Decomposing labelled proof theory for intuitionistic modal logic

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Labelled deduction has been proposed by Gabbay [7] in the 80's as a unifying framework throughout proof theory in order to provide proof systems for a wide range of logics. For modal logics it can take for example the form of labelled natural deduction and labelled sequent systems, as used by Simpson [3], Vigano [4] and Negri [2].

These formalisms make explicit use not only of labels, but also of relational atoms referring to the accessibility relation of a Kripke model. In this short note we propose a system that represents both the *accessibility relation* (for modal logics) and the *preorder relation* (for intuitionistic logic), using the full power of the bi-relational semantics for intuitionistic modal logics, and developing fully the idea of [1].

A *bi-relational frame* [5] $\mathcal{B}$ is a triple $\langle W, R, \leq \rangle$ of a non-empty set of worlds W equipped with an accessibility relation R and a preorder $\leq$, satisfying:

(F_1) For all worlds x, y, z, if xRy and $y \leq z$, there exists a u such that $x \leq u$ and uRz.

(F_2) For all worlds x, y, z, if xRy and $x \leq z$, there exists a u such that $y \leq u$ and zRu.

Echoing this construction, we define our two-sided intuitionistic labelled sequents to be of the form $\mathcal{B}, \mathcal{L} \Rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ where $\mathcal{B}$ denotes a set of relational atoms xRy and preorder atoms $x \leq y$, and $\mathcal{L}$ and $\mathcal{R}$ are multiset of labelled formulas $x\colon A$ (for x and y taken from the set of labels and A an intuitionistic modal formula).

Furthermore, our system has to incorporate the two semantic conditions into deductive rules as follows:

$$\mathsf{F}_1\ \frac{\mathcal{B}, xRy, y \leq z, x \leq u, uRz, \mathcal{L} \Rightarrow \mathcal{R}}{\mathcal{B}, xRy, y \leq z, \mathcal{L} \Rightarrow \mathcal{R}}\ u \text{ fresh}$$

$$\mathsf{F}_2\ \frac{\mathcal{B}, xRy, x \leq z, y \leq u, zRu, \mathcal{L} \Rightarrow \mathcal{R}}{\mathcal{B}, xRy, x \leq z, \mathcal{L} \Rightarrow \mathcal{R}}\ u \text{ fresh}$$

In the intuitionistic setting, the validity of a modal formula has to be defined using both the R and the $\leq$ relation as: $x \Vdash \Box A$ iff for all y and z s.t. $x \leq y$ and yRz, $z \Vdash A$.

Again, our system reflects exactly this definition in the rules introducing the $\Box$-operator:

$$\Box_\mathsf{L}\ \frac{\mathcal{B}, x \leq y, yRz, \mathcal{L}, x\colon \Box A, z\colon A \Rightarrow \mathcal{R}}{\mathcal{B}, \mathcal{L}, x \leq y, yRz, x\colon \Box A \Rightarrow \mathcal{R}}$$

$$\Box_\mathsf{R}\ \frac{\mathcal{B}, x \leq y, yRz, \mathcal{L} \Rightarrow \mathcal{R}, z\colon A}{\mathcal{B}, \mathcal{L} \Rightarrow \mathcal{R}, x\colon \Box A}\ y, z \text{ fresh}$$

$$\supset_R \dfrac{\Box_R \dfrac{\mathsf{F}_1 \dfrac{\text{trans} \dfrac{\blacksquare_4 \dfrac{\Box_L \dfrac{\text{id} \dfrac{}{x \leq w, w \leq w', w'Rv, v \leq v', v'Ru, w' \leq t, tRv', w \leq t, tRu, w : \Box A, u : A \Rightarrow}}{x \leq w, w \leq w', w'Rv, v \leq v', v'Ru, w' \leq t, tRv', w \leq t, \boldsymbol{tRu}, w : \Box A \Rightarrow u :}}{x \leq w, w \leq w', w'Rv, v \leq v', \boldsymbol{v'Ru}, w' \leq t, \boldsymbol{tRv'}, w \leq tw : \Box A \Rightarrow u : A}}{x \leq w, w \leq w', w'Rv, v \leq v', v'Ru, \boldsymbol{w' \leq t}, \boldsymbol{tRv'}, w : \Box A \Rightarrow u : A}}{x \leq w, w \leq w', \boldsymbol{w'Rv}, \boldsymbol{v \leq v'}, v'Ru, w : \Box A \Rightarrow u : A}}{x \leq w, w : \Box A \Rightarrow w : \Box\Box A}}{x : \Box A \supset \Box\Box A}$$

$$\supset_R \dfrac{\Diamond_L \dfrac{\blacklozenge_4 \dfrac{\Diamond_R \dfrac{\text{id} \dfrac{}{x \leq w, wRv, vRu, u \leq u', wRu'u : A \Rightarrow w : \Diamond A, u' : A}}{x \leq w, wRv, vRu, u \leq u', wRu'u : A \Rightarrow w : \Diamond A}}{x \leq w, wRv, vRu, u : A \Rightarrow w : \Diamond A}}{x \leq w, w : \Diamond\Diamond A \Rightarrow w : \Diamond A}}{x : \Diamond\Diamond A \supset \Diamond A}$$

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