

Aristoteles

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Achtergrond: Aristoteles (384 v.C.–322 v.C.)

- ▶ Grootste leerling (en tegenspeler) van Plato, leraar van Alexander de Grote.
- ▶ Heel actieve, invloedrijke en brede filosoof, maar ook (in de eerste plaats) wetenschapsmens
- ▶ Heeft geschreven over
 - ▶ Logica
 - ▶ Natuurwetenschap
 - ▶ Metafysica
 - ▶ Ethiek
 - ▶ Politiek
 - ▶ Letterkunde en redenaarskunst
- ▶ Nuchter, systematisch stijl (in tegenstelling met Plato)
- ▶ Meer verschillen tussen Aristoteles en Plato, bv. over kennis:
 - ▶ Plato: van algemeen (Ideeën, transcendent) naar particulier (zichtbare wereld) [top-down]
 - ▶ Aristoteles: van particulier naar algemeen (immanent) [bottom-up]

Categorieën en Isagoge

- ▶ Logische geschriften van Aristoteles verzameld in het Organon ('werktuig', 'methode'):
 1. **Over de Categorieën**, over de mogelijke vormen die entiteiten (of woorden) kunnen hebben
 2. Over de Interpretatie, over semantiek, en structuur van proposities
 3. Analytica priora, over opbouw en structuur van redeneringen
 4. Analytica posteriora, over kennisverwerving
 5. Topica, over dialectiek
 6. Sofistische weerleggingen, over drogredeneren.
- ▶ **Isagoge** van Porphyrius (ca. 234–305 n.C.): invloedrijke inleiding op de Categorieën van Aristoteles.
- ▶ Hoofdthema: Classificatie van typen van predikaten

Isagoge

► Citaat:

I shall attempt, ..., to rehearse, briefly and as in the manner of an introduction, what the older masters say, avoiding deeper inquiries and aiming suitably at the more simple. For example, about genera and species—whether they subsist, whether they actually depend on bare thoughts alone, whether if they actually subsist they are bodies or incorporeal and whether they are separable or are in perceptible items and subsist about them—these matters I shall decline to discuss. (Isagoge, 0:5-10)

► Vragen die Porphyrius niet gaat beantwoorden:

1. Bestaan genera en species? (realisme vs nominalisme)
2. Als ze bestaan, zijn ze dan alleen in de geest of ook daarbuiten? (conceptualism vs realisme)
3. Als ze in de werkelijkheid bestaan, zijn ze transcendent of immanent? (platonisme vs essentialisme)

Isagoge

(1) Geef voorbeelden van de vijf predicables. (2) Welke predicables zijn verbonden met essentiële eigenschappen? (3) Welke zijn belangrijk voor definitie? (4) Voor welke predicables is de vraag 'Wat is het?' van belang. Welke vraag is van belang voor de andere predicables?

1. Vijf predicables: genus, species, difference, property, accident.

- ▶ Genus (animal),
- ▶ species (man),
- ▶ difference (rational),
- ▶ property (laughing),
- ▶ accident (black).

2. Essentiële eigenschappen: noodzakelijk en met verklarende rol. Allen behalve accident en property zijn essentiële eigenschappen

3. Alleen genera en difference zijn van belang voor definitie.

4. Genus en Species geven antwoord op de vraag 'What is it?'. Difference, accident (en property) op de vraag 'What sort of so-and-so is it?'

Isagoge: species en genera

(1) Wat is het verschil tussen een species en een genus? (2) Kan een species ook een genus zijn? Leg uit.


1. Genus vs species:

- ▶ Genus is what is predicated of several items which differ in species
- ▶ Species is what is ordered under a genus, and that of which a genus is predicated in answer to 'what is it?';

2. Ja


Isagoge: species en genera

- ▶ Genus is what is predicated of several items which differ in species
- ▶ Species is what is ordered under a genus, and that of which a genus is predicated in answer to 'what is it?';



Isagoge: species en genera

- ▶ Substance: only a genus (most general)
- ▶ Animal: genus (of man) and species (of animated body)
- ▶ Man: only a species (most special)



Isagoge: kennis

4. Welke notie van kennis bezigt Plato wanneer hij zegt dat we geen kennis kunnen hebben van 'the infinities alone' (de individuen)?

- ▶ Ideeeler: Ideeën of Vormen (transcendent) zijn de enig ware objecten van onze kennis

Categorieën: said of vs being in subject

Wat is het verschil tussen 'said of en 'being in a subject?

- ▶ said of: wat jij bent [essentieel]
- ▶ be in: wat jij hebt [accidenteel]

(a) said of, not being in:

- ▶ voorbeeld: man

(b) being in, not said of:

- ▶ voorbeeld: white, knowledge-of-grammar (in soul)

(c) said of, being in:

- ▶ voorbeeld: knowledge is in soul; and said of knowledge-of-grammar

(d) not said of, not being in:

- ▶ Voorbeeld: individual man, individual horse

Hoe passen de 5 predicables van Porphyrius (genus, species, difference, property, accident)? Genus, species, difference zijn in (a); accident is in (b). Niet duidelijk waar properties staan.

Categorieën: said of vs being in subject

- (a) said of, not in: [universeel]
 - ▶ voorbeeld: man, animal, rational
 - ▶ Species, genera, differentiae (3a22-3a29)
- (b) in, not said of: [universeel]
 - ▶ voorbeeld: white, knowledge-of-grammar (in soul)
 - ▶ Accidents
- (c) said of, in: [particulier]
 - ▶ voorbeeld: knowledge (in soul; and said of knowledge-of-grammar)
 - ▶ Tropes
- (d) not said of, not in: [particulier]
 - ▶ Voorbeeld: individual man, individual horse
 - ▶ Individuals

Niet duidelijk waar properties staan.

Categorieën: primary vs secondary substances

(1) Wat is het verschil tussen een primary en een secondary substance, en geef voorbeelden. (2) Waarom zijn species meer substantieel dan de genus? (3) Is 1 van de vier cellen van het ontologisch vierkant alleen voor secundaire substanties? Ja, welke dan?

1. Primary vs secondary substance (2a13-2a18)
 - ▶ Primary: that which is not said of a subject nor in any other subject, e.g. individual man
 - ▶ Secondary: species in which the primary substances are, and genera of these species, e.g. man, animal
2. 'nearer to primary substance', 'more informative', 'species is subject for genus' (2b8-2b22)
3. Nee, in de cell universeel-essentieel ('not in, said of') zitten ook de differentia (3a22-3a29).

Categorieën: primary substances

2a35-2b7. All the other things are either said of the primary substances as subjects or in them as subjects. This is clear from an examination of cases. For example, animal is predicated of man and therefore also of the individual man; for were it predicated of none of the individual men it would not be predicated of man at all. Again, colour is in body and therefore also in an individual body; for were it not in some individual body it would not be in body at all. Thus all the other things are either said of the primary substances as subjects or in them as subjects. *So if the primary substances did not exist it would be impossible for any of the other things to exist.*

Categorieën: ontologische status universalia

3b10-3b23. Every substance seems to signify a certain 'this'. As regards the primary substances, it is indisputably true that each of them signifies a certain 'this'; for the thing revealed is individual and numerically one. But as regards the secondary substances, though it appears from the form of the name—when one speaks of man or animal—that a secondary substance likewise signifies a certain 'this', this is not really true; rather, it signifies a certain qualification—for the subject is not, as the primary substance is, one, but man and animal are said of many things. However, it does not signify simply a certain qualification, as white does. White signifies nothing but a qualification, whereas the species and the genus mark off the qualification of substance – they signify substance of a certain qualification. (One draws a wider boundary with the genus than with the species, for in speaking of animal one takes in more than in speaking of man.)

Categorieën: definities

De definitie van een predicable dat is 'said of' een subject is zelf ook 'said of' het subject. Waarom is dit niet het geval voor voor de definitie van wat 'in' het subject is? Wat is er dan wel het geval voor de definitie van wat 'in' het subject is?

- ▶ Man (said of) vs wit (in het subject)
- ▶ Definities:
 - ▶ man = dier + rationeel [said of]
 - ▶ wit = kleur + ... [in]
- ▶ De definitie van wat in het subject is (bv de definitie van wit) is zelf ook weer 'in' het subject, maar kan niet 'said of' het subject (2a19-2a34)
 - ▶ said of: Sokrates is een man \Rightarrow Sokrates is een rationale dier
 - ▶ in: Sokrates is wit \nRightarrow Sokrates is een kleur

Categorieën: substance

4 Wat is karakteristiek aan substances?

- ▶ Not in a subject (93a8-3a21)
 - ▶ secondary substance: said of, not in
 - ▶ primary substance: not said of, not in
- ▶ there is nothing contrary to them (3b24-3b31)
- ▶ do not admit of more or less: #more or less a man vs more or less beautiful (3b32-4a9)
- ▶ can receive contraries: an individual man becomes pale at one time and dark at another (4a10-4a20) [cf. voorbeeld was van Descartes]

Categorieën: waarheid

4a21-4b19, . . . Suppose, for example, that the statement that somebody is sitting is true; after he has got up this same statement will be false. Similarly with beliefs. Suppose you believe truly that somebody is sitting; after he has got up you will believe falsely if you hold the same belief about him. However, even if we were to grant this, there is still a difference in the way contraries are received. For in the case of substances it is by themselves changing that they are able to receive contraries. For what has become cold instead of hot, or dark instead of pale, or good instead of bad, has changed (has altered); similarly in other cases too it is by itself undergoing change that each thing is able to receive contraries. Statements and beliefs, on the other hand, themselves remain completely unchangeable in every way; it is because the actual thing changes that the contrary comes to belong to them. For the statement that somebody is sitting remains the same; it is because of a change in the actual thing that it comes to be true at one time and false at another. Similarly with beliefs.