

Intentionaliteit: Husserl

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Introductie

- ▶ Intentionality: 'directness' or 'aboutness' of conscious experience/mental states/mental phenomena
- ▶ Plan
 - ▶ Brentano (1838–1917)
 - ▶ Husserl (1859–1938)
 - ▶ Studievragen
- ▶ Literatuur:
 - ▶ Husserl (1900/1901) 'Logische Untersuchungen, V: über Intentionale Erlebnisse und ihre 'Inhalte'
 - ▶ Moran (2013) 'Intentionality: some Lessons from the History of the Problem from Brentano to the Present'

Brentano (1838–1917)

- ▶ Brentano (1838–1917): Duitse filosoof en psycholoog
- ▶ Eerste moderne analyse van intentionaliteit

Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction towards an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgment something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on. (Brentano 'Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint', 1874)

Brentano: Kenmerken

- ▶ Intentionaliteit: karakteriserende eigenschap van mentale verschijnsels ('mental phenomenon')
- ▶ Intentionaliteit als gerichtheid ('aboutness'):
 - ▶ 'directedness towards an object' (die Richtung auf ein Objekt)
 - ▶ 'relation to a content' (die Beziehung auf einen Inhalt)
- ▶ Intensionele objecten (object waarop de mentale verschijnsels zijn gericht) als immanente objecten
 - ▶ 'the intentional or mental inexistence of the object' (intentionale, mentale Inexistenz)
 - ▶ 'immanent objectivity' (die immanente Gegenständlichkeit)
 - ▶ 'every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself'
- ▶ Representationalisme: intensionele objecten als representaties van iets anders (Descartes)
- ▶ Indirect realisme
- ▶ Psychologisme: Intensionele objecten als mentale entiteiten (psychologisch reel)

Husserl (1859–1938)

- ▶ Duitser wiskundige, filosoof
- ▶ Vader van de fenomenologie
- ▶ Plan
 - ▶ Husserl kritiek op Brentano
 - ▶ Intensionele object als 'ervaring inhoud'
 - ▶ 'Horizon'
 - ▶ Intentionele ervaring (intentionale Erlebnis)
 - ▶ Fenomenologie
 - ▶ Fenomenologische analyse
 1. fenomenologische reductie (epochè)
 2. eidetische reductie
 3. transcendente reductie (epochè)

Kritiek op Brentano

- ▶ Anti-representationalisme, anti-psychologisme (vgl Frege)
 - ▶ 'Mind is not a self-enclosed box' (Moran)
 - ▶ Intentionele objecten zijn niet immanent, niet mentaal: kritiek op noties als 'intentional inexistence' of 'immanent objectivity' (Jupiter voorbeeld)

... [the second misunderstanding is] that we are dealing with a relation between two things, both present in equally real fashion (reel) in consciousness, an act and an intensional object, or with a sort of box-within-box structure of mental content (Ineinanderschachtelung). [LU, V, 11]

There are [...] not two things present in experience, we do not experience the object and beside it the intentional experience directed upon it. [...] only one thing is present, the intentional experience ... if this experience is present, then, eo ipso, ... the intentional 'relation' to an object is achieved [LU, V, 11]

Kritiek op Brentano

I have an idea of the god Jupiter: this means that I have a certain presentative experience, the presentation-of-the-god-Jupiter is realized in my consciousness. This intentional experience may be dismembered as one chooses in descriptive analysis, but the god Jupiter naturally will not be found in it. The 'immanent', 'mental object' is not therefore part of the descriptive or real make-up [Bestand] of the experience, it is in truth not really immanent or mental. But it also does not exist extramentally, it does not exist at all. This does not prevent our idea-of-the-god-Jupiter from being actual, a particular sort of experience or particular mode of mindedness, such that he who experiences it may rightly say that the mythical king of the gods is present to him, concerning whom there are such and such stories. If however nothing exists, nothing becomes phenomenologically different. It makes no essential difference to an object presented and given to consciousness whether it exists, or it is fictitious, or is perhaps completely absurd. I think of Jupiter as I think of Bismark ... [LU, V, 11]

Intensionele object als 'ervaring inhoud'

- ▶ Intensionele objecten
 - ▶ Niet psychologisch reel: niet mentaal, niet immanent
 - ▶ niet Reel: geen bestaand, natuurlijk object (vgl Frege's Sinne)
 - ▶ alleen aanwezig als inhoud in de bewustzijn 'given and presented into consciousness' (niet als representaties)
- ▶ Intensionele objecten \neq 'immanent content'
 - ▶ 'Immanent content': gewaarwording, 'matter of intentional act' (Moran, p. 334) (vgl Kant, Empfindung vs Erscheinung)

I do not see color-sensations [Farbenempfindungen], but coloured things, I do not hear tone-sensations but the singer's song (LU, V, 11)

I see a thing, e.g. this box, but I do not see my sensations [Empfindungen]. I always see one and the same box, however it may be turned and tilted. I have always the same 'content of my consciousness' –if I care to call the perceived object a content of consciousness. The experienced content, generally speaking, is not the perceived object ... (LU, V, 14)

Perceptie

- ▶ Perceptie: vgl Descartes, Berkeley, Kant en Husserl
- ▶ Husserl: Rol van 'horizon'

... in visual perception, the object as a whole is somehow apprehended even though one does not actually see more than one of its 'profiles' or 'adumbrations'

(Abschattungen). The other profiles are somehow apprehended as co-present but in an empty manner.

There is an 'excess' involved in all perceiving, a kind of 'empty intending' that accompanies what is given fully. This gives intentionality a peculiar complexity of present and absent moments and 'horizons', features that have not been taken up by the analytic discussion generally (Moran, p. 335)

... thus, if I see the front of the motionless thing-like object, I am conscious, within the horizon, of the back of the object, which I do not see (Husserl, Experience and judgement, p82)

Intentionele ervaring

- ▶ Husserl in LU onderscheidt tussen
 - ▶ Reële (reele) psychologische inhoud
 - ▶ Intentionele object
 - ▶ Ideale betekenis: 'ideal content tokened in the act (in the relation of instantiation)'
- ▶ Ideeën I (1913): andere analyse, andere termen
 - ▶ Intentionele handeling: **noesis**, 'noetic act'
 - ▶ Een psychologische episode: herinneren, zien, hopen, bedoelen, uitdrukken, ...
 - ▶ Intentioneel object: **noema** (meervoud: noemata), 'noematic content', met twee componenten:
 - ▶ **noematische Sinn** (ongeveer gelijk aan 'ideale betekenis' in LU): betekenis die de verschillende presentaties van de intentioneel object delen
 - ▶ **thetische component** (als herinnerd, gezien, gehoopt, bedoeld,...): aspect van gegevenheid waarin ze verschillen (namelijk de intentionele handeling voorzover dat een andere betekenis geeft)

Fenomenologie

- ▶ Fenomenologie:
 - ▶ logos van de fenomenen (de wereld voorzover zij zich aan ons voordoet)
 - ▶ onderzoek naar hoe de fenomenen in de ervaring worden geconstitueerd
 - ▶ Constitueren: tegenwoordig maken in de bewustzijn, betekenisvol maken
- ▶ Methode
 - ▶ Descriptief, niet verklarend of normatief
 - ▶ Intuïtief, Inzichtelijk middels ervaring
 - ▶ Fenomenologische houding (onnatuurlijke houding)
 - ▶ We hebben een speciale reflecterende houding nodig om fenomenen te beschrijven en te analyseren

Fenomenologische analyse

- ▶ Relationale karakter intentionaliteit onderscheidt twee polen:

- ▶ ego-pool – object-pool

- ▶ **Natuurlijke houding:** brengt ons meteen naar het object:

- ▶ (ego-pool) — object-pool

wij zien, ervaren objecten (appelboom) als echte objecten

- ▶ **Fenomenologische reductie (epoché):** afzien van natuurlijke houding, natuurlijke object 'tussen haakjes gezet'

- ▶ ego-pool – [object-pool] (verschil met Descartes twijfel)

het onderwerp van reflectie is nu de intentionele handeling, niet het object

- ▶ **Eidetische reductie** zich richten op het 'wezen' (eidōs)

- ▶ **Transcendentale reductie (tweede epoché):** 'empirische ego' wordt als object van reflectie genomen

- ▶ transcendental ego – [empirische ego – [object]] (verschil met Descartes, Kant)

leidt tot wezenlijk kennis van hoe objecten in de waarneming zijn gegeven, structuur transcendentale ego, analyse van constitutie van de fenomenale wereld op basis van beschrijvende onderzoek van mijn ervaring

V Untersuchungen: par. 11 en 12

- ▶ Structuur:
 - ▶ Kritiek op Brentano's terminologie die tot twee misverstanden leidt
 - ▶ Behandeling tweede misverstand (Jupiter voorbeeld)
 - ▶ Behandeling eerste misverstand
- ▶ Studievragen Husserl en Moran