

Fodor

Maria Aloni
ILLC-University of Amsterdam
M.D.Aloni@uva.nl

Theoretische filosofie 2014

May 24, 2014

Functionalisme

- ▶ Vier posities in de filosofie van de geest
 1. Geest-lichaam dualisme (Descartes)
 2. Behaviorisme
 3. Identity theory
 4. Functionalisme
- ▶ Discussie over aard van mentale toestanden (MT)
- ▶ Behaviorisme: MT = gedragdisposities
 - ▶ Problemen: 'Super-Spartans' en 'perfect actor'
- ▶ Identity theory: MT = breintoestanden
 - ▶ Probleem: 'multiple realization of mental states'
- ▶ Functionalism: MT = 'states identified by what they do rather than what they are made of' [mice traps vs diamonds]
 - ▶ Verschil met behaviorisme: MT zijn interne toestanden, en worden niet alleen in termen van zintuiglijke inputs en gedragoutput begrepen maar ook in termen van relaties tussen MT
 - ▶ Verschil met identity theory: MT hoeven niet in neurologische toestanden gerealiseerd te zijn
- ▶ Argumenten tegen functionalisme: Searle's Chinese room, philosophical zombies,

An example: pain (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

- ▶ Functionalist (simplistic) characterization of pain:
 - ▶ pain = state that tends to be caused by bodily injury, to produce the belief that something is wrong with the body and the desire to be out of that state, to produce anxiety, and, in the absence of any stronger, conflicting desires, to cause wincing or moaning.
- ▶ All and only creatures with internal states that meet these conditions, or play these roles, are capable of being in pain.
 - ▶ Suppose that, in humans, there is some distinctive kind of neural activity (C-fiber stimulation, for example) that meets these conditions. If so, then humans can be in pain simply by undergoing C-fiber stimulation.
 - ▶ But the theory permits creatures with very different physical constitutions to have mental states as well: pain can be realized by different types of states in different kinds of creatures, or pain can be **multiply realized**.
- ▶ Functionalism: officially neutral between materialism and dualism, but attractive to materialists, since many materialists believe that it is overwhelmingly likely that any states capable of playing the roles in question will be physical states.

Jerry Fodor

- ▶ Jerry Fodor (New York, 1935) Amerikaans filosoof, cognitief wetenschapper, psycholoog en taalkundige.
- ▶ Philosophy of mind: Fodors positie kan worden beter beschouwd als: dualisme, behaviorisme, 'identity theory' of functionalisme?
- ▶ Philosophy of language: Fodors positie kan worden beschouwd als: platonisme, mentalisme, extensionalisme, intensionalisme, 'verificationisme' of behaviorisme?
- ▶ Wij lezen hfdst 1 van zijn boek: 'Language of Thought'

'Language of Thought', hfdst 1

1. *The only psychological models of cognitive processes that seem even remotely plausible represent such processes as computational.*
 2. *Computation presupposes a medium of computation: a representational system.*
 3. *Remotely plausible theories are better than no theories at all.*
-
- ▶ Hoofdstellingen:
 - ▶ Cognitieve processen moeten worden voorgesteld als computationele processen
 - ▶ Computatie vereist een representatiesysteem
 - ▶ Structuur Argument:
 - ▶ Modeling \Rightarrow computation \Rightarrow representation
 - ▶ No representations \Rightarrow no computation \Rightarrow no modeling
 - ▶ Drie voorbeelden van cognitieve processen die als computationele processen moeten worden voorgesteld
 1. Beslissingen, keuzes
 2. Conceptformatie
 3. Waarneming
 - ▶ Studievragen