Why Don't We Agree? Evidence from a Social Network of Investors*

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Abstract

We study sources of investor disagreement using sentiment of investors from a social media investing platform, combined with information on the users' investment approaches (e.g., technical, fundamental). We examine how much of overall disagreement is driven by different information sets versus differential interpretation of information by studying disagreement within and across investment approaches. Overall disagreement is evenly split between both sources of disagreement, but within-group disagreement is more tightly related to trading volume than cross-group disagreement. Although both sources of disagreement are important, our findings suggest that information differences are more important for trading than differences across market approaches.

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Disagreement among investors has long been thought to be central to trading in financial markets. Indeed, it is difficult to motivate why investors would trade at all without some source of disagreement (Milgrom and Stokey, 1982; Karpoff, 1986). Motivated partly by this observation, a growing literature evaluates the effects of investor disagreement on financial market outcomes (e.g., Varian, 1985; Harris and Raviv, 1993; Kandel and Pearson, 1995; Nagel, 2005; Banerjee and Kremer, 2010; Carlin et al., 2014). Research has linked disagreement to trading volume and stock returns, and has studied its dynamic effects (Ajinkya et al., 1991; Diether et al., 2002; Banerjee and Kremer, 2010).

Despite the breadth of work on the consequences of investor disagreement, much less is known empirically about the *sources* of disagreement. That is, why do investors disagree in the first place? Leading theories posit that there are two main sources of disagreement — differences in information sets and differences in models that investors use to interpret information (Hong and Stein, 2007). To examine these questions empirically, we study disagreement among investors on a social media investing platform (called StockTwits), on which users regularly express their opinions (e.g., bullish or bearish) about the same stocks, and where user profile information *explicitly* conveys the user's broad investment approach (e.g., fundamental, technical). Using this setting, we provide novel insight into the relative importance of different information sets versus different investment models.[1]

Separating the roles of different information sets and heterogeneous models in investor disagreement is empirically challenging, given the typical data limitations. First, disagreement refers to differences in investors' opinions, which are difficult to observe. Even if a researcher had individual-level trading data (which itself is hard to come by), it is difficult to impute investors' opinions from their trades, as investors can trade for reasons unrelated to their opinions — like liquidity. Second, as Rothschild and Sethi (2016) and Baron et al. (2012) point out, in order to separate whether the differences in investor opinions are due to differences in information sets or differences in investors' models, the researchers would ideally observe investors' trading strategies — not just the executed trades.

Our data set enables us to empirically draw the distinction between information-driven ver-

[1] Specifically, Hong and Stein (1999) posit that gradual information diffusion is an important source of disagreement that can drive trading decisions. More recently, Chang et al. (2014) provide evidence that different information sources lead to divergences of opinion and greater trading volume. On the other hand, differential interpretation of information is central to the models of Harris and Raviv (1993) and Kandel and Pearson (1995). Kandel and Pearson (1995) provide evidence of differential interpretation by financial analysts, and argue that this differential interpretation leads to greater trading volume after public announcements of information (earnings announcements). A central aim of our paper is to use our decomposition of overall disagreement to speak to the relative weight of these two theories of trading.

sus model-driven sources of disagreement, because we show that disagreement across investment approaches is more likely to arise due to differing investment models, whereas within-investment approach disagreement is more likely to be related to different information sets. We find that differences in opinions across the broad investment approaches in our data are responsible for approximately half of overall disagreement. At the same time, within-group differences of opinion are much more strongly related to trading volume than are differences of opinion across groups, suggesting that model disagreement is less likely to generate trading than different information sets.

Given that these investment philosophies are self-reported, our empirical work carefully validates that adherence to an investment philosophy on StockTwits reflects adherence to different investment models in reality. Specifically, we analyze the textual content of tweets by users of different philosophies, finding that users of different philosophies use distinctive language that is consistent with the underlying philosophy (e.g., fundamental traders discuss earnings, technical traders discuss charts, momentum traders discuss trends). Speaking to the external validity of the language used, the language used on the StockTwits platform closely resembles public writing of prominent investors with particular investment philosophies. Furthermore, using hand-classified lists of information words (i.e., referring to news sources or timing) versus model words (i.e., referring to substantive analyses), we find that information words tend to be used across investment philosophies, but model words tend to be focused in one or two investment philosophies. Beyond language usage, we show that the sentiment reactions of investors to earnings news are concentrated among fundamental investors, and conversely, sentiment reactions to "technical view" events identified by a news analytics database, RavenPack, are concentrated among technical investors.[2] Collectively, these findings provide support that the differences across investment philosophies are significant, substantive, and tend to reflect differential beliefs about investing.

Turning to our substantive findings, we observe that both within-group and cross-group types of disagreement are significant predictors of abnormal trading volume, but that within-group disagreement exhibits a much stronger relation to trading volume. Specifically, we find that a standard deviation increase in within-group disagreement is associated with *four times* the increase in abnormal trading volume as a standard deviation increase in cross-group disagreement. This finding

[2]This test is analogous to the work of Jia et al. (2015) who show that local and foreign investors react differently to recommendations of local and foreign analysts in the context of the Chinese stock market.

is robust to how we specify the differences between within-group and cross-group disagreement, and we find a similarly large magnitude effect on within-group disagreement when we restrict attention to opinions from before the market opens. From this central finding, we conclude that both types of disagreement are important determinants of trading, but that within-group (informational) differences matter more than differences in investment philosophies. This finding suggests that disagreement due to slow information diffusion is important for trading volume.

We provide two additional pieces of evidence on this slow information diffusion hypothesis using self-reported experience classifications to split investors into sophisticated and unsophisticated investors. First, we find that within-strategy disagreement across sophisticated and unsophisticated investors predicts trading volume unto itself. This result suggests that information diffuses from sophisticated investors to unsophisticated slowly over time, consistent with slow information diffusion. Building on this result, we show that sophisticated investor sentiment leads unsophisticated investor sentiment in time, but not the other way around, consistent with information diffusing from sophisticated investors to less sophisticated investors over time.

These central findings are robust to a wide array of measurement choices and controls. Notably, we show that our disagreement measure is distinct from other factors that influence trading volume, such as attention or news articles about the firm. We analyze the joint effect of investor disagreement and investor attention on trading volume, where we proxy for investor attention by the number of daily messages on StockTwits and also by the number of daily searches for the companies' tickers on Google (e.g., Da et al., 2011; Niessner, 2016). We find that both investor disagreement and investor attention are strongly associated with greater trading volume, and that the relation between disagreement and trading volume is robust to granular controls for the number of messages posted. We also control for the presence of media articles in our analysis, and find that it doesn't change the effect of disagreement on volume.

Furthermore, we examine how our disagreement measures relate to disagreement proxies used in prior literature. We find a relatively weak correlation with previous proxies for disagreement, indicating that our disagreement measures capture a notion of disagreement distinct from prior work. One strength of our measure is that it directly captures dispersion of investor opinions, whereas leading alternative disagreement measures rely on indirect information, either observed trading patterns (i.e., volatility measures) or opinions of third parties (i.e., analyst forecast dispersion). Another advantage is that our measure can be reliably computed at the daily level, whereas alternative measures need to be measured at lower frequencies — typically, monthly or quarterly (e.g., Diether et al., 2002; Giannini et al., 2018).[3] Given that the puzzle in the literature is to explain high trading volume at the daily level (e.g., see Hong and Stein, 2007), this is an important distinction.

In addition to the broad evidence regarding cross-group and within-group disagreement, we apply our measure to study a classical setting of excess trading volume following earnings announcements (e.g., Kandel and Pearson, 1995). This application highlights the advantage of having a daily measure of disagreement, which contrasts sharply with analyst forecasts that are updated less frequently. We show that daily changes in disagreement can explain up to a third of the increase in trading volume after earnings announcements, providing corroborative evidence that disagreement across different models drives a significant amount of daily trading volume. Digging deeper into reactions to earnings news, we find evidence consistent with differential interpretation of earnings announcement news. We find that all investor types post more messages after earnings announcements, but their sentiment reactions show that investors interpret new information differently in a manner consistent with their investment philosophies. These findings provide additional support for our result that model-driven disagreement is an important source of overall disagreement in the market, and also provides fresh empirical evidence for emerging theories that argue for why disagreement rises precisely when information arrives to the market (Kondor, 2012; Banerjee et al., 2018).

Our results, measure of disagreement, and approach should be of broad interest to scholars studying individual investing behavior and market microstructure. First, although there has been significant inquiry into the consequences of disagreement for financial market outcomes, we are one of the first to empirically study the sources of disagreement. The broader literature has recognized that significant differences in early-life experiences and genetic predisposition to risk can affect how individuals approach financial markets (Malmendier and Nagel, 2011; Cronqvist et al., 2015, 2016; Brown et al., 2016). Our work builds on these underlying differences among investors to better understand how disagreement influences aggregate trading outcomes. In this respect, our work is most closely related to two contemporaneous papers on sources of disagreement, which

[3]Furthermore, in a recent paper Cen et al. (2016) show that the earnings analyst forecast dispersion measure not only captures disagreement but also other return-predictive information contained in the normalization scalars of the measure.

focus on differential exposure to information (Chang et al., 2014 and Bailey et al., 2017). Bailey et al. (2017) study how differential exposure to friends' real estate experiences influences optimism about real estate investing, and to the extent that these social network experiences are different, generates disagreement. In a similar vein, Chang et al. (2014) exploit differences in exposure to ideas, finding that linguistic diversity is a source of divergence of opinion because agreement is more difficult when there are communication barriers. Viewed broadly, these studies show empirically that features of the information environment generate differential information, which then leads to investor disagreement. In relation to these findings, we are the first to provide direct evidence of model disagreement among investors. In contrast to other sources of disagreement, disagreement in our setting would exist even if investors had the same information.

Second, our work provides a useful perspective on the large theoretical literature on disagreement. Heterogenious investor beliefs play a central role in explaining financial speculative bubbles (e.g., Chen et al., 2002 and Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003). For example, it is difficult to explain otherwise the high levels of trading volume in financial markets (Varian, 1989; Kandel and Pearson, 1995; Harris and Raviv, 1993). These models suggest that investors with different information-processing models interpret public information differently. Furthermore, a different set of models focuses on consequences of gradual information diffusion and investor inattention and its effects on trading volume and prices (e.g., Hong and Stein, 1999; Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003; Peng and Xiong, 2006). An excellent survey of the issues in this literature can be found in Xiong (2013). Our characterization of model disagreement relates most closely to the evidence in Kandel and Pearson (1995), which provides indirect evidence of differential interpretation of information by stock market analysts in response to earnings announcements. Relative to this work, our approach is novel in that it delivers an explicit measure of differences of opinion across investment models that can be related to trading volume at a daily level. As we show in our decomposition of trading volume effects, this direct measure enables a comparison of the importance of within-group disagreement and cross-group disagreement. Our finding that within-group differences of opinion matter much more for trading than differences across groups is novel evidence on the relative importance of each of these mechanisms. Because gradual information diffusion theories and differential interpretation theories each have empirical support (Kandel and Pearson, 1995 and Hong and Stein, 1999), this is an important quantification.[4]

We also contribute to the empirical disagreement literature by providing a useful measure of disagreement among individual investors. Although the consequences of disagreement are well studied, the extant measures of disagreement have notable weaknesses. For example, some of these measures measure dispersion of opinion indirectly (e.g., volatility of accounting performance, historical trading volume, firm age, return volatility), and the most prominent measure of analyst forecast dispersion measures the stated opinions of analysts, which has been questioned as a reliable measure of market-wide disagreement (Ataise and Bamber, 1994; Bamber et al., 2011). We fill this gap by combining our setting — which yields daily measures of sentiment at the individual firm $\times$ investment approach level — with a theoretically grounded measure of disagreement from Antweiler and Frank (2004). Taken together, our disagreement measure can be computed at a higher frequency than most other measures of disagreement, and because it is a direct sentiment measure, it is less likely to proxy for other market forces that are unrelated to disagreement, such as liquidity needs of investors.

Our results on abnormal trading volume and disagreement also relate to the literature on the abnormal trading of individual investors (Barber and Odean, 2000). In particular, this literature has identified numerous behavioral rationales for overtrading, including entertainment (Dorn and Sengmueller, 2009), sensation seeking (Barber and Odean, 2008; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2009), gambling (Kumar, 2009; Cookson, 2018), and learning by doing (Linnainmaa, 2011). We contribute to this stream of research by showing clean evidence that model disagreement is an additional reason for abnormal trading volume. It is notable that model disagreement is not well aligned with entertainment motives, nor learning by doing motives for trading and thus is a theoretically distinct rationale for additional trading.

[4]The literature recognizes that information differences need to interact some other forms of heterogeneity, like heterogeneous beliefs, to generate trading (see the review by Xiong, 2013). Thus, both informational differences and model differences are necessary to generate trades, yet it is an open question how much each source of disagreement matters for trading.

I Data

I.A StockTwits Data

Our data set comes from a company called StockTwits. StockTwits was founded in 2008 as a social networking platform for investors to share their opinions about stocks. The website has a Twitter-like format, where participants post messages of up to 140 characters and use "cashtags" with the stock ticker symbol (example $AAPL) to link a user's message to a particular company. According to a website analytics tool, Alexa, StockTwits was ranked as the 2,004th most popular website in the US as of May 2015. The users are predominantly male, and the number of users with a graduate school degree is over-represented relative to other websites.

StockTwits provided us with the universe of messages posted between January 1, 2010, until September 30, 2014. In total, there are 18,308,948 messages by 107,808 unique users mentioning 9,755 unique tickers. For each message, we observe a user identifier and the message content. We also observe indicators for sentiment (bullish, bearish, or unclassified), and "cashtags" with tickers that link the message to particular stocks.

We restrict our sample to messages posted between January 2013 and September 2014 because the best coverage and highest quality data come from more recent years. This restriction retains 75% of the messages in the StockTwits data. We also restrict attention to messages that mention only one ticker to focus on sentiment that can be directly linked to a particular stock. Because it will be useful for our decomposition of disagreement into different types, we retain StockTwits messages by users who select an investment approach, holding period, and experience in their profile information. We focus on firms that are headquartered in the United States and thus have regular filings with the SEC to facilitate linking with earnings announcement information. Finally, because daily observations of investors' opinions about individual firms are ideal for constructing a daily measure of disagreement, we concentrate on firms for which there is a high amount of StockTwits coverage. The top 100 firms mentioned comprise 60% of the overall number of messages in our sample. After these sampling restrictions, our final sample contains 1,442,051 messages by 12,029 unique users.[5] We present the

[5] We conduct a number of robustness exercises in the Appendix (Table A.9) to ensure that our findings are not sensitive to our sampling choices. First, we reproduce our main findings analyzing the top 150 firms, the top 50 firms, and the top 51-100 firms, obtaining similar results. These results indicate that our findings are not driven by the top stocks, nor are they sensitive to the 100-firm cutoff. Second, we evaluate how StockTwits user growth affects our findings. Our main tests control for the growing nature of our sample by including date fixed effects in our analysis (Out of 11,876

names of the 100 firms and the frequency of messages about these firms in the Appendix (Table A.2). Not surprisingly, many of the most discussed firms are in technology and pharmaceutical industries.

Table 1 Panel A presents summary statistics of the sample coverage. The median number of messages per firm-date observation is 10, with as many as 4,690 messages on some days for some firms. Since the typical firm has multiple messages per trading day in the data, we are able to calculate measures of disagreement at the firm-date level.

I.B Investor Philosophies

StockTwits users can fill out user profiles with information about themselves as investors – investment approach, investment horizon (or holding period), and experience level. In Table 1 Panel B, we present the breakdown of users by investment approach, holding period, and experience. Our analysis makes use of these user characteristics, particularly the investment approaches, which describe quite different investing philosophies. On StockTwits, the most common approach is technical, representing 38% of users and about 37% of messages. Momentum and growth investors represent the next two most common investment philosophies (20% and 18% of investors, respectively), followed by fundamental and value investors. Given that global macro investors only make up 2.24% of overall investors and 0.90% of messages, we exclude these investors from the rest of the analysis in the paper. To the best of our knowledge this is the first paper to directly measure investors' approaches, and therefore, we cannot compare whether this breakdown is representative of other samples in the market. Because there are no natural comparisons to ours, in Section IV.B we present several alternative weighting schemes to evaluate the external validity of our results.

To evaluate whether the StockTwits investment approaches reliably categorize users into truly different investment philosophies, we systematically analyze the content of the messages posted by users across approaches. The content of the messages posted by users of different approaches suggests that users adhere to the investment approach they select when they register (i.e., fundamental, technical, momentum, growth, or value). Specifically, we study the word saliency to focus

users, 4,566 joined before January 1, 2013). In the Appendix, we conduct a robustness test to ensure that the potentially changing composition of the investors is not affecting our results by repeating the analysis using just users who joined StockTwits before January 1, 2013, obtaining similar results. Third, we see no sharp changes to StockTwits message volume over time (i.e., Appendix Figure A.1), which provides a reliable basis for measuring disagreement.

on words that are distinctive of each approach as in Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2016). To visualize the differences across strategies, Panel A of Table 2 presents the 15 most salient words for each strategy, which are words most frequently used relative to language used by investors of other approaches. These salient words highlight the contextual differences between the strategies. For example, some of the most salient words for fundamental investors are "eps" (earnings per share) and "cash," whereas technical investors refer to "charts," "area," and "head."

These most salient words suggest investors follow the investment approaches that they self-report on their profile, but one concern is that these few words happen to be salient by chance or do not represent the full spectrum of word usage. We address this potential limitation with evidence that the full distribution of word usage across strategies is distinctive beyond the most salient words. We compute the word frequency distribution using all of the tweets by users of each investment philosophy, which provides a basis for this comparison. To measure the distinctiveness of the language used across different investment philosophies, we borrow a measure from information theory, called the Kullback-Liebler divergence (KL divergence), which captures the degree to which one distribution contains differing information from another. The more different are the two word distributions, the greater is the KL divergence.

Using the word distribution of tweets from each approach, we compute the pairwise KL divergences for each pair of word frequency distributions. Panel B of Table 2 presents the KL divergence of each strategy relative to the fundamental investor distribution, along with standard errors, obtained using a bootstrapping procedure.[6] By these calculations, the word distributions of growth, value, momentum and technical investors are highly statistically different from the word distribution used by fundamental investors. The tight standard error bounds also indicate that each strategy uses language that is quite different from the others.

Beyond showing that the language used across strategies is distinctive, we also show the language of the messages on StockTwits is consistent with investment views of identifiable focal investors who write extensively outside of StockTwits. To show this, we identify two focal investors (one technical investor and one value investor) who have significant public writing and investor rep-

[6] Specifically, we randomly draw a bootstrap sample of words from the reference distribution (with replacement and with the same number of words as the original). Using each bootstrapped reference distribution, we re-compute the KL divergence. Across 100 bootstrap samples, the standard deviation of the bootstrapped KL divergence calculations is the standard error reported in Table 2.

utation outside of the StockTwits platform. For the technical focal investor, we select Gregory W. Harmon (133K followers on StockTwits as of May 2017), who maintains a blog and subscription newsletter that espouses his technical trading views (e.g., the subtitle of his website is "Do you see what I see? What the charts are telling about the current state of the market"). By contrast, the other focal investor we select is Todd Sullivan (98K followers), who is decidedly not a technical investor. Sullivan writes publicly about investing on the blog Value Plays. For both focal investors, we download the universe of their public posts on their respective websites from May 2017, and process the text in the same way we process the StockTwits text.

Using these reference texts, we test whether StockTwits users with more technically-oriented approaches (i.e., momentum and technical) use language that is closer to the technical focal investor, Harmon, than StockTwits users with more fundamentally-oriented approaches (i.e., value, growth and fundamental), and vice versa for the more fundamentally-oriented focal investor, Sullivan. To implement this test, we group StockTwits messages by whether they were posted by a user who was technically-oriented versus fundamentally-oriented. For each grouping, we compute the KL divergence between the StockTwits messages and the external reference texts.

As we show in Panel C of Table 2, the KL divergence from the technical reference text is significantly smaller for the technically-oriented StockTwits group than for the fundamentally-oriented StockTwits group. The magnitude of the difference (0.073) is similar to cross-group differences on StockTwits, and this difference is significant at the 1% level (t-stat = 2.624). Consistent with the self-identified strategies, we also find that the KL divergence from the fundamentally-oriented reference text is significantly smaller for the fundamentally-oriented StockTwits group than for technically-oriented StockTwits group. The magnitude of the difference (0.228) is similar to cross-group differences on StockTwits, and this difference is statistically significant at better than the 1% level (t-stat = -5.871).[7]

As a final piece of textual evidence on StockTwits investment philosophies, we investigate whether the textual differences across strategies reflect different information sources or differen-

[7]To obtain standard errors for these difference-in-divergence tests, we draw 500 random bootstrap sample of words from the reference distribution (each with replacement and with the same number of words as the original distribution). For each bootstrapped reference distribution, we re-compute both KL divergences and their difference (i.e., the KL divergence for fundamentally-oriented approaches minus KL divergence for technically-oriented approaches). Across 500 bootstrap samples, the standard deviation of the differences provides the standard error we use for the test of differences in KL divergences.

tial interpretation of market information. To address this question, we hand-classify the top 1000 most frequently used words across strategies into three different lists – information words, model words, and unclassified words. Information words are words that describe the timing, source or direction of information (e.g., “positive”, “today”, “yesterday”, “news”, “cnbc”), whereas model words are words that imply a particular approach or analysis of market information (e.g., “sma” (simple moving average), “pattern,” “reversal”, “upgrades”, “squeeze”, “ichan”, “director”). We report these word lists in Panel A of Table 3, and note that we selected the clearest examples to be included in these lists, leaving the remaining words unclassified.[8]

Using these lists of model and information words, we examine the degree to which each type of words is commonly used (i.e., in the top 250 words) by each of the five StockTwits investment philosophies. Panel B of Table 3 presents the frequency distribution of number of investment philosophies that commonly use information words versus model words. Consistent with the differences across strategies reflecting different investment philosophies (i.e., different analyses of the same information environment), we find that model words tend to be commonly used by fewer StockTwits investment philosophies than information words. In contrast, information words tend to be used frequently, regardless of the strategy. Specifically, the mean number of strategies that commonly use model words is 3.351, whereas the mean number of strategies that use information words is 4.792. As the two-sample t-test in Panel C of Table 3 indicates, this difference in means is statistically significant at the 1% level.

Beyond the user language, we also evaluate whether the sentiment reactions of investors to different types of events are consistent with their self-ascribed investment philosophies. We use the news analytics database RavenPack to identify two types of events that should differentially associate with the opinions of users with different investment philosophies: Technical view events (labeled as such in RavenPack) and earnings announcements. Specifically, the RavenPack data pro-

[8]Selecting words for the word list is an inherently subjective exercise. Specifically, the type of classification error we are most likely to make is to classify a word as a “model word” when it truly belongs in the “information word” list. Because model words are about interpretation of information, they will necessarily refer to some types of information, even when they imply a particular approach toward processing information. Especially for fundamental strategies that discuss topics like “revenue”, “sales”, “profit” and “acquisitions” as their mode of analysis, it is difficult to draw the line between information and interpretation of information. On this intuition, we select 16 words from our original list of model words, which are most likely to be confused for information words. Using this list, we re-run our tests with those words included among the information word list instead of the model word list. We obtain quantitatively similar results (reported in Appendix Table A.6), which helps to alleviate concerns that our conclusions are sensitive to the subjective exercise of compiling these word lists.

vide both positive and negative events: “technical view bullish,” “technical view bearish,” “earnings up,” and “earnings down.” When we compute sentiment around earnings announcements, we pool the reactions to “earnings down” events with the reactions to “earnings up” events by multiplying the sentiment around “earnings down” events by -1. We similarly multiply “technical view bearish” by -1 when constructing the reaction to the signed technical events. These transformations ensure that the sentiment reaction to negative events do not cancel with the sentiment reaction to positive events in the aggregate. Figure 1 plots the sentiment of investors of different types around these two types of news. Consistent with investors having a technical investing philosophy, technical sentiment is high throughout the entire 9-day window around the technical view events, whereas non-technical sentiment is similar to outside of the event window. On the other end of the spectrum, fundamental sentiment reacts more strongly to earnings announcements news than non-fundamental sentiment.

Together, the sentiment reactions to fundamental and technical events and the contextual analysis of the StockTwits tweet content provide compelling evidence that self-ascribed investment philosophies accurately capture substantively different investor types. Moreover, these investment philosophies use language that is consistent with differential interpretation of the same information, and exhibit sentiment reactions to events that are consistent with these StockTwits investors primarily having different investment models across investment philosophies.

I.C Other Useful Features of the StockTwits Data

Two other features of the StockTwits data are useful in our tests. First, we observe the precise timestamp when a message is posted, which is informative of whether investors post the messages as they update their beliefs when news occurs, or in the evenings after work, when they have more free time. In Figure 2 we plot the distribution of messages by the day of the week and by the hour of the day. It is evident that investors predominantly post messages when the markets are open (Monday-Friday and between 9am and 4pm). This is consistent with investors updating their messages in real time as financial events unfold. In our empirical tests, we use the message timestamps to evaluate the degree to which sentiment and disagreement changes before trading volume does.

Second, we observe the self-reported experience level of each investor: novice, intermediate, and professional. About 20% of StockTwits users classify themselves as professionals, 52% as intermediate, 28% as novices. Consistent with likely trading behaviors, professionals post disproportionately more messages than novices or intermediates. In our empirical tests, we use the experience classifications to distinguish among investors with different levels of sophistication. As with the self-reported investor philosophies, it is important to validate that the experience levels approximate actual investor experience. We provide both contextual validation (via reading profiles) and quantitative validation (via tracking the abnormal market performance of mimicking portfolios).

Contextually, Figure 3 presents three examples of user profiles, one for each experience level in the data, to give a sense of this comparison. Consistent with our reading of many user profiles, the self-reported experience level matches well with likely real world investing experience. For example, the *novice* investor is a student, who is mostly trading for fun, the *intermediate* investor reports real-life trading experience, but does not trade as a primary source of income, and the *professional* investor has worked for Wells Fargo and Morgan Stanley and before then on floors of COMEX, CSCE, and NYFE.

We further validate the experience levels by constructing mimicking portfolios that separately follow professional, intermediate, and novice opinions. Specifically, for each experience level, we evaluate the performance of two portfolios based on the sentiment of StockTwits users: a bullish portfolio and a bearish portfolio. Within each group, we use the bullish or bearish message frequencies as portfolio weights for each portfolio.[9] Figure 4 presents graphs of the cumulative abnormal returns for bullish and bearish portfolios for the overall sample, novices, intermediates, and professionals. Consistent with self-reported experience being valuable, Panel (d) shows that the professional portfolio exhibits positive cumulative abnormal returns (bullish outperforms bearish over a 60-trading day period, t-stat = 1.55), whereas the novice portfolio exhibits negative abnormal returns (bearish outperforms bullish over a 60-trading day period, t-stat = -2.11).[10] Forming a long-short portfolio, the difference in 60-day performance between novices and professionals is highly statistically significant, with a t-stat of 3.844, a finding that implies substantial differences between professionals and novices. The differences between StockTwits professionals and intermediates is

[9]To be concrete, consider an example where there are two potential firms (A and B) and 20 bullish messages were posted in total. In this scenario, if firm A had 15 bullish messages and firm B had 5 bullish messages, then firm A will get a weight of 0.75 and firm B a weight of 0.25 in the "bullish portfolio." We construct cumulative returns over the following 60 days for each of the two portfolios and subtract out the value-weighted market index. We rebalance the portfolios daily.

[10]The novice portfolio findings are in line with prior research that individual investors lose money in the market, even before accounting for transaction costs (Barber and Odean, 2000)

similarly statistically significant with a t-stat of 3.10. Moreover, these differences are significant economically, with the professional portfolio outperforming the market by nearly 2% over a 60 trading-day period.

I.D Why Do Users Post Messages?

For constructing a measure of disagreement, it is important that the sentiment expressed on StockTwits reveals the true opinions of investors. Thus, we want to rule out the possibility that users are trying to manipulate the stock market by posting fake opinions. For example, if a user thinks the stock price will go down and thus wants to sell the stock, she could post really bullish messages, in an attempt to increase the price temporarily, which would allow her to sell at a higher price. This would invalidate our measure, as we would capture her opinion as bullish, even though she is bearish on the stock. This does not appear to be an important concern in our data for several reasons. First, there is anecdotal evidence that investors post on social networks to attract followers and gain Internet fame or a job.[11] In all those cases, it is in their best interest to provide their best forecast of the future stock performance, and thus their honest opinion about the stock. Second, per StockTwits policy, messages cannot be retroactively withdrawn by the user, which further enhances the incentive to post true, reliable opinions. Third, since we concentrate on the 100 most talked-about firms, the firms we examine are very liquid and have large market caps, and therefore it is very unlikely that individual investors think they can move the stock price.[12]

II Measuring Sentiment and Disagreement

II.A Sentiment Classification

When using StockTwits, users can post a message (limited to 140 characters) and indicate their sentiment as bullish, bearish, or unclassified (the default option). The following figure presents an image of the interface.

[11] For an example of an article on the fame motive for posting to investment social networks see the *Wall Street Journal* article from April 21, 2015 (article here).

[12] Consistent with this observation, a recent paper by Kogan et al. (2018) shows that the effects of "fake news" on financial markets are confined to small, illiquid stocks. Manipulation of large stocks through the posting of false opinions is typically infeasible.



Table 4 Panel A, column 1 shows the distribution of sentiment across messages in the original sample. According to these summary statistics, 18.3% of classified messages are bearish and 81.7% are bullish. Even though the setting and time period are different, our classifications give similar relative frequencies to the distribution reported in Antweiler and Frank (2004), who hand-classify individual trader messages on an Internet message board.

From reading the unclassified messages, it is clear that most of them are quite bullish or quite bearish, but the user did not select the option. To incorporate this information into the analysis, we use a maximum entropy-based method (described in the Appendix) to classify messages that were unclassified in the original sample as either bearish or bullish.[13] Furthermore, we train our algorithm and use it to classify messages separately by investment approach to account for the possibility that investors with different approaches use different terminology to describe positive or negative sentiment. Table 4 Panel A, column 2 shows the distribution of sentiment in the final data set. The fully classified data set has 452,258 bearish messages and 989,793 bullish messages.

Based on a reading of the classified messages, the sentiment classifier appears to accurately capture truly bullish and bearish messages. For example, Table 5 provides several examples of classified messages. Beyond reading the classified messages, we systematically evaluate the accuracy of the sentiment classifier using a cross-validation exercise. For the cross-validation, we hold out 10% user-classified messages, and train the algorithm on the remaining 90% of the messages. The cross validation shows that, on average, the predictive accuracy of our classifier is 83%. This high degree of accuracy enhances our confidence in using the classification scheme on unclassified messages.

Beyond the cross-validation evidence, a potential concern about the unclassified messages is

[13] Prior papers that use message data (e.g., Antweiler and Frank (2004), Giannini et al., 2018) must construct a training dataset (usually ~1,000 messages) by classifying the messages by hand, calibrating a classification model (usually based on maximum entropy methods) to this self-constructed training set of messages, and then using the calibrated model to classify the rest of the data. In our setting, we avoid the subjectivity of hand classification because 475,303 messages were preclassified by the users as bullish or bearish. This training sample is both larger and more accurate because the users report their sentiment directly to StockTwits.

that investors are more certain of their sentiment when they tag their message as bullish or bearish than when they leave sentiment unclassified. To examine this possibility, we randomly select 100,000 pre-classified messages by users who classify at least one message in the data set, to train the maximum entropy algorithm. Using this training set, we deploy the maximum entropy algorithm to classify a randomly selected set of 200,000 messages where half (100,000) of these were a second set of pre-classified messages, and the other half were unclassified by StockTwits users. For each message, the algorithm computes a probability that ascribes the level of confidence that the classification is either bullish or bearish based on the maximum entropy algorithm and the text of the message. We examine whether the unclassified messages and user-classified messages differ in the algorithm's confidence in assigning a bullish versus bearish label. The distributions of these confidence levels are almost identical with the mean being 0.958 for unclassified and 0.959 for pre-classified messages, and the standard deviation being 0.104 and 0.105, respectively. This confirms that the unclassified messages are very similar in nature to the user-classified messages.[14]

II.B Average Sentiment Measure

We follow Antweiler and Frank (2004) in constructing a sentiment measure from bearish and bullish message data. We code each bearish message as -1, and each bullish message as 1, and take the arithmetic average of these classifications at the $firm \times day \times group$ level:

$$AvgSentiment_{itg} = \frac{N_{itg}^{bullish} - N_{itg}^{bearish}}{N_{itg}^{bullish} + N_{itg}^{bearish}}. \tag{1}$$

The $AvgSentiment_{itg}$ measure ranges from -1 (all bearish) to $+1$ (all bullish). A group can either be all investors or investors with a given investment philosophy, holding period, or experience level. For our base measure, we calculate the average sentiment measure for day t from messages posted between the market close of day $t-1$ to the market close of day t. Alternatively, we use the message timestamp to construct a before-market-opens (BMO) version of the sentiment measure, which is useful for empirical tests that exploit timing. Figure 5 presents the timing of our measurement.

Table 4, Panel B presents the summary statistics of the average sentiment measure for all users, as well as average sentiment broken down by investment philosophy. As investors tend to post

[14]Furthermore, in the Appendix, we replicate our main findings in Table A.9 using only messages that were classified by the investors themselves (user-classified messages), and we obtain similar results.

bullish messages more frequently than bearish messages, it is sensible that the average sentiment for all users is 0.342 (closer to 1 than -1). During our sample period, technical investors are the most likely to post bullish messages, whereas value investors are the most likely to post bearish messages. We present the summary statistics of the sentiment measure broken down by experience level and holding period in the Appendix (Table A.4).

For our main analysis, we compute the average sentiment measure by assigning each message an equal weight. As a robustness check, we also calculate a follower-weighted average sentiment measure by weighting the sentiment of each message by the number of followers of the user who posted the message. As we show in the Appendix, our substantive findings are not sensitive to the choice of weights in the calculation of the average sentiment (see Table A.9).

Our reading of messages shows that investors tend to post new messages that reflect their opinion about the future prospects of a stock, which maps naturally into near-term trading sentiment. Specifically, a bullish message about the stock typically indicates that the investor intends to buy the stock, whereas a bearish message indicates the investor intends to sell the stock. If no messages were posted for a given firm/day/group, we set the average sentiment measure equal to 0, as we assume that users who do not post are not interested in buying or selling in the near term.[15]

One potential concern with an expressed sentiment measure is that expressed opinions might reflect a behavioral bias toward broadcasting positive information. We address this concern by relating the propensity to report negative news to the likelihood that an investor without an inventory of the stock cannot trade because of short-selling constraints. Given that many investors face short-selling constraints (Hong and Stein, 2003, Engelberg et al., 2018), a tilt toward bullish sentiment is natural. A bearish investor with a strict short-sale constraint can only sell the stock until her inventory is zero. Investors with limited attention tend to neglect information on stocks for which

[15]In the literature on trading and sentiment constructed from analyst forecasts (e.g., see Gleason and Lee, 2003), sentiment changes (i.e., analyst forecast revisions) are what lead to trading rather than the overall level of sentiment (i.e., analyst forecasts themselves). The literature focuses on sentiment changes to isolate the portion of sentiment that is fresh information (i.e., not yet impounded into prices or traded upon in the market). From this point of view, our sentiment measure is similar to a "sentiment changes" measure as StockTwits users tend to post when their information is fresh. Our normalization of average sentiment to zero in the no-messages case is consistent with this interpretation. However, one concern is that most messages do not contain fresh information (i.e., they are reiterations of prior statements), which reflect stale past sentiment. Stale sentiment should be less directly related to trading volume than sentiment updates. Nevertheless, if sentiment reflects stale opinions, it would be appropriate to set the average sentiment equal to the prior day's measure if no messages were posted for a given firm/day/group. As we show in the Appendix Table A.9, our substantive findings still hold if we make this choice instead. As theory would predict, we find that the empirical link is weaker between trading volume and disagreement under this assumption.

they have zero inventory (Davies, 2015). Zero-inventory stocks are likely to be the stocks for which investors are bearish, and because these stocks get less investor attention, bearish messages would be reported less frequently.

Using the percent of institutional ownership of a firm as a proxy for shorting constraints (Nagel, 2005), we find that the the fraction of bearish messages for companies in the top quartile of institutional holdings (lax shorting constraints) is 0.37, compared with 0.23 for companies in the bottom quartile (tight shorting constraints). This evidence suggests that the bullish-bearish imbalance in our sentiment measure is most likely due to the short-selling constraints.

II.C Measuring Disagreement

We construct the overall disagreement measure by computing the standard deviation of expressed sentiment across messages, as in Antweiler and Frank (2004). Because the underlying variable is binary (-1/1), the variance of the sentiment measure during a time period t equals $1 - AvgSentiment^2$. Although Antweiler and Frank (2004) used this formulation to study disagreement using opinions expressed across the whole set of investors, we adapt this insight to also measure disagreement within subgroups of investors. Specifically, the within-group measure for a given $firm \times day \times group$ is computed as:

$$Disagreement_{itg} = \sqrt{1 - AvgSentiment_{itg}^2} \qquad (2)$$

where a *group* can represent all investors, or only investors with a given investment approach. This disagreement measure ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 being maximal disagreement. We apply the formula to firm-day-group observations that have non-zero messages. When there are no messages for a particular firm-day-group, the logic for this formula breaks down (i.e., it no longer represents the standard deviation of sentiment). To compute disagreement in this corner case, we maintain the assumption that non-posting means that traders do not wish to buy or sell in the near term. Accordingly, we normalize disagreement in the no-message case to be 0, consistent with latent agreement. This choice of how to normalize the no-message case is consistent with the idea that minimal disagreement should correspond to minimal trading.[16] In Table A.9, we challenge our assumption and

[16]This choice deviates from how Antweiler and Frank (2004) handle stock-days where no messages come out. If there are no messages posted during a given time period, Antweiler and Frank (2004) set disagreement for that time period

replace the disagreement on days with no messages to be the last value of disagreement that we observe for the given stock.As the results in column (2) show, our main findings are conceptually robust to this assumption.

To illustrate the properties of the disagreement measure consider the following example of disagreement across 10 messages posted for the same $firm \times day \times group$ combination. In Figure 6, we show how the disagreement measure changes as the number of bearish messages goes from 0 (all bullish messages) to 10 (all bearish messages). There is no change in disagreement if everyone's sentiment is either bearish or bullish. The disagreement measure is maximized at 1 when there are 5 bullish and 5 bearish messages. Since the measure is a square root function, the disagreement measure changes the most when there are few bullish or few bearish messages (the measure has the largest slope).

Separately, we construct a measure of cross-group disagreement by computing the standard deviation of average sentiment ($AvgSentiment_{itg}$) across investment approaches, weighted by the number of individuals in that approach group. We implement the weighted approach to give our measure internal consistency, as dispersion of beliefs between two groups with many investors will contribute more to trading volume than dispersion of beliefs between two groups with few investors. The formula for the cross-group disagreement is:

$$CrossDisagreement_{it} = \sqrt{\frac{\sum_{a \in A} n_a (AvgSentiment_{at} - AvgSentiment_t)^2}{\frac{G-1}{G}(n_F + n_T + n_M + n_V + n_G)}} \tag{3}$$

where A ={Fundamental, Technical, Momentum, Value, or Growth}, n_a is the number of individuals in group a in January 2013, $AvgSentiment_{at}$ is the average sentiment of group a on day t, and $AvgSentiment_t$ is the average sentiment of all groups on day t, and G is the number of investment philosophies. Similar to the within-group disagreement measure, cross-group disagreement captures changes to the level of disagreement because StockTwits users are likely to post when their sentiment about the firm changes . Hereafter, we refer to our measures as "disagreement," though it is appropriate to think of the measure as capturing changes in investors' level of disagreement.

In Panel C of Table 4, we summarize our disagreement measures, both across and within groups.

to be 1, and justify their choice by saying that no information came out during that time period, and thus there is latent disagreement. As we believe that the opinions on StockTwits likely reflect fresh information, it is more appropriate in our context to set the case of no messages to be a change in disagreement of 0.

The first three rows summarize disagreement for all investors, cross-group disagreement, and the weighted average disagreement within investment philosophies (within-group disagreement). In constructing within-group disagreement, we weight by the number of users with a given approach. The average for our main disagreement measure for all investors is 0.467, and the median is 0.628. The average cross-group disagreement is 0.382, and the weighted average within-group disagreement is 0.245. In addition, we also report the autocorrelation of each measure in Panel D of Table 4. Given the daily frequency, these autocorrelations – which range from 0.265 to 0.500 for our main measures – are quite low, an indication that there is significant new information reflected in our measures on a daily basis.[17]

As a quantification of how investment approaches contribute to overall disagreement, note that both disagreement among "All Investors" and "Weighted average within-group Disagreement" are based on the same formula, and thus, are on a comparable scale to one another.[18] Contrasting overall disagreement with within-group disagreement, we note that splitting disagreement into groups reduces the average disagreement from 0.467 to the weighted average within-group disagreement of 0.245, an overall reduction of 47.5%.[19] The importance of investment philosophies toward explaining overall disagreement is robust to employing different subsamples of firms and users, different weighting schemes, and alternative measures of disagreement (see Appendix Table A.9, Panel A). Across the various alternative specifications, we find that the splitting disagreement into groups reduces average disagreement by 40.7% on the low end to 63.6% on the upper end.

The patterns of within-group disagreement for different investment approaches also provide interesting insight. Technical investors disagree the most with one another, whereas value, fundamental, and growth investors disagree much less with investors of the same investment philosophy.

[17]Another natural question is how firm characteristics and market conditions relate to our disagreement measures. To this end, Appendix Table A.5 presents two sets of results. On firm characteristics, disagreement is greater for larger firms, and bears an insignificant relation to book-to-market ratio. On market conditions, disagreement is positively related to market volatility and recent returns. Our specifications account for these factors using firm and date fixed effects, as well as controls for media attention, recent volatility and market returns.

[18]For some tests in Section III, we use a variable called *DisagreementRatio*, equal to the fraction of disagreement that can be attributed to within-group differences in opinion. Similar to the construction of R^2 in a regression-ANOVA context, we construct *DisagreementRatio* using the variance decomposition of total disagreement into within-group and cross-group disagreement.

[19]We did not take the ratio of our cross-group disagreement measure to the all-investors measure because the standard deviation of the average sentiment is not on the same scale as the standard deviation of user sentiment across all messages (our "All Investors" disagreement measure). Here, it also becomes clearer why using the number of individuals in a given approach as weights for the cross-group and the average within-group disagreement helps keep our measures internally consistent, since the "all investors" disagreement measure puts more weight on approaches with more users.

This finding resonates with the fact that there are many ways to be a technical investor, but much more standardization in what value investing and growth investing means.[20] We also summarize within-group disagreement by investor experience and by investment horizon in the Appendix (Table A.4).

II.C.1 Contrasting with Alternative Measures of Disagreement

It is instructive to relate our disagreement measures to existing measures of disagreement from the literature. Panel E of Table 1 presents evidence on how our disagreement measures compare with notable existing measures of disagreement in the literature: analyst dispersion as in Diether et al. (2002), return volatility, and divergence of sentiment on StockTwits from sentiment expressed in the media, as in Giannini et al., 2018. We separately examine the disagreement among all investors, cross-group disagreement, and the weighted average within-group disagreement.

To provide a comparison to analyst dispersion, we calculate a monthly measure of analyst dispersion using the standard deviation of analyst earnings forecasts made in a given month. To compare our measure to this monthly measure of analyst dispersion, we compute the average of our measure over the month, then calculate its correlation with analyst dispersion. As can be seen in column (1) of Panel E, the two measures do not strongly correlate with one another.

In column (2), we examine the correlation of our disagreement measures with return volatility. Interestingly, the cross-group disagreement is negatively correlated with both analyst dispersion and return volatility, whereas the within-group measure has a positive correlation. The significant within-group correlation suggests that analyst dispersion and return volatility are better measurements of information-driven disagreement.

Finally, we reconstruct a measure of divergence of opinion on StockTwits from sentiment expressed in the media, as in Giannini et al., 2018. We find that cross-group disagreement is more correlated with the Giannini et al., 2018 measure than within-group disagreement, consistent with the fact that StockTwits users and the media might have different models for processing financial information.[21]

[20]For example, many technical investors use the subjective method of finding patterns in charts (e.g., the head-and-shoulders pattern), and therefore often come to opposite conclusions.

[21]Giannini et al. (2018) measure the divergence between investor sentiment on StockTwits and the sentiment of breaking news articles and firms' press releases. Their measure is akin to a cross-group disagreement measure, where one group is all StockTwits users and the other group is whomever posts in the media. Unlike our analysis, Giannini et al.

When we correlate analyst dispersion at the monthly level with abnormal trading volume, we find a weak and insignificant correlation (0.0388). In contrast, our measure of disagreement correlates much more strongly with abnormal trading volume. Specifically, in column (4), we present the correlations between daily abnormal log trading volume and our daily measures of investor disagreement. We find that the correlation of overall disagreement and the abnormal log trading volume is 0.116. This correlation is substantially greater than correlations with other measures of disagreement. Moreover, the abnormal trading volume is more strongly correlated with the weighted average within-group disagreement than the cross-group disagreement measure.

II.D Variation-in-Sentiment Test of Cross-Group Disagreement

This section describes a more systematic test of the importance of investment philosophies for explaining divergence of opinion by examining the degree to which different investment philosophies explain variation in changes to sentiment. If adhering to differing investment philosophies leads investors to disagree, investment philosophies should significantly explain variation in sentiment over time. One example of cross-group disagreement in this vein is our evidence that fundamentally-oriented investors react to earnings news, but non-fundamental investors do not (Figure 1). In this section, we present a generic test for whether investment philosophies relate to variation in sentiment over time.

The insight for our variation-in-sentiment test is to imagine that information about firm i comes out on date t that is differentially interpreted by groups A and B. In this case, differential interpretation means that $\Delta AvgSentiment_{itg} = AvgSentiment_{itg} - AvgSentiment_{i(t-1)g}$ is different for $g = A$ versus $g = B$. We extend this intuition across all investment philosophies when we perform an analysis of variance of the following linear regression specification:

$$\Delta AvgSentiment_{itg} = FirmFEs + DateFEs + ApproachFEs + \varepsilon_{itg} \quad (4)$$

(2018) do not evaluate how different groups of StockTwits investors disagree with one another. To quantitatively evaluate how their style of measuring disagreement contrasts with ours, we reproduce an alternative measure that — like Giannini et al. (2018) — contrasts investor sentiment on StockTwits with media sentiment as reported in the Ravenpack database. Appendix I.C presents precise details on how we construct this alternative measure of disagreement, but our goal is to stay as close as possible to the Giannini et al., 2018 measure in an out-of-sample replication of their proxy for disagreement.

in which $\Delta AvgSentiment_{itg}$ is first-differenced average sentiment on date t for firm i by investors of approach g. We include firm, date, and approach fixed effects to explicitly compare the explanatory power of different investment models to the amount of variation in sentiment captured by differences across firms and across time. Beyond accounting for different levels of sentiment, because of the first difference specification, the firm and time fixed effects allow for differential trends in sentiment by firm.

In Table 6, we present the ANOVA decomposition of sentiment trends from estimating equation (4). We find that differing investment approaches explain 1.6% of the variation in first-differenced average sentiment. In contrast to the approach fixed effects, time and firm fixed effects explain little of the variation in first-differenced average sentiment, only 0.6%.[22] In columns (4) and (5), we present specifications that interact approach with year-month fixed effects and year-week fixed effects. Beyond the approach fixed effects, these interactions explain up to 0.6% of the variation in sentiment (equivalent to the variation explained by firm fixed effects, but less than the variation explained by approach fixed effects alone). The additional explanatory power of these interactions suggests that a small part of the differences across approaches occurs at a slower frequency of one day, which is captured by the approach fixed effects in the first difference specification.

From this test, we infer that differing investment approaches matter for disagreement beyond the simple summary statistics of disagreement we present in Table 4. Because these specifications include firm and date fixed effects, the evidence from this specification cannot be explained by different investor types following different firms, or by different investor types posting messages at different times.

III Empirical Analysis of Disagreement

In this section, we present the main results from our disagreement measures. First, we present results that link our various disagreement measures to trading volume, which contrast the quantita-

[22] The effect of different approaches is similar whether we estimate the specification on trends in sentiment (main text) or if we estimate the specification on levels of sentiment. In the levels specifications, we find firm and time dummies alone explain 10.7% of the variation in sentiment. Adding the approach fixed effects explains an additional percentage point of variation in sentiment. To put the importance of approach styles in context, differing approaches explain approximately 10.2% of the changes in disagreement (variation in sentiment) that is explained using firm and time fixed effects. The fact that differential approaches explain slightly more variation in sentiment trends is consistent with differential interpretation. These sentiment levels specifications are presented in Appendix Table A.7, Panel A.

tive implications of cross-group versus within-group disagreement. Second, we present results on sophisticated investors versus unsophisticated investors that provide evidence of gradual information diffusion. Third, we exploit the daily frequency of our disagreement measure to provide new evidence on the quantitative role of disagreement in driving the spike in volume around earnings announcements.

III.A Trading Volume and Disagreement, Within versus Across Groups

We now evaluate how trading volume relates to each of our measures of disagreement, with an emphasis on the contrast between cross-group and within-group disagreement. Specifically, we estimate the empirical link between disagreement and *abnormal* trading volume using the following regression specification:

$$\begin{aligned} AbLogVol_{it} &= \alpha_t + \gamma_i + \beta_1 DisMeasure_{it} + \beta_2 AbLogVol_{it-1} \\ &\quad + \beta_3 Media_{it} + \gamma Controls_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

where $AbLogVol_{it}$ is the abnormal log trading volume on date t for firm i. It is calculated as the difference between the log volume on date t and the average log volume from $t-140$ to $t-20$ trading days (6-month period, skipping a month). $DisMeasure_{it}$ is the one of the disagreement measures described in Section II (overall, within-group, across group). For ease of comparison across measures, we standardize each disagreement measure to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1 in the specifications. This standardization implies that the coefficient of interest β_1 equals the percentage change in abnormal trading volume for a one standard deviation increase in disagreement.

To account for alternative interpretations, all specifications include date and firm fixed effects (α_t and γ_i). We also control for abnormal trading volume on day $t-1$ to account for persistence in abnormal trading volume, account for firm-date-specific spikes in attention using an indicator variable $Media_{it}$ that equals 1 if there is a news article about firm i on date t in the *Wall Street Journal* or the *New York Times*, as well as controls for recent stock market volatility and recent abnormal returns. Across specifications, standard errors are double clustered by date and firm to account for within-firm autocorrelation and common daily shocks.

Table 7 presents our results on the link between disagreement and trading volume. We present the results using disagreement among all investors in Columns (1) and (2) of Panel A. According to the specification in Column (1), a standard deviation increase in disagreement is associated with a contemporaneous increase of abnormal trading volume by 10.0%. This estimate is statistically significant at the 1% level, and is robust to including firm and date fixed effects, lagged abnormal log volume, and controls for media attention, recent volatility, and abnormal returns. In Column (2), we additionally exploit the precise timing of the StockTwits messages to construct a measure of disagreement only from messages posted before the market opens (BMO disagreement). By construction, the BMO disagreement measure precedes trading volume. From Column (2), we find a standard deviation in disagreement before the market opens is associated with 5.3% greater *subsequent* abnormal trading volume. Although the magnitude of the estimate on BMO disagreement is weaker, this finding alleviates the concern that disagreement on StockTwits is merely a reaction to trading volume. Although investors who post on StockTwits make up a minor fraction of the overall trading in the stock market, this finding suggests that our measure of disagreement is a good proxy for overall changes in disagreement in the market.

In comparison to overall disagreement, we find a notably weaker positive relation between cross-group disagreement and trading volume (Columns (3) and (4) of Panel A), which is statistically significant at the 1% level. Specifically, a standard deviation increase in cross-group disagreement is associated with 3.0% greater abnormal trading volume, or 30% of the magnitude of the overall disagreement measure. Unlike overall disagreement, the estimate on cross-group disagreement is the same magnitude (3.3%) when relying upon differences of opinion from before the market opens.

In Column (5) of Panel A, we estimate a standard deviation increase in within-group disagreement is associated with 17.5% greater abnormal trading volume, which is more than five times greater than the comparable increase in cross-group disagreement. As in disagreement among all investors, the magnitude of the estimate in column (6) using disagreement from before the market opens is weaker in magnitude, but still economically large (8.5%) and statistically significant at the 1% level. These findings suggest that disagreement within groups is a critical determinant of trading volume, and though cross-group disagreement is important, it leads to less trading than disagreement within groups.

In Panel B, we present a series of regressions that contrast the effects of cross-group and within-group disagreement. The specifications in Columns (1) and (2) include both cross-group and within-group disagreement measures in the same regression of trading volume. Consistent with the estimates in Panel A, we find that within-group disagreement exhibits a much stronger relationship with trading volume, whether contemporaneous (Column 1) or using disagreement before the market opens (Column 2). Columns (3) and (4) present an alternative version of this test by constructing a measure, *DisagreementRatio*, which equals the fraction of the variance of sentiment that is due to within-group disagreement.[23] Consistent with the first two columns, the disagreement ratio results indicate that within-group disagreement bears a stronger link to trading volume. At times when within-group disagreement comprises a greater fraction of overall disagreement, there is significant abnormal trading volume.

Taken more broadly, these findings provide evidence that the link between differential interpretation (i.e., dispersion of opinion across investment philosophies) and trading decisions is notably weaker than the link between informational differences (i.e., dispersion of opinion within investment philosophies) and trading decisions. Although both sources of disagreement positively predict trading volume, the within-group disagreement effect is 2.5 to 4.0 times the cross-group disagreement effect. These differences are highly statistically significant, and as the Disagreement Ratio results indicate, these differences are robust to how we specify the cross- versus within-group differences.

Finally, one concern is that StockTwits investors tend to be retail traders, and thus, may not represent the marginal investor's preferences. In a test in the appendix, we restrict to only professional investors to address this potential limitation, finding quite similar results. An alternative tactic is to split by high versus low institutional ownership. To the extent that StockTwits is more representative of retail investors, we should observe a stronger relation between disagreement and trading volume among the low institutional ownership (high retail ownership) firms. Panel C presents the results of estimating equation (5) separately by high versus low institutional ownership firms (above / below the median of institutional ownership) for each of our measures of disagreement. Consistent with the marginal investor intuition, we find that the coefficient estimate is larger among the low institutional ownership group, but the magnitude is not dramatically smaller. We also find a relation between disagreement and trading volume in the high institutional ownership subsample. That is,

[23] We construct the DisagreementRatio measure by preserving the variance equality, $VarTotal = VarWithin + VarAcross$. Dividing through, the fraction of total variance in sentiment that is due to within-group disagreement is $\frac{VarWithin}{VarTotal}$.

although many of the StockTwits users are retail investors, the opinions are not just informative of stocks traded by retail investors.

III.B Disagreement and Sophistication

In this section, we use alternative cuts of the StockTwits data to provide precise tests of the gradual information diffusion hypothesis, whereby sophisticated investors discover information first and trade on it before the information diffuses to less sophisticated investors (Hong and Stein, 1999). This analysis deepens the insight from the prior section is that within-group differences are important for trading volume.

Specifically, we use self-reported experience levels from StockTwits user profiles to classify investors into sophisticated and unsophisticated categories. We classify an investor as sophisticated (S) if the investor indicates professional as the experience, and as unsophisticated (U) if the investor indicates either novice or intermediate as their experience level. Using these experience classifications, we calculate within-group disagreement for sophisticated and unsophisticated investors within each investment philosophy. Separately, we also calculate $|Dis\ S–U|$ within each investment philosophy, which is the absolute value of the difference of average sentiment for sophisticated and unsophisticated investors. $|Dis\ S–U|$ measures the degree to which sophisticated and unsophisticated investors with the same investment philosophy disagree with one another. We then aggregate these measures to the stock-day level by computing the weighted average of Dis S and Dis U across investment philosophies, where the weights are the number of messages posted by investors in each investment philosophy $\times$ sophistication bin. To compute the weighted average for the $|Dis\ S–U|$ aggregated measure at the stock-day level, the weights are the number of messages posted by investors in the given investment philosophy.

If gradual information diffusion between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors is important for trading volume, $|Dis\ S–U|$ should exhibit a significant predictive relation to trading volume, holding constant Dis S and Dis U. Panel A of Table 8 provides evidence on the link between trading volume and the disagreement between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors. The main finding of interest is in column (2), which estimates relation between before-market-opens disagreement measures and subsequent trading volume. After controlling for disagreement within sophisticated and unsophisticated investors, before-market-opens disagreement between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors with the same investment philosophy is significantly related to trading volume the following day. Specifically, a standard deviation increase in before-market-opens disagreement between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors with the same investment philosophy is associated with 3.1% more abnormal trading volume, holding other factors constant. This result is consistent with gradual information diffusion (as in Hong and Stein, 2007) in which sophisticated individuals obtain information earlier than unsophisticated individuals.

In Panel B, we provide a more direct evaluation of the diffusion of information by examining the within-day lead-lag relationship between sophisticated and unsophisticated sentiment. Specifically, we examine the degree to which before-market-opens sentiment among sophisticated and unsophisticated investors predicts after-market-opens sentiment of each type. In column (1), we find that unsophisticated sentiment from before the market opens has no predictive power for subsequent sophisticated sentiment. In contrast, column (2) shows sophisticated sentiment from before the market opens is a significant predictor of unsophisticated sentiment after the market opens. This pattern of results suggests gradual information diffusion in which sophisticated investors obtain information earlier than unsophisticated individuals.

III.C Disagreement around Earnings Announcements

We conclude our main results section with an application to trading volume around earnings announcements. This application highlights the advantage of measuring disagreement at the daily frequency.

It is a well-known empirical regularity that trading volume spikes on the earnings announcement date and remains high for several weeks (Drake et al., 2012; Kaniel et al., 2012). From the standpoint that earnings announcements provide information that resolves uncertainty, the persistent increase in trading volume is puzzling. Recent theoretical work on this phenomenon proposes a role for disagreement to resolve the puzzle (Banerjee et al., 2018). However, without a daily measure of disagreement, it is difficult to evaluate how much disagreement matters for the increase in daily trading volume. The daily frequency of our measure helps provide a useful test for how well disagreement can explain the volume changes around earnings announcements.

Specifically, we use the disagreement measure to predict how volume changes around earnings announcements in the following regression:

$$
\begin{aligned}
AbLogVol_{it} = & \alpha_t + \gamma_i + \beta_1 1WeekBeforeEA_{it} + \beta_2 EA_{it} + \beta_3 1WeekAfterEA_{it} \\
& + \beta_4 2WeekAfterEA_{it} + \beta_5 3WeekAfterEA_{it} + \beta_6 Disagreement_{it} \\
& + SUE_{iq} + Controls_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}
\end{aligned} \tag{6}
$$

where $AbLogVol_{it}$ is the abnormal log trading volume on day t for firm i, $1WeekBeforeEA$ is a dummy variable equal to 1 if day t for firm i falls in the week before an earnings announcement for that firm, EA_{it} is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i announces earnings on day t, and $1WeekAfterEA_{it}$, $2WeekAfterEA_{it}$, and $3WeekAfterEA_{it}$ are dummy variables for whether day t for firm i falls in week 1, week 2, or week 3 after an earnings announcement, respectively. SUE_{iq} is the earnings surprise for firm i in quarter q defined as the difference in reported earnings minus the median analyst forecast. As in the main trading volume specifications, we include date and firm fixed effects (α_t and γ_i), as well as controls for media attention, recent volatility, and recent abnormal returns. Finally, in some specifications, we control for the amount of disagreement for firm i on day t ($Disagreement_{it}$), and include interactions between disagreement and the timing dummy variables.

The results from estimating equation (6) are presented in Table 9. Column (1) replicates the finding in the literature that volume spikes on the earnings announcement date and remains high for three weeks after the earnings announcement. The coefficients on $WeekBeforeEA_{it}$, EA_{it}, $1WeekAfterEA_{it}$, $2WeekAfterEA_{it}$, and $3WeekAfterEA_{it}$ are relative to the time outside of these weeks. Based on the coefficient estimate on $WeekBeforeEA_{it}$, the trading volume before an EA is approximately the same as it is during the time outside of the earnings announcement period. On the day of the announcement, trading volume increases by 66% and remains high (24% higher) for one week, and then slowly decreases over time.

Columns (2) and (3) of Table 9 present a test of the role of disagreement. To the extent that disagreement explains the spike in volume, the coefficient estimate on EA_{ti} should diminish as we control for disagreement. Indeed, we find that controlling for disagreement can explain approximately one-eighth of the spike in abnormal volume around the earnings announcement (0.594 versus 0.658 on the earnings announcement date). Controlling for interactive effects of disagreement allows for the effect of disagreement to be different by date relative to the earnings announcement. In this specification, we observe that disagreement explains up to 20% of the spike in abnormal volume on the earnings announcement day.

In columns (4) through (7), we estimate the model on subsamples, split by whether the earnings surprise was positive (columns (4) and (5)) or negative (columns (6) and (7)). In either case, controlling for our measure of disagreement explains a significant fraction of the volume spike on the earnings announcement day, but the explanatory power is better for negative earnings surprises than positive earnings surprises (23.4% vs. 16.3%).

Our findings in Table 9 are useful from at least two perspectives. First, disagreement has been theoretically linked to the spike in trading volume around earnings announcements since at least the early 1990s (Kim and Verrecchia, 1991; Kandel and Pearson, 1995). Yet, without a daily measure of disagreement, it has been difficult to quantify how much of the spike can be attributed to disagreement. Our measure's daily resolution enables this test. Second, our estimates imply that most of the spike in trading volume around earnings announcements remains unexplained by disagreement, earnings surprise, and media attention. Although measurement error surely accounts for some fraction of this unexplained variation, future work would do well to further explain the spike in trading volume.

III.C.1 Message Volume and Sentiment around Earnings Announcements

To better understand the link between disagreement and trading volume around earnings announcements, we perform two additional tests that shed light on whether the disagreement effects are due to differential interpretation or gradual information diffusion.

The first test is to disaggregate sentiment reactions to earnings news by self-reported investment philosophies. Specifically, we use the news analytics database RavenPack to identify "earnings up" and "earnings down" events, and then examine sentiment reactions by individuals who ascribe to a fundamental investment philosophy versus those who do not in a 9-day window around the earnings announcement. We pool the "earnings up" and "earnings down" events by multiplying sentiment reactions in "earnings down" windows by -1. As Panel A of Figure 1 presents, fundamental investors exhibit a positive sentiment reaction to earnings news, consistent with their investment philosophy, whereas non-fundamental investors do not.[24]

The second test is to examine the pattern of message postings across groups around earnings announcement dates. If investors with different investment approaches disagree because of gradual information diffusion (i.e., they observe the same information just at different points in time), they will exhibit a different time pattern of posting messages around disclosures of new information. For example, if fundamental investors discover fundamental information from earnings announcements first, and other types of investors discover the same information at a later date, we would observe an increase in messages by fundamental investors followed by an increase in messages by other investment approaches. We evaluate this message-volume prediction from the gradual information diffusion model by focusing on message volume by approach around firm earnings announcements:

$$\begin{aligned} NumMessages_{git} = \alpha_t + \gamma_i + \beta_1 1WeekBeforeEA_{it} + \beta_2 EA_{it} + \beta_3 1WeekAfterEA_{it} \\ + \beta_4 2WeekAfterEA_{it} + \beta_5 3WeekAfterEA_{it} + \gamma Controls_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \end{aligned} \tag{7}$$

where $NumMessages_{git}$ is the standardized number of messages posted by StockTwits users on day t for firm i for group g, $1WeekBeforeEA$ is a dummy variable equal to 1 if day t for firm i falls in the week before an earnings announcement for that firm, EA_{it} is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i announces earnings on day t, and $1WeekAfterEA_{it}$, $2WeekAfterEA_{it}$, and $3WeekAfterEA_{it}$ are dummy variables for whether day t for firm i falls in week 1, week 2, or week 3 after an earnings announcement, respectively. To account for firm-specific and seasonal patterns in message volume, we also include date and firm fixed effects (α_t and γ_i), as well as controls for media attention, recent volatility and recent abnormal returns.

Table 10 presents regression evidence from estimating equation (7) separately for each investment approach. Regardless of the investment approach, there are significantly more messages posted on earnings announcement days (approximately 0.5 standard deviations more message volume), and the increased message volume persists for a week following the earnings announcement. Moreover, the increase in trading volume is similar in magnitude and statistically indistinguishable across groups. This pattern is consistent with differential interpretation of the same information environ-

[24] As we describe in the validation section, technical investors have greater sentiment around "technical view" events, consistent with their investment philosophy, whereas non-technical investors do not.

ment by different investment philosophies.

More specifically on this point, in the Appendix Table A.10 we examine whether fundamental investors' attention leads the attention of investors who use other approaches. We regress the message volume by nonfundamental investors on lagged message volume by nonfundamental and fundamental investors. We examine the entire time period, as well as times around earnings announcements. We reject that message volume by fundamental investors Granger causes message volume by nonfundamental investors. Together with our evidence on differential sentiment reactions across groups, this finding corroborates the view that cross-group disagreement is likely driven by model-based differences in opinions and not by gradual information diffusion. Together with these findings, our results in Section III.B indicate that most gradual information diffusion occurs within investment philosophies.

IV Robustness

We present two notable robustness tests in this section. First, we show that our disagreement measure is distinct from investor attention, and exhibits a sensible interaction with attention. Second, we examine the robustness of the analysis to dropping technical investors from the construction of the measure. To the extent that technical investors are over-represented on StockTwits, this exercise also speaks to external validity.

IV.A Measuring Disagreement versus Measuring Attention

We evaluate whether our disagreement measure is distinct from investor attention, we control specifically for two notable attention proxies. First, we approximate the amount of attention by using the total number of StockTwits messages posted about a stock on a particular day. Second, we use the Google Search Volume Index (SVI) measure proposed as a measure of attention by Da et al. (2011), which measures the frequency of stock ticker searches on Google for firm i on day t.[25] Using these

[25] For the exact construction of Google SVI at the daily level see Niessner (2016).

proxies for attention, we estimate the following specification:

$$\begin{aligned} AbLogVol_{it} = \alpha_t + \gamma_i + \beta_1 Disagreement_{it} + \beta_2 InvestorAttention_{it} \\ + \gamma AbLogVol_{it-1} + \delta Controls_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \end{aligned} \tag{8}$$

where $Disagreement_{it}$ is the disagreement among all investors about stock i on day t and $InvestorAttention_{it}$ is either the StockTwits message volume or the Google SVI for the stock on that particular day. We also control for trading volume on day $t-1$ to account for persistence in abnormal trading volume. As in our other specifications, we include date and firm fixed effects (α_t and γ_i), controls for media attention, recent volatility and recent abnormal returns, and we cluster standard errors at the date and firm levels. We conduct our analysis on firms for which we observe Google SVI.

Table 11 presents the results from estimating equation (8). For a base of comparison, Column (1) presents our main result without controlling for investor attention. In columns (2) and (3), we control for attention proxies, and find that the estimate on disagreement is quite robust. In columns (3) through (6), the specifications provide a more granular control for attention by including message bin fixed effects,[26] which allow for the effect of attention to be nonlinear with respect to the number of messages. Although the estimated magnitude is somewhat weaker with these more granular attention controls, the relation between disagreement and abnormal trading volume is not due to attention effects.

IV.B External Validity

A potential concern with using StockTwits data is the external validity of the setting. To speak toward external validity, it would be useful to know the fraction of investors by approach in the overall financial market, but information on relative frequencies of investor types is generally not available, and the proxies that exist (e.g., hedge funds) do not exist for styles that map well into our approach categories. Thus, we perform a variety of complementary tests that speak to external validity and the sensitivity of our results to various approach compositions.[27]

[26] Specifically, we define the message bins as firm-date observations with 0 messages, 1 message, 2 message, 3 messages, 4 messages, 5-10 messages, 10-30 messages, and more than 30 messages. Aside from controlling for attention, these fixed effects also account for the possibility that around findings are driven by firm-dates with few message postings.

[27] From the standpoint of external validity, it is useful to note that a recent paper by Giannini et al. (2017) shows the distribution of StockTwits users is consistent with the distributions of U.S. population and economic activity. Although

Although we do not have the precise breakdown of approaches in the market, the proportion of technical investors on StockTwits (38%) is likely higher than the overall proportion of technical investors in the market, as most large institutions place more weight on style investing than on technical analysis.[28] Given the relative overrepresentation of technical investors, in Table 12 we replicate our main results excluding technical investors (i.e., setting their weight to 0, the limit case). In Panel A, we find that when we exclude technical investors, cross-group disagreement accounts for 51.8% of overall disagreement. This proportion is similar to the proportion we obtain using our main specification in Table 4, Panel C (47.5%). In Panel B of Table 12, we replicate the main results from Table 7. After excluding the opinions of technical investors, we obtain very similar results on the relative importance of within-group versus cross-group disagreement, indicating that misalignment of investor types on StockTwits and the overall market does not drive our conclusions.

Another way to evaluate the robustness of our results to external validity concerns is to examine Table 4, Panel C in more detail. The average disagreement among all investors is 0.467, whereas the average within-group disagreement ranges from 0.124 for value investors to 0.341 for technical investors, which is consistently less than the overall level of disagreement, regardless of the population weights. These results suggest that — even though the composition of investment approaches on StockTwits likely differs from the composition of investors in the overall market — the importance of cross-group disagreement is likely to be similar in the overall market.

V Conclusion

There is a significant body of theoretical work on the sources of investor disagreement, which posits that disagreement can arise because investors have different investing models or different information sets (Hong and Stein, 2007). Despite the significant interest in this question, there has been limited empirical research to quantify these sources of disagreement in financial markets, mainly due to the limitation that it is usually impossible to observe an investor's investing model, ex ante. In this paper, we overcome this data limitation by studying message postings by investors on an in-

we do not employ geographic information in our analysis, their evidence on the representativeness of StockTwits provides additional support that our sample is representative of overall U.S. investors.

[28]There is not much work on the behavior and prevalence of technical investing in the finance literature. A notable exception is Avramov et al. (2018) follow the recommendations from the television show, Talking Numbers, which enables a direct comparison of technical versus fundamental stock recommendations.

vesting social network in which users self-classify their investing philosophy and indicate whether individual posts reflect bullish or bearish sentiment. Grouping by investing philosophy, our data enable a novel decomposition overall disagreement into within-group and cross-group disagreement, which provides new insight into the differential implications of model disagreement versus information disagreement.

From our data on message postings, we find that approximately half of investor disagreement is driven by differences across investment philosophies. Despite the even split into different types of disagreement, within-group and cross-group disagreement have different quantitative financial market implications. Specifically, although both sources of disagreement lead to more trading volume, within-group disagreement implies substantially more abnormal trading volume (2.5 to 4 times the effect of cross-group disagreement). These findings suggest that within-group differences (e.g., different information sets) are more likely to generate trades than cross-group differences (e.g., different investing philosophies).

We expect that our disagreement measures and setting will enjoy broad application. Apart from the decomposition into different types of disagreement, our measures can be constructed a higher frequency than other disagreement proxies (daily versus monthly). We highlight this data advantage in an application to excess trading volume after earnings announcements. In this setting, the day-to-day variation in disagreement is critical to study the disagreement-volume relation in the days and weeks following earnings announcements. Consistent with recent theoretical insights (Banerjee et al., 2018) and classic studies of investor disagreement (Kandel and Pearson, 1995), we find changes to disagreement explain up to one-third of the spike in trading volume around earnings announcements. On the other hand, it is notable that more than half of the spike in abnormal volume remains unexplained by disagreement and other factors.

In summary, our decomposition of investor disagreement into within-group and cross-group disagreement implies that not all disagreement is created equally. Although our evidence supports the interpretation that differences across investment models are important, within-group informational differences lead to substantially more trading than differences across investment philosophies. By highlighting the importance of within-group disagreement, these findings provide a new perspective on the importance of interventions to reduce informational asymmetries.

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A Appendix

I.A Alternative Disagreement Measure

As mentioned in Section II, our main disagreement measure is calculated as

$$D = \sqrt{1 - AvgSentiment^2}.$$

Since it's a square-root function, it has the largest slope if there are very few bullish or very few bearish messages. As a robustness test, we also use a function that is linear in the average sentiment measure.

$$D^* = 1 - |AvgSentiment|.$$

This disagreement measure for an example with 10 messages is depicted in the figure below.



Using this measure, the slope of the disagreement function remains the same as the fraction of bearish messages increases in the market. In Table A.9 we rerun our analysis using this measure of disagreement and get qualitatively similar results as our main disagreement measure.

I.B Maximum Entropy Method

There are a plethora of text and document learning algorithms that have been shown (empirically and theoretically) to yield desirable misclassification rates. Some of the more popular methods are maximum entropy, naive Bayes, k-nearest neighbor, and support vector machines. Here, we give a brief outline of the maximum entropy approach.

Excluding neutral opinions, "sentiment" is a binary variable, and therefore a standard logistic regression model can be used to estimate the proportion of bullish investors. Classification can be done by thresholding these probabilities. This technique, also known as a maximum entropy classifier, uses labeled training data to fix a collection of constraints for the model that define the class-specific averages. We will use training data to fix constraints on the conditional distributions of the learned distribution (the condition probability of bullish or bearish classification a particular message). The goal is to find the distribution $p^{\star}$, satisfying these constraints, that maximizes the entropy quantity

$$H(p) = \sum_{x \in \mathscr{X}} p(x) \log \left(\frac{1}{p(x)} \right),$$

where p is a probability mass function that belongs to a collection of mass functions $\mathscr{C}$ satisfying the constraint. That is,

$$p^{\star} = \text{argmax}_{p \in \mathscr{C}} H(p).$$

Let $\mathscr{M}$ denote our dataset. Let $m \in \mathscr{M}$ denote a message and define $f_w(m, c(m))$ to be equal to the proportion of times the word w appears in the message m when it is classified as $c(m)$. Here, $c(m)$ can be either "bearish" or "bullish." We explicitly write $c(m)$ to emphasize the dependence of the class on the message m. We stipulate that the conditional distribution of the class given the message $p(c|m)$ satisfies

$$\frac{1}{|\mathscr{M}|} \sum_{m \in \mathscr{M}} f_w(m, c(m)) = \frac{1}{|\mathscr{M}|} \sum_{m \in \mathscr{M}} \sum_{c} p(c|m) f_w(m, c),$$

for all words w we consider informative. In the above notation, $\mathscr{C}$ is the collection of all probabilities $p(c|m)$ satisfying the above constraints. Then we choose

$$p^{\star}(c|m) = \text{argmax}_{p(c|m) \in \mathscr{C}} H(p(c|m)).$$

Using the concavity of the logarithm, it can be shown that

$$p^{\star}(c|m) = \frac{\exp\{\sum_w \lambda_w f_w(m,c)\}}{\sum_c \exp\{\sum_w \lambda_w f_w(m,c)\}},$$

where the λ_w are estimated from the data. We classify a message m as bearish or bullish according to a 0.5 threshold for $p^{\star}(c|m)$. For more details on this method, we refer the reader to Nigam et al. (1999). We performed the maximum entropy algorithm separately within the six types of investment approach: growth, technical, value, momentum, fundamental, and global macro.

I.C Producing a Disagreement Measure in the Spirit of Giannini et al. (2018)

In Giannini et al. (2018), the authors download all breaking news and company press releases that mention the company name or the company ticker from PR News Wire, Dow Jones News Wire, and Reuters News Wire from the Factiva news database. They then use the maximum entropy approach to estimate the sentiment of every news article. We adopt a conceptually similar approach that is more easily replicable by turning to Ravenpack (a news database that collects and classifies news articles and company press releases) as that is much more readily available. The advantage of using Ravenpack is that Ravenpack produces a standardized classification methodology for sentiment of articles about firms, which avoids the need to replicate the time-intensive maximum entropy approach in constructing a measure analogous to Giannini et al. (2018). Further, the advantages extend to other researchers and practitioners, who can adopt a similar methodology to construct a Giannini et al. (2018)-like measure of disagreement.

Using Ravenpack, we collect company press releases from PR News Wire and Dow Jones News Wire. Ravenpack uses proprietary methods to assign a sentiment score to every article, which we use to classify articles into "bearish" and "bullish" categories. We then follow Giannini et al. (2018) in constructing the IMPACT and the NEWS measures, where the former measures the StockTwits sentiment and the latter captures the news media sentiment. We calculate these measures at the firm-day level.

To calculate the IMPACT measure at the daily level, we first assign each StockTwits message a -1 or 1, based on whether the message was bearish or bullish, and then weigh each message by 1 plus the number of followers the author of the message has. In other words, for an individual message $IMPACT = (1 + Followers) \times Sentiment$. We then add the IMPACT score for every message to the firm-day level.

We repeat the above procedure with press releases, by assigning -1 or 1 to each article, based on its sentiment, and then add up those sentiment scores for each firm at the daily level. To calculate the final disagreement measure, at the firm-day level, we follow Giannini et al. (2018) and define disagreement (DIVOP) to be 0 if both IMPACT and NEWS are either positive or both are negative (there is agreement), and 1 otherwise (there is disagreement).

Note that our reproduction of the Giannini et al. (2018) measure is not an exact replication of their original measure, as we use the Ravenpack data instead of manually downloading the Factiva articles. However, the replicated measure has the same concept — difference in sentiment between the media and the StockTwits messages, and we believe that this is a reasonable approach to take for someone who wants to replicate the original measure.

B Tables and Figures

II.A Figures

Figure 1: Sentiment Around Fundamental and Technical Events

Note: This figure presents the average sentiment around earnings announcements and technical events as defined by media analytics provider, RavenPack. In Figure (a) we present the average sentiment by fundamental and non-fundamental investors around events that Raven Pack designates as “earnings-up” and “earnings-down”. The “earnings-up” events are defined as “The Company announces an increase in financial earnings results for the period.” The ‘earnings-down’ events are defined as “The Company announces a decrease in financial earnings results for the period.” The bars are 1.645*standard errors of the sentiment measure. In Figure (b) we present the average sentiment by technical and non-technical investors around events that Raven Pack designates as “technical-bullish” and “technical-bearish”. The “technical-bullish” events are defined as “Technical analysis indicates the Entity’s price will appreciate or gain value.” The ‘technical-bearish’ events are defined as “Technical analysis indicates the Entity’s price will depreciate or lose value.” We only look at events that did not have any other technical bullish/bearish events in the proceeding/following 3 days. The bars are 1.645*standard errors of the sentiment measure. Since we have both positive and negative events, we multiply the sentiment around negative events by -1, to ensure that they do not cancel each other out.

(a) Sentiment around Earnings Announcements



(b) Sentiment Around Technical Events



Figure 2: Timing of Messages Posted

Note: This figure presents a frequency distribution of the (a) days of the week and (b) hours of the day (Eastern Standard Time) that messages are posted to StockTwits. Trading hours are plotted in dark, whereas non-trading hours are plotted as lighter bars.

(a) Day-of-Week Frequency Distribution of Messages Posted



(b) Hour-of-Day Frequency Distribution of Messages Posted



Figure 3: Examples of StockTwits User Profiles

Note: This figure presents screenshots of representative user profiles from StockTwits, illustrating the difference between novice, intermediate and professional StockTwits users.

(a) Novice Trader Profile



(b) Intermediate Trader Profile

(c) Professional Trader Profile



Figure 4: Performance of StockTwits Sentiment Strategies

Note: This figure presents the cumulative abnormal returns of strategies that buy when sentiment is bullish and sell when sentiment is bearish for several sentiment classifications: (a) the sentiment of all StockTwits users ("All Investors"), (b) the sentiment of Novices, (c) the sentiment of Intermediates, and (d) the sentiment of Professionals.

(a) All Investors



(b) Novices



(c) Intermediate



(d) Professionals



Figure 5: Timeline for Calculating Disagreement

Note: This figure explains the timeline for how we compute disagreement. We assign any messages that are posted on day $t-1$ after 4pm to trading day t, because trading stops at 4pm on day $t-1$. Similarly, we assign any messages posted after 4pm on day t to day $t+1$. To calculate "overnight" changes in disagreement, before the market opens (BMO) on day t, we include messages that are posted after 4pm on day $t-1$, and before 9am on day t.



Figure 6: An Example of the Disagreement Measure

Note: This figure portrays how our main disagreement measure depends on the average sentiment of the underlying messages.



C Tables

Table 1: Characteristics of StockTwits Data

Note: In this table, we report summary statistics from the StockTwits data. In particular, Panel A presents summary information on the coverage by stock and user, as well as user-level information. Panel B presents frequency distributions of users and messages posted by investment philosophy, holding period and experience, which are observed user profile characteristics.

Panel A: Characteristics of Messages and Users

	Mean	Stdev	Min	p25	p50	p75	Max
Number of messages per stock	14,420	32,493	616	1,589	5,296	14,686	275,969
Number of meesages per user	119	391	1	5	19	80	11,759
Number of messages per stock per day	43	134	1	3	10	31	4,690
Sentiment stock/day	0.439	0.518	-1	0.167	0.5	1	1
Number of followers user has	212	2,126	0	2	6	21	96,433
Number of people user follows	45	197	0	5	15	45	9,990
Total Days Active	457	411	1	131	343	679	1,908

Panel B: Frequencies of User Profile Characteristics

Investment Philosophy	Num. Users	Percent Users	Num. Messages	Percent Messages
Fundamental	1,505	12.51%	203,383	14.10%
Technical	4,610	38.32%	538,425	37.02%
Momentum	2,395	19.91%	368,939	26.12%
Global Macro	269	2.24%	12,974	0.90%
Growth	2,158	17.94%	217,504	15.08%
Value	1,092	9.08%	100,826	6.99 %
Total	12,029	100%	1,442,051	100%

Holding Period	Num. Users	Percent Users	Num. Messages	Percent Messages
Day Trader	1,872	15.56%	267,896	18.58%
Swing Trader	5,313	44.17%	660,898	45.83%
Position Trader	2,668	22.29%	288,238	19.99%
Long Term Investor	2,176	18.09%	225,019	15.60%
Total	12,029	100%	1,442,051	100%

Experience	Num. Users	Percent Users	Num. Messages	Percent Messages
Novice	3,392	28.20%	228,041	15.81%
Intermediate	6,272	52.14%	803,198	55.70%
Professional	2,365	19.66%	410,812	28.49%
Total	12,029	100%	1,442,051	100%

Table 2: Textual Validation of User Approaches

Note: This table presents three textual validation exercises for the self-defined user approaches. Panel A presents the 15 most salient words by investment approach, which is a technique to parse the useful content of a source text (as in Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2016). Panel B presents Kullback-Liebler divergence calculations for each strategy relative to fundamental. Standard errors are computed using 100 bootstrap replications of the fundamental word distribution, and then, recomputing the Kullback-Liebler divergence. Panel C presents Kullback-Liebler divergence calculations relative to two focal investors who write extensively about investments outside of StockTwits – Gregory Harmon (technical) and Todd Sullivan (value). For ease of comparison, the Kullback-Liebler divergence calculations are grouped by trends-oriented approaches (technical and momentum) versus more fundamentally-oriented approaches (growth, value, fundamental).

Panel A: Most Salient Words Used by Approach

Approach	**Most Common Unique Words**
Fundamental	eps, sales, growth, sentiment, read, revenue, earnings, million, quarter, consensus, billion, share, cash, results, analysts
Technical	chart, support, nice, break, looking, looks, gap, move, day, stop, calls, daily, close, resistance, bounce
Momentum	play, calls, time, via, week, day, news, squeeze, hod (high of day), hit, shares, cover, highs, run, money
Value	view, attempts, bulls, rising, aboard, stair, intraday, correction overextended, breakdown, fresh, mayb, steak, moved, rollout
Growth	news, er (earnings report), hope, green, shares, plug, money, article, time, bears, waitings, ve, wait, board, share, future

Panel B: Kullback-Liebler Divergences of Word Distributions by Approach (Fundamental as the Baseline Approach)

	Growth	Momentum	Technical	Value
Divergence from Fundamental	0.0854	0.1146	0.1919	0.2336
Standard Error (100 bootstrap replications)	0.00008	0.00009	0.00009	0.00008

Panel C: Divergence from Writing by Focal Investors (Comparisons to Writing Outside of Stock-Twits)

	Fund, Value, Growth	Technical, Momentum	Difference	Standard Error	T-stat
Technical Focal Investor	1.186	1.113	0.073	0.028	2.624
Value Focal Investor	1.284	1.512	-0.228	0.039	-5.871

Table 3: Model and Information Words

Note: In this table we examine whether present words that we determined are either more related to differences across models or to differences in information. In Panel A, we hand-classified the top 1000 most frequently used words across strategies into three different lists – information words, model words, and unclassified words. We display the information and the model words. Information words are words that describe the timing, source or direction of information (e.g., "positive", "today", "yesterday", "news", "cnbc"), whereas model words are words that describe a particular approach or analysis of market information (e.g., "sma" (simple moving average), "pattern," "reversal", "upgrades", "squeeze", "ichan", "director"). In Panel B, we present the frequency distribution of the number of strategies that commonly use information words versus model words. A word is commonly used by a strategy if it is one of the 250 most commonly used words among StockTwits users who adhere to that strategy. In Panel C, we present a two-sample t-test for the difference in the mean number of strategies – out of the five: technical, momentum, fundamental, value and growth – that commonly use information words versus model words.

Panel A: Words that are related to models or information

Information Words			Model Words			
yesterday	month	beat	value	growth	dip	set
weeks	money	cnbc	trend	gap	analyst	setup
weekly	monday	volume	transcript	fill	analysts	stage
week	lower	real	top	rsi	director	reversal
watch	looks		bottom	macd	candle	reports
watching	looking		test	bollinger	charts	pullback
waiting	look		swing	crossover	business	pattern
wait	friday		support	director	dma	moving
tomorrow	day		statement	deal	corporation	line
time	days		squeeze	cover	consensus	icahn
term	daily		sales	chart	conference	guidance
strong	coming		revenue	ceo	double	
stocks	close		resistance	breakout	data	
start	call		report	breaking	expected	
soon	calls		pattern	break	expect	
share	bulls		ownership	bounce	fast	
ready	bullish		near	bottom	flag	
quarter	bull		ma	volume	eps	
positive	bears		min	stop	er	
position	bearish		acquisition	profit	worth	
options	bad		levels	profits	wall	
news	article		level	pop	street	
move	added		key	low	upgrades	
morning	add		hod	earnings	sma	
months	current		highs	drop	trigger	

Panel B: Distributions of model and information words across investment philosophies.

Distribution of Model Words across Investment Philosophies					
Number of approaches that commonly use the word	1	2	3	4	5
Count of words	19	9	7	10	32
Distribution of Information Words across Investment Philosophies					
Number of approaches that commonly use the word	1	2	3	4	5
Count of words	1	0	2	3	47

Panel C: Test for differential use of information versus model words across StockTwits strategies.

	Mean # of Strategies that commonly use		
	Information words	Model words	Difference
Estimate	4.792	3.351	1.441^{***}
T-stat			(6.763)

Table 4: Sentiment and Disagreement Summary Statistics

Note: In this table, we display summary statistics of sentiment and disagreement measures. Panel A shows the distribution of bearish, bullish, and unclassified messages in the original sample in column (1), and the distribution of messages after we apply the maximum entropy approach to the unclassified messages, in column (2). Panel B presents the sentiment (average bullishness) by investment philosophy. Panel C presents summary information on the StockTwits measure of disagreement. The first three rows show summary statistics for disagreement for all investors, disagreement across groups with different investment philosophies, and the weighted average disagreement within groups. The weights are proportional to the number of investors with each approach. The table further shows the distribution of within-group disagreement by the individual investment philosophies. Panel D presents the amount of autocorrelation for the disagreement and sentiment measures. Panel E presents correlations between our main disagreement measure for all investors and other commonly used measures of disagreement (analyst dispersion, return volatility, and Giannini et al. (2018) measure), as well as with abnormal log trading volume.

Panel A: Sentiment Classification

	Number of Messages	
Sentiment	Original Sample	MaxEnt Classification
Bearish	86,615	452,258
Bullish	385,753	989,793
Unclassified	969,683	

Panel B: Sentiment Summary Statistics

	Average Sentiment	
	Mean	Stdev
All Investors	0.342	0.492
Fundamental	0.146	0.494
Technical	0.264	0.535
Momentum	0.237	0.504
Growth	0.252	0.489
Value	0.118	0.457

Panel C: Disagreement Within and Across Approaches

	Mean	Stdev	Min	p25	p50	p75	Max
All Investors	0.467	0.446	0	0	0.628	0.932	1
Cross-group Disagreement	0.382	0.262	0	0.151	0.435	0.545	1.117
Within-group Disagreement	0.245	0.299	0	0	0	0.480	0.994
Fundamental	0.172	0.354	0	0	0	0.531	1
Technical	0.341	0.434	0	0	0	0.866	1
Momentum	0.249	0.401	0	0	0	0.699	1
Growth	0.171	0.346	0	0	0	0.000	1
Value	0.124	0.313	0	0	0	0.000	1

Panel D: Autocorrelations for Disagreement and Sentiment

Disagreement			Sentiment					
Overall	Within-group	Cross-group	Average	Fundamental	Technical	Momentum	Growth	Value
0.345	0.500	0.265	0.311	0.183	0.185	0.164	0.187	0.160

Panel E: Correlations with other Disagreement Measures

Disagreement among	Analyst Dispersion	Return Volatility	Giannini et al. measure	Abnormal Log Volume
All Investors	0.030	-0.018	0.206	0.116
Cross-group Disagreement	-0.054	-0.151	0.391	0.052
Within-group Disagreement	0.062	0.076	0.129	0.188

Table 5: Examples of Bullish and Bearish Messages

Note: In this table, we present examples of some of the more bullish and bearish messages, according to our classification algorithm.

Bullish Messages
"$ZNGA BUY BUY BUY BUY BUY BUY BUY BUY BUY BUY BUY BUY BUY BUY BUY BUY BUY BUY BUY BUY BUY BUY BUY BUY BUY BUY BUY BUY BUY BUY BUY BUY BUY"
"$RXII way oversold but no worries I'm confident in the company's future!"
Bearish Messages
"$ZNGA Investors need to see growth, there is none with this game anymore, sad but true, they need to keep investors happy, just business"
"$AAPL It happened to BBRY & it appears it is happening to aapl, the downhill slide can happen in a few qtrs 1st a loss of mrkt share then :("

Table 6: Quantifying Disagreement Across Investment Models

Note: This table presents analysis of variance specifications for first differenced sentiment, using the following regression:

$$\Delta AvgSentiment_{itg} = \alpha_t + \gamma_i + InvestmentPhilosophyFEs + \varepsilon_{itg}$$

where $\Delta AvgSentiment_{itg}$ is the difference between the average sentiment measure on day t and day $t-1$. The regressions include date (α_t), firm (γ_i), and investment philosophy fixed effects as noted in the columns. We also examine the results if we include investment philosophy $\times$ year-month and investment philosophy $\times$ year-week fixed effects.

	Δ $Sentiment_{itg}$				
Sentiment Categories	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Firm FEs	X	X	X	X	X
Date FEs		X	X	X	X
Investment philosophy FEs			X		
Investment philosophy $\times$ Year-month FEs				X	
Investment philosophy $\times$ Year-week FEs					X
R-squared	0.004	0.007	0.016	0.018	0.022
Observations	102,567	102,567	102,567	102,567	102,567

Table 7: Disagreement and Trading Volume

Note: This table examines how each of the measures of disagreement relates to trading volume. We run the following regression:

$$AbLogVol_{it} = \alpha_t + \gamma_i + \beta DisagreementMeasure_{it} + \gamma AbLogVol_{it-1} + \delta Controls_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

$AbLogVol_{it}$ is the difference between log volume in time period t and the average log volume from $t-140$ to $t-20$ trading days (6-month period, skipping a month) for firm i. In columns (1) and (2) of Panel A, $DisagreementMeasure_{it}$ is the disagreement among all investors. In columns (3) and (4), it is $CrossDisagreement_{it}$ which is disagreement across different investment philosophies for firm i on day t. In columns (5) and (6), it is $WithinDisagreement_{it}$ which is disagreement among investors with the same investment philosophies. The disagreement measures are either contemporaneous to the abnormal log volume t, or are constructed from messages that were posted before the market opens (BMO) (between 4pm on day $t-1$ and and 9am on day t). We standardize the disagreement measures by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation, over the entire sample period. Since trading volume tends to be autocorrelated, we also control for abnormal trading volume on day $t-1$. Controls include $MediaArticle_{it}$, which is a dummy variable equals 1 if firm i was mentioned either in the Wall Street Journal or the New York Times on day t; Volatility (t-5 to t-1) which is measured as the standard deviation of abnormal returns over days t-5 to t-1; cumulative abnormal returns over days t-30 to t-6 and t-5 to t-1.
In Panel B, we examine cross-group along with within-group disagreement, at time period t and BMO. We also examine the disagreement variance ratio, which is the fraction of overall disagreement (in variance units) that originates from differences of opinion within group .
In Panel C, we examine the effect of cross-group disagreement on log abnormal trading volume separately for companies with high and low institutional ownership. We define a firm to have high institutional ownership if it is above the median in our firms.
All regressions include date and firm fixed effects (α_t and γ_i). Standard errors are clustered by firm and date. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Panel A: Disagreement and Trading Volume

	Abnormal Log Volume (t)					
Disagreement measure	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Disagreement (t)	0.099***					
	(0.008)					
Disagreement (BMO, t)		0.053***				
		(0.006)				
Cross-group Disagreement (t)			0.030***			
			(0.008)			
Cross-group Disagreement (BMO, t)				0.033***		
				(0.005)		
Within-group Disagreement (t)					0.175***	
					(0.011)	
Within-group Disagreement (BMO, t)						0.085***
						(0.009)
AbLogVol (t-1)	0.719***	0.723***	0.727***	0.725***	0.705***	0.717***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.016)
Media (t)	0.069***	0.071***	0.080***	0.077***	0.045***	0.057***
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Volatility (t-5 to t-1)	0.259	0.364	0.398*	0.391*	0.164	0.331
	(0.229)	(0.237)	(0.233)	(0.233)	(0.238)	(0.243)
AbRet (t-5 to t-1)	0.178***	0.174***	0.173***	0.172***	0.172***	0.167***
	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.053)
AbRet (t-30 to t-6)	0.113***	0.119***	0.117***	0.118***	0.108***	0.117***
	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.025)
Observations	42,041	42,041	42,041	42,041	42,041	42,041
R-squared	0.637	0.633	0.632	0.632	0.649	0.636

Panel B: Contrasting Within-Group and Cross-Group Disagreement

	Abnormal Log Volume (t)			
Disagreement measure	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Cross-group Disagreement (t)	0.045***			
	(0.008)			
Within-group Disagreement (t)	0.181***			
	(0.012)			
Cross-group Disagreement (BMO, t)		0.036***		
		(0.005)		
Within-group Disagreement (BMO, t)		0.087***		
		(0.009)		
Var Disagreement Ratio (t)			0.122***	
			(0.008)	
Var Disagreement Ratio (BMO, t)				0.058***
				(0.006)
AbLogVol (t-1)	0.700***	0.711***	0.715***	0.722***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Media (t)	0.045***	0.054***	0.066***	0.070***
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Volatility (t-5 to t-1)	0.099	0.282	0.261	0.376
	(0.233)	(0.240)	(0.225)	(0.238)
AbRet (t-5 to t-1)	0.175***	0.167***	0.163***	0.166***
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.052)
AbRet (t-30 to t-6)	0.103***	0.114***	0.111***	0.117***
	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.025)
Observations	42,041	42,041	42,041	42,041
R-squared	0.651	0.637	0.641	0.633

Panel C: Sample Splits by High versus Low Institutional Ownership

	Abnormal Log Volume (t)					
	High Institutional Ownership			Low Institutional Ownership		
Disagreement measure	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Cross-group Disagreement (t)	0.028***			0.032**		
	(0.008)			(0.013)		
Within-group Disagreement (t)		0.175***			0.181***	
		(0.016)			(0.017)	
Overall Disagreement (t)			0.097***			0.107***
			(0.008)			(0.015)
AbLogVol (t-1)	0.703***	0.668***	0.689***	0.735***	0.718***	0.730***
	(0.037)	(0.046)	(0.041)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.014)
Media (t)	0.080***	0.050***	0.071***	0.082***	0.044**	0.070***
	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.022)
Volatility (t-5 to t-1)	0.465	0.161	0.295	0.300	0.100	0.171
	(0.281)	(0.318)	(0.287)	(0.292)	(0.300)	(0.287)
AbRet (t-5 to t-1)	-0.012	-0.009	-0.005	0.233***	0.221***	0.231***
	(0.071)	(0.065)	(0.068)	(0.060)	(0.063)	(0.062)
AbRet (t-30 to t-6)	0.055*	0.051	0.058*	0.129***	0.114***	0.120***
	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.033)
Observations	20,990	20,990	20,990	21,051	21,051	21,051
R-squared	0.578	0.610	0.589	0.657	0.668	0.660

Table 8: Disagreement and Sophistication

Note: This table examines disagreement among sophisticated and unsophisticated investors. We define sophisticated investors as professional investors . Unsophisticated investors are defined as intermediate or novice investors. In Panel A we run the following regression:

$$AbLogVol_{it} = \alpha_t + \gamma_i + \beta DisagreementntMeasures_{it} + \gamma AbLogVol_{it-1} + \delta Controls_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

$AbLogVol_{it}$ is the difference between log volume in time period t and the average log volume from $t-140$ to $t-20$ trading days (6-month period, skipping a month) for firm i. In column (1) we define Dis Sophisticated as the weighted mean of within-group disagreements among sophisticated investors of each investment philosophy. The weights are the number of messages posted by sophisticated investors in each philosophy. Dis Unsophisticated is defined similarly, only looking at unsophisticated investors. We define |Dis S - U| as a weighted mean of the absolute value of the difference between the average sentiment of sophisticated investors and of unsophisticated investors for each investment philosophy . In column (2) we measure disagreement on day t before the market opens (BMO) (between 4pm on day $t-1$ and and 9am on day t), and in column (3) as disagreement on day t after the market opens (AMO) (between 9am and 4pm on day t). In Panel B we perform a lead-lag analysis, where we examine whether sentiment by sophisticated investors leads sentiment by unsophisticated investors and visa versa. Overall sophisticated and unsophisticated sentiment is defined as the weighted mean of sophisticated and unsophisticated sentiment for individual investment philosophies. We standardize the disagreement and the sentiment measures by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation, over the entire sample period. Since trading volume tends to be autocorrelated, we also control for abnormal trading volume on day $t-1$. As controls we include $MediaArticle_{it}$, which is a dummy variable equals 1 if firm i was mentioned either in the Wall Street Journal or the New York Times on day t; Volatility (t-5 to t-1) which is measured as the standard deviation of abnormal returns over days t-5 to t-1; cumulative abnormal returns over days t-30 to t-6 and t-5 to t-1. The regressions include date and firm fixed effects (α_t and γ_i). Standard errors are clustered by firm and date. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Panel A:

	Abnormal Log Volume (t)		
Disagreement measure	(1)	(2)	(3)
Dis Sophisticated	0.077***		
	(0.024)		
Dis Unsophisticated	0.097***		
	(0.008)		
|Dis S - U|	0.025***		
	(0.006)		
Dis Sophisticated (BMO, t)		0.068***	
		(0.007)	
Dis Unsophisticated (BMO, t)		0.042***	
		(0.012)	
|Dis S - U| (BMO, t)		0.031***	
		(0.004)	
Dis Sophisticated (AMO, t)			0.061***
			(0.006)
Dis Unsophisticated (AMO, t)			0.030***
			(0.011)
|Dis S - U| (AMO, t)			0.044***
			(0.005)
AbLogVol (t-1)	0.712***	0.719***	0.715***
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Media	0.040***	0.056***	0.050***
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Volatility (t-5 to t-1)	0.250	0.357	0.375
	(0.247)	(0.242)	(0.240)
AbRet (t-5 to t-1)	0.165***	0.151***	0.148***
	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.052)
AbRet (t-30 to t-6)	0.111***	0.112***	0.112***
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Observations	42,041	42,041	42,041
R-squared	0.645	0.639	0.638

Panel B:

Disagreement measure	Sentiment Sophisticated (AMO) (1)	Sentiment Unsophisticated (AMO) (2)
Sentiment Sophisticated (BMO)	0.065***	0.025***
	(0.014)	(0.005)
Sentiment Unsophisticated (BMO)	0.007	0.454***
	(0.008)	(0.012)
AbLogVol (t-1)	0.017***	0.014***
	(0.003)	(0.004)
Media	0.016***	0.023***
	(0.004)	(0.005)
Volatility (t-5 to t-1)	-0.019	0.077
	(0.034)	(0.063)
AbRet (t-5 to t-1)	0.032***	0.038**
	(0.011)	(0.015)
AbRet (t-30 to t-6)	0.007	0.017**
	(0.005)	(0.007)
Observations	42,053	42,053
R-squared	0.394	0.573

Table 9: Disagreement and Trading Volume around Earnings Announcements

Note: In this table, we examine disagreement among investors and trading volume around earnings announcements. We run the following regression:

$$\begin{aligned} AbLogVol_{it} &= \alpha_t + \gamma_i + \beta_1 1WeekBeforeEA_{it} + \beta_2 EA_{it} + \beta_3 1WeekAfterEA_{it} \\ &+ \beta_4 2WeekAfterEA_{it} + \beta_5 3WeekAfterEA_{it} + \gamma Disagreement_{it} \\ &+ \delta_1 Disagreement_{it} \times 1WeekBeforeEA_{it} + \delta_2 Disagreement_{it} \times EA_{it} \\ &+ \delta_3 Disagreement_{it} \times 1WeekAfterEA_{it} + \delta_4 Disagreement_{it} \times 2WeeksAfterEA_{it} \\ &+ \delta_5 Disagreement_{it} \times 3WeeksAfterEA_{it} + SUE_{iq} + Controls_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \end{aligned}$$

Where $AbLogVol_{it}$ is the abnormal log trading volume on day t for firm i, $1WeekBeforeEA$ is a dummy variable equal to 1 if day t for firm i falls in the week before an earnings announcement for that firm, EA_{it} is a dummy variable equal one if firm i announces earnings on day t, $1WeekAfterEA_{it}$, $2WeekAfterEA_{it}$, $3WeekAfterEA_{it}$ are dummy variables for whether day t for firm i falls in week 1, week 2, or week 3 after an earnings announcement, respectively. $Disagreement_{it}$ is our measure of investor disagreement about stock i on day t. SUE_{iq} is the earnings surprise in quarter q for firm i, defined as the earnings minus the median analyst forecast. Columns (1)-(3) include all observations that are around earnings announcements with a non-missing earnings surprise, while columns (4) and (5) have observations with a positive earnings surprise and columns (6) and (7) have observations with a negative earnings surprise. We standardize the disagreement measure by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation, over the entire sample period. Controls include $MediaArticle_{it}$, which is a dummy variable equals 1 if firm i was mentioned either in the Wall Street Journal or the New York Times on day t; Volatility (t-5 to t-1) which is measured as the standard deviation of abnormal returns over days t-5 to t-1; cumulative abnormal returns over days t-30 to t-6 and t-5 to t-1. The regressions include date and firm fixed effects (α_t and γ_i). Standard errors are clustered by firm and date. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.

	Abnormal Log Volume						
	Full Sample			Positive Earnings Surprise		Negative Earnings Surprise	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
1 Week before EA	0.039	0.038	0.043	0.027	0.028	0.039	0.040
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.037)	(0.037)
EA	0.658***	0.594***	0.534***	0.711***	0.595***	0.560***	0.429***
	(0.048)	(0.045)	(0.047)	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.063)	(0.062)
1 Week after EA	0.241***	0.223***	0.208***	0.234***	0.190***	0.216***	0.197***
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.031)	(0.043)	(0.041)
2 Weeks after EA	0.040*	0.034	0.034	0.036	0.028	0.031	0.027
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.034)	(0.033)
3 Weeks after EA	-0.020	-0.022	-0.022	-0.013	-0.019	-0.040	-0.036
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.031)	(0.030)
Disagreement		0.147***	0.142***		0.133***		0.175***
		(0.015)	(0.016)		(0.016)		(0.023)
Disagreement × 1 Week before EA			-0.023		-0.002		-0.041
			(0.014)		(0.013)		(0.029)
Disagreement × EA			0.119***		0.092*		0.147***
			(0.039)		(0.051)		(0.055)
Disagreement × 1 Week after EA			0.066***		0.085***		0.041
			(0.021)		(0.024)		(0.036)
Disagreement × 2 Weeks after EA			0.006		0.005		0.009
			(0.017)		(0.019)		(0.030)
Disagreement × 3 Weeks after EA			-0.000		0.006		-0.008
			(0.015)		(0.020)		(0.030)
SUE	-0.007	-0.007	-0.007	-0.016**	-0.016**	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Media (t) (t)	0.163***	0.147***	0.143***	0.150***	0.135***	0.177***	0.151***
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.048)	(0.046)
Volatility (t-5 to t-1)	7.232***	6.726***	6.694***	8.790***	8.141***	5.622***	5.022***
	(1.053)	(1.013)	(1.015)	(0.763)	(0.781)	(1.097)	(1.063)
AbRet (t-5 to t-1)	0.350	0.374	0.375	0.683***	0.656***	0.382	0.431
	(0.247)	(0.238)	(0.237)	(0.159)	(0.157)	(0.297)	(0.285)
AbRet (t-30 to t-6)	0.585***	0.579***	0.579***	0.408***	0.401***	0.741***	0.729***
	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.087)	(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.118)	(0.116)
Observations	32,042	32,042	32,042	19,079	19,079	12,889	12,889
R-squared	0.227	0.248	0.249	0.266	0.292	0.310	0.333

Table 10: Number of Messages around Earnings Announcements

Note: In this table, we examine the number of messages posted by individual groups around earnings announcements. We run the following regression:

$$\begin{aligned} NumMessages_{itg} &= \alpha_t + \gamma_i + \beta_1 1WeekBeforeEA_{it} + \beta_2 EA_{it} + \beta_3 1WeekAfterEA_{it} \\ &+ \beta_4 2WeekAfterEA_{it} + \beta_5 3WeekAfterEA_{it} + \delta Controls_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \end{aligned}$$

Where $NumMessages_{itg}$ is the number of messages posted by group g on day t for firm i, $1WeekBeforeEA$ is a dummy variable equal to 1 if day t for firm i falls in the week before an earnings announcement for that firm, EA_{it} is a dummy variable equal one if firm i announces earnings on day t, $1WeekAfterEA_{it}$, $2WeekAfterEA_{it}$, $3WeekAfterEA_{it}$ are dummy variables for whether day t for firm i falls in week 1, week 2, or week 3 after an earnings announcement, respectively. We standardize $NumMessages_{itg}$ by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation, over the entire sample period. Controls include $MediaArticle_{it}$, which is a dummy variable equals 1 if firm i was mentioned either in the *Wall Street Journal* or the *New York Times* on day t; Volatility (t-5 to t-1) which is measured as the standard deviation of abnormal returns over days t-5 to t-1; cumulative abnormal returns over days t-30 to t-6 and t-5 to t-1. The regressions include date and firm fixed effects (α_t and γ_i). Standard errors are clustered by firm and date. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.

	Number of Messages for				
	Fundamental	Technical	Momentum	Value	Growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
1 Week before EA	0.026	0.022	0.027	0.053	0.028
	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.045)	(0.028)
EA	0.487***	0.576***	0.535***	0.604***	0.525***
	(0.109)	(0.114)	(0.096)	(0.128)	(0.098)
1 Week after EA	0.197***	0.226***	0.214***	0.192***	0.190***
	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.050)	(0.048)
2 Weeks after EA	0.024*	0.024*	0.029	0.028	0.007
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.014)
3 Weeks after EA	0.007	0.009	0.000	0.015	0.005
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.012)
Media (t)	0.176***	0.254***	0.197***	0.170***	0.178***
	(0.043)	(0.076)	(0.053)	(0.048)	(0.046)
Volatility (t-5 to t-1)	1.291***	1.498***	1.753***	1.728**	1.597***
	(0.376)	(0.390)	(0.413)	(0.715)	(0.474)
AbRet (t-5 to t-1)	0.326**	0.337**	0.616***	0.407**	0.338*
	(0.158)	(0.146)	(0.167)	(0.188)	(0.172)
AbRet (t-30 to t-6)	0.132*	0.148**	0.223***	0.241*	0.194**
	(0.078)	(0.072)	(0.083)	(0.138)	(0.082)
Observations	42,060	42,060	42,060	42,060	42,060
R-squared	0.462	0.439	0.378	0.295	0.343

Table 11: Disagreement and Investor Attention

Note: This table examines whether our measure of disagreement complements investor attention in explaining abnormal trading volume. We run the following regression:

$$\begin{aligned} AbLogVol_{it} &= \alpha_t + \gamma_i + \beta_1 Disagreement_{it} + \beta_2 InvestorAttention_{it} + AbLogVol_{it-1} \\ &\quad + Controls_{it} + MessageNumberFEs + \varepsilon_{it} \end{aligned}$$

Where $Disagreement_{it}$ is the overall disagreement for a given firm i on day t. In columns (2) and (5) $InvestorAttention_{it}$ is the total number of messages posted on StockTwits about firm i on day t. In columns (3) and (6) $InvestorAttention_{it}$ is the abnormal Google Search Volume Index for ticker of firm i on day t. $AbLogVol_{it}$ is the difference between log volume in time period t and the average log volume from $t-140$ to $t-20$ trading days (6-month period, skipping a month) for firm i. Since trading volume tends to be autocorrelated, we also control for abnormal trading volume on day $t-1$. We standardize the disagreement measure and the total number of messages by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation, over the entire sample period. The regressions include date and firm fixed effects (α_t and γ_i). As controls we include $MediaArticle_{it}$, which is a dummy variable equals 1 if firm i was mentioned either in the *Wall Street Journal* or the *New York Times* on day t; Volatility (t-5 to t-1) which is measured as the standard deviation of abnormal returns over days t-5 to t-1; cumulative abnormal returns over days t-30 to t-6 and t-5 to t-1. Columns (4), (5) and (6) include *MessageBin* fixed effects that are defined as days with 0 messages, 1 message, 2 message, 3 messages, 4 messages, 5-10 messages, 10-30 messages, and more than 30 message. Standard errors are clustered by firm and date. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.

	Abnormal Log Volume (t)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Disagreement	0.088***	0.081***	0.081***	0.052***	0.031***	0.045***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Number of messages		0.103***			0.081***	
		(0.027)			(0.020)	
AbLog(GoogleSVI)			0.268***			0.204***
			(0.027)			(0.027)
AbLogVol (t-1)	0.712***	0.695***	0.685***	0.675***	0.665***	0.658***
	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Media (t)	0.066***	0.045***	0.047***	0.039***	0.026**	0.027**
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Volatility (t-5 to t-1)	0.279	0.156	0.249	0.128	0.037	0.114
	(0.232)	(0.274)	(0.261)	(0.266)	(0.283)	(0.285)
AbRet (t-5 to t-1)	0.164***	0.099	0.128**	0.111	0.065	0.087
	(0.060)	(0.066)	(0.056)	(0.067)	(0.071)	(0.063)
AbRet (t-30 to t-6)	0.088***	0.058	0.056*	0.058*	0.037	0.036
	(0.031)	(0.037)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.037)	(0.030)
Observations	27,662	27,662	27,662	27,525	27,525	27,525
R-squared	0.631	0.646	0.643	0.661	0.670	0.667
Message Bins FEs				X	X	X

Table 12: Robustness to Excluding Technical Investors

Note: This table presents our main results after excluding Technical investors. Panel A presents summary information on the StockTwits measure of disagreement. The first three rows show summary statistics for disagreement for all investors, disagreement across groups with different investment philosophies, and the weighted average disagreement within groups with different investment philosophies. In Panel B we run the following regression:

$$AbLogVol_{it} = \alpha_t + \gamma_i + \beta DisagreementMeasure_{it} + \gamma AbLogVol_{it-1} + \delta Controls_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

$AbLogVol_{it}$ is the difference between log volume in time period t and the average log volume from $t-140$ to $t-20$ trading days (6-month period, skipping a month) for firm i. In columns (1) and (2) $DisagreementMeasure_{it}$ is the overall disagreement among all investors. In columns (3) and (4) our $DisagreementMeasure_{it}$ is $CrossDisagreement_{it}$ which is disagreement across different investment philosophies for firm i on day t. In columns (5) and (6) our $DisagreementMeasure_{it}$ is $WithinDisagreement_{it}$ which is disagreement among investors with the same investment philosophies. The disagreement measure is either contemporaneous to the abnormal log volume t, or is constructed from messages that were posted before the market opens (BMO) (between 4pm on day $t-1$ and and 9am on day t). We standardize the disagreement measures by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation, over the entire sample period. Since trading volume tends to be autocorrelated, we also control for abnormal trading volume on day $t-1$. As controls we include $MediaArticle_{it}$, which is a dummy variable equals 1 if firm i was mentioned either in the Wall Street Journal or the New York Times on day t; Volatility (t-5 to t-1) which is measured as the standard deviation of abnormal returns over days t-5 to t-1; cumulative abnormal returns over days t-30 to t-6 and t-5 to t-1. All regressions include date and firm fixed effects (α_t and γ_i). Standard errors are clustered by firm and date. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Panel A: Summary Statistics

	Mean	Stdev	Min	p25	p50	p75	Max
All Investors	0.380	0.441	0	0	0	0.887	1
Cross-group Disagreement	0.342	0.284	0	0	0.403	0.527	1.118
W. Average within-group Disagreement	0.183	0.276	0	0	0	0.329	0.998

Panel B:

	Abnormal Log Volume (t)					
Disagreement measure	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Disagreement (t)	0.098***					
	(0.007)					
Disagreement (BMO, t)		0.052***				
		(0.005)				
Cross-group Disagreement (t)			0.040***			
			(0.007)			
Cross-group Disagreement (BMO, t)				0.036***		
				(0.005)		
Within-group Disagreement (t)					0.161***	
					(0.010)	
Within-group Disagreement (BMO, t)						0.084***
						(0.008)
AbLogVol (t-1)	0.718***	0.721***	0.724***	0.723***	0.706***	0.716***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Media (t)	0.064***	0.067***	0.077***	0.074***	0.042***	0.054***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Volatility (t-5 to t-1)	0.259	0.354*	0.385**	0.384**	0.168	0.315
	(0.178)	(0.184)	(0.178)	(0.180)	(0.191)	(0.192)
AbRet (t-5 to t-1)	0.157***	0.144***	0.143***	0.143***	0.156***	0.139***
	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.053)	(0.052)
AbRet (t-30 to t-6)	0.114***	0.119***	0.119***	0.120***	0.107***	0.115***
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.025)
Observations	42,225	42,225	42,225	42,225	42,225	42,225
R-squared	0.637	0.633	0.632	0.631	0.647	0.635

Internet Appendix to:

Why Don't We Agree? Evidence from a Social Network of Investors [29]

In the internet appendix we present additional evidence to support the findings in our paper. In Figure A.1 we present the number of messages per month posted on StockTwits, showing that the number of messages posted stayed fairly constant over time. In Table A.1 we demonstrate how we cleaned up our data to obtain the final sample, and how many observations we lost along the way. For the final analysis we keep the 100 most-talked-about firms, in order to have enough depth to construct our measures. We present the names, tickers, and coverage of these firms in Table A.2. In Table A.3 we show the tickers of the most-talked-about firms by investment philosophy. In our paper, we focus on different investment philosophies. However, we also have information on investors' self-reported experience and holding periods. Table A.4 shows the distribution of sentiment and within-group disagreement measure by those two investor characteristics. In Table A.5 we examine whether different firm characteristics (size, book-to-market, etc.) are associated with different levels of disagreement. In Table A.6, we present an alternative textual classification of model and information words as robustness to the main word lists we use in the paper. In Table A.7 we examine whether individuals with different investment philosophies, experience levels or different holding periods have different changes in disagree over their assessment of stocks. In Table A.8 we examine whether changes in cross-group disagreement, on top of changes in within-group disagreement, help explain changes in trading volume, and whether disagreement within different investment philosophies have a differential effect on trading volume. In Table A.9 we examine whether our main results are robust to various specifications and assumptions that we make in the paper. In Table A.10 we examine whether message volume by fundamental investors Granger causes the message volume by investors with non-fundamental investment approaches.

[29] Citation format: Cookson, J. Anthony, and Marina Niessner, Internet Appendix to "Why Don't We Agree? Evidence from a Social Network of Investors," Journal of Finance [DOI String]. Please note: Wiley is not responsible for the content or functionality of any supporting information supplied by the authors. Any queries (other than missing material) should be directed to the authors of the article.

Figure A.1: Monthly Time Series of Messages Posted to StockTwits

Note: This figure portrays the aggregate number of messages posted to StockTwits for each month in our 21-month sample (from January 2013 to September 2014).



Table A.1: Sampling Restrictions and the Size of the Analysis Sample

Note: In this table, we present the number of messages, number of unique StockTwits users, and number of company tickers covered as we clean the full sample to our final analysis sample.

Messages	Users	Tickers	Action
18,308,948	107,808	9,755	Original Sample
13,786,425	73,964	9,137	Years 2013 and 2014
7,294,348	56,445	8,558	Keep messages with 1 ticker per message
4,559,296	27,698	8,055	User must have non-missing approach and holding period and experience
3,890,814	25,368	6,326	Merge on CRSP
1,442,051	12,029	100	Keep top 100 firms

Table A.2: 100 Most Discussed Firms

Note: In this table we present tickers, names, and number of messages of the top 100 firms ranked by the number of messages posted to StockTwits that reference the firm's ticker.

Ticker	Name	Messages	Frequency	Ticker	Name	Messages	Frequency
AAPL	Apple Inc.	331,946	18.82%	FCEL	FuelCell Energy Inc	6,099	0.35%
FB	Facebook Inc	139,932	7.93%	ICPT	Intercept Pharmaceuticals Inc	6,055	0.34%
TSLA	Tesla Motors Inc	108,941	6.18%	QCOR	Questcor Pharmaceuticals Inc	6,015	0.34%
PLUG	Plug Power Inc	95,687	5.42%	CHTP	Chelsea Therapeutics International	5,865	0.33%
VRNG	Vringo, Inc	62,919	3.57%	CMG	Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc	5,774	0.33%
TWTR	Twitter Inc	49,576	2.81%	TTWO	Take-Two Interactive Software	5,756	0.33%
NFLX	Netflix, Inc	38,891	2.2%	GEVO	Gevo, Inc.	5,719	0.32%
KNDI	Kandi Technologies Group Inc	35,540	2.01%	Z	Zillow Group, Inc.	5,686	0.32%
INO	Inovio Pharmaceuticals Inc	34,107	1.93%	GS	Goldman Sachs Group Inc	5,663	0.32%
ARIA	Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc.	32,396	1.84%	CLF	Cliffs Natural Resources Inc	5,429	0.31%
MNKD	MannKind Corporation	31,083	1.76%	FIO	Fusion-IO, Inc.	5,405	0.31%
JCP	JC Penney Company Inc	29,132	1.65%	HK	Halcon Resources Corp	5,323	0.3%
ZNGA	Zynga Inc	26,697	1.51%	RAD	Rite Aid Corporation	5,276	0.3%
GOOG	Alphabet Inc	26,463	1.5%	CPRX	Catalyst Pharmaceuticals Inc	5,209	0.3%
AMD	Advanced Micro Devices	25,370	1.44%	ACHN	Achillion Pharmaceuticals, Inc	5,181	0.29%
GLUU	Glu Mobile Inc	23,833	1.35%	SWHC	Smith and Wesson Holding Corp	5,167	0.29%
SCTY	SolarCity Corp	23,205	1.32%	KERX	Keryx Biopharmaceuticals	5,075	0.29%
AMZN	Amazon.com, Inc.	22,368	1.27%	RMTI	Rockwell Medical Inc	5,071	0.29%
PCLN	Priceline Group Inc	21,321	1.21%	APP	American Apparel Inc.	4,957	0.28%
BAC	Bank of America Corp	21,091	1.2%	IBM	International Business Machines Corp.	4,899	0.28%
UNXL	UniPixel Inc	20,740	1.18%	CYTR	CytRx Corporation	4,832	0.27%
YHOO	Yahoo! Inc.	20,014	1.13%	OPK	Opko Health Inc.	4,741	0.27%
DDD	3D Systems Corporation	19,505	1.11%	ACAD	ACADIA Pharmaceuticals Inc.	4,684	0.27%
RNN	Rexahn Pharmaceuticals, Inc	18,711	1.06%	MSTX	Mast Therapeutics Inc	4,668	0.26%
GALE	Galena Biopharma Inc	17,221	0.98%	DRL	Diadem Resources Limited	4,485	0.25%
GTAT	GT Advanced Technologies Inc	16,276	0.92%	DGLY	Digital Ally, Inc.	4,455	0.25%
LNKD	LinkedIn Corp	15,108	0.86%	NIHD	NII Holdings Inc.	4,418	0.25%
ARNA	Arena Pharmaceuticals, Inc	14,768	0.84%	VHC	VirnetX Holding Corporation	4,411	0.25%
GPRO	GoPro Inc	12,649	0.72%	CRM	salesforce.com, inc.	4,407	0.25%
GOGO	Gogo Inc	12,531	0.71%	CLSN	Celsion Corporation	4,383	0.25%
FSLR	First Solar, Inc.	12,328	0.7%	BBY	Best Buy Co Inc	4,359	0.25%
GILD	Gilead Sciences, Inc.	11,896	0.67%	SBUX	Starbucks Corporation	4,296	0.24%
GMCR	Keurig Green Mountain Inc	11,625	0.66%	USU	Centrus Energy Corp	4,273	0.24%
YELP	Yelp Inc	10,830	0.61%	MNGA	MagneGas Corporation	4,217	0.24%
P	Pandora Media Inc	10,346	0.59%	IDRA	Idera Pharmaceuticals Inc	4,194	0.24%
FEYE	FireEye Inc	10,226	0.58%	SPWR	SunPower Corporation	4,194	0.24%
ONVO	Organovo Holdings Inc	10,094	0.57%	NAVB	Navidea Biopharmaceuticals	4,143	0.23%
MU	Micron Technology, Inc	9,999	0.57%	AA	Alcoa Inc	4,101	0.23%
F	Ford Motor Company	9,350	0.53%	S	Sprint Corp	4,101	0.23%
LULU	Lululemon Athletica inc	9,313	0.53%	ISRG	Intuitive Surgical, Inc.	4,042	0.23%
WLT	Walter Energy Inc	9,211	0.52%	ZGNX	Zogenix, Inc.	3,939	0.22%
GRPN	Groupon Inc	8,718	0.49%	NEON	Neonode, Inc	3,910	0.22%
ISR	IsoRay, Inc.	8,342	0.47%	CPST	Capstone Turbine Corporation	3,871	0.22%
MCP	McPherson's Ltd	8,085	0.46%	SHLD	Sears Holdings Corp	3,785	0.21%
RXII	RXi Pharmaceuticals Corp	7,542	0.43%	BA	Boeing Co	3,766	0.21%
MSFT	Microsoft Corporation	7,485	0.42%	PCYC	Pharmacyclics, Inc.	3,741	0.21%
INVN	InvenSense Inc	7,250	0.41%	V	Visa Inc	3,701	0.21%
SRPT	Sarepta Therapeutics Inc	6,299	0.36%	ZLCS	Zalicus Inc.	3,671	0.21%
EBAY	Ebay Inc.	6,284	0.36%	CAT	Caterpillar Inc.	3,663	0.21%
CYTK	Cytokinetics, Inc.	6,139	0.35%	SGYP	Synergy Pharmaceuticals Inc	3,646	0.21%

Table A.3: Top Five Most Discussed Firms by Investment Philosophy

Note: In this table we present tickers of firms ranked by the number of messages posted to StockTwits that reference the firm's ticker, by investment philosophy. In bold are the tickers that are in the top 5 most commonly used tickers across all investment philosophies.

Fundamental	Technical	Growth	Value	Momentum
AAPL	**AAPL**	**AAPL**	**AAPL**	**AAPL**
FB	**FB**	**PLUG**	**PLUG**	**FB**
PLUG	**TSLA**	**FB**	**FB**	**TSLA**
VRNG	**PLUG**	**TSLA**	**TSLA**	**PLUG**
TSLA	TWTR	VRNG	INO	VRNG

Table A.4: Sentiment and Disagreement Measures by Experience and Holding Period

Note: This table presents summary information on the StockTwits measure of sentiment and disagreement for different experience levels and for different holding periods, as reported in the StockTwits user profile.

Panel A: Sentiment Summary Statistics

	Average Sentiment	
	Mean	Stdev
Novice	0.215	0.488
Intermediate	0.301	0.506
Professional	0.228	0.521
Day Trader	0.157	0.491
Swing Trader	0.282	0.516
Position Trader	0.244	0.508
Long Term Investor	0.204	0.489

Panel B: Disagreement Summary Stastics

	Within-group Disagreement	
	Mean	Stdev
Novice	0.213	0.382
Intermediate	0.381	0.442
Professional	0.290	0.424
Day Trader	0.220	0.390
Swing Trader	0.367	0.441
Position Trader	0.244	0.400
Long Term Investor	0.177	0.356

Table A.5: Determinants of Disagreement

Note: In this table we examine the drivers of disagreement. In Panel A, we regress, cross-sectionally, the average disagreement measures about the firm over the entire sample on the firm-size quintile and the B/M quintile that the firm falls in at the beginning of the sample (first quarter 2013). In Panel B, we regress at the daily level the disagreement measures on Volatility (t-5 to t-1) which is measured as the standard deviation of abnormal returns over days t-5 to t-1, and on cumulative abnormal returns over days t-30 to t-6 and t-5 to t-1. The regressions in Panel B include date and firm fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered by firm and date. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Panel A: Cross-sectional Analysis of Disagreement

	Average Overall Dis.	Average Cross-group Dis.	Average Within-group Dis.	Average Dis. Ratio
Size Quintile	0.117***	0.076***	0.110**	0.094**
	(0.043)	(0.028)	(0.045)	(0.042)
B/M Quintile	-0.006	-0.008	-0.029	0.004
	(0.049)	(0.032)	(0.052)	(0.048)
Constant	-0.310	-0.195	-0.232	-0.282
	(0.203)	(0.132)	(0.214)	(0.199)
Observations	100	100	100	100
R-squared	0.081	0.082	0.069	0.056

Panel B: Panel Analysis of Disagreement

	Overall Dis.	Cross-group Dis.	Within-group Dis.	Dis. Ratio
Volatility (t-5 to t-1)	2.898***	2.167***	3.076***	2.741***
	(0.350)	(0.326)	(0.422)	(0.386)
AbRet (t-5 to t-1)	-0.038	-0.019	0.035	0.104
	(0.080)	(0.096)	(0.086)	(0.086)
AbRet (t-30 to t-6)	0.121***	0.148***	0.142***	0.139***
	(0.031)	(0.045)	(0.042)	(0.038)
Observations	42,060	42,060	42,060	42,060
R-squared	0.506	0.231	0.552	0.484

Table A.6: Model and Information Words – Robustness to an Alternative Word List

Note: In this table we examine whether present words that we determined are either more related to differences across models or to differences in information. In Panel A, we hand-classified the top 1000 most frequently used words across strategies into three different lists – information words, model words, and unclassified words. We display the information and the model words. Information words are words that describe the timing, source or direction of information (e.g., "positive", "today", "yesterday", "news", "cnbc"), whereas model words are words that describe a particular approach or analysis of market information (e.g., "sma" (simple moving average), "pattern," "reversal", "upgrades", "squeeze", "ichan", "director"). The words that are in bold are words that our main specification treats as model words, but this alternative specification treats as information words.In Panel B, we present the frequency distribution of the number of strategies that commonly use information words versus model words. A word is commonly used by a strategy if it is one of the 250 most commonly used words among StockTwits users who adhere to that strategy. In Panel C, we present a two-sample t-test for the difference in the mean number of strategies – out of the five: technical, momentum, fundamental, value and growth – that commonly use information words versus model words.

Panel A: Words that are related to models or information

Information Words			Model Words		
yesterday	month	beat	value	growth	setup
weeks	money	cnbc	trend	gap	analyst
weekly	monday	volume	transcript	fill	analysts
week	lower	real	top	rsi	director
watch	looks	**near**	icahn	macd	candle
watching	looking	**acquisition**	test	bollinger	charts
waiting	look	**bottom**	swing	crossover	dma
wait	friday	**profit**	support	director	reports
tomorrow	day	**profits**	statement	deal	flag
time	days	**volume**	guidance	cover	consensus
term	daily	**earnings**	moving	chart	conference
strong	coming	**drop**	pattern	ceo	double
stocks	close	**dip**	resistance	breakout	data
start	call	**business**	report	breaking	expected
soon	calls	**corporation**	pattern	break	expect
share	bulls	**worth**	ownership	bounce	fast
ready	bullish	**upgrades**	near	set	er
quarter	bull	**squeeze**	ma	trigger	eps
positive	bears	**sales**	min	stop	wall
position	bearish	**revenue**	line	sma	street
options	bad		levels	pullback	
news	article		level	pop	
move	added		key	low	
morning	add		hod	reversal	
months	current		highs	stage	

Panel B: Distributions of model and information words across investment philosophies.

Distribution of Model Words across Investment Philosophies					
Number of approaches that commonly use the word	1	2	3	4	5
Count of words	16	9	6	9	22
Distribution of Information Words across Investment Philosophies					
Number of approaches that commonly use the word	1	2	3	4	5
Count of words	4	0	3	4	58

Panel C: Test for differential use of information versus model words across StockTwits strategies.

	Mean # of Strategies that commonly use		
	Information words	Model words	Difference
Estimate	4.696	3.193	1.503***
T-stat			(5.876)

Table A.7: Quantifying Disagreement Across Investment Philosophies, Holding Periods and Experience

Note: This table examines whether individuals with different investment philosophies, experience levels or different holding periods have different changes in disagree over their assessment of stocks. To shed light on this, Panels A, B and C present the following sentiment levels regression specification:

$$AvgSentiment_{itg} = FirmFEs + TimeFEs + GroupFEs + \varepsilon_{itg}$$

where $AvgSentiment_{itg}$ is the change in average sentiment for for group g (e.g., approach, experience level or holding period), firm i, on date t. In this regression group fixed effects capture whether differences in groups that investors belong to explain changes average sentiment. In Panels D and E, we examine whether individuals with different experience levels or different holding periods predict different changes to average sentiment.Analogous to the main specification in Table 6, we run the following regression:

$$\Delta AvgSentiment_{itg} = FirmFEs + TimeFEs + GroupFEs + \varepsilon_{itg}$$

where $\Delta AvgSentiment_{itg}$ is the difference between the average sentiment measure on day t and day $t-1$. The regressions include date and firm fixed effects as noted in the columns. Standard errors are clustered by firm and date. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Panel A: Analysis of Variance for Sentiment

	$Sentiment_{itg}$				
Sentiment Categories	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Firm FEs	X	X	X	X	X
Date FEs		X	X	X	X
Investment philosophy FEs			X		
Investment philosophy × Year-month FEs				X	
Investment philosophy × Year-week FEs					X
R-squared	0.104	0.111	0.122	0.124	0.127
Observations	102,669	102,669	102,669	102,669	102,669

Panel B: Analysis of Variance for Experience Level Sentiment

	$Sentiment_{itg}$				
Sentiment Categories	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Firm FEs	X	X	X	X	X
Date FEs		X	X	X	X
Experience FEs			X		
Experience × Year-month FE				X	
Experience × Year-week FE					X
R-squared	0.149	0.159	0.160	0.199	0.201
Observations	74,664	74,664	74,664	102,669	102,669

Panel C: Analysis of Variance for Holding Period Sentiment

	$Sentiment_{itg}$				
Sentiment Categories	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Firm FEs	X	X	X	X	X
Date FEs		X	X	X	X
Holding Period FEs			X		
Holding Period × Year-month FE				X	
Holding Period × Year-week FE					X
R-squared	0.127	0.137	0.140	0.166	0.168
Observations	90,504	90,504	90,504	102,669	102,669zx

Panel D: Analysis of Variance for Experience Level Sentiment Trends

	Δ $Sentiment_{itg}$				
Sentiment Categories	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Firm FEs	X	X	X	X	X
Date FEs		X	X	X	X
Experience FEs			X		
Experience $\times$ Year-month FE				X	
Experience $\times$ Year-week FE					X
R-squared	0.001	0.005	0.006	0.007	0.009
Observations	74,562	74,562	74,562	102,567	102,567

Panel E: Analysis of Variance for Holding Period Sentiment Trends

	Δ $Sentiment_{itg}$				
Sentiment Categories	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Firm FEs	X	X	X	X	X
Date FEs		X	X	X	X
Holding Period FEs			X		
Holding Period $\times$ Year-month FE				X	
Holding Period $\times$ Year-week FE					X
R-squared	0.001	0.004	0.007	0.008	0.011
Observations	90,402	90,402	90,402	102,567	102,567

Table A.8: Within-Group Disagreement, Cross-Group Disagreement, and Trading Volume

Note: In this table, we examine whether changes in cross-group disagreement, on top of changes in within-group disagreement, help explain changes in trading volume. We run the following regression

$$\begin{aligned} AbLogVol_{it} &= \alpha_t + \gamma_i + \beta_1 DisagreementMeasure_{it} + Controls_{it} \\ &+ AbLogVol_{it-1} + \varepsilon_{it} \end{aligned}$$

Where $AbLogVol_{it}$ is the abnormal log trading volume on day t for firm i. In column (1) *DisagreementMeasure* is the overall disagreement among all investors. In column (2) *DisagreementMeasure* is $CrossDisagreement_{it}$, which is the cross-group disagreement measure across different investment philosophies for stock i, on day t, and $WithinDisagremeent_{it}$ which is the weighted average of within-group disagreement measures for different investment philosophies. The weights are proportional to the number of investors with each approach. In column (3) *DisagreementMeasure* is disagreements among investors with the same investment philosophies. As controls we include $MediaArticle_{it}$, which is a dummy variable equals 1 if firm i was mentioned either in the *Wall Street Journal* or the *New York Times* on day t; Volatility (t-5 to t-1) which is measured as the standard deviation of abnormal returns over days t-5 to t-1; cumulative abnormal returns over days t-30 to t-6 and t-5 to t-1. We standardize all disagreement measures by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation, over the entire sample period. The regressions include date and firm fixed effects (α_t and γ_i). Standard errors are clustered by company and date. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.

	Abnormal Log Volume		
Disagreement Measure	(1)	(2)	(3)
Disagreement	0.099***		
	(0.008)		
Cross-group Disagreement		0.045***	
		(0.008)	
Within-group Disagreement		0.181***	
		(0.012)	
Disagreement Fundamentals			0.038***
			(0.006)
Disagreement Technicals			0.060***
			(0.006)
Disagreement Momentum			0.064***
			(0.005)
Disagreement Growth			0.034***
			(0.005)
Disagreement Value			0.048***
			(0.005)
AbLogVol (t-1)	0.719***	0.700***	0.703***
	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Media (t)	0.069***	0.045***	0.039***
	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Volatility (t-5 to t-1)	0.259	0.099	0.149
	(0.229)	(0.233)	(0.244)
AbRet (t-5 to t-1)	0.178***	0.175***	0.169***
	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.053)
AbRet (t-30 to t-6)	0.113***	0.103***	0.106***
	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Observations	42,041	42,041	42,041
R-squared	0.637	0.651	0.651

Table A.9: Robustness of Main Results to Different Sampling Restrictions and Measurement Choices

Panel A

Note: In this panel we present the summary statistics for disagreement for all investors, disagreement across groups with different investment philosophies, and the weighted average disagreement within groups with different investment philosophies for different robustness specifications. In the final row, we calculate the percent of overall disagreement attributable to cross-group disagreement. That number is calculated by subtracting the fraction of average within-group disagreement from overall disagreement. Column (1) presents results for our main specifications. In column (2), we replace missing disagreement and sentiment levels with their last non-missing value (thinking about our measures as levels of disagreement and sentiment). In column (3), we weight each message by the number of followers the author of the message has. In column (4), we only include opinions by investors who joined StockTwits before 1 January, 2013. In column (5), we only use messages that were classified by users as bullish or bearish. In column (6), we only include professional investors. In column (7), we use a linear disagreement measure described in the appendix. In column (8), we only include top 50 most talked-about firms. In column (9), we only include top 51-100 most talked-about firms. In column (10), we include top 150 most talked-about firms. In columns (11) and (12), we keep firms that were above or below the median market cap in our sample, respectively. In column (13), we use the number of users from January, 2013 to calculate the weights for individual approaches. In column (14), we equal-weight all the approaches. In column (15), we weight each approach by 1 minus the average correlation between sentiment of the given approach and sentiment of other approaches. In column (16) we exclude days with missing messages.

Disagreement	(1) Main dataset	(2) Levels	(3) Follower-weighted	(4) Joined before 1 Jan 2013	(5) User-classified Messages	(6) Professionals
All Investors	0.467	0.491	0.366	0.380	0.198	0.291
Cross-group	0.382	0.561	0.434	0.324	0.342	0.277
Within-group	0.245	0.291	0.192	0.184	0.072	0.136
Cross-group share	47.5%	40.7%	47.5%	51.6%	63.6%	53.3%

Disagreement	(7) Linear Disagreeement	(8) Top 50 firms	(9) Top 51-100 firms	(10) Top 150 firms	(11) Large firms	(12) Small firms
All Investors	0.320	0.719	0.228	0.334	0.543	0.392
Cross-group	0.382	0.449	0.316	0.330	0.409	0.354
Within-group	0.170	0.419	0.081	0.168	0.292	0.200
Cross-group share	46.9%	41.7%	64.5%	49.7%	46.2%	49.0%

Disagreement	(13) Weights from Jan 2013	(14) Equal-weighted	(15) Weight = 1-AvgCorr	(16) Non-missing Message Days
All Investors	0.467	0.467	0.467	0.601
Cross-group	0.371	0.392	0.391	0.491
Within-group	0.258	0.211	0.209	0.310
Cross-group share	44.8%	54.8%	55.2%	48.4%

Panel B

Note: In this panel we examine how disagreement within different types of investors change around earnings announcements. We run the following regression

$$
\begin{aligned}
AbLogVol_{it} &= \alpha_t + \gamma_i + \beta_1 CrossDisagreement_{it} + \beta_2 WithinDisagreement_{it} \\
&+ AbLogVol_{it-1} + Controls_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}
\end{aligned}
$$

Where $AbLogVol_{it}$ is the abnormal log trading volume on day t for firm i, $CrossDisagreement_{it}$ is the cross-group disagreement measure across different investment philosophies for stock i, on day t. $WithinDisagreement_{it}$ is the weighted average of within-group disagreement measures for different investment philosophies. We standardize the disagreement measures by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation, over the entire sample period. Controls include $MediaArticle_{it}$, which is a dummy variable equals 1 if firm i was mentioned either in the Wall Street Journal or the New York Times on day t; Volatility (t-5 to t-1) which is measured as the standard deviation of abnormal returns over days t-5 to t-1; cumulative abnormal returns over days t-30 to t-6 and t-5 to t-1. Column (1) presents results for our main specifications. In column (2), we replace missing disagreement and sentiment levels with their last non-missing value (thinking about our measures as levels of disagreement and sentiment). In column (3), we weight each message by the number of followers the author of the message has. In column (4), we only include opinions by investors who joined StockTwits before 1 January, 2013. In column (5), we only use messages that were classified by users as bullish or bearish. In column (6), we only include professional investors. In column (7), we use a linear disagreement measure described in the appendix. In column (8), we only include top 50 most talked-about firms. In column (9), we only include top 51-100 most talked-about firms. In column (10), we include top 150 most talked-about firms. In columns (11) and (12), we keep firms that were above or below the median market cap in our sample, respectively. In column (13), we use the number of users from January, 2013 to calculate the weights for individual approaches. In column (14), we equal-weight all the approaches. In column (15), we weight each approach by 1 minus the average correlation between sentiment of the given approach and sentiment of other approaches. In column (16) we exclude days with missing messages. The regressions include date and firm fixed effects (α_t and γ_i). Standard errors are clustered by company and date. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.

	Abnormal Log Volume					
Disagreement	(1) Main dataset	(2) Levels	(3) Follower weighted	(4) Joined before 1 Jan 2013	(5) User-classified Messages	(6) Professionals
Cross-group Disagreement (t)	0.045***	0.015***	0.053***	0.080***	0.052***	0.094***
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Within-group Disagreement (t)	0.182***	0.134***	0.163***	0.173***	0.110***	0.155***
	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)
AbLogVol (t-1)	0.697***	0.709***	0.701***	0.694***	0.707***	0.693***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.018)
Media (t)	0.045***	0.054***	0.049***	0.042***	0.049***	0.042***
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Volatility (t-5 to t-1)	0.148	0.191	0.097	0.154	0.141	0.166
	(0.237)	(0.179)	(0.177)	(0.188)	(0.174)	(0.184)
AbRet (t-5 to t-1)	0.174***	0.166***	0.163***	0.142***	0.181***	0.126**
	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.052)
AbRet (t-30 to t-6)	0.106***	0.113***	0.102***	0.105***	0.117***	0.103***
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Observations	42,041	42,225	42,225	42,225	42,225	42,225
R-squared	0.649	0.641	0.649	0.654	0.643	0.654

Disagreement	(7) Linear Disagreeement	(8) Top 50 firms	(9) Top 51-100 firms	(10) Top 150 firms	(11) Large firms	(12) Small firms
Cross-group Disagreement (t)	0.043***	0.009***	0.069***	0.068***	0.035***	0.054***
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.011)
Within-group Disagreement (t)	0.143***	0.159***	0.135***	0.175***	0.184***	0.179***
	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.016)
AbLogVol (t-1)	0.708***	0.708***	0.692***	0.689***	0.648***	0.712***
	(0.017)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.015)	(0.028)	(0.022)
Media (t)	0.053***	0.048***	0.032**	0.037***	0.051***	0.124**
	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.051)
Volatility (t-5 to t-1)	0.148	-0.278	0.282	0.246	-0.706**	0.291
	(0.182)	(0.274)	(0.208)	(0.163)	(0.295)	(0.189)
AbRet (t-5 to t-1)	0.176***	0.278***	0.080	0.163***	0.268***	0.156**
	(0.053)	(0.078)	(0.067)	(0.043)	(0.075)	(0.063)
AbRet (t-30 to t-6)	0.110***	0.120***	0.094**	0.140***	0.071**	0.108***
	(0.027)	(0.043)	(0.036)	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.034)
Observations	42,225	20,531	21,694	63,558	21,052	21,173
R-squared	0.644	0.679	0.641	0.642	0.629	0.665

Disagreement	(13) Weights from Jan 2013	(14) Equal-weighted	(15) Weight = 1-AvgCorr	(16) Non-missing Message Days
Cross-group Disagreement (t)	0.044***	0.049***	0.049***	0.012***
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.004)
Within-group Disagreement (t)	0.174***	0.187***	0.187***	0.183***
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.011)
AbLogVol (t-1)	0.701***	0.697***	0.697***	0.690***
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)
Media (t)	0.048***	0.037***	0.037***	0.051***
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Volatility (t-5 to t-1)	0.104	0.063	0.063	-0.241
	(0.179)	(0.186)	(0.186)	(0.165)
AbRet (t-5 to t-1)	0.169***	0.170***	0.170***	0.223***
	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.053)
AbRet (t-30 to t-6)	0.105***	0.102***	0.102***	0.091***
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.025)
Observations	42,225	42,225	42,225	32,927
R-squared	0.649	0.652	0.652	0.673

Table A.10: Granger Causality Test of Message Volume

Note: This table examines whether message volume by fundamental investors Granger causes the message volume by investors with non-fundamental investment approaches. We estimate the following model:

$$NumMessagesNF_{i,t} = \alpha_t + \gamma_i + \beta NumMessagesNF_{i,t-1} + \gamma NumMessagesF_{i,t-1} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

Where $NumMessagesNF_{i,t}$ is the standardized number of messages posted about firm i on date t by non-fundamental investors, and $NumMessagesF_{i,t-1}$ is the number of message posted about firm i on date $t-1$ by fundamental investors. In column (1), we examine our entire sample. In column (2), we look at the time period around earnings announcements (one week before and 3 weeks after an earnings announcement). The regressions include date and firm fixed effects (α_t and γ_i). Standard errors are clustered by company and date. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.

	Message Volume by non-Fundamentals (t)	
	(1)	(2)
Non-Fund Message Vol (t-1)	0.7280***	0.7398***
	(0.044)	(0.064)
Fundamental Message Vol (t-1)	-0.0916	-0.0834
	(0.054)	(0.110)
Observations	42,575	14,008
R-squared	0.647	0.616