



Cyber

Protect

Data

Threat

Security

Attack

Firewall


Malware

# DATA INTEGRITY

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# INTRODUCTION

## What is a MAC?

- MAC = Message Authentication Code
- Ensures:
  - Integrity: Detects unauthorized changes
  - Authenticity: Verifies the sender identity
  - Replay Protection: Blocks reuse via timestamps/nonces







# WHY ARE MACS CRITICAL?



## Real-World Risks if MACs Fail

1. Length Extension Attack: Grants admin privileges
2. Weak Hash Functions (MD5): Allow forgery
3. Timing Attacks: Reveal key bits via delay
4. Collision Attacks: Two different messages = same MAC



# LENGTH EXTENSION ATTACK

## Vulnerability

- When  $\text{MAC} = \text{hash}(\text{secret} \parallel \text{message})$
- Hash functions: MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256 (Merkle-Damgard based)
- Attacker doesn't know the secret key but guesses its length





# ATTACK REQUIREMENTS

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## Prerequisites

1. Uses MD5 or SHA-1
2. MAC structure: `hash(secret || message)`
3. Attacker can guess secret key length (bytes)

## Attacker has

1. Original Message: `amount=100`
2. Original MAC
3. New Data: `&admin=true`



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
# ATTACK MECHANISM

Let's Take a Break



# STEPS ATTACK MECHANISM

1. Intercept original message & MAC
2. Use hashpumpy to:
  - Generate hash padding
  - Append &admin=true
  - Create forged MAC
3. Server accepts forged message if using naive hash






# WHY IT WORKS?

## Hash Internals:

- MD5/SHA-1 process data in blocks (512 bits)
- Attacker uses original MAC as internal state
- Hash continues with appended data
- No need for the key






# ATTACK WORKS

## **client.py on vulnerable server.py**

- Attacker forges: amount=100&admin=true
- Server accepts forged MAC
- Admin privilege gained without key




# CRYPTOGRAPHIC DEFENSE

## Why Naive MACs Fail

- $\text{hash}(\text{secret} \parallel \text{message})$  is vulnerable to length extension

## How HMAC Fixes It

- Uses:  $\text{HMAC}(\text{key}, \text{message})$
- Internally:  $H((K \oplus \text{opad}) \parallel H((K \oplus \text{ipad}) \parallel \text{message}))$
- Prevents length extension
- Key never exposed





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# SECURE SERVER

**client.py on secure\_server.py**

- HMAC-SHA256 used
- Forged message rejected
- MAC cannot be extended



# CONCLUSION

- MACs protect data integrity & authenticity
- Naive use of hash functions is risky
- Length Extension attack is a real threat
- HMAC is a secure alternative
- Our demo showed how attacks can succeed/fail depending on the design





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# THANKYOU

Stay Safe, Stay Secure



UNLOCKED ✓