

Scepticisme en Inductie: Hume

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Theoretische filosofie 2014

March 3, 2014

Achtergrond: David Hume

- ▶ David Hume (1711 – 1776), Schotse filosoof, empirist, scepticus.
- ▶ Belangrijkste Werken:
 - ▶ A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to introduce the experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects. (1739–40)
 - ▶ An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748)
 - ▶ An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751)
 - ▶ ...
- ▶ Wij lezen:
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, section VII:
The idea of necessary connection

An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding: VII

- ▶ Mathematical sciences vs science of human nature
 - ▶ Wat zijn de voor- en nadelen van beide?
- ▶ Doel onderzoek: betekenis van de woorden *power*, *force*, *energy* or *necessary connection* vast te leggen
 - ▶ Zijn deze woorden synoniem volgens Hume?
 - ▶ Wat betekenen woorden volgens Hume? Ideeën
 - ▶ Hoe wil Hume zijn doel bereiken?
Via onderzoek van de indrukken ('impressions') waar de complexe ideeën van 'power' etc. van gekopieerd zijn
- ▶ Ideeën vs indrukken (section II: Origins of ideas)
 - ▶ Ideeën: kopieën van indrukken (≠ Locke)
 - ▶ Bronnen van indrukken:
 1. Externe zintuiglijke waarneming (impressions felt through external senses)
 2. Interne reflectie (impressions felt through internal senses)
 - ▶ Hoe verschillen ideeën van indrukken? 'Impressions are all strong and sensible. There can be no ambiguity in them. They are not only placed in the light themselves, but may throw light on the corresponding ideas that lie in the dark' (p. 31)

An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding: VII

- ▶ Wat is de uitkomst van Humes onderzoek?
 - ▶ Idee van 'necessary connection' komt niet vanuit
 - ▶ Externe zintuiglijke waarneming (outward sense)
 - ▶ Interne reflectie (inward sentiment)
 - ▶ Conclusie: 'we have no idea of connexion or power at all, and that these words are absolutely without any meaning, when employed in philosophical reasoning, or common life. One escape route may be still open to us: ... (p. 36)
- ▶ Idee van 'necessary connection' komt niet uit zintuiglijke waarneming (p. 31)
 - ▶ Billiard-ball, flame-heat
- ▶ Idee van 'necessary connection' komt niet uit interne reflectie (p.31-34)
 - ▶ Volition – motion in body (drie argumenten)
 - ▶ Volition – act of mind (drie argumenten)
- ▶ Occasionalisme (Malebranche): 'Intelligent mind (God) as immediate and sole cause of every event'?
 - ▶ Theologisch argument (p. 35)
 - ▶ Twee filosofische argumenten (p. 35-36)

Escape route

- ▶ Wat is dan Hume positie t.a.v. cause-effect relatie:

The source of this idea of a necessary connection among events seems to be a number of similar instances of the regular pairing of events of these two kinds; and the idea cannot be prompted by any one of these instances on its own, however comprehensively we examine it. But what can a number of instances contain that is different from any single instance that is supposed to be exactly like them? Only that when the mind experiences many similar instances, it acquires a habit of expectation: the repetition of the pattern affects it in such a way that when it observes an event of one of the two kinds it expects an event of the other kind to follow. So the feeling or impression from which we derive our idea of power or necessary connection is a feeling of connection in the mind – a feeling that accompanies the imagination's habitual move from observing one event to expecting another of the kind that usually follows it. (p. 37)

- ▶ Geen noodzakelijke connectie maar psychologische connectie ('habit of expectation of the mind')
- ▶ Consequentie: kennis middels inductie niet gerechtvaardigd

Causation

- ▶ Humes definitie van 'causation':
 1. An event followed by another, where all events similar to the first are followed by events similar to the second. (regularity)
 - 1a Or in other words where if the first event hadn't occurred the second wouldn't have occurred either (counterfactual)
 2. an event followed by another, where the appearance of the former always conveys the thought to the latter.

Each of these definitions brings in something that lies right outside the cause itself, because definition (1) brings in earlier events similar to the cause, while (2) brings in events in the mind of the speaker; but there's no remedy for this drawback. We can't replace those definitions by a more perfect one that picks out something in the cause itself that connects it with its effect. We have no idea of this connection (p. 38)

- ▶ regularity \neq counterfactual
- ▶ Volgende keer: Kants reactie

Inductie

- ▶ Hume: kennis middels inductie niet gerechtvaardigd (locale scepticisme)
- ▶ Reacties:
 - ▶ Popper
 - ▶ Russell
 - ▶ Reliabilisme
 - ▶ Coherentisme
- ▶ New riddle of induction