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Threats and Perceptions: the Coca-Cocaine Complex and its Securitization in Post-Crisis Argentina (2001-2010)

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Threats and Perceptions: the Coca-Cocaine Complex and its Securitization in Post-Crisis Argentina (2001-2010)

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This dissertation is lovingly dedicated to my parents,
Susana Broggi and Dr. Carlos Daniel Lasa

Si (como el griego afirma en el *Cratilo*)
el nombre es arquetipo de la cosa,
en las letras de *rosa* está la rosa
y todo el Nilo en la palabra *Nilo*.

El Golem, **Jorge Luis Borges** (1996)

ABSTRACT

Within the field of studies on drugs and security, the present dissertation is aimed at making, at least, three original contributions. First, from the traditional classification of illegal drugs –those derived from the coca leaf, those derived from the poppies, those derived from cannabis and the synthetic drugs– this study focuses on the coca-cocaine complex (CCC), i.e., the actors involved as well as the dimensions of production, manufacture, traffic and consumption of coca paste, cocaine base paste, cocaine hydrochloride, and its raw material, the coca leaf. The analysis was aimed at elucidating the way in which this complex has affected South America since the 1980s, and Argentina in the post-2001 crisis. Secondly, from a theoretical framework that combines an objectivist perspective of security with the constructivist Theory of Securitization, this dissertation not only deals with the material threats posed by the CCC, but also analyses the perceptions that South American and Argentinian political elites have developed and turned into security priority issues regarding the CCC. Finally, this thesis seeks to overcome the prevalent and traditional formulations on drugs and security studies, which have focused their analysis on the effects of drug trafficking on national security –the state-centered approach–. Instead, this dissertation widens the scope in order to integrate Argentina into South America as a Regional Security Complex (RSC) and as the geopolitical basis of the CCC. This, I consider, is the strongest contribution of this research work to the field, given the fact that, while there is an extensive bibliography on the CCC in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, there has been little research yielding information about the CCC in Argentina – arguably for its recent change of profile in the universe of drug trafficking.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AUC: United Self-Defense Forces (Colombia)

BACRIM: Emerging Criminal Bands (Colombia)

CAN: The Andean Community

CARICOM: Caribbean Community

CCC: Coca-Cocaine Complex

CHCL: Cocaine Hydrochloride

CND: Commission on Narcotic Drugs

CBP: Cocaine Base Paste

COPRI: Copenhagen Peace Research Institute

DEA: Drug Enforcement Administration

DND: United Nations Division of Narcotic Drugs

DPC: Downstream Producer Country

ECOSOC: United Nations Economic and Social Council

EU: European Union

EUROPOL: European Police Office

FARC: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

HA: Hectares

HDI: Human Development Index

IDCR: International Drug Control Regime

IMF: International Monetary Fund

INCB: International Narcotics Control Board

INCSR: International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (US Department of State)

INL: Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (US Department of State)

INTERPOL: International Criminal Police Organization

IR: International Relations

LSD: Lysergic Acid Diethylamide

MERCOSUR: Southern Common Market

MT: Metric Tons

MRTA: Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement

OAC: Opium Advisory Committee

OAS: Organization of American States

OBID: Brazilian Observatory of Drug Information

ONDCP: Office of National Drug Control Policy (United States of America)

OPEC: Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

RSC: Regional Security Complex

RSCT: Regional Security Complex Theory

SAODAP: Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention

SEDRONAR: Secretariat for Drug Addiction Prevention and Fight Against Drug Trafficking (Argentina)

SP: Shining Path (Peru)

UNASUR: Union of South American Nations

UN: United Nations

UNFDAC: United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control

UNODC: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

UPC: Upstream Producer Country

USA/US: United States of America

USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

UHV: Upper Huallaga Valley (Peru)

WHO: World Health Organization

WWI: World War I

WWII: World War II

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Introduction

The correlation between drugs and security has frequently been explored. There is an extensive literature that examines the impact of drug trafficking on national security as well as studies that warn about the intricate connections between under-developed countries, international conflicts and drugs. This dissertation falls within this research line –drugs and security–; however, it develops on the basis of an original reformulation of the classical binomial: **coca-cocaine complex** for drugs, and **securitization** for security.

Four large families of illicit drugs are identified at a global level: drugs derived from the coca leaf (CBP, CHCL, and crack); drugs derived from opium or poppy plant (heroin); drugs derived from *cannabis* (marijuana); and synthetic drugs. The latter, derived from pure chemical materials, may virtually be manufactured in any country in the world and near their final consumer markets. The manufacture of drugs of natural origin, however, depends on the availability of the raw material, which may be found thousands of kilometers away from the final consumer markets. This is the case with the coca-cocaine, whose consumers are mainly American and European while the coca leaf –the raw material of such a drug– grows as a bush in only one region in the world: the South American Andes.

The story behind the coca-cocaine, and its disruptive effects, is closely linked to the history of South American countries. There is no other region in the world more familiar with the suffering from the effects of impoverished *cocaleros,* the violence of traffickers and cartels, the corruption of police and military forces, and the structural failure of the states in the region, which feed back into the roughest sides of the phenomenon. For this reason, and since this dissertation is about Argentina –and, from a wider perspective, about South America–, I have considered it paramount to

focus my research not on *drugs* in general terms, but on the **coca-cocaine complex** (CCC), in particular, which brought about the first question: what perspective of security should guide this study?

The literature on security and drug trafficking in South America features a more or less consolidated tendency towards adopting an *objectivist* approach to security, according to which the analyst or researcher identifies, within the CCC, the processes or dynamics between actors that represent a threat to certain countries or the region as a whole. In the present research work, I propose that this dominating tendency should be adjusted since, even without relegating an *objectivist* approach to security, one of the main contributions of this dissertation derives from a constructivist theoretical approach to security: the School of Copenhagen's approach.

In 1998, in an effort to reformulate the concept of security, Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver forwarded an interesting question of a constructivist nature: how does a certain issue turn into a priority topic of concern? How is a threat constructed? This was the origin of the concept of **securitization**, which rather than focusing on the *objective material* threats an analyst may identify for a specific reference object, it concentrates on the threats that are intersubjectibly constructed on the basis of the enunciation of securitizing speeches. Even when it is a key concept, it has been heavily criticized: if a particular issue is not perceived as a priority topic of concern, does it mean that it is not a threat *per se* to a country, group of citizens or a region? This compelled Buzan and Wæver to complement their theoretical contribution by introducing the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT).

The theoretical contribution of the School of Copenhagen –this is the name given to the contributions made by Buzan, Wæver and other authors, such as De Wilde–, is successful not only because it features a balance which is not frequent between constructivism and realism, but also because it has allowed this dissertation to study the CCC as an objective as well as a perceived and/or constructed threat in Argentina (domestic level) and in South America (regional level). Furthermore, the theoretical approach adopted has been the key to analyze the structural failures present in South American countries. The CCC has grown in South America not only due to the increase in demand of cocaine at a global scale, but also since countries in the region exhibit serious deficiencies in terms of socio-political cohesion, political capacity, socioeconomic development and territorial centrality.

The **research questions** guiding this work were:

(a) What were the tendencies present as regards production, manufacture, trafficking and consumption of coca leaf, coca paste, cocaine base paste (CBP), cocaine hydrochloride (CHCL), cocaine by-products and derivatives in South America and Argentina, during the decade 2001-2010?

(b) What dimensions or national/regional tendencies of the CCC did the Argentinian political elites articulate as threats to the security of the Argentinian Republic during the decade 2001-2010?

In light of the above, the **main objectives** of this doctoral dissertation are:

(a) To identify and analyze the tendencies of the production, manufacture, trafficking and consumption of coca leaf, coca paste, CBP, CHCL, cocaine by-products and derivatives in South America and Argentina, during the decade 2001-2010.

(b) To identify and analyze the dimensions or national/regional tendencies of the CCC that the Argentinian political elites articulated as threats to the security of the Argentinian Republic during the decade 2001-2010.

Additionally, this dissertation pursues secondary objectives: (a) to provide a definition of CCC; (b) to build the Regional Security Complex (RSC) of the Argentinian Republic; (c) to identify and describe, on the basis of the available literature, the global, regional and domestic tendencies of the coca-cocaine market along three decades (1980-2010); (d) to contribute in the elaboration of knowledge about the CCC which takes the Argentinian Republic as case study.

In order to provide an answer to the two central questions –and the secondary objectives– that structure this research work, I have organized this study into five chapters and a final conclusion, which were written during my stay at the University of Texas at Austin (Ch. I and II); at the Università degli Studi di Camerino (Ch. III); at the University of Los Andes in Colombia (Ch. IV); and while I was carrying out my fieldwork and interviews in Argentina (Ch. V and the Conclusions).

The first chapter presents the State of the Art, the Theoretical Framework of this dissertation and the Methodology of the research, and it is divided into three sections. The first section places the current piece of research within a wider group of scientific

contributions to the same discipline field, and highlights its original contributions. The second section introduces the theories proposed by the School of Copenhagen (Theory of Securitization and RSCT). The last section, finally, refers to the appropriate methodological design in view of the theoretical framework adopted to meet the central objective of this dissertation.

Ch. II condenses one of the original contributions of this dissertation: the definition of CCC. As I will explain in due time, there are two economic concepts that are persistently used in the literature about coca-cocaine: industry and market. Even when the economic perspective is inescapable to the study of the coca-cocaine –the criminal organizations working on its production and trafficking seek, for example, an economic or material benefit–, it is deficient as it reduces the problem to only one analytical dimension. If this dissertation expects to contribute to the disciplinary field of the Social Sciences, it would be only logical and desirable to be able to approach the study of concern on the basis of a concept which does not exhaust the problem in its economic dimension. I provide a definition of CCC, then, by identifying its characteristic features; namely: its illegal character; the raw material and final products (coca, hydrochloride of cocaine, by-products and derivatives); its fundamental dimensions (production and manufacture, trafficking and consumption); and the actors involved, in a reactive or proactive behavior, in the stages of production, manufacture, trafficking and consumption of CHCL, its by-products and derivatives containing alkaloid of cocaine.

In the third chapter, I define South America as the RSC of Argentina, and with that purpose: (a) I build a security constellation of the South American RSC on the basis of four levels of analysis: the domestic level, the regional level, the interregional level and the global level; (b) I analyze the regional processes of securitization and desecuritization operating over the CCC; and (c) I determine the structure of the South American RSC on the basis of its borders, systemic units, polarity present in the region, and the patterns of amity/enmity. Among others, I will demonstrate in this chapter that South America is a RSC characterized by the presence of weak states with structural problems in multiple dimensions.

In Ch. IV I recover the idea of South America and I define it as the geopolitical basis of the CCC. In order to achieve this: (a) I identify the hard core of the production in South America –the Andean Area–, and analyze the producing profile of Bolivia,

Peru and Colombia; (b) I refer to the role played by Venezuela, Ecuador, Uruguay, Chile and Brazil in the trafficking stage; (c) I prove that, as the Andean Area is the producing heart of the region, the Southern Cone is the consumer heart of the region; and (d) I rebuild the relational network of the main actors of the CCC in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia.

In the fifth chapter, I condense three of the main original contributions of this study. In the first place, I enquire whether Argentina is a weak or a strong state according to its socio-political cohesion, political capacity, socioeconomic development and territorial centrality. In the second place, on the basis of unpublished interviews carried out to specialists in the matter, I analyze the dimensions, actors and tendencies related to the CCC in Argentina during the decade 2001-2010. Finally, I identify and analyze the national/regional dimensions or tendencies of the CCC that the Argentinian political elites have articulated as threats to the security of the Argentinian Republic during the decade 2001-2010.

In the final section of this dissertation, I introduce the ultimate conclusions that summarize the key contributions of this research piece, its findings and the research lines it has opened but has not explored.

CHAPTER I

Literary Review, Theoretical Framework and Methodology

1. Introduction

In this chapter I present: (a) the State of the Art of the most recent academic-scientific production on security, drugs and securitization; (b) the theoretical framework that allowed me to analyze and/or explain, as the case may be, the changes in the security environment of the Argentine Republic regarding the CCC, and the dimensions that the Argentinian political elites have turned into security threats for their country; and (c) the methodological design for data analysis.

2. State of the Art

In order to contextualize this research work within a larger group of scientific contributions to the same disciplinary field, I herewith a brief review of the literature available on the CCC and/or drug trafficking analyzed from the security or securitization perspective.

In the year 2011, when I started with the task of collecting specific bibliography on drug trafficking and security, I found the contributions laid by Pablo Dreyfus (1998; 2002; 2009). I had read some of his work from the years 2007 and 2008; however, what caught my attention due to its relevance for my research project, was

his doctoral dissertation presented in 2002. In this research work, Dreyfus set himself to analyze the "*national security problematique caused by the spillover effect of militarized enforcement policies and by drug trafficking in South America*" (2002: 59) by focusing on cases of analysis such as Venezuela and Argentina as neighboring transshipment countries of Colombia and Bolivia, respectively.

The doctoral dissertation by Dreyfus (2002) has played a key role when structuring this study since we both analyze an aspect of the link between drugs (CHCL and its derivatives) and security. However, while Dreyfus structures his dissertation around the concept *illicit drug trafficking*, the present dissertation focuses on the notion of the CCC. If the reasons that follow are taken into account, this first conceptual distinction results especially noteworthy.

Even when Dreyfus specifies in his dissertation that he would only analyze the production and trafficking of CHCL and its derivatives, *illicit drug traffic* is a broad concept that also includes the production, manufacture, extraction, preparation, offering, offering for sale, distribution, sale, delivery on any terms whatsoever, brokerage, dispatch, dispatch in transit, transport importation and exportation of other illicit drugs such as marijuana and its derivatives, opium and its derivatives or synthetic drugs. As I will argue in Ch. II, the CCC concept is an original contribution of this doctoral dissertation developed to explore the issue focusing exclusively on the production, trafficking and consumption of CHCL and its derivatives.

Furthermore, and also departing from Dreyfus perspective, whereas the CCC sees consumption as a central dimension of the concern, Dreyfus sets it aside from the security equation since he considers that it is a consequent dimension of drug trafficking.

> *The problem of consumption* –Dreyfus (2002: 60) says– *is only analyzed as a consequence of increasing production in a producer country and traffic through a transshipment or neighboring transshipment country, that is, as a collateral dimension of drug trafficking and not as a problem as such.*

A second important difference between Dreyfus's and the present research work is in the epistemological approach taken, which implies differences in the methodological approach too. Although both dissertations base an important part of their theoretical framework on the concepts put forward by Barry Buzan (2009 [1991]), while Dreyfus adopts a heavily objectivist perspective, this dissertation combines the most objectivist perspective of the RSCT with the constructivist

perspective of the Theory of Securitization. The most obvious result of this epistemological distance is that, while Dreyfus makes an analytical effort to provide a definition of *threats*, identify them in the regional scene and measure their impact on the case studies selected (Colombia, Venezuela, Bolivia and Argentina), this paper focuses on the analysis of those changes in the RSC in Argentina that have been constructed by the local political elites as threats to the security of the country.

There exists between the two studies, finally, an expected methodological difference: whereas Dreyfus (2002: 57) starts from a series of hypothesis and he embarks on validating them in each chapter, this dissertation is structured around questions that find their answers along the research study. The reason for this distinction is related to the nature and scope of each study. Dreyfus's doctoral dissertation is mainly correlational besides being descriptive and explicative: if enforcement policies are applied in a country X (producer), there will be consequences for country Y (neighbor transshipment country). *Which are those consequences and why do they take place?* Dreyfus wonders before formulating his hypothesis. In this dissertation, there is not a necessary correlation between variables X (changes in the RSC in Argentina) and Y (the perception of those changes as threats to the security of Argentina). The fact that Bolivia has increased its production of CHCL in the last ten years may or may not, for example, be perceived by the Argentinian political elites as a threat to the security of their country. The scope of this work, therefore, is not correlational but exploratory –given the lack or few previous research works on the issue–; and descriptive since it intends to characterize a concrete situation by identifying its dynamics, actors, securitizing processes, etc., without foreseeing a future scene.

Another chief contribution to the study of drugs and security has been found in the work by Ivelaw L. Griffith (1997)[1]. He sets himself to prove how the problem of drugs affects the sovereignty of the Caribbean countries. Apart from the obvious difference between Griffith's work and this dissertation –the former studies the

[1] In a previous work, Griffith (1993: 21) analyzed the security dilemmas faced by small Commonwealth Caribbean states in terms of the security perceptions of their political elites, their security capabilities, and their geopolitical environments. Given its year of publication –before the formulations by Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998)–, it was a novel contribution regarding the analysis of the perception of the political elites in the identification of specific subjects as security problems. The main flaw in his formulation, though, was that he did not use or specify any methodology in particular to deal with those perceptions, which were classified in three large areas: military, political and economic. On this issue, see Griffith, 1993: 3-85.

drugs-security dynamics in the Caribbean and the latter focuses on South America and Argentina–, there are other divergences worth mentioning.

Griffith's research refers to the *problem of drugs,* defined as "*a multidimensional dilemma with four problem areas: production, consumption and abuse, trafficking and money laundering*" (1997: 2). Three of the dimensions mentioned by Griffith are included in the definition of the CCC –production, traffic and consumption–; there are, however, two fundamental differences between the concepts *problem of drugs* and CCC: (a) when referring to *drugs,* Griffith analyses production, trafficking and consumption patterns not only regarding CHCL, but also marijuana and even alcohol and tobacco; and (b) Griffith includes money laundering in his equation. I too consider money laundering –as well as arms trafficking, human trafficking, forced labor, etc.– itself a criminal activity related to the production, trafficking and consumption of coca and CHCL, but deem it a dispensable element when referring to the essential dynamics of the CCC in South America.

Lastly, Griffith's work (1997) adopts the same theoretical framework as Dreyfus (2002): the one developed by Buzan (2009 [1991]) following a solid objectivist perspective on security. In analytical terms, this leads both authors to identify and determine the political, military, social, ecological and economic threats that *illicit drug traffic* –in the case of Dreyfus– and the *problem of drugs* –in Griffith– means to their referent objects[2].

Unlike the theoretical formulations that served as guides to Griffith (1997) and Dreyfus (2002), the Theory of Securitization and the RSCT have gained growing popularity in the last decade. In addition to arousing heated theoretical debate, many academic-empirical works have chosen one or both theories as orientation for their research; all of them have served as reference for this dissertation. Following, I will refer to the most significant ones.

[2] The referent object in the case of Dreyfus (2002) is clear: the state. As Dreyfus (2002: 60) himself declares, his dissertation suggests that drug trafficking is a problem of "*national security, that is, as a problem of the security of the state.*" In the case of Griffith (1997: 5), the referent object is uncertain, since he defines security as the "*protection and preservation of a people's freedom from external military attack and coercion, from internal subversion, and from the erosion of cherished, political economic and social values*." How should we understand the formulation *people's freedom*: as security to the individual or to the civil society? And in that case, why does the title of his work suggest that the drug concern represents a threat to the sovereignty of the state (in that a case, the referent object would be the state)?

Arlene Tickner (2004), on her part, explored the securitization practices in Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru and Venezuela in relation to the Colombian conflict. In her writing, after an interesting analysis that introduces a general discussion over the concepts security and securitization, the author concludes by stating that the perception of the South American countries on the Colombian conflict is not a product of objective consequences but rather of the local political dynamics of each country and of the way in which their elites articulate certain topics as security problems.

Wilkinson (2007), focusing in Asia rather than Latin America, analyses the 2005 revolt in Kyrgyzstan and questions the effectiveness of the theoretical framework introduced by the Copenhagen School to conduct empirical studies outside the Western World. Wilkinson (2007: 5) considers, in the first place, that Buzan and Wæver accept that the European interpretations of society and state are universal (the "*Westphalian straitjacket*", in the author's words). In the second place, she considers that the importance that both theories attach to the concept of speech-act means the exclusion of other forms of enunciation such as physical action. In the light of the Kyrgyzstan case, therefore, the author sees that if the theoretical proposal of the Copenhagen School intends to acquire universal validity, both criticisms should be catered for.

A third contribution is introduced by Vieira (2009), who deals with the security environment in the EU and the security perceptions constructed by their political elites as regards terrorism, illegal immigration, regional conflicts, weapons of mass destruction, organized crime and national issues like water resources, anti-Semitism or the acceptance of Turkey as a EU Member. After analyzing dozens of speeches and constructing the RSC of the EU –which includes not only the members of the EU but also the countries of the Mediterranean Basin–, the author concludes that, given the shared perceptions of security and references to a common identity, the EU is a powerful global actor that may play a more substantial role in the stabilization of the region.

Nourzhanov (2009), in turn, makes use of the RSCT to analyze the complex securitization process in Central Asia, and believes that the inter-state tensions between the five ex-Soviet nations studied (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tadzhikistan,

Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) hamper the formation of a successful collective security.

Finally, we should highlight the contributions made by Kahrs (2004), who analyses the situation in Northeast Asia from the RSCT, focusing her study on Chinese policy towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea after the Cold War; Menezes Teixeira (2010), who evaluates the progresses in MERCOSUR and UNASUR regarding the construction of a macro-system of regional security in South America; McLean (2011), who studies the position of Turkey between two RSCs (in the Middle East and in the EU); and Yepes (2013), who analyses the securitization that South American countries conduct on the development aid that Colombia receives from the United States.

In line with the antecedents mentioned, this dissertation is innovative since: (a) it defines the CCC, a concept that has been insufficiently explored and not defined in the literature about drugs; (b) it deals with the relation drugs-security in South America from a novel theoretical approach: one that includes the Theory of Securitization and the RSCT; (c) it studies the evolution of the CCC in South America during the years 1980-2010; (d) it studies the evolution of the CCC in Argentina during the years 2001-2010; (e) it analyses the dimensions of the CCC that the South American political elites have turned into security problems; and (f) it analyses, for the first time, the dimensions of the CCC that the Argentinian political elites have turned into security problems.

3. Theory of Securitization

During the first half of the 20th century, and due to a great influence of classical political realism, the concept of *security* was dominated by three great ideas (Lipschutz, 1995: 5): (a) *security* was equated with *national security* or *state security* –state-centric vision–; (b) the threats were clearly military[3] in character and,

[3] The excessive concern for military threats during the 20th century (particularly during the Cold War), had a double effect: while it strengthened the development of some studies on strategy and defense, it certainly doomed security to become an underdeveloped and unproblematized concept (see Buzan and Hansen, 2009: Ch. I). The paradox seems evident, since defense implies the protection from

therefore, they were represented by other states; (c) such threats could be clearly identified, in which case, the role of the international analyst was to evaluate the potential and *objective* threat that a given country could be facing.

With the Cold War, a new chapter in the history of rivalry was opened between the great powers, and the spectrum of challenges that the US as well as the USSR had to face were not only military, but also economic, ideological and social (Buzan, 1997: 6).

This expansion in the conceptualization of security was, however, soon relegated by the fear of nuclear weapons, the technological race and the doctrine of the Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). This led to the consolidation of the military, *objective*, state-centric vision of security. In fact, according to Buzan and Hansen (2009), the dominating concept of security during the second half of the XX century was that of the *Realist Strategic Studies*.

> *This concept of security defines the state as the referent object, the use of force as the central concern, external threats as the primary ones, the politics of security as engagement with radical dangers and the adoption of emergency measures.* (Buzan and Hansen: 2009, loc. 724)

However, the fall of the Berlin Wall changed everything. The dissolution of the Soviet Union, the collapse of numerous states, the outbreak of new conflicts and the increasing impact of problems such as terrorism, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, environmental issues and the flow of refugees and migrants have contributed to consolidate the new global (*dis*)order which has brought about a new security agenda that needs theorizing upon.

The erosion of the traditional agenda opened the debate among three big schools (Buzan, 1997: 5): the traditionalist school, which insisted on maintaining the focus of attention on military issues; the Critical Security Studies, whose theorists started to question the whole theoretical framework in which security was conceptualized; and the wideners, who intend to extend the range of issues on the security agenda. Among the last ones, Ullman (1983), Nye (1989) and Tickner (1992) –among others–, claimed about the need to expand the security agenda, but soon they highlighted Barry Buzan's contribution (1983; 2009 [1991]).

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military threats, whereas security is a much wider concept. In Vieira's words, "*security is a state of being, one feels secure or we as a society feel secure. Defense by its very nature is an action not a state*" (2009: 42). For the purpose of this dissertation, security and defense will not be considered synonyms.

Buzan, who was Project Director at the COPRI, argued that before expanding the security agenda, it was necessary to reach an agreement on the definition of security.

> *This concept is so weakly developed* –he claimed–. *(…) Realists tended to see security as a derivative of power: an actor with enough power to reach a dominating position would acquire security as a result. (…) Idealists tended to see security as a consequence of peace: a lasting peace would provide security for all.* (Buzan, 2009 [1991]: 25-26)

For this author, therefore, it was necessary to develop a more versatile concept of security that could lie in between power and peace.

In his classical text *People, States and Fear*, Buzan (2009 [1991]) finally identified the hard core of security.

> *In the case of security, the discussion is about the pursuit of* ***freedom from threats****. When this discussion is in the context of the international system, security is about the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity (…). Its bottom line is about survival, but it also reasonably includes a substantial range of concerns about the conditions of existence. (…) Security is primarily about the fate of human collectivities, and only secondarily about the personal security of individual human beings. In the contemporary international system, the standard unit of security is thus the sovereign territorial state*. (Buzan, 2009 [1991]: 26) [Emphasis added]

Considering that the states are the dominating units of the system, Buzan continued arguing, *national security* is the central concept in security studies, but since the military, ecological, political, economic or social threats affect the survival conditions of human communities and even the entire planet, it is also important to expand the concept of security to include also the survival of humanity as a whole (2009 [1991]: 37-38).

From Buzan's contribution, three central concepts were introduced to the field of security studies: (a) the *levels of analysis*; (b) the *sectors*; (c) the *referent objects* of security.

Regarding the *levels of analysis*[4], although these were originally an important development in the field of IR by Kenneth Waltz (1979; 2010 [1959]), the idea of structuring security theory in terms of spatial scales from individual through state to

[4] "*By levels, we mean objects for analysis that are defined by a range of spatial scales, from small to large. Levels are locations where both outcomes and sources of explanation can be located*" (Buzan, Wæver and De Willde, 1998: 5). In the study of IR, the five most frequently used levels of analysis are the following: *international systems* (meaning the largest conglomerates of interacting or independent units that have no system level above them); *international subsystems* (meaning groups of units within the international system that can be distinguished from the entire system by the particular nature or intensity of their interactions with or without interdependence of each other); *units* (meaning actors composed of various subgroups, organizations, communities and many individuals); *subunits* (meaning organized groups of individuals within units that are able to affect the behavior of the unit); *individuals* (the bottom line of most analysis in social sciences).

system can be attributed to Buzan. As for the concept of *sectors* (Buzan, 1991; Buzan, Wæver, De Wilde, 1998), although it was always implicit in the field of IR (Mann, 1986), Buzan's *sectors* have allowed for the identification of the origin of the threats, and for the analysis of the international system from the point of view of a particular type of relations and/or activities (military, political, economic, social perspective). Finally, the idea of the *referent objects*, was meant to question the role of the state as the only referent object in security studies. Even, from a still analytic state-centric perspective, and as Wæver (1993: 25) has noted, in his *People, States and Fear* (2009 [1991]), Buzan introduced an interesting duality: state security, with the sovereignty as a characteristic feature on the one hand, and society's security, with identity as its decisive core on the other[5].

In epistemological terms, however, Buzan did not overcome the strong objectivist matrix that had dominated security studies throughout the XX century. The concept of security, in fact, continued to revolve around issues of *real* and *objective* threats, which an analyst could identify as worrying or urgent for a specific referent object (state or society).

During the 1990s, Buzan was in constant contact with a colleague from COPRI, Ole Wæver. From a constructivist perspective, Wæver (1989; 1995) had been developing a central premise to the concept of security: security is a reality outside language that is seen as being *out there,* and that it can be measured in terms of threat or fear. However, Wæver's main aim was to redefine the concept of security from the notion of the *speech act*.

> *What is (...) security? One can view 'security' as that which is in language theory called a speech act: it is not mainly interesting as a sign referring to something more real – it is the utterance in itself that is the act: by saying it, something is done (like betting, giving a promise, naming a ship). By saying 'security' a state-representative moves the particular case into a specific area; claiming a special right to use the means necessary to block this development, but paying the price of some loss of prestige by needing to use this special resort: 'National Security was threatened'.* (Wæver, 1989: 5-6)

The idea of the *speech act* was developed by the British philosopher J. L. Austin. This scholar argued that for centuries philosophers had assumed two central ideas: (a) that an utterance could only *describe* some kind of state of things; and (b) that the statement of a fact could be judged with the criteria of truth or falsehood (Austin,

[5] For a criticism on the concept of identity from Buzan and the School of Copenhagen, see McSweeney, 1996.

1962: 1). Austin, on his part, called these kinds of utterances *constantive*, and argued that there was also another kind of utterance namely, *performative utterances*, which could not be judged as true or false, and whose objective was not to describe, but to *do* something. In his own words, the term *performative* "*indicates that the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action*" (Austin, 1962: 6).

Consider the following utterance: (a) *"I do!"* (perform the duties with loyalty, honesty, etc.), expressed in the course of an assumption of command ceremony; (b) "*I name this ship 'Queen Elizabeth'*", expressed by breaking a champagne bottle against the bow; (c) *"I give and bequeath my watch to my brother"*, as one of the clauses of a last will and testament; (d) "*I'll bet you one hundred pesos it will rain tomorrow*". In these examples provided by Austin (1962: 5), it seems clear that such an utterance (in the appropriate circumstances) does not imply a description; it does not imply doing the action I am supposed to do by uttering that idea, or stating that I am doing something in particular: it is actually performing the action.

This *doing by speaking* is, according to Austin, composed of three independent dimensions: (a) the *locutionary* dimension, which is the utterance of an expression that contains a given sense and reference; (b) the *illocutionary* dimension[6], which is the act performed in articulating a locution; and (c) the *perlocutionary* dimension, which is the consequent effects or sequels that aim at evoking the feelings, beliefs, thoughts or actions of the target audience. This triadic dimension is summed up by Jürgen Habermas (1984: 289) in the following: "*to say* something*, to act* in *saying something, to bring about something* through *acting in saying something*."

From the perspective of the *speech act*, Wæver (1989: 42) asks himself:

> *What is the illocutionary act in relation to security? It is to define the particular case as one belonging to a specific category ('security') where the state tends to use all available means to combat it.*

In subsequent works, this relationship between security and *speech act* would be mainly explored and defined with a new term: ***securitization*** (Wæver, 1995).

> *(...)* ***security is about survival****. It is when an issue* ***is presented*** *as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object (traditionally, but not necessarily, the state, incorporating government, territory, and society). The special nature of security threats*

[6] For Wæver (1989: 42), the illocutionary dimension "*is the effect on someone else who is made to do something*." For Sarle (quoted in Balzacq, 2005: 175), "*this category captures the explicit performative class of utterances, and as a matter of fact, the concept speech act is literally predicated on that sort of agency*."

justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them. The invocation of security has been the key to legitimize the use of force, but more generally it has opened the way for the state to mobilize, or to take special powers, to handle existential threats. Traditionally, ***by saying "security," a representative state declares an emergency condition****, thus claiming a right to use whatever means are necessary to block a threatening development.* (Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde, 1998: 21) [Emphasis added]

'Security' is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics*. Securitization can thus be seen as* ***a more extreme version of politicization****. In theory, any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from non-politicized (meaning the state does not deal with it and it is not in any other way made an issue of public debate and decision) through politicized (meaning the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations or, more rarely, some other form of communal governance) to securitized (meaning the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure).* (Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde, 1998: 23-24) [Emphasis added]

A security issue is posited (by a securitizing actor) as a threat to the survival of some referent object (nation, state, the liberal international economic order, the rainforests), which is claimed to have a right to survive. (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 71)

It can be concluded that, from this constructivist perspective, security is not about a real threat anymore; "*security issues are made security issues by acts of securitization*" (Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde, 1998: 204). Therefore, the analyst cannot really tell whether something is a security problem or not and for whom by looking at reality, they need rather to analyze the discourse that takes its form to present something as an existential threat to a given referent object, and which the audience accepts as being so.

3.1. Security Analysis from the Speech Act Perspective

So far I have referred to the theoretical basis of securitization, but there still remains the question of how to apply this approach in order to make a practical safety analysis. In principle, the authors of the Copenhagen School[7] identify three components of any securitization move:

(a) Referent objects: *things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival.*

[7] The term *Copenhagen School* was coined for the first time by McSweeney (1996) in a paper that started an exchange in the form of a debate between this author and several researchers whom he ascribed to this new school (Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan, from the COPRI, as the main referents). To expand on the discussion on McSweeney and the Copenhagen School, see McSweeney (1996), Buzan and Wæver (1997) and Williams (1998).

(b) Securitizing actors*: actors who securitize issues by declaring something –a referent object– is threatened.*
(c) Functional actors: *actors who affect the dynamics of a sector. Without being the referent object or the actor calling for security on behalf of the referent object, this is an actor who significantly influences decisions in the field of security. A polluting company, for example, can be a central actor in the environmental sector –it is not a referent object and is not trying to securitize environmental issues (quite the contrary)*– (Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde, 1998: 36).

Once the referent object, the securitizing actor and the functional actors have been identified, we should be able to recognize the specific rhetorical structure claiming priority of action, i.e., we should be able to recognize a *securitizing move*: "*if* [this] *problem is not handled now it will be too late, and we will not exist to remedy our failure*" (Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde, 1998: 24).

A *securitizing move*, i.e., discourse that attempts to present an issue as a threat for a specific referent object, is made more effective by the presence of facilitating conditions in three categories:

> *(1) the demand internal to the speech act of following the* ***grammar of security****, (2) the social conditions regarding* ***the position of authority for the securitizing actor*** *– that is, the relationship between speaker and audience and thereby the likelihood of the audience accepting the claims made in a securitizing attempt, and (3)* ***features of the alleged threat that either facilitate or impede securitization****.* (Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde, 1998: 33) [Emphasis added]

The grammar of safety, the first facilitating condition of the act of securitization, is an essential requisite that any securitizing discourse must have. While it is not necessary that the securitizing actor states the word *safety*, if they do not build their discourse including the reference to an existent threat; a point of no return in case of omission or inaction, and a possible solution to the problem, the securitizing move may have no effect or impact (Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde, 1998: 33). In addition to these general conditions of the securitizing grammar, Wæver (1996: 108-109) has pointed out that the rhetoric of safety may also include specific concepts of certain sectors (from the social sector, the idea of a nation's identity; from the political-military sector, the idea of a state's sovereignty; from the environmental sector, the idea of the environment's sustainability, etc.).

The second facilitating condition raises an important question about the securitizing actors: the question of power and inequality of access to discursive resources in security interactions (Balzacq, 2005: 174). Who can securitize a specific issue? Theoretically, any actor can make a securitizing move; however, securitizations are carried out by the traditional elites[8]. In fact, for Wæver (1995: 57), safety analysis should focus on the ways in which the political elites[9] identify specific issues, such as safety problems, so that when an issue is securitized, or is being securitized, it is possible to follow this process through political discourse in the media and/or in literature (to expand on this, see Section 5.2 of this chapter).

Although, being a necessary condition, the position of authority[10] of the securitizing actor is not enough to securitize a specific issue. In fact, the theorists from the Copenhagen School understand that "*securitization is* (…) *a kind of 'call and response' process: an actor makes a call that something is a matter of 'security', and the audience must then respond with their acceptance of it as such*" (Roe, 2004: 281). In this regard, Gad and Petersen (2011: 318) have noticed that, contrary to the Schmittian position in which the sovereign declares the state of exception and the audience does not intervene in the production of meaning, Wæver's idea is Arendtian[11]: securitization is defined inter-subjectively, and an issue is securitized

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[8] It is not a minor thing that, due to the fact that securitization is about priority, about elevating issues to absolute priority, "*it is natural that different candidates will battle (politically) with each other*" (Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde, 1998: 176).

[9] Buzan does not define in his work the terms e*lites* or *political* e*lites*. In this dissertation, I will define the e*lites* as those minorities that hold different forms of power over a majority that lacks any kind of power. As regards to the political dimension of the elites, the greatest contributions were those of the Italian School of Elitists. Among the many possible forms of power (ideological, economic, social, etc.), they have focused on the political power, that is to say, on the power held by a restrictive circle of people "*to take and impose, even ultimately recurring to force, decisions for all the members of a group"* (Bobbio, 2005: 519).

[10] *Position of authority* should not necessarily be identified with *position of official authority* (cf. Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde, 1998: 33).

[11] There are discrepancies regarding the Arendtian perspective on which the theoretical proposal of Wæver is structured. For example, Claudia Aradau (2004) suggests that the idea of securitization corresponds to Carl Schmitt's notion of politics (decisionist/exclusionary). Aradau considers securitization as negative inasmuch as its mode of extraordinary politics necessarily both institutionalizes fast-track decision-making ('process') and it produces categories of enemy others ('outcome'). Additionally, while desecuritization (*i.e.* maintaining issues in, or returning issues to, the realm of 'normal' politics) offers the possibility of a more positive conception, Aradau argues that its transformatory potential is severely circumscribed as the normal political mode is itself invariably subjected to the same institutional sovereign authority and domination as securitization. Wæver (2011) considers that the concept in his theory is essentially Arendtian. In that sense, "*the theory of securitization is a strictly focused theory with one key idea at its center: securitization. Its theoretical content comes not from accumulating correlations, but from a tight conceptual core around the key concept. Therefore, the definition of securitization shapes every usage of the theory and entails this Arendtian concept of politics, because the theory places power in-between humans –not least through the*

"*only if and when the audience accepts it as such*" (Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde, 1998: 25). As Balzacq (2005: 174) has pointed out, however, "*the nature and status of that audience remains unaccounted for*". In Wæver's (1995) individual work, he seems to equate *acceptance* with avoiding the escalation of public opposition or, as Stritzel (2007: 365) has noted, Wæver seems to foster toleration of emergency measures; neither of which imply inter-subjectivity or established shared understanding, "*so it is still not clear what audience acceptance entails*" (Watson, 2012: 285).

Finally, the third facilitating condition has to do with the characteristics of the alleged threat. "*It is more likely that one can conjure a security threat if certain objects can be referred to that are generally held to be threatening – be they tanks, hostile sentiments, or polluted water*" (Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde, 1998: 33). If we consider the CCC and evaluate the negative political, economic and social impact it has had in Latin America, it is evident that CCC is more likely to become a securitized issue than, for example, the problem of the climate change may be.

4. The Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT)

The idea of securitization has been, beyond doubt, one of the main contributions of the Copenhagen School; it has not been the only one though. In fact, I have previously made reference to the concept of *levels of analysis,* developed by Barry Buzan, and it is precisely this idea the one I would like to expand in this section.

In his original statement in *People, States and Fear* (2009 [1991]), Buzan asserted that in the studies about security there was a significant gap between two levels of analysis: the analysis at the state level and that at the global-international one. In an attempt to bridge this gap, the scholar develops his argument for the importance of the regional level in the international affairs and, particularly, in the studies about security. He advances his new analytical category specifically directed at security questions: the Regional Security Complexes (RSC).

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central role of the audience– and insists on securityness being a quality not of threats but of their handling, that is, the theory places power not with 'things' external to a community but internal to it." (Wæver, 2011: 468). To expand on this issue, cf. Roe, 2012: 249-250.

The proposal of the RSC was built on two fundamental assumptions: (a) due to the relational nature of security, it was not possible to explain the national security of a specific state without understanding the interdependent regional security systems in which it was inserted (Buzan, 2009 [1991]: 157); and (b) since most threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones, security interdependence is normally patterned into regionally-based clusters: security complexes (Buzan, 2009 [1991]: 161; Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 45). When developing his definition of the regional security, Buzan focused on the relation of power or the pattern of amity/enmity between the states:

> *By amity I mean relationships ranging from genuine friendship to expectations of protection or support. By enmity I mean relationships set by suspicion and fear. Separating these two poles is a broad band of indifference and/or neutrality, in which amity and enmity are either too weak to matter much, or else mixed in a way that produces no clear leaning on one way or the other. An extreme view of balance-of-power theory would hold that patterns of amity/enmity are a product of the balance of power, with states shifting their alignments in accordance with the dictates of movements in the distribution of power. The view here is that the historical dynamic of amity and enmity is only partly related to the balance of power, and that where it is related, it is much stickier than the relatively fluid movement of the distribution of power.* (Buzan, 2009 [1991]: 160) [Emphasis added]

Border disputes, different interests among towns, ideological affinity or historical bonds are some of the explanations that, according to Buzan, define the patterns of amity/ enmity among state units. Therefore, regional security subsystems can be seen in terms of patterns of amity/enmity "*that are substantially confined within some particular geographical area*", and security complexes –the resulting formations of the regional security subsystems– can be defined as "*groups of states whose primary security concerns link them together sufficiently closely so that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another*" (Buzan, 2009 [1991]: 160).

From those first accounts made by Buzan, according to which the RSCs were the product of a *traditional* way of considering security, the theory of the RSC (RSCT) was further developed. In *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (1998), Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998: 197-200) wondered whether it was necessary to redefine the security complexes from a more constructivist perspective. The main uncertainties that inhibited a redefinition of the concept lay in the facts that: (a) Buzan, in his original reasoning, could already recognize security as a relational phenomenon and,

in a way, this was in line with the idea of security as an intersubjective construction; and (b) the key idea to define the security complexes was related to the patterns of amity/enmity, a concept that was not necessarily contradictory to the securitization approach. There was, however, a central issue that researchers could not ignore: What was the explicative power of the RSCT in a context in which the states were not the only referent objects anymore and where the political-military sector was not the predominant either? Leaving aside Buzan's state-centered definition (Buzan, 2009 [1991]: 160), Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998: 201) (re)defined the RSC as *"a set of* ***units*** *whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another*" [Emphasis added].

In their book published in 1998, the Copenhagen School set the basis for considering the RSCT in the context of a wider agenda and from the securitization perspective. However, only in *Regions and Power: The Structure of International Security* (2003), do Buzan and Wæver provide an exhaustive theoretical and empirical presentation of the RSCT, by filling some gaps and by modifying some of the ideas from previous contributions.

The first contribution of *Regions and Power* (2003) was aimed at clarifying the idea that had led the Copenhagen School into studying the regions as privileged spaces of interaction in terms of security.

> *Since decolonisation* –Buzan and Wæver point out–*, the regional level of security has become both more autonomous and more prominent in international politics, and the ending of the Cold War accelerated this process. This idea follows naturally from the ending of bipolarity. Without superpower rivalry intruding obsessively into all regions, local powers have more room for manoeuvre.* (Buzan y Wæver, 2003: 1)

The second wise move in the new text by Buzan and Wæver (2003) was to elucidate the theoretical and methodological approach on which the RSCT was built. An attentive reader would have noticed, for instance, the fact that the RSCT rests upon an assumption related to the concept of security conceived from a traditional point of view: that threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones –and, consequently, security interdependence is normally patterned into regionally based clusters–. This clearly causes some confusion since, from the securitization perspective, threats are developed intersubjectively, and one cannot refer to them as being *per se* dangers to the attributes of a given referent object. In view of this, the

authors claim, the RSCT combines constructivist and *materialist* elements in its formulation.

> ***RSCT uses a blend of materialist and constructivist approaches****. On the materialist side it uses ideas of bounded territoriality and distribution of power that are close to those in neorealism. Its emphasis on the regional level is compatible with, and we think complementary to, neorealism's structural scheme, but it contradicts the tendency of most neorealist analysis to concentrate heavily on the global level structure. On the constructivist side, RSCT builds on the securitization theory set out in our previous works, which focus on the political processes by which security issues get constituted.* (Buzan y Wæver, 2003: 4) [Emphasis added]

On this issue, the authors put forward an important point: the RSC are not the product of a *discursive construction*[12]. A RSC is an analytical concept that can be understood from the securitization perspective only as it is subject to the security practice of securitizing actors. In this sense, it is important to study the ways in which the securitizing actors define a given region, "*but something is a RSC when it qualifies according to our criteria, not according to the criteria of practitioners*" (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 48).

4.1. RSCT: Main Variables

The analytical organization of the RSCT relies, in the first place, on a concept introduced in *Regions and Power* (2003: 51): the concept of *security constellation.* A security constellation is constituted by four levels of analysis that influence and limit a RSC, namely:

(a) the *domestic* level, looking at the vulnerability of states and what security threats they fear the most –I will return to this point in section 3.3 in this chapter–;

(b) the *regional* level, state-to-state relations which generate the region as such;

(c) the *interregional* level, the region's interaction with neighboring regions; this could be important if there are changes in the patterns of interdependence; and

[12] As Neumann (2003: 161) has noticed, "*the existence of regions is preceded by the existence of region-builders. They are political actors who, as part of some political project, see it in their interest to imagine a certain spatial and chronological identity for a region and to disseminate this imagination to a maximum number of other people.*"

(d) the *global* level, the role of global powers in the region and the interplay between the global and regional security structures.

After developing the security constellation from its four levels of analysis, the RSC can be built. RSCs are durable substructures with an important geographical component[13], and "*they have both internal structures and external boundaries*"[14] (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 53). The essential structure of a RSC embodies four variables:

(a) *boundary*, which differentiates the RSC from its neighbors;

(b) *anarchic structure*, which means that the RSC must be composed of two or more autonomous units;

(c) *polarity*, which covers the distribution of power among the units; and

(d) *social construction*, which covers the patterns of amity and enmity among the units.

These four elements illustrate the organization and uniqueness of a RSC. Empirically, in order to trace a RSC, one needs also to look at the patterns of security connectedness in three steps (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 73). Firstly, one needs to consider whether issues are being securitized successfully and if so, by which actors. Secondly, one must track the links and interactions from this instance and determine how the security action in this case impinges on the security of others, and "*where does this echo significantly?*" (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 73). Finally, when there is interaction and the security of one affects the security of the others, these

[13] Even when Buzan and Wæver refer to the RSC as "*substructures with an important geographical component*" (2003: 53. Cf. Also Buzan, 2009 [1991]: 164), and consider that a RSC exists when it fulfills its analytical criteria; Neumann (2003: 166) considers that the Copenhagen School does not contribute with a definition of region.

[14] The external structure and the external boundaries of a particular RSC may be used to monitor its own change or continuity. In this sense, the Copenhagen School sees that from its configuration at any given snapshot in time, there are three possible evolutions open to a RSC: (a) maintenance of the *status quo*, which means that there are no significant changes in its essential structure; (b) internal transformation, which means that changes in essential structure occur within the context of its existing outer boundary, which could mean changes to the anarchic structure, polarity or patterns amity/enmity; and (c) external transformation, which means that the outer boundary expands or contracts, changing the membership of the RSC and, most probably, transforming its essential structure in other ways (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 53). These possible scenarios of change and/or transformation of a RSC turn the RSCT into a predictive tool for the researcher. In this dissertation, however, we will disregard it for two main reasons. The first one is that in Social Sciences, including IR, predictive tools like the scenario-building has been viewed with a great deal of skepticism and resistance (cf. Neumann and Øverland, 2004). The second reason is that our object of analysis is the Argentinian Republic rather that the South American region –which we will make reference to for being the RSC or security environment of Argentina–.

interactions can be collected as a cluster of interconnected security concerns, thus having a RSC.

4.2. Types of RSC

It is possible for the RSCT to identify various types of RSC according to their structure. The Copenhagen School, before *Regions and Power* (2003), analyzed the variations in polarity and amity/enmity dynamics, ranging from *conflict formation* through *security regime* to *security community*[15] (cf. Buzan, 1991; Buzan, 2009 [1991]: 157-188). The whole spectrum of possible types of RSC, however, remained unexplored. In *Regions and Power* (2003), finally, Buzan and Wæver provide a detailed classification of different types of RSCs.

The first distinction drawn by Buzan and Wæver (2003: 55) is between *standard* and *centred* RSCs. A standard RSC is characterised by: (a) having an anarchic structure; (b) polarity defined by regional powers and varying from unipolar to multipolar (unipolarity means that the region contains only one regional power); (c) not having a global level power (and therefore in such regions, clear distinctions can be traced between inside, regional level dynamics, and outside, intervening, global

[15] In *Regions and Power* (2003), Buzan and Wæver suggest that *conflict formation*, *security regime* and *security community* are concepts that coincide with the three anarchic cultures of Wendt (1992; 1999). In 1992, *International Organization* published an article with unusual repercussions in the field of IR: *Anarchy Is What States Make of It* (1992). The starting point of the author, Alexander Wendt, was the realists' definition of anarchy as a self-help system, meaning that each state must take the appropriate steps to ensure their own survival in the anarchical international system (Schmidt, 2008: 11) because both central authority and collective security are absent. For realists, anarchy is defined in structural terms, which means that "*self-help is not seen as an 'institution'*" (1992: 392), but a social construction. Wendt, on the other hand, considers that self-help is an institution and not an essential feature of anarchy, "*because anarchy is what states make of it*" (1992: 395). In other words, anarchy is "*the absence of centralized authority*" (Wendt, 1999: 246-247), and what the states make with it will be the product of a process of social construction. This leads Wendt to assert that anarchy can have at least three kinds of structure, depending on the types of roles that dominate the system, such as those of enemy, rival, and friend. These correspond to three types of structure: Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian (Wendt, 1999: 247). In the Hobbesian culture, the other is an enemy. The exercise of violence is without limits, the mistrust among actors exists, and there is a perpetual war of all against all (*conflict formation* in the formulation of Buzan and Wæver). In the Lockean culture (*security regime* to Buzan and Wæver), the other is seen as a rival. The exercise of violence is limited by an acceptance of the other actors' right to live: *kill or be killed* in Hobbesian culture is replaced by *live and let live* (1999: 257). Sovereignty is thus recognized not only as a property of individual states, but an institution shared by many states. In the Kantian culture, finally, the other is a friend and disputes are settled without recurring to violence, and common action is possible. In the RSCT, the latter would be equivalent to the *security community*, "*marked by processes of desecuritization,* (…) [since] *actors stop treating each other as security problems and start behaving as friends*" (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 56). To expand on this issue cf. also Cutler, 1991.

level ones); (d) being in terms of amity and enmity, conflict formations, security regimes, or security communities, in which the region is defined by a pattern of rivalries, balances, alliances, and/or concerts and friendships.

The *centered* RSCs, in turn, may potentially adopt three forms and "*what links these three types of centered RSC together is the idea that the security dynamics of a region is dominated from a centre located within it*" (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 59). The first two forms are special cases in which a RSC is unipolar, but the superpower in question is not a regional power, but a great power (for example, Russia in the Commonwealth of Independent States –CIS–), or a superpower (for example, the US in North America). "*The expectation in these cases is that the global level power will dominate the region (unipolarity), and that what would otherwise count as regional powers (Ukraine, Canada, Mexico) will not have sufficient relative weight to define another regional pole*" (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 55). The third form of centered RSC involves a region constituted by institutions rather than a single power. A clear example of this type of RSC is the European Union (EU), which is in a middle position between a security community and a great power at the global level.

Once the distinction between standard and centered RSCs was drawn, Buzan and Wæver set themselves to identify those types of RSCs that do not fit in any one of the two categories mentioned.

> *These cases arise from having a number of global level powers scattered throughout the system. The more such powers there are in a system, the less room there will be for standard RSCs; the fewer, the more room. Having great powers scattered through the international system creates two possibilities other than centred complexes: great power regional security complexes, and supercomplexes*. (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 59)

In a great power RSC, the polarity of the region is defined by a global level power (throughout history this has been the case of Europe but now it could be illustrated by East Asia, where China and Japan make up the heart of a bipolar great power RSC). The characteristics of these types of RSC are: (a) the internal dynamics of the RSC affect the balance at the global level due to the fact that this type of RSCs is an hybrid of global and regional levels -this does not take place with a standard RSC-; (b) a major spillover effect into adjacent RSCs is expected since great powers are involved; and (c) it is possible to analyze them in terms of polarity, amity/enmity and boundaries, as in the case of a standard RSC. The supercomplexes, lastly, consist of

two or more great powers characterised by a strong interregional level of security dynamics arising from great power spillover into adjacent regions.

Finally, Buzan and Wæver (2009: 62-64) also explore the possibility of the lack of a RSC caused by the local actors failing at the moment to generate their own patterns of interdependence in matters of security. Regarding this situation, there exist two explanatory conditions for the absence of a RSC: *overlay* and *unstructured*.

> ***Overlay*** *is when great power interests transcend mere penetration, and come to dominate a region so heavily that the local pattern of security relations virtually ceases to operate. (...)* ***Unstructured security regions*** *occur for either or both of two reasons: first, where local states have such low capability that their power does not project much, if at all, beyond their own boundaries; and, second, where geographical insulation makes interaction difficult (for example, islands separated by large expanses of ocean). (...) In the case of overlay, the security region is defined by outside powers. In the case of unstructured regions, it is defined in part by the absence of regional dynamics.* (Buzan and Wæver, 2009: 62-63) [Emphasis added]

In the unstructured regions, though, the necessary security interactions may emerge in order to form a RSC. In such a case, the unstructured regions may be seen as "*RSCs in the making*" (Buzan and Wæver, 2009: 64), and they adopt two forms: *pre-complexes* and *proto-complexes.*

> *We will talk of* ***pre-complexes*** *when a set of bilateral security relations seems to have the potential to bind together into an RSC, but has not yet achieved sufficient cross-linkage among the units to do so. The Horn of Africa is a good example. And we will talk of* ***proto-complexes*** *when there is sufficient manifest security interdependence to delineate a region and differentiate it from its neighbours, but when the regional dynamics are still too thin and weak to think of the region as a fully-fledged RSC. West Africa is the clearest example of this condition.* (Buzan and Wæver, 2009: 64) [Emphasis added]

Buzan and Wæver (2003: 51-52), then, explore the existence of subcomplexes:

> *Subcomplexes have essentially the same definition as RSCs, the difference being that a subcomplex is firmly embedded within a larger RSC. Subcomplexes represent* ***distinctive patterns of security interdependence that are nonetheless caught up in a wider pattern that defines the RSC as a whole****. (...) Subcomplexes are not a necessary feature of RSCs, but they are not uncommon either, especially where the number of states in an RSC is relatively large.* [Emphasis added]

TABLE 1: Summary of Types of RSCs

Type	Key features	Example(s)
Standard	Polarity determined by regional powers	Middle East, South America, Southeast Asia, Horn of Africa, Southern Africa
Centered		
Superpower	Unipolar centered on a superpower	North America
Great power	Unipolar centered on a great power	CIS, potentially South Asia
Institutional	Region acquires actor quality through institutions	EU
Great power	Bipolar or multipolar with great powers as the regional poles	Pre-1945 Europe and East Asia
Supercomplexes	Strong interregional level of security dynamics arising from great power spillover into adjacent regions	East and South Asia

Source: Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 62.

4.3. The Domestic Level of Analysis: the Nature of States

In order to create a security constellation, as I have pointed out in previous pages, it is necessary to consider the four levels of analysis: the domestic level, the regional level, the interregional level and the global level. As regards the first level of analysis, the domestic level, Buzan and Wæver (2009: 51) suggest that the vulnerabilities of a certain state should be identified by answering the following question: "*is the state strong or weak due to stability of the domestic order and correspondence between state and nation?*" In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to first delineate some ideas as, for instance, the concept of state.

In his doctoral dissertation, Isuani (1979) wisely suggested that it is possible to find three basic notions of state within the literature on Political Theory: (a) the state as an association or community, including a government institution –as it was seen by contract theorists such as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau as well as Weber–; (b) the state as a dimension of society, which includes or opposes other social dimensions –Hegel being the main advocate of this tradition–; and (c) the state as an apparatus for the government, the administration and coercion –this point of view is supported by the

classical Marxism–. Buzan (2009 [1991]: 66), in turn, has indicated that the concept of state has been dominated by two tendencies: (a) the accent has fallen on the domestic dimension of the state over its international dimension; and (b) a distinction has been drawn between the concepts of *state* and *society* and they have been set apart –this issue has resulted in a definition of state that highlights its political-institutional component–. On that subject, consider the following definitions:

> *(…) the state* –Max Weber (1969: 43) argues– *is to be seen as a political institution in constant activity, when and to the extent that its administrative framework successfully keeps the claim to the legitimate monopoly of the physical compulsion for the maintenance of the current order.* [Emphasis added]

Joel Migdal (1988: 19) defines state as:

> *(…)* [a]*n organization,* ***composed of numerous agencies led and coordinated by the state's leadership (executive authority)*** *that has the ability or authority to make and implement the binding rules for all the people as well as the parameters of rule-making for other social organizations in a given territory, using force if necessary to have its way.* [Emphasis added]

In his classical work *Historical Postulations of the Current State*, Hermann Heller (1947: 142) delineates the notion of state as:

> ***a domination unit****, independent in the exterior and the interior, which acts in a constant way with means of power of its own and clearly limited in the personal and territorial aspects.* [Emphasis added]

The realist school of the IR, in turn, has insisted on defining the state from a political-territorial dimension –approach that results considerably restrictive (cf. Jarvis, 1989: 281-282 on the topic)–. Buzan (2009 [1991]: 67) recognizes that definitions such as the ones mentioned above –which highlight the political-institutional character of the state and its domestic dimension– are not adequate to conduct an analysis from a security perspective. For the purposes of security analysis, in contrast, Buzan (2009 [1991]: 67) suggests that:

> *state has to be conceptualized broadly enough to encompass not only the relationship between the internal dynamics of individual territory-government-society packages, but also the larger systemic dynamics of the way in which these packages relate to each other. (…)* [Also], *security analysis requires a view that places state and system into a mutually constitutive relationship. States are partly self-constructed, from their own internal dynamics, and partly products of the competitive and sometimes fierce anarchic environment. The domestic and the international dynamics are both essential to security analysis.*

On this basis, Buzan defines state as a "*complex socio-political sovereign entity that includes a territory, governing institutions, and a population*" (Dreyfus, 2002: 35). In the author's words (Figure 1),

> [states] *must have a* ***physical base of population and territory****; they must have* ***institutions*** *of some sort which govern the physical base; and there must be some* ***idea of the state*** *which establishes its legitimacy in the minds of its people. These three features alone, however, do not add up to statehood. (...) The additional factors which make states a distinctive group of entities are size and sovereignty.* (Buzan, 2009 [1991]: 71) [Emphasis added]

FIGURE 1: The Component Parts of the State According to Barry Buzan



Source: Buzan, 2009 [1991]: 71.

In Buzan's definition, the *physical base* of the state simply exists, and its *institutional expression* can be easily identified as from the machinery of government, including the executive, legislative, administrative and judicial bodies, and the laws, procedures and norms by which they operate. The *idea of the state*, however, is the most abstract component of the model, since "*the two main sources for the idea of the state are to be found in the* ***nation*** *and in organizing ideologies.*" (Buzan, 2009 [1991]: 74) [Emphasis added]

By defining nation as a "*large group of people sharing the same cultural, and possibly the same ethnic or racial heritage*" (Buzan, 2009 [1991]: 74), Buzan proposes that, in the same way in which the idea of sovereignty supports the international anarchic system, the idea of nation legitimizes the existence of a state and turns it into

a referent object of security, as from the extended term *National Security*[16]. In a pure state-nation model, therefore, the nation would precede the state and constitute itself as the founding element. Evidence suggests, however, that the relationship between states and nations is a complex one, and that the nation is not always the referent object of security.

Buzan (2009 [1991]: 76-83), identifies four possible models or ideal types of state-nation: (a) the *nation-state*, a bottom-up model in which the nation precedes the state and plays a major role in giving rise to it (and provides the state with both a strong identity and a base of solid legitimacy, as it is the case with Italy or Japan); (b) the *state-nation*, a top-down model in which the state plays an instrumental role in creating the nation or in absorbing/subordinating indigenous nations (the best examples of this model are Latin American countries); (c) the *part nation-state*, consisting in a nation that has been divided up among two or more states (Koreans separated into two countries is an example of this); and (d) the *multination-state*, which comprises those states that contain two or more nations within their boundaries. Two sub-types of this model are the *federative state* (states which contain two or more nations without trying to impose an artificial state-nation over them, as it may be the case of Russia), and the *imperial states* (states in which one of the nations within the state dominates the state structures to its own advantage, like Tutsis in Burundi).

When combined, the above-mentioned components, namely the *physical base*, the *institutional expression* and the *idea of the state*, result in an open-ended array of combinations around which a state is structured. Because of this diversity, (a) each state has a particular nature, and so security problems differ substantially from state to state; and (b) states can be classified in a spectrum ranging from weak to strong.

This last distinction between weak and strong states is vital to any analysis of regional security, and so Barry Buzan (2009 [1991]: 93) adopted a criterion in order to facilitate the classification of states[17]. This scholar argued that the difference

[16] Buzan acknowledges that the concept *National Security* may bring confusion since its main reference object is not always the nation; rather it applies mainly –and almost exclusively– to the state security (Buzan, 2009 [1991]: 75). On this subject, Buzan dedicates some pages to the discussion of the situations in which the State turns into a threat to its citizens. Cf. Buzan about it, 2009 [1991]: 55-63.

[17] There is an extensive literature to consult about the difference between strong and weak, soft, over-developed, illegitimate, poor, irrelevant, de-rooted, rogue, collapsed or failed states. Rotberg (2002: 87-88) considers that nation-states fail because they can no longer deliver positive political goods to their people (such as security, education, health services, economic opportunities,

between weak and strong states is based on the degree of socio-political cohesion. In trying to apply this variable scientifically, however, Buzan's criterion faces lack of a quantitative measure: no single indicator adequately defines the difference between weak and strong states. In spite of this limitation, Buzan (2009 [1991]: 95) provides a series of conditions that we may expect to find in weak states: (a) high levels of political violence; (b) a conspicuous role for political police in the everyday lives of citizens; (c) major political conflict over what ideology will be adopted to organize the state; (d) lack of a coherent national identity, or the presence of contending national identities within the state; (e) lack of a clear and observed hierarchy of political authority; and (f) a high degree of state control over the media.

According to Buzan's criterion, the weakness condition of South American states would be debatable. If we consider only the socio-political cohesion variable, for example, Argentina may be classified as a strong state –classification that, as I will show further on, is incorrect–. For the purpose of this dissertation, then, it was necessary to develop other indicators that may account for the weaknesses or strengths of a particular state. In such a pursuit, I have come across Pablo Dreyfus's work (2002; 2009).

By taking the socio-political criterion[18] from Buzan, but complementing it with the proposal by Mohammed Ayoob[19] (1995; 1997) and Edward Azar and Chung-In

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environmental surveillance, a legal framework of order and a judicial system to administer it, and fundamental infrastructural requirements such as roads and communications facilities). Eizenstat, Porter and Weinstein (2005: 136-139), in turn, believe that the weakness of a state can be measured according to three critical functions: security (by maintaining a monopoly on the use of force), the provision of basic services, and protection of essential civil freedoms. Osaghae (2007: 692-693), who focuses his attention on the African states and argues that it is possible to trace through history those conditions that turn a state weak, claims that weak states are characterized by one or more of the following: (a) weak, ineffective and unstable political institutions and bad governance, conducive to loss of state autonomy, informalization, privatization of state, personal and exclusionary rule, neo-patrimonialism and prebendal politics; (b) inability to exercise effective jurisdiction over its territory, leading to the recent concept of *ungoverned territories*; (c) legitimacy crises, occasioned by problematic national cohesion, contested citizenship, violent contestation for state power, perennial challenges to the validity and viability of the state, and massive loss and exit of citizens through internal displacement, refugee flows, separatist agitation, civil war and the like; (d) unstable and divided population, suffering from a torn social fabric, minimum social control, and pervasive strife that encourages exit from rather than loyalty to the state; (e) underdeveloped institutions of conflict management and resolution, including credible judicial structures, which pave the way for resorting to conflict-ridden, violent, non-systemic and extra-constitutional ways in which to articulate grievances and seek redress; and (f) pervasive corruption, poverty, and low levels of economic growth and development, leading to lack of fiscal capacity to discharge basic functions of statehood, including, most importantly, obligations to citizens such as protection from diseases like AIDS and guarantees of overall human security.

[18] Notice that Buzan (2009 [1991]: 93) considers that while the socio-political criterion is used to strike a difference between strong and weak states, the military and economic indicators are used to

Moon[20] (1988), Pablo Dreyfus (2002: 46-53; 2009: 176-178) distinguishes strong states from weak states in South America on the basis of four variables, some of them with clearly quantitative indicators: socio-political cohesion; policy capacity; socioeconomic development and territorial centrality. The four variables, elaborated on below, will be used in this dissertation in order to classify –as strong or weak– the South American states.

4.3.1. Socio-political Cohesion (Legitimacy and Integration)

Socio-political cohesion[21] will be defined based on two dimensions: (a) the legitimacy[22] of the idea of the state, taken as the identification of a particular population with its state-nation; the acceptance of the institutional legitimacy of its

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classify weak and strong powers. The distinction is not a minor one since strong powers such as North Korea or Pakistan are weak states, and weak powers such as the Netherlands, Sweden or Denmark, are all strong states. Handel (1981: 52) does not establish such a distinction; he incorporates military and economic indicators to classify weak and strong states. In this dissertation, I will adopt the distinction as it was suggested by Buzan.

[19] Ayoob (1995: 11; 1997: 131) suggests that the security issue in the states of the Third World is related to their key interest in building legitimate and believable political apparatus. According to Ayoob, the existence of insufficient levels of stateness in postcolonial contexts –defining stateness as a balanced combination of prohibitive capacities, infrastructural power and legitimacy–, is decisive for the securitization strategies of the political elites that work based on the reduction of the vulnerability of the states but, particularly, of the government. Such insecurity is a product of "*(…) the lack of unconditional legitimacy for state boundaries, state institutions, and regimes; inadequate societal cohesion; and the absence of societal consensus on fundamental issues of social, economic, and political organization.*" (Ayoob, 1995: 28).

[20] Azar and Moon (1988) focus on what they call the *software side* of the security problematic in the Third World as opposed to the traditional Western and hard analysis of security, and they operationalize that concept by disaggregating it into three primary components: legitimacy, integration and policy capacity. Third World states, in turn, are dependent upon the different ways in which three dimensions of state security –threats (security environment), hardware (capabilities) and software– interact in the case of particular states. Cf. on this point Azar and Moon, 1988; Ayoob, 1991: 258-259.

[21] Recent studies have aimed at elaborating accurate concepts, reference frameworks and indicators to measure the social cohesion in Latin America. On the subject, cf. United Nations, 2010.

[22] The legitimacy of the political regime will be defined here in the Weberian sense of the existence of a legitimate order when the ruled believe that the rulers have the right to rule (Dreyfus, 2002: 47). In accordance with this idea, Levi (2005: 852) defines the term legitimacy as "*the attribute of the state that consists in the existence, in a relevant part of the population, of a degree of consensus that secures* ***obedience without the necessity –except in minor cases– of resorting to force.*** *Consequently,* ***every power attempts to obtain consensus in order to be recognized as legitimate by turning obedience into adherence."*** [Emphasis added]. Monedero (2009) states that "*(…) talking about legitimacy implies wondering about the reasons of the citizenship to obey the power. The legitimacy of an existing power is declared comparatively with the assistance of a non-existing touchstone, that is to say, in relation to the* ***contents of the policy taken as legitimate by the individuals that manifest their agreement or disagreement as regards those in charge****. These contents constitute a collection of ideas whose common feature is their capacity to be applied to all the members of a community, whether in the form of rights or as manners and customs"* [Emphasis added].

central government[23], and the acknowledgement of that government; and (b) the fragmentation/ integration of a society in ethnic, social or political terms.

4.3.2. Policy Capacity

Policy Capacity "*refers to the effective capability of the government of a state to implement policies and extract resources from society (i.e. taxation) with this goal in mind*" (Dreyfus, 2002: 48). Mann (1986: 113) has called this capacity *infrastructural power*[24], and has defined it as "*the capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm*". According to this criterion, therefore, a strong state would be a state that has the "*capability to extract, penetrate, regulate, and appropriate resources from society*" (Migdal, 1988: 15). On this regard, as Dreyfus (2002: 48) has noted, this variable is strongly linked to the degree of legitimacy held by the state and the obedience of the population to the established government: "*A state with a weak policy capacity will be less able to implement policies to assure the security of the population and the territory.*"

An indicator to consider when evaluating the policy capacity of a state is corruption[25], given that it weakens the extractive capacity of the state apparatus and,

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[23] As Pablo Dreyfus (2002: 48) has noted, "*the vacuum left by the absence of broadly accepted and respected institutions could promote the replacement of the state by codes and practices of criminal groups or insurgent organizations. In that sense the population could follow and obey para-state authorities and legal systems imposed by non-state actors that challenge the state in terms of the use of armed force and the control of territory and population. Also the absence of legitimate and representative institutions could favors and even justify the emergence of insurgent groups that may attempt to change the political system. This could be certainly reinforced under a situation of massive social exclusion and deep social differences. Also a fragmented society along ethnic divisions can be, in the absence of strong and unifying political institutions, a cause for civil war and state disintegration.*"

[24] Mann (1986: 113) faced with the concept *infrastructural power*, puts forward the *despotic power,* defined as "*the range of actions which the elite is empowered to undertake without routine, institutionalized negotiation with civil society groups.*" It is important to highlight that Mann regards the infrastructural power also as an attribute of the state elites.

[25] The Argentinian scholar Ernesto Garzón Valdés (1995) has wisely pointed out that corruption has been traditionally defined from two perspectives: morality and modernization. While the former tends to establish a relationship between compulsion and corruption or rather to consider that every case of corruption is morally reprehensible; the latter sees corruption as a phenomenon characteristic of underdeveloped political regimes, that is to say, the greater the degree of development or modernization of a political society, the lesser the degree of corruption to be found. In this dissertation we consider that corruption is endemic to all governments (Friedrich, 1963: 167) and not an exclusive phenomenon of weak, soft, over-developed, illegitimate, poor, irrelevant, de-rooted, rogue, collapsed or failed states.

consequently, makes the implementation of public policies difficult. In this dissertation, we consider that:

> *Corruption is behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence. This includes such behavior as bribery (use of reward to pervert the judgment of a person in a position of trust); nepotism (bestowal of patronage by reason of ascriptive relationship rather than merit); and misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public resource of private-regarding uses).* (Nye, 1967: 419)

4.3.3. Socioeconomic Development

Socioeconomic development "*is defined in terms of the living standards of the population, the capacity of insertion of the economy in the international market, as well as the characteristics of the productive sectors of the country*" (Dreyfus, 2002: 49). A low socioeconomic development will be associated with dependency and underdevelopment. I identify *dependency* as:

> *a form of domination that reveals itself by a series of characteristics regarding the way of acting and the orientation of the groups that appear as producers or consumers in the economic system. This situation implies, in extreme instances, that* ***the decisions affecting the production or consumption of a given economy are taken bearing in mind the dynamics and the interests of the developed economies****.* (Cardoso and Faletto, 1977: 12) [Emphasis added]

In line with this idea, I see the term *underdevelopment* as

> *the structure of a kind of economic system with a prevalence of the primary sector, strong concentration of the rent, little differentiation in the productive system and, mainly, a predominance of the foreign market over the local one.* (Cardoso and Faletto, 1977: 12)

Weak socioeconomic development will strongly condition the policy capacity of a state. In this sense, Buzan (2009 [1991]: 94) notes the following:

> *Weak states may find themselves trapped by historical patterns of economic development and political power which leave them underdeveloped and politically penetrated, and* ***therefore unable to muster the economic and political resources necessary to build a stronger state****. The relationship between Latin American states and the United States is often characterized in these terms.* [Emphasis added]

4.3.4. Territorial Centrality

Territorial centrality refers to the monopoly of physical compulsion by a government over the territorial base of a state, as well as "*the functional presence and control over the entire territory and population without being matched by non-state groups*"[26] (Dreyfus, 2002: 49). As defined by Mann (1986: 110),

> ***centrality**, in the sense that political relations radiate outwards from a center to cover a **territorially demarcated area**, over which it exercises a monopoly of **authoritative binding rule-making**, backed up by a monopoly of the means of physical violence.* [Emphasis in the original]

If we take the four variables together, therefore, a weak state will feature low socio-political cohesion, low political capacity, low socioeconomic development and low territorial centrality. A strong state, in contrast, will be identified by high socio-political cohesion, high political capacity, high socioeconomic development and high territorial centrality (Figure 2). Nevertheless, in the weak-strong states continuum there are multiple possible combinations. On the subject, take the following examples: (a) a state that features low values in three out of the four given variables will be weaker than a state that shows weakness in two variables; (b) a state whose socio-political cohesion is seen as socially and ethnically fragmented will be taken as weaker than a state that is fragmented only in social terms; (c) a state with absent or intermittent functional and institutional presence in part of its territorial base will be stronger than a state that not only exhibits absent or intermittent functional and institutional presence in its territorial base but also has to deal with groups working from outside the state challenging its authority.

When operationalizing the variables, Dreyfus (2002: 50) encounters the same difficulty as Buzan does (2009 [1991]: 95). It is hard –if not impossible– to determine quantitative indicators that account for the weaknesses or strengths of a state. In an effort to overcome this problem, Dreyfus identifies several indicators in order to elaborate two polar types: the weak state and the strong state (states can be closer to one or another pole depending on the number of indicators they accumulate). The indicators of each variable are listed in Table 2 bellow.

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[26] As Mann (1986: 110) points out, the state may be defined from two levels of analysis: the institutional and the functional levels; whereas the former describes the institutional composition of the state, the latter analyses it from the point of view of what it does or ceases to do, that is to say, its functions. Notice in this sense that Dreyfus's definition aims at analyzing the territorial centrality from the functional analysis level.

FIGURE 2: Weak and Strong States



Source: Dreyfus, 2009: 178.

TABLE 2: Nature of the State. Polar Types of Weak and Strong States

Variable	Weak State	Strong State
Sociopolitical Cohesion	***Low***	***High***
	A. Political Legitimacy * Incomplete Nation Building * *Web-like societies* (*) * Strong loyalties to communal, ethnic and religious groups * High levels of political violence * Major recent changes in the structure of political institutions * Conspicuous use of force by the state in domestic political life * Conspicuous role of political police in everyday life of citizens * Major political conflict over what ideology will be used to organize the state * High degree of control over the media **B. Fragmented Societies** * Presence of contending national identities within the state * Coexistence of several ethnic, religious and linguistic groups within a state * Highly unequal distribution of wealth	**A. Political Legitimacy** * Complete Nation Building * Pyramidal societies (*) * Common shared loyalty to the nation-state. * Low levels of political violence * Stable and long lasting political institutions * Rare or nonexistent use of force by the state in domestic political life * Rare or nonexistent role of political police in everyday life of citizens * Absence of ideological polarization and major political conflict * No control over the media **B. Integrated Societies** * Coherent national identity and absence of contending national identities within the state * Absence of substantial, ethnic, religious and linguistic differences within a state. * Even distribution of wealth
Policy Capacity	***Low***	***High***
	* Rigid Policy Capacity * Inefficient state apparatus * High level of political corruption	* Flexible Policy Capacity * Efficient state apparatus * Low level of political corruption
Socioeconomic Development	***Low***	***High***
	* Low level of *per capita* income * Low level of productivity * No access to major markets * Dependence on foreign capital flows * Dependence on export earnings * Unequal distribution of incomes	* High level of industrialization * High level of per capita income * High level of productivity *Access to major markets * Local conditions for the reproduction of capital * Large domestic markets * Equality in the distribution of incomes
Territorial Centrality	***Low***	***High***
	* Strong presence of the state in frontier and areas outside major cities. * Absence of strong non-state organized armed groups	* Weak presence of the state in frontier zones and areas outside the major cities. * Strong non-state organized armed groups

Source: Dreyfus, 2002: 52; 2009: 177.

Note: (*) The concept *Web-like Societies* is used here to refer to countries where there are autonomous communal groups and authorities which compete with the authority of the state in the sense that there is a parallel network of institutions whose legitimacy is stronger than the legitimacy of the state's institutions and symbols. The concept draws on Joel Migdal (1988: 33, 37), who describes this kind of situation in the following terms: "*The ineffectiveness of state leaders who have faced impenetrable barriers to state predominance has stemmed from the nature of the societies they have confronted, from the resistance posed by chiefs, landlords, bosses, rich peasants, clan leaders, za'im, effendis, aghas, caciques, kulaks (for convenience, 'strongmen') through their various social organizations*" and also "*Web-like societies host a mélange of fairly autonomous social organizations*." The term *Web-like Societies* is opposed to *Pyramidal Societies* understood as societies in which the central authority of the state is recognized and is not in competition with any other form of authority.

5. Methodology

The epistemic design proposed by Buzan and Wæver results deeply valuable. These scholars have provided the key theoretical categories of a great part of the conceptual apparatus of this dissertation. Although in his early writings Buzan (2009 [1991]: 2-6) adopted a highly objectivist matrix of analysis, in his first book published in partnership with Wæver (1998: 204), they described themselves as "*radicalist constructivist*". In *Regions and Power* (2003), finally, they favored a compromising attitude by combining the strongly constructivist element of his securitization approach with the development in detail of the RSCT and a more traditional (geo)political analysis (Figure 3).

For the purpose of this dissertation, I adopt the objectivist/constructivist approach elaborated in *Regions and Power* (2003), which has inexorable methodological implications. This doctoral dissertation will be divided in two important sections: in the first section –Ch. III, IV and the first part of the V– I will use a more traditional geopolitical and political approach, highlighting the regional dynamics of the CCC; the power distribution within the South American region; the role of extra-regional superpowers in South America, and the rest of dimensions of the RSCT. In the second section –parts of Ch. IV and V– I will apply discourse analysis, which will allow me to determine which issues have been identified and accepted as security threats to South America and Argentina.

FIGURE 3: Epistemological Design of the Copenhagen School



Source: Personal formulation of Figure 9.1 by Buzan and Wæver (1998: 205).
Notes: **a.** Buzan's epistemological stance in his writing from 1991; 1993; 1995; 1997; 2009 [1991]; **b.** Epistemological stance taken by Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde in their writings from 1997 and 1998; **c.** Buzan and Wæver's epistemological stance in *Regions and Powers* (2003).

5.1. Political Analysis

When Buzan and Wæver (1998: 177) assert that discourse analysis is not the exclusive method of securitization studies and that it would be desirable to complement it with a "*more traditional political analysis*", the question that may arise is: what are the implications of a more traditional political analysis?

Errejón Galván (2011: 2) considers political analysis as

> *the understanding of concrete political situations (not only as regards change, but also in stability), that result from a certain* ***correlation of forces between diverse actors****, and from the sedimentation of shared meanings that order in one way and not in another* ***the perception of actors, their alignments and, in sum, the political field.*** *In this fashion, the main object of study of the political analysis is the political power, taken not as an object that may be owned completely but as a relationship of uneven distribution, ultimately unstable, subject to tension, contradictions and change.*[27] [Emphasis added]

Within the limits of this dissertation, the correlation of forces between diverse actors, the sedimentation of shared meanings and their perceptions –securitization processes–, as well as other dimensions, will be addressed from the conceptual apparatus of the RSCT.

[27] My own translation.

Firstly, I will look at the current political situation in South America, that is, the internal situation of each actor, patterns of amity and enmity, interregional relations and superpower influence. In order to determine the situation of the RSC regarding the four levels of analysis (domestic, regional, interregional and global), the questions that need to be raised include: (a) Are we in the presence of strong or weak states? (b) Are some of the dimensions of the CCC included in the security agenda of the region? (c) Are we in the presence of state-to-state relations based on interdependence or relations based on amity/enmity dynamics? (d) What is the level of interregional dialogue? (e) What is the role of the US in the region? Answering these questions will give us an overview of the South American RSC.

The distinction between weak and strong states, as referred to in section 3.3, will be carried out on the basis of the four variables of analysis discussed above: sociopolitical cohesion, policy capacity, socioeconomic development and territorial centrality. Table 2 shows the indicators to be used with each variable. On this regard, it is necessary to clarify that not all the indicators of the nature of the state will be analyzed in detail in this doctoral dissertation. The focus will be put on those considered the most relevant in order to explain the rise and consolidation of the CCC in South America. In this regard, the classification of Argentina will be analyzed in greater detail in Ch. V, which will also include elements related to the economic, political and social circumstances that may explain changes and continuities in the CCC in the last decade.

The analysis of the regional security agenda (in other words, the aspects of the CCC that have been securitized by the countries of the region) will be carried out on the basis of discourse analysis –see section 4.2 in this chapter–. I will combine primary sources (official documents, speeches, memos, cables, and newspaper declarations) and secondary sources (declarations in documentaries, memoirs, newspaper articles and archive materials) as sources of data. It is important to highlight that the collection of primary and secondary sources has followed a regional criterion; that is, I have not gather official documents, speeches, memos, cables, and declarations delivered, for example, in national Parliaments, but rather in international organisms such UNASUR, OAS, CAN and MERCOSUR.

As regards state-to-state relations, as Vieira has noted (2009: 57), "*state to state relations present their own challenges, and can have a strong influence on regional*

security perceptions." As such, we must determine if state to state relations are now built on partnership or confrontation. State to state relations can be measured by policy actions, and the intensity of relations can be judged by indicators including the number of treaties, ministerial or other bilateral/multilateral meetings and joint exercises or peacekeeping missions.

In the case of interregional relations, some of the elements mentioned earlier have been used here. The relation among regions, cooperative or conflictive in nature, has been determined from the analysis of joint political and economic actions, signed agreements, declarations of intention, ministerial meetings, etc. In this dissertation, I analyze the interregional relations between South American RSC and North American RSC, and, due to the recent role of the EU in South America, between the South American RSC and the European RSC.

Finally and in order to account for the global dimension of the RSC, I analyze the role of the United States in the region. At this point, specifically, the *War on Drugs* is explicitly mentioned as regards its historical development and the evolution of the political relations between South America and the United States in the decade 2001-2010.

5.2. Discourse Analysis

In the first part of this chapter, I have pointed out that, from a constructivist perspective, security is not anymore about a real threat; "*security issues are made security issues by acts of securitization*" (Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde, 1998: 204), namely, discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat to a referent object and the audience accepts it as such. In this sense, and in order to determine if an issue has been securitized, I will follow the rhetorical structure laid out in section 2.1. Three other key issues, however, still need to be considered: (a) the choice of unit/s of analysis; (b) the choice of method; and (c) the choice of material and sources.

The chosen unit of analysis is undoubtedly the Argentinian Republic. Although a number of connections are inevitably established with South America, the focus of my analysis remains on Argentina. After describing and analyzing –from a more traditional (geo)political perspective– the objective changes that went through in the

security environment of Argentina, the key purpose will be to identify the aspect/s of the CCC that the Argentinean political elites have articulated as being a threat to the security of the nation at the turn of the century.

In methodological terms, the conceptual apparatus of the RSCT used in Ch. III and IV, are complemented in Ch. V with discourse analysis. In this fashion,

> [I] *will not use any sophisticated linguistic or quantitative techniques. What follows is discourse analysis simply in the sense that* ***discourse is studied as a subject in its own right, not as an indicator of something else****. By this method we will not find underlying motives, hidden agenda or such. There might be confidential sources that could reveal intentions and tactics, but the purpose of discourse analysis is not to get at something else. (…) The technique is simple: read, looking for arguments that take the rhetorical and logical form defined* [in section 2 and 2.1] *as security.* (Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde, 1998: 176-177) [Emphasis added]

With regards to the number of texts that I analyze, and despite of the fact that it does not exist any methodological guideline to define or limit the relevant texts that should be taken into account, the scope of this study covers a decade of discourses (2001-2010); moreover, I have extended the sources to declarations to the media and television appearances by representatives of the Argentinian political elite during 2011, 2012 and 2013. As regards the number of texts to be analyzed, and the concerns on which the analyst should concentrate on, Buzan, Wilde and Wæver (1997: 178) indicate:

> *It is better to have a limited set of texts and a complete representation of securitization instances than a large set from which the authors pick at liberty. In each document, a search for security arguments is carried out, and each finding is investigated as to its context, the referent object, the threat, and –not least– its connection to other sectors, that is, whether the security nature of the issue is derived from the fact that the source of the threat is already securitized in another sector. If this were a case study of a region, of a security complex, it would have to include several referent objects, their securitizations, and –not least– the interaction among them.* [Emphasis added]

The speeches and shorthand versions of legislative sessions that I analyze in this dissertation have been downloaded from the websites of the Argentinian Honorable Senate, the Argentinian Honorable Chamber of Congressmen, and the Presidency of the Argentinian Nation, among others. In the research process, the following key words have been used: *security*, *drug trafficking*, *cocaine*, *paco*, *CBP* and *drugs*.

5.3. In-Depth Interviews

While gathering bibliography about the CCC in Argentina, I noticed three fundamental issues: (a) there is little academic literature on the subject; (b) there is an almost exclusive predominance of journalistic texts covering the topic; and (c) general agreement as to the tendencies related to the production, trafficking and consumption of CHCL and its derivatives during the decade 2001-2010 does not exist. In Ch. V, therefore, I make use of a methodological tool that may compensate for some of the difficulties mentioned: the in-depth interview.

The in-depth qualitative interview achieves, by means of questions and answers, communication and a cooperative construction of meanings about a topic (Janesick, 1998). With the purpose of promoting dialogue, the design of the interview, therefore, may be structured, semi-structured or open depending on the researcher's decision as regards to using a given set of questions or not.

For the purposes set in Ch. V of this dissertation, I have conducted semi-structured in-depth interviews to public officials, technicians in charge of government equipment and legislators. The interviews lasted an average of 30-45 minutes and were carried out on the basis of a questionnaire which was adapted freely in each interview in order to specify concepts and collect more information on certain topics.

For each interview, I asked the interviewee their name and last name, the organization they work for, their position in the organization, the duration in their term of office and the tasks carried out. Then, I initiated a free conversation with the interviewee on the basis of three questions that served as triggers: (a) If you had to describe the tendencies related to the *production* of coca, coca paste, CBP, CHCL and derivatives in Argentina, what would you emphasize? Do you consider that Argentina has turned into a producer country of coca-cocaine in the last decade?; (b) If you had to describe the tendencies related to the *trafficking* of coca, coca paste, CBP, CHCL and derivatives in Argentina during the decade 2001-2010, what would you emphasize? Do you consider that Argentina has turned into a transit country for coca-cocaine during the last decade?; (c) If you had to describe the tendencies related to the *consumption* of coca, coca paste, CBP, CHCL and derivatives in Argentina during the decade 2001-2010, what would you emphasize? Do you consider that Argentina has turned into a consuming country of coca-cocaine in the last decade?

Given the sensitivity attached to the topic, the conduction of the interviews was not a simple task. I could only complete eight interviews out of the fifteen I had planned. A *narco-scandal* in Córdoba Province (Argentina) in November 2013 and the overexposure by the media at a national level of the drug trafficking concerns, seriously affected my fieldwork. Nevertheless, some of the interviews performed are highly valuable and contribute with novel information regarding the study of the CCC in Argentina.

6. Concluding Remarks

In this chapter: (a) I have reviewed the main academic contributions on the drug, security and securitization concerns, and have highlighted the innovative contributions made by this dissertation; (b) I have developed the Theory of Securitization and the Regional Security Complex Theory in depth, which will allow me, on the one hand, to analyze the regional security complex of Argentina and, on the other, to account for the dimensions of the CCC that have been securitized in the country; and (c) I have referred to the methodological design that I have deemed adequate to conduct my study and the analysis of the data gathered.

In the following chapter, I will define a key concept for this dissertation –coca-cocaine complex (CCC)–, the elements that constitute it will be specified, and a brief history of the International Drug Control Regime (IDCR), which defines the prohibitionist basis of the CCC, will be developed.

CHAPTER II

The Coca-Cocaine Complex

1. Introduction

The terms *industry* and *market* are two economic concepts which are recurrently used in the literature that considers the coca and cocaine hydrochloride problem (Henkel, 1986; Lee, 1988; Andreas and Youngers, 1989; Dreyfus, 2002; Thoumi, 2003; Mejía and Posada, 2010; Thoumi, 2012). From the economic field of knowledge, the production and traffic of cocaine are defined as a dimension of an elephantine illegal industry, whereas the consumption of cocaine is defined as the demand curve of a market that operates from the shadows.

If we analyze it quickly, the economic dimension cannot be separated from the coca-cocaine problem since, among other reasons, (a) the main aim of these organized criminal groups associated to the production, trafficking and consumption of this substance is, directly or indirectly, a financial goal, i.e. attaining material or economic benefits and profits; (b) the coca-cocaine industry creates jobs in poor underdeveloped countries (Lee, 1988: 89); (c) narco-traffickers practice money laundering and channel the money back into legal economic circuits, which somehow boosts a country's economy; (d) the illegal international cocaine trade amounts to billions of US dollars; and, last but not least, (e) the coca-cocaine industry has generated an "*illegitimate economic bourgeoisie*" (Camacho-Guizado, 1981: 98) in South American countries like Colombia and Peru, which has arguably had an important effect in the economies of these countries –as I will show in Ch. IV–.

Analyzing the issue in detail, however, it becomes evident that the economic perspective should not dominate the interpretations of the production, trafficking,

and consumption of coca-cocaine for there are other viewpoints that can help us see the problem as the multifaceted phenomenon it really is.

Samuelson (Samuelson, Nordhaus and Pérez Enrri, 2003: 763) defined industry as a "*group of firms producing similar or identical products.*"[28] According to this definition, in the case of the cocaine industry, the *companies* are coca farmers, traders and cartels, and that it would be an illegal industry since the production and trade of the products (coca and cocaine), as well as the industry behind its supply, is prohibited by a solid legal regime. This concept is in itself right, but it is deficient since it omits a fundamental dimension of the problem: the demand. Incorporating this aspect (demand/consumption) to the equation, we get the idea of the *market*, which, as I argue below, only solves this dilemma partially.

A market is "*an arrangement whereby buyers and sellers interact to determine the prices and quantities of a commodity*"[29] (Samuelson, Nordhaus and Pérez Enrri, 2003: 769). Clearly, this definition includes the coca farmers, traders and cartels but also the consumers (buyers), i.e., the demand. However, here too, this definition appears to be incomplete since there are other actors who do not function as buyers or sellers, but who play a key role in the cocaine industry-market –the states, for instance–.

Despite of being fundamental and necessary, I do not consider that the economic perspective should dominate the formulations regarding the production, trafficking and consumption of drugs. An excellent contribution to think about this issue in broader terms belongs to Griffith (1997) in *Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty under Siege*. In this text, Griffith (1997: 2-3) referred to the "*problem of drugs*" as "*a multidimensional dilemma with four problem areas: production, consumption and abuse, trafficking and money laundering*", and as a "*multifaceted dilemma which owns internal and external ramifications. It involves public and private actors and it affects to all the areas of social existence*". This definition has provided a broader scope to think of the problem of drugs in general moving away from the economic perspective. Nevertheless, and taking into account that the aim of this doctoral dissertation is, fundamentally, to make an academic contribution to the field of Political Science and International Relations, I intend to

[28] My own translation.
[29] My own translation.

develop a broader concept which can help us to analyze the fundamental dimensions not of drugs in general but of one drug in particular (cocaine hydrochloride and its derivatives), thus advancing an alternative viewpoint from which to tackle the issue we are dealing with here.

The South American history of the last decades shows that the socio-political and economic impact that the production, trafficking and consumption of coca, cocaine hydrochloride –CHCL from now onwards in this work– and its derivatives has had on these countries cannot be compared to the problems that other drugs from natural and artificial origin (marijuana and poppy-opium) may have caused. In this respect, consider the following reasons.

First, the core producer of the 100% of coca and CHCL traded at an international level is located in South America, that is to say, Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. Second, unlike marijuana (which can be grown by the final consumer), the coca leaf needs to undergo a chemical process and to have numerous intermediaries to turn into CHCL. Third, it is evident that the criminal groups associated to the production and trafficking of marijuana, for example, have not been as destabilizing as those connected to the production and trafficking of coca-cocaine. Finally, neither the marijuana crops nor the poppy crops have entailed the intervention of extra-regional actors, such as the United States (US) and its *War on Drugs*.

From all this evidence, it would be logical and desirable to approach the study of drugs in South America focusing only on the problems associated to the coca-cocaine, and at the same time, without reducing the scope just to its economic dimension. In this sense, authors such as Lovón Zavala (1993), Tovar Pinzón (1994), Mansilla (1994), Mansilla and Blanes (1994), Thoumi (1995), Rossi (1996) and Osorio Machado (2001), have advanced an idea, which, although being very important, they have omitted to develop: the **Coca-Cocaine Complex** (CCC). In virtue of this theoretical gap, and from the identification of its fundamental dimensions, the actors involved and the conflictive and/or cooperative interaction among them, the CCC can be defined as the **set of actors that in a conflict-cooperation *continuum*, participate proactively or reactively during the illicit instances of production, manufacture, trafficking and/or consumption of the coca leaf crops, coca paste, cocaine base paste, cocaine hydrochloride, by-products and derivatives which contain cocaine alkaloid**.

In the following pages, the elements that constitute this definition will be specified, and a brief history of the International Drug Control Regime (IDCR), which defines the prohibitionist basis of the CCC, will be developed.

2. The International Drug Control Regime (IDCR): The Genesis of Prohibition

In 1994, the World Health Organization (WHO) developed a lexicon with the intention to provide a set of definitions of terms concerning alcohol, tobacco and other drugs. In it, the word drug is defined as a "*term of varied usage*" (WHO, 1994: 34). In Medicine, points out the WHO, "*it refers to any substance with the potential to prevent or cure disease or enhance physical or mental welfare*". In a common usage, however, "*the term often refers specifically to psychoactive drugs, and often even more specifically, to illicit drugs, of which there is non-medical use in addition to any medical use*". For the purpose of this work, I take the second definition, which refers to the double character of drugs such as the CHCL: they are psychoactive and illegal.

It can be considered psychoactive any "*substance that, when ingested, affects mental processes, e.g. cognition or emotion*" (WHO, 1994: 53). The habitual changes registered can be the inhibition of pain, changes in the person's mood and alterations in the levels of perception. The most outstanding characteristic of these types of substances is that they also generate a high level of dependency, which can eventually lead to the withdrawal syndrome in case the consumption is interrupted. The illegal status[30] derives from the fact that these drugs have devastating effects on the physical and mental health of their consumers. This is the reason why the US and some international organizations have created an international control regime to regulate and, in some cases, to prohibit the production, trafficking, selling and consumption of narcotics.

[30] Strictly speaking, it is not the drug that is illicit, but its production, sale or use in particular circumstances in a given jurisdiction (WHO, 1994: 41).

After revising the definitions of *regime* that Keohane and Nye[31], Hass, Hedley and Bull have contributed with, Stephen Krasner (1982: 186) defined it as a

> *set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.*

According to Jack Donnelly (1992: 282), there exists an international regime when the states and other international actors, in order to avoid the consequences of a discordant action, "*agree (more or less explicitly) on normative or procedural constrains to their sovereign freedom of action in an issue-area and, at least in part, conform their behavior to these norms or procedures*". The strength of a regime usually lies in the extension of its powers and the decision-making processes. However, most of the international control regimes have relatively weak procedures in this sense. This last idea is applicable to the IDCR because

> *the norms of the global drug control regime are coherent, well-developed, and widely commended by states and non-states actors alike. Nonetheless, in most cases, the implementation of these norms remains almost entirely in the hands of national, not international, actors. The result is a largely promotional regime*[32] *except in the area of licit manufacture and trade, where there is a strong international implementation subregime.* (Donnelly, 1992: 283)

In fact, and with numerous limitations, the creation of an IDCR has a long history, whose beginning could be traced back to 1909. In February that year, the International Opium Commission met in Shanghai and created the first instrument of International Law regarding the psychoactive substances: the International Opium Convention, which was signed in The Hague in 1912. The Convention was the result of a serious concern for the free trade of drugs, taking place in China, right after the Opium Wars with the British Crown. This provoked an *outbreak* of opium consumption. However, the nature of the Convention was more regulatory than of

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[31] Keohane and Nye (1988: 59-86), in their famous contribution, have tried to explain why international regimes change.

[32] For Donnelly (1992: 283), there exist five types of international regimes: those of *promotion*, which favors the application of international norms through public information mechanisms and optative resolutions; those of *assistance*, which concentrate on providing support for the national application of international norms, usually through economic or technical assistance; those of *enforcement* which put into practice the norms of a regime (through the information exchange systems, public consulting or coordination, supervision, etc.); those of *application*, in which the main role of the states consists in giving binding force to supranational decisions; and those of *declaratory* type, which include international norms but they lack the power to take decisions.

applications of prohibitions (Jelsma, 2011: 2). Even though controls to the free trade regime of certain psychoactive[33] substances were applied, there were no measures to prohibit the growing or consumption of certain drugs such as opium or cocaine[34]. These first steps into drug trade control, however, were interrupted by the outbreak of the First World War.

From 1914 till the end of 1919, when finally the Hague Opium Convention came into general application, certain countries adopted domestic measures to fight against the trafficking and possession of illegal substances like opium or cocaine. However, not all of them did[35], and this made it evident that "*the laxity* [of controls] *in one jurisdiction imperiled the efficacy of legislation elsewhere. The dilemma highlighted the international dimensions of the drug control equation*" (McAllison, 2000: 36).

By 1920, worried about the limited scope of the 1912 Convention, the US put pressure on the League of Nations[36] to organize a new conference (McAllister, 2000: 50-51). The result was the two Geneva Conferences, which took place between 1924 and 1925. These ended with the writing of two different treaties: the first Geneva Convention[37], focused on opium-producing nations, and the second Geneva Convention[38], that was intended to impose global controls over a wider range of drugs, including for the first time marijuana –defined in Article 1 as *Indian Hemp*–. Apart from that, the novelty was that "*while the 1912 Hague Convention had focused*

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[33] Among the established controls, those highlighted are included in Article 3 of the Convention, which establishes that "*the contracting Powers shall take measures (a) To prevent the export of raw opium to countries which shall have prohibited its entry, and (b) To control the export of raw opium to countries which restrict its import, unless regulations on the subject are already in existence*" (League of Nations, 1912).

[34] In fact, in the declaration of interests of the Convention, it can be read that the signatory countries were determined to implement a "*gradual suppression of the abuse of opium, morphine, and cocaine as also of the drugs prepared or derived from these substances, which give rise or might give rise to similar abuses*" (League of Nations, 1912).

[35] Before the First World War, Germany was the first offered of morphine, heroin, and cocaine (Friman, 1996: 15-19). With the outbreak of the war, Germany stopped providing such substances to countries such as the United Kingdom, Japan or France, which saw themselves obliged to increase their pharmaceutical capacities. Thus, for instance, Holland turned into the main producer of cocaine at a world level (McAllison: 2000, 37).

[36] On 11 November 1918, an armistice ended fighting in Europe. The victorious Allied Powers of World War I established the League of Nations by the Treaty of Versailles. The League of Nations' Charter was approved as part of the Treaty of Versailles at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. To expand on the notion of international control on narcotics during the League of Nations' administration, consult Renborg's famous study (1947).

[37] *Agreement concerning the Manufacture of, Internal Trade in, and Use of Prepared Opium*, done on 11 February 1925. Entry into force: 28 July 1926 (League of Nations, 1925a).

[38] *Geneva Convention on Opium and Other Drugs*, done on 19 February 1925. Entry into force: 25 September 1928 (League of Nations, 1925b).

on domestic controls, the Geneva Conventions were an attempt to improve transnational control" (Sinha, 2001: 12).

Despite this growing prohibition-based control regime encouraged by the US, the drug problem seemed to be worsening. As McAllister (2000: 86) has pointed out,

> *In addition to continued overproduction of opium inside China, statistical returns indicated that Chinese imports of manufactured drugs had skyrocketed. The European colonial powers continued to tolerate (and profit from) opium smoking through government monopolies, (...)* [and] *traffickers became more sophisticated in their operations, colluding with political and/or military brokers to avoid prosecution.*

Furthermore, signatory countries were not inclined to accept the authority of the League of Nations in the matter of supervision of the control of drugs (Van der Kruit, 2007: 34), nor did the League of Nations have the possibility to impose sanctions for the violation of the Conventions' regulations (McAllister, 2000: 76).

From the evidence that, and despite of being signed and ratified, the 1925 Conventions were not able to stop the advance of drug trafficking, in 1931, the League of Nations sponsored another conference in Geneva to put limits on the manufacturing of narcotics and to control their distribution[39]. The result was the *Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs* of 1931. For the first time, and although prohibition was not mentioned, the 1931 Convention established the imposition of limits to the manufacturing and trading of a wide range of drugs, and it made the distinction between legal drugs for medical and scientific use, and illegal[40] drugs. However, the main problem of the agreement was that the High Contracting Parties would assume obligations in respect of all or any of their colonies, protectorates and overseas territory or territories under suzerainty or mandate[41] (League of Nations, 1931: Article 26). The regulation

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[39] *Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs*, done on 13 July 1931. Entry into force: 9 July 1933. According to the Preamble, the intention of this new agreement was "(…) *to supplement the provisions of the International Opium Conventions, signed at The Hague on 23 January 1912, and at Geneva on 19 February 1925, by rendering effective by international agreement the limitation of the manufacture of narcotic drugs to the world's legitimate requirements for medical and scientific purposes and by regulating their distribution*." (League of Nations, 1931).

[40] To understand why this differentiation was important, it should be taken into account that "*by the early 1930s, pharmaceutical firms were producing an increasing number of drugs that mixed various substances with an opium-based analgesic. Codeine, a derivative of morphine, was the most common example*" (McAllister, 2000: 96).

[41] Another important disposition of the Convention was that, through the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, the High Contracting Parties would share information regarding the kind and quantity of drugs involved; the origin of the drugs, their marks and labels; the points at which the drugs were diverted into the illicit traffic; the place from where the drugs were dispatched, and the names of shipping or forwarding agents or consignors; the methods of consignment and the names and

appear to be paradoxical if we consider that in India, for instance, one of the major opium-producing, opium-exporting and opium-using countries at that time (United Nations, 1949) was a colony of the United Kingdom, one of the signatory countries of the 1931 Convention.

Between 1931 and 1939[42], "*the international control organs proved capable of regulating the legitimate trade, but they could not eliminate the most significant cases of illegitimate manufacture*" (McAllister, 2000: 124). However, the improvements in the field of regulations were not enough. This is the reason why the Opium Advisory Committee (OAC)[43] of the League of Nations decided to consider a variety of new projects, such as dealing with abuse through public health approaches, including psychological treatment, dispensary clinics and educational programs. The US, however, blocked such initiatives because it considered them as being inspired in social-etiological approaches to drug problems that could only be solved through institutionalization (McAllister, 2000: 126; Sinha, 2001: 16). Therefore, the focus of attention remained on the development of a new treaty to impose prohibition and supply control. This effort was frustrated by the end of the decade due to the outbreak of Second World War.

After 1945, with the end of Second World War, the UN replaced the League of Nations[44], and the OAC was replaced by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND), one of the functional commissions of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Highly influenced by the US, a prohibitionist perspective prevailed in the

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address of consignees, if known; the methods and routes used by smugglers and names of ships, if any, in which the drugs were shipped; and other information which would assist in the suppression of illicit traffic (League of Nations, 1931: Article 23). As it can be seen, "*the suppression of illicit drug trafficking was, therefore, dependent on a uniform standard administration and the willingness of states to supply data*" (Van der Kruit, 2007: 35).

[42] In those years, the *Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs* was concluded in Geneva (1936). The US, led by Harry Anslinger and Stuart Fuller, proposed including in the treaty the criminalization of all activities related to the use of opium –cultivation, production, manufacture and distribution–, coca and cannabis for non-medical and non-scientific purposes (McAllister, 2000: 123). But many countries opposed to this and focus remained on illicit trafficking (Taylor, 1969: 293-295). In the end, the US refused to sign the final version because it considered the Convention too weak, "*especially in relation to extradition, extraterritoriality and the confiscation of trafficking profits*" (Sinha, 2001: 15).

[43] The OAC, short for *Advisory Committee on the Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs*, was established by the Assembly of the League of Nations on December 15, 1920. The Advisory Committee held its first meeting from May 2 to May 5, 1921, and continued its activities until 1940.

[44] The Protocol under which the UN was given the power to carry on the League of Nations' functions under the various narcotic treaties, was the *Protocol Amending the Agreements, Conventions and Protocols on Narcotic Drugs Concluded at The Hague on 23 January 1912, at Geneva on 11 February 1925 and 19 February 1925 and 13 July 1931, at Bangkok on 27 November 1931, and at Geneva on 26 June 1936*. Done on 11 December 1946. Entry into force: 11 December 1946.

CND (Bewley-Taylor, 1999: 212; McAllister, 2000: 152-153). But, due to the new political global context of equilibrium of forces, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) also started to impose its own perspective. Firstly, and since it did not allow any kind of interference with its own sovereignty, the USSR did not authorize the inspections carried out by international organizations within its territory (McAllister, 2000: 161). Also, the USSR showed interest in considering the social and psychological factors underlying the consumption of narcotics (Sinha, 2001: 17), a perspective that the US denied accepting. Being obliged to reconcile their interests, Moscow and the Western countries met in Paris in 1948.

The agreement[45] signed in the French capital established, in its Article 1, that the WHO would be responsible for deciding which substances had to be controlled. The Protocol also brought under international control specific synthetic opiates hitherto not covered by previous treaties.

By the end of the decade of the 1940s, it was evident that the great number of existing treaties on drug control had resulted in great confusion. As requested by the US[46], the ECOSOC approved[47] the proposal of unification of all existing treaties in a unique convention. Since the negotiations for the writing of the Single Convention would take some time, Leon Steinig, Director of the Division of Narcotic Drugs (DND) of the UN, recommended the creation of an International Opium Monopoly. His idea was to create an independent agency which could set the prices and sell opium to drug producers. In this way, according to Steinig, the illegal trafficking of the substance would be avoided (McAllister, 2000: 173-179).

On August 1950, representatives of the principal manufacturing states met with their producer counterparts. Despite Steinig's efforts, the parties could not reach a final agreement. As McAllister has pointed out,

> *Manufacturers wanted to pay considerably less tan producers were willing to accept, [so they] desired a strong Agency, possessing inspection powers to ensure that over-*

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[45] *Protocol Bringing under International Control Drugs Outside of the Scope of the 1931 Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs*, done on 19 November 1948. Entry into force: 1 December 1949.

[46] According to McAllister (2000: 172), the US "*hoped the new treaty would serve a dual purpose. Consolidating existing agreements would create a truly universal regime. Additionally,* [the US] *aimed to inject more stringent production control provisions into the Single Convention.*"

[47] ECOSOC passed the US proposal as from the resolutions E/RES/1948/159(VII)IID (United Nations, 1948) and E/RES/1949/246(IX)D (United Nations, 1949), both titled *Simplification of Existing International Instruments on Narcotic Drugs*.

production did not occur. [However] *producing states would not countenance such a violation of their sovereignty.* (McAllister, 2000: 175)

In spite of Steinig's insistence on applying the *International Opium Monopoly*, in the sixth session of the CND in 1951, the member countries agreed on putting an end to the regime and settled on writing an interim agreement until the preparations for the writing of the single document had started. The meeting was in the United Nations Opium Conference, held at the UN Headquarters (New York), from 11 May to 18 June 1953. At the behest of the US, the prohibitionist bases of the treaty[48] were considerable, but an agreement could not be reached, and the protocol only came into effect in 1963.

On January 24th 1961, 73 counties attended the conference in New York to work on the third draft of the single convention, in process since 1948 (Van der Kruit, 2007: 43). The instruments that were replaced by the Single Convention of 1961[49] (United Nations, 1961), are enumerated in Article 44 of such convention[50], but the main foundations of the previous drug control treaties remained in force[51]. Among the regulations gathered from previous agreements, the supervision of crops of plants that were grown as raw material for the production of narcotic drugs: the poppy, the coca bush, the plant of cannabis, the straw of poppy and the leaves of cannabis (United Nations, 1961: Article 2, subsection 7) persisted. Besides, the Convention retained certain monopolies for the production of drugs for medical and scientific purposes; introduced guarantees for the treatment and rehabilitation of

[48] *Protocol for Limiting and Regulating the Cultivation of the Poppy Plant, the Production of, International and Wholesale Trade in, and use of Opium*. Done 23 June 1953. Entry into force: 8 March 1963, in accordance with Article 21. The protocol stated in Article 2 that parties were required to limit the use of opium exclusively to medical and scientific needs. At the same time, Article 6 restricted opium production to seven states, and parties could only import or export opium produced in one of these countries. Those seven producing countries were Bulgaria, Greece, India, Iran, Turkey, the USSR and Yugoslavia.

[49] In the preamble of the Convention, the parts express their wish "*to conclude a generally acceptable international convention replacing existing treaties on narcotic drugs, limiting such drugs to medical and scientific use, and providing for continuous international co-operation and control for the achievement of such aims and objectives*" (United Nations, 1961).

[50] The only previous convention that was not incorporated into the Single Convention (United Nations, 1961) was the *Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs* (1936) because delegations could not agree on which of its provisions should be included in the new convention (McAllister, 2000: 208).

[51] Parties were still required to submit estimates of their drug requirements and statistical returns on the production, manufacture, use, consumption, import, export, and stock build-up of drugs (United Nations, 1961: Articles 19 and 20); limitations to the import and export of drugs remained (United Nations, 1961: Article 21); the import certification system created by the Geneva Convention (1925) continued, and parties were required to license all manufacturers, traders and distributors (United Nations, 1961: Articles 29-32).

addicts (United Nations, 1961: Article 38); gave the WHO the key role in determining whether, based upon a medical/scientific analysis, a new drug had to be added to a schedule and thus placed under international control (United Nations, 1961: Article 3). In addition, the Convention created the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), which was intended to limit the cultivation, production, manufacture and use of drugs to the adequate amount required for medical and scientific purposes; to ensure their availability for such purposes, and to prevent the illicit cultivation, production, manufacture trafficking and use of drugs (United Nations, 1961: Article 9).

Another important concept that the Single Convention obtained from the *Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs* (1931), was that of the schedules of control, which originally being two, were later turned into four. Classified according to control levels, the schedules I and IV were the most stringent ones and covered primarily raw organic materials (opium, coca, cannabis) and their derivatives, such as heroin and CHCL. Schedules II and III, on the other hand, were more lenient and contained primarily codeine-based manufactured drugs (Sinha, 2001: 17). Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that the provisions of this Convention were not aimed at combating illicit trafficking of clandestinely produced or manufactured drugs, which became a large-scale organized criminal activity after the adoption of the 1961 Convention (Van der Kruit, 2007: 45).

After the signing of the Single Convention (United Nations, 1961), drug abuse increased and spread rapidly around the world, and the rise was seen specifically in psychotropic substances[52] such as amphetamines, barbiturates and LSD (Kušević, 1977: 37-38; McAllister, 2000: 227-230; Musto, 1993: 81-83; Musto, 2002: 305-310; Sinha, 2001: 24; Van der Kruit, 2007: 45). These types of substances had not been included in the 1961 Convention. During the decade of the 1960s, and in the context of the UN (cf. United Nations: 1968a; 1968b; 1969), the possibilities for the adoption of an international instrument for the control of psychotropic substances –hitherto

[52] There exist in the world four big families of illegal drugs (three of them are of a natural origin): those derived from the coca leaf, those derived from the poppies, those derived from cannabis and the synthetic ones (Labrousse, 2011: 11). By psychotropic substance is understood any natural or synthetic substance which is included in the lists I, II, III or IV of the *Convention on Psychotropic Substances* of 1971. The term is sometimes employed as a synonym for a "*psychoactive substance, i.e., affecting the mind or mental processes. Strictly speaking, a psychotropic drug is any chemical agent whose primary or significant effects are on the central nervous system*" (WHO, 1994: 55).

not regulated by the IDCR–, was discussed. On the basis of those negotiations, the CND drafted a treaty that became the basis for negotiations in Vienna in 1971, conference in which the *Convention on Psychotropic Substances*[53] was signed (United Nations, 1971).

Like in the Single Convention of 1961, in the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971, several norms and regulations were maintained, such as the schedules establishing the levels of control for different drugs were maintained (United Nations, 1971: Article 1 and Annexes), the mandatory transaction documentation and licensing (United Nations, 1971: Article 8), the import/export control system (United Nations, 1971: Article 13), and the penal provisions (United Nations, 1971: Article 22). However, these Conventions are completely different, because the 1971 Convention imposes controls which are significantly weaker than the 1961 Convention[54]. The reason for this was, mainly, that the writing of the agreement was strongly influenced by the representatives of the big pharmacist firms which produced psychotropic substances[55] (Kušević, 1977: 38-39; McAllister, 2000: 233-234; Sinha, 2001: 25).

In terms of addressing the demand side of drug problems, however, the 1971 Convention is far ahead of the 1961 Single Convention. Article 20 of the 1971 Convention (United Nations, 1971: Article 20), introduced, for the first time, the concepts of public education and abuse prevention into the IDCR:

> *1. The Parties shall take all practicable measures for the prevention of abuse of psychotropic substances and for the early identification, treatment, education, after-care, rehabilitation and social reintegration of the persons involved, and shall co-ordinate their efforts to these ends.*

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[53] *Convention on Psychotropic Substances*. Done on February 21, 1971. Entry into force: 16 August 1976, in accordance with Article 26.

[54] The main difference lies in the schedules of control. While the Single Convention of 1961 includes in its schedules raw organic materials (opium, coca, cannabis), their derivatives and codeine-based manufactured drugs, the Convention of 1971 does not include any derivative of the psychotropic substances. The effect of this is that every substance that is to come within the treaty regime must be explicitly mentioned. In practical terms, it is impossible to do this as new derivatives are constantly being created, and they comprise 95% of the substances created by pharmaceutical firms (McAllister, 2000: 233).

[55] To illustrate the considerable *lobbying* that the pharmaceutical firms had in such Conference, it is important to remember an anecdote example that Kušević (1977) includes in his text *Drug Abuse Control and International Treaties*: "*Representatives of large pharmaceutical manufacturers were sometimes included in the delegations of individual countries. (...)* [There] *was a group of six small Latin American countries all led by the head of one delegation. Some of the representatives noticed that this delegate did not speak flawless Spanish. Later it was discovered that he was born in Switzerland, that he was neither a professional diplomat nor a technical expert on drugs, but rather represented a large European pharmaceutical firm in those South American countries.*" (1977: 39).

2. The Parties shall as far as possible promote the training of personnel in the treatment, after-care, rehabilitation and social reintegration of abusers of psychotropic substances.

3. The Parties shall assist persons whose work so requires to gain an understanding of the problems of abuse of psychotropic substances and of its prevention, and shall also promote such understanding among the general public if there is a risk that abuse of such substances will become widespread.

During the years that followed the passing of the 1971 Convention, the consumption of drugs increased exponentially in the US (Chepesiuk, 2002: XXV; Traub, 1983: 9-27). Firstly, new types of narcotics like the Lysergic Acid Diethylamide (LSD) and heroine[56] came on stage. For the Hippie Movement[57], drugs became a symbol of resistance and opposition to the government and the Vietnam War. Secondly, psychoactive substances, such as marijuana, started to gain acceptance in new social sectors traditionally not associated with the consumption of drugs[58].

The answer from the Nixon Administration was not delayed[59]. At the national level, the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention (SAODAP) was created in 1972 with the aim of preventing the abuse and reducing the drug demand through prevention, research, education and rehabilitation. A year later, the SAODAP would be dissolved and fused with the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs[60] to create the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). The DEA's mandate was to enforce federal drug laws as well as to consolidate and coordinate the government's drug control activities (Walker, 1989: 190-191). At a regional level, the US "*expressed a new willingness to support large-scale crop-substitution programs, technical assistance to improve the administration and law enforcement, regional efforts to interdict trafficking, and even coordination of educational efforts*" (McAllister, 2000: 237). At a global level, meanwhile, the US suggested the creation of a government-funded, UN-administered anti-drug abuse fund. This is how the United Nations Fund for Drug

[56] Between 1960 and 1970 the number of heroin users in the US rose from 40,000 to 500,000. By 1971 an estimated 25,000 to 37,000 American soldiers in Vietnam were using heroin, and about 14% of them became addicted to the drug (Traub, 1983: 27).

[57] To expand on the Hippie Movement and the consumption of drugs, consult Miller, 2000; Issitt, 2009: Ch. III.

[58] According to Musto (1993: 82), *"during the fifties, heroin addicts were, mainly, young men concentrated on the Black and Hispanic urban ghettos.* [However, years later,] *marijuana had great acceptance among the young, although its popularity also was gradually increasing among older groups".*

[59] To have access to a detailed analysis of the strategy used by the Nixon Administration to fight against drug, consult Musto, 1987: 248-257.

[60] In February 1966, the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control was created, and it functioned until 1968 when it was merged with the Federal Bureau of Narcotics –created in 1930– to form the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.

Abuse Control (UNFDAC) was born in 1971[61], whose main emphasis was put on law enforcement and crop substitution rather than on abuse and demand-oriented strategies (McAllister, 2000: 237).

Another initiative from Nixon was to strengthen the Single Convention of 1961, initiative that ended with the passing of the *Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs*[62] in Geneva in 1972. Since the products of the pharmaceutical companies began to be controlled by the US government, the main formal goal of the Protocol was to reduce the licit production of opium. However, as it has been observed by Kušević (1977: 48), it was not a down-to-earth objective:

> *By 1972, world demand for opium for medical and scientific purposes was about 1,200 to 1,300 tons a year with a continuing tendency towards increasing the demand. Since licit production of opium was already at this level, a decrease in production because of a bad crop two years in a row could result in a shortage in the availability of opium for medical purposes.*

In the end, the most important amendments added to: the extension of the terms in office of members of the INCB (United Nations, 1961: Article 10); the authority given to the INCB to use information furnished not only by governments, but also by specialized agencies and intergovernmental and international non-governmental organizations approved by the Commission (United Nations, 1961: Article 14); and the provisions for the extradition of illicit traffickers (United Nations, 1961: Article 36).

Until then, the concern for the consumption of opium and synthetic drugs, like amphetamine dominated the global public agenda. During the early 1970s, however, "*cocaine use in the US began to move from the underground to the mainstream*" (Inciardi, 2008: 118). This process could be explained from three concomitant facts.

Firstly, Gerald R. Ford's policies on drug control had a crucial impact on drug consumption; while they focused on strengthening the initiatives to reduce the use of

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[61] The UNFDAC was highly criticized for two reasons. First, it received almost exclusive financial assistance from the US, and it soon turned into a fund dominated by the priorities of Washington (McAllister, 2000: 238). Second, it turned into a very bureaucratic and inefficient structure. "*A large proportion of the money allocated to the Fund's various programs is in fact spent on supporting an ever-expanding bureaucracy to administer the programs. Indeed many of the Programs appear to serve no purpose other than to provide occupation for the enlarged secretariats*" (Bruun, Pan and Rexed, 1975: 281). Analysts like Jack Donnelly, however, consider that the creation of the UNFDAC has been an important step in the fight against drugs. In his own words, "*UNFDAC's programs have considerably extended, giving to the United Nations a much more active stand in the national efforts to control drugs*" (Donnelly, 1993: 364).

[62] *Protocol Amending the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs*, done on 25 March 1972. Entry into force: 8 August 1975.

amphetamine[63] (Inciardi, 2008: 118; Walker, 1989: 193), these policies derived in the raise of cocaine as an alternative narcotic substance. Secondly, the World Bank started to finance the building of the Pan American Highway[64] in Alto Huallaga, a Peruvian region where the cultivation of coca bushes supplied the local population. The construction of a highway in the region created a suitable means of transport of big quantities of coca leaves, the raw material of CHCL. Having the offer of opium and amphetamines been reduced in the US, the demand for CHCL began to grow, so "*South American growers and entrepreneurs responded by opening vast new areas for the cultivation of coca*" (Inciardi, 2008: 118).

Finally, an economic reason could also explain the rise in the consumption of CHCL in the US during those years. As it has been pointed out by Dr. David Musto (1987), the 1970s was a period of enormous *growth in the wealth of the US. "The gross national product doubled from 1960 through 1970, (...) so all this productivity and money created an unparalleled market for consumer good and anything else that promised to make a person feel comfortable, including drugs*" (Musto: 1987: 247).

In this context, marked by the increase in the demand for drugs, President Ford and President Carter formulated more tolerant policies regarding drug use. For example, Ford, did not share Nixon's rigid view regarding drug control, and his closest analysts even considered the idea of legalizing certain narcotics. President Carter, on the other hand, favored the decriminalization of the possession of small quantities of marijuana for personal consumption, setting up civil penalties such as small fines (cf. Musto, 1987: 257-264).

With the end of the Carter Administration, however, the perspective on the fight against drugs changed completely. In 1981, Sam Nunn –a Democrat Senator for Georgia– headed a proposal to amend the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878[65] in order to authorize the US armed forces to share information about drugs obtained from

[63] A remarkable fact in this regard was the creation in the US Congress of the House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control (1976). Since the creation of that Committee, in 1981, considerable emphasis would be put on the articulation of militarized responses to the trafficking of CHCL (Walker, 1995: 2).

[64] The Pan American Highway is a collective system of roads, of approximately 25,800 kilometers long, which connect almost all the countries of the western hemisphere of the American continent. It was conceived in the V International Conference of American States in 1923, and it extends along from Buenos Aires (Argentina) to Prudhoe Bay (US).

[65] The Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the military personnel and the units of the National Guard to be used to enforce a civil law in the US (except when they are expressly authorized by the Constitution or the Congress). This law, passed after the Reconstruction Era (1865-1877), regulated the use of military forces as forces of internal order by the Federal Government.

military sources with civil servants; to lend military equipment to the national agencies of the US; and to provide federal agents with military facilities (Bagley, 1993: 183). To carry out the new strategy, the amendment requested more coordination and cooperation between the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General's Office, since the nation was in the presence of a "*serious threat to the interests of the United States*" (Bagley, 1992: 131). Thus, and for the first time in almost seventy years, drug trafficking was referred to as a serious threat to the US national security.

In 1985, a wave of crack put under alert several regions of the US (Musto, 1987: 269). *Crack* is a smoking derivative of cocaine, considerably much cheaper but highly addictive. This generated immediate public concern not only because of the drug itself, but also due to the violence that was associated to the consumption of crack. This led the Reagan Administration to declare the *war against drugs* at home and in Latin America, where cocaine came from (Friesendorf, 2007: 79; Smith, 1992: 6-7).

A year later, Reagan signed *The Anti-Drug Abuse Act*[66] and, by a secret presidential directive (David, 1989: 72), declared illicit drug trafficking a national security issue, thus authorizing the utilization of the armed forces in the interdiction and eradication of drugs and crops, inside and outside the US borders. Showing its support, the Congress doubled the annual budget for the fight against drugs in 1987 (Bagley, 1992: 131). This rise in funds allowed for the increase in the number of hours of surveillance for tactic teams of the Navy and Air Force to intercept drug loads.

Toward the end of 1988, the American Congress had its doubts regarding Reagan's direction on this matter. The policies centered on the control of the offer were not functioning adequately, and a rise in the world production of CHCL was verified (cf. Table 1). Therefore, Washington began to evaluate more comprehensive solutions, putting emphasis on the offer reduction strategies, but also incorporating a demand control approach. This new perspective made evident the need of passing the

[66] The Anti-Drug Abuse Act assigned US$1.7 billion to fight the drug crisis. US$97 million is allocated to build new prisons, US$200 million for drug education and US$241 million for treatment. The bill's most consequential action is the creation of mandatory minimum penalties for drug offenses. Possession of one kilogram of heroin or five kilograms of cocaine is punishable by at least ten years in prison. In response to the crack epidemic, the sale of five grams of the drug leads to a mandatory five-year sentence.

Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances[67] (1988), whose preamble[68] recognized that the parts were

> *Deeply concerned by the magnitude of and rising trend in the illicit production of, demand for and traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, which pose a serious threat to the health and welfare of human beings and adversely affect the economic, cultural and political foundations of society.*

TABLE 1: Worldwide CHCL Production.
Quantities (in MT) Available for Export to the US, 1986-1990

CHCL Production	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
Worldwide Production	606	635	714	776	824
Eradicated	-2	-8	-26	-21	-80
Interdicted	-13	-45	-62	-98	-152
Consumed overseas	-50	-55	-60	-65	-75
Available for export to the US	541	527	566	592	517

Source: Unpublished estimates supplied by US Office of Management and Budget. Cit. in Smith, 1992: 14.

In spite of all the questioning to the narcotic policy followed by the United States, when in 1989 George H. W. Bush became President of the nation, a constant militarization of the fight against drugs started in the South American[69] hemisphere. According to Coletta A. Youngers (2007: 109), "*it was the Andean Initiative the one that led to what was named as the 'demilitarization' of the international policy of drug control in the US.*" Launched in 1989, the *Andean Initiative* focused on the so-called *countries of origin*: Peru, Bolivia and Colombia, by then the main producers of coca leaves and CHCL (cf. Tables 2 and 3).

> *The initiative pretended to impede the production and transportation of drugs as well as to strengthen and diversify the economies of the Andean countries. However, the military and police assistance was given priority in the five-year plan, while the concession for economic assistance was subordinated to the idea that significant interruptions in the drug business were supposed to be demonstrated. In the end, most of the resources were assigned to the local police and military forces.* (Youngers, 2007: 109)

[67] *Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances*, done on 20 December 1988. Entry into force: 11 November 1990.

[68] Although the Preamble is not legally binding, it is intended to provide an overview of the spirit of the legal instrument.

[69] The decision of the US in 1989 to military intervene in Panama to depose Lieutenant Manuel Noriega, accused of trafficking drugs and money laundering, is another clear example of Bush's inclinations to deepen the militarization of the fight against drugs in Latin America. To expand on this issue, consult Scranton, 1991; Scott and Marshall, 1991: 65-78.

The labeling of drug trafficking as a threat to the national security of the United States, on the other hand, is made evident when revising some statements made during the Bush administration. In a White House report to the US Congress, it was stated that:

> *The United States Information Agency, with policy guidance developed by the Department of State and supported by other Federal Agencies, will lead our coordinated international information efforts. These initiatives will focus on providing information to foreign audiences about the threat posed by the drug trade to national security, economic welfare, and the environment, and educating them about the consequences of illicit drug use.* (White House, 1990: 59)

In addition, William J. Bennett, by then the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy declared in September 1989:

> *The source of the most dangerous drugs threatening our nation is principally international. Few foreign threats are more costly to the US economy. None does more damage to our national values and institutions and destroys more American lives. While most international threats are potential, the damage and violence caused by the drug trade are actual and pervasive. Drugs are a major threat to our national security.* (Quoted in Smith, 1992: 7)

TABLE 2: Coca Leaf Cultivation (Estimates). Figures in Thousands of MT, 1985-1988

Country	1985	1986	1987	1988
Bolivia	42,0 – 53,2	44,0 – 52,9	46,0 – 67,0	50,0 – 73,3
Colombia	12,4	12,0 – 13,6	18,0 – 23,0	19,0 – 25,3
Peru	95,2	95,0 – 120,0	98,0 – 121,0	114,5
Ecuador	1,9	1,0	0,4	0,2
Totals	151.5 – 162.7	152.0 – 187.5	162.4 – 211.4	183.7 – 213.7

Source: GAO, 1988: 13.

TABLE 3: Maximum CHCL Production (Estimates). Figures in MT, 1985-1988

Country	1985	1986	1987	1988
Bolivia	84.0 – 106.4	88.0 – 105.8	92.0 – 134.0	100.0 – 147.4
Colombia	24.8	24.0 – 27.2	36.0 – 46.0	38.0 – 50.6
Peru	190.4	190.0 – 240.0	196.0 – 242.0	229.0
Ecuador	3.8	2.0	0.8	0.4
Totals	303.0 – 325.4	304.0 – 375.0	324.8 – 422.8	367.4 – 427.4

Source: GAO, 1988: 13.

During William Clinton's Administrations, there was a bigger concern for the control of the demand. In February 1994, during the announcement of a new Drug Control Strategy, Clinton affirmed that: "*We know that no nation can fight crime and drugs without dealing honestly and forthrightly with the problem of drug addiction*" (JET, 1994: 7). Nevertheless, as a specialist has pointed out,

> *Despite encouraging (though lukewarm) signs of change in this area, President Clinton's administration reinforced the policy of employing a coercive anti-drug strategy abroad even as he opened a second front at home at the same time in an effort to resolve, albeit incipiently, the enormous problems generated by the high demand for drugs through education and rehabilitation rather than relying on enforcement alone. Nevertheless, the principles and foundations of Washington's domestic and international drug strategy have not been rectified. Neither has an alternate debate been initiated nationally that might indicate an eventual arrangement of gravitating social and political forces in the United States which could give rise to a strategy different from the one in place.* (Tokatlián, 1994: 83)

The Plan Colombia, the answer to drug trafficking in that country, formulated by Clinton, is probably the best example of the continuity of the militarized policies in the war against drugs. Initially suggested by the Colombian President Andrés Pastrana in 1999, the Plan Colombia gained acceptance rapidly in Washington, and, in a few years, turned into the main effort of the US to fight against the CCC in Latin America.

Approved by the US Congress in July 2000, among its initial objectives, the Plan Colombia proposed to intensify counter-narcotics efforts aimed at ending the threats to Colombian democracy posed by narcotics trafficking and insurgency; to help the Colombian government to strengthen its democratic institutions and promote the respect of human rights and the rule of law; to foster socioeconomic development, and to address immediate humanitarian needs (Pickering, 2009: 75). In economic terms, however, the rhetoric deviated from reality[70] in an abysmal way. To illustrate this, take this information into account: "*for the fiscal year of 2005, US$ 463 millions*

[70] The literature on the failures and the negative effects of the Plan Colombia is extensive. See, for example, Acevedo, Bewley-Taylor and Youngers, 2008; Estrada Álvarez, 2001; Nagle, 2002; Reuter, 2007; Youngers, 2007. Professor Michael Shifter (2010: 116), for example, recognizes the negative effects of the Plan Colombia, but believes "*it is undebatable that security conditions in Colombia have considerably improved during the last decade. It is no longer possible to claim, as it occurred 10 years ago, that it is a country 'on the edge of the precipice' with real possibilities to turn into a failed state. The data regarding the drastic fall in the levels of massacres, homicides and kidnappings speak for themselves, the same as the information about police presence, now present in all the national territory, and the decrease in the operational capacity of the strongest insurgent group: the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).*" In the same line of analysis, we can find the report of the Center for Strategic and International Studies headed by DeShazo, Primiani and McLean (2007), and the 2010 National Drug Control Strategy of the White House (White House, 2010).

were given to (...) Colombia. Almost three quarters at that money was sent to anti-narcotics operations and to security while the rest was assigned to economic and social development" (Reuter, 2007: 101).

The Plan Colombia continued being financed during the administrations of George W. Bush, even though, at the beginning of his first term, he admitted publicly that the origin of the drug problem was not in Latin America. "*The main reason why drugs are shipped through Mexico to the United States is because United States citizens use drugs*", declared Bush on February 16 of 2001 in San Cristobal, Mexico, in a conference with the Mexican president Vicente Fox (Weiner and Thompson, 2001). Nevertheless, September 11, 2001, changed the *status quo*: the *war against terrorism* started to redefine the *war against drugs*.

Some months after the attack on the Twin Towers, the US Attorney General, John Ashcroft, declared that "*terrorism and drugs go together like rats and the bubonic plague. They thrive in the same conditions, support each other and feed off each other*" (quoted in Youngers and Rosin, 2005: 77). Since then, the US included its war against drugs in its global strategy of the war against terror (Reuter, 2007: 102). This was made clear by the US Ambassador in Colombia, Anne Paterson, who in her speech delivered to the Colombian Cattle Ranching Association (FEDEGAN), in November 2002, claimed that:

> *The US strategy is to give the Colombian government the tools to combat terrorism and narcotrafficking, two struggles that have become one. To fight against narcotrafficking and terrorism, it is necessary to attack all links on the chain simultaneously.* (Quoted in Isacson, 2003: 13)

Two years later, on October 10, 2004, in a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Bantz John Craddock confirmed his diplomat fellow countrywoman's words:

> *The terms insurgents or guerrillas are less applicable today than in the past. I believe the term narcoterrorists is more appropriate, given the fact that the center of gravity for these groups is the incredible financial support they get from illicit drug trafficking.* [Then, General James Hill declared that:] *Narcoterrorists in Colombia remain the largest and most well-known threat in our region.* (House of Representatives, 2004: 23,243)

Barack Obama's rise to power, in January 2009, provided a change in the approach regarding the fight against drugs. In May of the same year, the new administration named Gil Kerlikowske, ex Chief of the Seattle Police Department, as a

Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy. In her first interview, Kerlikowske stated that:

> *Regardless of how you try to explain to people it's a 'war on drugs' or a 'war on a product,' people see a war as a war on them. We're not at war with people in this country. The Obama Administration is likely to deal with drugs as a matter of public health rather than criminal justice alone, with treatment's role growing relative to incarceration.* (Fields, 2009)

On the other hand, the priorities of the Obama Administration in Latin America have also changed, as it has been pointed out by Professor Lowenthal (2010: 114):

> *In its first months, the Obama Administration refocused US policy in Latin America and the Caribbean from the "war on terror" to challenges more salient in the region, including economic growth, job creation, energy, migration, and democratic governance. It also began to shift from the so-called war on drugs, which had concentrated on eradicating crops and interdicting narcotics, to focus instead on countering drug-money flows, reducing the demand for drugs, and offering treatment to addicts.*

It is my opinion, however, that the messages given to the region by the Obama Administration are still contradictory. Although it is possible to see a progressive reduction of the budget requested by the White House to fight against drugs outside the US[71] territory (for the concrete case of the Plan Colombia, see Table 4), it is evident that Obama has continued fostering the militarization of the fight against drugs in the hemisphere.

[71] According to an official report of the year 2012, "*the decreases are largely due to the continued transition of counternarcotics responsibilities from the United States to partner nations such as Colombia, Mexico, and Afghanistan*" (White House, 2012b: 2).

TABLE 4: US Assistance for Plan Colombia during Fiscal Years (FY) 2000-2013 (in US$ Millions)

FY	ACI/ ACP	ESF	FMF	IMET	INCLE	NADR	Air Wing	DOD	Total
2000	60,1	–	–	–	–	–	38.0	128.5	226.6
P.L. 106-246[a]	832,0	–	–	–	–	–	–	100.7	932.7
2001	48,0	–	–	–	–	–	38.0	190.2	276.2
2002	379,9[d]	–	–	–	–	25.0	38.2	117.3	560.4
2003	580,2[e]	–	17.1	1.2	–	3.3	41.5	164.8	808.1
2004	473,9	–	98.5	1.7	–	0.2	45.0	178.2	797.5
2005	462.8	–	99.2	1.7	–	5.1	45.0	155.3	769.1
2006	464.8	–	89.1	1.7	–	–	45.0	140.5	741.1
2007	465.0	–	85.5	1.6	–	4.1	37.0	129.4	722.6
2008	244.6	194.4	55.1	1.4	41.9	3.7	39.0	119.9	700.0
2009	230.1	196.5	53.0	1.4	45.0	3.2	12.4	127.9	669.5
2010	–	201.8	55.0	1.7	243.9	4.8	12.9	129.4	649.5
2011	–	184.4	47.9	1.7	204.0	4.8	3.6	110.4	556.8
2012[b]	–	179.0	37.0	1.7	160.6	4.8	8.3	97.9	489.3
2013[c]	–	30.0	30.0	1.6	142.0	3.3	N/A	85.6	417.5
Total	4,241.4	1,111	667.4	17.4	837.4	62.3	403.9	1,976	9,316.9

Source: Beittel, 2012: 38.
References: **FY** = Fiscal Year; **ACI/ACP** = Andean Counterdrug Initiative/Andean Counterdrug Program; **ESF** = Economic Support Fund; **FMF** = Foreign Military Financing; **IMET** = International Military Education and Training; **INCLE** = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; **NADR** = Non proliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs.
Notes: **a.** The US Congress approved legislation in support of Plan Colombia in 2000, as part of the Military Construction Appropriations Act of 2001 (P.L. 106-246, Sec. 3201) providing US$1.3 billion for counternarcotics and related efforts in Colombia and neighboring countries (US Congress, 2000); **b.** Estimated; **c.** Requested; **d.** Includes $6 million appropriated to FMF but transferred to the ACI account; **e.** Includes US$93 million in FMF regular appropriations and $20 million in FMF supplemental funds that were transferred to the ACI account.

After the US left the Manta Base (Ecuador) in July 2009[72], the signing of the *Supplemental Agreement for Cooperation and Technical Assistance in Defense and Security between the Governments of the United States of America and the Republic of Colombia* –informally known as US-Colombia Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA)– was announced in October the same year (Colombian Government, 2009). According to Article 4, subsection 1 of the agreement, Colombia would continue authorizing the

[72] The Convention of the Manta Base was signed in 1998 by the US and Ecuador, by then chaired by Jamil Mahuad. According to the text of the agreement, declassified only in 2010, it was granted to the US the use and access to the track of the Manta Base for a period of ten years to fight against narcotrafficking in the region. The concession of the Republic of Ecuador expired in November 2009 and it was not renovated by President Rafael Correa. To access to a detailed chronology of the signing of the agreement, see Salgado Tamayo (2003).

US access to seven Colombian military bases[73] in order to facilitate the fight against terrorism and drug trafficking. Moreover, the agreement granted the US authorization to have access to and use military facilities by military and foreign civil personnel (Article 4); it granted authorization with the faculty of free circulation of vessels, ships, aircrafts and foreign tactic vehicles inside the national territory, without the need of inspection or control from the part of the national authorities (Article 6); it granted authorization with the extension of a personal statute of immunities and diplomatic privileges for contractors and subcontractors as well as people in charge of the US personnel (Article 8); and it also granted authorization to use and carry arms in the national territory by foreign personnel (Article 15).

The agreement aroused controversy in South America[74], and it was Álvaro Uribe himself, by then President of Colombia, who summoned for an Extraordinary Summit Meeting of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) to deal with the issue. The result was the release of the Bariloche Declaration on August 28, 2009 (UNASUR, 2009), which emphasized the unrestricted respect for the territorial sovereignty, integrity and inviolability of the States. Nevertheless, it also reaffirmed that the presence of foreign military forces, with its means and resources related to its own objectives, cannot threaten the sovereignty and integrity of any South American nation, nor the peace and security of the region. Finally, on August 17th 2010, the agreement was declared unconstitutional through the Notice No. 40 of the Constitutional Court of Colombia[75] (Constitutional Court of Colombia, 2010).

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[73] The seven military bases were: German Olano Moreno Air Base (Palanquero); Alberto Pawells Rodríguez Air Base (Malambo); Tolemaida Military Fort (Nilo); Larandia Military Fort (Florencia); Capitan Luis Fernando Gómez Nino Air Base (Apiay); ARC Bolivar Naval Base in Cartagena; and ARC Málaga Naval Base (Bahía Málaga).

[74] South American analysts such as Juan Tokatlián (2009) have observed that the negative reaction of countries like Venezuela, Ecuador and, above all, Brazil, could have its origin in the perception that Bogotá is turning into a bridge of military-strategic projection of the US in the Andean-Amazonian area. Such projection was believed to have been truncated with the US withdrawal from the Manta Base. For an analysis on geostrategic key, see also Iglesias-Cavicchioli, 2010.

[75] The Court considered that the DCA was not a simplified agreement, but an instrument involving new obligations for the Colombian State, as well as an extension of the obligations previously acquired. For this reason, the Court ruled that the agreement was supposed to be handled as an international treaty, that is to say, being subject to approval by the Congress of the Republic and later revised by the Constitutional Court of Colombia (Constitutional Court of Colombia, 2010: fundament 3.3). Originally, the agreement had been signed, without the approval of the Colombian Congress, in Bogotá, on the 30th October 2009, by then the Colombian Chancellor Jaime Bermúdez and the Ambassador of the US in Colombia, William Brownfield.

TABLE 5: Historical Overview of the Drug-Control Treaties (1912-1988)

Pre League of Nations	1912: Hague Opium Convention
League of Nations	1925: Agreement concerning the Manufacture of, Internal Trade in, and Use of Prepared Opium 1925: Geneva Convention on Opium and Other Drugs 1931: Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs 1936: Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs
	1946: Protocol amending the Agreements, Conventions and Protocols on Narcotic Drugs concluded at The Hague on 23 January 1912, at Geneva on 11 February 1925 and 19 February 1925 and 13 July 1931, at Bangkok on 27 November 1931, and at Geneva on 26 June 1936
United Nations	1948: Protocol bringing under International Control Drugs Outside of the Scope of the 1931 Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs 1953: Protocol for Limiting and Regulating the Cultivation of the Poppy Plant, the Production of, International and Wholesale Trade in, and use of Opium. 1961: Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs* 1971: Convention on Psychotropic Substances* 1972: Protocol amending the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs* 1988: Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances*

Note: *Treaties still in force

3. Coca and Cocaine Hydrochloride

The IDCR, in its evolution, has laid the foundations for regulating and prohibiting the production, trafficking and consumption of four big families of drugs:

those derived from the coca leaf, those derived from the poppies, those derived from cannabis and the synthetic psychotropic drugs. In this dissertation, and since I am going to deal with drugs derived from the coca leaf, it is necessary to specify the origin of the coca leaf, the type it belongs to, its history, the cultural practices and misconceptions that revolve around it, as well as its role being the raw material of the cocaine hydrochloride. The following paragraphs will refer to this.

3.1. The Coca Bush

The coca bush belongs to the *Erythroxylum* type and the tropical family of the *Erythroxylaceae*. The *Erythroxylum* type includes around 250 species, but all the coca cultivated in the Andes for coca chewing or the production of CHCL, belongs to four varieties of two species (Table 6): the *Erythroxylum coca* var. *coca* (*huanaco* or Bolivian coca); the *Erythroxylum coca* var. *ipadu* (Amazonian coca); the *Erythroxylum novogranatense* var. *novogranatense* (Colombian coca); and the *Erythroxylum novogranatense* var. *truxillense* (Trujillo coca).

TABLE 6: Species of Coca and Their Characteristics

Species	*Erythroxylum Coca*		*Erythroxylum Novogranatense*	
Varieties	*Coca*	*Ipadu*	*Novogranatense*	*Truxillense*
Origin	Mountainous region of eastern Andes: Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia (mainly between 500-1500 m)	Western Amazon of Brazil, Colombia and Peru	Colombia (Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, Santander, Cauca and Huila), Venezuela and Central America (up to 1,800 m)	Desert coast of Peru and in adjacent arid valley of the Rio Maranon, Truxillo region on the north coast of Peru
Description of plant and/or leaves	Pointed leaves, parallel longitudinal lines on leaf undersides	Tall, spindly shrub with long weak branches and relatively large elliptical leaves which are blunt or rounded at the apex	Large bush plan with small, narrow, thin, and bright yellow-green leaves which are rounded	Up to 3m tall with multiple trunks reaching 4 cm in diameter. Branches are dense erect
Climate	Favorable tropical environment with high rainfall, moderate temperatures and well drained mineral rich soils	Low tolerance to intense heat or poorly drained soils, short-lived	Hot, seasonably dry habitat resistant to drought	Has been cultivated in arid, desert climate and wet mountainous habitat of Colombia; very tolerant to drought. Prefers desert conditions
Adaptability	Very little	Very little	Will survive under a wide range of environmental conditions. Resistant to drought	
Commercial uses	Most important commercial species providing the largest supply of coca leaves and cocaine by far	Used for chewing	Illegal in Colombia. Grown illegally for coca chewing and cocaine production	Principal variety used in beverage industry owing to its high content of essential oils and flavors (used in making Coca-Cola)
% Alkaloids	0.5 – 1.0	Unknown	1.0 – 2.5	1.0 – 2.5
% Cocaine of total alkaloid content	70 – 90	Very little	20 – 50	20 – 50

Source: Lee, 1981: 30. For further information regarding the botany of coca bush, see Lee, 1981; Plowman, 1986: 9-23.

The *Erythroxylum coca species,* a variety of *coca*, is primarily cultivated on the Eastern slopes of the Andes in Bolivia and Peru.

Its greenish-colored leaves are elliptically shaped with parallel longitudinal lines on the underside of the leaf. (…) The plant grows well in altitudes between 500-1500 meters

where the climate is favorably tropical, high in rainfall, moderate in temperature, and the soils are rich in minerals and well drained. (Lee, 1981: 25)

This species is the most cultivated one in Bolivia and, in Peru, 95% of the annual coca crops belong to this variety (Lee, 1981: 25). The *ipadu* variety of the same species "*is cultivated on a small scale in small jungle plots by a number of tribes of the upper Amazon in parts of Colombia, Brazil and Peru*" (Plowman, 1986: 15). This variety is propagated by cuttings rather than seeds, and it prefers moderate temperatures and well-drained soils. This plant is taller than *Huanaco* and has weak branches and relatively large elliptical leaves which are blunt or rounded at the apex. "*Amazonian coca contains very little true cocaine and is primarily used for chewing by the people who cultivate it*" (Lee, 1981: 29). It is important to clarify that, in this context, cocaine must be define as "*one of the groups of alkaloids, substances occurring naturally in plants. Alkaloids are basic (alkaline) compounds synthesized by living organisms from amino acid. Some examples are caffeine, from the coffee and other plants; morphine and codeine, from the opium poppy; quinine, from cinchona bark; strychnine, from Nux vomica; and nicotine, from tobacco*" (Grinspoon and Bakalar, 1976: 73).

The *Erythroxylum novogranatense* species is native from Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, desert coasts of Peru and parts in Central America. In Colombia, it grows in Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta (north of Colombia) and in the departments of Santander, Cauca and Huila, up to about 1,800 meters elevation (Plowman, 1986: 21). Both varieties (*novogranatense* and *truxillense*) are well adapted to arid conditions and are usually grown in areas where *Erythroxylum coca* could not survive. In some chemical studies carried out during the decade of 1980, it was found that the concentration of cocaine was higher in the *Erythroxylum coca species, a* variety of *coca,* than in any of the other two varieties of *Erythroxylum novogranatense* (Plowman, 1986: 18).

Coca bushes mature sufficiently in three years and, depending on the coca variety, climate and geographical conditions, coca bushes can be harvested –on average– from three to six times annually for a period of 10 to 25 years (Mejía and Posada, 2010: 255; Tullis, 1991: 3).

3.2. The Coca Leaf

The coca leaves[76], the raw material for cocaine, have been cultivated in South America since Pre-Columbian times. The first chronicles which describe them date from the XVI century (Inciardi, 2008: 116), when the first Spanish colonizers arrived to the Andes. Back then, the coca plant had a sacred status for the Incas, who strictly controlled its cultivation (Murra, 1986: 49) and used it for religious gifts, weddings, funerals, healings and the *huaraca*, an initiation rite for the young nobles (Grinspoon and Bakalar, 1976: 10). This pattern of consumption and production of coca, however, was affected by the Spanish conquest and colonization.

Initially, Spain tried to prohibit the consumption of coca[77]. In fact, in 1551-1567, the Catholic Church "*formally denounced its use as idolatry, and a royal proclamation declared its effects a demoniacal illusion*" (Grinspoon and Bakalar, 1976: 10). However, in 1573, a royal order from Viceroy Francisco de Toledo authorized the cultivation of the coca leaf for the payment of taxes. Thus, this is how the coca turned *"into a good that came to represent the second source of income for the Crown, after the minerals"* (Quiroga, 1990: 12). From then onwards, and already free from the religious restrictions of the Incas and Spaniards, the cultivation and the chewing of coca leaf would expand considerably in extensive zones of the Andes.

For decades, the practice of *acullicar*, *picchar*, *chacchar* or *coquear* (the chewing of the coca leaf[78]) is an object of controversy. The origin of the problem lies in affirming that the coca is a *drug* that suppresses hunger to the *acullicadores* from the poorest and most marginalized areas of the Andes. According to this hypothesis, supported by a questionable scientific basis (Quiroga, 1990: 8-11) and promulgated mainly by the Peruvian physician Carlos Gutiérrez Noriega in the decade of 1940, the chewing of a coca leaf will suppress hunger because *"it would be a way of extracting*

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[76] Coca leaf is defined in the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs as "*the leaf of the coca bush except leaf from which all ecgonine, cocaine and any other ecgonine alkaloids have been removed*" (Article 1, Subsection 1).

[77] For more detailed information about the history of coca during colonial times, see Streatfeild, 2001: 19-35.

[78] According to some specialists, the expression *chewing* is not accurate. Coca is not chewed, but the leaves are placed in the mouth between the inferior part of the cheek and the gum of the same side, making a bolus or rumination called *acullico* (in Bolivia), *piccho* or *chaccha* (in Peru), *mambeo* (in Colombia). See United Nations, 1950: 23.

cocaine from the leaves"[79] (Quiroga, 1990: 10). In Gutiérrez Noriega's words (Gutiérrez Noriega and Zapata Ortiz, 1948: 77),

> *The coca chewer consumes it to suppress the awful feeling that chronic starvation produces. But the consumption of drug, after some years, provokes the loss of appetite. The habitual chewer prefers the drug instead of food, establishing a vicious circle. People start chewing coca to suppress hunger, provoking the loss of appetite, and they end up eating even less, due to the consumption of coca.*[80]

The *vicious circle,* according to Gutiérrez Noriega, finally generates malnutrition and physical and mental weakness in the chewers. It was this paradigm (Figure 1), named "*the nutritional interpretation*" by Dr. Roderick Burchard (1992: 4), the one that contributed the necessary elements for the United Nations[81] to prohibit the cultivation of the coca leaf and its chewing in the Single Convention of 1961[82].

[79] My own translation.

[80] My own translation.

[81] Research studies like the one by Gutiérrez Noriega gave birth to the nutritional paradigm suggested by Dr. Burchard, and it was collected before 1961 in the *Report of the Commission of Enquiry on the Coca Leaf* of 1950. This research work points out that "*the chewing of the coca leaf is much more generalized in areas* [like the *Altiplano* or Andean Plateau and the hill] *which do not offer any facilities and just a limited variety of food*" (United Nations, 1950: 17). Moreover, it is claimed that in the areas of Peru and Bolivia where most of the coca is chewed, "*kids are less physically developed than the European ones. Naturally, this could be a racial feature, but it is much more likely that the reason could be the lack of Vitamin A and natural protein*" (United Nations, 1950: 19).

[82] In June 2011, Bolivia abandoned the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961. This was considered a crucial historical event, since after fifty years of the approval of the Convention, one of the main Andean producer countries of coca and cocaine dropped the Convention and dared to challenge the labeling of coca chewing and the coca leaf as drugs. However, by the end of 2011, Bolivia requested its readmission to the Convention with an explicit request: the country would not accept the labeling of *acullicu* as an addiction. Bolivia's reincorporation, finally, was admitted on January 2013, with just 15 votes against, from the183 countries that are members of the Convention (184 including Bolivia).

FIGURE 1: The Nutritional Interpretation of the Coca Leaf



The nutritional hypothesis, which inspired the prohibitionist basis of the United Nations, was refuted by Burchard (1975; 1992: 14) himself, who claimed, based on an extensive *in situ* empirical research, that the chewing of coca had to be considered a complementary activity and not an antagonistic one of the consumption of food. At the same time, coca was found to be rich in calories, protein, carbohydrates, fiber, calcium, phosphorus, iron, vitamin A and riboflavin. "*These data contradicted earlier claims which stated that coca chewing results in malnutrition*" (Plowman, 1986: 7).

When coca is chewed, a bitter juice with high levels of proteins and alkaloids like cocaine is released from the coca leaf[83]. This bitterness is counteracted by the addition of an alkali substance, such as powdered lime or ashes that sweetens the

[83] Another way of consuming the coca leaf is though a coca tea infusion. The coca tea "*can range from a light, yellowy-green with a very faint taste (Colombian* Nasa Esh's *tea) to a darker brown-green with a sharp, yet earthy smell (*Peruvian Wawasana *or* Bolivian Lupi *tea). Although the taste can initially be overpowering (especially if made directly from the leaves and not from teabags), it soon grows on you as its sweet undertones become apparent*" (Pereira, 2010: 388).

chewing and potentiates its effects[84] (Plowman, 1986: 6). The primary effect of chewing coca is a mild stimulation of the central nervous system resulting from the assimilation of cocaine from the leaves.

> *This stimulation gives a sense of increased energy and strength, a suppression of the sensation of fatigue, an elevation of mood or mild euphoria and a sense of well-being and contentment. Coca also produces a temporary suppression of appetite, but it is never used in place of food. Owing to the local anesthetic properties of cocaine, coca chewers experience pronounced numbing sensations on the cheeks and tongue, [but] there is no evidence that coca chewing results in tolerance or physiological dependence, or any acute or chronic deleterious effects.* (Plowman, 1986: 7-8)

Therefore, it can be argued that there are not enough arguments to typify the *acullicadores* as drug addicts or the coca leaf as a narcotic –as it has been done by the Single Convention of 1961–. The green coca leaf is not the white powder we know as cocaine. Moreover, we shall then deal with their differences.

3.3. From Coca to Cocaine (and its Derivates)

In 2006, addressing the General Assembly of the United Nations with a coca leaf in his hand, the President of Bolivia, Evo Morales, proclaimed: "*This is the green coca leaf, which is not white as cocaine is. This is the coca leaf that represents the Andean culture, our environment and the hope of our people*"[85] (Morales, 2006). In fact, the symbolic and cultural role that the coca leaf has had for centuries in the Andes deviates abysmally from the destabilizing and disruptive effects that the cocaine hydrochloride has once it is mass-produced and synthetized in illegal laboratories.

Cocaine, or cocaine hydrochloride, is a psychoactive alkaloid processed from the leaves of the coca bush (Tullis, 1991: 3). The process to convert the coca leaf into CHCL (Figure 2), contrary to what it could be thought, is not a complex process. This allows for its production by the same coca growers in precarious kitchen-type clandestine laboratories or small home workshops (Lee, 1981: 35; Mejía and Posada, 2010: 255). The first step consists of extracting the alkaloid cocaine from the coca leaves. "*Cocaine is obtained from coca leaves using a relatively simple method by which*

[84]Although the most frequent explanation is that the alkaline substance plays an important role in the extraction of cocaine, the available literature offers several explanations for the addition of lime or ashes to coca: to improve the flavor of the coca, to potentiate the cocaine action, or to release the cocaine alkaloid from the coca quid. Some studies also maintained that lime might retard the freeing of cocaine from the leaf. To expand on this respect, see Wynne and Phillips, 1980: 13-24.

[85] My own translation.

it is extracted from the leaves with an organic solvent (often kerosene)" (Dreyfus, 2002: 25).

The result in this first stage is the crude cocaine sulfate, commonly known as coca paste. This "*is usually tannish brown, the color coming from plant material, dirt, etc. It usually contains all compounds which will precipitate with lime and dissolve in gasoline. If a stronger alkali is used, more compounds will be present*" (Lee, 1981: 35).

The next step of the process is to convert the coca paste into CBP. This stage is crucial in the manufacturing of cocaine because it will determine "*the amount and proportions of different alkaloids which will be present in the finished product*" (Lee, 1981: 36). The conversion of the coca paste into CBP is obtained by dissolving the coca paste in water and adding sulfuric acid to further acidify the solution. Following, potassium permanganate is added, which triggers an oxidation process which does not affect the cocaine immediately, but the oils and impurities that the coca paste could have.

> *The critical part of the process is deciding when to stop the action of the permanganate by adding an alkali. If the decision is made too early, the resultant base will contain more impurities and other alkaloids; if the decision is made too late, some cocaine will be destroyed by the permanganate.* (Lee, 1981: 36)

Inasmuch as destroying part of the cocaine with over oxidation would mean to lose money, drug traffickers sometimes skip the oxidation process with potassium permanganate. The result is that the CBP is sold containing impurities, rests of kerosene and only 60% of cocaine hydrochloride[86] (cf. Lee, 1981: 36-37).

In spite of not being the final product in the process of extracting cocaine from the coca leaves –it has not yet been turned into CHCL–, the CBP is also consumed, usually inhaled or smoked mixed with marijuana or tobacco. CBP was first consumed in the decade of 1980 in Venezuela, Peru and Colombia –where it is known as *bazuco*–, and in Brazil –where it is given the name of *merla*– a decade later. In the first years of the new millennium, a considerable increase in the consumption of this drug was noticed in Uruguay, Chile and in Argentina, where it is known as *paco* (an acronym in Spanish for CBP) or *the drug of/for the poor* due to its low price, high toxicity and harmful effects.

[86] "*Cocaine hydrochloride made from properly oxidized base may be as much as 82 % cocaine base*" (Lee, 1981: 36).

Paco is smoked in homemade pipes with a hollow aluminum tube, where burning marijuana or tobacco keeps it warm and allows for the volatilization of the powder. The effect of the drug varies according to the type of precursor chemicals included in the preparation, but it is almost immediate: its effects can be seen between the 8-40 seconds right after consumption. However, it quickly loses its effect in a few minutes. This causes a very strong drive to continue smoking (Blickman and Garibotto, 2006: 5).

Finally, in the last stage, the CBP is turned into cocaine hydrochloride. In order for this process to be carried out, only one fundamental chemical is needed: ether. In this stage, the CBP "*is dissolved in ether, and hydrochloric acid is added to precipitate cocaine hydrochloride crystals. These are collected by filtration and they are then dried*" (Lee, 1981: 37).

> *Cocaine hydrochloride (...) is a powerful central nervous system stimulant used non-medically to produce euphoria or wakefulness; repeated use produces dependence. [It is] often sold as white translucent, crystalline flakes or powder, frequently adulterated with various sugars or local anesthetics. The powder is sniffed, and produces effects within 1-3 minutes that last about 30 minutes. Cocaine may be ingested orally, often with alcohol, and combined opioid and cocaine users are likely to inject it intravenously.* (WHO, 1994: 23)

The typical amount of drug for consumption when sniffed is about 10 to 35 mg. per line (typically users will repeat the dose in both nostrils), and from 10 to 20 mg. when injected. The immediate, short or long-term pharmacological effects are described in the following chart (Table 7).

Another form of consuming cocaine is by freebasing it, a process whereby the potency of CHCL is increased by extracting pure cocaine alkaloid with ether. Cocaine salt is heated together with baking soda and the vapors are inhaled through a water pipe. This form of cocaine consumption is commonly known as "*smoking crack*"[87] (WHO, 1994: 23). Alternatively, and due to the high cost and difficulty producing cocaine freebase, the cocaine hydrochloride powder can be mixed with ammonia or powdered amphetamine and cooked; the resultant substance mixed with water, filtered with a cloth, and left to dry (Belenko, 1993: 3). The crystalline-like residue is then broken up and sold in form of *rocks*. These rocks are heated and the vapors inhaled either in a marijuana or tobacco cigarette, or in a small glass pipe. "*A typical*

[87] *Crack* refers to the crackling sound made when the compound is heated.

vial of crack contains anywhere from an estimated 80 mg. to 100 mg. of cocaine" (Belenko, 1993: 4).

TABLE 7: Pharmacological Effects of CHCL in the Sought-After, Short and Long Term

Sought-after effects	- Feelings of physical and mental well-being, exhilaration, euphoria - Increased alertness and energy - Postponement of hunger and fatigue
Short-term effects	- Loss of appetite - Faster breathing, increased heart rate and blood pressure, increased body temperature, sweating - Dilation of pupils - Bizarre, erratic, sometimes violent behavior - With larger doses: hallucinations, talkativeness, sense of power and superiority, restlessness, hyper excitability, irritability which can lead to panic and paranoid psychosis (disappears if discontinued) - Excessive doses may lead to convulsions, seizures, stroke, cerebral hemorrhage or heart failure
Long-term effects	- Destruction of tissues in nose if sniffed - Respiratory problems if smoked - Infectious diseases, abscesses, if injected - Malnutrition, weight loss - Disorientation, apathy, confused exhaustion due to lack of sleep - Development of tolerance - Strong psychological dependence - With continued use, a state similar to paranoid psychosis may develop - After stopping, there usually follows a long period of sleep and then depression; during the crash, death from respiratory failure may occur

Source: UNODC, 2003b: 17-18.

FIGURE 2: Stages in the Process of Elaboration of CHCL and its By-Products

Coca leaf	+	Alkaline (lime, cement, etc.)	=	**Coca Paste**
Coca Paste	+	Water, potassium permanganate, sulfuric acid and ammonia	=	**Base Paste (CBP)**
CBP	+	Ether and hydrochloric acid	=	**Hydrochloride of cocaine (CHCL)**
CHCL	+	Baking soda and acid, acetone, ether, etc.	=	**Crack**
		Ammonia and powdered amphetamine	=	**Residue/Rocks**

4. Dimensions

4.1. Production and Manufacture

As it has been mentioned before, manufacturing CHCL from the coca leaf is a three-step process. The first step involves harvesting the coca leaves and turning them into coca paste; during the second step, the coca paste is turned into CBP; and in the final step the CBP is converted into CHCL. Therefore, I will define the *production* as the process of illegal cultivation and harvest of the coca leaf, and *manufacture* as the transformation and refining of the raw material into CHCL and/or derivatives[88].

The major coca leaf producing nations are Peru, Bolivia and Colombia, and, to a lesser extent, Brazil[89]. The cultivation of the coca leaf in Colombia takes place in the counties of Putumayo, Caquetá, Meta, Guaviare, Nariño, Antioquia and Vichada (Hudson, 2010: 190). In Peru, the areas where cultivation is more concentrated are the Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV), Apurímac (a region in southern-central Peru), La Convención and Lares. Other growing regions are Palcazú-Pichis-Pachitea, Marañón, Putumayo and some smaller growing areas in the Amazon basin (UNODC, 2011a: 101). Bolivia, meanwhile, has Yungas and Chapare as two big producing areas, and Apolo and Yapacani as regions of less importance (Machicado, 1993: 135; UNODC, 2011a: 244).

In these three Andean countries, the cultivated area with coca bushes since 1985 till 2000, comprised an average of around 200,000 hectares (Childress, Dombey-Moore and Resetar: 1994: 10; Mejía and Posada, 2010: 258), but each country's share of total cultivation changed dramatically during the last decades. In

[88] The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, in its Article 1, distinguishes the production from the manufacture. While the former is defined as "*the separation of opium, coca leaves, cannabis and cannabis resin from the plants from which they are obtained*" (Article 1, subsection T), it is understood that manufacturing corresponds to "*all processes, other than production, by which drugs may be obtained and includes refining as well as the transformation of drugs into other drugs*" (Article 1, subsection N). In this dissertation, I will reflect that distinction in the differentiation between *Upstream Producer Countries* and *Downstream Producer Countries* (cf. section 4.1.1 of this chapter). In Ch. V, additionally, I will include more categories that I will define in that same chapter: production, manufacture, adulteration and fractionation.

[89] In the report *Cocaine production, eradication, and the environment: policy, impact, and options* from the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations belonging to the Committee on Governmental Affairs from the US Senate, it was pinpointed that "*the coca cultivation has spread to Brazil as well*". However, and since the coca cultivated in Brazil is from the *ipadu* variety, it is "*yields per hectare* (…) *are much lower*" (1990: 55).

1990, Peru had the largest number of hectares under coca cultivation (about 62% of the total), and Colombia the lowest (14%). By 1999, these shares had completely reversed, with Peru having 21% of the total, Bolivia 12%, and Colombia 67% (Mejía and Posada, 2010: 258). Between 2001 and 2010, and although the ONDCP and the UNODC differ in the data provided regarding the hectares of cultivated areas with coca bushes[90], two big tendencies were noticed: on the one hand, Colombia substantially reduced the number of hectares of cultivated land with coca plantations, whereas Bolivia and Peru increased the cultivated area.

TABLE 8: Estimates of Coca Bush Cultivation (in Ha.) in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, 2001-2010 according to the data provided by the ONDCP and the UNODC

Year	Colombia		Peru		Bolivia		Total	
	ONDCP	UNODC	ONDCP	UNODC	ONDCP	UNODC	ONDCP	UNODC
2001	69,800	144,800	32,100	46,200	19,900	19,900	121,800	210,900
2002	144,450	102,000	34,700	46,700	21,600	21,600	200,750	170,300
2003	113,850	86,000	29,250	44,200	23,200	23,600	166,300	153,800
2004	114,100[a]	80,000	27,500	50,300	24,600	27,700	166,200	158,000
2005	144,000	86,000	34,000	48,200	26,500	25,400	204,500	159,600
2006	157,200	78,000	42,000	51,400	25,800	27,500	225,000	156,900
2007	167,000	99,000	36,000	53,700	29,500	28,900	232,500	181,600
2008	119,000	81,000	41,000	56,100	32,000	30,500	192,000	167,600
2009	116,000	73,000	40,000	59,900	35,000	30,900	191,000	163,800
2010	100,000	62,000	53,000	61,200	34,500	31,100	187,500	154,300

Sources: White House (2010; 2012b) and UNODC (2011a; 2013a).
Note: **a.** From 2004 to 2005, there appears to have been a jump in cultivation. That was not necessarily the case. Due to reports from the Colombian Police and the Colombian Armed Forces and some informants and other Intelligence sources, the ONDCP increased the observed area inside Colombia where they looked for coca and found larger amounts in non-traditional growing areas.

A possible explanation for the increase in the cultivated areas in Peru and Bolivia, and the simultaneous reduction of the ones in Colombia is the *balloon effect*.

[90] The two main sources of data for illegal drug production, prices, extent of cultivation of illegal crops, and seizures of drug shipments are the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the US Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). The difference that can be noticed in the figures provided is due to the methodology employed to collect the information. The UNODC, using surveys and studies on yields, produces an estimate of potential cocaine production; gathers prices of intermediate goods such as dry coca leaf and coca base, and collects other crucial statistics such as eradication measures; seizures of drug shipments, and the number of cocaine-processing laboratories destroyed as reported by different governmental institutions in producer countries. The ONDCP, in preparing its estimates of coca cultivation, analyses black-and-white, high-resolution satellite imagery and aerial photographs. These photographs are taken only between November and January each year, if weather allows it. However, this technology is not reliable, because it did not take into account image distortions or variations in the terrain and the atmosphere, such as cloud cover (see Mejía and Posada, 2010: 257).

Metaphorically speaking, the balloon effect refers to a balloon filled with air or water. If this balloon is squeezed by law enforcement, the air or water, i.e. the coca fields, cocaine laboratories, and trafficking routes, will shift somewhere else. From this perspective, the conclusion would be that, in the last decade, the Plan Colombia has been effective in its purpose of reducing the cultivated areas in Colombia but, consequently, there has been a displacement of these crops to Peru and Bolivia. Nevertheless, there is still not enough empirical evidence to support this claim[91]. However, the tendency does represent a warning sign of the potential large increases in Bolivia and Peru if anti-drug policies and monitoring are not maintained in all areas where coca can and has been grown in the past (Mejía and Posada, 2010: 261).

After collecting information about illegally cultivated as well as eradicated areas of coca[92] bushes (cf. Table 9), international organizations estimate the production of cocaine hydrochloride. In order to do that, for instance, the UNODC considers yields per hectare as well as technical coefficients of transformation for each of the main links in the cocaine production chain (Mejía and Posada, 2010: 264). Analyzing the data of the last decade provided by the UNODC, the conclusion is that the main trend in potential cocaine production is very similar to that of coca cultivation. Thus, as it is shown below in Graphics 1 and 2, a reduction of the cultivated areas in each of the analyzed countries corresponds to a reduction in the production of cocaine in the same countries. However, when analyzing the global trend, there is not such a clear direct correlation between the reduction of the cultivated areas and the decrease in the production of cocaine.

Between the years 2003-2006, for example, certain stability can be noticed in the global quantity of hectares of cultivated lands with coca bushes. Nevertheless, the production of CHCL during the same years, increased considerably. According to the UNODC, this could be because the "*traffickers have found ways to improve the efficiency of clandestine laboratories in extracting cocaine alkaloids from coca leaves. The lack of precise measurements of laboratory efficiency in the different countries*

[91] According to Friesendorf (2005) –and I agree with him–, the balloon metaphor as a causal explanation, oversimplifies the highly complex process of displacement. "*Ideally, a causal mechanism posits different explanatory factors influencing an eventual outcome in a chronological fashion. Displacement is more complex, however. Numerous background conditions, idiosyncrasies, and explanatory factors may operate simultaneously or in a random order*" (Friesendorf, 2005: 43).

[92] Not all the coca production is illegal. In Bolivia, and according to Law No. 1008 of July 19, 1988, on the Regime Applicable to Coca and Controlled Substances, a cultivated areas of 12,000 hectares for traditional uses such as coca chewing, medicines, and coca tea infusion is allowed.

increases the level of uncertainty" (UNODC, 2011a: 101). In the last years of the decade (2007-2010), an increase in the eradicated areas and a drop not only in the cultivated areas, but also in the production of cocaine can be clearly noticed.

TABLE 9: Cumulative Eradication of Coca Bush in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, 2001-2010 (in Ha.) according to the data provided by ONDCP and the UNODC

Year	Colombia[a]		Peru		Bolivia		Total	
	ONDCP	UNODC	ONDCP	UNODC	ONDCP	UNODC	ONDCP	UNODC
2001	85,996	95,898	6,436	6,436	9,435	9,395	101,867	111,729
2002	125,457	133,127	7,133	7,134	11,839	11,839	144,429	152,100
2003	131,332	137,036	7,022	11,312	10,000	10,089	148,354	158,437
2004	138,056	142,786	7,605	10,399	8,437	8,437	154,098	161,622
2005	172,014	170,755	8,966	12,237	6,073	6,073	187,053	189,065
2006	206,229	215,077	10,136	12,688	5,700	5,070	222,065	232,835
2007	213,414	219,939	11,056	12,072	6,269	6,269	230,739	238,280
2008	225,607	229,130	10,143	10,143	5,484	5,484	241,234	244,757
2009	162,527	156,315	10,025	10,025	6,341	6,341	178,893	172,681
2010	141,793	145,731	12,033	12,253	8,200	8,200	162,026	166,184

Sources: White House (2010; 2012b) and UNODC (2011a; 2013a).
Note: **a.** The figures corresponding to Colombia include manual and aerial eradication.

GRAPHIC 1: Estimates of Coca Bush Cultivation (in Ha.) in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, 2001-2010



Source: I personally made it based on the data provided by the UNODC, 2006a; 2011a.

GRAPHIC 2: Potential Manufacture of CHCL (in MT) in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, 2001-2010



Source: I personally made it based on the data provided by the UNODC, 2006a; 2011a.

4.1.1. The International Division of Production

So far, we have referred broadly to the production of coca and cocaine, and have highlighted the trends of this production in the main producer countries, and at the global level, in the last decade. However, it is necessary to point out that the division of labor required to transform the raw material into massive amounts of the final product gave way to a sophisticated transnational industry that involves criminal groups settled not only in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, but also in other South American countries. For the purpose of this dissertation, South America countries will be divided into five types according to the role they play in the CCC. These countries can be: Upstream Producer Countries (UPC); Downstream Producer Countries (DPC); Major Precursor Chemical Source Countries; Full Cycle Countries and Transshipment Countries[93].

The terms used to refer to these types of countries are non-standard in the existing literature. Lee (1988: 88), for example, makes reference to UPC and DPC. Dreyfus (2002: 72), uses four of the categories I am going to resort to in my

[93] The category *Transshipment Countries* should be analyzed in section 4.2 of this chapter related to cocaine trafficking as the main problem of the CCC. However, in order not to hinder the development of this argument, it will be included in this section.

dissertation –he does not use the concept Major Precursor Chemical Source Countries–, but he adds a fifth one: Neighboring Transshipment Countries. The INL (US Department of State, 2014), meanwhile, classifies the countries in four categories: Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries, Drug-Transit Countries, Major Precursor Chemical Source Countries and Money Laundering Countries.

Similar to Pablo Dreyfus' (2002: 73), this dissertation does not develop a close set of indicators to measure each one of these variables, but rather typifies South American countries according to the information given in the existing literature on the subject and the statistics provided by the national and international research and enforcement agencies. Also, it is worth clarifying that none of these types are static. The five categories of analysis, in Weberian terms, are *ideal types* to apprehend the general profile of a country and classify it. However, given the dynamism of the CCC and the narcotics policies applied in South America, a country can belong to a category today, but to another in the short –or long– term.

Following, the five categories mentioned above and the classification of some South American countries are developed. The analytical analysis will be carried out in Ch. IV of this dissertation.

Upstream Producer Countries (UPC)

Upstream and *downstream* are business terms applicable to the production processes that exist within several industries. Industries that commonly use this terminology include the metal industry, oil, gas, and biopharmaceutical and biotechnology industries. In this research study, both terms will be applied to refer to the illegal industry of coca-cocaine.

The upstream stage of the production process involves searching for and extracting raw materials, so UPC within the CCC are those where the bulk of the coca leaf production is located in and the coca paste is processed. Bolivia, Peru and Colombia could be defined as UPC, but given the fact that Colombia and Peru have been the main producers and exporters of CHCL during de decade 2001-2010, only Bolivia will be classified under this category.

The general characteristic of these countries is that a high percentage of the peasant labor force is engaged in coca production and harvest (growers), and in

transport of leaves to the maceration pits and production of coca paste (Dreyfus, 2002: 73). The territories in these countries are used for the production of the first two stages of cocaine production –which does not imply, of course, that CBP or CHCL is not produced in their territories–.

Downstream Producer Countries (DPC)

The downstream stage in the production process involves processing the materials collected during the upstream stage into a finished product. In the case of the cocaine industry, Colombia has historically been a paradigmatic case, but for the last decade, Peru must also be included in this category. Dreyfus (2002: 75), who characterized Peru as an UPC in 2002, pointed out that "*it is possible to see that the percentage of workers employed in the coca-cocaine industry in Colombia as compared to the total active economic population, is significantly smaller than in the cases of Peru and Bolivia*." Today, such claim is not evident, and it will even be refuted with data I will provide in Ch. III of this dissertation.

Major Precursor Chemical Source Countries

This category includes those countries with large chemical manufacturing or trading industries that have significant trade with drug-producing regions and those with significant chemical commerce susceptible to diversion domestically for smuggling into neighboring drug-producing countries. The designation as a major chemical source country does not indicate lack of adequate chemical control legislation or the ability to enforce it. Rather, it acknowledges the fact that the volume of chemical trade with drug-producing regions, or proximity to them, makes these countries the sources of the greatest quantities of chemicals liable to diversion (US Department of State, 2013: 50-51).

The US Department of State has classified three South American countries within this category: Argentina, Brazil and Chile (US Department of State, 2013a: 51-52). For reasons I will explain later, I will exclude Brazil from this category, since the profile of the country adjusts better to the description I will provide of Full Cycle

Countries. In the case of Argentina and Chile, both will be classified not only as precursor chemical source countries, but also as transshipment countries.

Full Cycle Countries

Full Cycle Countries[94] refer to those countries where the raw material is produced and completely processed. Another requirement is that these countries have local or foreign criminal organizations that manage all the stages of production (alone or through cooperation among them) and the retailing of the product. These countries do not depend on the importation of chemical inputs and they also have their own channels for money laundering and their own big centers for the distribution, retailing, and consumption of the final product. The only South American country that fulfills this type is Brazil, since Colombia and Peru are not the main consumers of their own CHCL, and always depend on the import of chemicals needed for the production stages.

Transshipment Countries

Article 1 of the 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, defines Transit States as those "*states through the territory of which illicit narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and substances in Table I and Table II are being moved, which is neither the place of origin nor the place of ultimate destination thereof*" (United Nations, 1988).

Transit countries function as *pit stops* for traders, since they may serve as a base for operations to set up a deal, for aircraft or ship refueling, and for recruitment of personnel required for such activities and protection (Dreyfus, 2002: 76). Some of these countries also play a major role as financial havens for the legitimization of *drug money* through the banking system, or for purchases or investments in commercial and industrial activities.

Within this category I will include Ecuador, Uruguay and Venezuela –Suriname, Guiana and the French Guiana, as I will explain later, are not included in my analysis–.

[94] This category of analysis was suggested by Dreyfus (2001: 77) from an interview he had with the Argentine analyst Rubén Heguilein in 1995.

Venezuela shares an extensive border with Colombia, which is the biggest producer of coca and cocaine in the world, and its territory is used as a route for the loads sent to Europe. There is, however, recent evidence that shows that Colombian and Mexican criminal groups have settled in Colombia to process the cocaine in clandestine laboratories near the border with Colombia (US Department of State, 2013a: 314). Uruguay, meanwhile, has traditionally been a tax haven for money laundering from drug trafficking[95]. Nevertheless, the increase in the consumption of CBP in Montevideo during the last decade (Laborde, Negrín and Pascale, 2010: 228; Blickman and Garibotto, 2006: 12), has made people question the role this country performs in the regional dynamics of the CCC (Garibotto, Calicchio, Latorre and Scarlatta, 2006). Finally, located between Peru and Colombia, we find Ecuador, a neighboring country of the two major producers of coca and cocaine in the world, from which CHCL, CBP and chemical precursors circulate (US Department of State, 2013a: 154).

4.2. Traffic and Final Distribution

The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 defined the *illicit trafficking* as "*the cultivation or any kind of trafficking of narcotics, contrary to the dispositions of the present Convention*" (United Nations, 1961: Article 1). I will not adopt such definition in this dissertation for I consider cultivation as part of the production stage. Illicit trafficking will be defined as the transport, transfer or transit of coca leaves, coca paste, CHCL, crack and chemical precursors used in the production of CHCL from the areas of production to the very consumer markets.

Illicit trafficking essentially uses routes of transportation and distribution. In this respect, French researchers have made important contributions so as to help understand the real dimensions of routes[96]. Chouvy (2002) has pointed out that the routes have not only an evident geographical dimension, but also a strong political component. Firstly, the routes of illicit trafficking are usually the stage of conflict

[95] In 2003, the INL of the US Department of State classified Uruguay as a major money laundering country. "*A major money laundering country is defined by statute as one whose financial institutions engage in currency transactions involving significant amounts of proceeds from international narcotics trafficking*." (US Department of State, 2003).

[96] For a brief history of the geopolitical evolution of drugs carried out by academics, journalists and French analysts, see Labrousse, 2011: 13-15.

between different actors (the police, the military, peasants, guerilla groups and criminals). Secondly, the route generates and creates access; a fundamental facet in countries with geographically isolated populations and little development regarding road infrastructure. To this respect, the French geographer stresses that

> *the production and transportation of drugs are made possible by an equilibrium between accessibility and inaccessibility, because if the geographical isolation of the region of production is required (for reasons of security and sustainability of unlawful activity supposed to be hidden) accessibility is also imperative.*[97] (Chouvy, 2002: 241)

Part of the inaccessibility of a road is given by natural obstacles (mountains, rivers, and rainforests), political obstacles (borders) and/or situational obstacles (hostile populations, arm conflicts, tolls, etc.). Chouvy (2002) understands that those obstacles turn the roads into anti-roads. If the trafficker still decides to take such risks, it means that he will be able to change the inconveniences into benefits.

> *The rugged terrain, the weather conditions, the border and tariff regulations of international trade, the conflicts which impose limits on the movement be it of goods or people are anti-roads. In the case of drug trafficking as that of any other illicit trafficking, the risks and problems of anti-roads then turns to the traffickers advantage since it provides him a form of security (low police and customs control) and justifies higher prices.*[98] (Chouvy, 2002: 241)

From the Andes, and through the traffic roads to the two main markets (the US and countries of Western Europe), drug traffickers have to overcome many obstacles, the most evident ones being the oceans. According to EUROPOL (2010), three main narco-maritime routes towards Europe have been identified: the northern route, which originates in the Caribbean and whose final destination is Portugal or Spain; the center route, from South America to Europe going through the Canary Islands; and the southern route, from the South coming from Western Africa, and from there to Portugal and Spain. Along these paths, the local narco-actors participate in not only the trafficking but also the selling in target markets (EUROPOL, 2010: 20-21). In the case of the US,

> *the bulk of cocaine shipments are still by sea across the Pacific to Mexico and on to the United States. In addition, Central American countries have gained prominence in recent years as transshipment locations. The Caribbean, in contrast, has lost significance as a transshipment hub over the last decade.* (UNODC, 2011a: 122)

[97] My own translation.
[98] My own translation.

On routes where drug passes there also tends to develop illegal transport of arms, diamonds, gems and people. Labrousse (2011) has named this phenomenon as *multi-trafficking*.

> *What is new in all these routes is the development of multi-trafficking. Drug traffickers frequently use the same routes and the same networks of complicity to carry, for instance, arms, gems or human beings. This diversification of their activities increases the harmful capacity of criminal organizations.*[99] (Labrousse, 2011: 12)

It must be pointed out that many criminal groups associated with drug trafficking also participate in other illegal activities. However,

> *In relation to other products, drugs have the particularity of having several transformations and each one of them represents an important increase in the revenues. Given that drugs are frequently transported in large quantities, the benefits from the different levels of production are added to the ones provided by the postage of physical and political obstacles. Consequently, drugs, unlike diamonds, for example, which are able to trespass borders due to its small size and because they are not cut until they reach the buyer, may allow financing various organizations, mafias or guerillas, all along the route that goes from the producers to the consumers.*[100] (Labrousse, 2011: 13)

The final stage of trafficking is the distribution in target markets. Rengert (1996) advanced a theoretical framework where from to examine the distribution of illegal drugs, and named it the Two-Step Drug Diffusion Model. According to this model, which analyses the illegal distribution of narcotics from a geographical-spatial pattern, two types of distributors are active agents: the organized criminal, who markets drugs for personal profit, and the user, who contains and may distribute drugs further for personal gratification. Two interdependent and reinforcing motivations –the entrepreneurial and the psychological– thus, govern the diffusion process (Rengert, 1996: 19).

For the first step of the model, the distribution of organized criminal activity in illegal drug sales is expected to conform to a hierarchical pattern of diffusion. In accordance with this, organized drug distributors originate in the largest cities at the top of the country's hierarchy of central places and subsequently filter down in an orderly progression to metropolitan centers of decreasing size in the urban system. The main assumption behind this top-down diffusion of illegal market is that

> *because large cities contain more potential customers than smaller urban centers, we expect the larger centers to be chosen first as narcotics market areas and hence to experience widespread drug addiction earlier. Subsequently we would expect smaller*

[99] My own translation.
[100] My own translation.

cities in the adopting hierarchy to be chosen as fertile new market areas, as the larger cities become "saturated" with illegal drug marketers. (Rengert, 1996: 20)

On the other hand, the second step of the model assumes a new pattern in the area surrounding an established illicit drug market in each urban center. That is, following hierarchical diffusion of illicit drug markets in accordance with the size of the urban centers in decreasing order, local or neighborhood expansion of the markets takes place in the region served by each center/city. In order to exploit the potential drug-consuming population in each metropolitan area, illegal drug distributors expand their activities outward from the central city into surrounding suburban areas in an expansion-contiguous-neighborhood diffusion process and distant-minimizing effects that largely shape the spatial patterns of drug distribution (Rengert, 1996: 33).

4.3. Consumption

Cocaine is a stimulant with powerful psychotropic impact. The intensity of its effects depends on the rate of absorption into the blood stream and the brain[101]. Intravenous injection or smoking produces an almost immediate effect. Inhalation, via the smoking of crack or CBP, also produces a fast effect. However, "*the cocaine 'high' is over very quickly. Indeed, with a one-to-two-hour duration, cocaine has the shortest 'high' of all dangerous drugs*" (Griffith, 1997: 43). Because of cocaine's short *high* and the intensity of its pleasurable effect, there is an extraordinary dependency factor.

Addicts need to resort to larger doses at shorter intervals, and addiction has serious psychological consequences. There is often a toxic psychosis similar to paranoid schizophrenia, reflected by anxiety, restlessness, and extreme irritability. Tactile hallucinations develop in some cases (...). Cocaine overdose can also be fatal. Death can result from seizures, respiratory failure, strokes, and cerebral hemorrhage. (Griffith, 1997: 44)

[101] "*Drug-induced pleasure has two components: the initial, rapid effect (colloquially known as the rush) and the euphoria that follows this, often extending over several hours (the high). The faster the drug enters the brain the stronger the rush, which is why there is a drive to formulate street drugs in ways that allow them to be injected intravenously or smoked: in both cases, effects on the brain can occur within 30 seconds.*" (Nutt, King, Saulsbury and Blakemore, 2007: 1048).

The consumption[102] of CBP, CHCL or crack, damages the social tissue in many ways, by causing physical and/or mental problems in their consumers (Waldorf, Reinarman and Murphy, 1992; Saffer and Dave, 2005); family disruption (Somers *et al*., 2011), and crime and violence[103][104] (Desimone, 2001; Goldstein, 1985). The UNODC estimates that around 16 million people in the world[105] (Graphic 3), between 15 and 64 years old, consume CHCL (UNODC, 2008a: 84). The biggest markets for consumption are North America (with 7.1 millions of consumers), Western and Central Europe (with 3.9 millions) and South America, including Central America and the Caribbean (3.1 millions of consumers). During the XX century, the consumption of cocaine in the US was gradually growing, but a rapid fall took place between 1985 y 1993. Since then, the consumption in the world's biggest market has remained stable (Mejía and Posada, 2010: 270). In Europe, however, cocaine consumption, according to most estimates, has been on the rise in recent years. "*Over the last decade, the volume of cocaine consumed in Europe has doubled. In recent years, there are some signs of stabilization, though at the higher levels. Cocaine use in East Europe is limited*" (UNODC, 2011a: 16).

According to a report provided by the UNODC based on data gathered in the year 2009 (UNODC, 2011a: 122), around 380 MT of CHCL were exported from the South American Andes to the US. If approximately 100 MT were seized in South America and other 100 were seized in the US, around 180 MT of CHCL were consumed in the US. To Europe, meanwhile, 220 MT of CHCL were exported, from which 60 were seized before leaving South America or the Caribbean. The

[102] Reference will not be made here to the theories regarding the use of drugs. For an excellent compendium of all the biological, psychological and sociological theories which explain the consumption of drugs, see Goode, 2011: Ch. 6.

[103] In his well-known article, Goldstein (1985) examines the consumption and trafficking of drugs as generators of violence. To do this he develops a tripartite conceptual framework according to which drugs and violence are related in three ways: psychopharmacological (some individuals, as a result of short or long term ingestion of specific substances, may become excitable, irrational, and may exhibit violent behavior); economically compulsive (some drug users engage in economically oriented violent crime, e.g., robbery, in order to support costly drug use); and systemic (this type of violence refers to the traditionally aggressive patterns of interaction within the system of drug distribution and use. Some examples are disputes over territory between rival drug dealers, assaults and homicides, robberies, elimination of informers, etc.).

[104] A detailed analysis of all the problems mentioned related to the consumption of CHCL, can be found in Inciardi, 2008 (see especially Ch. VIII and IX).

[105] In its report 2011, the UNODC does not estimate an approximate number of consumers at global level (based on year 2009). On the contrary, it estimates that the annual prevalence of cocaine is between 0,3% and 0,5% of the world population aged 15-64, or some 14,2 to 20,5 million people in that age range (UNODC, 2011a: 16).

approximate volume of CHCL consumed in Europe during the year 2009 was, thus, of 160 MT.

GRAPHIC 3: Annual Prevalence of CHCL Use in 2006/2007. Distribution by Region (N=16.0 million)



Source: UNODC, 2008a: 84.
Note: South America includes Central America and the Caribbean.

In Rengert's Two-Step Drug Diffusion Model (1996), I have mentioned that consumers have an active role in the spread of CHCL, even in the second step of the model. But, what mechanisms specifically help drugs to diffuse through a local population? Rogers and Shoemaker (1971) provide a key analysis so as to understand the process of experimenting a new drug. Taking as basis more than 50 interviews which were carried out in 1950, the authors conclude that the new users undergo three stages: (a) trial-adoption, in which the new user, in the company of converted friends, learns how to smoke properly; (b) knowledge, in which the novice learns to get high and to cope with the intoxicating effects of marijuana; and (c) persuasion-confirmation, in which the newly initiated user acquires a favorable attitude toward the innovation, gains a taste for the experience, and actively seeks continued gratification by smoking marijuana thereafter. The scenario for addiction to hard drugs, such as CHCL "*is probably quite similar to that for marijuana, and it seems reasonable to draw a strong parallel between the two learning situations*" (Rengert, 1996: 33-34). Abadinsky (1993: 28) also describes the stages of the *race* of a heroin

addict, and identifies five: experimentation, initiation, commitment, dysfunction, and maturation.

To conclude, it seems that the micro-spatial behavior characterized by the neighborhood component of the Rengert's Diffusion Model, involves direct communication between sets of individuals. Furthermore,

> *the spread of addicts around an established drug seller entails a learning process, which depends on interpersonal contact and social pressures. (...) An individual's decision to experiment with a narcotic such as heroin or cocaine usually occurs as a result of watching friends demonstrate its use.* (Rengert, 1996: 34)

5. Actors

The CCC, given its transnational character[106], involves a variety of actors. Given the focus of this dissertation, I will analyze some of these actors' interactions and the securitizing role some of them have; I think it is fundamental to identify and classify these actors by following certain criteria.

Griffith (1997) identified the main actors involved in what he defines as "*the geonarcotics milieu, the relations of conflict and cooperation among national and international actors that are driven by drugs*" (1997: 13). When identifying the actors and the relations among them, the American author understands that:

(a) Actors can be proactive and reactive, and both proactive and reactive behaviors are possible from the same actor;

(b) Cooperative and conflictive relations can be established among them –conflict and cooperative interactions exist both nationally and internationally, and can involve more than two actors at any or one time–; and

(c) The relations among actors can be bilateral or multilateral, symmetrical or asymmetrical, and involve flows of vertical or horizontal cooperation.

[106] The term *transnational* is used here to refer to "*the movement of information, money, physical objects, people, or other tangible or intangible items across state boundaries, when at least one of the actors involved in this movement is non-governmental*" (Williams and Savona, 1996: 5). The CCC has a transnational dimension because the non-state actors that participate in it, "*act across the national borders and establish relationships with their counterparts in other countries without taking into account the sovereignty of the states*" (Dreyfus, 2001: 63).

In this dissertation, I will work on the following assumptions:

(a) Actors can be proactive or reactive in relation to the stages of production, trafficking, and consumption. Both proactive and reactive behaviors are possible from the same actor (Griffith, 1997: 16). Cartels, for example, are proactive in relation to production and trafficking, but reactive when states introduce countermeasures (interdiction, crop substitution, eradication, confiscation, etc.).

(b) The interaction between actors can be either conflictive or cooperative (Griffith, 1997: 16), and all possible levels of conflict and cooperation in that *continuum*. Conflict interactions include protests, complaints, warnings, threats, seizures, blockades, arm attacks, murders, abductions, etc.

(c) Conflict and cooperation are two *ideal types* of processes of interaction among the actors, which can occur in different degrees and can go, in the case of a conflict, from a situation of discord to an armed confrontation. In the case of cooperation, from a coincidence of interests to the development of a network of collaboration and integration so as to accomplish shared objectives –these shared objectives can be legal or illegal, which implies that these instances of cooperation can take place among guerilla people, narcotraffickers or states– (Marrero Rocha, 2001: 130).

(d) Actors can be regional or extra-regional –notice that Griffith makes reference to national and international actors (Griffith, 1997: 17)–. The term *regional actors* should be understood as South American actors, and *extra-regional actors*, are actors from the rest of the world outside South America[107].

(e) The actors mentioned are only those involved in the stages of production, trafficking and consumption of coca, coca paste, cocaine hydrochloride, and its derivatives. Unlike Griffith (1997), I will exclude in this mapping of trans-state actors (intergovernmental organizations –IGOs–); inter-state actors (multinational corporations –MNCs– and other corporations) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which can actively participate in the stage of money laundering.

(f) According to their nature, the actors involved in the CCC can be state actors and state-structure actors (states, armed and police forces); violent non-state

[107] About the definition of South America, see Ch. III of this dissertation.

actors[108] (criminal organizations[109], paramilitary groups, guerrillas, drug cartels, terrorist groups and youth gangs), and individual actors (some traders, peasants and consumers).

[108] A violent non-state actor (VNSA) is an organization that uses illegal violence to reach its goals. Williams (2008) identified seven types of VNSA: (a) warlords; (b) militias; (c) paramilitary forces; (d) insurgencies; (e) terrorist organizations; (f) criminal organizations; and (g) youth gangs.

[109] The term *organized criminal group* was defined in the Article 1 of the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (2000) as "*a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit*". In line with this concept, and for the scope of this dissertation, a criminal organization will be defined as a group of people associated for the purpose of engaging in criminal activity on a more or less sustained basis. These groups of people engage in the enterprise crime, namely the provision of illicit goods and services, or of licit goods that have been acquired through illicit means, such as theft or fraud. Criminal organizations have a significant degree of cooperation and organization to provide the illicit goods and services. This includes entrepreneurial skill, specialization, capacity for coordination and when necessary the use of violence and corruption to facilitate the conduct of activities. The structure of criminal organizations may range from formal bureaucratic and highly cohesive structures to fluid and informal networks. This conception of criminal organization, quoted in Dreyfus (2000: 33), has been developed by Williams and Savona, 1996: 3-4.

FIGURE 3: Regional and Extra-Regional Actors Involved in the *Continuum* Conflict-Cooperation within the CCC



Note: This graphic of personal elaboration, was inspired in that one developed by Ivelaw L. Griffith (1997: 17) to explain the conflict interactions in what he considers the *Geonarcotics milieu*.

6. Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, the CCC has been defined as the **set of actors who, in a conflict-cooperation *continuum*, participate proactively or reactively in the illegal instances of production, manufacture, trafficking and/or consumption of crops of coca leaf, coca paste, cocaine base paste, cocaine hydrochloride, by-products and derivatives which contain cocaine alkaloid.** From this definition, a historical reference has been given regarding the creation of the IDCR, which explains the prohibitionist basis on which the CCC rests. Next, the difference to the coca bush and the leaf of the CHCL and their derivatives has been established. Moreover, the three main dimensions of the CCC have been identified: the production, trafficking and consumption.

It is argued that in the production stage, there exist three big producers of coca leaf and CHCL (Peru, Bolivia and Colombia), but actors from all South American countries participate in the CCC from a multifaceted international division of production. In order to categorize these countries later (in Ch. IV), five types of countries have been identified depending on the role they play in the CCC: Upstream Producer Countries (UPC), Downstream Producer Countries (DPC), Major Precursor Chemical Source Countries, Full Cycle Countries and Transshipment Countries. In reference to the stage of trafficking and final distribution, Chouvy's contributions and the geographic and political dimension of the transportation routes have been taken into account; Labrousse's idea on multi-trafficking; and Rengert's Two-Step Drug Diffusion Model so as to explain the final distribution in the target markets. Finally, the stages undergone by an addict during consumption, and the global consumption tendencies of CHCL, were analyzed.

Toward the end of this chapter, the actors that belong to the CCC are identified and the assumptions around which the analysis of the following chapters will be structured are specified too.

In the following chapter, I will analyze the CCC at the South American level, taken into account the concept of coca-cocaine complex elaborated in this chapter.

CHAPTER III

South America as the Regional Security Complex of Argentina

1. Introduction

As indicated in the title of the present chapter, South America will be taken as the category to analyze the Regional Security Complex (RSC) of Argentina. This implies that there is a group of state units that can, collectively, be identified under this name: South America – and which are not related to other concepts such as Central America, North America, or the Caribbean. From a geographical point of view, South America may be defined as the southern sub-continent of the American continent, and which includes twelve sovereign countries and one European overseas territory: Argentina[110], Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guiana, French Guiana (overseas territory of France), Paraguay, Peru, Surinam, Uruguay and Venezuela.

South America is traditionally divided into two large areas: the Andean Area and the Southern Cone. The Andean Area consists of Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia. The southern most area of the continent, on the other hand, covers Argentina, Chile and Uruguay although it often extends to include Paraguay and Brazil given the historical and political elements they share (Map 1). Finally, Guiana, French

[110] In this dissertation, the Islas Malvinas or Falkland Islands, will not be considered a British overseas territory, but a disputed territory administered by the United Kingdom and claimed by Argentina.

Guiana and Surinam, while being part of the South American geographical space, they require a separate comment.

French Guiana is an overseas department of France and, as such, it belongs to the EU. It is not an independent republic and it has been part of the French territory since 1604. The Co-Operative Republic of Guiana, in turn, is a sovereign English-speaking state which was originally colonized by the Dutch and later by the British. The Co-Operative Republic of Guiana acquired its independence in 1966 and it is part of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). Even when it also participates in some South American spaces such as UNASUR, it has traditionally been considered part of the Caribbean integration space. Surinam, on its part, achieved its independence in 1975. As a member of CARICOM, it is frequently considered a Caribbean country and has had frequent trade and cultural exchange with the Caribbean nations.

Besides their colonial past, which is more similar to the Caribbean nations than to the South American ones[111] (Heuman, 2014: 174-188), Surinam, Guiana and French Guiana are set apart from the rest of South America not only for their languages, but also for two major natural barriers: the Amazon rainforest and the Rondônia mountain chain. The two independent nations and the French Guiana, additionally, are generally considered part of the Caribbean from both a classical geopolitical point of view[112] and from their role in the CCC[113].

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[111] Anderson (1984: 15) has accurately pointed out that the Guianas present a problem of classification due to the fact that "*the British, Dutch, and French colonies in the Guianas were exceptions on a continent conquered by the Spanish and the Portuguese. A result of this situation is that throughout their history, the Guianas have functioned as islands.*"

[112] Authors such as Anderson (1984: 15), Atkins (1989: 421), Dreyfus (1995), Griffith (1997; 1998: 58) and Heine and Maginat (1988: 385), leave the Guianas and Surinam aside as parts of the geostrategic Caribbean area. Child (1985), Dreyfus (2002) and Kelly (1997), in contrast, add them to the South American region.

[113] The role that Guiana, Surinam and the French Guiana play in the CCC should not be underestimated – even when it is not conclusive. According to the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2010 (2010: 576), "*cocaine and heroin from South America, primarily destined for Europe, are transshipped through Surinam via Guiana from Venezuela. Drugs exit Surinam via numerous means including commercial air flights, drug couriers, and concealed in small private planes. (…) The majority of the cocaine on commercial air flights is bound for Europe, but there have also been several cases of cocaine identified on US-bound flights.*"

MAP 1: South America

Source: Latin American Network Information Center, Perry-Castañeda Library, The University of Texas at Austin (http://lanic.utexas.edu)

In view of this, in this chapter I will analyze South America as a Regional Security Complex (RSC), in terms of its being part of a constellation with two security sub-complexes: the Andean area and the Southern Cone; its structure; and the processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both, of the CCC (Figure 1).

FIGURE 1: A Regional Security Complex (RSC), its Structure and Constellation



From the above it follows that: (a) the South American RSC includes the Andean area and the Southern Cone as security sub-complexes, but it does not include Guiana, Surinam and French Guiana; (b) the ultimate purpose of studying the South American RSC and both its security sub-complexes the analysis of the security environment of the Argentinean Republic, main unit of analysis in this dissertation; (c) out of the numerous security problems affecting the region, I will focus only on the CCC and, rather than determining the threats it represents for the South American countries, I will analyze the aspects that are securitized or desecuritized in the region; (d) I will build a constellation of the South American RSC on the basis of four levels of analysis: a domestic level, a regional level, an interregional level and a global level; (e) the structure of the South American RSC will be determined in terms of its boundaries, units, polarity of the region and patterns of amity/enmity.

2. Constellation

2.1. The Domestic Level: the Nature of South American States

According to the variables developed in Ch. II, it is clear that none of the South American states could be defined as a strong state. In this section I will make a brief analysis of the characteristics of the states I have worked with in the previous chapter (Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Chile, Brazil and Uruguay). However this part of the dissertation will not proceed with a country-by-country study. Also, and since this is not a dissertation on the nature of the state in South America, not all the indicators of the nature of the state will be analyzed here. Importance will be given to those considered the most relevant in the sense that they have contributed to the rise of the CCC in South America.

2.1.1. Socio-political Cohesion (Legitimacy and Integration)

Bolivia and Peru have not concluded their processes of nation and state-building (Dreyfus, 2002: 81). Peru, for example, has three geographical regions, which are discontinuous in political and institutional terms: the coast, the hills and the Amazonia. In the hills and the Amazon regions, the presence of the central government is weak; Shining Path (SP) is currently operational, and the indigenous communities have developed a sense of belonging and loyalty to non-state actors like the associations of cocaleros. In Bolivia, something similar has happened. The country is divided into three large regions (the western, the central and the eastern regions), which feature an unbalanced development. Whereas most of the wealth is concentrated on the eastern region –in the Santa Cruz, Beni and Pando Departments–, poverty centers and most of the indigenous population are condensed in the western and central regions. The most evident outcome of this profound division is the fact that the poverty levels the Bolivian indigenous population suffer, are disproportionately more severe than the situation faced by other members of the

society[114]. Gradually, this economic gap has developed acute ethnic connotations, which has contributed to deepen social disintegration.

Ecuador features similar characteristics to Peru and Bolivia in terms of ethnic-economic issues as well as a weak state presence, at least in key border areas such as the Agrio Lake zone and the Putumayo area –Colombian department with a strong presence of the FARC and thousands of hectares of coca plantations–. It is estimated that around 2,500 seasonal Ecuadorian workers are employed in the Colombian coca plantations (Bartolomé, 2003). Nevertheless, the situation in Ecuador is not as critical as in Bolivia and Peru since Ecuador is not essentially a producer country in the CCC.

Regarding Brazil, social fragmentation derives from income distribution, while also taking an ethnic shade[115].

> *(…) the mean per-capita income of Afro-Brazilians was only half that of whites. Further, in 2005 about 33 percent of Afro-Brazilians lived in poor households whose incomes were below 50 percent of the median income of the country, in contrast to 14 percent of whites falling into this group*. (Gradin, 2009: 1426)

Although the idea of nationhood is strong among the population, and it does not contend with alternative identities (even when there are indigenous groups in the Brazilian Amazonia), the lack of access to housing and formal employment; structural poverty and overcrowding in large regions of the country generate social exclusion and foster a breeding ground for informal and illegal economies, such as the drug economy. The lack of state presence in the numerous *favelas* that extend throughout the peripheral belts of metropolis such as São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, additionally, contributes to the consolidation of criminal groups involved in the drug business and other law-breaking activities.

A similar pattern of socioeconomic fragmentation can be seen in Venezuela. As I will explain in detail in next chapter, Venezuela had two oil booms in the second half of the 20th century; both of them, however, culminated in severe cases of the Dutch Disease [116], hyper-inflationary processes and serious social and economic

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[114] In Bolivia, "*about 80% of the indigenous population is under the poverty line, whereas the non-indigenous population is affected in about 40%*" (Valenzuela Fernández, 2004: 12).

[115] According to The World Factbook (CIA, 2013), Brazil's population is comprised of 47.7% white population, 43.1% mulattos (mixed white and black), 7.6% Africans, 1.1% Asians and 0.4% indigenous people.

[116] The *Dutch Disease* is the name given to the damaging consequences of a significant increase in the income of foreign currency in a country. The term emerged in the decade of the 1960s when the Netherlands found natural gas deposits in Slochteren, a city near the North Sea. Due to this millionaire discovery, the Netherlands received a great income of currency and, as a result, the Dutch currency

consequences. During the 1990s, the outcomes of the adjustment policies of previous decades were felt as socioeconomic fragmentation started to emerge in three evident ways: a significant increase of families suffering from poverty level; rise of unemployment and a progressive growth in the informal sector (Maingon, 2004: 52).

When President Hugo Chávez (1998-2013) began his term in office, he launched the *Plan Bolivar 2000*, a civic-military plan whose objective was to deploy the Armed Forces to address the needs of the citizens in a situation of maximum social exclusion. Taking into account the disruptive role the Armed Forces have taken in South American countries, the policy of making use of the military structure to promote social inclusion was truly revolutionary.

In a few years Chavez's social agenda started to yield results: the poverty index and the households in a state of indigence in Venezuela decreased, a rise in the HDI was recorded (Table 7) and the index of schooling and literacy increased (Maingon, 2004: 60-61). Nevertheless, the structures that generated poverty, marginalization and exclusion remained intact – to which, other problems need to be added.

Even without having to face internal conflicts like in Colombia, or the Cartel wars in Mexico, in the last decade Venezuela has become the most dangerous country in South America. Caracas, in turn, has become the most violent capital city (Jácome and Gratius, 2011: 2-3). Moreover, the breakdown of the system of political parties and polarization, is a matter of concern (Hernández, 2005). At the moment of writing down these lines –March, 2014–, for example, Venezuela is under a spiral of violence between groups of the ruling party and opposing groups, which has been on for more than a month and has brought about 30 deaths. This episode, though, is only a sample of the absolute polarization that

> *(…) has led to conflicts between the central power, state authorities and municipal ones. The lack of coordination leaves room for criminal groups and non-state armed actors. As a consequence, a change in the way of living is at work, since people have withdrawn to private spaces by retreating from public ones. In this way, a form of political control emerges due to fear of violence causing a loss of the sense of community and participation. In addition, there is a growing atmosphere of political and union violence (...) with violent outcomes during protests and demonstrations, as well as an increase of contract killings.*[117] (Jácome and Gratius, 2011: 5)

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appreciated thus damaging the competitiveness of the exports that were not related to petroleum in the country.

[117] My own translation.

Summarizing, what is in doubt in Venezuela is not the legitimacy of the nation-state idea or its acceptance by the population, but rather the social cohesion that features deep economic and political ruptures.

Colombia, in turn, features both legitimacy and integration problems. On the one side, the concept of nation-state and its political-institutional manifestation has been challenged by guerrilla groups such as the ELN and the FARC since 1960. To this day, the FARC controls vast territories in the south of the country, which remains the focus of the armed conflict with the government as well as a point of strategic value for the drug-dealing business (Arnson and Llorente, 2009: 9). On the other side, Colombia is the poorest country in South America, after Bolivia, (Parra Torrado and Trujillo, 2012: 61). According to the Indigence and Poverty Index, 49.2% of the population was affected in 2005 by poverty and 14.7% by indigence (López Castaño and Núñez Méndez, 2007: 52).

Yet there are other problems that deepen the socioeconomic disintegration in Colombia. One of them, of great significance, is the problem of the internally displaced. Colombia is the country with the highest number of internally displaced population in the world, and the only one in South America featuring this phenomenon. According to recent estimates, the number of displaced citizens would rise to 4.9-5.5 million people (Wallace, 2013). These processes of forced migration from rural to urban areas have brought about informal settlements in peripheral zones of large cities, where informal economies emerge, mostly around the sale and trading of narcotics.

Finally, there are countries such as Uruguay and Chile. Even when comparatively they do not exhibit serious legitimacy or integration problems, they present a common characteristic to all South American countries: their democratic institutions are weak, with the exception of the presidential figure. Guillermo O'Donnell (1994: 59), who has conducted extensive research on this characteristic, defined the Latin American democracies as *delegative democracies,* where

> *(…) the President is taken to be the embodiment of the nation and the main custodian and definer of its interests. The policies of his government need bear no resemblance to the promises of his campaign. (…) In this view, other institutions, courts and legislatures, for instance, are nuisances that come attached to the domestic and international advantages of being democratically elected President.*

In view of this characteristic, as Dreyfus has noted (2002: 82), the serious cases of corruption related to drug-trafficking may cause lack of legitimacy of the political system as well as of the democratic structure. The latter is particularly worrisome in South America, a region with endemic corruption problems in its political and military elites.

2.1.2. Policy Capacity

In general terms, the ability of South American countries to obtain resources from the society –infrastructural power– and to apply public policies has been considerably affected by regional crises derived from the Latin American debt crisis (1983). As I will show in Ch. IV, for example, that financial crisis originated in the early 1980s affected mainly countries such as Bolivia and Peru, which in only few months were overwhelmed by two concomitant processes: (a) the expansion of the coca plantations, which in a context of economic crisis, turned into a labor source for thousands of families; and (b) the incapacity of the state apparatus to implement alternative development policies and anti-trafficking laws, control of the borders, access to territories disconnected from the urban centers, etc.

I believe it is worthwhile to refer briefly to the foreign debt crisis I have just mentioned[118], before proceeding with the analysis of the political capacity of South American states. In this sense, it is necessary to allude to the origin of the crisis, which is not to be found in Latin America, but rather in developed countries that do not have oil and in developing countries which do.

After the Yom Kippur War (1973), the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEP) reduced the production of crude oil and established an embargo to the oil shipments heading to Western Europe and, mainly, to the US. This had a two-fold consequence: on the one side, it caused an inflationary effect on the price of hydrocarbons and a reduction in the economic activity of the affected countries –it actually sparked off a severe process of economic recession that lasted until 1980–. On the other side, it increased the liquidity of the oil countries after the great influx of

[118] The brief summary I provide on the origin of the external debt crisis in Latin America was elaborated on the basis of the excellent text by José María Vidal Villa on the Center-Periphery capital flows (cf. Martínez Peinado and Vidal Villa, 2005: Ch. 24). A similar analysis may be consulted in Smith, 2012: 118-121.

petrodollars they received. These countries, however, did not possess a developed banking system to deposit these huge monetary flows, which brought about an avid competence between European and American multinational banks to expand their operations through subsidiary branches and bank holding companies to the periphery of the system.

Although the most important banks in Europe and the US had surplus capital in their coffers, the demand for loans by the central countries was stagnant. In view of this panorama, they resolved that they should offer the international market loans with low and variable interest rates, which many Latin American countries –infused with the liberal economic ideology and under the yoke of military dictatorships– found attractive. Going into debt was profitable (Table 1). Between 1976-1986, for example, the loan for Argentina multiplied six times, which resulted in a gross external debt equivalent to 80% of the Argentinean GDP (Rodríguez, 1986). The interest rates, however, were close to zero, and nobody seemed to care too much about the fact that South American countries were using their loans to, among other things, update the military equipment of the Armed Forces, which were capturing, torturing and caused the disappearance of their citizens.

TABLE 1: Total Disbursed External Debt. Balance By Years (in US$ Millions), 1980-1990

Country	1980	1985	1988	1989	1990
Argentina	27,162	49,326	58,473	63,314	62,233
Bolivia	2,340	3,249	4,043	3,492	3,768
Brazil	64,000	105,126	113,469	115,096	123,439
Chile	11,207	20,403	18,960	17,520	18,576
Colombia	6,805	14,063	17,935	17,586	17,993
Ecuador	4,167	8,111	10,669	11,533	12,222
Paraguay	861	1,772	2,002	1,801	1,812
Peru	9,595	13,721	16,493	18,356	19,996
Uruguay	1,165	3,551	4,239	4,313	4,472
Venezuela	26,963	31,238	35,876	33,812	35,528

Source: Dreyfus, 2002: 83.

The debt business ceased to be attractive for Latin America towards the beginning of the 1980s. As soon as he became President of the US and with the purpose of controlling inflation, Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) originated a strong

movement of the interest rates in his country, which was immediately translated into an increase of the interest rates at the international level. Since the loans had been taken with variable interest rates, the repayment of the South American debt turned into a titanic task. The first to face this reality was Mexico, which in 1982 declared its impossibility to comply with its financial duties.

Seeing the imminent domino effect that was going beyond control, the US launched four adjustment and renegotiation plans which were headed by the IMF, the World Bank and the Club of Paris: (a) the Recessive Adjustment Plan, in practice from 1982 to 1985; (b) the Baker Plan (1985-1987); (c) the Baker Plan B (1987-1989); and (d) the Brady Plan (1989 onwards). In general terms, the four plans helped controlling the hyper-inflationary processes that South American countries were suffering; none of them, however, contributed to increasing the capacity of the states since they were forced to reduce public expense, cut down on social expenditure, liberalize trade, remove price controls and state subsidies, privatize public assets, etc. Dreyfus (2002: 84) has also noticed this positive-negative aspect of the external debt crisis and the subsequent negotiation plans.

> *In some ways it contributed to reducing the legitimacy of military governments that were unable to cope with the control of recession and hyperinflation as in Argentina, Brazil and Peru. On the other hand it created a real crisis of governability in the sense that the new democratic regimes were unable to cope with the increasing demands of their populations or even provide the most basic social services. The extreme cases were countries such as Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia where the capacity and even the infrastructure of the state were almost already non-existent in some areas.*

It must be said that Colombia requires a special treatment in this analysis since it was the only country in the region that did not suffer from an external debt crisis; in fact, as I will point out in next chapter, Colombia benefited from both a legal as well as an illegal exporting boom of coffee and CHCL. The undeniable weakness of the state in Colombia and its lack of legitimacy, therefore, must be explained on the basis of other factors, such as the restrictive and patronage-based nature of its political system, which has not reacted accordingly to the social demands therefore forcing the use of violence. Thoumi (1995b: 36) makes reference to this:

> *Colombia's economic development has a dark side reflected in the country's deep and continuous socioeconomic problems. Indeed, Colombia has experienced a growing institutional crisis in which old political and legal frameworks have become increasingly unable to cope with social conflicts and economic change, and the political regime has suffered an erosion of its legitimacy. (...) The growing erosion of the Colombian regime's legitimacy has caused a growing gap between the legal norms of social, political, and*

economic behaviour, and socially accepted behaviour; that is, a gap between the de jure and de facto social norms. This deep institutional crisis has symptomatically manifested itself in several ways such as an extremely high level of violence, the growth of a large informal economy, widespread rent-seeking and predatory economic behaviour and an increasingly weaker and more ineffective state.

In spite of not being affected by the foreign debt crisis, Colombia could not transform its economic growth into development mainly due to the lack of state political capacity. The rest of South America, in turn, initiated slow and complex democratizing processes, which have continued till today with some gains and some set-backs.

2.1.3. Socioeconomic Development

Throughout the years 2001-2010, South American countries went through a substantial improvement in various indicators of human development (Table 2). In fact, some administrations, such as the Argentinian government, did not hesitate to name this decade *La Década Ganada*[119] –in clear reference to *La Década Perdida* or The Lost Decade, as the decade of the 1980s was popularly known (Brieger, 2002: 341)–. If we consider the definition I provided in Ch. II of socioeconomic development, however, it can be argued that South American countries still have, to a greater or a lesser extent, dependent economies since none of them is fully capable of generating and sustaining a full cycle of storage and expansion of capital.

[119] On March 1st, 2013, at the inauguration of the 131st Period of Ordinary Sessions of the Argentinean Congress, President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner stated that: "*Development and growth are two words that, I believe, best summarize the last 10 years. Development in employment and national security was possible due to this period of economic growth, which was the most important, lasting and stable in our 200 years of history. Moreover, development and growth were accentuated in spite of the world collapse in 2008 and in spite of the fact that still today the crisis seems to have no limits. I want to share with you my views on this decade, which I call* ***the won decade*** *by all the Argentinians. It was won because of what we have achieved, and let this be clearly understood; you can win an election but yet lose a government. When I speak of* ***the won decade*** *I do so not in political terms, but rather to refer to the recovery in social, economic, cultural, and democratic terms, as well as in terms of equality. For this reason I dare name this decade, beyond doubt, –which initiated on 25 May 2003– the won decade by the Argentinian people.*" (Fernández, 2013) [Emphasis added] My own translation.

TABLE 2: Poverty and Indigence Rates per Country, 2000-2010

Country	Around 2000		Around 2010	
	Poverty	Indigence	Poverty	Indigence
Argentina	23,7	6,6	8,6	2,8
Bolivia	48,7	19,8	42,4	16,2
Brazil	32,9	9,3	22,1	5,5
Chile	19,7	5,1	11,7	3,5
Colombia	50,6	21,9	38,5	11,1
Ecuador	63,5	31,3	37,1	14,2
Paraguay	49,1	17,1	46,5	19,4
Peru	36,1	9,3	19,1	2,5
Uruguay	9,4	1,8	8,6	1,4

Source: Vv. Aa., 2012.

Kay and Gwynne (2000), in an excellent article on the validity of the structuralist theory for the analysis of the South American economies, described at least four key dimensions in which it is possible to identify the dependency of the Latin American countries: (a) increasing asymmetry in world economy; (b) financial vulnerability; (c) dependency on technology and transnational corporations; and (d) unequal trade.

A simple indicator of the growing asymmetry in the world is the GDP per capita. The richest countries in the world remain the central countries and, through the oil rent or the technological development, some other countries have acquired the *status* of semi-central (Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Korea, Australia, etc.). South American countries, however, are among those with the lowest GDP per capita in the world (compare Table 3 with Table 4); tendency that has remained constant since the 1980s.

TABLE 3: GDP *per capita* of South American Countries (in US$), 1980-2010

Country	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010
Argentina	2,737	2,914	4,333	7,408	7,701	4,740	9,133
Bolivia	845	890	716	879	989	1,021	1,935
Brazil	1,931	1,637	3,087	4,750	3,694	4,739	10,978
Chile	2,463	1,359	2,388	4,941	5,133	7,615	12,685
Colombia	1,240	1,160	1,209	2,529	2,504	3,393	6,179
Ecuador	2,261	1,914	1,505	2,018	1,462	3,013	4,501
Paraguay	1,280	801	1,340	1,887	1,532	1,479	3,101
Peru	1,192	965	1,208	2,242	2,050	2,863	5,386
Uruguay	3,486	1,571	2,990	5,985	6,873	5,222	11,520
Venezuela	4,447	3,344	2,382	3,390	4,800	5,445	13,559

Source: World Bank Open Database (http://data.worldbank.org/)

TABLE 4: GDP *per capita* of G7 Countries (in US$), 1980-2010

Country	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010
Canada	10,934	13,712	20,968	20,117	23,560	35,088	46,212
France	12,500	9,564	21,301	26,403	21,775	33,819	39,186
Germany	11,746	9,125	21,584	30,888	22,946	33,543	40,145
Italy	8,148	7,669	20,065	19,910	19,338	30,479	33,761
Japan	9,308	11,466	25,124	42,522	37,292	35,781	43,118
United Kingdom	9,623	8,210	17,805	20,350	25,362	38,545	36,703
United States	12,598	18,269	23,955	28,782	36,467	44,314	48,358

Source: World Bank Open Database (http://data.worldbank.org/)

Regarding financial vulnerability, although it is true that all the countries in the world are relying increasingly on the mobility and availability of world capital, this is much more so in underdeveloped and developing countries (Gwynne, 1990; Stiglitz, 2002: 89-131), which has greatly increased their exposure and vulnerability to changes in world capital markets substantially reducing their room for policy maneuver (Kay and Gwynne, 2000: 53). In this sense the mounting crisis in Argentina in 2001 –I will return to this in Ch. V– is an excellent illustration. Even when the Argentinian crisis has an undeniably financial-economic origin, its social, political and institutional consequences resulted catastrophic. Not long before the collapse, in 1998, Argentine President Carlos Menem was the only Latin American President invited by the IMF to address its biannual meeting in Washington. The Argentinian

political expert Atilio Borón (quoted in Evans, 2003) refers to this issue in the following lines:

> *They said that Menem was a brave politician who dared to introduce the needed reforms in Argentina, and that because of the reforms, Argentina has found the road to prosperity. Menem made the wonderful reconciliation of the country with the markets possible and things couldn't be better. This was when the economy was already running out of control. Argentina was the most expensive country in the world even compared with Japan. The cost of living rose to the skies. Even if salaries were very high they were never high enough to match the prices.* ***There was massive capital flight****.*
>
> *On 19th and 20th of December, 2001, there was a major popular revolt in Argentina. Tens of thousands of people took to the streets in opposition to announced cuts in public spending, generally looked upon as a consequence of deep indebtedness to the IMF. There were large gatherings outside the Presidential Palace and the Congress. Police attacked the demonstrators, killing more than 20 people. The Fernando De La Rúa Administration, which had succeeded Menem, was forced to resign.*
>
> ***The crisis of December 2001 was precisely because they could not control capital flight****. The establishment economists insisted that policies of fiscal austerity would bring continued capital investment, but the opposite happened.* ***During the 1990s, US$150 billion fled from Argentina, more than the country's total foreign debt****. (...) [But that]* ***foreign capital invested in Argentina was largely speculative and made no long-term commitment to enterprises in the country****.*

Dependency theorists put special emphasis on the third topic introduced by Kay and Gwynne (2000: 54): technological dependency. During the 1960s and 1970s –as it was also the case during the first two Peronist governments in Argentina– numerous South American countries launched Import Substitution Industrialization processes (ISI). Although initially ISI showed positive results –as they were largely applied to consumer and not to capital goods–, the South American economies remained dependent on central countries. Larger countries such as Argentina and Brazil achieved certain success in developing industries of intermediate goods like the chemistry or steel industries. Nevertheless, with the revolution in the field of technology and communications during the 1980s and 1990s, the central countries definitely gained an advantage over the less developed countries.

Finally, the vulnerability of South American countries is manifested in the patterns of participation in international trade. A number of authors (Singer, 1991; Diakosavvas and Scandizzo, 1991; Cuddington, 1992; Ocampo, 1993) have noticed that less developed countries "*have to export an increasing amount of commodities to the developed countries so as to be able to import the same amount of commodities from the developed countries*" (Kay and Gwynne, 2000: 55). This does not mean that

international trade has declined; on the contrary: South American countries have actually increased the number of their exports, but only in order to be able to import the same amount. Therefore, the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis is confirmed: terms of trade, between primary products and manufactured goods, deteriorate in time benefitting the most powerful and industrialized countries and damaging the weakest and raw-material producer countries.

2.1.4. Territorial Centrality

In all the South American countries considered in this section, the territorial presence of the state is or has been weak, intermittent or inexistent throughout the several historical moments analyzed. Peru and Colombia, the paradigmatic cases of analysis, have had to deal with the power of guerrilla groups in vast areas of their respective territories; in Brazil, Ecuador and Venezuela, in the Amazonia regions, the presence of state is virtually inexistent; Bolivia exhibits a geography that hinders connectivity between the main urban centers and the rural areas; and Argentina had tried to control its more than 9,000 km. of borders in hardly an efficient manner.

In addition to this, almost all South American countries throughout their history –particularly between the decades of the 1960s and 1980s– have had to face guerrilla movements or insurgent groups. The FARC –the oldest guerrilla movement in the continent– have been in operation since 1964; additionally, the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Popular Liberation Army (EPL) remain active, whereas the Movement April 19 (M-19) was demobilized. In Peru, during the decade of the 1980s, SP and the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) challenged the Peruvian state; SP remains active to this day. In Chile and Ecuador, several rather weak guerrilla organizations operated without much prominence: the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front, created during the Pinochet dictatorship and dismantled in 1999; and the People's Armed Forces Eloy Alfaro (AVC), created in 1983 and active until 1991.

Early in 1960, the National Liberation Movement Tupamaros (MLNT) emerged in Uruguay; it had an important role as urban guerrilla during the 1970s and became part of the country's political life in 1989. In Venezuela there were the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN), which did not play a major role and disintegrated by the end of 1960. Lastly, in Argentina, there were left-wing movements such as

Montoneros; the Peronist Armed Forces (FAP); the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP); the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), and the Argentine Anticommunist Alliance (AAA), a Peronist paramilitary group of extreme right-wing that operated between 1973-1976 under the control of José López Rega, state officer during the governments of Juan Domingo Perón (1973-1974) and María Estela Martínez de Perón (1974-1976).

Dreyfus (2002: 88) has indicated that in all the countries of the Southern Cone –but particularly in Argentina– the guerrilla groups were crushed by military dictatorships, which were accused of very serious violations of human rights –forced disappearances and high levels of repression–. This may be one of the reasons why, unlike Argentina, Uruguay or Chile, in the Andean countries some guerrilla groups remain operational after four decades.

I have so far analyzed the nature of South American states, on the basis of the four variables introduced in Ch. I. I have not provided an exhaustive treatment of the indicators or the classification of the states because, as mentioned before, this dissertation is not aimed at analyzing the nature of the South American states in detail, but to demonstrate that Argentina is framed in a RSC that is dominated by weak states, that is, a security complex dominated by countries with serious problems in terms of sociopolitical cohesion, policy capacity, socioeconomic development and territorial centrality.

Following, I will analyze the regional dimension of the security constellation in which Argentina is immersed, not only from the (geo)political categories, but also from the securitization processes around the CCC. In that regard, it should be noted that, according to my theoretical framework, a RSC is an analytical concept rather than the product of a discursive construction. Nevertheless, it can be understood from the perspective of the Theory of Securitization as long as it is subject to the security practice of securitizing actors.

2.2. The Regional Level & Subcomplexes

After the processes of decolonization throughout the 19th century, a number of inter-state conflicts took place in South America. I will return to them below –cf.

Section 3.2 in this chapter–, but it is interesting, at this point, to ask ourselves why has there never been any large-scale war, equivalent to the European wars (WWI or WWII, just to mention some) in the region? Buzan and Wæver (2003: 313-318) have attempted possible answers to this question.

From a geopolitical viewpoint, it has been argued that South America is a low-conflict RSC given the fact that, due to its deficient urban infrastructure and its vast unpopulated regions, there are physical and symbolic barriers that hinder interaction –conflictive or cooperative– between their state units. This hypothesis began to raise a concern from 1970 onwards, mainly because South America has deepened its process of physical integration. This has brought about a succession of political, economic and social interactions, which have not always been cooperative. By itself, however, this explanation has proved to be inadequate.

In addition, the role of Brazil and the game of power balance with Argentina since the mid-19th century have been central to maintain regional stability –particularly in the security sub-complex of the Southern Cone–. After the War of Brazil (1825-1828), which pitted the two countries and concluded with the establishment of a new state –Uruguay–, there have been no direct confrontations between Brazil and Argentina. However, there have been conflicts of interest around (a) the Río de la Plata Basin; (b) influence over the buffer states in the region (Paraguay and Uruguay); and (c) reciprocal fears: Brazil fears that Argentina could lead the Spanish-speaking South America; Argentina, conversely, fears that Brazil could execute the old colonial dream of owning an east-west corridor with outlets to both oceans.

During the 19th century, the tensions between Argentina and Brazil were added to the tensions between Argentina and Chile, especially with regards to the delimitation of borders; the inter-oceanic path; the struggle to achieve continental preponderance, and the competition over maintaining the power balance in the south of Latin America (Otero, 2002: 195-196). The last two phenomena led to an escalating arms race, which reached its maximum voltage between Brazil and Argentina, but also between Argentina and Chile. The consequences could have been catastrophic but, instead, the three countries solved their divergences by means of the Tripartite Treaty ABC (1915), whose objective was reaching a peaceful solution to the conflicts that arose between the three countries.

In the 1950s, the most active stage of the Cold War, the models of interrelation in the international arena tightened, and this ideological rigidity was used by the US to intervene deliberately in the internal affairs of various countries in the continent. In order to counterbalance the US, Argentina in times of Juan Domingo Perón launched an integration project –the South American Economic Union–, but Brazil interpreted this as an ideological-political strategy of Argentinean domination and the project did not succeed.

During the 1960s and 1970s, there were numerous attempts at consolidating a South American union, at least in commercial terms. Some associations emerged as a result, for example: the Latin American Free Trade Association (1960); the Andean Pact (1969) – or Andean Community of Nations after 1996; the Treatise of La Plata Basin (1969); the Latin American Economic System (1975), and the Latin American Association of Integration (1985), which replaced the Latin American Free Trade Association. There was, nevertheless, an essential problem to definitively consolidate these integrating initiatives: the still present rivalry between Argentina and Brazil deepened by the military juntas that controlled both countries between the years 1960-1980[120].

With the return of democracy, Raúl Alfonsín and José Sarney –Presidents of Argentina and Brazil, respectively–, signed the Foz do Iguaçu Declaration (1985), whose purpose was launching a program of bilateral integration. Such an agreement was the cornerstone of the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR), which, with the subsequent additions of Uruguay and Paraguay, was completed on 31 December 1994. Since then, the MERCOSUR, *de jure*, has been a commercial and customs union; however, *de facto* and in geopolitical terms, it has led to the consolidation of a security system and the solution of the conflict hypothesis between the two heavy-weight countries in the South American RSC and in the Southern Cone sub-complex (Argentina and Brazil).

Unlike the Southern Cone, the security dynamics in the Andean sub-complex has not been defined on the basis of the interaction of the regional powers, but rather on a transnational security problem: the drugs dilemma (Buzan and Wæver: 2003: 316).

[120] The coup d'état in Brazil was against President João Goulart on 31 March 1964. The military dictatorship extended until 1985. The last coup d'état in Argentina, against President María Isabel Martínez de Perón, took place on 24 March 1976 and lasted until 1983.

The most obvious consequence of this is that, unlike the Southern Cone, in the Andean region there is a strong infiltration of extra-regional actors.

Throughout the preceding chapters, I have made reference to the role played by the US in countries such as Bolivia, Colombia and Peru. At this point, a deeper treatment of the topic is not only unnecessary, but it would also advance into the next section in this chapter, which deals with the global dimension of the South American security constellation. It is important to mention, though, that some other extra-regional actors have been involved in the Andean sub-complex as a consequence of the fight over drugs. An example of this is the EU and the Andean Community of Nations (CAN), which in 1995 decided to initiate a special dialogue around drug trafficking. As a result, two bilateral agreements were signed as well as one agreement of cooperation and technical assistance for the fight against drug trafficking and the deviation of chemical precursors used in the drug manufacture (Otero Silva, 2000: 58-59). Since then, the EU has been an active actor in the Andean region and, among other initiatives launched, it has provided countries of the CAN with preferential access to the European market in support of their fight against the drugs conflict.

So far, I have given an account of the most significant dynamics of each security sub-complex; however, it is necessary to complete the scheme by referring to a growing process of regional integration that has brought closely together –at least in terms of discourse and identity– the Southern Cone and the Andean Area: the South American Union of Nations (UNASUR).

In 1994, within the framework of the First Summit of the Americas, celebrated in Miami, the US stated the need for an integration of the whole of the American hemisphere by means of a free trade agreement called Free Trade Association of the Americas (FTAA). The neoliberal ideology dominated then the Latin American countries and, in fact, there were advancements towards the design of the agreement in the following years. Nevertheless, Brazil's economic crisis in 1998, Hugo Chávez ascendency to Presidency in Venezuela in 1999, and the financial-political crisis in Argentina in the year 2001, questioned the efficiency of the economic and commercial policies promoted by the US. Finally, in the IV Summit of the Americas, celebrated in Mar del Plata (Argentina) in 2005, Argentina and Brazil openly questioned the implementation of the FTAA, stating that there were still deep structural differences

between the economies of the Americas. In this regard, Néstor Kirchner, the Argentinean President at that moment, sentenced:

> *Integration will be possible only to the extent that the existing asymmetries are met and only if the negotiations suit the essential interests of every country, especially in the area of market access without restrictions.*[121] (Kirchner, 2005)

In view of the failure of the FTAA, the South American longing for a project of regional integration of its own –and solely South American for the first time– was materialized with the signing of the Cusco Declaration in the III Summit of South American Presidents (2004). In that document, the South American Presidents decided to create the South American Community of Nations, which came to be called the South American Union of Nations (UNASUR) after its constitutive treaty in 2008.

In this dissertation's view, the UNASUR –like the CAN and the MERCOSUR– is presented as a political-institutional construction with an enormous analytical value. According to the theoretical framework that leads this research work, the security constellation should also take into account the securitization/desecuritization processes that exist on the CCC at a regional level. In this sense, it would be virtually impossible to review the speeches and public addresses of the political elites of twelve sovereign states; moreover, such a task would significantly deviate from the core objective of this dissertation. However, the documents generated by inter-governmental organisms are presented as public speeches that articulate the perceptions agreed upon in relation to the CCC at a regional level.

Next, I will analyze the securitization of the CCC at a regional level by taking as analytical instruments the declarations, documents and speeches delivered in the UNASUR, CAN and MERCOSUR.

2.2.1. The Securitization of the CCC at the Regional Level

One of the characteristics I have noted in the official documents of regional organisms is that, without exceptions, the securitizing speeches address the seriousness of the *drugs problem* or the *global drugs problem* without specifying, in concrete terms, the risks that the CCC implies to the region. If a literal analyzis of the text was carried out –detached from any interpretation–, I would have to conclude

[121] My own translation.

that no dimension of the CCC has been securitized in South America. Common sense indicates, however, that policy makers, Chiefs of State and state representatives when referring to *the drugs problem* are also considering what I have defined in this dissertation as the CCC.

At this point, it is worth asking –for a future research, perhaps– about the reason why South America does not single out in its securitizing public speeches the main drugs complex that affects the region (the CCC). For the time being, and since I have not reached a satisfactory answer to this question, the securitization of the CCC in this section will be analyzed from the securitization of the *drugs problem.*

Referent Objects

During the decade of 2001-2010, the main reference object of the securitizing speeches at the regional level was the state. The logic of the regional securitizing speech runs counter to the pre-existing characteristics of the regional states that contributed to the rise of the CCC in South America. The structural failures do not promote the drugs problem; rather, the drugs problem generates the failures in the states. This is not a minor difference since it constitutes the core of the securitizing rhetoric structure: the drug problem is serious, it generates structural failures and it deserves immediate attention. The CAN, for example, has constructed such discourse in the following manner:

> *(…) the manufacture, trafficking and consumption of illicit drugs, asset laundering, deviation and smuggling of chemical precursors and arm trafficking,* ***severely affect the development and security of the Andean countries***.[122] (CAN, 2001) [Emphasis added]

> *(…) the manufacture, trafficking and illicit consumption of drugs is a world-scale problem that seriously affects the development and* ***security of the Andean countries****,* [and] *it constitutes one of the most damaging and dangerous forms of transnational organized crime, which uses the globalizing logic,* ***perverts the social dynamics, distorts the economy, undermines the rule of law and subverts public order***.[123] (CAN, 2001) [Emphasis added]

Other speeches do acknowledge the two-fold effect of the problem: drugs weaken the state structure and distort the economy; nevertheless, South America

[122] My own translation.
[123] My own translation.

exhibits pre-existing conditions that facilitated those dynamics. In words of Wagner Tizón (2005), General Secretary of the CAN 2004-2006,

> *(…) the human development rates that appear in the reports of the United Nations over our countries are matters of concern, due to the* ***persisting conditions of poverty, exclusion and inequality that afflict the Andean towns.*** *If we add to this* ***the negative effects of drug trafficking on politics, economy and, therefore, in the governance of our countries, we find that we are faced with even more complex and dangerous scenarios that need to be undertaken with decision***. [Emphasis added]

A second reference object that is articulated on the basis of the regional securitizing speeches is the international community. The emphasis on the view that contends that drugs are a global calamity and that the problem of manufacture is as serious as the demand is recurrent. Consider the following extracts from the speeches delivered by Adalid Contreras Baspineiro, General Secretary of the CAN 2011-2013, and the Vice-minister of Internal Security of Ecuador, Javier Córdoba.

> *(…) In the international arena, finding coincidences as regards the importance of the debate on the drug issue is more and more frequent.* ***We see this problem as a global and world concern.*** *Global in as much as its complexity in terms of manufacture, trafficking, distribution and consumption is indivisible, thus leading to various forms of related crimes.* ***It is also a world problem because it affects the human kind as a whole, in several dimensions and responsibilities.*** *In general,* ***the policies have had an impact on the production pole, thus neglecting the demand and the shared-responsibilities areas***.[124] (CAN, 2012a) [Emphasis added]

> *(…) we frame our fight against drugs within the* ***shared responsibility principle;*** *we consider that the* ***world problem of drugs*** *is a complex, dynamic and multi-cause phenomenon*.[125] (CAN, 2012a) [Emphasis added]

Lastly, it is possible to identify a third reference object in the South American securitizing rhetoric: society and the people. In a work document by the Andean Community (CAN, 2012b) regarding the harmonization of statistics for city security, it is evident that

> *(…) security should be understood as the situation in which* ***state and society*** *are protected against threats or risks that may affect the* ***integral development and the wellbeing of the citizens,*** *as well as the free exercise of their rights and freedoms in a context of full democratic circumstances*.[126] [Emphasis added]

Identifying the threats that could put the security of the people at risk, the document explicitly refers to the drugs supply; the prevalence of consumption, and the perception of risk, etc. (CAN, 2012b: 13).

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[124] My own translation.
[125] My own translation.
[126] My own translation.

FIGURE 2: The Securitization of the CCC at the Regional Level

Referent Objects	The CCC represents a threat to…	Securitizing Actors
State International Community Society	Development Economic Order Public Order Rule of Law Governability Human Rights	Regional elites CAN UNASUR MERCOSUR Others (CELAC)

Rhetorical Structure

The classical securitization rhetoric –that is to say, the rhetoric that calls for a priority of action considering the seriousness of a specific issue– has dominated the regional discourse. Since 2006, however, an unprecedented process of desecuritization of a central element in the CCC has been noted: the coca leaf.

In Ch. II of this dissertation, I quote the President of Bolivia, Evo Morales, who, holding up a coca leaf in his hand at the General Assembly of the UN in 2006, proclaimed: "*This is the green coca leaf, which is not white as cocaine is. This is the coca leaf that represents the Andean culture, our environment and the hope of our people*"[127] (Morales, 2006). The relevance of this speech is central since it became the kick-start of an alternative to reorder the policy of regional security as regards the CCC.

After 2006, the emphasis of the Bolivian government on desecuritizing the coca leaf was made explicit in other public interventions. In 2009, during the 52º Session of the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Evo Morales (2009) stated: "*a coca leaf is not cocaine. It is not possible for this to be in the United Nations' list of narcotics".* Three years later, before the same UN Commission, he asserted:

> *(…) we, the producers of coca leaf, are not drug dealers, and we, the consumers of coca leaf, are not drug addicts. (…) The coca leaf in its natural state is not cocaine, and we need to change in that respect.*[128] (Morales, 2012)

[127] My own translation.
[128] My own translation.

Bolivia's discourse aimed at removing the coca leaf, its growers and its consumers from the list of regional threats –or, in other words, Bolivia's attempt at moving security issues back into normal politics– left the rhetoric sphere in 2011. That year, in June, President Morales pulled Bolivia out of the 1961 Single Convention in protest against its 50-year classification of the plant as an illegal drug. Six months later, he asked for readmission under the condition that the chewing of coca leaves be decriminalized in his country. On 11 January 2013, Bolivia won readmission and was granted this special exemption, which came into force on 10 February 2013.

At a regional level, the desecuritization of the *acullico* and the coca leaf found support on official discourses. On 30 November 2012, within the VI Meeting of the Council of Heads of State and Government, the South American Union of Nations admitted that

> *the traditional use of chewing (akulliku) the coca leaf is an ancestral cultural manifestation of the Bolivian and Peruvian peoples, which should be respected by the International Community.* (UNASUR, 2012)

In the I Summit of Heads of State, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), in turn, proclaimed that

> *(…) by reaffirming the commitment to support the cultural and ancestral practices of the indigenous peoples, within the framework of respect for Human Rights and Fundamental Rights of the Indigenous Peoples, we assume the readmission of the Plurinational State of Bolivia to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, amended by the Amendment Protocol of 1972. By means of the act mentioned, the prohibition on the traditional consumption of coca leaf (akulliku) is removed from its territory.* (CELAC, 2013)

According to Huysmans (1995: 67), what the speeches quoted so far have in common, accounts for a deconstructivist desecuritizing strategy. Separating the coca bush, coca leaf and the *acullico* practice from the narrations and symbolic dimensions built around them –the coca bush being the raw material of cocaine; the coca leaf being drug, and the *acullico* being a sign of addiction–, these speeches tell a parallel story in which the coca leaf represents the culture of the people, life and nature.

It is not easy to find many examples of desecuritizing practices[129] (Wæver, 1995: 57) in the literature on securitization. The Bolivian case, in this sense, acquires a particular relevance since: (a) it is a discrete desecuritization process that focuses on some dimensions of a heavily securitized issue; (b) it started as a local process of

[129] For two practical analysis of desecuritization, see cf. Huysmans, 1995 (on migrants) and Roe, 2004 (on minority rights).

recognition which later gained regional support; and (c) it had a specific impact at the international level (the withdrawal and later readmission of Bolivia from the 1961 Single Convention).

2.3. The Interregional Level & Global Level

Because of historical and cultural interests, Spain has had a prominent role in South America. Until the early 19th century, South American countries were no more than Spanish colonies, and even after the independence processes in Latin America, Spain maintained a strong presence in the region. Damaged by internal conflicts and wars with other countries, however, Spanish presence in the southern hemisphere gave way to new actors during the 19th century. For commercial interests, for example, Venezuela established links with the OPEP from the 1970 onwards; later, after 1990, the CAN and the MERCOSUR built closer ties to the UE. In terms of security, though, there was one actor that began to monopolize the South American relations with the rest of the world: the US.

After 1945 and having won WWII, the US found itself with the possibility of relaunching the liberal international project that Woodrow Wilson had outlined in his famous *Fourteen Points*. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, however, was not willing to repeat the mistake and, in order to avoid a new failure from the multilateralism that had dominated the Wilsonian proposal, saw it fit to inject more realism to the formula. The world could not be led by everyone: the world had to be led by the powerful.

With this rationale, the US designed a new international architecture that combined multilateralism with the leadership of the great powers. The UN, the Bretton Woods institutions and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were all conceived in order to achieve this purpose. Yet, due to weakness in Europe and the practical difficulties in creating institutions and making them work, the US emerged not only as the main sponsor and project leader, but also as its sole owner and main operator (Ikenberry, 2009: 76).

At the beginning and from the operational center of the liberal order built, the US began to provide public goods: open markets, global institutions and security. So

far, the scheme was cooperative –rather than imperative–: the US needed allies, and those allies needed the US. This scenario changed with the ascent of the USSR, which set off the alarms in Washington after consolidating its role as a superpower with the first nuclear test in 1949 and the launching of the Sputnik in 1957. The response came without delay. Towards the end of the 1940s –and until the mid 1970s– the US displayed the Policy of Containment, whose main objective was to avoid the political, military, ideological and geographical expansion of the USSR towards the American areas of influence.

In a demonstration that it was possible to circumvent the Policy of Containment, the USSR triggered the well-known Cuban Missile Crisis in 1963, thus initiating the era of *indirect wars* that led the great powers to face each other –in an indirect way– in countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. Therefore, and as the USSR supported insurgent groups, guerrilla movements or revolutions such as the Castro revolution in Cuba (1959), the US started promoting military coups.

South America, from 1953 onwards and within the National Security Doctrine, suffered military coups in Colombia (1953), Paraguay (1954), Brazil (1964), Peru (1968), Bolivia (1970), Ecuador (1972), Uruguay (1973), Chile (1973) and Argentina (1976). In this regard, and although drawing generalizations is a highly complex task, all these cases have significant points in common: (a) nationalist discourses, which highlighted the hypothesis of conflict between the countries of the region; (b) militarization of the state apparatus, which considerably exceeded the purpose of containing communism and was directed to the persecution of the citizenship – Argentina, for example, still today is in the process of judging the forced disappearances, extrajudicial executions, tortures, ill-treatments, violations of homes, unlawful deprivation of liberty and other human right violations perpetrated between 1976-1983; (c) increase of the foreign debt, caused by the militarization of the state apparatus –weapons and technology were bought to the US–; and (d) the adoption of a security agenda whose main purpose, containing communism, was dictated by the US.

During the Carter Administration (1977-1981), the priorities of the US changed: the Democrat President not only emphasized the US strong commitment to human rights, but also abandoned the Containment Policy to give rise to the Peaceful Coexistence Policy, although a subsequent event forced a shift towards an escalation

of the Cold War: the Iranian Hostage Crisis (1979), which Carter failed to manage. With a hardened public opinion in the presidential elections of 1980, and after beating the former President in the dispute, Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) arrived at the White House.

Unlike Carter, Reagan designed his foreign policy over the premise that the USSR was in decay and, by means of the Strategic Consensus –as his initiative came to be known (Sohr, 1982: 88)– he set himself to defeat the USSR by forcing it along an arms and spatial race, which the USSR could not afford. During those years, it was estimated that Latin America would be relegated to a secondary position in the American agenda. Two concomitant events, however, forced the US to keep an alert eye on the region: (a) the democratizing wave that made the military governments collapse after constitutional reforms –Ecuador, Peru and Uruguay– or special circumstances in each country, such as the decay of the *de facto* government in Argentina after the defeat in the Malvinas War in 1982; and (b) the foreign debt crisis made reference to above.

After the end of the Cold War, the interests of the US in South America were redefined along new axes; namely: (a) the War on Drugs, which started around 1985, and whose history we have dealt with in Ch. II; (b) the reformulation of the security agenda for Latin America, less ideologically driven, more pragmatic and more functional to the War on Drugs and the pacification of conflicts in Central America (Hens and Sanahuja, 1995: 55); and (c) *The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative* –the antecedent of the FTAA– which promoted the opening and the liberalization of Latin American economies, and which established the well-known Washington Consensus, theorized upon by John Williamson (1990: Ch. II).

3. Structure

With a complete overview of the security constellation in South America, the structure of the RSC in the region can now be determined taking into account four variables: (a) its boundaries; (b) its autonomous units –anarchic structure–; (c) its polarity; and (d) its social patterns of interaction (patterns of amity and enmity

among the units). So far, I have referred to the boundaries of the South American RSC and I have identified the autonomous units that support its anarchic structure (states and regional organizations). In this section of the chapter, I will focus on elaborating the two remaining variables: the polarity of the system and the patterns of interaction of amity/enmity among its units.

3.1. Polarity

Polarity in the region refers to the distribution and location of power in the region as well as to who wields it. The definition of power has changed over the years; it has moved away from the traditional military centered approach (Nye, 2005) to include a large array of indictors and instruments away. Therefore, I will examine both soft and hard power, and determine which actors have influence throughout the region.

The obvious starting point is Brazil. Taking into account three traditional variables in order to measure the power of countries in absolute terms (population, territory and GDP), it is possible to say that Brazil: (a) is the most densely populated country in South America and the fifth at a global scale (Graphic 1); (b) it is the largest country in South America and the fifth largest country in the world (Graphic 2); and (c) it is the first South American economy and the seventh at an international level (Table 5). There are only two other countries in the world, besides Brazil, that exhibit these conditions simultaneously: the US and China.

GRAPHIC 1: Population of South American Countries in Millions Citizens (Estimated), 2010



Source: World Bank Open Database (http://data.worldbank.org/)

GRAPHIC 2: Total Area of South American Countries in Millions of Km²



Source: The Economist (http://www.economist.com/world-in-figures)

TABLE 5: GDP of South American Countries (in Billion US$), 2000-2010

Country	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
AR	284,2	268,7	102	129,6	153,1	183,2	214,1	260,8	326,6	307,2	368
BO	8,398	8,124	7,095	8,082	8,773	9,549	11,45	13,12	16,67	17,34	19,65
BR	644,7	553,6	504,2	552,5	663,8	882,2	1,089*	1,367*	1,654*	1,62*	2,143*
CL	79,33	72,34	70,98	77,84	100,6	124,4	154,4	172,9	179,6	172	217,6
CO	99,89	98,2	97,93	94,68	117,1	146,5	162,8	207,4	244	233,8	287
EC	18,33	24,47	28,55	32,43	36,59	41,51	46,8	51,01	61,76	62,52	67,63
PY	8,196	7,663	6,325	6,588	8,034	8,735	10,66	13,84	18,5	15,95	19,65
PE	53,29	53,94	56,77	61,35	69,73	79,39	92,3	107,2	126,8	126,9	153,6
UY	22,82	20,9	13,61	12,05	13,69	17,36	19,58	23,41	30,37	30,23	38,85
VE	117,1	122,9	92,89	83,62	112,5	145,5	183,5	230,4	315,6	329,4	393,8

Source: World Bank Open Database (http://data.worldbank.org/)
Note: *In Trillions US$

TABLE 6: Military Expenditures by Country In Constant (2011) US$ Millions, 2001-2010

Country	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
AR	2,138	1,822	1,876	1,931	2,028	2,091	2,421	2,750	3,264	3,607
BO	304	284	318	307	296	299	333	398	394	364
BR	29,161	29,550	23,574	24,494	26,503	27,442	29,596	31,489	34,335	38,129
CL	3,404	3,387	3,397	4,040	4,335	4,937	4,944	5,222	4,569	5,131
CO	6,683	7,018	7,372	7,868	8,011	8,470	8,985	10,621	11,158	11,072
EC	637	745	1,011	945	1,240	1,198	1,616	1,873	2,109	2,188
PY	198*	191*	170*	202*	181*	204*	209	215	238	264
PE	1,482	1,384	1,403	1,487	1,646	1,694	1,626	1,591	1,965	2,076
UY	860	792	709	687	702	725	697	794	877	885
VE	2,640	1,939	1,888	2,676	3,615	4,770	3,981	4,447	3,253	2,553

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Military Expenditure Database (http://milexdata.sipri.org/)
Note: * Estimated

Sosa (2008: 8-9) has described Brazil as a "*whale country*"[130]; besides its territorial, demographic and economic size, it has political and geostrategic influence; furthermore, it exercises regional leadership; it has centers of industrial growth and technological innovation; it is part of the BRICS group –which brings together the five largest emerging economies in the world– it integrates the G4 group of nations, competing for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council; it has been invited, together with China, India, Mexico and South Africa, to the peripheral sessions of the

[130] My own translation.

G7, and, in absolute terms, it is the country that allocates the biggest amount of money to its military apparatus (Table 6). Unlike other whale countries such as China, Russia or India, however, Brazil does not exhibit a key power attribute in the international system: nuclear weapons.

In the early 1990, and after a tense rivalry during the decades between 1960-1980, Argentina and Brazil established an agency of bilateral inspection that would review and verify these countries' commitment to their agreement to use nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes. On 10 February 1995, Argentina signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and Brazil eventually signed it on 13 July 1998. Since then, Brazil has renounced its capability of becoming a nuclear military power, compensating this decision with an excellent diplomatic strategy.

During the Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva Administration (2003-2011), Brazil's diplomatic effort focused on building south-south alliances in the fields of commerce, finances and climate change (Dauvergne and Farias, 2012: 909). Within the framework of this macro-strategy, for example, agreements of technical cooperation were signed with African, Asian and South American countries, and the UNASUR was launched.

In my view, by means of the UNASUR, Brazil has attempted to create a political and an integration space, which could turn it into an undisputed leader. Being part of Latin America –a region which is in fact a political, cultural and colonial construction– the rivalry with Mexico is impossible to avoid. Mexico is neither as large in territorial terms or in population, nor as economically powerful; nevertheless, it integrates the NAFTA and it is the natural social, political and commercial partner of the US. In South America, however, Brazil shares the area with weaker associates that do not dispute its leadership –those that have tried, have failed–.

Argentina, Brazil's natural ally, is the second most important economy in the region[131]; the largest country after Brazil (Graphic 2), and the third most populated after Brazil and Colombia (Graphic 3). In terms of soft power, Argentina is more powerful than Brazil due to its language, Spanish, the most widely spoken language in

[131] The Argentinean GDP in the years 2009-2010 was surpassed by Venezuela (Table 5). This responds to the fluctuations in international prices of the greatest export product of Venezuela (oils and its derivatives); this is barely an anecdote in the long trajectory of Argentina as the second economy in the region.

the region. Argentina's Educational Development Index[132] and its HDI also contribute in this regard, being the highest in the region after Chile (Table 7). Argentina, however, is not a military power and it is still struggling with serious economic and financial problems that were triggered as a result of the crisis in 2001 – foreign indebtedness and a difficult access to international financing, among the most worrying ones.

TABLE 7: The Human Development Index (HDI) of South American Countries, 1980-2010

Country	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010
AR	0,675	0,701	0,755	0,771	0,787	0,805	0,810
BO	0,489	0,577	0,620	0,647	0,652	0,688	0,671
BR	0,522	0,590	0,669	0,699	0,710	0,726	0,728
CL	0,638	0,702	0,759	0,789	0,800	0,813	0,817
CO	0,556	0,600	0,658	0,681	0,698	0,714	0,717
EC	0,596	0,635	0,659	0,682	0,688	0,719	0,722
PY	0,549	0,578	0,617	0,641	0,650	0,668	0,670
PE	0,580	0,619	0,679	0,699	0,716	0,733	0,738
UY	0,664	0,693	0,741	0,744	0,771	0,785	0,789
VE	0,629	0,635	0,662	0,694	0,712	0,744	0,746

Source: United Nations Development Program (http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries)
Notes: **1.** 0 = Low HDI < 1 = Very High HDI. **2**. The HDI measures development by combining indicators of life expectancy, education attainment, and income. The education component contains two indicators: expected years of schooling and mean years of schooling. The income component is measured by GNI per capita (PPP$).

Venezuela, in turn, has openly disputed the Brazilian leadership. In the perspective of President Hugo Chávez (1999-2013), South America should be integrated around the Great Gas Pipeline of the South, a project designed to transport 150 million cubic meters of crude on a daily basis and along 8,000 km. to reach all the Southern Cone countries (Sanahuja, 2007). Apart from several reasons that justified certain skepticism regarding the viability of the project –its high cost estimated in US$20,000 million, for example– Brazil opposed the project for two issues of weight (Linkohr, 2006: 101): (a) the pipeline had to cross the Brazilian Amazonas and this would have generated a devastating environmental impact; and (b) it would have

[132] The Educational Development Index (EDI) of Argentina is the highest not only in South America, but Latin America too. The EDI includes the net rate of participation in primary education, the rate of adult literacy, the rate of success in the fifth grade and the index of gender relation of the UNESCO. For a detailed analysis, cf. CINDA, 2007: 56.

increased the energy dependence of the southern countries with respect to Venezuela, generating a dynamic similar to that of Russia with the countries of Western Europe.

The dispute over regional leadership was been additionally articulated from a concept that condensed the aspirations of Venezuela to refund a Grand Homeland: Bolivarianism[133]. Defining Chávez' Bolivarianism is a highly complex task, and there are actually only a couple of handful articles that have tried to do so. López Maya (2008) and Tillman (2010), agree that Chavez' Bolivarianism can be defined as a left-wing populism[134] characterized, at a domestic level, by the presence of a charismatic leader; the mobilization of masses; the anti-imperialist and anti-bourgeois discourse; the design and implementation of public policies with a strong social and inclusive component; the empowering of grassroots social movements; the socioeconomic inclusion of relegated human groups, among other features. At the international level, Bolivarianism showed a clear Pan-Americanist orientation, which tried to be articulated on the basis of energy cooperation and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America –an initiative that arose as a counterpart of the FTAA, and that sought to launch projects of political, social and economic cooperation between certain countries of South America and the Caribbean.

After Hugo Chávez's death in 2013, Venezuela, in my view, has lost the regional prominence it held during the 2001-2010. At the domestic level, moreover, it has endured a worrisome political tension between the ruling party and the opposition, street violence, shortage of primary goods, massive social protests and fiscal deficit. The exercise of the regional leadership is no longer a realist option for Venezuela.

Ecuador, Bolivia, Uruguay and Paraguay play another role in the region: they are buffer states (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 316). A buffer state is a country lying in between two rival or potentially hostile greater powers, and its existence can sometimes be thought of as a way to prevent conflicts between the conflicting states.

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[133] Simon Bolívar (1783-1830) was a Venezuelan military officer and politician that contributed to the independence of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama and Venezuela. Together with José de San Martín, who freed Argentina, Chile and Peru, he is considered a Liberator of America.

[134] For Ernesto Laclau (2005), populism is not a policy, but the answer to a series of popular demands enchained in a series of equivalences (*interchangeabilities*, as he called them). This enchainment creates popular political identities such us *the people*, which becomes a universal political subject. Populism has no inherent program or political orientation, but through discourse, the leader addresses *the people*, and a certain political subjectivity emerges through *interpellations* and *the people* develop an identity that did not exist before.

Before losing its outlet to the sea in the Pacific War (1879-1883), Bolivia, served as a buffer state between Chile and Peru. Ecuador has historically been a buffer state between Peru and Colombia (Verdesoto Custode, 2005: 55). Paraguay and Uruguay –mainly the latter[135]– are buffer states between Argentina and Brazil.

Buffer states are important to restore the power balance after a war; a clear example of this was the creation of Holland in order to control France after the Vienna Congress. However, in peaceful times, buffer states acquire roles that may redefine the power poles in a region. This is the case of Uruguay, for example, which until very recently, was considered a tax haven because of its policies of tax exemption and bank secrecy implemented to attract investments; furthermore, it was working as a center for laundering assets derived from drug trafficking. In 2009, however, Uruguay introduced a tax reform in order to adopt standards of transparency and exchange of tax information from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

The picture of regional polarity is not complete until we make reference to three key countries in the economic, political and security dynamics of South America: Colombia, Chile and Peru.

While the center of gravity of world economy is gradually moving from Europe and the US to Asia, Brazil and Argentina are faced with the disadvantage of lacking an outlet to the Pacific Ocean. Colombia, on the other hand, is the only South American country with the extraordinary geostrategic position of counting with coasts in both oceans. This power attribute, however, loses strength in the eyes of a region which, for decades, has suffered the negative externalities that arise from the Colombian internal conflict, its guerrillas and drug trafficking.

Another element that has contributed to the increasing complexity of the Colombian situation in the region, has been addressed by Tickner and Mason (2003). These authors have argued that since Colombia has turned into the main associate of the US in the region –because of the War on Drugs and the fight against drug terrorism– the sub-regional processes of the Andean interaction has been suppressed

[135] The Oriental Republic of the Uruguay was a creation of the British diplomacy after the War of Brazil (1825-1826) with a double purpose: (a) avoiding a future war between Argentina and Brazil that would unbalance the region; and (b) preventing the two largest countries in South America from controlling both margins of the Río de la Plata river, the main trading rout of the British. Lord John Ponsonby, Plenipotentiary Minister of the United Kingdom to the Río de la Plata during that war, referred to Uruguay as "*the cotton between two crystals*" (cit. in Dojas, 2001: 26).

due to the overlay processes[136] with the American security imperatives. This reinforces the negative perception that many countries in the region have had regarding Colombia, who has no choice but to continue to strengthen their commercial, political and security ties with the controversial extra-regional partner: the US.

Chile and Peru, in turn, have also developed a relation of close commercial exchange with extra-regional partners. Like Colombia, they have both signed and ratified free trade agreements (FTAs) with the US, and they have recently intensified their commercial exchanges with blocs such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In addition, Chile and Peru are countries with a low annual inflation rate and an attractive financial environment for the foreign direct investments (FDI) – Chile is in fact the greatest recipient of FDI in South America after Brazil (CEPAL, 2012). In the regional strategic scale, however, not everything is positive. Unlike Peru, Chile lacks a power attribute, which needs to be compensated with costly imports: the southernmost Andean country, unlike its neighbors, does not own oil or gas deposits.

3.1.1. Patterns of Amity/Enmity

Inter-state conflicts were frequent in South America during the 19th and 20th centuries. Driven by the delineation of influence areas, territorial claims or border disputes, all the countries in the region have been involved in armed conflicts. Having made brief reference to some of them above, in this section of the chapter, I elaborate on all of them in detail.

In 1826, Argentina and Brazil saw themselves locked in a central South America conflict. The dispute originated over the control of the Río de la Plata river and a mutual perception that triggered fears: while Brazil feared that Argentina could lead the Spanish-speaking South America, Argentina feared Brazilian expansionism inherited from its imperialist past. Throughout the 20th century, mutual distrust remained acute, but after the denuclearization of both countries and the creation of the MERCOSUR, Argentina and Brazil have overcome, I dare say, their conflict hypotheses permanently.

[136] I have made reference to the overlay processes in Ch. I (p. 41).

Another relevant war in the Southern Cone was the War of the Triple Alliance (1864-1870), which confronted Paraguay and a coalition formed by Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. Even to this day, several hypotheses have been drawn over what might have triggered the conflict. Some authors have pointed at the British interests in the region (Rela, 2012: 8). What is certain is that the consequences of the war were devastating for Paraguay, who suffered losses in money, territories and thousands of lives.

Argentina has also had to face conflicts with Chile. These countries have disputed trans-Andean and trans-Atlantic paths. Furthermore, they confronted quite important conflicts over border delineation. They were in fact on the brink of war in 1978 over the control of three islands near Tierra del Fuego. Moreover, there existed for some time the belief –still not officially proven– that Chile collaborated with the United Kingdom in the war over the sovereignty of the Islas Malvinas/Falklands Islands in 1983, fought between the UK and Argentina. However, the MERCOSUR has brought the parties closer and the late return to democracy in Chile in 1990 has contributed to the development of a security agenda of bilateral consensus.

Chile, in turn, has been involved in one great war along its history: the War of the Pacific (1879-1883). By the end of this clash, between Chile, Bolivia and Peru, Chile had acquired the disputed Peruvian and Bolivian territories. Currently, the differences between Chile and Peru have been solved, but the relations between Chile and Bolivia continue to undergo periods of tension. During the War of the Pacific, Bolivia lost its outlet to the sea and became –as Paraguay– a landlocked country. To this day, Bolivia is claiming its sovereignty over the Atacama Corridor, with the following specific implications: (a) Bolivia and Chile only keep consular not diplomatic relations; (b) Bolivia refuses to export natural gas to Chile – who, as said before, lacks gas in its territory; (c) on 24 April 2013 the Bolivian government formally initiated, before the International Court of Justice, the filing of an application request to Chile for the negotiation of a sovereign outlet to the sea.

In 1941, 1981 and 1995, Peru and Ecuador confronted each other over border disagreements and the control over a sovereign outlet to the Amazon basin. Ecuador could never achieve its goal; however, in an agreement signed in 1998 between the parties, and guaranteed by the US, Argentina, Chile and Brazil, Ecuador was recognized in its right to freely navigate the Amazon rivers.

The dispute between Venezuela and Colombia, finally, deserves special attention. Since the independence of these countries, there has been a boundary dispute over a portion of land rich in hydrocarbons in the Gulf of Coquibacoa/Venezuela. To this day, the dispute remains although it was not the cause of the last two diplomatic crises that these countries confronted: (a) in January 2005, Presidents Hugo Chávez and Álvaro Uribe had an argument caused by the arrest of Rodrigo Granda, Canciller of the FARC, in Caracas in the hands of Colombian agents, who delivered him to Colombian authorities in the borders; (b) in 2010, Colombia accused Venezuela of allowing the FARC and the ELN –considered by Colombia and not by Venezuela as terrorist organizations– to operate in bordering territories.

Summarizing, it can be argued that, except for the dispute between Chile and Bolivia and an obvious tension between Colombia and Venezuela due to ideological differences, there are no latent focus of enmity in South America. The integration process that started with the UNASUR can be said to not only account for but also highlight the remarkable political, economic and social maturity of a very young region, from the state-building point of view.

4. Concluding Remarks

In virtue of what I have explained so far, we can classify South America as a RSC: (a) standard, because its polarity is the result of the interaction of a regional power –Brazil– with neighboring countries of substantial relative power –Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru–; (b) structured, since the countries in the region have been capable of building their own patterns of interdependence in security matters; and (c) penetrated at a regional level by the US, but having generated an overlaid dynamics in one of the two regional security sub-complexes: the Andean sub-complex.

In terms of securitization, while the CCC is highly securitized at a regional level, a desecuritization process has started –although very recently– and is aimed at removing the coca leaf, its growers and consumers from the sphere of regional threats.

In next chapter I will return to the idea of South America, that it will taken not as the RSC of Argentina, but as the category to analyze the geopolitical basis of the CCC. In order to achieve this: (a) I will identify the hard core of the production in South America –the Andean area–, and analyze the producing profile of Bolivia, Peru and Colombia; (b) I will refer to the role played by Venezuela, Ecuador, Uruguay, Chile and Brazil in the trafficking stage; (c) I will prove that, as the Andean Area is the producing heart of the region, the Southern Cone is the consumer heart of the region; and (d) I will rebuild the relational network of the main actors of CCC in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia.

CHAPTER IV

The Coca-Cocaine Complex in South America

1. Introduction

In Ch. III, I defined South America as the RSC of Argentina. In this chapter, South America will be taken as the category to analyze the geopolitical[137] basis of the CCC. On this purpose, I will exclude from my analysis the Guianas, Surinam as well as Paraguay[138], and I will demonstrate that the Andean area concentrates the producer heart of coca, coca paste, CBP and CHCL. The Southern Cone, in turn, has played different roles such as trafficking and deviation of chemical precursors, and it has grown to be the consumer heart of the CCC in the past decade.

[137] Attinà (2005: 703) considered that geopolitics, as the study of the determinism of the physical environment over state politics, had ceased to exist. However, after years of rejection of its membership from the Social Sciences, the study of the geographical factors associated to political phenomena has re-emerged. The analysis of international relations in the last decade has been focusing again on variables such as physical environment, distance, resources, etc., which are now preferably called ecological variables or variables of the non-human environment. In this sense, "*although geopolitics acquired an unsavory connotation through its employment during the 1930s as a rationale for Hitler's expansionist policies, it remains a valid approach to regional analysis. In brief, geopolitics can be regarded as the interaction of geography and politics, with particular attention to strategies associated with those interactions*." The value of the concept of geopolitics is, then, that "*it provides a more comprehensive treatment of a region's geography. It should be understood that geography properly includes consideration not only of locational and environmental circumstances, but also of demographic, social and economic conditions*" (Anderson, 1984: 2).

[138] Paraguay is the major South American producer of marijuana, but it does not play an important role in the CCC. For analytical purposes, Paraguay will be excluded in this dissertation from the analysis of the production, trafficking and consumption of coca, coca paste, CBP, CHCL, and derivatives.

2. Production and Manufacture

From the production point of view, the hard core of 100% of the CHCL marketed at an international level is located in three countries of the Andean area: Colombia, Peru and Bolivia (UNODC, 2011a: 36). These countries, additionally, exhibit a significant percentage of their indigenous population[139] that has historically consumed the coca leaf. Most of the cultivation and coca leaf chewing has, in fact, been located in the Yunga region in Bolivia and in Cuzco, Peru. The coca chewing practice in those areas is common among about 8% of the population –500,000 people in Bolivia and 1,500,000 people in Peru[140]– (Nadelmann, 1990: 32). In view of this and regarding the role played by each South American country in the international division of the coca-cocaine production, Bolivia and Peru have been traditionally in charge of growing coca leaf and producing coca paste. Colombia, conversely, has focused on CBP processing and the production of CHCL. In the last decade, however, such dynamics of the coca-cocaine production has changed and I will demonstrate in this dissertation that Peru can no longer be regarded as an UPC.

In virtue of the above, I will go back to the classification introduced in Ch. II in order to categorize Bolivia as an UPC, and Colombia and Peru as DPC. The criteria used to apply this classification, include: (a) the estimated number of workers employed in the coca-cocaine production –as the production of CHCL is capital-intensive, in the countries oriented to the production of CHCL, the percentage of labor engaged is lower than the percentage of labor engaged in those countries oriented to the production of coca and CBP (Dreyfus, 2002: 72)–; (b) the estimated production of coca leaves, CBP and CHCL; (c) the number of illegal laboratories –producing CBP or CHCL– effectively destroyed; and (d) the importance of the coca-cocaine economy in

[139] According to The World Factbook (CIA, 2013), the Native American population reaches 55% of the total population in Bolivia (30% of the Quechua ethnicity and 25% Aymara), and 45% in Peru. In Colombia the percentage of mestizos is high (58%), the aboriginal population only constitutes 1% though.

[140] According to Cabieses (2005: 73), it is estimated that the legal coca leaf consumption in Peru is common among 1,5 and 2 million traditional consumers –70% of them are located in the mountainous area, 20% in the coast and 10% in the forest–. In the year 2000, a Peruvian organization dealing with the drug issue –the Observatorio Peruano de Drogas– hired an agency –the Consultora Asesoría y Negocios Financieros S.A.– to carry out a study about the traditional consumption of coca leaf. The results indicated that 1,4 million people consumed up to 13,3 thousand MT per year (grown in about 12,000 hectares). Taking these data into account, it may be said that an average *picchador* consumes up to 9,5 kg. of coca leaves per year; which I consider to be inaccurate.

relation to the annual GDP of the country. A fifth criterion, the presence of criminal organizations specialized in the production and trafficking of coca paste, CBP and CHCL in the national territories of these countries (Dreyfus, 2002: 72), will be further developed in section 2.4 in this chapter.

2.1. Bolivia: an Upstream Producer Country

The role played by Bolivia as a supplier of raw materials and as a producer of coca paste consolidated in the 1980s, when "*some peasants began producing* [coca paste]*, the much more profitable but illegal first stage in the conversion of coca leaves into cocaine, earlier in the Chapare, later in the Yungas*" (Léons, 199: 124). Bolivia was then suffering from a severe economic recession with high rates of inflation[141], and the illegal production of coca paste became a profitable business. Towards the end of the decade, there were about "*60,000 farmers growing coca,* [and] *thousands more involved in picking, selling, and transporting the coca and in processing and distributing the paste*" (Painter, 1994: 40). In this regard, it is worth mentioning that "*there is wide disagreement on the total number of people employed in the coca-cocaine chain, with (…) estimates ranging from a low of 120,000 to a maximum of 500,000*" (Painter, 1994: 40). Machicado (1993: 138-139) states that

> *employment levels are difficult to estimate. According to unofficial information, the number of people working in the coca growing activity exceeds 120,000; moreover, we would need to consider at least 10,000 people more working in the production of sulfate. There are not quantitative studies on the workforce employed in the production of the sulfated base (paste) or the hydrochloride. (…) In general, this means that the workforce employed in the coca-cocaine cycle includes in a direct way about 150,000 people; that is*

[141] Bolivia returned to democracy in October, 1982, year in which the new democratically elected government, headed by Hernán Siles Suazo (1982-1985), underwent two successive economic crises: (a) one related to their foreign debt, which virtually affected all Latin American countries; and (b) one related to the collapse of the tin market. I will consider the first crisis later. As regards the second crisis, it is necessary to make a historical account. From the mid-1970s the global mining industry for most metals experienced a prolonged recession. The price of tin, for example, fell dramatically towards 1980, which brought about severe economic crises in the countries that depended on the tin export. Bolivia, the fourth world producer of tin in 1984 (Thoburn, 1994: 127), was one of them. In 1985, the tin market collapsed and Bolivia entered into an unprecedented recession. Consider the following figures: "*the mining sector in 1987 accounted for only 4% of the GDP, 36% of exports, 2.5% of government revenues, and 2% of the labor force, compared to 8% of GDP, 65% of exports, 27% of government revenues, and about 6% of the labor force in 1977*" (International Business Publications, 2008: 225). Regarding the second issue, the total foreign debt rose from US$481.7 in 1970, to US$3,259.3 million in 1985. Hyperinflation in the years 1984-85, in turn, became one of the most severe in world history by reaching the 623% in the year 1985 (Morales and Sachs, 1987: 2-3).

to say 7% of the economically active population (...), without considering the informal workers in charge of the laundry of narco-dollars in the country.[142]

Lee (1988: 89) considers that "*in Bolivia, where one-fifth of the population is officially unemployed, cocaine employs an estimated 350,000 to 400,000 people (5-6% of the population).*" Thoumi (2003: 155), finally, estimates that the CCC in Bolivia employs between 120,000-300,000 people, most of whom work in farming activities.

In truth, the data mentioned above have had an unquestionable impact on the agricultural sector in Bolivia. In 1987, coca cultivation represented almost a third part of the national agricultural production and it was estimated that in 1988 it represented 6.38% of the national agricultural GDP (Machicado, 1993: 137). The estimates by Rojas Farfán (2002) are even higher (Graphic 1). In terms of exports and as regards the effect of the CCC on the global trade, it is estimated that between US$470-490 million coming from drug trafficking entered Bolivia in 1987 (Machicado, 1993: 143).

In 1988, in response to the rampant impact of the CCC on the Bolivian economy, the national government put forward the *Regulation of Coca and Controlled Substances*, established by Law 1008 of July 19, 1988, and regulated by the Supreme Decree 22099 of December 28, 1988, signed by President Víctor Paz Estenssoro (1952-1956; 1960-1964; 1985-1989)[143]. As a result, the significance of the coca economy as compared to the total GDP started to weaken from 1990 onwards (Graphic 1), until it reached in 1999 2.63% of the GDP (Rojas Farfán, 2002: 17). In the same decade (1990-1999), it was possible to observe a historical reduction of the number of hectares used for coca cultivation (Rojas Farfán, 2002: 18); unlike the production of CHCL, whose quantities were not considerably reduced (Table 1). There are several reasons that may explain this paradox.

[142] My own translation.

[143] Article 8 of the Supreme Decree 22.099 established three zones of coca production: the traditional zone of coca production, the zone of surplus production in transition, and the zone of illegal production. The first one includes the coca production for traditional consumption. According to Article 9 of the Law 1008, it extends through the provinces of Muñecas, Murillo, Franz Tamayo, Inquisivi, Nor and Sud Yungas belonging to the Department of La Paz, as well as parts of the provinces Tiraque and Carrasco of the Department of Cochabamba. The zone of surplus production in transition represents the area that started to grow coca as a consequence –spontaneous or managed– of the colonization process. The last zone, finally, comprises those areas where the growing of coca is prohibited altogether.

GRAPHIC 1: Importance of the Coca Economy as Compared to the Total GDP and the Agricultural GDP in Bolivia (in %), 1980-1999



Source: Rojas Farfán, 2002: 17.

Until 1988 the Bolivian government awarded monetary compensation to the coca producers for each removed hectare; ironically though, for each hectare that was removed the price of coca went up. The Bolivian producers and peasants, therefore, saw that they had a double motivation for being involved in the illegal growing of the coca bush: if their hectares were eradicated, they would receive compensation from the government and, if they were not, they could sell their coca to the highest prices. In the early 1990s, however, the main buyers of the Bolivian coca –the Colombian drug trafficking groups– were suffering from hard enforcement measures in their country, which started to weaken them. As a result, the Bolivian producers began to transform coca leaves into CHCL themselves and they also created new routes to ship the final product directly to consumer markets (Dreyfus, 2001: 74; Rojas Farfán, 2002: 26; UNODC, 2000a: 30).

TABLE 1: Global Illicit Cultivation of Coca Bush (in Ha.) and Potential Manufacture of CHCL (in MT), 1990-2000

Year	Colombia		Peru		Bolivia	
	Coca Bush	CHCL	Coca Bush	CHCL	Coca Bush	CHCL
1990	40,100	92	121,300	492	50,300	189
1991	37,500	88	120,800	525	47,900	220
1992	37,100	91	129,100	550	45,300	225
1993	39,700	119	108,800	410	47,200	240
1994	44,700	201	108,600	435	48,100	255
1995	50,900	230	115,300	460	48,600	240
1996	67,200	300	94,400	435	48,100	215
1997	79,400	350	68,800	325	45,800	200
1998	101,800	435	51,000	240	38,000	150
1999	160,100	680	38,700	175	21,800	70
2000	163,300	695	43,400	141	14,600	43

Source: UNODC, 2006a: 81.

By the mid-1990s, and in spite of the efforts of the National Strategy for the Fight against Drug Trafficking adopted in 1990, and the millions of dollars in aid given to the country each year by various countries and organizations to tackle this problem (Rocha, 2007: 11), Bolivia showed no signs of progress in the dismantlement of the CCC. According to the estimates of the Educational System Against Drugs and Mobilization (SEAMOS, 1996: 16), the population employed in the CCC by 1996, was: 175,000 temporary workers in the Chapare region; 70,000 coca leaf producers; 30,000 producers of coca paste; 25,000 workers involved in the trafficking of coca paste and chemical inputs; 500 cocaine merchants and producers; and 150 networks (Figure 1).

In 1997 the Bolivian President Hugo Banzer Suárez (1971-1978; 1997-2001) –with the full support of the American government– implemented the program *Plan Dignidad*, which meant the ultimate[144] militarization of the fight against the CCC in Bolivia. From a markedly liberal economic perspective, Banzer intended to turn

[144] I speak about an *ultimate* militarization being implemented as from the *Plan Dignidad* because around 1990 Bolivia actually signed an Anti-Narcotics Agreement with the US. Even when the militarization was not executed then, the agreement represented the culmination of a gradual process that had started in the 1980s and which was characterized by the military training of the Bolivian police force by the US Special Forces. The Army had never been officially or permanently devoted to the fight against drug trafficking. There were, however, joint operations between the United States and the Bolivian Armed Forces in 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989 and 1990 (Queiser Morales, 1992: 353). In Dreyfus (2002: 217-282), it is possible to find a detailed history of the consequences of the Bolivian government's use of militarized enforcement as the main strategy to control the expansion of the illicit drugs industry.

Bolivia into an attractive country for foreign investments in the hydrocarbons sector. "*For this vision to succeed, Bolivia would need an image which was free from the stigmas of corruption, contraband, and narcotrafficking*" (Rocha, 2007: 16). The program Plan Dignidad was extended until 2001 –coinciding with the conclusion of Banzer's Administration– and it was structured around four key axes: eradication of coca plantations; interdiction (the destruction of clandestine laboratories); efforts to counter money laundering; and implementation of social programs that countered and prevented drug addiction[145] (Siegel, Van de Bunt and Zaitch, 2004: 36-37).

FIGURE 1: Population Employed in the Bolivian CCC (1996)



Source: SEAMOS, 1996: 16. Cit. in Dreyfus, 2002: 224.

Within the program Plan Dignidad, the Joint Task Force (JTF), created in 1998, was a unit that combined military and police forces that were trained by the US in order to eradicate hectares growing coca illegally in the Chapare region, as in the rest of the country. The positive results were obvious: between the years 1998-2000,

[145] Also known as the *Bolivian Strategy against Drug Trafficking*, the program Plan Dignidad received a total investment of US$952 millions during its five-year implementation. US$108 millions were used in the eradication of plantations (11%) and US$700 millions (73%) were destined to the alternative farming of crops such as banana, pineapple, palm heart, passion fruit and black pepper (Rojas Farfán, 2002: 13). Furthermore, US$129 (14%) and US$15 millions (2%) were invested in interdiction and prevention, respectively.

23,400 hectares of coca bush were removed (Table 1). The social consequences were severe, though. From the year 1998 onwards, there was an increase in the violation of human rights of peasants and cocaleros; there were arrests, cases of torture, and even murders (Ledebur, 2005: 154-166; Rocha, 2007: 24; Salazar Pérez, 2002: 104). In the year 2002 the number of deceased cocaleros, police officers and military personnel ascended to 60 (Ledebur, 2005: 164).

As a consequence of the ruthless eradication policies in Chapare, the production of coca began to grow in the Yungas region (Ledebur, 2005: 158), and soon violence spread to that region as well. Frustrated and economically bankrupt, the farmers of both areas began to complicate matters for the JTF, and between September and October 2001, the violence became unbearable[146]. Finally, in November of the same year, the government decided to initiate negotiations with the main coca Federations of the country and agreed to: (a) remove the individual compensations for the eradication of plantations; and (b) replace the individual compensations for community compensations.

In order to reassert their demands, the cocaleros went on a *March for Respect and Dignity* walking 600 km. from Cochabamba to La Paz. Given the popular support that the march enjoyed, Jorge Quiroga Ramírez[147] committed himself to respect the terms of the negotiations. However, as soon as the cocaleros left the Bolivian capital, the government commanded the arrest of eight leaders of the coca sector and the dismissal of the representative for Cochabamba in the Chamber of Deputies, Evo Morales.

A new wave of violence broke out in the country, but in February 2002 the government reached an agreement with the coca unions committing itself, amongst other points, to: (a) reconsider the dismissal of Evo Morales from his position; (b) suspend the Supreme decree that prohibited the drying, transport, and sale of Chapare coca; and (c) to investigate human rights violations and pay compensations to victims (Ledebur, 2005: 159).

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[146] See a detailed report about the social protests that extended throughout 2000-2001 in Bolivia, in Cajías De la Vega, 2004: 491-513; Ledebur, 2005: 154-166.

[147] In the second term of his administration, it was made public that Hugo Banzer Suárez was fighting against cancer. This forced Banzer to quit his post as President of the Nation for health issues in 2001. His Vice-President, Jorge '*Tuto*' Quiroga Ramírez, replaced him. Banzer died a few months later, on May 5, 2002.

In June of the same year (2002), the presidential elections were held and the results were quite unexpected: Evo Morales, candidate for the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), achieved the second position with only 1.6% behind Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, who obtained 22.05% of the votes (out of a total 2,778,808 votes). Morales's electoral campaign rhetoric, focusing on the eradication of the coca plantations and the abolition of Law 1008, proved to be attractive. He gained his reward in 2005 when he was elected President of Bolivia after obtaining 53.72% of the votes (a total of 1,539,045 votes as compared to 581,884 votes in 2002).

From the very beginning, Morales was reluctant to adopt the American policy that consisted in eradicating and replacing coca plantations by using the Armed Forces. Instead, he proposed the policy of *Cero Cocaine but Not Cero Coca,* which was immediately rejected by the US since it was considered that legitimizing an increase in the hectares of coca plantations –from 12,000 to 20,000 as Evo Morales intended– would favor an increase in the production of CHCL; and this, in turn, would violate Law 1008 and the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 (Lasa, 2013: 239).

Statistics demonstrate that throughout the administrations of Morales (2006-2009; 2009-2014), Bolivia has shown an important progress towards the control of the illegal dimension of the CCC (cf. Ledebur and Youngers, 2013). In spite of the fact that in the decade between 2001-2010 the number of hectares of illegal coca cultivation (Table 1) and production of the MT of CHCL grew, it was also possible to confirm an increase in the seizures of CBP and CHCL and in the destruction of laboratories of CBP and CHCL (Table 2).

The DEA considers that the increase in the interdiction of CBP and CHCL in Bolivia should not be considered as a sign of progress, but rather the proof that this country has multiplied its manufacture of coca leaves, CBP and CHCL (Rocha, 2007: 51). Without disregarding this interpretation, in this dissertation I consider that the figures related to interdictions and destroyed laboratories (Table 2) during the last decade show that Bolivia remains a country more oriented towards the manufacture of CBP rather than of CHCL. This would reinforce my decision of classifying Bolivia as an UPC.

TABLE 2: Potential Manufacture of CHCL (in MT), Seizures of Coca Paste, CBP and CHCL, and Destroyed Labs of CBP and CHCL in Bolivia, 2001-2010

Year	Manufacture of CHCL	Seizures (MT)		Labs Destroyed	
		Coca Paste/CBP	CHCL	Coca Paste/CBP	CHCL
2001	100	4.0	0,5	877	1
2002	110	4.7	0,4	1,285	2
2003	100	6.4	6,5	1,769	2
2004	115	8.2	0,5	2,254	4
2005	115	10.2	1,3	2,619	3
2006	115	12.7	1,3	4,070	3
2007	130	14.9	2,9	4,076	7
2008	195	21.6	7,2	4,988	7
2009	195	21.9	4,9	4,864	16
2010	205	25.7	3,4	4,827	24

Source: US Department of State, 2001; 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007; 2008; 2009; 2010; 2011; 2013a.

Another fact that confirms the role of Bolivia as an UPC is that the importance of the coca leaf economy, in relation to the total GDP and the agricultural GDP, has increased in percentage as compared to the decades 1980-1989 and 1990-1999 (Graphic 1 and 2). Whereas in the years 1980-1999 the importance of the coca economy in relation to the total GDP fluctuated between 0.37-1.31%, and between 2.63-8.53% regarding the agricultural GDP, in the years 2003-2012 the fluctuation was between 1.2-3% (Coca/Total GDP) and 11.93-21% (Coca/Agricultural GDP).

GRAPHIC 2: Importance of the Coca Economy in Relation to the Total GDP and the Agricultural GDP in Bolivia (in %), 2003-2012



Source: My own design. The figures of the total GDP and the agricultural GDP were obtained from the database of the World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/), years 2003-2012. The total value of the coca leaf manufacture, in thousands of US$, was taken from UNODC, 2003c; 2004b; 2005b; 2008b; 2008c; 2010b; 2011c; 2013b.

In 2011, the National Council against Illicit Drug Trafficking (CONALTID) of the Bolivian government presented its *Strategy for Combating Drug Trafficking and the Reduction of Surplus Coca Farming 2011-2015*. The report claims that, considering that the essential foundations of the fight against drugs should be a reduction in offer, a reduction in demand and a reduction in surplus coca farming, the *"nationalization of the fight against drug trafficking"* (CONALTID, 2011: 12) is possible and, to that end, necessary by taking a multidimensional approach.

> [It is necessary that] *the fight against drug trafficking to be fought from the construction of a South American identity, taking into account previously acquired international commitments, the national legislations and, particularly, in accordance with the principles of sovereignty, self-determination, non-intervention and the cultural practices of each country*.[148] (CONALTID, 2011: 13)

[148] My own translation.

Furthermore, the document states that Bolivia has become a "*transit country*" (CONALTID, 2011: 14) of CHCL, which means that the CHCL confiscated in Bolivia has mostly been manufactured in other countries (Peru and Colombia). This official piece of information further confirms the role of Bolivia as an UPC. Furthermore, and as regards coca leaf cultivation, the report indicates that:

> *in the past, total eradication of the coca plantations was sought over the 12,000 Ha. From the year 2007 onwards, a sustainable strategy, which has included social participation and implied the respect for human rights, was set out with the aim of stabilizing the plantations in 20,000 Ha., as a realistic goal for the traditional and legal consumption.*[149] (CONALTID, 2011: 15)

Even when the Law 1008 –which limits the number of legally grown hectares of coca to 12,000– has not been repealed yet, the project of increasing the legally cultivated area to 20,000 hectares remains on track. This represents a source of specific conflicts with the US and some European countries to Bolivia. I will return to this idea below.

As a conclusion, and in order to reinforce our considering Bolivia as an UPC, it is important to highlight that: (a) Bolivia is the third manufacturer country of CHCL at a global level although its illegal industry is mainly focused on the manufacture of coca leaves and CBP; (b) in 2010, the total value of the coca leaf manufacture represented 1.7% of the country's GDP, and there were more than 90,000 farmers working in the coca cultivation section; (c) even when estimates may vary, it is believed that a 5-7% of the Bolivian population[150] is directly or indirectly working in relation to the CCC; (d) from the number of illegal laboratories destroyed it can be inferred that the number of laboratories that manufacture CBP, is considerably higher than the number of illegal laboratories that produce CHCL; and (e) the dimension of the coca leaf economy in relation to the total GDP and the agricultural GDP of the country, has been considerably superior between 2003-2012 than during the decades 1980-1989 and 1990-1999.

[149] My own translation.

[150] According to the Population Census carried out in 2001 by the National Institute of Statistics, Bolivia has got 8,274,325 inhabitants (3,109,095 of them live in rural areas and 5,165,230 in urban districts). If the estimate is correct, between 413,000-580,000 people live directly or indirectly on the CCC (between 103,000-145,000 four-member families).

2.2. Downstream Producer Countries: Peru and Colombia

2.2.1. Peru

Like in Bolivia, coca became the most profitable export crop in Peru towards the end of the 1970s. In 1978, for instance, the coca bush cultivation area ascended to 18,230 hectares; the harvest of coca leaves reached 16,702 MT; and 6,702 MT of coca were used in the illicit manufacture of 19 MT of CBP and 51 MT of CHCL (De Rementería, 1995: 97-98). By 1993, only fifteen years later, the coca growing area had increased eleven times; the volume of the harvest of coca leaves, twenty-two times; and the production of CBP and CHCL, twenty-four times (Table 3). How can we account for this extraordinary expansion of the CCC in Peru?

TABLE 3: Potential Manufacture of Coca Leaves (in Ha. and MT), CBP (in MT), and CHCL (in MT) in Peru, 1978-1993

Year	Manufacture of Coca Leaves		Manufacture of CBP	Manufacture of CHCL
	In Ha.	In MT		
1978	18,230	16,702	19	48
1979	21,582	20,362	30	78
1980	35,020	35,664	74	207
1981	43,202	43,209	96	276
1982	50,000	50,000	116	330
1983	60,000	60,000	145	311
1984	70,000	70,000	174	355
1985	95,200	90,370	233	329
1986	107,500	104,925	275	306
1987	108,800	124,000	330	332
1988	110,400	125,900	336	289
1989	120,400	137,300	369	367
1990	125,730	138,300	398	485
1991	137,700	137,700	396	441
1992	163,560	147,200	426	467
1993	196,630	157,300	457	501

Source: De Rementería, 1995: 98-99.

Dr. Álvarez (1993: 119-121) considers that the expansion of the CCC in Peru may be associated with three factors of the local order. The first one is related to a pattern of development in the Peruvian agricultural industry. In a country where most of the farms are small holdings of fewer than five hectares, the government put forward an agricultural reform in 1969, which benefitted the owners of large states

and the private companies of food industry while damaging a great number of deprived smallholding peasants. Second, great migrations to the cities and the forest areas of the Amazonas took place as a direct consequence of the impoverishment of the rural areas (US Congress, 1993: 6). It was precisely in those areas where the greatest increase of coca cultivated hectares was recorded from the year 1979 onwards. Finally, the pattern of food consumption in Peru may have contributed to turn coca into the most profitable crop in the country. The traditional Andean diet has gradually been replaced by a more Occidental diet in the urban areas. Therefore, in the past decades "*the Andean farmers have had to face a decreasing market for the kind of food they produce within the ecological regions they inhabit*"[151] (Álvarez, 1993: 119).

Lovón Zavala (1993: 95), in turn, offers an economic hypothesis: the main reason for the expansion of the coca plantations and the manufacture of CBP arises from the market logic. As long as the coca leaf remains the raw material needed for the production and marketing of CHCL, the maximizing behavior of coca producers will be aimed at increasing production and benefitting from the rise in prices, "*which, applying a basic economic principle, emerges from any steadily growing demand of any product*"[152] (Lovón Zavala, 1993: 95).

Finally, among other possible explanations, Kay (1999) states that the *boom* in the coca economy sprang from two parallel and complementary processes. The first one is found in the dynamic of international drug trafficking, since the growth in the consumption of CHCL in the US, "*combined with more sophisticated trafficking and money-laundering techniques, fuelled an unprecedented demand for coca in the* [Huallaga] *Valley, where the soils were ideally suited for the crop*" (Kay, 1999: 101). The second process may be explained by the transition to democracy after twelve years of military dictatorship, as well as by the economic recession Peru faced between 1983-1985.[153]

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[151] My own translation.

[152] My own translation.

[153] Around 1983 the fall in the price of metals brought about a serious economic crisis that was reflected in the difficulties to pay the foreign debt, high inflation and national currency devaluation. The annual inflation, for instance, increased 68.21% in average in the years 1979-1982; 130.78% in the years 1983-1985. For a detailed analysis of the Peruvian economic and political crisis between the years 1983-1985, cf. Farnsworth, 1988.

The return to democracy paved the way for a broad participation of political parties; all of which, however, failed in extending the bases of participatory democracy to the Huallaga Valley, which remained isolated from the national political arena. Due to this institutional and power vacuum, drug traffickers increased their power in the region, even resorting to bribes and coercion to secure immunity from arrest by corrupt local police agents (cf. Tarazona-Sevillano and Reuter, 1990). The economic crisis, in turn, brought about favorable conditions for the expansion of the CCC. With raging inflation and a severe foreign debt crisis, coca plantations –which used to be thirty times more profitable than other traditional crops– contributed to create

> *an abundant source of jobs in a depressed economy [that] was not unwelcome from the point of view of national politicians, many of whom hesitated to interfere with the activity that, although illegal, contributed more than marginally to national income.* (Kay, 1999: 101)

In early 1980, the Huallaga Valley (UHV) turned into the second most important agricultural region in Peru due to coca production (Álvarez, 1993: 120). According to a report by the United Nations Development Program in 1988 (cit. en Álvarez, 1993: 122), about 30,000 workers grew approximately 42,000 hectares of coca bush in the UHV. Taking other national estimates, which considered both the direct and indirect employment, the coca economy in 1988 provided work for 165,000 to 279,000 workers (Álvarez, 1993: 129).

De Rementería (1995: 114) believes that between the years 1978-1993 about 150,000 peasant families worked in the CCC; however, they only received between 10-25% of the local profits for the export of coca, CBP and CHCL since the intermediaries and great producers received between 75-90% of the profits. In any case, participation of the coca farmers in the national agricultural GDP showed a substantial increase from 1978 onwards (Graphic 3).

In 1978 the coca peasants received about US$20 millions thus, participating, of 1.2% of the national agricultural GDP. Between the years 1986 and 1988, they received ten times as much –about US$200 millions–, increasing their participation to 10% of the Peruvian agricultural GDP (about 0.5% of the total GDP). In 1989, following an international fall in the price of CHCL and a rise in production costs, the peasants grew more hectares (Table 3) but received a pay of US$86 millions –4.2% of the national agricultural GDP, 0.29% of the total GDP–. Towards 1992, finally, the

Peruvian coca farmers received US$362 millions –the highest figure in sixteen years– for a production of 137,000 MT of coca leaf, in other words, twenty times the production of 1978 (De Rementería, 1995: 102-103).

GRAPHIC 3: Importance of the Coca Economy in Relation to the Total GDP and the Agricultural GDP in Peru (in %), 1978-1993



Source: My own design on the basis of the data provided by De Rementería, 1995: 102-103.

In view of the magnitude the coca economy had reached by mid-1980s[154], the Peruvian Government launched programs for the eradication of coca plantations in the UHV. Even though, initially, they seemed to respond to a successful policy to reduce the illegal coca bush plantations, they turned into a serious national problem towards the end of the same decade. Indirectly, the eradication program had paved the way for an alliance of the coca producers and Shining Path –I will return to this point below–. Therefore, while the coca producers received guerrilla protection against the army, Shining Path (SP) received incomes for their activities (Kay, 1999: 97; Rospigliosi, 2005: 82). It is difficult to say whether those incomes made SP

[154] Gonzáles de Olarte (1990: 10) considers that the macroeconomic importance of the coca production in Peru in the year 1989 may be summarized as follows: it constituted approximately 5% of the GDP, 20% of the agricultural GDP and 25% of the industrial GDP. Lovón Zavala (1993: 108) states that in the same year, the CCC employed 81,500 farmer families.

stronger, "*they surely contributed, however, to the escalation of violence in the eighties*" (Álvarez, 1993: 133).

In 1990, Alberto Fujimori became president of Peru and he radically changed the policy towards drug control.

> *His new approach, called* Fujimorismo*, did not consider the coca-growing peasants to be part of the criminal chain of drug trafficking. At the same time, the eradication of coca bush plantations stopped, and this played a key role in the decrease of peasant support for Shining Path in the Upper Huallaga Valley. Up to 1992, with the exception of the air force, the armed forces did not participate in drug law enforcement activities. Soon, however, the situation would radically change.* (Dreyfus, 1999: 387)

In April 1992, Fujimori led an internal coup d'état supported by the Armed Forces. He dissolved the Congress and intervened the Judiciary Power, and the Army started to participate in interdiction activities and in the repression of drug trafficking. In addition, in the same year, a new air force region (Air Force Region VI) was created in the UHV with the purpose of controlling airstrips and intercepting illegal flights.

The direct effects of the counternarcotic initiatives in Peru as of 1992 were three: (a) due to the forced eradication and to marketing reasons (CHCL overproduction until 1993 –Table 3– and a fall in demand by the US), there was a reduction of coca bush plantations between 1994-2000 (Table 1); (b) the weakened cooperation between the producers and SP was replaced by a new alliance between the producers and the Peruvian Armed Forces, which gave rise to a decade packed of corruption scandals (Dreyfus, 1999: 388-389); and (c) as a consequence of the inefficient strategy of forced eradication by hand or by means of fumigation, as much as the failure of the alternative development and the increase in the coca prices and its derivatives, three collateral phenomena worsen the situation: the *balloon effect,* the *mercury effect* and the *membrane effect* (Cabieses Cubas, 2005: 27-28).

The balloon effect –the displacement of coca plantations from a region and/or country to another region and/or country– caused coca plantations to move from Peru to Colombia between 1996-2000 and, as a result, the coca cultivation in the Andean region remained stable –around 210-220 thousand hectares– despite the eradication and fumigation of 455 thousand hectares in the same period (Graphic 4). The mercury effect –the spread of plantations in the same area or multiple areas– also took place between the years 1996-2000. Due to the persistent forced eradication in

Quillabamba, UHV and Apurímac-Ene, the illicit coca plantations were displaced to new coca basins throughout the Peruvian geography[155]. The membrane effect –the *borderization* of plantations– finally, favored the spread of plantations to the border areas of Putumayo (Colombian border), Río Madre de Dios (Bolivian border), and Yavarí and Alto Purús (Brazilian border).

GRAPHIC 4: Estimates of Coca Bush Cultivation (in Ha.) in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, 1991-2000



Source: My own design, based on the data provided by UNODC, 2006a: 81.

In the decade between 2001-2010, Peru consolidated her status as an UPC by increasing not only the number of hectares for coca cultivation (Table 4), but also the CHCL production (Table 5). According to Cabieses Cubas (2004; 16; 2005: 29-34; 2007: 74-75) in 2002:

(a) Between 24,600-53,000 hectares of coca plantations were used for the illegal manufacture of CBP and CHCL, that is to say, 68-80% of the total coca plantations;

[155] A similar phenomenon took place in Bolivia (1997-2001) between the regions of Yungas, Chapare and Apolo as a result of the Plan Dignidad. To expand on this, cf. Cabieses Cubas, 2007: 65-67.

(b) The legal production and consumption of the coca leaf moves US$57 million through the official channels of the National Coca Company (ENACO)[156] and US$64 million through informal channels (in other words, the coca-related profits in Peru reaches US$115 million a year);

(c) According to the Crime and Narcotics Center (CNC) in the US, out of 25,500 MT of coca leaf, 33 MT of CBP are produced to be processed in Colombia and Brazil; and 71 MT of CHCL to be exported to consuming markets. According to the UNODC, out of 29,300 MT of coca leaf, 38 MT of CBP are produced to be processed outside the country; and 81 MT, to be exported to consuming markets. According to specialists and the ENACO, out of 36,000 MT of coca leaf, 47 MT of CBP are produced to be processed outside the country; and 100 MT of CHCL are sent to the consuming markets;

(d) In terms of the flow of money, the CCC deals with US$144 million as recorded by CNC (US$61 million in the coca leaf business, US$14 million in the CBP business and US$69 million related to CHCL); US$165 million according to UNODC (US$70 million coming from the coca leaf plantations, US$16 million from CBP and US$79 million from CHCL); and US$203 million according to specialists and ENACO (US$86 million in coca leaf business, US$20 million from CBP and US$97 million from CHCL);

(e) The coca growers whose production has an illegal target amount to: 37,000 according to the CNC; 52,000 according to the data by UNODC; and 72,000 according to specialists and ENACO. All in all, there is a minimum of 55,000 and a maximum of 90,000 coca producers in the country;

(f) It is believed that there are 300,000 agricultural producers in the areas of greatest coca production, which means that the cocaleros *per se* represent around the 20-30% of the total number of agricultural producers.

[156] The National Coca Company (ENACO) was created in 1949 as the only Peruvian company that was authorized for trading the coca leaf and its derivatives. From 1982, ENACO turned into a state company regulated by private law (ENACO S.A.), which held the monopoly on the legal store of coca leaf and the oligopoly in the distribution of the product. In addition to maintaining the bad habits of state bureaucracy, informal smugglers and traffickers that offered better prices to the coca farmers had to face unfair competition.

TABLE 4: Estimates of Coca Bush Cultivation (in Ha.) in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, 2001-2010, According to the Data Provided by ONDCP and UNODC*

Year	Colombia		Peru		Bolivia		Total	
	ONDCP	UNODC	ONDCP	UNODC	ONDCP	UNODC	ONDCP	UNODC
2001	69,800	144,800	32,100	46,200	19,900	19,900	121,800	210,900
2002	144,450	102,000	34,700	46,700	21,600	21,600	200,750	170,300
2003	113,850	86,000	29,250	44,200	23,200	23,600	166,300	153,800
2004	114,100	80,000	27,500	50,300	24,600	27,700	166,200	158,000
2005	144,000	86,000	34,000	48,200	26,500	25,400	204,500	159,600
2006	157,200	78,000	42,000	51,400	25,800	27,500	225,000	156,900
2007	167,000	99,000	36,000	53,700	29,500	28,900	232,500	181,600
2008	119,000	81,000	41,000	56,100	32,000	30,500	192,000	167,600
2009	116,000	73,000	40,000	59,900	35,000	30,900	191,000	163,800
2010	100,000	62,000	53,000	61,200	34,500	31,100	187,500	154,300

Sources: UNODC (2011a; 2013a) and White House (2010).
Note: *This table is also found in Ch. II (Table 8).

TABLE 5: Potential Manufacture of CHCL (in MT), Seizures of Coca Paste, CBP and CHCL, and Destroyed Labs of CBP and CHCL in Peru, 2001-2010

Year	Manufacture of CHCL	Seizures (MT)		Labs Destroyed	
		Coca/CBP	CHCL	Coca/CBP	CHCL
2001	255	6,2	2,9	72	0
2002	280	10,4	4,1	238	0
2003	245	4,3	3,5	955	9
2004	230	6,4	7,3	810	11
2005	260	4,5	1,7	1,104	22
2006	265	5,1	14,1	713	11
2007	210	7,5	7,9	649	16
2008	215	11,7	16,2	1,205	19
2009	225	9,3	10,4	2,494	25
2010	325	11,9	15,4	1,130	18

Sources: US Department of State 2000; 2001; 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007; 2008; 2009; 2010; 2011.

Additional data allow us to state that, during the decade 2001-2010, Peru consolidated an illegal production matrix that was more oriented to the manufacture of CBP and CHCL rather than to the production of coca leaves and coca paste. In fact:

(a) The importance of the coca leaf production in relation to the total GDP and the agricultural GDP in Peru has diminished in the past few years (Graphic 5); and

(b) The seizures of CHCL have gradually increased from 2004, even exceeding the seizures of CBP (Table 6). If we compare the seizures of coca leaf, CBP and CHCL to those in Bolivia, the data is revealing: the seizures of coca leaf and CBP

are significantly larger in Bolivia; the seizures of CHCL, in contrast, are larger in Peru.

TABLE 6: Seizures of Coca Leaf (in Kg.), CBP (in Kg.) and CHCL (in Kg.) in Peru and Bolivia, 2003-2012

Year	Coca Leaf		CBP		CHCL	
	Peru	Bolivia	Peru	Bolivia	Peru	Bolivia
2003	1,328,347	66,811	4,366	6,934	3,574	5,969
2004	916,024	155,182	6,330	8,189	7,303	531
2005	1,525,739	886,268	3,199	10,152	2,119	1,300
2006	1,067,439	1,343,062	5,044	12,779	14,794	1,309
2007	N/A	1,705,636	6,260	14,991	8,119	2,923
2008	N/A	2,064,823	11,753	21,641	16,203	7,246
2009	N/A	1,574,041	9,914	21,970	10,744	4,922
2010	N/A	1,015,035	12,238	25,714	17,544	3,390
2011	N/A	603,319	13,975	28,352	10,758	5,614
2012	N/A	739,884	19,697	32,133	12,677	4,175

Sources: UNODC, 2003c; 2003d; 2004b; 2005b; 2005d; 2006c; 2007c; 2008b; 2008c; 2008d; 2010b; 2010e; 2011c; 2011e; 2012c; 2013b; 2013d.

GRAPHIC 5: Importance of the Coca Economy in Relation to the Total GDP and the Agricultural GDP in Peru (in %), 2004-2011



Source: My own design. The figures of the total GDP and the Agricultural GDP were retrieved from the World Bank Open Database (http://data.worldbank.org/), 2003-2012. The total value of the coca leaf production, in thousands of dollars, has been taken from UNODC, 2005d; 2006c; 2007c; 2008b; 2008d; 2010e; 2011e; 2012c.

Taking into account that "*the experience of recent years show that the Peruvian State has given no priority to the fight against drugs*" (DEVIDA, 2012: 3), Ollanta Humala's administration adopted the *National Strategy Against Drugs 2012-2016* in February 2012, with four main objectives: (a) an alternative, integral and sustainable development; (b) interdiction and sanction; (c) prevention and rehabilitation; and (d) a global commitment with a cross-cutting approach. In spite of the optimism that may emerge from the diminishing number of hectares growing coca bush (from about 53,000 in 2010 to 49,500 in 2011), we will only be able to evaluate the achievements and failures of Ollanta Humala's Administration in the next few years.

As a synopsis and in order to justify my decision to classify Peru as a DPC, I highlight that: (a) Peru was the second CHCL producer country in between 2001-2010, and the first one in the period between 2012-2013; (b) in absolute terms, Peru produces more coca leaves than Bolivia (Table 4); in relative terms, however, the importance of the coca economy in relation to the total GDP and the agricultural GDP is significantly higher in Bolivia than in Peru (Graphics 2 and 5); (c) while 18,000 peasants work in coca plantations in Peru, in Bolivia there are about 90,000; (d) the number of CHCL laboratories that were destroyed in the decade between 2001-2010 has gradually increased; (e) the CCC moves about US$144-203 million; the greatest money flow is represented by the production and trafficking/distribution of CHCL, followed by the coca leaf and the CBP.

2.2.2. Colombia

For two decades (1975-1995), the role of Colombia in the international division of the coca-cocaine production was clear: the country imported coca leaf and CBP from Peru and Bolivia while actively participating in the processing, transport and export of CHCL (about this process, cf. Lee, 1988: 99; Gómez, 1990: 64; Nadelmann, 1990: 48; García Rocha, 2000: 14; Mason, 2010: 332-333, among others). Even when it is a typical case of an UPC, the Colombian equation is noteworthy. How has a country that lacked the necessary raw material become the main exporter of the refined product in just a few years?

A number of factors converge when venturing an answer to this unusual phenomenon. An element to consider is the explosion in the consumption of CHCL that took place in the US during the 1970s (cf. Ch. II of this dissertation). From a

simple market-oriented logic, the increase in the demand of a product –and consequently in its price– encourages an increase in the supply of the same good or complementary ones. Following this line, there were, at that time, the necessary incentives for the stakeholders to devote themselves to the production, processing and refining of CHCL and its derivatives. This explanation alone results limited. What other elements contributed to turning Colombia into the main exporter of CHCL in 1980? In an extraordinary article, the Colombian researcher Hermes Tovar Pinzón (1994) puts forward a key idea to understand this process: the short-cycle export economies.

After the great emancipation processes in Latin America (1808-1826), the brand new states in the region sought export markets that were able to guarantee local development and economic stability. The result of these efforts was twofold: the generation of long-cycle export economies on the one hand, and the emergence of short-cycle export economies on the other. The export cycles of long duration –illustrated for example by the agro-exporting economic matrix in Argentina– "*allowed for the development of road infrastructure, transport and ports following the route of the raw material going abroad*"[157] (Tovar Pinzón, 1994: 92). Additionally, they contributed to the formation of regional economies and, even though at the expense of independence, facilitated the modernization of the economy (Sevilla Soler, 1992: 726) –though not its industrialization–. These exporting cycles, while bringing about economic progress, they coexisted with speculating cycles that were exclusively oriented towards the satisfaction of temporary demands from European economies.

During the 19th Century, Colombia developed four short-cycle export economies: tobacco, natural rubber, chinchona bark and indigo plant. The tobacco economy, for example, flourished towards 1850 as a consequence of the global increase in the consumption of cigarettes. When tobacco started to be produced in other countries or in the Asian colonies around 1865, or when the supply largely exceeded the demand, the prices collapsed. The towns in the interior of Colombia that had grown due to the tobacco industry had to face massive unemployment, disinvestment, depopulation and subjection to squalor. Actually, as stated by Tovar Pinzón (1994: 94), the short-cycle economies

[157] My own translation.

(a) invade farming or indigenous areas and they demand a product that, up to that moment, had only served the purposes of organizing local markets and has satisfied mere domestic uses; (b) this invasion comes along with capital, which is used to acquire new lands, establish transformation centers for the products and generate new working relationships; (c) the small farmers are dispossessed of their lands and turned into peasants or producers that depend on the great buyers; (d) new owners of great units emerge and recruit new people, who widen and diversify the work field; (e) immigration and demand of "qualified" workforce generate a rise in wages or incomes; (f) a rapid inflation of prices emerges from the scarce availability of food for a population that increases by doubling or tripling the consumption of the goods available in towns, whose food resources are limited; (g) the bonanza that salaries provide intends to satisfy the postponed needs and frustration that affect the social order and paves the way for the proliferation of activities such as prostitution, gambling, alcohol abuse and the acquisition of costly goods. This reorganization of demand and consumption leads the surplus to business people, who make their profits out of these short-cycle booms; (h) producer societies share a climate of violence and instead of works of social infrastructure, all that remains is ruin, neglect and isolation; (i) in isolated and mainly indigenous areas new indebtedness systems arise by the increase of barter practices, which leads the people to personal dependency formats which may be considered close to slavery (j) the benefits of exploitation do not stay in the region but a great proportion of them is transferred to other towns and metropolitan centers; (k) over the ruin of towns and the bonanzas that faded away, hundreds of people are left without privileges whereas some families or wealthy groups form a "neo-oligarchy."[158]

Throughout the 20th Century, Colombia did not escape from these temporary cycles of illusion and disenchantment. Four short-cycle economies, in fact, dominated the southern regions of the country by the mid-century: the coffee, emerald, oil and marijuana economies. At the beginning of the year 1970, however, all of them collapsed. The coffee economy was affected by the fall in the prices at the international level[159] (Gómez, 1990: 78); the emerald collapsed because of the decrease in the demand and hundreds of mines in the Bocayá region closed down (Federico, 2011: 44-49); the oil economy fell due to the *Oil Crisis* in 1973 –which caused an increase in the price of petroleum, a great inflation effect and a reduction in the economic activity of the countries involved–; and the marijuana economy collapsed because it was illegal and during the administrations of Julio César Turbay (1978-1982) and Belisario Betancur (1982-1986) the cannabis plantations started to be eradicated (Costantino and Lasa, 2010: 81).

At the beginning of 1980, we find Colombia with: (a) a great number of unemployed workers as a consequence of the collapse of short-cycle economies such as coffee, oil and emerald; (b) the impoverishment of the thriving industrial

[158] My own translation.

[159] To expand on the idea of the coffee economy as the engine of the Colombian economy, cf. the excellent work by Sevilla Soler, 1992; 1994.

bourgeoisie in Caldas and Medellin, cities which used to be connected to the coffee export activity; (c) the loss of competitiveness in foreign markets of the textile industry in Medellin –a city developed after the coffee boom– which showed an unemployment rate that was 30% higher than the national value in 1976, and 65% higher in 1979 (Gómez, 1990: 78); and (d) an emerging illegal network of production and trafficking of marijuana towards the US –controlled from Barranquilla by the Dávila Armenta and the Dávila Jimeno[160] families–, which was facing the eradication of raw material. If we combine these local elements and the increase in the demand for CHCL in the US, we will find an explanation to the blooming of the short-cycle illegal economy of the coca-cocaine. In this scenario, even when the raw material had to been imported from Bolivia and Peru, the coca-cocaine economy took advantage of: (a) the great number of unemployed workers of the damaged economies of coffee, emeralds and oil; (b) the illegal distribution networks developed for the trafficking of marijuana along the 1970s; and (c) the relative industrial development in Colombia needed to refine CHCL.

Some key data will help us better understand the dimension of the refining-exporting profile of Colombia in the decade of 1980. In 1981, Peru had 50,000 hectares of coca plantations, Bolivia had 55,000, and Colombia 2,500 (Abruzzese, 1989). Colombia, however, was responsible for 50% of the CHCL's world market, which represented 2.9% of the annual GDP, in terms of repatriable incomes during the years 1980-1985. Between 1986-1990, the Colombian participation in the world market of CHCL increased to 75%, which contributed to consolidating the structure of the industry in cartels –I will return to this point below–. The profits in those years represented the approximate 5% of the annual GDP[161] (García Rocha, 2000: 16-17).

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[160] One of the *dealers* working in the network of the Dávila Armenta and the Dávila Jimeno families was Carlos Lehder. Lehder, a Colombian of German father, was arrested in the US under charges of drug trafficking. While he was in Danbury's Federal Prison (Connecticut), Lehder met George Jung, his fellow inmate, and they promised each other that, once free, they would take advantage of the CHCL market that was emerging. Lehder was released in 1974 and a year later he acquired an island in the Bahamas, which he turned into the spearhead to enter the American market. The first illegal cargo that went to Lehder's island set sail from Medellín in 1977. The supplier was a fellow from Antioquia called Pablo Escobar Gaviria, who years later would fund the powerful Medellin Cartel together with Rodríguez Gacha and the brothers Jorge, Luis and Fabio Ochoa. In Cali, on the other hand, Hélmer Herrera Buitrago organized a network together with the Rodríguez Orejuela brothers; in this way, the second great drug-dealing cartel of CHCL emerged in Colombia.

[161] In terms of GDP percentage, there are several estimates as to the magnitude of the repatriable incomes of drug dealing activities in Colombia. According to some authors, the estimates show 3.6% of the GDP in 1978 (Caballero and Junguito, 1978); between 9.8% in 1982 and 0.9% in 1991 (Gómez, 1990a; Gómez, 1990b; Gómez and Santa María, 1994); between 3-17% as minimum and maximum

During the 1990s, the prevailing refining-exporting role of Colombia was slightly modified due to the geometrical increase of the number of hectares with coca plantations (Table 1). If we consider that in 1981 the area growing coca only covered 2,500 hectares, the following figures are surely remarkable: in 1990 the area of coca plantations ascended to 40,100 hectares; in 1995, 50,900 hectares could be counted; finally, towards the end of the decade in 1999, Colombia presented a cultivated area of 160,100 hectares. In other words, Colombia had increased 64 times its coca cultivation areas in just twenty years.

From being a DPC in the 1980s, in the 1990s Colombia became an UPC/DPC or rather into a deficient Full Cycle Country, since it depended, then –as well as today–, on imported chemical precursors. This change, in part brought about by the eradication of coca plantations policies in Bolivia and Peru –balloon effect–, and by a greater efficiency in the control of air corridors open between Colombian drug dealers and Bolivian and Peruvian cocaleros, had profound effects in the socio-political life of Colombia.

In the first place, the increase in the coca plantations generated mass migrations of temporary workers towards southern agricultural-rural areas in Colombia. According to national population censuses carried out between 1988-1993 (cit. in Martínez and Rincón, 1997), 1,2 million people –that is to say, 3.7% of the national population– lived in the region known as Orinoquía-Amazonía[162] (Departments of Caquetá, Putumayo, Guaviare, Meta, Vichada, Vaupés and Guainía). According to the Colombian researcher Vargas Meza (2004: 273-299), this process of mass migrations was structured along a "*social dynamics typical of a disorganized process of occupation of the territory*", whose ultimate consequence was an alarming environmental impact (forest clearance, pollution of rivers, extinction of native species of flora and fauna, etc.).

In the second place, what García Rocha (2000: 19) referred to as a "*land counter-reform or reverse land reform.*"[163] With the huge amount of money that was accumulated in the 1980s (Rubio, 2004: 2; Rubio and Vaughan, 2007: 24; Costantino

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potentials between the years 1985-1994 (Rocha García, 1997); between 5-2% in the years 1980-1998 (Rocha García, 2000; Steiner, 1997); between 2.3-1.7% in 1999-2003 (Rocha García and Ramírez, 2005) and, more recently, 2.3% of the GDP in 2008 (Mejía and Rico, 2010).

[162] In 1998, 80% of the cultivated surface in the Orinoquía-Amazonía region grew illegal plantations (García Rocha, 2000: 48).

[163] My own translation.

and Lasa, 2010: 82), the drug barons invested great sums in buying estates, automobiles, race horses, and vast lands which were now concentrated in the hands of the new rich. It is estimated that nowadays drug dealers possess 4,4 million hectares, valued at US$2,400 million.

A third obvious process –related to the previous one– consisted in the "*drip distribution*" (Nadelmann, 1990: 50). The same as in Peru and Bolivia, car dealers, restaurant owners, domestic staff, drivers, construction workers, day laborers, farmers, peasants, and many other qualified and non-qualified workers, even if they were not directly involved in the CCC, obtained an economic profit from the expenses and investments of those who were. Even more serious was the economic profit obtained by corrupt officials –police officers, public prosecutors, judges and politicians– by means of bribes and kickbacks.

In the fourth place, Colombia suffered from a local variety of the Dutch Disease (Gómez, 1990: 80-81; Thoumi, 1990: 105) since the exporting bonanza of CHCL appreciated the local coin, reduced the relative price of tradable goods –among them, the imports of competitive goods for the national production– and, consequently, also the profitability of the manufacture of those goods.

Finally, the socio-political consequences were disastrous: weakness in government institutions which were consumed with corruption and inefficiency (Thoumi, 1990: 105); the violent control of social conflicts and the use of violence in the service of private interests (Dombois, 1990: 112); the strengthening of drug dealing groups, guerrilla and paramilitary groups, which found in the CCC a funding source for their activities (García Rocha, 2000: 20); etc.

By the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the new millennium, the CCC in Colombia had acquired elephantine proportions. Whereas in 1990 Colombia had 40,100 hectares cultivated with coca bush, produced 92 annual MT of CHCL and employed 40,000 workers (cf. Table 1 and 7, and Graphic 4), in the year 2000, the cultivated area reached 163,300 hectares, the annual production of CHCL ascended to 695 MT, and more than 200,000 people were employed (Vargas Meza, 2004: 276). It is important to say that, throughout the 1990s, the CCC in Colombia increased four times its coca-bush cultivated area, seven times and a half its production of CHCL, and five times its workforce.

In this context of boom of the CCC, the Colombian government –with the economic and logistical support of the US government– put forward the Plan Colombia. I have mention in Ch. II the objectives of the Plan Colombia, the context of its emergence and the vast literature on the topic. I will not deal with the Plan Colombia in an exhaustive way in this chapter; but it is necessary to point out that it had a decisive impact –even when questionable– in the reduction of the coca plantation hectares, the quantities of CHCL produced, the number of families living on coca-related incomes and the dimension of the coca economy in relation to the agricultural GDP.

TABLE 7: The Coca-Cocaine Economies in Bolivia, Peru and Colombia, 1990

	Bolivia	Peru	Colombia
Ha. under cultivation	50,300	121,300	40,100
Production of coca (in MT)	116,000	138,000	32,000
Total value added (in US$ millions)	695-911	498-1,219	1,127
Value added as % of GDP	15,6-20,5	1,5-3,7	2,9
Income remaining in the country (in US$ millions)	179-216	382-942	645
Income as % of legal exports	19,4-23,5	14,3-35,4	16,8
Workers employed in the CCC	207,000	165,000-279,000	40,000
Workers as % of EAP	6,7-12	2,7-4,5	0,4

Source: Painter, 1994: 51.

By means of manual eradication or aerial spraying, the number of coca plantation hectares was reduced in a gradual and sustained manner during the decade 2001-2010 (Graphic 6). The historic maximum values of 163,300 cultivated hectares in 2000 and 144,800 in 2001, were reduced to a minimum figure of 62,000 hectares in 2010 (Table 4), which was further lowered in 2012 (48,000 hectares). In terms of CHCL production (Table 8), Colombia went from producing about 695 MT in 2000, to producing about 350 in 2010, 345 in 2011 and 309 in 2012.

GRAPHIC 6: Coca Bush Cultivated Ha., Manually Eradicated Ha. and Fumigated Ha. in Colombia, 2000-2010



Sources: UNODC, 2002b; 2005c; 2006b; 2007b; 2008b; 2009b; 2010c; 2011d.

TABLE 8: Potential Manufacture of CHCL (in MT), Seizures of Coca Paste, CBP and CHCL, and Destroyed Labs of CBP and CHCL in Colombia, 2000-2010

Year	Manufacture of CHCL	Seizures (MT)		Labs Destroyed	
		Coca/CBP	CHCL	Coca/CBP	CHCL
2000	695	N/A	69	N/A	N/A
2001	530	26,7	57,3	N/A	N/A
2002	700	30,0	94,0	N/A	129
2003	585	31,1	114,0	N/A	83
2004	445	28,3	138,6	N/A	150
2005	410	43,8	179	N/A	137
2006	500	48,1	130,2	1,952	205
2007	515	60,6	130,7	2,875	240
2008	485	41	182,8	3,238	301
2009	295	49,85	156	2,795	285
2010	350	57,84	160,1	2,283	256
2011	345	61	125	N/A	N/A
2012	309	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Sources: UNODC (2012b; 2013c) and US Department of State (2010; 2012; 2013a).

The Plan Colombia was also effective in reducing the dimension of the coca economy in relation to the total GDP, the agricultural GDP and the Colombian labor

market. Graphic 7 shows a reduction in the dependency of the Colombian economy on the coca leaf. Graphic 8, in turn, accounts for the manual and voluntary eradications that were settled with some families, who agreed on replacing their coca plantations with traditional crops.

GRAPHIC 7: Importance of the Coca Economy in Relation to the Total GDP and the Agricultural GDP in Colombia (in %), 2005-2012



Sources: UNODC, 2005c; 2006b; 2007b; 2009b; 2010c; 2011d; 2012b; 2013c.

GRAPHIC 8: Number of Households Involved in Coca Cultivation in Colombia, 2005-2012



Sources: UNODC, 2005c; 2006b; 2007b; 2009b; 2010c; 2011d; 2012b; 2013c.

The Plan Colombia contributed as well to improve the safety conditions of the country although not everything fell in the positive side. As mentioned above, Plan Colombia brought about the militarization of the fight against drugs in the country; it affected, due to the fumigations, the population's health and it damaged forests, micro-basins, rivers, ravines, cattle and domestic animals (Vargas Meza, 2004: 298-299); and it created a spill-over effect in the region. Peru and Bolivia, for instance, are suffering from the consequences of an unquestionable balloon effect of coca cultivation (cf. Table 4 and Mejía and Posada, 2010: 261), and the center of criminal interest organized around the trafficking of CHCL has been gradually displaced to Central America and Mexico (Bagley, 2012: 5). The latter hypothesis has actually emerged in an interview I held with a high official of the State Department of the United States[164].

[164] The interview was carried out within the *Brussels Forum 2013*, which took place in the city of Brussels (Belgium) during March 15-17, 2013. I attended such meeting as Young Professional recommended by the World Bank and selected by the German Marshal Fund of the United States. I cannot reveal the identity of the interviewee, as requested by her.

> *I think we are working very, very* [inaudible word] *with Mexico. The new President has met with our Administration, we– both in the US and in Mexico. We are making sure that we keep our close cooperation going forward now that there is a new Government, different party in Mexico as you know. I don't think the virtual ends will be any less in terms of trying to end the drug trafficking and the violence that come with it. It is obviously interconnected with America and American demand as well and demand throughout the region in the world, hemisphere in the world. We– We have* [inaudible word] *what we have to do on our end to help in that regard, but I think the most important thing is that we have a strong partnership, that we understand we share the border, and if we– as we saw in Colombia,* ***Plan Colombia and the work with the Colombian Government did a remarkable job in ending the impunity, the violence, the drug traffickers, the human trafficking networks in Colombia. But unfortunately, because it was not broadly regional approach, it moved drugs to Central America, it moved drugs Mexico****. So, it has to be a– a whole west hemisphere security approach, security on every level.* (US Department of State, 2013b) [Emphasis added]

. . .

As can be seen, a classification of the Colombian role in the international division of the coca-cocaine production is a highly complex task. During the years 1985-1994, Colombia was clearly a DPC. It used to produce a mere 10% of the world supply of coca leaf, but it participated in 50-70% of the world CHCL market. In the middle of the year 2000, however, it was not only the producer of almost 80% of the CHCL manufactured at a global level, but it was also the producer of 70% of the coca leaf cultivated in the Andean area. As we have previously stated, if Colombia were not still depending on the import of chemical precursors, its role would be more adjusted to one of a Full Cycle Country. Some elements lead me to think, however, that the role of Colombia is still mainly oriented towards the production and exportation of CHCL –rather than coca leaves, coca paste and CBP–.

In the first place, the importance of the coca economy in relation to the total GDP and the agricultural GDP in Colombia is significantly lower than the one in Bolivia, a typical Upstream Producer Country (cf. Graphics 2 and 7). In the second place and taking into account the data shown in Table 8, it is noticeable that the seizures of CHCL in the last years have been greater than the seizures of coca paste and CBP. This clearly points to a greater supply and a higher volume of exports of CHCL than of CBP –the exact opposite takes place in Bolivia, for example (Table 2)–. There is, however, a note of discord in this formulation: the number of workers employed in the coca economy is greater in Colombia than in the neighboring Andean

countries. Whereas Bolivia employs more than 90,000 cocaleros and Peru exhibits an estimated minimum of 55,000 workers –even when more realistic numbers calculate 90,000 peasants working in the coca bush cultivation–, there are 310,130 workers in Colombia engaged in the cultivation of coca (UNODC, 2010a: 59).

By quoting Dreyfus (2002: 72) in the first paragraphs of this chapter, I indicated that the production of CHCL is capital-intensive, so in the countries oriented to the production of CHCL, the percentage of labor engaged should be lower than the percentage of labor engaged in those countries oriented to the production of coca and coca paste. In this sense Colombia represents an enormous challenge since, even when it exhibits a profile that is more compatible with a DPC, it employs more coca peasants than Bolivia.

In the consulted literature, there is no explanation that accounts for this paradox –save the obvious: Colombia currently produces more coca than Bolivia–. An observation by Gómez (1990), though, may throw light on this matter. The cultivated hectares in Colombia, as stated by the researcher, are less productive than those in Bolivia and Peru: "*whereas the average alkaloid content of the coca leaves in Bolivia is 0.72% and in Peru is 0.53%, the Colombian leaves only present 0.28%*" (Gómez, 1990: 64. Cf. also Table 6 in Ch. II of this dissertation). Taken in isolation and in absolute values, then, the empirical information about the Colombian CCC cultivating more hectares and employing more workers than the Bolivian CCC may lead us to the mistake of classifying Colombia as an UPC. Nevertheless, we soon notice, that: (a) due to the Bolivian coca having an alkaloid concentration that is almost three times higher than the Colombian one, Bolivia is able to produce coca leaves and coca paste of a higher quality by cultivating fewer hectares and employing fewer peasants; (b) Bolivia is, then, more efficient than Colombia as regards the three first stages of the coca-cocaine production; and (c) in combination with other facts already mentioned, we notice that the Colombian profile is more similar to a deficient Cycle Producer Country than to a DPC that turned to coca cultivation as a result of a balloon effect in the decade of the 1990s.

The difference between UPC and DPC has become blurred, and Colombia is probably the best example of this. Its role has changed from the decade of the 1980s and its productive matrix is no longer exclusively oriented to the production and export of CHCL. The decision of classifying Colombia as a DPC, in this sense, responds

mainly to the analytical and conceptual need of understanding the characteristic features of the coca-cocaine industry in this country as well as striking a difference from Bolivia and Peru. My choice, however, has not been one taken at the spur of the moment.

In addition to the information presented here, the following sections of this chapter will analyze the most relevant actors in the CCC in Bolivia, Peru and Colombia. It will be noticed then that Colombia has had two large cartels throughout its history, which Bolivia and Peru have not; also, that the coca unions in Bolivia have had a prominence that contrasts considerably with the weak associations of coca peasants in Colombia. The importance of one or other actors will have an impact on the role that each country plays in the CCC in South America.

3. Trafficking

The moment of trafficking in the CCC is probably the most logistically organized among narco-actors. The illegal load not only needs to pass border controls, but it also needs to travel long distances through different geographical areas. In order to have some CHCL loads delivered from South America to Europe, for instance, cocaine must go across the ocean by boat or by plane, the distance being more than 12,000 km. (Lasa, 2013a: 8).

From the consolidation of the CCC, land and water roads have been opened in an unchanging pattern: to connect the Andean producer heart to the main consumer markets. During the decades of the 1970s and 1980s, the main consumer market was the US, which was supplied by the two great Colombian cartels: the Medellin Cartel supplied the west coast and the south of the US and the Cali Cartel concentrated on meeting the demand of Miami, New York and the east coast (Pasquini and De Miguel, 1995: 117-118). In order to reach its destiny, the CHCL was carried in ships and aircrafts through the Caribbean islands (Federico, 2011: 42); when the DEA started to stalk the Caribbean path, Medellin and Cali found new trafficking allies: Manuel Antonio Noriega in Panamá, gangs of Central America such as Mara Salvatrucha (MS-

13) and M18, and Mexican cartels such as the one in Guadalajara, led by the legendary Miguel Ángel '*El Padrino*' Félix Gallardo.

In the 1990s, three key events favored the opening of a huge new market across the Atlantic Ocean: (a) the North American market was swamped with CHCL and the US had declared the war against drugs; (b) the collapse of the Soviet bloc generated power vacuums that facilitated the strengthening of criminal groups in the territory of the former USSR; and (c) the fragmentation of Europe that brought about political, economic and institutional uncertainty. In this context, the persecuted and decimated Colombian cartels embarked on the pursuit of roads that may supply the growing markets, as well as reinforce their depressed finances. In the diversification of their operations, then, Peru and Bolivia turned into ideal countries for two essential characteristics: (a) they were UPC that, with the appropriate capital, could produce CHCL; and (b) they shared borders with Brazil and Argentina, countries with extensive coasts on the Atlantic Ocean. As Painter (1994: 29) indicated,

> *while it was still true that the United States remained the main destination for Bolivian cocaine, new and more lucrative markets, particularly in Europe and the Pacific Rim countries (mainly Japan) were opening up via new routes through Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay or Brazil.*

The increase in the trafficking of cocaine to Europe results evident if we analyze the figures on the total seizures of CHCL in the world. In 1985, out of the total percentage of seized CHCL at a global level, barely 2.1% belonged to Europe. This number ascended to 5.9% in 1990, to 7% in 1995, to 8.3% in 2000 and to 16.3% in 2001 (UNODC, 2004: 104). Raymond Kendall, Interpol's Executive Director (1985-2001), when interviewed by Hargreaves (1992: 8) at the beginning of the decade of the 1990s, described this process as follows:

> *(…) 'the amount of cocaine confiscated in Europe more than doubled, from 6 to 14 tons. Given that police estimate they seize a maximum of 10 per cent of the total, which means that in 1990 Europe was awash at least 140 tones. (…) South American drug barons have seen their outlets to North America squeezed by law enforcement and oversupply, and are looking for new markets. (…) Bolivian and Peruvian traffickers are also exporting directly to Europe. We are no longer seeing as much of the north-south movements. (…) Traffickers are switching from Caribbean routes to new ones through Brazil's Amazon waterways and Argentina through Africa and Europe's major ports.'*

Summing up, during the decade 1991-2000, the Andean CCC provided the American and European markets through two great routes: (a) the route of the Mexican Pacific and the Central American route towards the US; and (b) the Atlantic

route, via Venezuela, Brazil and Argentina, towards Europe. Throughout the first years of the new millennium, these dynamics was maintained stable but, by the year 2005, new trafficking routes to the Old Continent started to appear.

In 2004, as estimated by the UNODC (2011a: 12), Colombian drug traffickers started to experiment with routes through Western Africa. As a consequence, the seizures in offshore platforms and coastal areas in Morocco, Nigeria, Guinea, Mauritania, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Senegal, Gambia and Guinea Bissau increased in a significant way. During 2005, a total of 4,408 kilos of CHCL were intercepted in those countries; the figures increased to 12,510 kilos in 2006 and to 13,331 in 2007 (my own estimates on the basis of the data provided by UNODC, 2011a: 13). Towards the end of the decade, according to the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction and Europol (EMCDDA and Europol, 2012: 15), three narco-maritime routes towards Europe were consolidated: the northern route, from the Caribbean to Portugal, Spain and the Netherlands; the center route, from countries like Venezuela to Europe going through the Canary Islands; and the southern route, from Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay coming from Western Africa, and from there to Portugal and Spain.

The opening of the African route led to, at least, two problems that emphasize the complex dynamics of the CHCL trafficking at the regional and global levels. The first of them was signaled by Alexandre Schmidt, UNODC's Regional Head for West and Central Africa. In an interview given to the CNN in June 2011 (CNN Mexico, 2011), Schmidt mentioned that "*the repositioning of the drug routes (...) is a new tendency, and what we are witnessing in Western Africa is what we already saw in Mexico*"[165] –in reference to the way in which the Mexican traffickers displaced the Colombian in the trafficking of CHCL to the US–. The second problem is that the African routes have intensified the trafficking of CHCL in *marginal* countries of the CCC. Venezuela, for example, belongs to this latter group.

3.1. Venezuela, Ecuador, Uruguay and Chile

In spite of sharing an extensive border with Colombia, the importance of Venezuela as a transit country for CHCL and its derivatives was not consolidated until

[165] My own translation.

the middle of the 1980s. According to the National Commission against the Illegal Use of Drugs (CONACUID, 1986: 20-24), Venezuela was then suffering from a severe economic crisis[166] that led many families –especially those living in the border areas with Colombia– to get engaged in the trafficking of CHCL and its derivatives. Besides this, according to Dreyfus (2002: 208), there could be more factors to come into play. The fact that Venezuela became a major trafficking country in South America in the mid-1980s may also be explained by: (a) the policy of interdiction in the Caribbean led by the US, which forced traffickers to look for alternative trafficking routes towards the north; (b) the increase of inspections in air and surface cargo coming from Colombia; (c) the pattern of enforcement in Colombia that led the traffickers to move their operations closer to the Venezuelan border; and (d) the rise of Europe as a new consumption market and the high level of trade between Venezuela and Europe.

In the past three decades, the cocaine seizures in Venezuela have greatly escalated (Table 9). This indicator, together with others[167], reveals the profile of Venezuela: a major transshipment country, from which an estimated of 161-212 MT of CHCL departed to global destinations in 2011 (US Department of State, 2012).

[166] Between the years 1950-1957 and 1974-1975, Venezuela experienced an unprecedented oil *boom.* However, rather than benefitting the country, the tax revenue coming from the high oil prices resulted in the appreciation of the Venezuelan currency and therefore damaged the exports not related to petroleum in the country (Dutch disease). This drawback translated into an inflation spiral and the devaluation of the local currency in 1983. In a context of foreign debt crisis in the region, on December 4, 1988, Carlos Andrés Pérez was elected President, and he acted without delay by implementing an adjustment program that involved a reduction of public expense and an increase in the prices of public services, transport and fuel. A few weeks later, on February 27, 1989, protests broke out in Caracas and other near cities against the adjustment policies; they culminated the following day after pillages, urban unrest and a violent repression by the government. That episode is known in Latin America as *El Caracazo*.

[167] About 37% of the seizures reported in Spain in the years between 2008-2010 came from Venezuela. About 13% of the shipments of CHCL arriving at Portugal in 2009 were sent from Venezuela. Venezuela was the departure location of 34% of the cocaine seizures in France between 2003-2008. Out of the total drug trafficking shipments by sea from South America to Europe, between the years 2006-2008, about 51% set sail from Venezuela –this overtly surpassed Brazil, Colombia, Argentina and the Caribbean countries– (UNODC, 2011a: 25).

TABLE 9: Seizures of CHCL in Venezuela, 1985-2014

Year	Seizures (Kg.)	Year	Seizures (MT)	Year	Seizures (MT)
1985	378,9[a]	**1995**	6,17[b]	**2005**	58,44[c]
1986	862,5[a]	**1996**	5,6[b]	**2006**	38,94[c]
1987	366[a]	**1997**	14,58[b]	**2007**	31,79[c]
1988	735[a]	**1998**	7,3[b]	**2008**	33,57[c]
1989	2,704[a]	**1999**	12,48[b]	**2009**	27,74[c]
1990	2,661[a]	**2000**	15,03[b]	**2010**	24,83[c]
1991	1,107.9[a]	**2001**	13,39[c]	**2011**	26[d]
1992	1,705[a]	**2002**	17,79[c]	**2012**	27,06[e]
1993	5,596[a]	**2003**	32,25[c]	**2013**	N/A
1994	5,844[a]	**2004**	31,22[c]	**2014**	N/A

Sources: **a.** Statistics by CONACUID cit. in Dreyfus, 2002: 208; **b.** US Department of State, 2000; **c.** Oficina Nacional Antidrogas, 2010: 56; **d.** Volume estimated by the US Department of State, 2012; **e.** US Department of State, 2013a.

Similar profiles to that of Venezuela are found in two other South American countries: Ecuador and Uruguay. The former, one may think, should play a central role in the production stage of CHCL and its derivatives, since: (a) it is located in the Andean region, which is suitable for growing *Erythroxylum Coca*, a variety of coca that possesses a significant percentage of alkaloid content (cf. Ch. II, Table 6); (b) the country's ethnic composition[168] is similar to that of its neighbors' and, therefore, it may exhibit the extended cultural practice of *acullico*; and (c) it shares borders with two of the greatest CHCL producers in the world –Peru and Colombia–. Ecuador, however, possesses an insignificant number of coca plantation hectares –around 100, according to the data provided by UNODC (2008a: 7)– and it does not exhibit a producer profile such as Bolivia, Peru and Colombia (the number of laboratories that were found and destroyed, for example, is minimum. Cf. Table 10). As stated by the INCSR (US Department of State, 2001), "*there is no evidence that illicit crops are cultivated to any significant degree in Ecuador, or that there is substantial processing of raw materials into market-ready drugs within the country*."

Uruguay, in turn, used to be an active money-laundering center during the 1990s. However, there has never been conclusive information that indicated its present or past participation in the production stage of coca paste, CBP or CHCL. Both

[168] The ethnic groups in Ecuador, according to The World Factbook (CIA, 2013) are: mestizos (71,9%); montubios (7,4%); afroecuadorians (7,2%); amerindians (7%); whites (6,1%); others (0,4%).

Ecuador and Uruguay, nevertheless, are countries through which cocaine moves in its way to the main consumer markets at the global level.

Displaying a volume of seizures similar to that of Venezuela (Table 11), it is estimated that as much as 200 MT of CHCL is transited through Ecuador each year, with 60% of that cocaine estimated to be transited towards the US, and 40% to Europe (US Department of State, 2010). Although the estimates for Uruguay are considerably inferior, the increase in seizures from the year 2000 (Table 12) reinforces the idea that "*foreign drug traffickers, increasingly attracted to Uruguay's strategic maritime location, take advantage of its porous borders with Argentina and Brazil to transit illegal substances through the country*" (US Department of State, 2010).

TABLE 10: Destroyed Labs of CHCL in Ecuador, 1994-2006

1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
-	-	-	0	0	1	0	2	2	0
2001	**2002**	**2003**	**2004**	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**
4	0	0	0	0	3	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Sources: US Department of State, 2004; 2007.

TABLE 11: Seizures of CHCL (in MT) in Ecuador, 1993-2010

1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
-	-	1,04	2,18	4,4	9,8	2,16	10,77	9,24	1,72
2001	**2002**	**2003**	**2004**	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**
10,83	10,49	6,22	2,95	42,11	31,09	22,45	22	43,5	14,8

Sources: US Department of State, 2001; 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005; 2007; 2008; 2009; 2010; 2012.

TABLE 12: Seizures of CHCL (in Kg.) in Uruguay, 1991-2010

1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
7,7*	3,16	25,54	19,45	231,72	84,80	27,97	23,90	18,70	20,64
2001	**2002**	**2003**	**2004**	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**
26,79	43,01	49,91	310,91	53,94	471,03	696,44	827,92	2.466,7	398,55

Sources: Junta Nacional de Drogas de Uruguay, 2000: 7; 2003: 249; 2004: 22; 2010: 23.
Note: *Grs.

Finally, in the category of transit countries, we find Chile. In the literature on drugs, there is little interest in the drug trafficking dynamics in Chile, and this probably derives from a series of characteristics that displace Chile to a secondary position when analyzing the CCC in South America.

In the first place, we may mention that from 1980 onwards, the Chilean international trade has focused on the Pacific Ocean axis so that the countries of the Pacific basin –the US in particular– are its main commercial associates. This turns Chile into an unattractive country for the Bolivian traffickers who aim the majority of their production at countries in Western Europe. In turn, Peruvian and Colombian traffickers, who direct their production to the US, move it through Central America and Mexico, as already stated (Dreyfus, 2002: 133-134).

Secondly, the border that Chile shares with Peru is far away from the main coca growing areas (Yungas and Chapare in Bolivia, and the Peruvian UHV Province), and from the CHCL production areas (the Peruvian Amazonía and the Beni department in the Bolivian Amazonía). From a geographical perspective, in addition, the shared border extends through an arid desert –the Atacama Desert– which prevents the setting up of illegal laboratories for the refining of cocaine.

Thirdly, in the Southern Cone, Argentina rather than Chile has been the most attractive country for drug trafficking activities. Argentina owns a more extensive and difficult to control territory, its borders with other five countries may be easily permeated and, moreover, it has access to the Atlantic Ocean –and, consequently, it is the destination of goods traded in countries of Western Europe–.

Nevertheless, Chile, has not always been a peripheral country to the CCC. As a matter of fact, the production of CHCL

> *(...) started as a cottage business in Chile in the early 1970s in response to an incipient growing demand in the North American West Coast. Chilean chemists produced cocaine with coca paste brought from Bolivia until the military authorities ousted them after General Pinochet's coup in 1973.* (Dreyfus, 2002: 134)

The chemists and drug traffickers that fled Chile after Pinochet's coup settled in the US and Colombia, but contributed to extending the trafficking network between Chile and the Andes. Since then, the Chilean role in the productive chain has been oriented towards: (a) the trafficking of mild quantities of CHCL –according to estimates by the Office of National Drug Control Policy of the White House (2012: 2), between 2-5% of the CHCL that is produced in Bolivia and Peru heads towards Chile

for local consumption or in transit towards Europe–; (b) the provision of chemical precursors to Bolivia, Colombia and Mexico (US Department of State, 2012); and (c) the processing of CBP, a tendency that has been growing since 2005 (Table 13).

TABLE 13: Seizures of CBP and CHCL (in Kg.) in Chile, 2003-2013

Year	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
CBP	N/A	N/A	N/A	4,239	5,400	3,200	2,537	5,0*	3,776	9,5*	10,7*
CHCL	559	2,697	2,777	2,225	3,400	1,421	1,659	2,300	1,467	2,400	2,9*

Sources: US Department of State, 2004; 2005; 2007; 2008; 2009; 2010; 2012; 2013a.
Note: *In MT

3.2. Brazil

Brazil is a country of continental dimensions: (a) in terms of territorial extension, it is the largest in South America; (b) it displays borders along more than 14,500 km.; (c) it borders with French Guiana and other nine sovereign countries –all the South American countries, except for Ecuador and Chile–; and (d) it has control over more than 65% of the Eastern Amazon basin, an area of 8 million km^2, shared with Bolivia, Peru, Colombia and Ecuador.

The Eastern Amazon basin is a key geographical space when it comes to understanding the dynamics of the CCC beyond the Andes. In the region, there are coca plantations of the variety *ipadu* (cf. Ch. II, Table 6), which supply a universe of 5,000-10,000 local consumers in indigenous communities (Henman, 1990: 580). The *ipadu* variety has a low concentration of alkaloid content but, unlike other varieties, it grows rapidly. By taking advantage of this characteristic of the *ipadu* bush, Brazilian drug traffickers started to cultivate coca to produce CHCL at the beginnings of the 1980s. When the prices of cocaine fell in 1985, the transport of coca from Brazil to Colombia ceased to be profitable and the *ipadu* variety started to compete against the Andean *coca* variety; then the coca production in the Amazonas Basin went back to its traditional dynamics: providing a reduced market of local consumers (about this process, cf. Henman, 1990: 580-583).

Fore more than twenty years, the coca production dynamics was kept stable in the Amazonas Basin. In 2008, however, the Brazilian authorities warned about a new

discovery in the areas surrounding the Tabatinga municipality area: satellite pictures indicated the existence of coca bush plantations extending through 150-200 hectares (Duffy, 2008). Since then, a slow and progressive increase in the cultivated hectares in Brazil has been recorded, especially in the areas bordering Ecuador and Colombia (UNODC, 2012a: 8).

The Eastern Amazon basin is also famous for being a cocaine processing zone, and an alternative route for the transit and export of CHCL (Osorio Machado, 2001: 387-398). In terms of processing, on the one hand, "*Brazil is one of the world's ten largest chemical producers and the leading chemical producer in Latin America*" (US Department of State, 2013). In this sense and even when CBP is still largely refined in Colombia and Peru –probably with chemical precursors deviated from Argentina or Brazil–, the existence of some laboratories in border areas account for Brazil's productive capacity (Table 14). In terms of trafficking, on the other hand, Brazil is the South American country that traffics more CHCL heading for Europe –after Venezuela and Ecuador, and excluding the three great producers (UNODC, 2011a: 109)–. In recent years, the seizures of CHCL have increased significantly in Brazil, going from 4 MT in 2000, to 22,2 in 2010 (Table 15).

Brazil is the only South American country that, throughout the 1970s, was involved in all the stages of the CCC, which turns Brazil into the only Full Cycle Country in South America.

TABLE 14: Destroyed Labs of CHCL in Brazil, 1991-2004

1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
3	0	5	0	0	0	0	2	2	1
2001	**2002**	**2003**	**2004**	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**
3	2	1	3	-	-	-	-	-	-

Sources: US Department of State, 2000; 2001; 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005.

TABLE 15: Seizures of CHCL (in MT) in Brazil, 1993-2012

1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
7,7	11,8	5,7	3,1	4	4	5,91	4	7,3	9,16
2003	**2004**	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**
7,3	7,7	15,8	13,2	13,1	18	18,9	22,2	15,2	19,9

Sources: US Department of State, 2001; 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005; 2007; 2008; 2009; 2010; 2013a.

4. Consumption

The UNODC estimates that the annual prevalence[169] of CHCL is between 0.3-0.5% of the world population aged 15-64, that is to say, about 14,2 to 20,5 million people in that age range (UNODC, 2011a: 16). In South America, the average prevalence is 1.4%, which is higher than the global average (UNODC and OAS, 2008: 64).

Table 16 shows the prevalence of CHCL consumption –throughout a lifetime and during the last year–, in the general population aged 12-64 in South American countries. If the cut-off line is established at 1.4% (the average prevalence in South America), it can be said that: (a) Paraguay and Ecuador exhibit the lowest lifetime prevalence in total percentage terms; (b) Peru, Bolivia, Uruguay, Chile, Colombia, Brazil and Argentina show the highest lifetime prevalence in total percentage terms; (c) all South American countries present lifetime prevalence higher than the global average (0,3-0,5% < 1,4%).

Even if in percentage the prevalence in South America is higher than the global average, it is necessary to consider a comparative construction in order not to oversize the consumption issue in the region.

In South America, 1.4% of the population between 15-64 years old equals, approximately, 2,4 million consumers. In comparative terms, the annual prevalence of CHCL use in Europe is estimated at between 0.8-0.9% of the population aged 15-64, corresponding to some 4,3-4,8 million people who used cocaine at least once in the past year. The US, meanwhile, has the highest prevalence of CHCL use in the world: 2.4% of the population, or 5 million people aged 15-64 (UNODC, 2011: 87-93).

[169] In this dissertation we define a *consumer* as a person that has used freebase, COC, crack or other cocaine derivatives, at least once. The measures of prevalence indicate the frequency of substance use. The annual prevalence represents the proportion of people consuming the substance in the last twelve months out of the total people studied. The lifetime or global prevalence, in turn, accounts for the proportion of people that consumed the substance at least once in their lifetime out of the total people studied.

TABLE 16: Prevalence of Consumption of CHCL in the General Population Aged 12-64 in South American Countries. Total % and by Age Groups

Total percentage		
	Lifetime	**Last year**
Countries with the lowest prevalence (> 1,4%)	(a) Paraguay (2003): 0,66 (b) Ecuador (2008): 1,34	(a) Ecuador (2008): 0,11 (b) Venezuela (2009): 0,30 (c) Peru (2008): 0,31 (d) Bolivia (2008): 0,66 (e) Colombia (2009): 0,7 (f) Brazil (2011): 0,70
Countries with the highest prevalence (< 1,4%)	(a) Peru (2008): 1,55 (b) Bolivia (2008): 4,10 (c) Uruguay (2008): 4,63 (d) Chile (2008): 6,40 (e) Colombia (2012): 7 (f) Brazil (2009): 7,70 (g) Argentina (2008): 8,25	(a) Uruguay (2011): 1,70 (b) Chile (2011): 2,40 (c) Argentina (2011): 2,60
Age groups		
	Lifetime	**Last year**
Countries with the highest prevalence in the age group 12-17	(a) Brazil (2009): 0,70 (b) Colombia (2012): 0,83 (c) Chile (2008): 0,84	(a) Uruguay (2006): 0,57 (b) Colombia (2008): 0,78 (c) Brazil (2009): 0,80
Countries with the highest prevalence in the age group 18-34	(a) Argentina (2008): 6,47 (b) Uruguay (2006): 8,49 (c) Chile (2008): 10,10 (d) Brazil (2009): 10,5	(a) Chile (2008): 2,34 (b) Argentina (2008): 2,45 (c) Uruguay (2006): 3,34 (d) Brazil (2009): 3,50
Countries with the highest prevalence in the age group 35-64	(a) Uruguay (2006): 2,09 (b) Chile (2008): 4,31 (c) Brazil (2009): 13,90	(a) Brazil (2009): 0,30 (b) Chile (2008): 0,71

Sources: My own design based on the data provided by UNODC and OAS, 2008: 46; UNODC, 2011a: 91; PRADICAN, 2012: 53.

The South American countries with the highest prevalence of consumption in the last year (Table 16) are Argentina (2.6%), Chile (2.4%) and Uruguay (1.7%), but Brazil should also be included in the group. Due to its large population, the consumption prevalence in Brazil barely reaches 0.7%, but in real terms it is the country with the most CHCL users in the region: between 900,000 and 1 million people –which means that out of the total South American consumers, about 37.5-41.66% are Brazilian–.

Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and Brazil exhibit high percentages in the consumption prevalence of CBP –Table 17–. I will deal with CBP in Ch. V, but it is necessary to state here that:

(...) CBP and its various forms used to be substances found only in countries that produced CHCL and they were relatively cheap versions of cocaine to be smoked. Current information indicates that the use of freebase has extended beyond the producer countries and that it is a substance causing severe addiction cases in Central America and Southern America, particularly in countries of the Southern Cone.[170] (UNODC and OAS, 2008: 58)

TABLE 17: Use Prevalence of CBP in the General Population Aged 12-64 in South American Countries (Lifetime and Last Year)

Country	Lifetime	Last year
Argentina (2008)	0.40	0.20
Brazil (2005)	0.50	0.50
Chile (2008)	3.10	0.70
Colombia (2008)	1.09	0.17
Ecuador (2007)	0.72	0.13
Peru (2006)	1.30	0.38
Uruguay (2006)	0.80	0.30

Sources: OBID, 2005; UNODC and OAS, 2008: 54.

The information provided so far suggests that the CCC in South America not only possesses a *producer heart* in the Andean region, but it has also consolidated a *consumer heart* in the Southern Cone. This tendency, together with the elements that may have contributed to the arrival of CBP in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, remains largely in the dark. It is possible that the boom in CBP consumption resulted from changes in the specific trading and trafficking modes in the Southern Cone or from more general transformations in the economy of the illicit drugs at the regional and global levels. Finding answers is a complex task given the invisibility of the illegal drug trafficking activity. The possible explanations that I will explore in next chapters are often ambiguous and contradictory.

5. Actors

The most intricate relational networks within the CCC have emerged in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. In these countries, there are not only consumers and drug traffickers as in the rest of South America, but there is also an extensive network of

[170] My own translation.

peasants and violent non-state actors (VNSA) who, in the 1970s, defined the dynamics of the coca, CBP and CHCL production in the Andean region. In this section and based on the contributions by other authors, I will refer to such relational networks. Ch. V, which deals with the CCC in Argentina, will incorporate original data contributions which help to understand the construction of the networks of actors, and which were gathered from interviews carried out for the purposes of this dissertation.

5.1. Colombia

Tickner, García and Arreaza (2011) argue that the relationship between drug trafficking and VNSA in Colombia has developed through three stages: (a) the stage of pioneers and the great cartels (1984-1995) –Figure 2–; (b) the moment of invisible cartels and the participation of the VNSA in drug trafficking activities (1995-2003) –Figure 3–; and (c) the period following the demobilization of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) after 2003 –Figure 4–.

The first stage (1984-1995) resulted from several factors. The first of them was the transition in Colombia from marijuana to cocaine trafficking. During the 1970s, Colombia was the main supplier of marijuana to the US. In the presidencies of Julio César Turbay (1978-1982) and Belisario Betancur (1982-1986), however, the *cannabis* plantations were eradicated and this coincided with a rise in the demand –and the consequent international price increase– of cocaine. This cocaine *boom* attracted unemployed workers from the former *cannabis* plantations and, therefore, coca cultivation started to be promoted in Colombia given the great restrictions it suffered in neighboring countries such as Peru and Bolivia (Costantino and Lasa, 2010: 83). The first hectares cultivated with coca had emerged in Colombia and, at the same time, the two greatest cocaine Cartels in history: the Cali and the Medellin Cartels.

The first hectares used for coca cultivation were located in Putumayo, Caquetá and Guaviare, departments with a strong presence of the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (known by its Spanish acronym, FARC). Initially, the FARC prohibited farmers living in the lands under their control to cultivate coca and to sell coca paste. However, in the VII FARC Conference of 1982, the Colombian guerrilla not only

decided to unban both practices, but it also established the charge of *gramaje* –a sort of tax to producers and drug traffickers, which would serve as a funding source for the guerrilla–. In exchange for the gramaje, the FARC offered protection to farmers' plantations and to drug traffickers persecuted by the authorities.

The agreement between the FARC, the farmers and the Medellin Cartel –the Cali Cartel was importing CBP from Peru– seemed promising; difficulties arose without much delay, though, due to severe disputes that began to emerge between the guerrilla groups and the powerful members of the Medellin Cartel –amongst them, Rodríguez Gacha–. As a result of these differences, a new actor came into play: paramilitary forces. Steinitz (2002: 4) has referred to the process as follows:

> *(…) when Rodríguez-Gacha purchased huge tracts of real estate in northern and central Colombia to invest his narco dollars, he came into further conflict with the FARC because he pushed the peasant populace off the land. Moreover, his land became subject to FARC 'revolutionary taxes' and property requisitions. Other traffickers had trouble with the FARC because of land acquisition, but none more so than Rodríguez-Gacha, who reportedly became Colombia's biggest private landowner. The Medellin drug lord already had numerous gunmen ('sicarios') on his payroll, but needed additional strength against the FARC. He injected money and resources into small, private armies that legitimate cattlemen and landowners had established earlier to fend off FARC encroachment. In addition to providing Rodríguez-Gacha an alternative to FARC protection of his trafficking activity, these paramilitaries, as they came to be called, increasingly became a potent weapon in the hands of the political ultra-right wing, including some members of the armed forces and security services. Invigorated with drug money and espousing a violent, anti-communist agenda, the paramilitaries helped to conduct a terrorist campaign of assassinations against leftist politicians and other civilians sympathetic to the FARC.*

While the paramilitary forces were acquiring a prominent role in rural areas, a merciless war broke out between the Medellin Cartel, the Cali Cartel and the Colombian State.

Until the mid-1980s, Cali and Medellin kept cooperative relationships. Gilberto Rodríguez Orejuela from the Cali Cartel and Jorge Luis Ochoa Vásquez from the Medellin Cartel, were actually arrested in Spain in 1984 charged with working together to establish extended trafficking networks in Europe. The cooperativeness ended when the fall in cocaine prices towards the end of the same decade forced both cartels to dispute the greatest market of the US, New York, which used to be an exclusive territory of the Cali Cartel. The struggle was taken to Colombian territory as middle-ranking members of both cartels sowed violence in the streets of Cali and Medellin (Sabogal, 1988).

FIGURE 2: Mapping of Actors Involved in the Colombian CCC, 1984-1995. Cooperative and Conflictive Relationships



Another parallel conflict erupted between the Colombian State and the Medellin Cartel. By 1983, Pablo Escobar had managed to hide his illegal activities and, he had even obtained a substitute seat in Parliament as a representative of the Liberal Party branch. In August of the same year, though, Rodrigo Lara Bonilla –Minister of Justice of Colombia– accused Escobar Gaviria of being involved in the Medellin Cartel. A few months later, in April 1984, gunmen working for Pablo Escobar assassinated Lara Bonilla in Bogotá city.

In response to the assassination of Lara Bonilla, the government of Belisario Betancur passed the Extradition Law, which was strongly opposed by Escobar Gaviria. One of the most violent periods in Colombian history had begun. The period claimed the lives of Carlos Mauro Hoyos –the Nation's General Procurator–, seventy judges and Luis Carlos Galán, politician of the Liberal party who was preparing his Presidential campaign with good prospects (Federico, 2011: 48).

Worn out by two open war fronts –against the State and against the Cali Cartel– the Medellin Cartel fell in disgrace. In this context, the President César Gaviria offered Pablo Escobar to suspend his extradition in return for the confession of his crimes; in 1991 he decided to give himself in. Less than a year later, surprisingly, Escobar broke

away from the prison where he was held, and through his spokesperson he declared to Caracol Radio that he would initiate a "*merciless war (...) against the Cali Cartel and the highest positions in government*"[171] (cit. in Federico, 2011: 50).

The *merciless war* came to an end for Pablo Escobar on December 2, 1993, when he was murdered by an elite military unit in his shelter in Medellin. He was 44 years old. After his death, the Cali Cartel gained a leading position in the market, but its prominence was brief since it came publicly known that President Ernesto Samper (1994-1998) had received funds from the Cartel for his electoral campaign. Due to this piece of news, Washington started to exert great pressure on the Colombian government, which ended up negotiating the ultimate surrender of the Rodríguez Orejuela brothers. Later, in 1995, a new stage in the CCC begun: the moment of the *invisible cartels* and the participation of the VNSA in drug trafficking (1995-2003).

The fall of the two great narco-empires generated a huge power vacuum that, in a short period of time, contributed to the configuration of a system of small networks involved in the production and trafficking of CHCL (Steinitz, 2002: 11). The fragmentation of the illegal chain that used to be in charge of the Cartels in Cali and Medellin paved the way for the entrance of new actors –or the reinforcement of old ones– to the Colombian CCC, namely: (a) the farmers and the FARC, in the stage of coca and CBP production; (b) the self-defenses and paramilitary groups, in charge of security in the production scene at the local level and of transport at the national level (Tickner, García and Arreaza, 2011); and (c) lieutenants and middle-ranking officials of the former Cartels of Cali and Medellin, who took advantage of their knowledge of the business to keep trafficking CHCL to the US[172] –the Valle del Norte Cartel is probably the most relevant example of these new minicartels–.

As a preamble and in order to better comprehend the dynamics between these new actors, we should take the following into account. As seen above, by the mid-1996, the number of hectares of coca plantations was exponentially growing in Colombia, and President Samper was trying to survive in political terms the scandal he had been involved in with the Cali Cartel. In this context, the Colombian

[171] My own translation.

[172] Tickner, García and Arreaza (2011) argue that the fragmentation of the Colombian CCC chain resulted in the entry and later control of the Mexican cartels in the trafficking and wholesale trading stages of CHCL to the US.

government authorized the chemical eradication of coca plantations in the southern territories of the country. This policy led to massive protests by the farmers.

The farmer protests were key given that: (a) they made evident the fact that Colombia "*had ceased to be a processor of psychoactive substances and had turned into a producer of illegal crops*"[173] (Tokatlián, 2001: 20); and (b) they led the farming sector to attempt an organization in local associative forms. The latter experiment seemed promising, but it did not last long. In Putumayo, for example,

> *The farming and civic leaders were exposed to constant threats that led to a virtual beheading of the spontaneous representation forms; this stressed the organic weakness of the associative forms that had emerged in this process.*[174] (Vargas Meza, 2004: 274)

Having their local economies destroyed and unable to organize themselves institutionally, many farmers became internally displaced; others, in contrast, decided to join the FARC lines (Armenta, 2008: 8). The situation of the latter was unbeatable. The FARC not only gained new combatants but also the control of vast productive regions in the south of the country without state presence. At this moment, the FARC initiated an active participation in the production stage of the CCC, by selling coca leaves to representatives of the new minicartels and establishing standard prices for CBP (Tickner, García and Arreaza, 2011: 422).

As the FARC were growing, so were the paramilitary groups, only without the subjection to the cartels that had characterized the previous stage –actually, they were now providing them with protection–, and without the sole objective of fighting the guerrilla. Echandía Castilla (2013) has shown, in fact, that the territorial presence of the self-defenses between 1997-2002 went beyond the counter-insurgent dimension and spread themselves out in the interests of drug trafficking.

> *Even when the relation between the presence of self-defences and the coca cultivation is highly significant, the mechanism of the self-defences go beyond that since they cover the passage between them and the embarkation points, going through the processing centres.*[175] (Echandía Castilla 2013: 14)

[173] My own translation.
[174] My own translation.
[175] My own translation.

FIGURE 3: Mapping of Actors Involved in the Colombian CCC, 1995-2003. Cooperative and Conflictive Relationships



Similarly, the direct confrontation between the self-defenses and the FARC, were not only aimed at weakening the guerrilla group. Fighting was recorded around coca plantations, but also in geographical areas that worked as passages and trafficking routes.

The period of growth of the FARC and the self-defenses lasted until 2002, but in view of the Plan Colombia and the demobilization policies implemented by President Álvaro Uribe (2002-2006; 2006-2010), the guerrilla and the paramilitary groups started to weaken. The last stage in the Colombian CCC had begun: the stage of demobilization of the self-defenses as of 2003.

The demobilizations had a determining incidence in the fragmentation process of the CCC in Colombia since the chiefs of the self-defenses sold or ceded their participation in the drug trafficking business to various factions. The criminal gangs (BACRIM) emerged in this manner and they started to adopt several roles mainly in the CHCL and CBP production stage (Echandía Castilla, 2013: 19). This marked the beginning of a stage characterized by its multipolarity –defined as the cohabitation of multiple centers of power in permanent competition without the evident existence of

an hegemonic actor–; its multidimensionality –due to the multiple roles that the actors adopt in relation to drug trafficking–, and its hyper-specialization –which is evident due to the diversity of roles and actors involved in the production and trafficking chain– (Tickner, García and Arreaza, 2011).

FIGURE 4: Mapping of Actors Involved in the Colombian CCC, 2003-Present Days. Cooperative and Conflictive Relationships



The BACRIM worked as circumstantial allies of more traditional actors such as the FARC or the ELN –another rather minor guerrilla group–. Echandía Castilla (2013: 21) has indicated in this sense that

> *(…) The BACRIM have established alliances with the guerrillas in some regions of the country. In the departments Valle, Cauca, Nariño and Chocó, the links with the ELN have been established around drug trafficking in order to guarantee passages and participate in other illegal activities. In the south of the Bolívar, Urabá, Córdoba, Bajo Cauca of the Antioquia region, south of César, Meta and Vichada, at least six fronts of the FARC have agreed on a joint management of the coca plantations, the protection of laboratories and the use of roads for drug export. As regards the relation existing between drug trafficking and irregular groups, the self-defences in the past and, currently, the gangs are more connected to the trading of narcotics; that is to say, they are more interested in controlling the routers and the embarkation points than in plantations and laboratories (…) In turn, the guerrilla, particularly the FARC, have been more related to the plantations; that is, to the territory and the processing of coca to form freebase or hydrochloride of cocaine, which they sell to drug dealers. For these reasons, it is not*

surprising that both the former and the latter are functional to the business and that they have established alliances in a relevant way around it.[176]

5.2. Peru

Dreyfus (1999) has made an extraordinary contribution to the understanding of the dynamics between the main actors in the Peruvian CCC. Focusing his research work on the Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV), he started off with the identification of six prominent actors during the 1980s: (a) the civilian state teams of coca (CORAH); (b) the police forces –the Mobile Units of Rural Patrolling (UMOPAR) and the Civil Guard–; (c) the Army; (d) the Peruvian organization of drug dealers (*firmas*); (e) Shining Path (SP); and (f) the peasants that cultivate coca.

Dreyfus (1999) characterized the context as follows: the hectares of coca cultivation were growing at a dramatic rhythm –cf. the second section of this chapter–, and the consumption of CHCL was rising in the US. Under the pressure exerted by Reagan's Administration, the Peruvian government created the Control and Reduction of Coca Cultivation in Upper Huallaga Program (CORAH). The project was aimed at eradicating as many hectares of coca as possible; for that purpose 480 workers were assigned and equipped with chain saws (Dreyfus, 1999: 376). At the same time, a complementary project –the Special Project of the Upper Huallaga (PEAH)– was seeking the substitution of coca cultivation for legal crops.

In order to protect the teams working for the CORAH and the PEAH, the government created the UMOPAR and deployed it in the UHV between 1982-1987. Their mission was to arrest dealers and destroy coca paste maceration pits and laboratories for CBP and CHCL manufacture. The mobile units were integrated by 500 officials that were logistically supported by the DEA. Due to corruption scandals and violation of human rights, the President Alan García (1985-1990) replaced the UMOPAR by the Civil Guard in 1987.

In the UHV also the Army was active carrying out counter-insurgent tasks against SP[177]. Only after 1991 and at a request of the US, did the Army get involved in

[176] My own translation.

[177] We will not provide a detailed account of the history of Shining Path –or about the FARC, ELN or other guerrilla groups in South America– as it is not an objective of this dissertation. The guerrilla groups are significant in this text for they operate as relevant actors in the CCC of some South

the shooting down of drug dealing planes and in the destruction of coca plantations and laboratories. SP, in turn, was looking for economic resources by interacting with farmers and traffickers. By then, It was estimated that SP possessed 3,000-4,000 combatants and 50,000 activists in several groups of civilian support and political cadres of the party (Scott Palmer, 1996: 128).

Finally, the network of actors was completed by the farmers that cultivated coca and the firmas, drug dealing groups which were considerably weaker than their Colombian counterparts. The firmas, in fact, were vertically integrated and subordinated in the CHCL production process to the Colombian organization, to which they sold coca paste and CBP to be processed in Colombia.

It is difficult to establish the reason why so many actors converged in the Peruvian CCC during the 1980s, but we could certainly point out that the lack of state presence in the UHV and other vast areas of the Peruvian Amazonía contributed to accelerating the process. SP, for example, took real advantage of this situation and deployed its forces in the UHV towards 1993 (Dreyfus, 1999: 381-382).

When it reached the UHV as a consequence of a brutal counter-insurgent policy that undermined its structure in the Ayacucho region, SP found with farmers –not organized in unions– that were victims of the crossfire between the UMOPAR –which eliminated their plantations– and the firmas –which randomly set the coca price–. SP, then, opted for systematically murdering the leaders of the peasantry, and turned itself into the only intermediary between the firmas and the peasants –who, in turn, were protected by the UMOPAR–. Moreover, as a financing strategy, the guerrilla established fixed prices for the cargos leaving for Colombia and they created the revolutionary fifth, a tax on the coca leaf production.

The plans of eradicating coca plantations were failing and, with the support of the peasantry, SP was consolidating an enormous liberated area in the UHV. Seeing the situation of emergency, the Peruvian state decided to deploy the Army in 1984. The Army soon understood that it was impossible to fight against a SP in alliance with the peasants: the peasants provided SP with information and, in that way the guerrilla anticipated their movements. It was necessary, then, to gain the trust of the peasants and to prioritize the defeat of SP to the fight against the CCC.

American countries. If the reader wishes to explore the detailed history, origin and ideology of SP, cf. Tarazona-Sevillano and Reuter (1990), and Scott Palmer (1996).

The reading of the situation as seen by the Army was as follows: in order to break the alliance between SP and the peasantry, they needed to gain the trust of the peasants by allowing them to maintain their coca plantations. With this strategy in mind, the Army banned UMOPAR from entering the UHV; they ceased in providing protection to the CORAH, and started to fight on military terms against SP. By means of this movement, the Army won the support of the peasants as well as the firmas, which saw how a weakened SP made their business easier.

In 1985, Alan García became President and regarded that the SP issue had deep socioeconomic roots, which would hardly be solved by armed actions. At the same time, he set himself the objective of putting limits to the prerogatives of the Armed Forces; the reduction of their autonomy and the reinforcement of the crop eradication programs. Therefore, in 1985 he withdrew the Army from the UHV and resumed the operations of persecution of firmas and eradication of plantations.

As expected, SP returned to the UHV but they found the strong presence of a new actor in the scene: the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), founded in 1983. The confrontation stage had begun, which Dreyfus (1999: 383) called "*guerrillas against guerrillas.*" The MRTA was defeated in 1987 –leading to the end of this stage– not only because this guerrilla group had less experience, training and equipment than SP, but also because they had tried to impose a strict moral code that prohibited the consumption of drugs by the peasants.

Towards 1988, the control of the UHV by SP was complete. In view of this, a year later President García reorganized his priorities and decided to deploy the armed forces in the region in order to fight the guerrilla group. The CORAH suspended his activities once again, concentrated on the development of alternative crops and built infrastructure in rural areas.

After 1990, the power of SP in the UHV was considerably reduced. In the first place, President Fujimori (1990-2000) ended the criminalization of the activity of cocaleros and the forced eradication programs were interrupted. This new policy played a decisive role in the relationship between SP and the peasants, since the latter no longer needed protection against raids by eradication brigades, and the guerrilla lost their supporting basis. In the second place, the SP leader Abimael Guzmán was arrested and imprisoned in 1992. Due to his imprisonment and

demobilization laws, the guerrilla group began a gradual disintegration until the influence they used to have in the 1980s disappeared.

FIGURE 5: Mapping of Actors Involved in the Peruvian CCC, 1980-1990. Cooperative and Conflictive Relationships



Only some of the actors that had the control of the Peruvian CCC during the 1980s are still operational. The peasants, obviously, are still key factors in the coca productive chain, but the MRTA was active only until 1997, for example. UMOPAR became the Department of Anti-Drug Tactical Operations (DEPOTAD), their objectives, however, remain the same: destroying coca leaf maceration pits and CHCL laboratories as well as providing safety to civilian personnel from the CORAH in the eradication of illegal plantations of coca. SP, in turn, has developed a new business: instead of protecting the peasants and collect taxes on their coca production, they are protecting firmas and producing CHCL in its own laboratories (Romero, 2009).

5.3. Bolivia

After eighteen years of institutional instability and in a context of economic crisis, Hernán Siles Suazo (1982-1985) became President of Bolivia. Since he was the first democratically elected president after many years, and in fear of risking the stability of his administration, Siles was afraid of taking forcible actions against cocaleros and traffickers at the beginning of his term in office. The US, however, put pressure in order to put forward eradication campaigns and, finally, in August 1983, the Bolivian government agreed on creating the Mobile Unit of Rural Patrolling (UMOPAR) and destroying 4,000 hectares of coca (Malamud-Goti, 1990: 38).

Initially, the UMOPAR devoted itself to their mission of destroying coca plantations, but on June 30, 1984, three officials in its lines –Germán Linares, Carlos Barriga and Julio Vargas–, kidnapped Siles Suazo and led a coup d'état against his government. The attempt at removing the President from office failed; nevertheless, Siles Suazo himself resigned a year later in a context of an unprecedented economic crisis.

President Paz Estenssoro (1985-1989) succeeded Siles Suazo and, as Siles Suazo, he was pressed by the US to establish a *Three-Year Plan on Combating Drug Trafficking*. This plan,

> *sought the passing of an anti-drug law by the Legislative Power and the implementation of a plan against the coca leaf production based on an interdiction task (obstruction of trading channels of coca leaves for the production of cocaine), which would result in a decrease in the price of the coca leaf and, in that way, the peasants would find the program of alternative development and voluntary substitution attractive.*[178] (Pinto Ocampo, 2004: 6)

Between May-June of 1987, coca farmers, organized in unions[179], blocked several routes to protest against the Three-Year Plan implemented by the government. Paz Estenssoro, in response, decided to send the army against the protesters and, as a result, there were eight peasants killed and nineteen injured.

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[178] My own translation.

[179] The union organization in the coca regions of Bolivia is structured in the following way: first, in local communities a number of 10-300 peasants that own parcels get together to form a *union.* The members of the union should make monthly contribution with the aim of building roads, schools, health posts, etc. *Centrals* are created by joining 5-20 unions, and they work in groups to form *federations.* The federations are members of the National Federation of Colonizers and/or the Unique Confederation of Rural Laborers in Bolivia (CSUTCB). Finally, there is a Coordinator of Federations, which was created in 1990 given the need to unify demands (Pinto Ocampo, 2004: 5). To expand on this, cf. Pinto Ocampo, 2008: 44-47.

After the conflict, commissions were created between the government and the coca workers in order to analyze the Three-Year Plan. Eventually, they reached an agreement so as to voluntarily replace the coca plantations; to receive an economic compensation for it, and to fumigate without the use of chemical agents. In November 1987, however, the government continued with eradications and the peasants resumed the protests. Only in February 1988, an agreement was reached around three main points: (a) greater representation of the peasants in the National Council for the Fight against Drug Trafficking; (b) suspension of the cultivation eradication plan; and (c) revision of the Controlled Substances Law under the debate of the Chamber of Deputies, which would initiate a second conflict between the coca unions and the government.

Between April-September 1988, a second conflictive moment emerged between the government and the coca workers since "*the coca workers asked the Congress to pass a law of Controlled Substances, which would penalize the offenses of drug dealers, and another law about the Coca Regime that would regulate its cultivation*"[180] (Pinto Ocampo, 2004: 8). To this end, the cocaleros introduced their own law project to regulate coca production. In this project CHCL was differentiated from the coca leaf, which should not be matter of penal legislation. At first, the government rejected the proposal, but in view of the pressure and hunger strikes organized by the farmers, an agreement was signed in May 1988. It established the need of passing two different laws based on the specificities of their objects of regulation, i.e., coca and/or CHCL.

Towards June, and in view of disagreements with the government because of their lack of commitment to the agreements signed, 25,000 cocaleros blocked routes in Chapare and Yungas. La Paz answered with the deployment of the police and military forces. After days of intense conflict, the coca producers acceded to have a dialogue with the government. While the negotiations between the parts were carried out in the Bolivian capital, 5,000 farmers occupied a quarter of the UMOPAR and were violently evicted by police officers. Some days later, on July 5, 1988, the government refused to recognize any agreements with the cocaleros and the *Regulation of Coca and Controlled Substances Law* was passed by the Congress.

In the midst of farmer claims and protests, Jaime Paz Zamora (1989-1993) assumed the Presidency of the country. Paz Zamora advocated a diverse policy for the

[180] My own translation.

treatment of the CCC, which was away from the American guidelines and which focused on the alternative cultural and medicinal uses of the coca leaf. However, due to the strong Bolivian economic dependency on the US, his policies did not achieve real results and a new conflictive situation began towards 1991.

In 1991, the coca workers demanded the participation of the Armed Forces in the fight against drugs. To that end, they organized a multitudinous protest on July 11 that year, which ended violently, after the intervention of the army and the police, and with the subsequent call for new coca protests.

FIGURE 6: Mapping of Actors Involved in the Bolivian CCC, 1982-2010. Cooperative and Conflictive Relationships



The conflicts between the coca unions and the government dominated the interactions between the actors of the Bolivian CCC throughout the 1990s as well as the first years of the new century –I have mentioned the most relevant struggles in previous pages of this chapter–. Nevertheless, in 2006, everything changed with the first Aymara and coca-grower President in the history of Bolivia: Evo Morales. From that year onwards, the peasants and coca unions have not only integrated the electoral basis of the Socialist Movement (MAS) –political party whose candidate was Evo Morales–, but have also openly supported the first socialist President to translate

into real laws and actions their conviction that the coca crop is different from CHCL and that its traditional uses should be respected (cf. Durand-Ochoa, 2012). Only as an example, let me mention that at present, the UMOPAR is still working in the eradication of surplus coca plantations; however, it is mainly devoted to the persecution of drug dealers, the destruction of laboratories and the seizure of coca paste, CBP and CHCL.

6. Concluding Remarks

In Ch. II, I defined the CCC on the basis of five essential elements: raw material and final products (coca, CBP, CHCL and derivatives); production; trafficking; consumption; actors. In this chapter, following that conceptual organization and taking South America as geographical basis, I have: (a) identified the production hard core in South America –the Andean Area–, and categorized Bolivia as an UPC and Peru and Colombia as DPC; (b) I have referred to the roles played by Venezuela, Ecuador, Uruguay, Chile and Brazil in the trafficking stage; (c) I have shown that as the Andean area is the producer heart, the Southern Cone is the consumer heart of the region; and (d) I have built the relational networks of the main actors in the CCC in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia.

In the following chapter, I will: (a) provide a diagnosis of the Argentinean Republic from a domestic level of analysis, proposed by the RSCT; (b) analyze the dimensions and the actors involved in the CCC in Argentina; and (c) identify and analyze the securitization and desecuritization processes that the political elites of the country are articulating around the CCC.

CHAPTER V

The Coca-Cocaine Complex in Argentina and its Securitization

1. Introduction

This chapter is divided in three sections. In the first section, I advance a diagnosis of the Argentine Republic based on an analysis at the domestic level from the RSCT. I have tried to determine the strength of the Argentine state according to its socio-political cohesion, policy capacity, socioeconomic development, and territorial centrality. Secondly, taking into account the bibliography available and the interviews I have conducted for the collection of data about these points, I analyze the dimensions and the actors that compose the CCC in Argentina. Finally, I identify and analyze the securitization or desecuritization processes that the Argentinian political elites have implemented around the CCC.

MAP 1: Argentina

Source: Latin American Network Information Center, Perry-Castañeda Library, The University of Texas at Austin (http://lanic.utexas.edu)

2. A RSCT Analysis of Argentina at the Domestic Level

2.1. Socio-political Cohesion (Legitimacy and Integration)

Pablo Dreyfus (2002: 292-293) has pointed out that the Argentine society is not fragmented along linguistic or ethnic lines because of three reasons. First of all, Argentina was not the geographical center of any of the greatest empires (Aztecs, Mayas and Incas) that dominated the region in the American Continent before the arrival of the Spanish colonists. The number of Native-Americans that inhabited the territory of present-day Argentina in Pre-Columbian times is estimated at not more than half a million. Secondly, those few native people were virtually eliminated during the process of national consolidation (1865-1885). From 1878 to 1885, for instance, the Argentinian government carried out an aggressive military campaign against the Mapuche and Tehuelche peoples. The aim was to annex territories from the Pampas and Patagonia regions. Finally, the huge influx of transoceanic immigrants at the beginning of the 20th century, and which represented 30% of the population[181], was assimilated and Argentinized by means of the compulsory primary school and a year of the compulsory military service for men over 18 years old – the latter was abolished in 1994. In spite of this ethnic-linguistic unity, there exists a fragmentation with socioeconomic overtones in Argentina.

In the 1930s, the agro-export model carried out by Argentina since the 1880s was showing signs of exhaustion. The arable lands could not be expanded any further (Ferrer, 2004), and the world trade collapse caused by the Great Depression in 1930, severely affected the possibility of imports and the price of Argentinian products to be exported (Gerchunoff and Llach, 1998: 113). This collapse of foreign trade had, in the short run, a two-fold outcome, that is, it had a positive and a negative effect: (a) politically speaking, it gave rise to a long period of institutional instability which started with the military coup of President Hipólito Yrigoyen in 1930; (b) on the other hand, economically speaking, the country was forced to produce the products it

[181] The transoceanic migration that took place from the mid-19th century and early 20th century contributed essentially to the settlement of Argentina. It provided something more than 4,200,000 people in the period 1881-1914. Among them, the dominant communities were: Italians (2,000,000), Spanish (1,400,000), French (170,000) and Russians (160,000). See Texidó, 2008: 7.

could no longer import and therefore, it started an incipient industrialization (ISI) of its production matrix.

In the context of this Argentinian economic growth, triggered also by the end of WWII, there took place the arrival to the presidency of Juan Domingo Perón (1946-1955). By resorting to redistributive policies and a strong state presence instrumented from public spending measures, nationalization and social investment, the Peronist Movement consolidated the golden age for the Argentinian welfare state. Never before, had the working class experienced so much prosperity. But it was then, together with the greatest equitable transformation of the Argentinian political history, that a certain social dynamics started to be knitted and which would implode some years later.

Let me explain this last point. Unlike the agro-export model which offered working opportunities in the provincial hinterland and by substituting imports, the industrialization model generated a lot of employment in the factories and industries located in metropolitan areas. By mid-1940s, prosperity triggered massive migrations from rural areas to cities such as Buenos Aires, Rosario, Córdoba, La Plata, Paraná and Santa Fe, which started to grow in an informal and unplanned way in their outskirts. Paradoxically, the Peronist industrialization and redistribution were then intertwined to bring forth a new suburban marginality: the slums or shantytowns.

Ciudad Oculta –Hidden City–, one of the first slums in Argentina, started to develop by the middle of the year 1940 as an informal settlement built around a tannery, a market of finance and a slaughterhouse (Tasín, 2007: 40-42). In 1955, when Perón was overthrown by an uprising led by the Argentinian Military Forces, Argentina started to undergo a gradual process of political instability and a deep economic crisis. The tannery, the market of finance and the slaughterhouse broke; therefore, a lot of workers were made redundant.

Between the years 1955-1983, the generalized perception of slums was that shantytowns were chaotic areas and places where there were foci of social pathology (Cuenya and Falú, 1997). Therefore, there was an attempt to eradicate them by: (a) relocating their inhabitants in huge housing complexes also located in peripheral areas (1955-1976); and (b) evicting their inhabitants by force, without giving them alternative dwellings to live in (1976-1983). But even then, there existed informal job positions thanks to some growth during the 1960s, and the international loans that

were acquired during the 1970s. The big problem started in 1983 when Argentina returned to democracy[182]. Despite this positive achievement, Argentina had to face the external debt crisis –which I referred to in Ch. III–; the increase in the fiscal deficit; a substantial increase in poverty and indigence (Graphics 1, 2 and 3), and a hyperinflation process, which started in 1988 and eventually led President Alfonsín to resign six months before completing his government.

GRAPHIC 1: Percentage Evolution of the Poor and Indigent Population in Greater Buenos Aires (Argentina), 1974-2004



Source: Amadeo, 2006: 2.

[182] To understand how Argentina has moved from military dictatorship to a *low-intensity* democracy that systematically marginalizes large numbers of citizens, cf. the excellent study by Auyero (2007) – that also provides an analytic description of the origins, course, meanings, and outcomes of the December 2001 wave of looting in Argentina.

GRAPHIC 2: People Living on Less Than US$2 a Day in Argentina (in Millions of Poor), 1991-2010



Source: Poverty & Equity Databank (http://povertydata.worldbank.org/)

GRAPHIC 3: People Living on Less Than US$2 a Day in Argentina (in %), 1991-2010



Source: Poverty & Equity Databank (http://povertydata.worldbank.org/)

If in 1983 the popular mandate for Raul Alfonsín was institutional in nature –that is, to take the country back to democracy–, Carlos Saúl Menem's mandate in 1989 was quite clear: to halt hyperinflation (Gerchunoff and Llach, 1998: 421). The *Menemismo* therefore introduced neoliberal economic and political reforms such as labor flexibility; restrictive fiscal policies (the reduction of public expenditure); the reorganization of the tax system; liberalization and deregulation of the economy; privatization of assets, and enacted the Austral Convertibility Act (Law No. 23,928).

The Convertibility Act, designed by the then Minister of Economy, Dr. Domingo Felipe Cavallo, obliged the Central Bank of the Argentinian Republic to back up each Austral with an equivalent amount of gold or currency, so that each Austral could be exchanged, at any time, by an American dollar, which slowed down the spurious emission of money and consequently, hyperinflation. But some years later, the Tequila Crisis in Mexico (1994), the crises of Southeast Asia (1997), Russia and Brazil (1998) caused a credit contraction affecting both the public and private sectors both locally and in the region. The result of this was a sharp increase in unemployment (Graphic 4), poverty and indigence (Graphics 1, 2 and 3).

GRAPHIC 4: Percentage Annual Average Rate of Unemployment in Argentina, 1980-2010



Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (http://estadisticas.cepal.org/)

In 1997, the Argentinian economy entered a period of recession (Graphic 5), and the process was accelerated with the victory of Fernando De la Rúa in the presidential elections of 1999. De la Rúa sought to build confidence to moderate capital outflows implementing policies of fiscal austerity and tax increases set to restore budgetary balance. However, on March 21, 2001, *"it was the month of increased outflow of deposits in the financial system over the entire decade of convertibility"* (Gerchunoff and Llach, 1998: 451), and Argentina was forced to renegotiate its foreign debt obligations due to its inability to pay.

The renegotiation of the debt postponed its maturity due to burdensome interests, which hastened the fall in bank deposits. In order to face this situation, the government decided to restrict cash withdrawals from bank accounts, which was called *corralito*. The whole situation exploded on December 20, 2001. The following day, and in the middle of street demonstrations 39 people were killed and President Fernando De la Rúa resigned.

GRAPHIC 5: Annual GDP Growth in Argentina (in %), 1980-2010



Source: World Bank Open Database (http://data.worldbank.org/)

After De la Rúa's resignation, Argentina witnessed a catastrophic week during which five presidents ruled one after the other. One of them was Adolfo Rodríguez Saá, who in his first speech to the nation announced the suspension of foreign debt

payments. Therefore, being in default, with massive street riots and in the middle of an unprecedented institutional and economic crisis, Argentina was forced to abandon the Convertibility Act.

The economic downfall of 2002 had serious social consequences. Unemployment reached almost 20% (Graphic 4); employees' income and the number of retired people fell; small and medium enterprises (SMEs) went bankrupt; poverty climbed to 57% in Greater Buenos Aires[183] (Graphic 1) and affected more than 9 million people nationwide (Graphic 2); the average real salary fell by 23% (Dabat, 2012: 49); and there was a sharp reduction in the growth of the economy (Graphic 5. See also Table 5 from Ch. III). In 2002-2003, Argentina went from being one of the most egalitarian societies in Latin America, to being one of the most unequal ones, with a difference of income between the rich and the poor of more than 20 times between the highest income quintile and the poorest quintile (Graphic 6).

GRAPHIC 6: Argentina's Inequality Trend: Distribution of Income by Quintile, 2000-2010



Source: World Bank Open Database (http://data.worldbank.org/)

[183] Greater Buenos Aires (GBA) refers to the Argentinian megacity comprising the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires and its annexed outskirts located in the Buenos Aires Province. It is estimated that the approximate population is 13,530,000 inhabitants in the region.

When Néstor Kirchner took over the Argentinian presidency on May 25th, 2003, the country started an amazing process of macroeconomic recovery. Isolated from international trade loans, but benefiting from a historical rise in prices of agricultural commodities, Argentina grew at an annual rate of 8-9%. The country initiated a process of external debt reduction; increased exports and import capacity; reduced unemployment; increased real wages; improved fiscal and regulatory capacity; increased social spending; expanded national savings, and a significant reduction in poverty and indigence (Dabat, 2012: 50-54; Wylde, 2011: 437-439).

To the economic expansion that took place between 2004-2007 followed a recessionary and inflationary period during the biennial 2008-2009, and by the end of the decade, the situation was critical: not even during the years of greatest growth in the country had the conditions of inequality, which have persisted since the 1930, been reversed.

Graphic 6 shows that there is still a high concentration of wealth in a few hands, and according to recent measurements by NGOs –there are no official statistics about this– there are about 2.5 million people living in informal settlements or shantytowns in the metropolitan areas of Buenos Aires[184], Córdoba, Rosario and other cities inside the country (Techo Argentina, 2013).

Apart from a complex picture, evidence of deep socioeconomic disintegration, Argentina is undergoing serious problems in terms of state legitimacy. Given the fact that I have defined the socio-political integration from the perspective of cohesion and legitimacy, it should be noted that Argentina can be said to show clear evidence of some degree of state weakness, which is summarized in the following points: (a) throughout the 20th century, Argentina suffered six military coups –1930, 1943, 1955, 1962, 1966, 1976– and military uprisings during democratic periods, the most recent ones during the governments of Raúl Alfonsín and Carlos Menem; (b) despite showing that the country has improved its performance in the last decade, governance[185] indicators (Graphic 7) are still far from the desired optimum index; (c)

[184] *"The neighborhoods of the city that have been growing since 2000 are the slums. Data from the Housing Institute of the City recorded only between 2001-2005 show that the population of slums has climbed from one hundred and ten thousand to one hundred and fifty thousand. Of the forty thousand new inhabitants in Buenos Aires slums, half have come from neighboring countries, ten thousand have come from the provincial hinterland, and the rest have come from other areas of the Capital and Greater Buenos Aires"* (Tasín, 2007: 28). My own translation.

[185] Governance –as a synonym of governability– refers to the traditions and institutions by means of which authority is exercised in a country. This includes the process by which governments are

the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) ranks Argentina as one of the most corrupt countries in the world (Graphic 8); and (d) since Argentina is a representative democracy rather than a delegate one (O'Donnell, 1994: 59), it has the legitimacy of origin –the popular vote–, but it has transformed with the exercise of power in hyper-presidencialism which usually does not recognize the constitutional limits nor the division of Republican powers.

GRAPHIC 7: Governance in Argentina, 2002 and 2010

Source: Poverty & Equity Databank (http://povertydata.worldbank.org/)
Note: 0 = Lowest Governance < 100 = Highest Governance

selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state by the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them (See Oriol Prats, 2003: 241).

GRAPHIC 8: Perception of Public Corruption in Argentina, 2002-2010



Source: Transparency International (http://www.transparency.org/)
Note: 0 = Highly Corrupt < 10 = Very Clean

2.2. Policy Capacity

Two recent and severe crises of governance have hit the policy capacity of Argentina: the first one took place during the presidency of Raúl Alfonsín (1983-1989); and the second one in 2001.

During his six years in government, President Alfonsín had to face great challenges: the foreign debt crisis; hyperinflation; integration and subordination of the Military Forces to a democratically elected power; pressure from international lending agencies (World Bank and IMF); claims from national unions, which strongly endorse a Peronist tradition, among others. Unable to generate consensus among the contending groups, joint policy responses to individual claims, or to formulate possible solutions to the challenges bedeviling the country, Alfonsín opted for anticipated presidential elections in 1989. The presidential elections were held on May 14, 1989, amid lootings and an unprecedented process of hyperinflation.

On 30th of the same month, Alfonsín declared a state of siege. Shortly thereafter, on July 8th, due to social unrest, President Alfonsín handed the power over to the candidate who had won the election with 47% of the votes: Carlos Saúl Menem. With Alfonsín's resignation, the Argentinian welfare state collapsed with its strengths and

its weaknesses. Paradoxically, the Peronist Movement saw the dismantling of the great legacy of the hitherto most transformative political reform in the history of Argentina in the hands of a Peronist man.

In the eyes of the new government, the state was inefficient and corrupt, furthermore, public enterprises needed to be privatized in order to reduce the fiscal deficit. Airlines; airports; pension funds; water companies; shipyards; banks; television stations; sugar companies; postal services; railways; military factories; oil and gas companies; racecourses; agricultural companies; suppliers of electricity and radio stations were privatized. In many cases, the privatization processes received reports of irregularities, omissions and cases of corruption. Dreyfus (2002: 296) named this process "*the paradox of all paradoxes: a corrupted state apparatus was dismantled through corrupt practices.*"

The Menemist Argentina was the necessary preface to the 2001 crisis, and although I have already referred to the macroeconomic conditions which triggered it, I now need to go deeper into its analysis in order to show that 2001 was, in fact, a corollary of a less obvious deep-rooted feature of the politico-institutional system of Argentina.

Several authors have tried to explain the reasons for Argentina's political instability between 1960-1980, and its crises of governance or periods of ungovernability. The main interpretative hypotheses can be grouped around three axes of analysis (De Luca and Malamud, 1996; Malamud, 2002): (a) the social draw (Portantiero, 1973, O'Donnell, 1972; O'Donnell, 1977); (b) the crisis of legitimacy (Botana, 1988; Mora y Araujo, 1978; Mora y Araujo, 1982), and (c) the absence of a right-wing party (Mora y Araujo, 1982). Let me briefly review each approach to better understand the changes that took place since 1983 onwards.

The analysis around the social or hegemonic draw considers the relationship of social forces alternatively able to veto the projects of the others, while being unable to impose and/or sustain its own due to lack of resources (Portantiero, 1987: 76). From a markedly Gramscian approach, Portantiero (1973; 1987) attempts to explain the tension between social forces embarked on transformation –Peronism and trade union movements– and forces which retained a significant capacity for resistance. This is to say a conservative landowning oligarchy, which by not being successful in imposing a pattern of permanent domination, it opened the possibility of mutual

political and institutional blockage. This situation triggered the coups of 1955 and 1966.

According to Natalio Botana (1988), however, the national political instability is the result of a crisis of legitimacy, that is, disagreement among the political actors regarding the rules of succession to power, and lack of shared beliefs by a ruling group and a subordinated group on the ultimate goals of government and society. In line with this hypothesis, Manuel Mora y Araujo (1982) suggests the coexistence of two criteria of democratic legitimacy that struggle to consolidate. On the one hand, there is the idea of a pluralistic and competitive democracy based on the representative system, political parties, free association and a limited government. On the other hand, there is the principle of plebiscitary and majority democracy, based on the support of an electoral majority and the government without formal restrictions.

Mora y Araujo (1978; 1982) finally makes an effective synthesis of the previously mentioned approaches and adds the absent party component. From his conception of the crisis of legitimacy as rooted in the social structure, the author argues that the viability of an open political system should be left to the emergence and electoral success of a right-wing political force. This should be able to reinforce a social coalition aimed at solving the social draw. Under these conditions, which the author considered viable, an effective stability of the political system could be ensured.

The theories presented here account for the volatile nature of Argentina's politics throughout its history; however, Malamud (2002) believes that the explanatory power of these is limited when it comes to explaining the 2001 crisis.

> *The social draw approaches have experienced an evolution from unicausality –and certain economic determinism– towards considering more institutional aspects and broader analytical perspectives. The analysis focused on the crisis of legitimacy were based on the idea that the post-dictatorial consensus derived from the abuses by the military government and the defeat that took place in the Falklands had created the conditions for the political actors in the civil field to find a few points in common in the democratic play. Meanwhile, the hypotheses of the absent right-wing party, arising from an analytical matrix of the political balance, found in the transformation of the Peronist movement, carried out by Carlos Menem, the party that would assure them that their interests would be defended.*[186] (Malamud, 2002: 5)

[186] My own translation.

According to Malamud (2002: 5-6), the 2001 crisis is different from other previous crisis in two ways: (a) the instability was no longer the political regime, but the government; and (b) what generated instability were not military coups –democratic breakdowns– but interruptions in the constitutional calendar –ungovernability–. Furthermore, the 2001 crisis is simultaneously economic and political. It is economic because it denounces a serious fiscal deficit and problems of productivity. It is political because it expresses a legitimacy deficit, administrative inefficiency and corruption. This would explain why in 2002: (a) the levels of trust and reputation of Argentinian politicians reached historical minimums; (b) the phenomenon of the null vote and/or blank vote in the presidential elections of 2003, to which we have to add the manifestations by the middle class –*cacerolazos* or pot-banging– and the lower classes –*piquetes* or picket lines–; and (c) the demand from the people, that did not really find a way[187], that the leaders of all the political parties in Argentina "*May them all go away!*"

An alternative hypothesis has been offered by Spiller and Tommasi (2000). According to them, the causes of the crisis of 2001 in Argentina and its decay are primarily institutional. The main drawback of the Argentinian political system is that its structure of incentives "*has fostered the implementation of erratic policies and the difficulty of generating intertemporal agreements that support the generation of long-term efficient policies*"[188] (Spiller and Tommasi 2000: 456). Therefore, the solution would be to change government institutions, especially the Congress, and the system of fiscal federalism.

[187] The traditional *de facto* two-party system that has dominated Argentinian politics since mid-20th century (Unión Cívica Radical and Partido Justicialista), was rocked by the 2001 crisis. The "*May them all go away!*" proclamation, the main slogan of the political marches of 2001-2002, emphasized the gap that separated citizens from political parties, and this opened the game for the emergence of new spaces of representation. The clearest one is, probably, the PRO. Propuesta Republicana (PRO), born in August 2005 as an electoral alliance, was transformed into a political party at the national level, and since 2007 governs the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires. With a liberal economic matrix, but a progressive political discourse, which has led them to vote for civil unions between people of the same sex, for example, the PRO will take its own candidate for the presidential elections of 2015 without forming alliances –this is what is expected– with another traditional political force.

[188] My own translation.

2.3. Socioeconomic Development

During the 20th century, Argentina went through four clearly identifiable[189] macroeconomic stages: (a) the agro-export model (1880-1930); (b) the industrialization stage derived from the substitution of imports (1930-1975); (c) the foreign debt crisis (1983-1989); and (d) the neoliberal period (1991-2001). Afterwards came the crisis of 2001, which, although it initiated a period of uncertainty in the economic history of the country, it made it clear that it was necessary to look for new economic formulas.

President Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007) understood this need: the economic orthodoxy of the neoliberal model had led Argentina into poverty, crisis and default. Thus, from 2003 onwards, Argentina took a new direction in its economic history. Even today, more than twelve years after the crisis at the beginning of the new millennium, there are no solid theories to approach the analysis of the core features of Kirchner's model. An exception is, perhaps, the conceptualization made by Svampa (2013): the Commodities[190] Consensus as a form of neoextrativism.

Svampa (2013: 30-32) argues that at the beginning of the new millennium, Latin American economies, which were oriented towards primary extractive activities and the production of goods with little value added, underwent a process of re-primarization. This dynamics, with some moderate growth at first, was deepened by the rise of emerging powers such as China. This country imposed itself in South American countries as an unequal partner in terms of trading activities[191]. Besides, the new model is characterized by a tendency toward monoculture, the scarce economic diversification and a clearly destructive logic of occupying territories. It is

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[189] For further information on Argentina's economic history see Gerchunoff and Llach, 1998; Visintini, 2001. A shorter text, but it sums up well over a hundred years of history, is the one of Matesanz Gómez and Sánchez Díez, 2004.

[190] Svampa (2013: 31) defines commodities are "*'undifferentiated products whose prices are set internationally'* or *'products of global manufacture, availability and demand, which have a range of international prices and do not require advanced technology for manufacturing and processing'".* My own translation.

[191] Between 2002-2007, Argentina's trade balance with China was positive (0.8 in 2002, 1.8 in 2003, 1.2 in 2004, 1.0 in 2005 and 0.4 in 2006, 0.1 in 2007). Since 2008, Argentina's trade balance with China began to show a deficit (-0.7 in 2008, -1.2 in 2009, -1.9 in 2010). Another important trend to consider is that, between 2002-2010, the volume of transactions between the two countries increased almost tenfold (from US$1,4 billion in 2002 to US$13,4 billion in 2010). By the year 2013, the volume of transactions had climbed up to US$17,3 billion, and Argentina's deficit with China stood at US$ 5,4 billion. See Ministry of Economy and Public Finance of Argentina, 2011; Parks, 2014.

no surprise, in this sense, that Argentina has financed part of its economic recovery with the overproduction of soy monocultures.

The Soy Model, consolidated after 2003, was profitable for the Argentinian Pampas –located in the center of the country– and to the national government because of the surpluses of the commercial and fiscal balance, which were generated in concept of exports, withholding tax and other taxes. However, in 2008, many negative aspects of the model came to light (Giarracca and Teubal, 2010: 121-124). First, a conflict between the agrarian unions and the government on the latter's decision to increase withholding taxes on exports of soybeans and sunflower and to establish a mobile system for these. Second, Argentina consolidated its agro-export-oriented economic matrix being subject to fluctuations in international commodity prices. Third, the growth of genetically modified soy to increase productivity per hectare has created a phenomenon of dependence of the country on large multinational companies such as Monsanto and Novartis which provide seeds and agricultural technology. A fourth aspect to be highlighted is the unprecedented increase in the use of agrochemicals and deforestation to increase the arable areas. Finally, this model has contributed to the demise of much of family farming, rural workers and the self-sustained regional economies.

Another facet that neoextrativism has adopted, according to Svampa (2013), has been the exploitation of minerals and hydrocarbons. In Argentina, specifically: (a) the successive *kirchneristas*[192] governments have ratified opencast mega-mining[193] projects which started during the government of Carlos Menem; and (b) YPF[194], the country's largest oil company, was nationalized. In 2010, this company discovered the largest hemispheric site of shale gas in the foothills of Sierra de Vaca Muerta (Province of Neuquén).

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[192] Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007) and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (first term: 2007-2011; second term: 2011-2015).

[193] Social conflicts in Argentina due to opencast mega-mining are been minor. The most exposed case in the media is perhaps the Famatina Project, a mining project in Cerro Famatina (Province of La Rioja). To this day –August 2014–, there is strong resistance from the population of the city of Chilecito and Famatina against the Canadian Osisko Mining Corporation to explore or exploit the resource.

[194] YPF –acronym in Spanish for Treasury Petroleum Fields– is a joint venture company engaged in the exploration, exploitation, distillation, distribution and sale of petroleum and petroleum products. It is the largest company in Argentina and the third largest oil company in South America, and Carlos Menem privatized it in 1992. In 1999, the Spanish company Repsol bought 97.81% of stocks from YPF, and kept it until 2012 when the Argentinian government seized and took control of the 51% of the company.

This neoextractivist moment in South America has raised awareness of three concerning issues: (a) the large size of investments –intensive in terms of capital not labor– that have empowered large transnational corporations that promote economic concentration; (b) infrastructure projects financed by China, Europe and the US have been launched, such as waterways, ports, hydroelectric dams, airports, whose strategic objective is to facilitate the extraction and export of raw materials; and (c) in a similar way to the past, South America has established export enclaves associated with a neocolonial logic (Svampa, 2013: 35), and it has set up productive spaces dependent on the demand of the international markets.

In Ch. I, I argued that a low socioeconomic development would be the result of dependency and underdevelopment. In this sense, Argentina is not an underdeveloped economy, but a developing economy or an economy in process of development; these would be more appropriate terms to describe it. Its dependence, however, is still evident. Its periods of growth are almost always the result of external factors such as the price of commodities, and its economic matrix still relies on the production of raw materials with little added value.

2.4. Territorial Centrality

Although Argentina has consolidated its physical and institutional presence throughout its territory –except the Malvinas or Falkland Islands after 1983– there remain some problems that have increased the impact that the CCC has had in the country. In principle, Argentina shares a long, porous and poorly controlled border with Uruguay, Brazil, Paraguay, Bolivia and Chile. I have already discussed the profile of these countries in Ch. IV, but there is no doubt that it is the border with Bolivia the one that represents a major problem. Bolivia, let us remember, is an UPC dedicated to the cultivation of coca leaves and CBP. An extended part of the total length of 773 kms. of international border between Bolivia and Argentina was drawn in 1889 – although there were corrections in 1925. It is not the longest binational border of Argentina, but along its route, the geopolitical boundary is irregular, mountainous and it crosses some tropical forests and shallow rivers. It is easy to go across it since

the border control is not tight, and the neighboring Argentinian provinces (Salta and Jujuy) are sparsely populated.

A second problem that Argentina has in its territorial centrality is also evident in the northern provinces of the country. In this area, according to what some governmental sources have confirmed in statements to the press (Ortelli, 2014), there are at least 500 clandestine airstrips where irregular flights arrive from Paraguay and Bolivia. These irregular flights do not necessarily have to do with drug trafficking, but they demonstrate the permeability of the air and land space of the country.

A third problematic node is represented by the Triple Frontier that Argentina shares with Paraguay and Brazil. The Triple Frontier not only combines all the weaknesses of the South American states, but it also provides them with feedback (Dreyfus, 2005: 14). This means that it deepens the informal economy; it facilitates the trafficking of counterfeit products, stolen goods, arms and drugs; it nourishes police corruption; it creates huge markets for prostitution and human trafficking. Furthermore, it is suspected that the terrorist attacks against the Embassy of Israel (1992) and the Argentine Israeli Mutual Association (1994) in Buenos Aires, Argentina, were planned from Ciudad del Este in Paraguayan territory.

Finally, and as it has been suggested by Dreyfus (2002: 310), the territorial centrality of the Argentine state is tested whenever the political culture and the exercise of power in some provinces of Argentina is incompatible with the political and institutional system prevailing nationwide. In the northwestern provinces of the country, for example, a small number of traditional families have wielded power for decades, sometimes in a corrupt and violent way. This means that although the degree of territorial presence of the national state is high –through the police, gendarmerie, national social organizations, etc.– its functional presence is weak, understood this as the general acceptance of unified political practices (O'Donnell, 1993).

> *Provincial governance in most of the provincial hinterland can be best described as a mixture of patronage systems and clientelism. In the provincial capital and perhaps a few second cities and towns, the government functions as a political machine. In the more isolated, rural and backward areas, patron-client relations maintain their hold.* ***In the most traditional and underdeveloped provinces, family dynasties remain in power for decades and control the provincial political machines, using local patrons as lieutenants to rule the province****. The Saadi family has dominated the government of Catamarca since the late 1940s. Felipe Sapag ruled Neuquén for decades, and since 1990*

his relatives have continued to dominate the province. The Menem family has long been in control in La Rioja, as have the Romeros in Corrientes, the Cornejos in Salta and the Guzmáns in Jujuy. Adolfo Rodríguez Saá ruled San Luis for many years. (Sawers, 1996: 173. Quoted in Dreyfus, 2002: 310) [Emphasis added]

. . .

Due to some of its economic and socio-cultural indicators, Argentina remains one of the most developed countries in South America, but it has enough problems so as not to be classified as a strong state (Figure 1). Although it is not fragmented along ethnic or linguistic lines, Argentina has a profound socioeconomic fragmentation; it has recently suffered serious crises of governance; its socioeconomic development is marked, even today, by dependence and underdevelopment; and there are areas where territorial control by the state is weak or intermittent. All these factors, as they will be discussed in the next section, create fertile ground for some dimensions of the CCC to strengthen or deepen.

FIGURE 1: South American States Classified According to the Polar Types Weak and Strong



3. The Coca-Cocaine Complex in Argentina

3.1. Production and Manufacture

After 1930, and with a booming economy, Argentina became a recipient country of regional migration flows. Chilean workers, for example, were employed in *estancias* in the Patagonia, and Bolivian workers moved from Cochabamba and La Paz for employment in the sugar plantations in the provinces of Jujuy, Salta and Tucumán. These new workers, like any other group of migrants, brought their own culture; new habits and customs, amongst them the *acullico*, reached then the northern part of Argentina (Rivera, 2005: 129-130).

Argentina was and is not a coca grower country, but the increasing demand for coca by the Bolivian workers has generated unconstrained cross-border traffic of coca leaves that, according to Molins (1917), has reached 256 MT per year on average. Regarding tax matters, Bolivia and Argentina were missing a great source of income, but in 1948 a bilateral agreement was signed according to which Bolivia would supply Argentina 500 MT of coca leaf annually in order to supply the growing domestic market (Rabey, 1989: 58). Only two years later, however, the UN published the Report of the Commission of Enquiry on the Coca Leaf (United Nations, 1950) –see Ch. II– and legal imports of coca leaf were progressively reduced until they were banned by the 1961 Single Convention.

Despite the prohibitionist paradigm, the consumption of coca leaves from 1960 to 1970 rose to 900 MT (Rivera, 2005: 130). This was the reason why, during the 1980s, an attitude of pragmatic tolerance toward *acullico* prevailed. However, in 1989, it was finally decriminalized[195]. Since then, coca chewing is not only a cultural practice of Bolivian immigrants, but it has also become a symbol of identity for *norteños* –northerners– who seek to differentiate from the central region of the country, especially Buenos Aires, which is considered to be more modernized, cosmopolitan and Europeanized (Rabey, 1989; Cusicanqui Rivera, 2005).

[195] On coca chewing in Argentina, and its evolution from the stigma to the identity claim see also Igaki, Akira (2010).

So far, it clear that although there are consumers of coca in its territory, Argentina is not a producer country of coca leaves. According to my classification in Ch. II, the country is not in fact an UPC. This is confirmed in an interview I had with Dr. Patricio Orlandini, Technical Advisor to the Ministry of National Security.

> *Argentina is mainly a transit country, that is, it is in the route of drug trafficking. This is because our country is adjacent to a producing country: Bolivia. But there is no production in Argentina. The production of cocaine hydrochloride has several stages; so to speak of production in a country where coca is not grown, is not accurate.*[196] (Orlandini, 2013)

Under the technical terms of the current Conventions, this was also referred by Dr. Mariana Souto Zabaleta[197] in another interview.

> *Some time ago, it began to be said that Argentina had become a transit as well as a producer country, and we work hard to make this clear not only in the media and public opinion, but also to the INCB who was very concerned about this. Technically, strictly speaking, production refers to the whole production processes, from the initial raw material, of which Argentina could never be a producer country, especially derivatives of coca leaves, because there have not been historically coca leaf crops in Argentina. If we want to speak of production in terms of the Convention, we should not talk about production but manufacture. This occurs when from more processed raw material –CBP– all the other remaining processes are started until cocaine hydrochloride is obtained.*[198] (Souto Zabaleta, 2013)

Although it is clearly not an UPC, if Argentina was participating actively in the stages of manufacturing of CBP and CHCL, its role as a transit country should be reformulated. Has Argentina become a DPC during the 2001-2010 decade? Is CBP from Bolivia processed in Argentina? I asked to Dr. Souto Zabaleta.

> *We have studied the whole decade* [2001-2010], *and not more than 40 laboratories in annual cuts have been found. If we think in Bolivia and Colombia, where there are more than 2,000 laboratories, the role of Argentina* [as a processing location] *is negligible. What I mean is that this does not mean that we do not have to pay attention to it, but we should not believe that we have become something we are not.*[199] (Souto Zabaleta, 2013)

According to a study published by SEDRONAR (2011a), the analysis of the processing centers of illicit drugs in prosecuted cases in Argentina showed that a total of 80 processing centers linked to the illicit production, manufacture, adulteration or fractionation of drugs derived from the coca leaf were reported between 2000-2006. Of the 43 which the study analyzed (Graphic 9), 30 were cases of adulteration or

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[196] My own translation.

[197] Dr. Souto Zabaleta serves as Director of Technical Evaluation and Analysis of Drug from SEDRONAR, dependent from the Presidency of the Nation.

[198] My own translation.

[199] My own translation.

fractionation[200] (68%), only 14 were related to the illicit manufacture per se (32%), and none of the cases was related to the production.

GRAPHIC 9: Clandestine Drug Laboratories Discovered in Argentina, 2000-2006



Source: SEDRONAR, 2011: 18.

The same study (SEDRONAR, 2011a) yields two other pieces of data of particular relevance. First, the centers of manufacturing, processing and/or adulteration are characterized by their extremely precariousness. This is why it would not be correct to call them laboratories. Second, both manufacturing facilities and processing and/or adulteration laboratories are mostly concentrated in the Province of Buenos Aires, the most populous area of the country (SEDRONAR, 2011a: 68).

The volume of illicit processing centers discovered in Argentina, at least until 2006, is not conclusive so as to say that the country has become a DPC. Two objective data, however, have led to divergent interpretations regarding the role played by

[200] According to the concepts presented in the report (SEDRONAR, 2011: 38): (a) the production centers are "*those establishments that contain plant species as well as elements necessary for the cultivation or harvesting of plants*"; (b) manufacturing centers are defined by *"the presence of chemical precursors used in the manufacture of drugs as well as proper equipment even if it were rudimentary"*; (c) adulteration centers are those in which *"the presence of some substances and chemical precursors are normally used for adulterating or fractionating the drug, elements suitable for adulteration"*; and (d) adulteration centers are those where there is "*the presence of suitable instruments for this task, as well as elements that allow the packaging (bags, wrappers, packing tape, etc.).*"

Argentina in the international division of labor within the CCC: (a) the increase in the number of seizures of CBP and CHCL; and (b) the increase in the consumption of CHCL and CBP. Taking into account these two points, I shall deal now with the traffic and consumption dimensions.

3.2. Traffic

The confiscations of CHCL in Argentina climbed from just over 1 MT in 2001 to more than 6 in 2010[201] (Table 1). If one assumes that the efficiency of the Argentinian security forces remained constant to detect and seize drug shipments, the increase is remarkable. In an attempt to explain, and when being interviewed by SEDRONAR (2011b: 39-41), several analysts have formulated two differing assumptions. First, since Argentina has a chemical industry that would ensure greater availability of chemical precursors for processing narcotics, Bolivians and Peruvians traffickers enter the country with CBP to process it. In such processing, two products are obtained: CHCL, which is exported to Europe, and the disposable material from the processing, which is sold for consumption in local markets. The latter would explain the increase in the consumption of paco since 2001. Second, the number of illicit processing centers that have been dismantled (Graphic 9) does not confirm that the increase in the smuggling of CBP derives from the settling of CHCL manufacturing centers in the country. These two products enter Argentina: CBP and CHCL. The increase in the traffic of CHCL is a consequence of the trafficking routes heading Europe as its main destination. Meanwhile, the increase in the trafficking of CBP in the country could be explained by the emergence of a specific demand for CBP as a result of changes in local consumption patterns and the appearance of a new profile of consumers with limited resources after the 2001 crisis.

[201] There are no official and disaggregated data on confiscations of CBP. If necessary, this contribution may be relevant. Between 2008-2010, there were 382 judicial proceedings conducted in the Province of Salta linked to drug trafficking (SEDRONAR, 2011b: 97-110). In 46% of the cases, CBP was seized; CHCL in 35% of cases; in 12% of cases one of the two was seized – for the purposes of criminal proceedings, the identification of the drug alone, regardless of its precise chemical composition, is enough; the remaining 7% was marijuana.

TABLE 1: Seizures of CHCL (in Kg.) in Argentina, 2001-2010

2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
1,059	1,562	1,918	3,048	5,618	5,9*	8*	7*	5,924	6,306

Sources: US Department of State (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2008, 2012) and Fleitas (2010).
Note: *Figure Expressed in MT

Mauro Federico (2011: 10), in a frequently quoted journalistic research, sides with the first interpretative hypothesis.

> ***The cocaine produced in Bolivia is finally processed in Argentinian territory****, after entering by land through permeable border posts lacking controls. Or by air, thanks to the absence of adequate radar installation that allows the detection of hundreds of covert flights which violate the airspace and they land on undeclared runways. Within the borders,* ***the remnants of high purity drug*** *that is exported to the First World, in the form of paco and freebase cocaine, reaches the halls of the poorest neighborhoods in Argentina.*[202] [Emphasis added]

Meanwhile, the Vice President of the Committee on Addictions of the Legislative Assembly of the Province of Córdoba, Dr. Aurelio García Elorrio supports the hypothesis according to which:

> *Two types of drug or two types of cocaine enter into Argentina: cocaine already transformed into cocaine hydrochloride basically of Bolivian origin, and from Colombia too; CBP also enters Argentina. Finished cocaine, that is hydrochloride, usually transits towards Europe. The Bolivian CBP, meanwhile, is admitted for domestic consumption. It is also possible that cocaine that previously enters the country as CBP becomes hydrochloride right here in Argentina and is then exported. However, what you see mostly here is the finished and in-transit cocaine, and CBP for local consumption.*[203] (García Elorrio, 2014)

The interviews, the literature and the data analyzed over more than three years, allow me to say that the second hypothesis is more acceptable to explain the situation for several reasons. First, after 2001 the profile of the Argentinian market has changed due to a marked socioeconomic decline, which has had undeniable implications for the emergence of a consumer with less purchasing power. If we consider that what motivates drug traffickers is their economic interests, then the introduction of CBP to the country can be understood as the supply curve for a market that demands cheaper drugs. Secondly, if the first hypothesis was to be proven, CHCL manufacturing laboratories should proliferate throughout the country, but I have already shown that the empirical data do not verify this assumption. Third,

[202] My own translation.
[203] My own translation.

the entry of CHCL into the country should be marginal –because it would be more profitable to process CBP–, and yet this is not the case (Table 1). Finally, and this is an original contribution of this thesis, there is a new profile of actors[204]: criminal organizations with relative links managing micro-trafficking networks.

In a diagnostic study on drug trafficking in the Province of Salta (SEDRONAR, 2011b: 35-39), conducted jointly by SEDRONAR and the Government of the province, two types of traffic operating in Argentina were identified: (a) a macro-trafficking of high quality CHCL entering the country in large quantities in order to be transported for consumption in Europe –mainly Spain–; and (b) a micro-trafficking, which carries little CBP to meet the demand of local consumers in the Argentinian provinces of Córdoba, Santa Fe and especially Buenos Aires. In general terms, trafficking has been classified according to three categories: the type of product traded; the amounts involved, and the final destination. However, in two of my interviews collecting data, another category emerged, that is, there is another criterion for distinction between micro and macro-trafficking: the actors involved.

During the decades of 1980-1990, Bolivian and Peruvian firmas, but especially the Colombian cartels, trespassed their state borders and became major players in the regional and international levels. The cartels had a great hierarchical structure, and they managed to cover extensive territories thanks to the coordination and interaction between the different links between the production, manufacturing and trafficking.

At that time, regular operations had to do with sending large shipments of CHCL to the US, but by the late 1980s –as seen in Ch. IV– three key events triggered the opening of a huge new market across the Atlantic Ocean: (a) the American market was saturated with CHCL and the US had declared the war on drugs; (b) the collapse of the Soviet Union led to power vacuums that led to the strengthening of criminal groups in the territory of the former USSR; and (c) the fragmentation of Europe brought about political, economic and institutional uncertainty. In this context, the Colombian cartels started to search for new trafficking routes, and this is the reason why Argentina became a transit territory by 1985.

[204] In Ch. IV, I devoted a special section to the mapping of actors involved in the CCC of Bolivia, Colombia and Peru. Since the complexity of the mapping of actors in Argentina is not comparable to those Andean countries, I will not proceed in the same way in this chapter. I will analyze the actors of the Argentinian CCC (dealers, consumers, the Argentinian state, etc.) around the central dimensions: consumption and manufacturing, trafficking and consumption.

In 1988, Argentina registered the first major case of macro-trafficking in its history: the so-called Shrimp Operation (Pasquini and De Miguel, 1995: 78-89). On July 12th of that year, two Argentine Federal Police drug raids detected and seized 588 kg. of CHCL, which were concealed in a shipment of frozen shrimp in the fish shop *Estrella de Mar* whose owner was the Peronist leader Jorge Antonio. The shipment came from Colombia, via Bolivia, and there was at least one Argentinian person involved in the trafficking chain, whose final destination was Spain: Carlos Savignon Belgrano.

Since then, other episodes of macro-trafficking –with killings– have not only indicated that Argentina still is a transit country for high quality CHCL –with Europe as its final destination–, but they have also provided evidenced that Colombian and Bolivian criminal organizations with considerable power[205] continue to operate in the country. Following, I describe the most relevant or resonant episodes of the 2001-2010 decade.

(a) On September 17th, 2004, aboard Flight 6420 of Southern Winds, four suitcases identified under the name of the Argentinian Embassy in Spain arrived at Barajas International Airport (Spain). Since no passenger claimed them, the Spanish Civil Guard proceeded to check inside them, and found that it contained 60 kg. of maximum purity CHCL. For that cargo, valued at €1,500,000, two Spanish citizens were convicted by the Argentinian justice, an Argentinian citizen who works for the airline, and a Colombian one who had carried the cargo to Minister Pistarini International Airport (Ezeiza, Argentina). It is assumed that the CHCL was in transit coming from Colombia.

(b) In 2006, one of the most important drug raids of the decade was recorded: Operation White Hake. In three raids conducted in Argentina and Spain,

[205] At least in South America, the big cartels like Cali or Medellin, no longer exist. Therefore, when referring to macro-trafficking actors, these are large criminal or medium-size criminal organizations (SEDRONAR, 2007a: 61-62). Large criminal organizations have the power to move large volumes of high-quality drugs to supply foreign markets with affluent consumers. The trafficking operations of these organizations involve heavy investment in camouflage and transportation (planes, ships, submarines, etc.), and powerful members with the ability to secure and effectively cover the movement of the goods to their final destination. Meanwhile, medium-size criminal organizations deal with volumes of drugs of good or acceptable quality to supply domestic or regional markets with relative purchasing power. Operating in these organizations requires some investment in camouflage and transport (trucks, cars, boats, etc.), and having connections with groups of certain social status, abled to conceal and transport goods within certain areas under their influence.

over 700 kg. of high purity CHCL hidden in shipments of frozen fish were seized. There were two hypotheses: the shipment came from Colombia or Peru. Subsequent judicial investigations proved that the cocaine had been produced and fractionated in Colombia (Federico, 2011: 204).

(c) On March 3rd, 2008, two Colombians were found murdered and burned in La Tablada (Province of Buenos Aires). The victims were Raúl Enrique Silva alias '*El Viejo*', and Fernando Cardona Osorio alias '*El Mono*'. The killings were attributed to a fight over cocaine routes to Europe by Daniel Barrera and Carlos Mario Jiménez, leader of the AUC.

(d) In a police operation in Avellaneda (Province of Buenos Aires), on May 10th, 2008, the police seized 470 kg. of CHCL in a family home. The cocaine came from Colombia and was bound for Spain.

(e) On July 24th, 2008, in the parking lot of Unicenter Shopping Mall (Martínez, Province of Buenos Aires), two Colombians, Héctor Edilson Duque Cevallos and Jorge Alexander Quintero Gartner, were murdered. It is presumed that they had lived in Argentina for a year and were working to send shipments of CHCL from Colombia, via Argentina, to Spain.

(f) On 13th August, 2008, the Argentinian citizens Sebastián Forza, Damián Ferrón and Leopoldo Bina were found dead in General Rodríguez (Province of Buenos Aires). The case was linked to the illegal sale of ephedrine, a chemical precursor used in the manufacture of synthetic drugs.

(g) On February 23rd, 2009, the Colombian Juan Sebastián Galvis Ramírez was assassinated in San Fernando (Province of Buenos Aires). The motive for the murder is unknown, but it has been linked to the double murder in Unicenter.

(h) Early in 2011, two brothers, Gustavo and Eduardo Juliá, were arrested in El Prat Barcelona Airport with 944.5 kgs. of CHCL, which they had carried on a private sanitary jet plane. The route of trafficking originated in El Palomar (Province of Buenos Aires), via Cape Verde (Africa) and Barcelona, and Madrid as its final destination. The cocaine transported was of Colombian origin and had come to Argentina through Bolivia's trafficking networks (Federico, 2011: 269-277).

Together with the macro-networks of trafficking, since 2001 there have been micro-trafficking networks that supply CBP to an Argentinian market with relatively good purchasing power (Figure 2). In generally terms, these trafficking networks are managed by small criminal organizations (SEDRONAR, 2007: 62), which trade small amounts of CBP, which is adulterated and turned into shoddy doses. The logistics of the trafficking of these micro-networks do not require large investment and coordination. They do not have great financial and innovative capacity so as to design new types of trafficking methods. Furthermore, they resort to traditional methods of trafficking (mules, camels, some kind of camouflage in bags or they hide the drug under their clothing, etc.). But there is another feature of these micro-trafficking networks in Argentina: many of them are organized based on family ties. This information was provided for the first time in a report by SEDRONAR (2007: 57), but it has not been analyzed in depth since then (an exception is perhaps Tasín, 2007: 34). In the interviews I conducted with Dr. Souto Zabaleta, and Graciela Ahumada –Director of the Argentine National Drug Observatory–, I specifically asked about what appeared to be a new type of actor, which had emerged in the post-2001 crisis in Argentina.

> *What we are observing in the past decade is that Argentina still holds the traditional traffic pattern, the classical one, that is, cocaine enters the Argentinian territory through the northern border in order to go to Europe. Cocaine is of Bolivian, Peruvian and also Colombian origin. That circuit still exists. Now, what has been happening since a few years ago, drawing attention and being a matter of concern in relation to the field of public policies is that the circuit that generates violence and causes problems in Argentina seems to be linked to another dynamics connected to the growth of local consumer markets in large urban centers. A different type of crime has emerged, which in some cases may be connected with the traditional transit routes, although not often, and it has new features (how they operate, what substances they are trafficking, etc.). Why? Well, the substance that is in transit is generally of high quality, but in the local market there are consumers with low purchasing power demanding drugs such as paco. So, these drugs are smuggled by organizations which lack the complexity and the high level of logistics of large organizations.* ***But we have also found that these groups are generally organized based on family ties****, and it is worrying, because in terms of persecution, they are more difficult to control than large organizations. Why? Because of the famous drug bunkers or kiosks. You close a kiosk and send the person who was running it to jail.* ***But these kiosks are mobile and dynamic, and if the guy in jail does not continue to control it from prison, he handles it over to his cousin, sister, aunt... I mean, these are networks of family links.*** *And they are, in my opinion, the type of organizations that are generating violence in cities like Rosario and the metropolitan area.*[206] (Souto Zabaleta, 2013) [Emphasis added]

[206] My own translation.

The social, political and economic crisis in Argentina in 2001 resulted from the 1990s and the increase in poverty levels, but not only in an objective poverty, but a poverty of social disaffiliation, to put it into Castel's words[207]*. This poverty is not just about the loss of jobs, but also the loss of family ties and relationships. So, from this, we speak of a new, much more complex and profound social condition than simply being unemployed. We talk about social disaffiliation because we speak of an exclusion that is cultural, symbolic. So all this reached its peak in terms of magnitude with the political crisis of 2001.* ***In this context, paco emerged, as it must be understood as survival strategies for many impoverished sectors.*** *(...) Money is needed to live, and it doesn't matter where the money comes from: the important thing is that you need it. This is the context in which a change in patterns of drug trafficking is made possible in the country. By devaluating the currency, the price of cocaine is another one and there are new routes and modes of trafficking.* ***These are the conditions for CBP to be installed in urban centers for domestic consumption, and families that are born here are beginning to take part in the micro-trafficking networks****. In Argentina there are no drug cartels or notorious drug dealers:* ***here we have clusters of families in precarious conditions, whose survival strategy has been making money out of selling cheap substances for consumption in the domestic market****.*[208] (Ahumada, 2013) [Emphasis added]

As Dr. Souto Zabaleta states (2013), Rosario[209] has become a notorious city for its micro-trafficking networks. In its streets, for example, we can find the criminal gang called *Los Monos*, founded and run by the Cantero's family. Nevertheless, other criminal organizations with relative links, have also contributed to increase violence since the middle of the 2001-2010 decade. In a media report by the National University of Rosario (Irigaray and Colman, 2014), two pieces of data are particularly striking and disturbing: (a) the rate of drug-related homicides has increased since 2005. In 2013, while the national average rate was 5.5 homicides per 100,000 people, in Rosario it was estimates at 20 per 100,000; and (b) by the end of the 2001-2010 decade, *narcosoldaditos* –young narco-soldiers– were born. These are teenagers living in exclusion and marginalization, who, for about US$15-20 a day and weapons, protect CBP kiosks and clandestine labs located in the urban slums of Rosario. According to Eventon (2013: 2), these young narco-soldiers under the age of 16 are also intended to sell CBP, since in case of detention by the police, they cannot be sent to prison.

A similar dynamics seems to repeat itself in another city in the north of the country, located in the trafficking route from Salta to Buenos Aires: San Miguel de Tucumán. In a recent newspaper report published by La Nación (Di Nicola, 2013), one

[207] Robert Castel, French sociologist.

[208] My own translation.

[209] Rosario is the largest city in the Province of Santa Fe and the third one in population after Buenos Aires and Córdoba. It is located 300 kms. northwest of Buenos Aires on the Parana River, a historic route of drug trafficking and illegal weapons from Paraguay and Brazil.

of Argentina's most read and important newspapers, the Chair of the Federal Court of Appeals of Tucumán, Ricardo Sanjuan, stated that

> *Drug kiosks have grown and multiplied in a brutal way. Unfortunately, this no longer calls my attention.* ***There are whole families engaged in adulterating and fractionating the drug.*** *These SMEs use minors to avoid being caught up by the law.*[210] [Emphasis added]

FIGURE 2: Types of Drug Trafficking in Argentina, 2001-2010



Another significant aspect of the micro-trafficking is the drifting of chemical precursors. The Argentine Republic has one of the most important chemical industries in the region. This is the reason why substances that are commonly used in the production and manufacturing processes of coca paste, CBP and CHCL are available. During the 1990s, the drifting of chemical precursors was worrying. Eduardo Amadeo (2013), a National Deputy for the Province of Buenos Aires at the time of the interview, and who was the Secretary of the SEDRONAR in 1998, stated when I interviewed him:

[210] My own translation.

> *I was invited to take over the Secretariat* [SEDRONAR] *to solve the problem regarding chemical precursors. There was a lot of information from the intelligence bureau related to chemical precursors. For example, we compared the amount of hydrochloric acid purchased by the sugar mills across the north of the country, especially Salta and Tucumán, and the use they made of it, which is easily obtained by the sugar production function. We noticed that they bought much more than what was needed for the industry. Now, for example, there is a huge increase in the purchase of ephedrine. That is a problem today.*[211]

In order to control traditional chemical precursors and substances from being used for illegal purposes such as the production of illicit drugs, the National Register of Chemical Precursors (RENPRE), for the SEDRONAR (Law No. 26,045), was established in 2005. Since then, SEDRONAR (2011b: 46-47) understands that

> *(...) The cases detected the most regularly do not generally represent large shipments of controlled chemicals, but they are rather an attempt to 'ant smuggling', through which traffickers try to cross over the border with small amounts of precursors, particularly ether and acetone, camouflaged in containers of other products, the shipping by parcel or the use of vehicular transportation.*[212]

However, a recent case with a lot of media exposure calls into question the hypothesis of the ant smuggling. In July 2014, José Ramón Granero –the Secretary of SEDRONAR between 2004-2011– was convicted of participating in the trafficking of ephedrine, a substance used in the production of methamphetamines[213]. At the time of the conviction, the Judge Servini de Cubría noted that *"of 47,625 kg. of ephedrine that pharmaceutical companies were allowed to import between 2004-2008, 40,972 kg. were sent to drug trafficking. The rest was used for making legal drugs"*[214] (Cappiello, 2014). According to official data, the local pharmaceutical industry requires annually 10 MT of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine for the manufacture of drugs (Gaffoglio, 2008).

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[211] My own translation.

[212] My own translation.

[213] In 2007, Mexico restricted imports of ephedrine to 70 MT per year to cover only the demand for pharmaceutical laboratories. Such controls shifted the activity of Mexican narcos to the Southern Cone. Argentina was one of the selected countries, becoming a new route for smuggling of chemical precursors for the manufacture of synthetic drugs. On July 17th, 2008, in a country house in Ingeniero Maschwitz (Province of Buenos Aires), items to make ecstasy, methamphetamine and ephedrine were seized, and 9 Mexican citizens and an Argentinian were arrested (Federico, 2011: 76-82).

[214] My own translation.

3.3. Consumption

During the decades of 1980-1990, the pattern of demand for illicit drugs in Argentina was dominated by the consumption of CHCL, psychotropic drugs and, to a lesser extent, morphine, ketamine and LSD (Kornblit, 2004). Argentina was then a market with high purchasing power; buyers were able to find high purity drugs in all the major cities of the country. However, by 2002, after the socioeconomic collapse of 2001[215], the media warned about a new drug that was rapidly expanding in the poorest neighborhoods of Buenos Aires. It was called paco by its consumers.

Paco is smoked in handmade pipes with a recessed aluminum pipe to which one extreme of which, burned tobacco is placed in order to keep the heat on, which enables the volatilization of the powder. The effect of the smoked drug varies according to the type of chemical precursors included in the preparation, but it is almost automatic: it takes effect between 8-40 seconds after consumption, but just as quickly, the effect is lost within minutes. This causes a very strong drive to continue smoking.

So far, there is no agreement on what paco is, and regarding this issue too, there are two competing hypotheses that explain its emergence. Does Argentina process CBP in its territory and turn it into CHCL for its export to Europe or do both CHCL and CBP enter the country with the aim of supplying different consumer markets (one local and one international)? Depending on the answer given to this question, a different definition of paco can be adopted.

For the Deputies Carrió, Cinquerrui and Martello (2006: 12), for example, paco "*is the form of commercial presentation of the residue from the processing of cocaine sulfate into cocaine hydrochloride.*"[216] For Tasín (2007: 35) is "*the refuse of cocaine production.*"[217] And following both definitions, Federico (2011: 100-101) understands that

[215] Several studies have shown that the patterns of drug consumption may be affected by spirals of violence, socioeconomic conditions characterized by high unemployment and marginalization, health policies, or the criminalization of drug use (Bourgois, 2003; Curtis, 2003; Epele, 2003). In all agreement with these studies, in this dissertation, I contend that changes in drug use patterns are the result of public policies, economic crises, social crises and/or political conflict (Epele, 2011).

[216] My own translation.

[217] My own translation.

> *The Plan Colombia, which harassed the Colombian cartels during the nineties, and the decision of the Mexican government to ban the import of chemicals used for the production of cocaine, were the two main reasons that* ***led traffickers to seek new places to turn CBP into hydrochloride for export.*** *Brazil, Chile and* ***Argentina were the chosen destinations****.*[218] [Emphasis added]

Meanwhile, Blikman and Garibotto (2006: 6) argue that

> [In the case of Argentina,] *the most common assumption among users and the media is that the substance which is being consumed is the 'waste of cocaine';* ***the remains left in the pots after the process of producing cocaine hydrochloride from coca paste or CBP****, which is sold afterwards.*[219] [Emphasis added]

In the interviews I conducted, I obtained the following answers.

> *Paco is the name that was given by the media. From the studies that we have conducted, it has emerged that what is known as paco has cocaine hydrochloride, residues of CBP and other chemicals that are residues of the processes of adulteration.* ***It is difficult to reach a conclusion on what is paco based on chemical analyses****.*[220] (Ahumada, 2013) [Emphasis added]

> *Paco is a street name that responds to a variety of chemical compositions. A comprehensive study was never carried out to tell or reveal what paco really is. But why was not the study done? Because it is not easy to do so. In Argentina the possession of drugs is a crime; this means that you cannot send people to the streets to buy paco in order to analyze it. Now, there are partial studies on the chemical composition of paco, whose results have been very different: in some of them sulfate prevails, that is to say, it is adulterated freebase cocaine. In other studies, hydrochloride is found and a lot of other things appear. So, for example, you have the alkaloid in the form of sulfate or chloride, but you have a lot of other things and there is never the exact composition.*[221] (Souto Zabaleta, 2013)

Likewise, Cristian Alarcón (2010: 33), a Chilean journalist who lives in Argentina, argued that

> *The media and smokers themselves have installed the idea that paco is the residue left when coca paste is 'cooked' to obtain cocaine hydrochloride. However,* ***even the most complex studies cannot tell us what in fact the actual composition of this drug is****, which spreads among the youth in Argentina, with foci of consumption in some slums of Buenos Aires and Greater Buenos Aires, and in some areas of Montevideo, in Uruguay.*[222] [Emphasis added]

Another version is that of Dr. Carlos Damin, Professor of Toxicology of the Faculty of Medicine at the University of Buenos Aires, who once declared in a press interview that he did not believe that paco *"is the residue which results from the*

[218] My own translation.
[219] My own translation.
[220] My own translation.
[221] My own translation.
[222] My own translation.

production of cocaine hydrochloride because in chemical analyses there were no sulfates and hydrocarbons found" (Di Nicola, 2009).

This lack of agreement on defining what paco is seems to be settled when analyzing the reasons that have led to its increased consumption. Indeed, Carrió, Cinquerrui and Martello (2006: 9-11), Touzé (2006), Míguez (2007), Epele (2011: 1470-1471), Federico (2011: 100), Zabaleta Souto (2013), Ahumada (2013), and Amadeo (2013), agree that the spread of paco was closely linked to the socioeconomic crisis of Argentina in 2001 because: (a) mass unemployment created more poverty and inequality; (b) Argentina abandoned the Convertibility Law and devalued its currency; and (c) the local markets of drug consumption, now with low incomes, began to demand cheaper substances.

Since 2001, the selling formula of the paco has been simple and cheap: a highly addictive dose from 0.01-0.03 grams is bought today by ARS $15-20[223] (Ahumada, 2013), which is, according to Souto Zabaleta (2013), a market strategy.

> *Let's see, it is my impression that* [paco] *is a consumption pattern that started at that time* [2001]*, because previously inhalants were widely spread. Some have tried to link it to the fact that Argentina produces it, because they say it is the residue from the manufacture of cocaine, but it is not. It has to do with* ***marketing strategies of small criminal organizations to cater for small local markets for consumption. They found a cheap and highly addictive substance, but precisely because of these two features paco is very profitable,*** *and it became a business opportunity*.[224] [Emphasis added]

By 2010, the consumption levels of paco nationwide were estimated at: (a) 0.6% of the population measured on the basis of the prevalence of life (i.e., about 250,000 people had consumed paco at least once in their lives); and (b) 0.2% of the population measured on the basis of the prevalence of consumption during the last year (about 80,000 people). These national averages (SEDRONAR, 2010) showed that the media impact of paco is higher than the actual impact, but it is clear that in some population sectors –poor social classes of marginal urban settlements– the consumption of paco dominates the stage.

The south of the City of Buenos Aires is the most affected area of the country, and it is estimated that *"of the children living in the slums* [in that area] *90% traffic,*

[223] In 2001 (Epele: 2011: 1470), a dose of paco cost ARS $1. In 2007 (Tasín, 2007: 34), it cost between ARS $2-5. In 2011, according to Federico (2011: 98), a dose cost ARS $ 5.

[224] My own translation.

consume or perform both of them"[225] (Tasín, 2007: 32). This has changed the face of many poor urban settlements, which have grown from humble to violent places.

> *Paco gets in the way of people's everyday lives because consumers are part of the micro-trafficking within the slum. The kids who consume it are often used as security personnel for the dealers, who are selling, and I am not referring to wholesale dealers, but family homes where yerba mate, sugar, yogurt and paco are sold. Then the social fabric becomes more complex, and violence grows. (...)* ***The income obtained from the selling of paco represented a turning point in the history of slums. In the past, they were poor and safe places. Now they are poor and unsafe places*** *because violence, in the case of paco, occurs inside the slum. Those who steal to consume, do not steal in Palermo*[226]*, they do it within the slum. And if they are drugged, consumers of paco do not go out to steal, because they cannot walk. So these kids steal from their family or their own neighbors in order to consume. Today the houses inside the slum are filled with bars. They have small shacks filled with bars.*[227] (Ahumada, 2013) [Emphasis added]

Statistically, it has been estimated that the age of the first consumption of paco is located at an average of 18 years old with a variation of 5, which means that in some cases the first consumptions is at the age of 13 years old (SEDRONAR, 2007b: 10). Why are the consumers so young?

> *The increase in the consumption is given by three variables: easy access to the drug, social tolerance and individual vulnerability. In Argentina, social tolerance to the drug has risen, which added to an increase in the supply, has resulted in easier access to the drug. But let us pay special attention to individual vulnerability. The dropout rate of poor young Argentinians is dramatic: 30% do not finish high school. Let us add all these dimensions up: we have young people living in overcrowded homes; they have an awful school performance; in scaring percentages, many of them have no dads (i.e., they come from single-parent households with a female head, as it is technically called). Not finishing high school, they are doomed to end up in the labor market; and we also have a pandemia of teenage pregnancies: 3 out of 10 births in suburban Buenos Aires belong to poor girls under 18. And that is a circle from which they cannot leave. Imagine the despair! And from there, to the drug, there is just a step.* ***Argentina has a dramatic problem of chronic marginalization****.*[228] (Amadeo, 2013) [Emphasis added]

[225] My own translation.

[226] Palermo is a neighborhood of an upper social class and an affluent middle class in the northeast of the City of Buenos Aires.

[227] My own translation.

[228] My own translation.

4. The Securitization of the Coca-Cocaine Complex in Argentina

The theoretical, conceptual and analytical description I have carried out up to here is aimed at answering one of the central questions of this dissertation: what are the aspects or national/regional dimensions of CCC that Argentinian political elites have articulated as threats to the security of Argentina during the 2001-2010 decade? After reviewing hundreds of official presidential speeches, media interviews, minutes of meetings of the National Congress of Argentina and ministerial statements, among other discourses, I have identified a securitizing dynamics with the following characteristic notes:

(a) Between 2001-2005, there were few securitizing speeches regarding the CCC and, except for specific cases where a securitizing rhetoric calling for urgent action, there were only general references to the link between drug trafficking and money laundering, the financing of election campaigns and terrorism as a threat among many others;

(b) With the start of the Kirchner Administrations in 2003, the securitizing speeches of the CCC abandon presidential speeches;

(c) As from 2004-2005, the securitizing speeches articulated nationwide began to multiply, the spectrum of perceived threats became broader and for the first time, the speeches warning about the dangers of paco arose;

(d) Since 2005, the securitizing speeches are articulated mainly from the political opposition to the Kirchner government (the ruling party);

(e) Since 2010, the speeches that securitize some aspect of the CCC are included in the electoral agenda of the opposing political candidates and are used to highlight the mismanagement of the ruling party;

(f) The speeches that securitize aspects of CCC at the regional level (e.g., the dangers posed by the situation in Colombia for the safety of Argentina) are articulated by both the opposing parties and the ruling party.

(g) There are no desecuritizing practices in relation to any dimension of CCC.

. . .

On March 1st, 2001, on the occasion of the opening of the 119th Regular Session of the Congress of Argentina, President Fernando De la Rúa said in his speech:

> ***To prevent and combat illegal drugs from entering the country are inevitable premises for my administration, as well as to detect and prevent transit and departure towards third countries. We have declared war on drugs****. We have worked on the prevention of drugs addiction. The effort was aimed at achieving the formation of social networks that would serve as support for the reduction of demand, seeking for strategies of social participation, tracking projects and training human resources, which should then take an active role in prevention. (...)* ***My government will continue to provide unconditional support for research related to drug trafficking****, money laundering, smuggling, organized crime, counterfeiting of currency and tax evasion.*[229] (Argentinian Senate, 2001) [Emphasis added]

After this speech by President De la Rúa, the rhetorical structures oriented to securitize some aspect of the CCC were completely excluded from presidential speeches[230]. Although in some speeches there were certainly scattered references to drug trafficking, it was no longer possible to discern the discursive construction declaring an emergency condition (e.g., in De la Rúa's speech, "*We have declared war against drug trafficking*"). Consider the following examples.

> *In the order of another major struggle, and taking into account the total drugs seizures carried out by the state system, which includes the actions of the security forces and the Directorate General of Customs in drug trafficking investigations, the growth in the seizing of cocaine during the last year, compared to 2005, was 37%. (...) Despite the improvement, the issue* ***remains a matter of growing concern, which is worth the constant and renewed effort of the entire population and of all institutions****.*[231] —President Néstor Carlos Kirchner (Argentinian Senate, 2007) [Emphasis added]

> *I have talked to presidents, with colleagues from* ***countries where the struggle against drug trafficking is taking on dramatic proportions****, and this demands a strong commitment from the major developed countries, because, normally, these networks, these organizations, have also links, financing, and eventually the place of location for their large profits in developed countries.*[232] —President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (Fernández, 2009) [Emphasis added]

In his speech, President Néstor Kirchner, at first, expressed concern over the severity of the traffic of CHCL, but he understood that the solution to the problem was the *"renewed and sustained effort"* of the already existing institutions. In his

[229] My own translation.

[230] After the resignation of De la Rúa, and the application of the Acephalia Act, Eduardo Alberto Duhalde was appointed President of the Nation. He held office between January 2nd, 2002, and May 25th, 2003, and in his inaugural speech to the Legislative Assembly, there is no reference to drug trafficking. It is remarkable, however, that Duhalde (1989; 1994; 1997; 2011) has written four books on topics related to CCC. In all his writings, there are whole paragraphs that securitize multiple aspects of CCC (traffic, consumption of paco, narco-politics, violence linked to drugs, etc.).

[231] My own translation.

[232] My own translation.

formulation, there is no alarmist rhetoric or appeals to take extraordinary decisions to fight drug trafficking. Although rarely, because her public speeches on drug trafficking are scarce, the speech of President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner gave rise to a discursive pattern that has been repeated since 2009 –: (a) her statements securitize the aspects of CCC at a regional level; and (b) consumer countries are largely responsible for drug trafficking.

> *(...) I also want to refer to something that President Santos [of Colombia] has referred to, that is, drug tracking. (...) It is true what he says, they have dealt with it with some success, but they are still suffering from its ravages. (...) And a question that I always ask myself regarding drug trafficking is that, what is curious is that in any other activities we find leaders of all nationalities, but never from Latin America. Drug trafficking is the only activity in which there seems to only be leaders who are Latin American leaders. (...) But when Felipe* [Calderón, President of Mexico] *spoke today of drug trafficking,* ***he specifically addressed the responsibility of the developed countries and mainly of the consumer countries.*** *Moreover, not only consumers but also those who launder money from those businesses carried out by them.*[233] —President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (Fernández, 2011) [Emphasis added]

> *(...) We must be realistic, neither Chile nor Argentina are drug-producing countries. I will not identify drug-producing countries, nor consumers, because ultimately producers exist because there are consumers, no one produces what is not consumed. (...)* ***I think that what is central to the drugs problem is that countries that are major recipients, Europe and the United States, should participate in this fight*** *and agree upon common protocols because actually our countries, beyond the addictions that there can be in* ***Chile or Argentina or anywhere else, they are actually almost only transit countries, they are not producers or large consumers.*** *(...) I think we have to be more creative, more inventive and fundamentally more realistic when addressing the problem, we shouldn't assimilating the media agenda but an agenda of the problem, and ask this to the people that...* ***Because I do not see other presidents being asked on these issues, they are far more linked to this –not them, of course, but their countries– on the problem of drug trafficking****.* [234] —President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (Fernández, 2014a) [Emphasis added]

No presidential speech since 2003 up to the present has made reference to the dimension of local consumption. Only once I have had the perception that President Fernández de Kirchner was referring to paco – but not with securitizing rhetoric, but rather from a descriptive enunciation.

> [We must] *end this myth, which everyone knows is a great hypocrisy to think that only poor people take drugs. (...) The last drug raids carried out by the Security Ministry was precisely on VIP drug gangs. You know what's the big difference? As always,* ***drug traffickers use shoddy drugs with the poor, which breaks the head of these poor***

[233] My own translation.
[234] My own translation.

***consumers**; those who are rich consume high quality drugs.*[235] (Fernández, 2014b) [Emphasis added]

In contrast to the discourse of the ruling party, since 2005, paco has been the linchpin of much of the securitizing strategy of the opposition parties. In the cases I share below, opposition Deputies reveal the dangers of paco as both a substance of use, and as an emergent of a production dynamics and trafficking which is more complex and goes deeper.

*We know of the movement of drugs in private airports across the country, which is permanently detected by radar from the Air Force, and which goes without arresting anyone on land. The drug that circulates and is sold is so much that the remains are late adulterated with kerosene from where the famous **paco is made, and which contaminates 400,000 young people of Buenos Aires daily**. These kids, after three months of consuming that crap, end up having absolutely irreversible brain injuries. (...)* [This situation] ***is funded, tolerated and encouraged by vast sectors of the national government**.*[236] —National Deputy Marta Olinda Maffei, Afirmación para una República Igualitaria (ARI). (Argentinian Chamber of Deputies, 2005b) [Emphasis added]

*Today, in the poorest neighborhoods of Buenos Aires, paco is consumed by our kids, which they buy at one peso. There are kids who say they buy fifteen pacos – the waste of cocaine, which destroys their neurons much faster than if they consumed cocaine. This happens because of what I have just explained. First, the state does not take care of the kids. Secondly, society looks away, and finally, the family does not deal with this for various reasons. (...) **For God's sake, let us take this issue seriously!** It is not a question of political parties. We are not discussing whether the province of Buenos Aires has more drug addicts or if its police force is worse. We are facing an existential problem of human beings, which is affecting us all, and **soon none of us will be free from this scourge**.*[237] —National Deputy Hilda González de Duhalde, Partido Justicialista (PJ). (Argentinian Chamber of Deputies, 2006a) [Emphasis added]

***The emergence of paco on the national stage presents us with evidence of negligence, abandonment and neglect of the state** and the society about the problems that we ourselves have created: the marginality and anomie of young people, especially those in severely affected sectors by joblessness and with almost no hope for their own future.*[238] —National Deputy Lucía Garín de Tula, Unión Cívica Radical (UCR). (Argentinian Chamber of Deputies, 2006b) [Emphasis added]

*(...) Paco, which tonight is destroying the brains of our youth, is what is left at the bottom of the pot where cocaine is produced. **This means that the cocaine laboratories are here**, in the City of Buenos Aires and in the suburbs.*[239] —National Deputy Eugenio Burzaco, Propuesta Republicana (PRO). (Argentinian Chamber of Deputies, 2008) [Emphasis added]

[235] My own translation.
[236] My own translation.
[237] My own translation.
[238] My own translation.
[239] My own translation.

On the same subject, the ruling party has articulated a response that seeks to remove the dimension of exception to the problem of paco consumption –which is not the same as to desecuritize it–. This was expressed by the Chief of Staff of the Presidency of the Republic, Aníbal Fernández (Argentinian Senate, 2011), in a hearing before the Senate's Office.

> *It is important to speak of CBP. What we know as paco is nothing but from alkaloid, CBP, consolidated with sodium bicarbonate and some similar substances. It is what is done in the United States but reversely with cocaine hydrochloride so as to produce what they finally call 'crack'. It is exactly that: terribly harmful, but* ***within a very small universe****, thanks God!* ***We have in this a level of consumption within the levels of what is recorded anywhere in the world. Not exceeding it in any way.*** *There is no such thing as what some dilettantes are speaking publicly saying it has. These days, I've seen some people talking on the media as if they knew this; as if they were great connoisseurs.* ***They never read a newspaper, they do not know what they are talking about and on top of that, and they frighten society saying terrible things!***[240]

Another aspect securitized by the opposition party is the supposed status of Argentina as a producer country of CHCL and its derivatives. Earlier in this chapter, I have explained that, at least in terms of this thesis, Argentina is not a producer country. This securitizing dynamics, then, is the best example which proves that securitization is not always the result of objective consequences, but partisan of political interests. The texts stated below illustrate this.

> *We, Argentinians, got used to believing that Argentina is a transit country or that we are not a consumption market or a producer country. So, control was exercised at the border. All that was watched with some degree of effectiveness was the export traffic, and we neglected the internal links in this illegal process.* ***But now we have realized that this is no longer the case.*** *(...) I was alarmed when I heard the former Minister Béliz say that* ***Argentina was on his way to becoming a narco-democracy****. I do not know if such a phrase may have a severe link with reality, but it is a warning voice. (...) Therefore, we must change the lens with which the phenomena of drug addiction and illicit drug trade are seen.*[241] —National Senator Antonio Cafiero, PJ. (Argentinian Senate, 2004)

> ***Argentina has gone from being a transit country to a producing one.*** *Thousands of teenagers are addicted to paco and are used as cheap labor force of criminal mafias. Ephedrine traffickers have financed the campaign of this government.* ***In Greater Buenos Aires, we have the landing of Colombian and Mexican cartels****.*[242] —National Deputy Fernando Iglesias, Coalición Cívica (CC). (Argentinian Chamber of Deputies, 2009) [Emphasis added]

[240] My own translation.
[241] My own translation.
[242] My own translation.

Against this securitizing attempt, the response given by the ruling party was not pushy, but clear enough to leave no doubt about the role played by Argentina in the international division of the production of coca-cocaine.

> ***Those who work every day in the fight against drug trafficking in Argentina know that cocaine is not produced here.*** *It is virtually impossible for that to occur in Argentina because the conditions of altitude and climate does not provide for the growth of this plant. What happens is that sometimes we get confused when it comes to laboratories in Argentina, which are the places where the drug is adulterated; usually drugs coming from Colombia, Peru or Bolivia.*[243] —Sergio Berni, Secretary of Security, Office of the President. (Berni, 2014) [Emphasis added]

The regional dimension of CCC has not been excluded from the securitizing rhetoric of Argentinian elites. Something interesting to highlight here is that both the ruling party and the opposition parties seem to agree on the dangers that Colombian drug trafficking represents for the country.

> *Those who are citizens of border provinces, like we are, know that* ***the problem started with this combination of Colombian drug trafficking and terrorism and the links between them.*** *(...) So we hope that this issue will soon be reversed, that security in the province of Buenos Aires be ordered and Gendarmerie forces be returned to guard our borders and* ***prevent narco-terrorism from entering our country.***[244] —National Senator Sonia Escudero, PJ. (Argentinian Senate, 2003) [Emphasis added]

> *According to the International Narcotics Control Board, dependent from the United Nations, fifty thousand kilos of cocaine enter Argentina per year, and thirty thousand leave the country. This is not new, but started many years ago,* ***and it has been exacerbated by the progress of Plan Colombia, which caused the drop of almost twenty percent of hectares of cultivated coca in Colombia****, which eventually make them come down too in Peru and Bolivia.*[245] —National Deputy Juan Manuel Urtubey, PJ (Argentinian Chamber of Deputies, 2005a) [Emphasis added]

> [A report by the State Department of the United States of America] *said that because of the public policies implemented in Colombia and Mexico against drug trafficking, traffickers use alternative routes such as Argentina. (...) I ask the Chief of Staff* [of the Presidency of the Republic]*: What measures are being implemented by the Executive Branch against the fact that Argentina is not only a transit country but also a country of drug consumption?*[246] —National Senator Liliana Negre de Alonso, PJ Federal. (Argentinian Senate, 2011) [Emphasis added]

> *In the department of Orán* [Province of Salta,] *there is a great concern in all neighbors for the advancement of drug trafficking; also by the presence, –as they say to us– of Colombians involved in drug trafficking who have refugee status. That's what they tell us, that as they have refugee status, but it cannot be asked that, in fact, these people are*

[243] My own translation.
[244] My own translation.
[245] My own translation.
[246] My own translation.

dedicated to drug trafficking.[247] –National Senator Sonia Escudero, PJ. (Argentinian Senate, 2013) [Emphasis added]

When we met with the Mothers of Paco of the Orán boys, (...) they told us that ***they had to face drug traffickers****. In the federal courts, moreover, it was established that there are* ***more than 1,500 Colombians*** *who are intended to Oran financial activity, they are "loan sharks" who lend money*.[248] —National Senator José Manuel Cano, UCR. (Argentinian Senate, 2013) [Emphasis added]

Finally, I wish to focus my attention on a securitizing dynamics that has become more evident since 2010: the securitizing speeches of CCC integrate some aspect of the electoral agenda of opposition political candidates and are used to highlighting the mismanagement of the ruling party.

Elisa Carrió, National Deputy of the Coalición Cívica (CC), repeatedly uses her securitizing speeches in the media. On January 13th, 2011, months before the presidential elections of that year, she visited the television program *A dos voces* and, as a Presidential Candidate for the CC, said:

(...) Mexicans, Colombians, Americans and everyone tell me that ***Argentina is now the center of the drug trade in South America****. Spain says it, Britain says it: it is the center of drug trafficking because the strength of the drug is in decadence in Mexico, there is a whole battle there; Colombia has this pretty much controlled, and everything moved here. So here Colombians and Mexicans die because here drugs have been trafficked for many years thanks to the complicity of the political power in Argentina*.[249] (Carrió, 2011) [Emphasis added]

Some days later, in a campaign meeting, she claimed that

The drugs business is absolutely protected and promoted by the government, *so that no one can control anyone. Illegal money coming from drug trafficking financed the campaigns of Menem and Duhalde in 1989; the financing of the 1999 campaign of Duhalde and 'Palito' Ortega has also been investigated. The campaign of Cristina Kirchner was financed with ephedrine. The only political power that speaks against this drug trafficking is the Coalición Cívica. We have to face the issue of drug trafficking, and you can only deal with it with international aid, with a force that has no complicity. All the countries in the world point at Argentina as the place of drug money and money laundering of Eastern European mafias. It is highlighted as the place where (cocaine) is exported to Europe today*.[250] (Wurgaft, 2011) [Emphasis added]

Francisco De Narváez, the Peronist opposition politician against the Kirchners, who made an alliance with UCR, was a candidate for Governor of the Province of Buenos Aires in 2011. Some days before the provincial elections –October of that same year of 2011– he was invited to the C5N News Channel and there he stated that

[247] My own translation.
[248] My own translation.
[249] My own translation.
[250] My own translation.

> *This government continues with the same shortcomings that Argentinian politics has, that is, three central factors: structural poverty, the advancement of organized crime in Argentina –drug trafficking–, and finally the non-compliance with the law.* ***In none of these three issues this administration has improved****. Poverty increases, not decreases. (...) The drug trade continues to move forward. (...) We have in Argentina the settlement of a narco band that was formed in '96 and was first detected in Mexico, and it is one of the most violent, corrupt and vicious bands ever seen. And here they are! Not that they are planning on coming!* ***They have taken Argentina as a hub****.*[251] (De Narváez, 2011) [Emphasis added]

Fernando '*Pino*' Solanas, current Senator of the Nation, expressed his intention to become a presidential candidate for the Frente Amplio UNEN. In March of this year, debating on a TV channel on the presidential elections in Argentina in 2015, he said that

> *It is true that Argentina is one of the three major drug-consuming countries, and one of the three major drug exporting countries in the continent. This is data from the United Nations. We do not produce leaves, but the leaves come in barges along Parana, which is a waterway. Where do they come from? Santa Cruz de la Sierra [in Bolivia] from Paraguay... (...) The northern border is unguarded; the Pucará aircraft flies 6 or 7 hours a day and we do not know if half a dozen of airplanes fly; there are only 2 dimensional radars… Now, why is this? This is an official decision of national policy.*[252] (Solanas, 2014) [Emphasis added]

Sergio Massa, between the years 2008-2009, served as the Chief of Staff of the Presidency of the Republic. After leaving office, he distanced from the Kirchner movement and in 2013, he ran for National Deputy for the Frente Renovador, a new Peronist space created and led by him. Currently, Massa is emerging as one of the two candidates most likely to win the presidential election of 2015. In November 2013, speaking to *Radio Mitre*, he said:

> ***We need an Aircraft Shot-Down Act***[253] ***that will hinder the entrance of drug to Argentina.*** *This law does not mean to shoot down all planes. (...)* [The bill provides] *a procedure, as it is the mandatory identification and landing of any aircraft that is not identified in airports established by the security forces. (...) If not, what happens is that the planes entering drug, pull packages from above with a pager and those who run the*

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[251] My own translation.

[252] My own translation.

[253] On March 13th, 2014, Juan Schiaretti, Blanca Rossi and Carlos Caserio, National Deputies of the Province of Córdoba, filed a bill entitled *Integrated Protection System of the National Airspace (SIPEAN)* (Docket No. 0674 D-2014). Among other procedures to protect Argentina's northern border, SIPEAN expects the shooting down of suspicious ships that have entered the country without authorization. Currently, the project is undergoing treatment in the committees of National Defense, Transport and Budget and Finance of the Chamber of Deputies. On this subject, I had the opportunity to talk with Dr. Ricardo Dios Said, National Director of Coordination and Liaison of the Judiciary Powers in the Ministry of National Security. I appreciate the time he took to share with me the perspective of the National Government in relation to the project.

business have the ability to know where the bag containing the drug has fallen.[254] (La Prensa, 2013) [Emphasis added]

In a recent speech by Mauricio Macri, the Mayor of Buenos Aires and presidential candidate by the PRO for the 2015 Presidential Elections, this securitizing binomial was also noticeable: the dangers of drug trafficking is the responsibility of the national government.

Another great debt of these 30 years of democracy is security –Macri claimed–*, which has worsened in the last 10 years with* ***drug trafficking and the neglect of this government****.*[255] (Macri, 2014) [Emphasis added]

I could continue listing to examples, but I understand that at this point I have shown that many securitizing speeches in Argentina have, at least since 2010, an electoral functionality. In this regard, I wish to bring up one securitizing speech enunciated in an electoral context and, although it is part of this dynamics –i.e., disqualifying the ruling party by securitizing any aspect of the CCC–, it resulted paradoxical.

On September 11th, 2013, by order of a Federal Prosecutor, over twelve raids were held in the Head of the Provincial Anti-Drug Secretariat of Córdoba, and some police officers were arrested. They were suspected of having protected a gang of drug-traffickers of CHCL[256]. José Manuel De la Sota, the Governor of the Province who endorses the Peronist movement but not the Kirchner movement, blamed the national government of orchestrating a move against him to discredit him. The fact is that in October of that year, under National Legislative Elections, candidates for Deputies of Córdoba of the Frente para la Victoria –a political party belonging to the Kirchner movement– launched campaign spots blaming the provincial government for the increase in drug-trafficking.

For 14 years they have been in power and today we are helpless. *Drug trafficking is a hard and sad reality, in which the police are also involved. The first thing the government did was to try to deny the fact.* (Scotto, 2014) [Emphasis added]

The case of the Province of Córdoba is a paradigmatic one because it shows that the Kirchner movement also, when it is not a ruling party, resorts to the securitization of CCC in electoral contexts to discredit its political opponent.

[254] My own translation.
[255] My own translation.
[256] It was in the context of this public scandal that many of my interviews were canceled.

5. Concluding Remarks

In the first section of this chapter, I dealt with the domestic analysis of Argentina from the RSCT, and showed that: (a) the Argentinian society is not fragmented along ethnic or linguistic lines, but it has a severe socioeconomic fragmentation; (b) two recent and serious governance crisis have hit the policy capacity of Argentina; (c) after the 2001 crisis, Argentina has adopted a neo-extractive model of raw materials which continues to condemn their economic matrix to dependency; and (d) even though Argentina consolidated its physical and institutional presence throughout its territory, there remain some problems that increase the impact that CCC has in the country.

Secondly, I analyzed the three dimensions of CCC in Argentina (production and manufacturing, trafficking and consumption), and identified its key actors. The main contributions of this section have been: (a) there is no conclusive information to say that paco is the residue of cocaine and that, consequently, Argentina has become a producer country of CHCL; (b) there is a new profile of actors since 2001 (criminal organizations with family links that operate networks of micro-trafficking); (c) there are two types of drug trafficking in the country (macro- and micro-trafficking); and (d) there is a detailed profile of the consumption of paco in Argentina, with original interviews for this thesis.

Finally, after reviewing hundreds of official documents, interviews and speeches of legislators, among others, I have drawn a profile of the securitizing dynamics that Argentinian political elites have articulated around the CCC during the 2001-2010 decade.

Conclusions

1. Accomplishments

In the first chapter of this dissertation, I clearly stated that given the object of study of this piece of research and its theoretical framework, it was not possible to work with predictive hypotheses. In the first place, as I have pointed out, there is no necessary correlation between variables X (changes in the RSC in Argentina) and Y (the perception of those changes as threats to the security of Argentina). In the second place, the hypothesis are generally constructed around previous information, and it has become clear that there are plenty of pieces of research carried out on CCC in the Andean region, but there are little, if any research studies, on the CCC in other South American countries such as Argentina. The scope of this work, therefore, has not been correlational but exploratory. In this section, thus, I am not going to state whether the hypotheses have been confirmed or not, rather I am going to highlight the most important findings and contributions of this dissertation.

This study, in the first place, has adopted an innovative theoretical approach in the field of drugs and security. Without relegating the classical (geo)political analysis, the contributions of the Copenhagen School have allowed me to account for the major role played by ideas and perceptions in the building up of threats and, eventually, in the formulation of public policies.

In the second place, as an original contribution, I define the CCC. I consider that this definition has compensated for a serious theoretical deficiency in the studies on drugs –which should be more exhaustive when specifying which complex affects, which region, which actors are involved and which dimensions define it–.

Additionally, it has tempered the strong economic perspective dominating the studies on coca-cocaine from the concepts of *industry* and *market.*

In the third place, this dissertation has proven that, taken as a whole, the South American states are still weak in spite of the last decade of economic growth (2001-2010). All of them, without exception, exhibit problems of socio-political cohesion, political capacity, socioeconomic development and territorial centrality. In some countries, such as Bolivia, Colombia and Peru, these deficiencies are more evident and they maximize the most noxious dimensions of the CCC. Other countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Uruguay and Venezuela, are not as weak as their neighbors, yet they present economic, social and political problems related to the CCC and its most violent actors.

This study, in the fourth place, has advanced in considering South America as a RSC as well as the geopolitical basis of the CCC. This analytical effort should not be underestimated, since: (a) it assigns new value to the importance of the regional level of analysis; and (b) it seeks to overcome the classical formulation of the studies on drugs that have concentrated their analysis on the effects of drug trafficking on national security –state-centered view–.

A fifth contribution of this research work is represented by the comparative analysis of actors and dimensions of the CCC in South America during the decades 1980-2010, on the basis of the most updated bibliography. This research work has revealed that:

(a) There is a producing heart of coca leaves, coca paste, CBP and CHCL in the South American Andes. However, whereas Bolivia features a profile of an UPC since before 1980, Peru and Colombia –although with certain fluctuations– have consolidated as DPC.

(b) The regional consumer heart of CBP and CHCL is located in the Southern Cone. At a global scale, however, the markets of greater consumption of high purity CHCL are found in Western Europe and the US.

(c) Venezuela, Ecuador, Uruguay and Chile are transit countries for the CBP and CHCL directed towards the greatest global consumer markets. Brazil, in turn, is the only Full Cycle Country in the region.

(d) The mappings of the most complex and conflictive drug-actors are those of Bolivia, Peru and Colombia, where, since 1980 onwards, there are

cooperative and/or conflictive dynamics between cocaleros, guerrillas, firmas, cartels, security forces, Armed Forces and BACRIM.

In the sixth place, this dissertation has studied for the first time the dimensions of the CCC in Argentina during the decade 2001-2010, as well as the aspects of the complex that the local political elites have perceived and articulated as threats for the security of the country. This original contribution, condensed in Ch. V, may be summarized in a phrase that emerged in one of the interviews: "*Argentina is not turning into Colombia, Bolivia or Peru.* ***Argentina is becoming Argentina***" (Souto Zabaleta, 2013) [Emphasis added].

From the mid-1980s, there have been shipments of high purity CHCL in transit throughout the Argentinian territory that arrive from Bolivia, Peru and Colombia, and which head for consumer markets in Europe –or, during the 1990s, the US–. These drug-trafficking networks, managed by criminal organizations of a significant size and logistical capacity, continue to operate in Argentina and were providing, until recently, the local market. After the socioeconomic crisis of 2001, however, the Argentinian market was impoverished and it resulted in the emergence of a new consumer profile, which started to demand cheaper drugs. As a direct consequence of this new type of demand, new criminal organizations with relative links appeared, and they have managed, since then, the micro-trafficking networks that enter CBP from Bolivia to Argentina. In this context, the consumption of paco in the marginal urban areas of the main Argentinian cities is a consequence of this process, rather than a result of what many have called the *Colombianization* of Argentina – according to which, paco would be the waste from the production of CHCL in the country.

Argentina, in strict terms, would neither ever be a DPC, nor are there enough signs to support the hypothesis that it has become an UPC. For this reason, any statement indicating the contrary is an attempt to misinform, or else to securitize certain aspects of the CCC according to political, electoral and or partisan agendas and interests.

In the drug-securitizing formulations of the Argentinian political elites during the decade 2001-2010, for example, it is possible to identify two dynamics that illustrate what has been said: (a) since 2005, the securitizing speeches have been mainly articulated by the political opposition of the governing party; (b) the speeches that securitize an aspect of CCC, since 2010, have been used as part of the electoral

agenda of opposition political candidates, and as to highlight the mismanagement of the party in government. In turn, and recurrently, the party in office has avoided referring to the drug-trafficking concern in official speeches, and this causes uneasiness in at least one sense: public speeches –their intention being to securitize or not– reveal objectives, state priorities, management directives; and only public policies make those objectives, priorities and management directives visible. What are the objectives of the government as regards the fight against drug-trafficking? What is their diagnosis on the subject of the evolution of CCC in Argentina during the last decade? It is difficult to provide answers by analyzing the official discourse.

Additionally, the securitizing speeches delivered by the Argentinean political elites are not based on realistic diagnoses about the evolution of CCC at a local and regional level. "*Argentina is today the center of drug-trafficking activities in South America*", a National Deputy declared, as quoted in this dissertation. We are able to assert, after many chapters of analysis, that such a statement is closer to the rhetoric figure of the hyperbole than to reality. What are the effects of such dangerous distortion?

In this dissertation I have proven that CCC has a regional geopolitical basis – South America–, but the profile of each country is unique according to: (a) the role played in the international division of production, manufacture and trafficking; and (b) its actors and the interactions between them. The act of securitizing dimensions, actors and processes that are not present in Argentina, therefore, implies not only to produce unfounded fear in order to gain electioneering impact –or a political or government effect–, but also to remove the real problem from the security agenda of the country.

The actual problems in Argentina are not the cartels, or the production of CHCL in the local territory, or the *Colombianization* of the CCC. The actual problem in the last decade is that, in matters of drug-trafficking, **Argentina has turned into Argentina**; that is to say, it has developed its own model of CCC, which did not previously exist in any other country of the region. And *turning into Argentina* has represented a great challenge as well as it has triggering three changes: (a) in order to attend to the demand of the impoverished local market of consumption, Argentina has adapted its classical role of Transit Country from 2001 generating two trafficking routes (at a macro and at a micro levels); (b) new actors related to the micro-

trafficking routes have emerged –criminal organizations with relative links–, which account for the profound socioeconomic consequences of the crisis of 2001; (c) in the marginal urban neighborhoods of the metropolitan area, the consumption of paco has increased –a cheap and harmful drug of high toxicity–. The challenge: to develop an early diagnosis in order to design public policies in accordance with the real dimension of the Argentinean CCC.

This dissertation is essentially an academic research study. However, it works also as a diagnosis of the problem, which is one of its greatest achievements. This is so, for several reasons: public policies –and the security policies above all– should be stated on the basis of a dynamic and better integrated connection between investigation and praxis, between the creation of knowledge and public management; because responsible –and effective– public policies are co-produced by governments, representatives of civil society and, necessarily, members of the academy; and because the knowledge produced from the Social Sciences should never abandon its political interest of making a positive impact on social reality.

2. Directions for Future Research

All doctoral dissertations provide knowledge about the topic explored and, simultaneously, they generate new research questions. This study is not an exception and, thus, I will mention some issues to consider in future research.

(a) This dissertation, in the first place, has presented a definition of CCC. It would be desirable that the definition be enriched, criticized, complemented or even reformulated. There are dimensions and actors that I have not taken into account, and it is possible that other researchers consider that the dimension of money laundering, for example, should be central to the definition of the complex.

(b) It is imperative to lead a deeper study on the CCC in the Southern Cone. This work sheds light on the situation in Argentina during only one decade; it is very important, however, to gain an understanding of the sub-regional dynamics of drug trafficking. There are evidently plenty of research works

on Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, but it is highly difficult –if not impossible– to find studies whose reference objects are Brazil, Chile or Uruguay.

(c) The Theory of Securitization is a powerful theoretical tool for analyzing securitized and desecuritized issues, and some of the desecuritization processes I have mentioned have not been thoroughly analyzed. The speeches delivered about the coca leaf during Evo Morales Administration, for instance, constitute a concrete case of desecuritization, and this fact results particularly interesting if we consider that there are only a handful of practical desecuritization cases within the literature on security taken from a constructivist approach.

(d) The Theory of Securitization recognizes a difference between referent objects, securitizing actors and functional actors. In this dissertation I have explored the first two unit of analysis, but I have not made reference to actors that may affect the securitizing dynamics of CCC in Argentina. What about the role played by the media in the securitizing dynamics? Are there lobby or pressure groups interested in securitizing a certain aspect of the Argentinean CCC?

(e) Taking a strictly theoretical approach, can the Argentinean drug-securitization case provide new elements to complement the Theory of Securitization? The School of Copenhagen considers that securitization displaces an issue of the public sphere –subject to debate and ordinary democratic control– in order to be built as a threat that requires certain priority in the political agenda. But what about the securitizing processes which are not interested in establishing a priority in the political or government agenda, but rather in the electoral agenda?

3. Final Thoughts

I decided to study the CCC because, when I was an undergraduate student in Argentina, I heard the testimony of a Bolivian cocalero. His life had been subject to deprivation, material and symbolic absences, and the trading of the coca leaf –to

drug-trafficking firmas, of course– had returned some hope to his life (as terrible as it may sounds). At that time, the story of the cocalero seemed far from my reality. That was the situation in Bolivia, quite far north from my country and relatively removed from my home. However, when the consequences of the crisis of 2001 in Argentina became evident, the story of the cocalero –reformulated and with different nuances– turned into the story of many Argentineans.

It is difficult to accept the idea that although Argentina has been until recently a promise of progress to immigrants around the world, it has now become a country with a hard core of 3 million unemployed workers. Although being an agro-exporter country, it exhibits 12% of its homes suffering from moderate and chronic food uncertainty. Although it is the *most educated* country in Latin America, almost 1 million of 16 to 24 years-olds do not study or work. It is also difficult to believe that there are in the country micro-trafficking networks managed by unemployed families since 2001 – or perhaps since before.

My point is that the trajectory of the CCC in South America is, among others, the story of inequality, public corruption, the breach between the rich and the poor, lack of opportunities, macro-economic shocks and of the foreign debt crisis. Would the CCC be as disruptive without so much inequality, poverty and marginality? Are there solutions to such inequality, poverty and marginality? Are there solutions to the disruptive effects of drug trafficking?

I believe in the unthinkable for many times the unthinkable has materialized. Sometimes it is only a matter of pondering which unthinkable one longs to realize, and to work for it in the best possible way. I, then, imagine that this research study is the way in which I can contribute to materialize the *unthinkable* of improving the situation in Argentina, my country; of improving the reality of South America, my region.

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