

From IMF Working Paper:

Cebotari, A., Chueca-Montuenga, E., Diallo, Y., Ma, Y., Turk, R. A., Xin, W., & Zavarce, H. (2024). Political Fragility: Coups d'État and Their Drivers. IMF Working Papers, 2024(034), Article A001, A001. Retrieved Feb 25, 2026, from <https://doi.org/10.5089/9798400266751.001.A001>

- « Collier and Hoeffler (2004, 2005, 2007 and 2009)— surveyed in Collier (2007, chapter 2)— study the links between poverty, stagnation, and conflict, and argue that countries in a state of fragility could be trapped in conflict patterns with events that are either persistent (civil wars) or swift (coup d'état). Their research shows that risks of civil war and of coups are affected by low growth (hopelessness), low income (poverty), **low state capacity** and past conflict or coup » => [see weak/effective government](#)
- « Acemoglu et al. (2011) also finds that countries exposed to coups are characterized by weak institutions and low levels of economic development, which can lead to permanent internal instability. » => [see weak/effective government](#)
- « one of the most cited factors that can lead to coups is political instability, including factors such as **weak or ineffective government, corruption, or political polarization** (Hunter et al, 2020) »
 - **Corruption: Political corruption index (D) (v2x_corr)** => for the politicians + **Public sector corruption index (D) (v2x_pubcorr)** => linked to state capacity
 - **Weak/ineffective government: State authority over territory (C) (v2svsterr)** => control of the land + **State fiscal source of revenue (C) (v2stfiscap)** => control of its finances, capable to enact policies
 - **Political polarization: Political polarization (C) (v2cacamps)**
- « **The potential of military intervention in politics** is also found to be an important driving factor of coups—even more important than economic influences—when the ability of the party in power to control the military group is weak (Feaver, 2003 and Powell, 2016) »
 - **Military dimension index (D) (v2x_ex_military)** => Question: To what extent is the power base of the chief executive determined by the military? Clarification: Representing one of five regime dimensions, each of which may be more or less present in any given case, this index taps into the extent to which the appointment and dismissal of the chief executive is based on the threat or actual use of military force. — Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).
- « **Social factors, such as ethnic or religious tensions**, can also contribute to coup attempts, particularly if they are associated with political or economic inequality (Hiroi and Omori, 2015). »
 - I did not really find anything on this, and the political violence one (has any political been killed this year etc) does not seem appropriate... => I am going to find more!

From A global model for forecasting political instability Jack A Goldstone, Robert H Bates, David L Epstein, Ted Robert Gurr, Michael B Lustik, Monty G Marshall, Jay Ulfelder, Mark Woodward 2010/1 American journal of political science 54 (1) 190-208 Blackwell Publishing Inc

- Quote from the abstract : « Whereas regime type is typically measured using linear or binary indicators of democracy/autocracy derived from the 21-point Polity scale, the model uses a non-linear five-category measure of regime type based on the Polity components. **This new measure of regime type emerges as the most powerful predictor of instability** onsets, leading us to conclude that political institutions, properly specified, and not economic conditions, demography, or geography, are the most important predictors of the onset of political instability. »
- VDEM allows us to have something between fun democracies and full autocracies also => **Electoral democracy index (D) (v2x_polyarchy)**