



Master of Public Policy 2018-2019 | Summer Project Report

Design and implementation of Open Government Strategies in highly decentralised federations

The case of Argentina



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Executive Summary

In May 2019, the Open Government Unit at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) published a review on the state of open government policies in Argentina (OECD, 2019). The study includes the analysis of laws, good practices and public policies of the three branches at the national level (Executive, Legislative and Judicial) and 15 provinces. Overall, the report recognizes progresses made by Argentina, especially regarding the creation of a solid legal framework for open government, the development of a monitoring and evaluation system for open government initiatives, and the participation of stakeholders and citizens in the policy cycle. However, the document also highlights that the country does not have yet a National Open Government Strategy¹ (NOGS) that includes all branches of power and all levels of government. As a key recommendation, then, **the OECD suggests Argentina to develop such a strategy** (OECD, 2019: 20).

Why Argentina has not developed a NOGS yet? **Has its federal multi-level governance structure hindered the design and implementation of an open government strategy in the country?** In answering this research question, I will suggest that, indeed, **the federal multilevel governance structure of the country hinders the development and the potential implementation of a NOGS**. The rationale behind it is that the structure of incentives in highly decentralised federations determines the behaviour of political actors (Ardanaz, Leiras & Tommasi, 2014: 26), and in Argentina—a highly decentralised federation—there is a mismatch of incentives between the national level of government and some subnational units. As I will show, some provinces in Argentina are dominated by entrenched elites with limited political competition that have little incentives to implement open government policies at the subnational level. Conversely, the national administration that is often audited by international organisations has high incentives to implement open government policies in order to avoid a credible-commitment problem.

¹ The OECD Recommendation (OECD, 2017) defines an Open Government Strategy as “a document that defines the open government agenda of the central government **and/or of any of its sub-national levels**, as well as that of a single public institution or thematic area, and that includes key open government initiatives, together with short, medium and long-term goals and indicators.” [Emphasis added]

This report comprises three sections. Section 1 introduces the Multi-Level Governance Theory and two key concepts that will facilitate further analysis: the Time-Inconsistency Problem and the definition of Open Government. Section 2, the analytical core of this report, explores the federal structure of Argentina that might explain why the country has not yet developed nor implemented a NOGS. This section, that includes both qualitative and quantitative analysis, was developed by reviewing primary and secondary sources of data, scholarly papers and information provided by the OECD. Section 3, to conclude, presents some recommendations addressed to the Open Government Unit at the OECD, my host organisation in Paris for 8 weeks during July and August 2019.

1. Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

This section presents the Multi-Level Governance Theory (MGT) as the main theoretical framework for my analysis. Additionally, two concepts that will be used in this report are also clarified: the Time-Inconsistency Problem and the definition of Open Government.

1.1. Multi-Level Governance Theory

In the decades that followed World War II, a state-centric view dominated studies of Political Science and International Relations. The rise of new states, the patterns of authority and legitimacy, the bipolar world, the global role of leadership and new challenges faced by bureaucracies fuelled, indeed, a state-centric understanding of domestic and global politics. A state-centric interpretation of contemporary trends, however, looks less convincing.

Today, governments around the world face complex challenges that they cannot solve individually. Among them, terrorism, climate change and rising inequality are at the top of the list. This evokes a **triple dynamic that is changing the structure of states**.

Firstly, states have had to progressively enter into multiple forms of international cooperation aimed at controlling or mitigating global threats. Secondly, we have been witnessing a territorial restructuring of both federal and unitary states towards more decentralization and regionalization. Lastly, governments must now navigate through dense networks of public and private actors in order to arrive at inclusive and legitimate policies. This triple dynamic has been labelled by some scholars as “*challenges to the gate-keeping capacity of the state*” (Piattoni, 2010: 11).

The assumptions historically implicit in the state-centric view were that governments could effectively control:


- (a) the *subnational-foreign gate*, thus retaining the power to be the sole legitimate and operative bridge between subnational units and the international arena;

- (b) the *centre-periphery gate*, thus deciding which subnational formations could be given the right to represent themselves in the political process as carriers of legitimately distinct interests;
- (c) the *national-supranational gate*, thus functioning as the sole architects of a country's foreign policy.

For centuries, national governments functioned indeed as strict gatekeepers, but they cannot fulfil that role any longer: all three gates have been opened.

Different theories have tried to explain the scenarios derived from this *gateless* political context (Figure 1). On the one hand, the concept of *glocalization* —not yet a theory as such— have tried to bring light on the multiple forms in which global dynamics shape subnational and local dynamics — and vice-versa (Roudometof, 2015). Scholars on Federalism, on the other hand, have opened the state black box to explain recent dynamics of decentralisation, the architecture of power and incentives, and institutional designs in federations (Beramendi, 2009). The Two-Level Game Theory introduced by Robert Putnam in 1988, finally, drew attention to the influence of the supranational level in the domestic policymaking process (Putnam, 1988). Putnam's model conceived international negotiations between states as the result of simultaneous negotiations at both the domestic and the international level. His formulation, then, acknowledged the fact that domestic representatives are not the sole architects of a country's foreign policy: supranational negotiations do also shape domestic policymaking.

Figure 1: Theoretical Frameworks to analyse a Gateless Political Context



Source: author's own elaboration based on Piattoni, 2010: 27.

While the above-mentioned theories have focused their attention on specific planes of Figure 1 (x_1 - x_2 ; x_2 - x_3 ; x_3 - x_1), the Multi-Level Governance Theory (MGT) has been the one that has comprehensively integrated all dynamics of the contemporary gateless scenario.

The MGT, put forward by Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks in the early 1990s (Marks, Hooghe & Blank, 1996), has emphasized both the dispersion of the decision-making process and the fact that states are no longer capable of designing its policies in isolation due to pressures from *above* and pressures from *bellow* (Piattoni, 2010: 9-10). Pressures from above imply that supranational institutions constrain domestic policymaking and, in most cases, they can even impose sanctions on irregular state behaviour. Pressures from below are the result of a process that started in the 1980s. Since then, for either economic efficiency or administrative reasons, states have progressively transfer decision-making power to subnational units. In unitary systems, the result of the later has been a scaling down of competencies of central states. In the context of federations, it has implied that provinces or states have more power and resources to undertake actions either in the domestic or the international arena.

The MGT has been traditionally applied to explore the arrangements in the production of policies within the European Union (EU). As the theoretical development went forward, the MGT also started to explain two additional dimensions of European politics apart from policymaking (Piattoni, 2010: 18): *politics* —defined as patterns of political mobilization and actor's behaviours—, and *polity* —understood as state-society interactions—. More recently, apart from European policy fields, the MGT has pollinated studies on climate change networks (Di Gregorio *et al.*, 2019) and health care programmes (Touati *et al.*, 2019) in non-European countries.

For the purpose of this report, the most relevant concept to bear in mind is that the process of **policymaking in contemporary settings exceeds the powers of nation-states**. The historically implicit assumption that governments can effectively exert their gate-keeping capacity to control subnational, supranational and international dynamics, does not hold anymore. In this sense, the **MGT provides an answer by bringing attention to the dispersion of the decision-making process and the different levels of governance involved in the ideation, implementation and assessments of public policies**.

1.2. Time-Inconsistency Problem and Credible Commitments

A time-inconsistency problem occurs when the preferences of a decision-maker change over time in a way that the initial preference becomes inconsistent at another point in time. From a complementary perspective, the time-inconsistency problem refers to decisions that are made according to short-term incentives that undermine long-term policy goals. To revert it, then, credible commitments are the key (Miller & Whitford, 2016: 56).

Scholars (Miller, 2011) have suggested that political actors can commit themselves to credible courses of action through:

- (a) *Programming of behaviour*, namely, a bureaucratic machinery that mechanically implements responses independently of the decision-maker preferences; or
- (b) *Delegation*, but only when the person/organisation receiving the delegated authority has preferences different from the person doing the delegating. The delegation solution may include constitutional features to discourage opportunistic actions of politicians, independent regulatory agencies and/or international organisations that act as trustees.

For the purpose of this report, it will be important to recall that international organisations may act as trustees for the *erratic* behaviour of national units.

1.3. Open Government

In a broad sense, *"the principles of open government are still rooted in transparency and accountability, but have evolved to encompass additional components, most notably public participation and the improvement of public services"* (Chatwin, 2019: 452). The Obama Administration—that catalysed the debate around open government with a Presidential Memo in 2009—framed open government as accountability, collaboration, public participation, transparency and technology. To add further specificity, the OECD (2017) defined it as *"a culture of governance that promotes the principles of transparency, integrity, accountability and stakeholder participation in support of democracy and inclusive growth"*, where:

- (a) Transparency is the disclosure and subsequent accessibility of relevant government data and information.
- (b) Integrity is the consistent alignment of, and adherence to, shared ethical values, principles and norms for upholding and prioritising the public interest over private interests in the public sector.
- (c) Accountability is defined as the governments' responsibility and duty to inform its citizens about the decisions it makes as well as to provide an account of the activities and performance of the entire government and its public officials.
- (d) Stakeholder participation comprises all the ways in which stakeholders can be involved in the policy cycle and in service design and delivery, including through the provision of information, consultation and engagement.

For the purpose of this report, initiatives of open government implemented by Argentine provinces will be the ones listed at the Argentina Action Plan 2017-2019 submitted to the Open Government Partnership (OGP, 2017), and at the OECD Review (2019).

2. Multi-Level Governance Analysis

2.1. The Supranational Level: the Open Government Unit at the OECD

The Open Government Unit (OGU) at the OECD “supports countries around the world to strengthen a culture of open government policies by providing policy advice and recommendations on how to integrate these core principles into public sector reform efforts.”² Policy advices and recommendations are given upon request of country members or partners and, after a process of mutual consultation between the OGU and its counterpart, they are published in documents peer-reviewed by high-ranking officials.

As shown in Table 3, seven reviews have been published so far and seven will be soon publish this or next year. Except for the one on Myanmar, all reviews recommend the implementation of an OGS regardless of the political system of the country being reviewed. In this sense, as I will demonstrate shortly, this overlooks the fact that in highly decentralised federations the implementation of a NOGS as defined by the OECD might be a non-viable policy option.

Table 3: Overview of Reviews published by the Open Government Unit

Year of Review	Country	Political System	Does the review recommends the implementation of an OGS?
2014	Myanmar	Unitary	No
2016	Tunisia	Unitary	Yes
2016	Indonesia	Unitary	Yes
2016	Costa Rica	Unitary	Yes
2017	Kazakhstan	Unitary	Yes
2019	Biscay*	N/A	Yes
2019	Argentina	Federal	Yes
2019 (Forthcoming)	Santa Fe**	N/A	(Yes) ⁺
2019 (Forthcoming)	Salé***	N/A	...
2019 (Forthcoming)	Jordan	Unitary	...
2020 (Forthcoming)	Brazil	Federal	(Yes) ⁺
2020 (Forthcoming)	Romania	Unitary	...
2020 (Forthcoming)	Czech Republic	Unitary	...
2020 (Forthcoming)	Thailand	Unitary	...

* Subnational unit in Spain.

** Province in Argentina.

*** City in Morocco.

⁺ Not published yet. Information obtained through interviews at the OECD.

Source: author's own elaboration based on information provided by the Open Government Unit. Available at <https://www.oecd.org/mena/governance/opengovernmentpublications.htm> [Accessed 26 August 2019]

² Open Government Unit, OECD. Available at <https://www.oecd.org/gov/open-government.html> [Accessed 26 August 2019]


2.2. The National Level: Policymaking in Argentina

Argentina is a federal republic with a presidential form of government and a bicameral legislature. The federation consists of twenty-three provinces and the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires. Since most provinces existed before the conformation of the national government, provinces are important political and administrative entities: they dictate their own constitutions, their own electoral rules and their own education, social and health policies. Moreover, their policymaking authority is reinforced by the fact that:

- (a) Provinces reserve all powers not delegated to the federal government —the so-called *Constitution's residual power clause* (Ardanaz, Leiras & Tommasi, 2014: 27-29)—.
- (b) Provincial bureaucracies manage, in many cases, the implementation of national policies (Benton, 2003: 109).
- (c) Each province in Argentina functions as a single constituency for all congressional elections, reason that has caused a **severe legislative malapportionment** given the huge interprovincial variation in the size of their electorates. The Province of Buenos Aires, for example, has 12.280.736 electors, 70 representatives and 3 senators, while the Province of Tierra del Fuego has 132.375 electors, 5 representatives and 3 senators (Appendix, Table 1). This is the reason why, according to Samuels & Snyder (2001: 661-662), Argentina ranks twelfth in the world ranking of worst cases of Lower Chamber malapportionment, and first in the world ranking of worst cases of malapportionment in Upper Chambers.

To balance the provincial overpower in the detriment of federal entities, the federal government can take control of a province in certain extreme cases —Article 6 of the National Constitution— and provinces are allowed to collect only a small fraction of taxes. While the latter is beneficial from a political point of view —provinces do not have to bear the administrative and political costs of taxation—, it is a problem in terms of resources: **provincial budgets cover only the provision of approximately one-third of the goods and services they are supposed to provide** (Ardanaz, Leiras & Tommasi, 2014: 29). The scenario can be even worse in the case of low-income provinces (Figure 2). As a result, mechanisms utilised to correct that imbalance are politically contentious: the differences between spending and revenues are financed with a common pool of resources not strictly regulated by a Federal Tax-Sharing Agreement, scenario that gives the Executive branch at the national level multiple channels and discretionary manoeuvres to allocate funds (Tommasi, Saiegh & Sanguinetti, 2001: 184).

Figure 2: Provincial Revenues and Federal Transfers to Provinces (in %), 2010



Source: author's own elaboration based on information provided by Dirección Nacional de Asuntos Provinciales, Ministerio de Hacienda. Available at <https://www.argentina.gob.ar/hacienda/sechacienda/asuntosprovinciales> [Accessed 24 August 2019]

Considering the above-mentioned dynamic, it can be said that **the political imbalance in favour of provinces is counteracted by the vertical fiscal imbalance in favour of the national government**. In more simple words, political power is atomised but resources are concentrated—and mostly managed—by the President. This dynamic has profound policy implications that can be summarise as follows:

- Policymaking in Argentina is the result of exchanges between the President and the provinces: fiscal transfers are traded in exchange for political support.
- When the ruling party at the national level does not control the majority in the chambers, the President has high incentives to “buy” political support at the best possible price. The latter ultimately results in the transference of funds to the least populated provinces: in exchange for the vote of three senators, for example, it is always cheaper to bankroll public works in sparsely populated provinces such as La Pampa, Santa Cruz or Tierra del Fuego.
- Presidents always want to promote their own agendas and provinces are always in need of resources. The policymaking process in Argentina, then, does not take place in the Congress but is instead the result of exchanges between the president and provincial governors—that is to say, between politicians that try to maximise benefits before short-term elections.

The institutional design of Argentina —meaning, the rules of the game to allocate power and resources—, **incentives volatility and undermines long-term policies**, whether they are fiscal, economic, social or foreign policies. This cyclically leads Argentina to time-inconsistent behaviours that damage more and more the already weakened global credibility of the country.

In an attempt to revert its time-inconsistency problem, Argentina has been trying to access to the OECD, an organisation known for *bringing discipline* to the domestic policymaking process through a **policy coordination cycle among member states**. In the eyes of the current administration³, the policy coordination cycle promoted by the OECD can act as an antidote to the volatility of domestic policies, allowing the country to commit itself to credible courses of action. However, even if that rationale applies to some policy areas, it does not seem to be the case with the development and implementation of a National Open Government Strategy.

As mentioned in the introduction of this report, while the national government has high incentives to implement open government policies in order to avoid time-inconsistent behaviours, some provinces in Argentina have high incentives not to. The cause of this mismatch of incentives will be described below.

2.3. The Subnational Level: Provinces in Argentina

Provinces in Argentina vary in their size and wealth. The four largest provinces, all geographically located in the centre of the country —City of Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, Córdoba and Santa Fe (Appendix, Figure 3 & Figure 4)—, account for 62% of the population and 71% of GDP. However, independently of economic and demographic variations, provinces are “*typically characterized by executive dominance, limited political competition, and clientelist political linkages. (...) These structural characteristics may impact the way politics is played out at the subnational scale*” (Ardanaz, Leiras & Tommasi, 2014: 30).

In a classic peripheral province, a single *caudillo* or family clan⁴ controls the political game and most of the available resources. Furthermore, most provinces have high levels of poverty (Appendix, Figure 5), high levels of provincial public employment (Appendix, Table 2) and the partisan turnover rate is significantly low—even though the number of registered political parties in each province is high (Appendix, Table 2)—. **These political patterns, then, might be acting as powerful disincentives to implement open government policies in provinces.**

³ Cf. interview to Marcelo Scaglione, Under-Secretary of State for OECD Accession (Ministry of Treasury, Argentina). Available at <https://www.infobae.com/economia/2017/12/04/marcelo-scaglione-el-acceso-a-la-ocde-nos-da-una-mirada-que-va-mas-alla-del-mandato-de-macri> [Accessed 5 August 2019]

⁴ Rodríguez Saá family in San Luis; Saadi family in Catamarca; Sapag family in Neuquén; Romero family in Salta; Kirchner family in Santa Cruz; Gildo Insfrán in Formosa, among others.

In order to assess empirically the validity of this initial premise, I have explored the correlation between the implementation of open government initiatives and four variables (Appendix, Table 2 & Table 3):

- (a) As proxies of political competition, the number of partisan turnovers in executive elections measured since the return to democracy in 1983 until 2019, and the number of registered political parties in each province;
- (b) As proxy of provincial development and living standards, the provincial GDP per capita expressed in American dollars (USD);
- (c) As proxy of clientelist provincial linkages, the percentage of provincial public employment as a percentage of total employment in each province.

Even though further rigorous research is needed to establish a regression analysis in terms of a dependent and independent variables, I have found (Table 3) that **there is a positive significant correlation between the implementation of open government initiatives and the number of partisan turnovers** ($p < 0.05$). With less statistical confidence ($p < 0.1$), other two relevant correlations were found: a positive one between the implementation of open government initiatives and the number of registered political parties, and a negative one between the implementation of open government initiatives and the percentage of provincial public employment.

Table 3: Correlations between the implementation of Open Government Initiatives and political/economic variables

	Implementation of Open Government Initiatives		No. of observations
	(1)	(2)	
No. of Partisan Turnovers	0.4389*	0.4389**	211
No. of Registered Political Parties	0.4002	0.4002**	24
Provincial GDP per capita	0.0242	0.0242	24
% of Provincial public employment	-0.3458	-0.3458**	24

* = $p < 0.05$.

** = $p < 0.1$.

A possible interpretation for the positive significant correlation between the implementation of open government initiatives and the number of partisan turnovers is that **political competition acts as an incentive for political actors to adopt open government initiatives**. If major political parties in a province face the possibility of being not only a governing party but also an opposition party, they may have high incentives to implement policies of transparency, accountability and integrity (laws on access to information, limits on political donations, regulated lobbying, etc.). Conversely, if a major political party has consistently been the governing party only, the implementation of open government policies can undermine its sources of power (clientelism, corruption, bureaucratic patronage, etc.).

The above-given interpretation could be one possible explanation to understand why **there is a high probability (83.33%) that a province that has not had any partisan turnover since 1983, has not either implemented open government initiatives so far** (Table 4). The outliers in this dynamic would be then the provinces of Santiago del Estero and Neuquén.

Santiago del Estero, on the one hand, does not have any open government initiative in place even though it has experienced partisan turnover since 2007. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the partisan turnover in Santiago del Estero followed a federal intervention that took place in 2004 (Appendix, Table 2). Until then, one family ruled and controlled the province: the Juárez family. On the other hand, Neuquén has not experienced partisan turnover since 1983, but it has developed one open government initiative. The initiative, however, is not on transparency, accountability and/or integrity but citizen participation (OGP, 2017: 188-189).

Table 4: Provinces classified according to the implementation of Open Government Initiatives and the number of Partisan Turnovers since 1983

No. of Partisan Turnovers	Open Government Initiatives		
	None	At least one	Total
0	5*	1**	6
1	0	5	5
2	0	6	6
3	1***	3	4
4	0	2	2
5	0	1	1
Total	6	18	24

* Formosa, La Pampa, La Rioja, San Luis, Santa Cruz.

** Neuquén.

*** Santiago del Estero.

To summarise, some provinces in Argentina are dominated by entrenched elites with limited political competition that have little incentives to implement open government policies at the subnational level. In this sense, partisan turnover may be a powerful predictor of this behaviour.

3. Recommendations

Explore in-depth the policy implications of federal structures of government

In federal countries, multiple decision structures, multiple levels of government and several actors operate with substantial autonomy from one another and guided by dissimilar incentives. Consequently, as shown in this report, the design and implementation of a National Open Government Strategy —conceived as whole-of-

government framework that includes all branches of power and all levels of government— might be hindered by this fragmented and highly decentralised structure of countries alike Argentina.

Argentina is not a member country, but this report will hopefully shed light on potentially similar dynamics that might be taking place in member countries such as the United States, Germany, Australia, Canada and Mexico. Likewise, a better understanding of federal governments may also give useful insights to relatively unitary systems of government —such as France, Great Britain or Chile— that are facing a large decentralisation of their structures given the complexity of the public good and services they are required to deliver.

Make tailored and viable recommendations for countries to implement

It was apparently Albert Einstein the one who said: *“Everybody is a genius. But if you judge a fish by its ability to climb a tree, it will live its whole life believing that it is stupid.”* Figuratively speaking, some countries are being judged by its ability to climb a tree, but they simply cannot do it because they are a fish.

In highly decentralised federations such as Argentina, because of a mismatch of incentives between the national government and subnational units, the implementation of a NOGS as defined by the OECD is a non-viable policy option. The country cannot be judged, then, for its inability to implement it. In this sense, it is suggested to the Open Government Unit to make tailored and viable recommendations for countries to implement, assessing the situation, structure and specific context of each of them.

Develop new soft enforcement mechanisms to strengthen a culture of open government around the world

Soft enforcement mechanisms may strength a culture of open government around the world by providing the right rewards and incentives. Out of the many available mechanisms to put into practice, the Open Government Unit has already implemented one: peer-reviews by high-ranking officials. It is suggested to continue on this path, perhaps exploring the implementation of new ones.

The Access to Public Information Agency at the World Bank, for instance, has developed a Public Access to Provincial Information Index⁵ to rank the quality of the provincial regulatory frameworks regarding access to public information. An *Open Government Index for Subnational Units* to measure government openness of provinces or states in federal countries, for example, may encourage the implementation of open government initiatives at the subnational level.

⁵ Available at <https://www.argentina.gob.ar/noticias/acceso-la-informacion-en-las-provincias> [Accessed 27 August 2019]

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Appendix

Table 1: Provincial Economic and Political Indicators

Province	GDP (USD Bn, 2011)	Size of the electorate (2019)	No. of Representatives (Lower Chamber)	No. of Representatives (Upper Chamber)	Number of voters per seat (Lower Chamber)	Number of voters per seat (Upper Chamber)
City of Buenos Aires	118,000	2,563,749	25	3	102,550	854,583
Buenos Aires	161,000	12,515,361	70	3	178,791	4,171,787
Catamarca	2,331	319,290	5	3	63,858	106,430
Córdoba	33,239	2,946,060	18	3	163,670	982,020
Corrientes	4,053	874,413	7	3	124,916	291,471
Chaco	2,120	946,270	7	3	135,181	315,423
Chubut	7,110	447,335	5	3	89,467	149,112
Entre Ríos	7,137	1,097,135	9	3	121,904	365,712
Formosa	1,555	457,106	5	3	91,421	152,369
Jujuy	2,553	557,244	6	3	92,874	185,748
La Pampa	2,000	287,141	5	3	57,428	95,714
La Rioja	1,419	288,558	5	3	57,712	96,186
Mendoza	18,800	1,420,183	10	3	142,018	473,394
Misiones	4,044	924,168	7	3	132,024	308,056
Neuquén	14,398	506,992	5	3	101,398	168,997
Río Negro	4,924	555,348	5	3	111,070	185,116
Salta	5,165	1,025,631	7	3	146,519	341,877
San Juan	3,927	561,207	6	3	93,535	187,069
San Luis	2,444	389,831	5	3	77,966	129,944
Santa Cruz	6,892	252,428	5	3	50,486	84,143
Santa Fe	37,500	2,760,951	19	3	145,313	920,317
Santiago del Estero	2,598	759,897	7	3	108,557	253,299
Tucumán	5,807	1,247,664	9	3	138,629	415,888
Tierra del Fuego	2,606	137,875	5	3	27,575	45,958

Source: author's own elaboration on the basis of information provided by Dirección Nacional de Asuntos Provinciales, Ministerio de Hacienda. Available at <https://www.argentina.gob.ar/hacienda/sechacienda/asuntosprovinciales> [Accessed 24 August 2019] and Cámara Nacional Electoral, Poder Judicial de la Nación. Available at <https://www.electoral.gob.ar/nuevo/paginas/datos/padrondatos2019.php> [Accessed 21 August 2019]


Figure 3: Argentine Republic (Political Division)



Source: Instituto Geográfico Nacional, Ministerio de Defensa.


Available at <http://www.ign.gob.ar/AreaServicios/Descargas/MapasEscolares> [Accessed 25 August 2019]

Figure 4: GDP and Population of Provinces (in %), 2008



Source: author's own elaboration on the basis of information provided by Ardanaz, Leiras & Tommasi, 2014: 31.

Figure 5: Provincial Poverty Rates (in %), 2018



Source: author's own elaboration on the basis of information provided by Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos, República Argentina. Available at <https://www.indec.gob.ar/indec/web/Nivel3-Tema-4-46> [Accessed 25 August 2019]

Table 2: Provincial Economic and Political Indicators

	Open Gov. Initiatives (1)	No. of Partisan Turnovers (2)	83-87	87-91	91-95	95-99	99-03	03-07	07-11	11-15	15-19	No. of registered political parties (3)	GDP per capita (USD), 2011	% Provincial public employment (4)
City of Buenos Aires (5)	1	2				0	0	1	1	0	0	50	23,309	8
Buenos Aires	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	71	7,310	19
Catamarca	1	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	34	6,009	58
Córdoba	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	46	6,477	18
Corrientes	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	36	4,001	36
Chaco	1	3	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	30	2,015	46
Chubut	1	4	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	12	15,422	25
Entre Ríos	1	3	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	17	5,682	32
Formosa	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	23	2,879	54
Jujuy	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	29	3,755	52
La Pampa	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	16	5,987	32
La Rioja	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	16	4,162	56
Mendoza	1	4	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	26	9,079	31
Misiones	1	2	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	23	3,751	33
Neuquén	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	24	26,273	31
Río Negro	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	15	8,247	33
Salta	1	2	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	28	4,220	37
San Juan	1	3	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	23	5,642	36
San Luis	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	23	5,580	28
Santa Cruz	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	15	30,496	34
Santa Fe	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	42	8,423	21
Santiago del Estero	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	19	3,003	48
Tucumán	1	2	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	28	3,937	35
Tierra del Fuego (6)	1	5			0	0	1	1	1	1	1	22	20,682	28

Notes

(1) 0 = none. 1 = at least one.

(2) Number of partisan turnovers between 1983-2019 (1983: Argentine political transition towards democracy). 0 = none. 1 = partisan turnover.

Political parties:

Justicialist Party (PJ)	Radical Civic Union (UCR)	Provincial parties	Republican Proposal (PRO)	Federal Intervention (Art. 6, National Constitution)
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(3) Source: Observatorio Político Electoral, Ministerio del Interior, Obras Públicas y Vivienda. Available at <https://www.argentina.gob.ar/observatorioelectoral/partidospoliticos> [Accessed 3 August 2019]

(4) Source: Ministerio de Trabajo, Empleo y Seguridad Social. Available at <https://www.argentina.gob.ar/trabajo> [Accessed 3 August 2019]

(5) The 1994 constitutional amendment granted autonomy to the City of Buenos Aires. First Chief of Government was elected in 1996. Previously, the Mayor was directly appointed by the President of the Republic.

(6) Tierra del Fuego was declared province in 1990. First elections were held in 1991.

Total word count: 5,753
Word count excluding Bibliography: 4,475.

