 1 eadership will be the attrition of highly skilled individuals into the supervisory and eventually the command ranks. The benefit to the officer exposed to such training and experience will be the acquisition of skills critical to his future advancement not usually available to his peers on other assignments.

III COMPETENT STAFF

In *order to* run an institution where suicessf ul operation is dependent upon the effectiveness of staff, rather than technol ogi cal devi ces, the staff must be competent. A community whi ch places little val ue on this factor would be best advised not to consider a podular/direct supervision f aci l i ty.

1. Recruitment of **Qualified** Staff

   A basic **requirement for acquiring** a qualified staff is a formal recruitment program which recognizes the qualifications for **officers to** staff a podular/direct supervision **facility. A** candidate for such a position should have the ability to relate effectively to people, to become **a** leader of men, and to **possess** the capacity to learn the skills required of this position. Qualified candidates **do** not have to be **college** graduates, but **should** be capable of participating beneficially in the required training. Such candidates **cannot be expected to** be recruited **at** salaries lower than their road patrol counterparts.

2. Effective Training

   In addition to basic correctional officer training the officer **needs to be** trained **in** the history, philosophy, **and tne** principles and dynamics of new generation jails. He should al so receive training to develop the critical skills of **effective** **supervi** si on, leadership, management, and interpersonal communication.

3. Effective Leadership by Management

   Even trained staff can only function as effectively as their leaders. **As** indicated previously, management must assume the responsibility for making their staff effective. They 'must develop their **staff** through constructive supervision and leadership, ensure that they *receive* proper training, and maintain **high** recruitment standards.

PRINCIPLE IV -- SAFETY OF STAFF AND INMATES

Probably the greatest concern about being incarcerated or seeking employment in a detention facility is personal safety. **Our** detention facilities have gained a reputation of danger and **fear.**

1. Critical to Mission and Public Expectations

   Despite *the* general fear of jails in our society, there **is** a **public** expectation that inmates should be safe and the staff who **operate these** facilities should not be exposed to undue **hazards.** The **basic** mission of a detention facility is to provide safe and secure **custody** of its wards until **they** are **released.**

2. **Life** Safety Codes

) Jails are often the scenes **of** tragic fires. During the past 15 **years** there have been *more* than a dozen mass-fatality fires in American **correctional** facilities. The fatalities from these

fires occurred primarily from smoke inhalation which resulted from deficient evacuation and key control procedures. Any jail, regardless of architectural or management style, must be responsive to these critical issues.

3. Personal Liability

Millions of dollars have been paid in court-awarded damages to victims or their families as a result of personal injuries sustained in jails because of preventable unsafe conditions. It is a travesty that **these** public funds were not spent in the first place to *correct* the unsafe conditions responsible for the injuries. The community now has to not only pay the damages and the attorneys' fees, but must also correct the unsafe conditions after the fact.

4. Inmate Response To Unsafe Surroundings

A critical day-to-day element of this principle is how inmates respond to unsafe surroundings. Their response is rather predictable -- **self** preservation. It is one of the basic instincts of man. Inmates attempt to enhance personal safety by acquiring defensive weapons, affiliating with a kindred group for common defense, presenting themselves as tough persons not to be **messed** with, or by purchasing security with cash **or** kind. Inmates often commit violent or destructive acts in order to be placed in administrative or punitive segregation, where they perceive it to be safer than the general population. The very **acts** which **jail** practitioners identify as the primary inmate management problems are often normal reactions to unsafe **surroundings.**

Inmates in a podular/direct supervision facility where personal safety is ensured do not find these defensive strategies necessary or in their *best* interests. On the contrary, such behavior is dysfunctional. It does not fulfill their needs and serves no constructive purpose. An important indicator of this condition is the almost total absence of contraband weapons in **podular/direct** supervision facilities.

5. Staff Response To Unsafe Working Conditions

Staff's response to unsafe conditions is not too different from inmates', since self preservation is also one of their basic **instincts.** Staff often affiliate with unions to achieve **saf**er working conditions. They avoid personal contact with inmates and avoid patrolling areas perceived by them to be unsafe. They **often avoid** coming to work altogether by using an excessive **amount** of sick leave for stress-related disabilities and at other times by simply abusing the **sick leave** system. They are also **known** to **occasional**ly carry their **own** personal and prohibited **weapons, and** Some have tried to buy personal safety from inmates

through the granting of **special** favors.

Free from the **feeling** of being in constant jeopardy, **work in** the podular /direct **supervision jail** can even become a **rewarding** experience. The challenges presented by directly **supervising a group** of inmates presents new and interesting experiences each day and, as a result, **sick l eave** and employee attrition are reduced.

6. Fear-Hate Response

The inevitaple result · of an unsafe environment is **the** "fear-hate" response. Fear and hate are closely related emotions. We **usuall** y hate those we fear and fear those we hate. The inmates? fear and the resultant hate of other inmates and staff leads to some hideous consequences. The staffs' similar feelings towards inmates and even other segments of staff exacerbates the situation. The combined result of all of this **intense** hatred for one another is a "cancerous" working situation which is extremely hazardous. Such conditions fueled the atrocities **of** the tragic New Mexico State Prison riot in 1980.

PRINCIPLE V -- MANAGEABLE AND COST EFFECTIVE OPERATIONS

One very practical and important consideration for any jail is that it be manageable and cost effective. The jail's mission and goals should be readily obtainable. Taxpayers are not anxious to spend more than they have to on jail operations and rightly so. A community's di screti onary fiscal priorities general1 y do not **include** the jail. However, jai 1 expenses cannot be avoided by neglect. Many communities have tried this strategy, only to find it far more costly in the long run. The podular/direct supervision jail is able to fulfill the mission of the jail while **at** the same time reduce costs.

1. Reduced Construction Costs

Construction costs vary according to region and unique local **circumstances** confronting the architect and contractor. Tnereiore, the cost **of** constructing podular/direct supervision **facilities** vary from one location to another. The fact that this type of institution is free to take on many architectural styles, as long as they facilitate the principles and dynamics, also contributes to the variation in cost.

There are, however, some basic component cost characteristics which are unique to the podular/direct supervision style. The **absence** of vandal-proof and security style furnishings, fistures, and finishes throughout 90% of the facility is the **major** contributor to lower construction costs. When one considers that the cost of a china toilet and bowl is about **$150.00** and a stai nl ess steel vandal-proof toilet and bowl is about **$1,500.00,**

some appreciation for construction costs savings is gained. The costs of gang cell door closers and locking systems are also avoided.

2. Wider Range of Architectural Options

Since the architect does not have to select materials primarily as a reaction to the anticipated destructive behavior of inmates, he is free to select a wider range of materials. For example, if a facility wishes to utilize carpeting as a floor covering and benefit from its relative cost advantages, ease of maintenance, and sound dampening qualities, it may do so.

3. Reduced Vandalism

One unique characteristic of the podular/direct supervision facility is the absence of graffiti and vandalism which is so pervasive in other types of jail. This contributes to a reduced operating cost. As in other public facilities, vandalism and graffiti are significantly reduced by both pleasant appearance of the facilities and perpetual supervision and maintenance.

4. Anticipate Fundamental Needs

AS indicated previously, much negative inmate behavior is driven by efforts to fulfill. their many human needs. The pro-active jail manager uses his knowledge of how human needs effect behavior to achieve the behavioral response he is seeking. He perceives them as environmental forces that can be effectively manipulated to assist him in accomplishing his agency's mission and goals. If the inmate understands that the majority Of his fundamental human needs can be fulfilled on a general housing unit, then he has a very important investment in remaining on the unit.

One of the most powerful forces affecting the inmate's behavior, next to the self-preservation instinct, is the need to communicate and have contact with family and significant others. This need is particularly influential when a person finds himself incarcerated. The fulfillment of this need · then becomes a critical dynamic in the general housing unit. The timing and conditions of the visiting area are all very important. Are contact visits available to those who conduct themselves responsibly? The potential loss of privileges that affect an inmate's relations with his loved ones is a potent force.

Telephone access is likewise an important priority for the inmate. Through the telephone, he is able to keep in communication with the important people in his life. We all know how frustrating it can be when our telephone access is limited when we have a need to communicate with someone important to us. Therefore? another important ingredient for the general housing

unit is sufficient collect call phones to meet the population's telephone needs. Not only does this meet the inmate's need, but it relieves the officer from the annoying and time-consuming task of processing inmate telephone calls.

Television viewing is an important part of contemporary life. Most all of the inmate population have been raised on it since infancy. They have been conditioned to sit quietly in front of the tube for hours on end. Considering how effectively television occupies an inmate's time, it is one of the most economical devices we can obtain for this purpose. This is particularly true in those institutions where such equipment is purchased from the inmate welfare fund.

Television is by no means a panacea. As in the home, it can be the source of a great deal of strife. On a housing unit of 50 felons representing a variety of cultural backgrounds the resulting discord can be very violent. The solution to this problem is to have sufficient television sets to be responsive to basic needs and interests of the population. Usually two to four sets are sufficient, depending on the design of the unit and the mix of the population. Using multiple sets can keep the sound volume lower and divide the population into smaller and more compatible groups.

Inmates should be able to purchase important items from the inmate store or commissary on a regular basis. When inmates are unable to make purchases from the inmate store or commissary, they will make their purchases from other inmates with all of the negative factors associated with these transactions.

The service of meals also takes on an exaggerated importance in jails. Good food well-prepared and presented goes a long way toward increasing the inmate's investment on the general unit. On the other hand, the unprofessional preparation and presentation of the same basic food can cause considerable unrest.

Security of personal property is another important consideration. The lack of secure storage for the inmate's personal property contributes to a high incidence of theft, along with the concomitant corrective actions attempted by the inmate with all of their negative implications.

A great many problems occur in multiple or gang showers. The installation of sufficient individual shower stalls virtually eliminates the difficulties associated with this daily activity.

Physical exercise is an effective way to release pent-up emotional tensions which accompany the stress of incarceration. The opportunity for exercise is also a condition of confinement required by the courts. When the unit is designed to meet this

need, it is **no** longer **a management** problem.

Inmate idleness **still remains** One Of the leading management problems **in a detention facility. The** introduction of industrial opportunities can contribute significantly to the resolution of that problem. The income earned by the inmates' involvement in this activity is a significant motivator to **remain eligible for** these assignments. Inmates involved in constructive activity are seldom management problems.

5. Sanitation and **Orderliness**

A very important dynamic in **managing a** unit in a podular/direct supervision facility is the set of activities involved in maintaining **a clean** and orderly unit. These **activi** ties promote a healthy interaction between staff and inmate in which the inmate **becomes condi** t i **oned** to responding to the officers" directives. **The** orderly state of the **unit is also a continual** reminder th: **the** officer is exerting active control of the unit. **Competit:c:** between units for a prize **awarded** to the cleanest unit can produce **amaf** i ng results in maintaining a high' standard of sanitation and orderliness.

PRINCIPLE VI -- EFFECTIVE **.COMMUNICATION**

Effective communication is a critical element i n the operational strategy of **all** human enterprises. **Jails** are no exception, 'and **management must be** sensitive to the important **impact of the various elements of this principle.**

1. Frequent Inmate and Staff **Communication**

Frequent communication between staff **and inmates** should be **encouraged.** Inmates will often advise **staff of** illegal activities **being·planned** by other inmates if they have the opportunity to do so without running the risk of being identified. **The** inmate's cooperation is motivated both by **an expectation of** favorable treatment from the administration **and by a** desire not to have his living conditions jeopardized by the irresponsible actions of others, particularly if he does not stand **to benefit.**

2. Communication **Between Staff Members**

Because of **the** assignment of **individual** officers to separate units, there is a particular **need for management** to facilitate effective communication between staff members. This needs to be **accomplished** between shifts and between **.assignments. It** can be **achieved** through **shift** roll calls, timely **and** clear policy and **procedure statements, post** orders, and unit logs.

:. Techniques of Effective Communication

Every officer should be trained in the techniques of interpersonal communication. These skills will greatly assist him in accomplishing his objectives. Considerable knowledge has been assembled over the years by communication specialists in correctional settings and should be fully utilized to ease the officer's task. The officer's acquisition of these important communication skills and his mastery of them through daily application will serve him well in other assignments as well as prepare him for promotional opportunities.

PRINCIPLE VII -- CLASSIFICATION AND ORIENTATION

The classification and orientation of inmates is a critical element that must be included in the day to day operations of podular/direct supervision facilities.

1. Know With Whom You Are Dealing

The officer must know with whom he is dealing and should have the benefit of as much information about the inmate as possible. While it is true that jails receive many prisoners on whom little information exists, they also receive many repeaters on whom confinement records should be available detailing, among other things, their behavior patterns in confinement.

2. Orientation

Inmates should be told what is expected of them. Any correctional facility is a strange and structured environment, and a podular/direct supervision facility is unique among detention facilities. A carefully structured orientation program will save a lot of time and misunderstanding and will provide a further opportunity to learn about the inmate's behavior.

3. Assumption of Rational Behavior

Human behavior is amazingly responsive to the expectations communicated. This has been demonstrated frequently in educational settings and has also been seen in detention facilities. When we convey to a person the kind of behavior we expect from him, either verbally or non-verbally, the tendency is to respond to these cues.

The traditional detention facility approach is to treat all newly admitted inmates as potentially dangerous until they prove otherwise. The jailer's expectation of the new inmates' behavior in these situations is clearly transmitted. In a podular/direct supervision facility the reverse 'approach is taken. All new Inmates are treated with a clear expectation that they will behave as responsible adults until they prove otherwise. Staff is equipped to deal with those who prove otherwise, but the vast

majority of inmates conduct themselves responsibly **even during** *t h e* admission process. Observers of this "phenomenon" from traditional jails frequently conclude that the podular/direct **supervision facility has a** "better **class** of inmate" **than they do, when of ten** the reverse is true.

4. Maximum Supervision During Initial Hours of Confinement

The first **24 to 48 hours** Of Confinement **is** a critical **period in** the detention process. The highest rate of suicide **occurs during this** period, accounting for nearly half the total jail suicides. Intensive supervision at this phase of the detention process **will contribute** to a lower suicide rate.

PRINCIPLE VIII -- JUST AND FAIR

To advocate that detention facilities operate in a **just** and fair manner sounds more like a homily than **a** principle of jail management. However, the many implications of this issue in **a** detention facility warrant further examination, and because of its significance to jail management, it is regarded as an operational principle.

1. Critical To. Mission and Public Policy

A critical part of the mission of most detention facilities **is** the provision of just custody. This is in recognition of the fundamental obligation to comply with **constitutional** standards and other applicable *codes* and court decisions. Despite the wide-spread public confusion regarding the role of *t h e* jail, there is a public expectation that prisoners should be treated **fairly** and **in** accordance with the provisidns of the law.

Unfortunately, a large segment of the **publ** i c and even many jai 1 practitioners. appear to be oblivious to the Fifth Amendment prohibition against pre-trial punishment. The Supreme Court's **May** 1980 decision in bell **v.** Wolfish is explicit in its interpretation of the Fifth Amendment to prohibit the imposition cf **any** condition of confinement on pre-trial prisoners for *t h e* purposes of **puni shment. Most** pre-trial punishment advocates **back** down when they are confronted with *t h e* illegality of their position and veil their position with such comments as **"we** can't **make** it too nice for them can **we?"** or "we can't make a country club out of the jail" and "jails need to **look** jail-like." It becomes particularly obvious what is meant by these comments in the context of normal housing accommodations that **are** devoid of **the** harshness of the traditional jail. Even *t hough* the harsher furnishings are costlier, they are preferred because **they** are **Perceived to fulfill** the punishment objective.

There is no place for the self-appointed public avenger in a **professi onal** l y run consti **tuti onal** jai 1. **Such preoccupations are**

counter productive to the -pro-active resolution of jail management problems. It is, therefore, not only legally correct to manage your jail 'in harmony with our constitutional charter,. but it is also a critical element in the principles and dynamics of managing podular/direct supervision facilities.

2. Consistent Root Cause of Collective Violence

The level of violence in our society has reached such **alarming** proportions that there have been two presidential commissions appointed to study this phenomenon within the past 15 years. After examining the history .of collective violence in the United States they were able to identify a set of root causes which were present in all of the· many occurrences. One consistent root cause, which is particularly relevant to the correctional setting, is that in every such event there was a strong **ieeling** by the participants that they had been treated unfairly.

When a person is in a captive status, the impact of unfair treatment is greatly magnified. This is particularly true of Americans, because we have *been* conditioned to expect fair and just treatment by our government. As a principle of inmate management, it is not sufficient for management to be, *in* fact, **just** and fair; it is also vitally important that management's actions are perceived by the inmate population as just and fair.

3. Critical Leadership *Quality*

As referred to previously in the tent, the officer's role as the leader of the unit is an important dynamic in exerting positive control over the inmate popuiation. A critical quality of any leader is a keen sense of fairness that can be consistent1 y depended upon by subordinates. Any compromise of the officer's reputation for fairness will seriously jeopardize his operational effectiveness.

4. Formal Administrative Remedy and Disciplinary System

There will always be those cases where the inmate does not accept the officer's position. Regardless of the basis for the Inmate's disagreement, it is very functional to have a formal administrative procedure in which to channel such disputes. A creditable third party review is not only a good pressure release mechanism, but it also serves as a good monitoring system to ensure consi stency of equitable treatment.

CONCLUSION

These principles and dynamics of jail **management** are neither dogma nor a philosophy around which a **management approach was** designed. **They** represent the collective observations of **both** **successful** and unsuccessful examples of the podular/direct

supervision type detention facilities over a period of several years and under the leadership of a succession of chief executive officers.

It is reasonable to conclude that, if these principles and dynamics are implemented within an institution that is designed to facilitate them, they will achieve the same beneficial results as the successful examples. The results will be a safe, secure, humane, and just facility which will be considered an appropriate place for the detention of American citizens charged with crimes.

&END[TEXT]

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TO CORRECTIONS OFFICER APPLICANTS

THE READING MATERIALS

If you are hired as a Corrections Officer, you will be required to study and learn policies, *procedures,* rules, regulations and other written materials. The written test will include a section assessing *your* ability to study and learn the types *of* materials included in the attached information.

It is your *responsibility to* study this material in preparation for *a* portion *of* the written test. The written test will include 25 multiple choice questions based on the attached reading material. One *or* more, or none *of* the *answers may* be correct. When one *or more* appear correct to you, *mark* all the *correct answers.* The material attached includes ● xerpts *from* several sources, including "The Jail And It's Operation and Management,United *States Bureau* of Prisons, 1977 and Principles And Dynamics of Jail Management Essential To New Generation Jails, W. Ray Nelson, Jail Division, National Institute of Corrections, 1983.

EXAMINATION SCHEDULE

At time of initial application you will be scheduled by the Pima County Personnel Department *for* a written examination.

VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

If you desire to receive veteran's preference you must attach a copy of your DD214 to your application.

I. DETENTION FACILITY CLIMATE
THE SETTING FOR INMATE SUPERVISION

The influence of the detention facility on the inmate is not limited to the effects of educational or religious programs or the impact of other specialized efforts but includes the effects of the total facility environment. "Climate" consists of the total impact of the physical and psychological elements which characterize each facility. Among these are:

1. inmate rules of behavior,
2. policies and procedures,
3. staff attitude
4. the physical conditions of the facility, which includes colors of the walls, cleanliness and privacy or lack of it in the inmate living and sleeping areas, etc

It is typical of human behavior that an individual will become accustomed to his surroundings, whether in a detention facility, a copper mine or a noisy factory. Familiarity makes the abnormal seem normal and the unusual seem commonplace. To the experienced Corrections Officer, the locked doors, restrictions on freedom, bizarre behavior of some inmates and lack of privacy are all routine; they are an everyday part of the work situation. Although it may sometimes cross a Corrections Officer's mind that a detention facility is not a normal place, he or she accepts the work situation unemotionally and gives little thought to the effect of such a place on inmates or what it represents to them.

The knowledge of what "climate" is and how it is developed gives Corrections Officers a new and necessary perspective on the environment in which they must work and helps them understand how it affects inmates and staff's ability to manage and control inmate behavior. With this awareness, staff is better able to understand their own contribution to the climate of a facility. To a large extent, the Corrections Officer can determine whether he works in a place where inmates are cooperative and there is a minimum of tension, or, in a facility where there are many inmate disciplinary problems and the inmate population is hostile and uncooperative. An officer has the ability to actively and positively contribute to the facility climate, or permit inmates to set the climate. In the former case, the Officer is in control of their own behavior and manages inmates in a pro-active manner, controlling and setting the climate of the facility. In the latter case, the Officer relinquishes control to the inmates and all his or her actions are reactive to inmate behavior, permitting the inmates to control the Officer and the facility climate and ultimately have primary control of the facility. The rest of this section is devoted to a discussion of the impact of the incarceration experience and of the facility climate on the

inmate, *from* admission through release,

The Admission Process

The admission process is the inmate's **first and** most impressive experience **in** a **detention facility and one that may** remain with *them for* **the duration of confinement.**

With incarceration, the individual's role changes from that of citizen to inmate. The role played in society includes his or her identity (how he or she perceives him or her "self" and is **perceived** by others) and what he or **she does (work** and social behavior). The inmate's identification as a husband, **father,wife,** mother, worker **and provider** for **the** *family* **will all be deeply** affected **by incarceration. Being confined has** deep **personal consequences because it involves loss** of freedom *to* move about the community **as one** chooses, loss **of** self-determination and loss **of** self-esteem *and respect from* others. *An* inmate suddenly becomes someone in new and unfamiliar **circumstances** over which they have no control.

The change **from** citizen. to inmate begins upon admission to the detention facility with **loss** *of* all tangible items with which one **may express** individuality. Personal clothing, *jewelry* and other valuables *are* taken and stored for **safekeeping,** as are **loose change, cigarette lighters, wallets,** keys, **etc.** Jail clothing is issued, which affords no expression of individuality. The inmate is not permitted to have a wristwatch, a belt or **shoelaces, items that the** rest *of* society takes **for** granted.'

Other ● spech **of the admission** process **are** often humiliating and **traumatic experiences** for many. **In some detention facilities inmates are strip searched during the intake** *process* **and must** remove **all items of clothing in the presence** *of* an *officer.* **The** *search* **is usually quite thorough, and although done in a** professional and **impersonal manner by Corrections Officers, still** has a **devastating emotional effect on some inmates, particularly females. In** many **cases, the inmate's** embarrassment **is replaced, as** a **defense mechanism, with defiance** and **hostility. The** *vagrant,* **the** experienced **criminal and the** average **citizen arrested for non-payment of a traffic** fine 811 **have a desire for** *personal* **privacy and** are **embarrassed by examination.**

Of equal importance is the change in routine and familiar ways of doing things the inmate experiences. Meals **are** served *at* specific times in detention facilities. *Portions* are **controlled and "seconds"** *are* not available. Utensils *are* usually limited to plastic **spoon and fork only and partitioned** *trays* **are used instead of** plates. **Food must be eaten when** *served,* and normally cannot-be saved until later. The menu is based on nutritional needs and not on a **particular inmate's likes and dislikes. Hygiene needs are** also **affected. Razors are issued** by staff and **are usually of the disposable type. No after shave** or **cologne are permitted and the selection of** items **available through the inmate commissary** *are*

limited. **Showering** facilities must **be** shared, **and** *turns* must **be taken. Clothing is exchanged for clean items on a scheduled basis**
and worn for **two** or three days **before** *an* **exchange** is made for
clean clothing.

When **a person** enters **a** detention facility, they **can no longer make the everyday** decisions affecting them and **their family. Contact with** the outside world **is suddenly limited and telephones must be shared with many others. In most** instances, calls must be **made** collect, limiting the calls that can be made. Their means of communication with friends, family and the outside world becomes very **limited.** Calls to attorneys may have to **be** made by family **members or** friends; if their automobile is parked on a **street** they may **have to depend on someone outside to have it moved.** The everyday **manner of** handling thing5 that all of us **take for** granted **becomes a difficult** process for **the** inmate. *If* **the inmate is ill they must depend on the facility medical** staff for **care and no longer have access to their family doctor.** If **the family is having** financial difficulties the **inmate is unable to help** *and* **must hope that the family will be able to handle the problem.** His or her **incarceration may have cut off the only source** of **income for the family.**

In the community, the average person takes **orders on the job** from **a supervisor and must follow** certain *rules.* **In the work situation all the negative factors may be balanced by the rewards of the job -** a **paycheck, approval** from **others and a feeling** of **accomplishment and responsibility.** None **of these** rewards are **available to the inmate. They are made, rather quickly, to realize that** if **they do not comply with the rules and regulations they will suffer disciplinary penalties. In many instances the** courts **have shown interest in the inmate's behavior while in custody, giving the inmate an incentive to avoid disciplinary action. In other instances the facility** may **have the ability to give "good time" to a sentenced inmate, making it possible to shorten their sentence.** But **these** rewards **cannot compare to the** feelings **of self-worth available through accomplishments in the** workplace **and community.**

The inmate's relationship with his or **her family also** undergoes **a drastic change.** If they **are married, they** *can* **no longer meet their,** or **society's,** perceived **responsibilities to their family** by **providing financial support** *or* **care.** A **wife may be** forced **to go to friends** or **relatives** for **help or to apply** for **welfare. A husband may be** forced **to** ask *friends* **or relatives** to care for **the children while he** *works.* **This demonstrates to the inmate that they** can **be replaced as a provider** of **financial support or in taking** *care* of **the needs of the family. The fact that, because of confinement, the wife is no longer dependent on** her husband **can result in the** wife **assuming the role** of **head** of **the household and** discovering she no **longer needs to depend on her husband. A husband may be unfaithful to his wife while** she is **confined, creating irreparable damage** to **their relationship. An inmate's relationships with friends is altered by the** fact **that they** are

confined and their friends are free. Confinement means failure in one way or another, it may be failure to be successful at crime, to perform adequately in society (drunkenness, disorderly conduct, inability to pay a fine or make support payment, etc.) or failure to live within the rules society has set. The inmate may be forced to ask friends for financial assistance in the form of a loan or to pawn items to raise bond; the inmate may need favors such as transportation for spouse and children to be able to visit . If the inmate is a single *parent*, they may have to place their children with a friend *or* public *agency* if no one else can care for them. In any case, the inmate becomes dependent on those outside for assistance and that may make the inmate very uncomfortable.

By the time the inmate has reached the final stages of the admission process, they have made the change from citizen to inmate. They may not understand how it has happened, but they will be aware that a significant change has occurred in them and in their relationship with those *on* the outside. They have suddenly lost *privacy,* their sense of identity, control over their own life and *are* dependent on others for all their needs. The *incarcerated individual* bears the *burden* of social disapproval, rejection and the ● •☺□■℩•• □↗ personal failure.

Adjusting to the Detention Facility

It is doubtful that anyone has ever felt happy or comfortable about being arrested. Arrest and confinement are stress producing situations which result in unpredictable behavior on the part of the inmate. The detention facility is a new and strange environment with new rules and regulations, *new* expectations and new ways of behaving. Adjustment requires rapid learning; the individual must learn *rules* of behavior that *may* include prohibitions of specific and general conduct. Such rules regulate visiting hours, *correspondence,* freedom of movement and personal cleanliness.

The inmate will be required to learn to conform to schedules for every phase of living in the facility- wake up time, lights out, meal times, sick call, bathing times and recreation schedules. If the inmate does not become quickly familiar with the rules they may find themselves in violation of them or may miss an activity. *If* the sick call or commissary procedures require submission of request by a certain time, the inmate must be aware of this procedure or may miss sick call for that day or commissary *for* the week.

At the same time the new inmate is learning the formal rules and regulations of the jail, they must also learn the informal rules, the social system of the facility, including the way Corrections Officers and inmates deal with *one* another. Detention facilities try to attain a certain uniformity in the way staff deal with

inmates and they achieve this to remarkable *degree*. It is not realistic, however, to assume that all Corrections Officers will be able to behave toward all inmates in the same way at all times, This means that the inmate must adjust, to some degree, to the individual differences in Corrections Officers. These differences may not be great, but must be taken into account by the inmate. Not all Officers will react to the same situation in quite the same manner, some will be generally be pleasant to everyone, while *some may* have a formal, no-nonsense approach to all situations and individuals. In a confinement setting, the burden of adjustment is on the inmate, and these individual differences may be *very* important.

Finally, the inmate must adjust to other inmates. This may require very little if they are housed in a maximum security area and confined to their room and out of contact with other inmates most of the time. On the other hand, in a podular dayroom setting, most of the day will be spent with other inmates with different backgrounds, attitudes and levels of criminal experience. Loners will have to get used to being in a group, the footloose vagrant will have to conform to a schedule, the unkempt will have to improve their personal grooming habits, the short-tempered may have many occasions when they must exert a *great* deal of self control, or the sensitive-natured may have to tolerate a *great* deal of kidding or harrassment.

Stress and Critical Times

Adjusting to confinement, while stressful for all newly admitted inmates, is more difficult for others. All inmates are subject to stress at various times during their incarceration. Stress points *are* referred to as "critical times", and are periods or events that include emotional pressure that *may* cause the inmate to lose the control they have maintained and behave in a violent manner. Such outbursts are not common, but do occur and Corrections Officers must be *prepared* to deal with them in an appropriate manner. This may mean showing a little *more* empathy, spending a little more time listening to an inmate or even telling them you understand their feelings and giving them a cooling off period *before* trying to talk with them. The most critical times for inmates are usually during admission to the facility, during searches, following significant court appearances and during trial, *after* sentencing and after family visits.

Frequently inmates will transfer the hostility they feel toward an arresting Officer to the Corrections Officers when they are first brought to the facility. The receiving *Corrections* staff *may* know nothing of the circumstances *of* the arrest and the way the inmate was handled by the arresting Officer. Often the hostile arrestee becomes even more hostile when they arrive in the detention facility. Corrections Officers may have to "talk' them down, taking care to present a calm and understanding attitude, avoiding

discussing the inmate's hostility in front of the inmate with other staff members which may further antagonize the inmate. Experienced and capable Corrections Officers can perceive when an incoming inmate is hostile and make *every* effort to avoid scal8ting that situation. They realize that the attitude and actions of the inmate are not a personal challenge to them, but rather an outward expression of the anger and frustration the inmate feels at the situation, over which they have lost control.

Io cases where the *arrestee* has enjoyed high status in the community or has experienced a series of personal misfortunes, arrest and confinement may be so stressful that they may attempt suicide. This is especially true of those that are arrested for child molesting *or* crimes involving incest. It sometimes appears to these inmates that even death is *an* acceptable alternative to the inevitable consequences of their actions and scorn of friends, family and the community. An extremely important quality in a good Corrections Officer is the ability to recognize small actions, attitudes or remarks by inmates that may indicate a potential suicide attempt.

Persons experienced in law enforcement and corrections know that most arrestees and inmates dislike *being* touched. People become agitated when their "personal space" is violated. The ability to effectively accomplish required searches is a mandatory one for Corrections Officers and the ability to gain the cooperation of the person to be searched is an ability seen in a highly qualified and competent Corrections Officer. The Officer should explain to the inmate what will occur and why. The inmate should be advised in a quiet, calm, non-threatening manner that they will not be touched my more than is necessary *and* that each step will be explained as it is about to be done. The *Corrections* Officer who has learned the *art* of maintaining control of the situation does not apologize for the search, they handle it in a matter-of-fact manner and are not hostile or defensive in giving instructions to the inmate, but are *firm* and conduct a thorough search.

Experienced inmates can sometimes manipulate the staff and take away the psychological advantage from the Corrections Officer. This can be done in a number of ways. Inmates complain to the Officer on the morning shift that the one *on evening* shift allow5 them to have any extra *dinner* trays. Not wanting to be a "bad guy" the critcized Officer lets them have the extra *trays*. Inmates may claim that another Officer lets them take their blankets to place on the floor when watching t.v. or allows them to take their meals into their room, or perhaps lets several *of* them play cards in the *room of* one inmate. Usually when this occurs, there is insufficient communication between the Pod Corrections Officers and they do not know that the inmates *are* manipulating them. *An* inmate may claim that their request for a non-collect phone call has not been taken care of. If records *are not* kept and good communication does not exist, it is difficult for staff to determine the truth of the matter and may allow another phone call to be made.

Any situation that will draw a purely emotional response from a Corrections Officer may be exploited by inmates. If they are successful, they will have taken the advantage in determining the climate in their housing area. The Officer who becomes angry when an inmate swears at them and then swears back is no longer in control of the climate in that *area.* Inmates are quick to recognize inexperience, apprehension, fear of them, lack of knowledge or insecurity, and will quickly exploit these weaknesses. Inmates will test new employees and the latter's efforts to disguise their inexperience will frequently cause them embarrassment. Inmates will accept and respect the new employee who acknowledges that he or she finds it necessary to consult the supervisor before *answering* a question *or* granting a request.

Lack of experience can have serious consequences if inmates know that a Corrections *Officer* will overreact. A suicide or suicide attempt can be *an* unsettling emotional experience for the new Corrections Officer, and if an inmate knows he can get an emotional reaction from the Officer, they may stage a suicide attempt. This is most likely to occur with young, impulsive inmates. The reaction of new staff is usually anger, fear or confusion. Knowledge about adherence to proper policy and procedures *is* the best defense against this type of manipulation. Rules and regulations should be based on behavior standards expected of the inmates, and response to misbehavior should be dealt with firmly *and* consistently in *accordance* with the rules.

Knowledge and ability to perform on the job are important factors in self-confidence. Any Corrections Officer who *can* remember his *or* her first *day* on the *job can* evaluate the effects of inexperience on self-confidence. Most Corrections Officers will remember the apprehension they felt doing their first shakedown, strip search *or* giving the first order to *an* inmate. What will someday *become* routine, initially is approached with insecurity and apprehension. The employee who is lacking in self confidence will usually react defensively to inmates. Their insecurity is evident in the way they reacts to the inmates. They overreact and perceive *every* lack of immediate response to orders as a personal challenge to their authority. They may view an inmate's actions as disrespectful and threatening *and* consider the inmate's attitude hostile when *there* is no evidence to 5upport this interpretation. Silent insolence is *an* inmate action that can unsettle and infuriate an inexperienced officer. The self confident *Officer* is flexible, impartial, does not overrreact *and* is able to comfortably deal with the inmates without being overbearing.

Decision Making

Decision making requires the ability to gather facts, consider the alternatives and apply the appropriate'policy or principal to resolve the problem. An inmate who has just come back from sentencing may be emotionally upset and may violate a minor rule

shortly after returning from court. The experienced and capable Officer will be aware of the inmate's emotional state and map not let the violation go **unadressed** but may handle it differently than under *normal* circumstances.

Willingness to Perform the Job

The Corrections Officer knows the various jobs for which he or she is responsible and does not hesitate to accomplish them. Some may be less pleasant than others, but the Officer does them thoroughly and competently and realizes they are a *pert* of him duties.

Impartiality

Every Corrections Officer **ham** personal feelings about inmates under his supervision, but this should not interfere with the ability to deal with inmates impartially and fairly. All **inmates** have the **same** rights, and although the Officer acknowledges the differences in personality of the **inmates,** they are able to **deal** with them each in **a** *manner* thrt respects their individuality but still requires that they all observe the same standards of behavior.

Relationships With Inmates

The self Confident Officer is not easily threatened by inmates. He or she **does not** regard an inmate's failure to follow **directions or** sloppy **work** as a personal **affront,** *nor* do they take rule **infractions** personally. When inmates misbehave **or** attempt to manipulate the Officer, the competent Officer **does** not **lose** control **of** their emotions, but instead recognizes what is happening and views it merely as a problem to be solved. The good Officer knows that they do not rely on the inmates to enhance their self-esteem, but rely on their own ability to do the job effectively and competently as indications of their self-worth.

Expressions of hostility are out of place in a detention facility. The hostile Officer will use poor **judgement** in relationships with inmates and this hostility will show. As a result, insolence and disciplinary **problems** from the inmates will increase. An Officer cannot deal with the crime, they must deal with the individual, and *must* do it with impartiality and respect **for** the inmate as **an** individual. Inmates are not placed in a detention facility to have punishment **for their** alleged crime meted out **in** small and continuing doses by the Corrections Officer. The function of *a* detention facility is to hold persons' accused of a crime until adjudication by the courts. A vindictive and hostile attitude *towards* inmates has no **place** in a detention facility. The Corrections **Officer** *recognized* by his peers as a **"professional"** will treat **the job with** respect and recognize that that it is a

difficult and sometimes hazardous job. A *person* who has a low opinion of their **work** will not have a high opinion of themselves or **of** their peers. They will not have self-respect nor will they gain the respect of others. Careless *dress* habits are an indication that an individual is disinterested in other's opinion of them and is, to some extent, a form *of* self-degradation. Lack *of* self respect will be reflected in their **behavior**, approach to their job and carelessness in performing their job.

Language as *a* Contribution to Climate

Although a positive attitude about the job will be reflected in the *Corrections Officer's* **appearance** and interest in the job, the most important aspect **of** their **work** will be the manner in which they treat inmates. If a *Corrections Officer* is to be respected by the inmates, they must **also** show respect. This does not mean they must be the inmate's "friend" and must grant every request, **nor** does **it** mean they should not expect the inmate to abide **by** the rules, but it does mean that the Officer should treat the inmate •• a person, **an** individual with problems **perhaps**, but, nevertheless a person. Language is an indicator of attitudes Detention **facilty personnel** are concerned with getting the cooperation of the inmate population *in* the simplest, most direct way, *and* this cannot be done by using obscenity or **"talking** down" to them. The Officer may find it difficult to use *correct* language in dealing with inmates who use profanity as a matter of course among themselves and on occasion with facility staff, but *Officers* who use profanity in their conversations with inmates will find that they lower themselves in the eyes of the inmates and lose **respect.** Use of correct language also includes the use of proper *forms* of • cress. Addressing a an inmate as "Mr Brown" or "Ms. Smith", for **example**, **serves** to remind both the *Officer and* the inmate that the inmate is an individual with an identity that is tc be respected and promotes a formal atmosphere, lessening the **opportunity** for conflict.

Staff Behavior

Detention facility staff find it *easier* to be courteous to inmates if they • rr courteous to aach other , It *makes* little sense to **attempt** to treat inmates as individuals if the same *is* not expected among staff **members** in their relationships with each other. *Consideration* and courtesy, when consciously used on a daily **basis,** will become a habit.

The Corrections Officer should never express a negative opinion about other staff members or administrative or operational policies *or* practices in front *of* an inmate. How can we • xpect'the inmates to respect **the staff** or the facility operation as a whole when negative remarks are *made* by staff in their presence ? Can we expect them to think more highly of our fellow **staff** members or

our facility than we do? Gossiping among staff is also detrimental to the attitude of the- inmate. What staff do in their off-hours should not be a subject *of* discussion in the facility by staff in the presence of **inmates.** Inmates cannot be expected to **accept** the rules that are *set* for them if the facility *staff* do not follow the rules. An Officer's failure to agree with **a** decision of the *supervisor,* or with a policy or a rule, should never become a subject *of* discusesion with an inmate. If the inmates know the **Officer disagress** with a decision or a rule, it will be used by the inmate as an excuse to *ignore* it. Problems and differences *of* opinion *occur* in *any* **workplace** *and* often result *in* improvements in the organization, but, the **place** to rir differences of opinion is in *staff* meetings *and* not within earshot *of* **inmates. Inmates** may misinterpret the **situation** and *use* it **as** an *excuse for* disagreement with administrators *and* other staff. Inmates should *never* get the impression that staff **are** in conflict, as it will be **used** by them to manipulate the situation *and* cause difficulties *among* **staff.** When the staff *appears* to lack unity, whether or not that is factual, the facility climate will be negatively affected.

II. PROCEDURES AND ENVIRONMENT

Up to now discussion has centered on human *factors* in the facility climate-attitudes and behavior of **staff,** problems the inmate feces **in adjust**ment. The physical and procedural elements of the **facility-** rules, **regulations,** quality *of* food, *programs* and physical surroundings **-** also contribute to the creation of an orderly atmosphere in which inmates understand what is expected of them and do not view the staff as hostile and disinterested.

Published Regulations

Clear and effective regulations are basic to an *orderly* facility climate. The times, places, length and frequency of visits, for **●** x8mple, should be governed by regulations. Laundry exchanges, commissary orders, recreation and other inmate activities should be regulated *and* a consistent schedule- followed. This enables inmates to be *aware* of the way things are done and **comform** to the schedule and procedures. Confusion is eliminated *and* the inmate is more **●** rsily able to adapt to the **facility.** To be effective, regulations must be easily understood. **Clear** and reasonable regulations are an indication that the **staff** is in control. **Vague** regulations or none **at all** are an **invitation** to the **inmates** to take over and determine their own limits and standards. If the administration *of* the facility and the staff *are* disorganized and inept, the regulations and operations will reflect this. Inmate movement, programs and **activities** should all occur at specific times and in an orderly manner. Several activities **ocurring** in the same place and at the same time, with staff scurrying in all

directions and seeming having no control of the situation indicate to the **inmate** that the staff is disorganized, untrrined, poorly managed **and have** very little **understanding** or *control of the* facility itself. Under such circumstances the sophisticated inmate often succeeds in imposing his own **version** of order, including smuggling contraband, victimizing other inmates and manipulating **staff**.

Rules

Rules are an **expression** of staff **expectations** of **inmate** conduct. **By** eliminating confusion in the inmate's mind as to what is considered correct in the facility, they make **a** major contribution to orderly operations. **Rules** are **also an** excellent reflection of staff attitudes. If the facility is overly *concerned* with inmate **behavior,** the *rules* will reflect this concern. They will be long **and** detailed and *rigidly* enforced. There will be no flexibility. The result will be an **excessive** number of **staf**f reports and a tense atmosphere. In facilities that are run this way it is **not unusual** for every inmate to have at least one violation in their file during their stay. In a facility with a healthy climate, only some **inmates** are **disciplinary problems and usually** much less than **5%** will present serious disciplinary problems. Rules are also standards of **conduct that staff use to judge** inmate behavior. **Without written** rules, **each staff member would apply** their own **standards** and **the result would be continual conflict** in **staff** expectations and a *great* deal of misunderstanding. What one might see as horseplay another **may** see as an attempt at willful disorder. There will always be individual variation in interpretation of the rules, but this *can* be minimized by careful wording. Well-phrased, **reasonable** rules promote understanding and reduce conflict *between* **inmates** and staff. Orientation to **the** rules **,regulations** and *procedures* should always be done by staff ● *nd,never* by the other inmates. Allowing inmates to orient the *newcomers* affords them the opportunity to develop and present their own rules and impose them on the newcomer. Obviously the **facilty staff** must assume responsibility for inmate orientation if they are to maintain control *of* the facility and inmates.

Food

Meals take on a greater significance for the inmate than they do for those in *free* society, possibly because the inmate has no choice in what or when they will ●◑◍ Food can be a cause of serious problems in the detention facility. Variety *and* condition of the food, whether it is served **warm** or **cold** and the method of it's prep&ration and serving all contribute to the facility climate. **Meals,** more than most other things, **are** a visible indicator of whether or not facility personnel are concerned with the **welfare** of the inmates. Monotonous meals, *of* poor quality, result in discontented and resentful inmates who are difficult to manage.

Conclusion

Admission to a detention facility must be recognized as an emotional experience for *the* individual at a time when they must quickly adjust to a new environment. The surroundings are new, the procedures are unfamiliar and usual ways *of* behaving must be temporarily discarded for new. The inmate must learn not only new rules, procedures and expectations of facility staff, **but** how to get along with other inmates. At the same time they must make the difficult change from private citizen to inmate and cope with the feelings of helplessness and failure that accompany admission and confinement. The initial impact of the facility on the inmate will, to a great extent, determine how they react to the total experience of being *confined*. The Corrections Officer is part of this experience and the way they control their own behavior may determine how successful they will be in anticipating and controlling the behavior of the inmate. The Corrections Officer needs to understand their own emotions and to recognize the need to keep them under control. They must also learn to recognize thr emotion81 conflicts of the inmate and how to minimize them. The Officer must demonstrate that the facility is under control of the staff and that they determine and are responsible *for* the climate of the facility. This means that the rules, regulations, procedures and activities are originated and controlled by the *staff* and not the inmates. Other *factors* that contribute to a facility climate include cleanliness, ventilation and lighting. A dark end dingy building has *a* gloomy atmosphere. *Good* lighting and a clean facility that does not have an oppressive odor go far in contributing to a positive atmosphere in which inmates and staff alike are able to live and work compatibly.

Bibliography

Coser, Rose Laub-Life in the Ward, Michigan State University Press, East Lansing, Michigan, 2962.

Goffman, Erving-Asylums, Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates, Anchor Books, Doubleday *and* Co., *Garden* City, New York, 1961.

Ward, David A. and Kassebaum, Gene G.- Women's Prison; Sex *and* Social Structure, Aldine Publishing Co., Chicago, Ill. 1965

Changes in CPI Items from the 480-item Version to the 462-item Version

480-item version	**462-item** version
22. When a person "pads" his income tax report so as to get out of some of his taxes it is just as bad as stealing money from the government.	22. When a person "pads". n **income** tax report so as to **get out** Of some taxes. It Is **just as bad as stealing** money froo **the government.**
23. In most ways the poor man is better off than the rich man.	23. In most **ways, a** poor **person is** better off than a rich one.
49. When someone does me a wrong I feel I should pay him back if I can, just for the prlnclpls of the thing.	49. When someone does me a wrong I feel I should pay that person back if I csa, just for the principle of the thing.
51. Every family owes it to the city to keep their sidewalks cleared in the winter sad their lawn moved in the summer.	51. Every family owes It to the city to keep Its sidewalks cleared in the winter and Its lawn mowed In the summer.
90. As long as a person votes every four years, be has done his duty as a citizen.	90. As long as people vote every four years, they have dose their duty as citizens.
117. I don't blame anyone for trying to grab all be can get in this world.	117. I don't blame people for trying to grab all they can get la this world.
127. I always try to consider the other fellow's feelings before I do something.	127. I always try to consider the other person's feelings before I do something.
137. I wish I were pot bothered by thoughts about SU.	dropped
143. I like to be with a crowd who plsy jokes on one snothir.	143. I like to be with people who play jokes on each other.
155. A person should adapt his ideas and his behavior to the group that happens to be with him at the time.	155. People should adapt their Ideas and behavior to the group that happens to be with them at the. time.
189. In school my marks In deportment were quite regularly bad.	189. In school my marks for conduct were quite regularly bad.
192. When I meet a stranger I often think that he is better thsn I am.	192. When I meet a stranger I often think that he or she is better than I am.
195. The most important things to me are my duties co my job and to my fellowman.	19s. The most Important things to me are my duties to my job and to other people.
203. When things go wrong I sometimes blame the other f llov.	203. When things go wrong I sometimes blame the other person.
207. Sometimes at elections I vote for men about whom I know very little.	207. Sometimes at elections I vote for candidates about whom I know very little.
214. In school I was sometimes sent to the principal for cutting up.	216. In school I was sometimes sent to the principal because I had misbehaved.
233. A parson does not nied to vorry about other people if only be looks after himself.	233. People don't need to worry about others If only they look after themselves.
241. The man who provides temptation by leaving valuable property unprotected is about as much to blame for Its theft as the one who steals It.	241. The person who provides temptation by leaving valuable property unprotected is about as much to blame for Its theft as the one who steals It.
When a man is with a woman be Is usually thinking about things related to her sex.	dropped