


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# What if our models of risk are insufficient?

Risk modelling in complex, dynamic environments

# Where are we ? The Sociotechnical system




## The Challenges:

- **Complex network of interdependencies** across stakeholder groups
- There are many **degrees of freedom** from each actor (impossible to foresee all local contingencies)
- All actors will tend to **rationalise behaviour when making local decisions** which may affect upstream and downstream actors in unforeseeable ways, when resolving goal conflicts

Figure 6. The course of an accidental event is created by side effects of decisions made by decision-makers busy coping with their local work requirements.



# Risk-management-as-Imagined



Risk Management as defined in ISO 31000 and ISO 27005


*Design involves “matching an object that does not yet exist to a context which cannot be completely specified” [Rasmussen quoting Alexander]*

# But there's an elephant in the room



Org chart fence

# Risk-management-as-Done



# A Functional abstraction approach






Figure 3. Under the presence of strong gradients behaviour will very likely migrate toward the boundary of acceptable performance.

# Unacceptable workload boundaries




# Economic failure boundaries



Adapted from Jens Rasmussen  
Risk management in a dynamic society - a modelling problem

# Marginal boundaries and Normalisation of Deviance

Original marginal boundary



Risk and Compliance functions don't share a model of where the marginal boundary is or where it should be with Engineering / Operations


Unrealistic policies set the tone for normalisation of deviance which deteriorates over time

Covert work systems emerge

Eventually... drifts into failure

Copyright © 2004 by R.I. Cook

# Unacceptable performance boundaries





“It's the design that creates behavior change. Not rules and decrees from the top-down. It's the design”

- Sidney Dekker


# Coping skills at boundaries

- Chaos Engineering
- Security Chaos Engineering
- Game Days / Storm Drills
- Disaster Recovery exercises (with surprises)



*“all systems, however successful, have boundaries and experience events that fall outside these boundaries—model surprise” (Woods 2015), “theory of graceful extensibility”*

# Real-World Risk Management requires multiple strategies



**Empirical strategy** - where we can **apply simple controls (automated governance)**, things happen often so it's simple to study and discuss with operators best approaches and heuristics to control them

**Evolutionary strategy** - we can analyse past events and understand how **different parts of sociotechnical system interacted to produce conditions** which led to incidents


**Analytical Strategy** - well-defined hazards but entanglements of systems are numerous, **requires appreciation and understanding of entanglements** and how failures in one part of the system can affect other parts

Figure 7. Hazard source characteristics and risk management strategies.

# Managing IN complexity - Muddling through




"Affordance is what the environment offers the individual"  
James J. Gibson



Complex systems have a history (path dependency)

## SAFE TO FAIL EXPERIMENTS





It is not necessary to change.  
Survival is not mandatory.

W. Edwards Deming



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