

The Scalability, Efficiency and Complexity of Universities and Colleges: A New Lens for Assessing the Higher Educational System

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The growing need for affordable and accessible higher education is a major global challenge for the 21st century. Consequently, there is a need to develop a deeper understanding of the functionality and taxonomy of universities and colleges and, in particular, how their various characteristics change with size. Scaling has been a powerful tool for revealing systematic regularities in systems across a range of topics from physics and biology to cities, and for understanding the underlying principles of their organization and growth. Here, we apply this framework to institutions of higher learning in the United States and show that, like organisms, ecosystems and cities, they scale in a surprisingly systematic fashion following simple power law behavior. We analyze the entire spectrum encompassing 5,802 institutions ranging from large research universities to small professional schools, organized in seven commonly used sectors, which reveal distinct regimes of institutional scaling behavior. Metrics include variation in expenditures, revenues, graduation rates and estimated economic added value, expressed as functions of total enrollment, our fundamental measure of size. Our results quantify how each regime of institution leverages specific economies of scale to address distinct priorities. Taken together, the scaling of features within a sector and shifts in scaling across sectors implies that there are generic mechanisms and constraints shared by all sectors which lead to tradeoffs between their different societal functions and roles. We particularly highlight the strong complementarity between public and private research universities, and community and state colleges, four sectors that display superlinear returns to scale.

institutional scaling | higher education | student performance

Significance Statement Scaling up higher education is critical to meet the human capital needs of the 21st century. Here we apply scaling theory as a novel approach to study the scalability and structure of institutions of higher education, using data covering over 5,800 institutions from the United States education system. This approach helps us uncover tradeoffs between the different societal functions of universities and assess which type of institution is best suited to scale up the provision of a particular societal function. Data such as the ones presented here and the theoretical framework of scaling can help set policy to achieve desired transformations of the higher education system.

Introduction

How we deliver higher education globally and at increased rates to a growing population is a key challenge facing most societies today that will only increase in the future. It is not simply a challenge about growth, but equally about diversification and adaptation. In addition, universities and colleges play a central role in the future of human societies as complex social and environmental challenges require educated and active citizens, and as an increasing number of people need advanced training to participate in the “knowledge economy”, including retraining in response to rapid technological innovations that shift the labor market [1, 2, 3]. These trends affect both mature and growing economies, as we see governments in countries with lesser penetration of higher-education set aggressive targets to catch up with more advanced economies (e.g. India’s skill-building challenges and targets [4]), and

both high-income and low-income economies struggling to finance education [5, 6, 7]. In addition, the details of institutional design and educational strategy matter for the ultimate success of graduates [8, 3] and, by implication, of societies.

Universities and colleges in the United States represent one of the most diverse instances of a higher education system in that they span sizes from 10 to over 200,000 enrolled students, contain both nonprofit and for-profit models, and range in strategy from vocational training to the production of novel research [9]. Consequently, analyzing the US higher education system can provide important insights about how the basic mechanisms, tradeoffs, and outcomes of university function relate to size as societies aim to scale-up total educational outputs. To date, our understanding of these tradeoffs and capabilities as a function of institutional structure, educational mission, and overall size is still limited and important policy decisions have to be made without sufficient empirical evidence.

Scaling laws have provided important insights across the entire spectrum of science and technology ranging from understanding the fundamental forces and constituents of nature to the dynamics and structure of human engineered systems, biological organisms, and social organisations [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22]. A number of studies have shown how systematic analyses of scale can reveal underlying mechanisms [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15]. As yet, no such analysis has been done for universities and colleges, which make up the higher education sector. In biology, a longstanding theory of organism scaling has motivated extensive empirical work, finding that many physiological and life-history characteristics ranging from metabolism and growth rates to life expectancy vary systematically with body mass [10, 12, 23]. Theoretical advances on the origins of these phenomena have led to predictions of universal biological behavior, biogeography, evolutionary transitions, growth dynamics, and detailed physiological tradeoffs [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15]. The application of scaling theory to social systems has also revealed important regularities: for example, measures of human creativity increase predictably with city size, with the super-additivity of human interactions in social networks being the driving mechanism [16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22]. This literature illustrates that the scaling perspective can effectively (i) illuminate key systematic behavior and tradeoffs, (ii) define the most appropriate way of standardizing features by the size of the system (for example showing when per capita measures are inappropriate in social systems), (iii) identify fundamental mechanisms and constraints, and (iv) make predictions.

Reserved for Publication Footnotes

105 These scaling relationships typically take the simple mathematical 178 perspective, we focus mostly on the value of the exponent, α , which
106 form of power laws:
179

$$Y = aX^\alpha \quad [1]$$

180 where Y is a property of interest in the system, X is the size of the 181 system, α is the scaling exponent, and a is a normalization constant.
182 For instance, in cities, data show that almost all socio-economic met-
183 rics, from total wages and GDP to the number of social interactions and
184 number of patents produced, scale with population size as a power law
185 with an exponent of ≈ 1.15 . This is an example of what is commonly re-
186 ferred to as superlinear scaling (exponent larger than 1). Consequently,
187 on a per capital basis, socio-economic metrics increase proportionally
188 to $X^{0.15}$, implying that on a per capita basis, larger cities promote
189 more social interactions and greater production of patents, and there-
190 fore more innovation [24, 16, 17].

191 Analyzing scaling relations in universities provides us with a fas-
192 cinating case study for applying scaling theory in that universities are
193 a class of entities that share a subset of overlapping goals, but also
194 manifest radically different strategies and fine-grained differences in in-
195 stitutional objectives. Furthermore, many universities are currently
196 undergoing rapid transformations which may be expressed as changes
197 in overall scaling relationships due to shifts in their internal structures.
198 This can potentially provide a diagnostic tool for understanding the
199 mechanisms underlying long-term trends in the performance of these
200 institutions with applications for designing higher education.

201 Our findings include: first, that universities do indeed exhibit scal-
202 ing behavior, and that the seven commonly used sectors for characteris-
203 ing institutional differences – research universities (public and private),
204 state colleges, community colleges, non-profit private colleges, for-profit
205 colleges, and professional schools – follow very different scaling regimes.
206 For example, consider research universities. We find that they scale sub-
207 linearly in revenues and expenditures (i.e. these variables grow faster
208 than linearly with the size of the institution). They diversify into more
209 activities with size, accrue prestige and wealth, becoming increasingly
210 active in research but expensive for students. In contrast, we find that
211 revenues and expenditures in state and community colleges scale with
212 exponents that are less than 1, that is, they scale sublinearly: increas-
213 ing size allows them to decrease costs to students and taxpayers faster
214 than linearly. Second, we find that almost all of these sectors display
215 similar economies of scale in one or more components of their expendi-
216 ture streams, particularly in instruction costs, but also in maintenance
217 and bureaucratic costs. Third, we observe that universities in differ-
218 ent groups leverage these economies of scale in different ways, which
219 support different goals, ranging from expanding research, to increasing
220 access to education, or increasing profits. Fourth, we discuss the trade-
221 offs between the different functions of universities which could explain
222 these patterns, thereby providing a synoptic view of how different types
223 of universities differ in their ability to further these functions at scale.

224 As a consequence, this novel perspective into the entire higher ed-
225 ucation system, which reveals broad systematic quantitative insights
226 into its structure and taxonomy, provides a fundamentally new frame-
227 work for fruitfully informing policy-makers to respond to the challenging
228 needs of society. Furthermore, it also provides university and college
229 administrators a new, potentially powerful, tool for understanding the
230 stated roles of their institution and for assessing its performance relative
231 to other institutions.

232 Scaling Framework

233 In this paper we describe the scaling behavior of basic processes
234 in universities: their inputs, including revenue, faculty and students,
235 and their outputs, including expenditures, graduation rates and other
236 related outcomes that fulfill key societal purposes. Our focus on scaling
237 is close to the economists' approach to measuring economies of scale
238 and scope in multi-product firms [25], but is less parametric and more
239 general in that we do not presuppose the form of the cost function. In-
240 stead, we consider different variables' scaling relationship individually,
241 and, then, by contrasting them and taking a synoptic view, highlight
242 the salient variations and properties of the institutions. In contrast to
243 the economics approach where student enrollment is, in turn, taken as
244 an input or an output [26], depending on the model, here we consider
245 student enrollment to be a fundamental property of the system, treat
246 it as the independent variable, and ask whether it systematically struc-
247 tures the institution. One advantage of first analyzing variation with
248 scale, is that we can more easily identify whether the differences in two
249 universities' mix of inputs and outputs is a result of their size difference,
250 or whether it reflects different management strategies. From a scaling

251 perspective, we focus mostly on the value of the exponent, α , which
252 leads to the classification of systems as follows:
253 1. $\alpha > 1$: superlinear scaling; this points to increasing returns to scale
254 (if Y is an output), or diseconomies of scale (if Y is an input).
255 2. $\alpha = 1$: linear scaling; this points to constant returns to scale (if Y
256 is an output), or constant economies of scale (if Y is an input).
257 3. $\alpha < 1$: sublinear scaling; this points to decreasing returns to scale
258 (if Y is an output), or economies of scale (if Y is an input).
259 If X is an input in the production of Y , Y/X gives the average cost,
260 which is proportional to $X^{\alpha-1}$. If α is less than one, the unit cost is
261 decreasing with system size, indicating economies of scale.

262 Expected scaling in higher education

263 The scaling approach is well positioned to enrich the study of organi-
264 zations. The guiding question is that of scalability: what, if anything,
265 limits the size of firms, institutions, and societies [27, 28, 29]? What
266 tradeoffs between multiple productive and bureaucratic functions ac-
267 company growth? To this end, scaling supplies a natural quantitative
268 connection to structuralist theory of organizations in economics, sociol-
269 ogy and anthropology. Universities provide a unique class of institutions
270 to test how differences in internal strategy alter overall scaling relation-
271 ships, which has applications not only for designing higher education
272 but understanding how the mechanisms behind social scaling could be
273 adjusted.

274 How should we expect scale to affect the internal processes of uni-
275 versities? Past efforts have found varying patterns of economies of
276 scale and scope, but more consistently that universities tend to oper-
277 ate near their optimal size and surprisingly near their efficiency frontier
278 [30, 31, 32, 33]. In contrast, the broader higher-education literature has
279 tended to cast doubt on the efficiencies of universities, with little regard
280 for size. It has focused instead on the alarming rising costs of education
281 (average full-time student tuition in the U.S. increased by 113% from
282 1984 to 2014 [34]). Papers and reports in the higher-education literature
283 have suggested the causes are increases in the wages of professionals [35],
284 changing market structure [36], but also increase in non-instructional
285 professional services and associated administrative costs [37, 38]. In this
286 literature, some fault universities for their profligate spending, accusing
287 them of excessively diversifying into non-core activities, while others
288 point to personalized attention and diverse campus activities as a key
289 to success after graduation [39]. Others point to the pernicious effects
290 of the race for prestige amongst the top-tier universities [3, 40].

291 Here we distinguish between two main processes: production pro-
292 cesses – teaching and research – and maintenance processes of admin-
293 istration and operations. Teaching is the most fundamental produc-
294 tion process. Teaching expenditure is dominated by the remuneration
295 of academic staff, itself the product of the number of faculty and the
296 mean faculty salary. Scale can thus impact teaching expenditure via
297 either of these variables. As a university increases in size, it has the
298 possibility of exploiting economies of scale in the number of faculty by
299 increasing class sizes. Universities may follow this strategy, possibly at
300 the risk of compromising educational quality and outcomes. Research
301 is another important production process for the subclass of universities
302 that engage in it. Research, very much like new patent production in
303 cities, is a creative process, which is typically assumed to be driven
304 by the frequency and diversity of social interactions. We expect this to
305 scale superlinearly with the number of university researchers and enroll-
306 ment, similar to the scaling of patent production in cities with increas-
307 ing population size [17]. [20] provides indirect evidence for universities,
308 documenting that citations scale superlinearly with the size of research
309 universities. For research universities, the increased research activity
310 that we expect to see with increased size could have both positive and
311 negative effects on student learning: it gives students access to research
312 staff, but may draw resources away from teaching. It should also be
313 noted that students not only affect increasing returns by supporting
314 a larger faculty and campus, but are also themselves an input to the
315 education system through peer learning and to the research enterprise
316 as participants.

317 Maintenance processes include all aspects of administration and
318 institutional support. An important general hypothesis is that larger
319 organizations let bureaucracy grow out of proportion because they dif-
320 ferentiate into a wider range of operations [41] and must monitor more
321 personnel [42, 43]. This mechanism would put a limit on the size of org-
322 anizations. It has been suggested that the growing size and complexity
323 of social organizations lead to a disproportionate growth in maintenance
324 processes, portending the collapse of entire societies [44]. At the same

252 time, the economies of scale of each operation would seem to promise 326
253 unbounded growth [41].

254 All of these hypotheses are of interest, which we explore in different 328
255 university sectors using 2013 data from the Delta Cost Project (here 329
256 "delta data") [45] (see methods).

257 Scaling in Higher Education

258 In all of our analyses we use total student enrollment as the natural mea- 327
259 sure of size as we are ultimately interested in the resources and benefits 328
260 provided to the individual student (see SI Figure C1 for alternatives).

261 Figure 1 shows the total financial throughput (total expenditure and 329
262 total revenue) of all universities and colleges, pooled together regardless 330
263 of their sector, plotted as a function of their size. This clearly demon- 331
264 strates that, as a totality, they do indeed systematically scale with size, 332
265 strongly supporting the use of scaling as a methodology for revealing 333
266 underlying regularities and mechanisms common across all universities 334
267 and colleges. The figure shows that financial throughput scales linearly 335
268 with size, suggesting that, on average, there is no advantage to being 336
269 larger at least as far as these economic indicators are concerned. How- 337
270 ever, this masks significant underlying diversity of behavior between 338
271 different educational sectors, arising from the wide diversity of mission 339
272 and strategy amongst universities.

273 To see this, we classify all universities and colleges into seven con- 340
274 ventional sectors according to institutional control, level, and research 341
275 activity (outlined in Table 1; see SI Tables D1-D2 and Figure D1 for 342
276 detail). As shown in Figure 2, these different sectors display dramati- 343
277 cally different scaling behaviors for total revenue and expenditure. At 344
278 this level of granularity, we can distinguish between four broad regimes. 345
279 First, research universities (both public and non-profit private) scale su- 346
280 perlinearly: as they enroll more students, their revenues and expendi- 347
281 tures increase faster than linearly, in other words, financial throughput 348
282 per student increases with size (note however the large confidence in- 349
283 terval for the private research sector). Second, and in marked contrast, 350
284 community colleges and state colleges display remarkably sublinear scal- 351
285 ing, that is, financial throughput per student decreases with size, rep- 352
286 resenting strong overall economies of scale. Third, non-profit private 353
287 colleges and professional schools scale roughly linearly with size, indi- 354
288 cating little advantage in being larger. Fourth, for-profit colleges display 355
289 linear scaling in revenue but sublinear scaling in expenditure, which im- 356
290 plies that they are able to make a profit by exploiting economies of scale 357
291 in their costs.

292 To better understand the different strategies of these sectors, Fig- 358
293 ure 3 shows the detailed scaling of components of revenues and expen- 359
294 ditures, which allows us to examine the relative importance of various 360
295 university activities with changes in university size (see SI Figures F1-F4 361
296 for explanation of how these plots are constructed). Table 2 summa- 362
297 rizes the most salient of these activities (teaching expenditure, research 363
298 expenditure, tuition revenue, and maintenance) along with the scaling 364
299 of several other key educational inputs and outcomes (faculty size, re- 365
300 search revenue, student completions, and student mid-career earnings). 366
301 Typically, we find that as universities grow, they find specific areas of 367
302 economies of scale that they then exploit to further their core mission. 368
303 At the same time, Table 2 shows clearly that different sectors differ 369
304 markedly in the areas in which they display respectively superlinear, 370
305 linear or sublinear scaling, suggesting that there are tradeoffs between 371
306 the different functions universities choose to play. The table also sug- 372
307 gests that we can summarize the typology of universities according to 373
308 their scaling behavior into four distinct regimes:

- 309 1. Research universities (public and private) scale superlinearly in all 310
activities and sources of revenue, but sacrifice affordability. As they 311
grow larger, they seek to attract increasingly prestigious faculty (as 312
indicated by the superlinear scaling in faculty pay, especially in pri- 313
vate universities) and charge higher tuition, also attracting better re- 314
sourced students, who later on enjoy higher earnings. The fact that 315
both research and educational outcomes scale superlinearly suggest 316
that these activities are synergistic.
- 317 2. State and community colleges display very strong sublinear scaling 318
in teaching expenditure and total faculty. This translates to some 319
extent into sublinear scaling in tuition revenue and potentially com- 320
pensates for the observed sublinear scaling in public funding rev- 321
enue. Their baseline graduation rates are low compared to research 322
universities, but stay constant or increase with the size of the school 323
despite lower costs. Hence, for the same likelihood of achieving a 324
degree, they become increasingly affordable with size, either to stu- 325
dents, or taxpayers, or both.

3. Non-profit private colleges and professional schools expand student 326
services disproportionately with increasing size, and come to rely 327
increasingly on tuition revenue. Tuition scales superlinearly, while 328
graduation rates scale only linearly. Therefore, they become less 329
affordable with size for a similar probability of graduating.

4. For-profit colleges display strong economies of scale in all areas of 330
expenditure, but tuition revenue scales linearly, which implies that 331
they become increasingly profitable with size. Unfortunately, we do 332
not have data on student completions.

These regime characteristics suggest that research universities on 333
the one hand, and state and community colleges on the other, dis- 334
play particularly favorable scaling relationships, but in non-overlapping 335
functions. These four sectors (and two regimes) therefore seem strongly 336
complementary, fulfilling different societal functions. We will come back 337
to this in the Discussion. We now provide a detailed analysis of each 338
sector, in which we examine their distinct economic strategies and how 339
it relates to the outcomes in Table 2.

343 Public research universities

In line with the expectations we outlined earlier in the paper, research 344
activities (as measured by research expenditures) and research output 345
(proxied by revenue from grants) scale superlinearly with size in public 346
research universities (Figure 3a). We note, however, that the proxy we 347
use for research output is not very precise. We also look at data on re- 348
search funding provided by the NSF and find this relationship to be very 349
uncertain (see SI Figures F5-F6 and Table F1). Along with this, teach- 350
ing expenditure also scales superlinearly with size: the amount of money 351
spent per student increases more than proportionally with the number 352
of students. Thus, far from exploiting the potential economies of scale in 353
teaching, public research universities pursue an opposite strategy: they 354
increase both the student-to-faculty ratio and the salaries of their fac- 355
ulty. Indeed, as Table 2 shows, this trend in instruction expenditure is 356
the combination of a superlinear increase in the total number of faculty 357
(dominated by full-time faculty), and a moderate increase in the average 358
salary of faculty members (in Table 2, "Faculty Pay" is the total sum 359
paid to all faculty so that the average faculty salary increases if and only 360
if the exponent for "Faculty Pay" is higher than the exponent for "Total 361
Faculty"). For example, in a university of 5,000 students, the faculty- 362
to-student ratio is 9:100, with faculty paid on average \$42,500/yr, while 363
in a university of 50,000 students, the faculty-to-student ratio is 13:100, 364
with faculty paid on average \$47,000/yr. This suggests an interesting 365
interaction between research and instruction as universities grow in size: 366
as research becomes more rewarding and important, universities seek to 367
attract a greater number of professors (as well as graduate students), 368
competing more fiercely for sought-out faculty, thereby raising faculty 369
pay.

Maintenance and administrative costs scale slightly superlinearly, 370
but do not systematically outpace production processes (teaching, re- 371
search and student completions). This indicates that there are no ap- 372
parent diseconomies of scale in maintenance function. On the contrary, 373
efficiency in maintenance seems to support the diversification of activ- 374
ties in line with the hypothesis in [41].

Given the superlinear increase in instruction expenditure, it is per- 375
haps not surprising that the number of students completing their degree 376
scales superlinearly with the size of the student cohort. In particular, 377
we note the very high scaling exponents for first-time full-time student 378
completion (1.24 for public universities). This superlinear scaling in 379
completions is accompanied by a superlinear increase in tuition, indi- 380
cating that these schools attract better resourced students [46]. For 381
example, a school of 5,000 students will typically charge \$6,650 with 382
a 63% graduation rate (using FSA completion rates), while a school of 383
50,000 students will typically charge \$10,100 with an 78% graduation 384
rate. Consistent with this result, the number of students receiving fed- 385
eral financial aid (FSA students) scales sublinearly (see SI Appendix 386
G). While the completion rates amongst these students scales superlin- 387
early, it does so more weakly and in absolute terms is lower than for 388
first-time full-time students, suggesting that the socio-economic back- 389
ground of students plays an important role in explaining outcomes in 390
these schools.

394 Private research universities

Private non-profit research universities behave similarly to public ones 395
396 with a few critical distinctions. First, we note that this sector displays 397
a lot more variability than other sectors (see confidence intervals in Ta- 398
ble 2). This is likely due to a greater variety of institutional models,

399 with some institutions running very large non-degree granting govern- 471 mains constant. Maintenance and administration are also increasingly 400 ment and private research centers. Second, for any size, tuition is much 472 efficient, characterized by an exponent $\alpha = 0.88$.
401 higher than in the case of public research universities, and also scales 473 A majority of students in community colleges do not complete their
402 with a higher exponent. The scaling behaviors of expenditure and rev- 474 degrees (the average completion rate for FSA students is 30%). This
403 enue streams are dominated by the disproportionate increase in instruc- 475 is to be expected because this specific sector attracts substantial num-
404 tion expenditure and tuition revenue, respectively. The data on faculty 476 bers of non-degree seeking students, and often caters to them. With
405 numbers and faculty pay also reveal an interesting difference. In pri- 477 this mind, it is striking that student completions in the public 2yr sec-
406 vate research universities, the superlinear scaling in faculty pay betrays 478 tor scale linearly with the size of the FSA cohort, which is evidence
407 an important increase in average faculty salary with school size (from 479 that larger community colleges at least maintain their capacity to re-
408 an average of \$48,700/yr in a school of 5,000 students to \$81,000/yr 480 tain students despite very large economies of scale in expenditures and
409 in a school of 50,000 students). Despite these differences between the 481 increasing class sizes. Furthermore, once we consider the educational
410 private and public sectors, the superlinear scaling of completions is not 482 outcomes of students who transfer to a 4yr institution, we see a super-
411 significantly different. 483 linear increase in the number of students securing a 4yr diploma. In
412 Our analysis suggests that research and education act synergisti- 484 other words, students at smaller colleges more often stay for Associate
413 cally since student outcomes increase with increases in research, which 485 Degrees, while students at larger ones tend to secure a Bachelor's –
414 is consistent with prior findings on educational economies of scope [33]. 486 arguably a better educational outcome (see SI Appendix G).
415 The data also suggests that as research universities grow larger, they 487 In line with their public service mission, community colleges take
416 become more prestigious, more successful, but also more expensive for 488 advantage of their cost savings to reduce the cost to attending students.
417 students. At the larger end, the public and private universities' pattern 489 Indeed, tuition scales decisively sublinearly with total enrollment (with
418 of expenditure and revenue become very much alike, with large pub- 490 a fairly low exponent $\alpha = 0.89$), in stark contrast to research univer-
419 lic research universities attracting private money in addition to public 491 sities and non-profit private colleges. This seems partially due to the
420 funding, and private research universities attracting federal appropri- 492 increase in the number of part-time students with scale, who pay lower
421 tions in addition to private funds. 493 tuition (see SI Appendix C). Per capita tuition revenue at a 5,000 stu-
422 **State colleges** 494 dent community college is on average \$2,200, while it is \$1,700 at a
423 State colleges stand in stark contrast to research universities. First, 495 college of 50,000. Additionally, outside revenue from appropriations,
424 they display very strong economies of scale in instruction, largely due 496 donations and grants, also scale sublinearly, and even more dramati-
425 to sublinear scaling of the number of faculty, thus decreasing faculty- 497 cally than student revenue. These schools thus operate with a tighter
426 to-student ratio as schools increase in size (Table 2). For example, 498 and tighter budget at scale, providing education at a decreasing cost to
427 a state college of 1,000 students has a faculty-student ratio of 8:100, 499 the taxpayer.
428 whereas a school of 50,000 students has a faculty-student ratio of 5:100.

429 Faculty salaries, on the other hand, scale significantly higher than fac- 500 **Non-profit private colleges**
430 ulty number, so each instructor earns systematically higher wages at 501 Non-profit private colleges (which include liberal arts colleges) behave
431 larger schools. Nonetheless, total faculty pay exhibits economies of scale 502 very differently from research universities or public colleges (see SI Ta-
432 ($\alpha = 0.91$). We also see very strong economies of scale in maintenance 503 ble D4 for results specific to liberal arts colleges). First, as with all
433 costs (with a scaling exponent $\alpha = 0.80$). Other areas of expenditure 504 the other sectors so far, they display economies of scale in maintenance
434 (student service, auxiliary expenditure) also scale sublinearly. 505 and administration. In contrast, instruction expenditure remains con-
435 Surprisingly, this impressive decrease in per capita expenditure is 506 stant on a per capita basis (Figure 3e). Interestingly, this is due to the
436 accompanied by superlinear scaling in the completion rate of students, 507 combination of sublinear scaling of the number of faculty (decreasing
437 with a scaling exponent of 1.11, both for students receiving financial 508 faculty-to-student ratio), combined with an increase in the average fac-
438 aid and other first-year, first-time students. The completion rate for 509 ulty salary. Hence non-profit private colleges, as they become larger,
439 FSA students in state colleges is 47% for a college of 1,000 students 510 pay fewer but more expensive faculty, keeping their instruction expen-
440 but increases to 60% for a college of 10,000 students¹ (compared with 511 diture per student constant. Meanwhile, we observe a marked increase
441 68% for a university of 10,000 students in the public research sector, 512 in student services expenditures, a form of diversification of the school's
442 and 90% in the private research sector). Yet, what our scaling anal- 513 activities with scale.
443 ysis reveals is that larger schools do increasingly better, despite lower 514 The graduation rate at these schools is fairly high (on average 55%)
444 expenditures (in particular lower faculty numbers), the larger schools 515 and remains the same for schools of different sizes (traditional com-
445 reaching graduation rates of 60%. Possible explanations are that stu- 516 pletions appear slightly superlinear, see SI), suggesting no systematic
446 dents benefit from the increasing opportunities for social interactions 517 changes to educational output with scale, despite dramatic increases
447 in larger schools, that larger schools attract more applicants and are 518 in student services. Interestingly, donations, endowment revenue, and
448 therefore more selective, or that larger schools offer a greater diver- 519 appropriations scale sublinearly. To finance the increase in student
449 sity of courses, better satisfying the demands of students, despite the 520 services despite this decrease in several revenue sources, these schools
450 larger class sizes. External factors could be at play, such as incentives 521 become increasingly focused on increasing tuition as they grow in size.
451 to graduate arising from the local labor market. While often overshad- 522 Indeed, tuition scales strongly superlinearly ($\alpha = 1.15$). This indicates
452 owed by their public research counterparts, the state colleges fulfill an 523 that affordability for an equal probability of completion decreases for
453 essential role in the American higher education system and seem to be 524 larger schools in this sector.
454 particularly well positioned to provide higher-education at scale.

455 Another noteworthy feature of state colleges is that tuition scales 525 **Professional schools**
456 linearly. Thus, the reduction in expenditure does not drive a commen- 526 In for-profit professional schools, expenditure scales slightly superlin-
457 surate decrease in tuition. This is even clearer if we replace total enroll- 527 early. This increase is accounted for by a ramp up in student services,
458 ment with the full-time equivalent number of students to account for 528 while instruction expenditure slightly decreases on a per capita basis,
459 part-time students, in which case we find that tuition increases slightly 529 similar to the non-profit private colleges (Figure 3g). This sector has the
460 superlinear (see SI Appendix C). One reason is that appropriations, as 530 most drastic reduction in total faculty number with enrollment (with a
461 well as local grants, decrease significantly with the size of the university 531 scaling exponent $\alpha = 0.76$).
462 (Figure 3c). Hence, at scale, state colleges educate more students at 532 Data on completion is very scant for professional schools. We only
463 lesser cost to the taxpayer, and, overall, affordability for an equal prob- 533 have data on first-time first-year student completions from the same
464 ability of completion tends to be higher, or at least non-decreasing, for 534 two-year college within three years, which scale linearly ($\alpha = 1.02$).
465 larger state colleges. 535 These completions are paired with a slightly superlinear growth of to-
466 **Community colleges** 536 tal tuition revenue ($\alpha = 1.09$). Indeed, without the support of any
467 Community colleges behave similarly to state colleges, but display even 537 private investment, tuition quickly becomes the overwhelming source of
468 more pronounced economies of scale. Expenditures in instruction de- 538 funds for these schools. Notably, unlike for-profit colleges, schools in
469 creases dramatically on a per capita basis. This is driven by a sublinear 539 this sector do not seem to use economies of scale to increase their profit
470 scaling of the number of faculty, while the average instructor salary re- 540 as the enrolled population grows.

¹This value does not include students who transferred to another institution

541 **For-profit colleges**

542 As with state colleges, these schools are able to reduce their per capita 615 instruction costs as the school grows in size. As in the case of state 616 colleges and non-profit private colleges, this reduction in instruction 617 costs with size can be decomposed into a decrease in the faculty-to- 618 student ratio (note the very strongly sublinear exponent for total fac- 619 ulty $\alpha = 0.83$), combined with an increase in the average instructor 620 salary. The sublinear scaling in instruction is paired with a strongly 621 sublinear scaling in academic support and student services, in contrast 622 to non-profit private colleges. Overall, this private for-profit sector dis- 623 plays dramatic expenditure reductions in all areas, on par only with 624 state and community colleges.

553 Neither traditional nor FSA graduation rate data were reliable 625 enough for us to assess returns to educational outcomes with size. How- 626 ever, we can still assess affordability and profitability. Tuition scales lim- 627 early with both total and FTE enrollments, indicating consistent access 628 to these colleges across the full range of their sizes. All other four-year 629 sectors show higher scaling of tuition. However, Figure 2f shows that 630 the difference between revenue and expenditure systematically widens 631 with scale, which indicates that this sector uses economies of scale to 632 increase profitability.

562 **Discussion**

563 Twenty-first century higher-education requires scalability. However, so 564 far there has not been any mechanistic understanding for the tradeoffs 565 and capabilities of universities both as a function of their institutional 566 structure and educational mission, nor of their overall size. Here, we 567 have used scaling analysis to provide a synoptic view of the population 568 of universities, which allows us to begin to characterize some important 569 tradeoffs and capabilities of universities, provide a taxonomy of insti- 570 tutional scaling behaviors and assess the scalability of different sectors.

571 Our results display several interesting patterns that are common 572 to all sectors. First, we see a split between sectors whose operations 573 diversify with size (public and private research universities, and to some 574 extent non-profit private colleges, which expand their student services) 575 and those who specialize in teaching and exploit economies of scale in 576 their instruction expenditure. Administration and maintenance scale 577 sublinearly in all sectors (where we have the data), except in research 578 universities, where they scale superlinearly with enrollment, but less 579 steeply than productive functions, such as teaching or research expen- 580 ditures. These findings are consistent with the structural theory of 581 organization in sociology [41], where there are economies of scale for 582 the administration of each operation, but an increase in administrative 583 resources as operations diversify with the size of the organization.

584 Second, gains in efficiency with size are redeployed in ways that 585 are, by and large, consistent with the core mission of these institutions. 586 In research universities, increasing returns to size in the revenue from 587 donations, research grants, and endowment correlate with a growth in 588 research activities in larger schools. In state and community colleges, 589 efficiencies in teaching allow a dramatic fall in cost. In for-profit colleges, 590 they allow greater profit margins. In professional schools and non-profit 591 private colleges, they are redeployed towards student services, which is 592 less obviously a core function.

593 The tradeoffs inferred from our scaling analysis across diverse sec- 594 tors complement previous sociological and economic thinking on the 595 U.S. higher educational system, which is more organizationally diverse 596 than that of most other national systems of education. Largely a prod- 597 uct of history [47], this diversity in form provides a diversity of func- 598 tion. It is uncontroversial to note that public universities provide key 599 public goods - such as social cohesion through mass education, civic 600 education, and research - which require subsidy. Non-profit private in- 601 stitutions enabled the professoriate to organize as a professional class, 602 with autonomy from both the market and the state [48]. Just as in the 603 public form, the non-profit private form can also provide public goods, 604 and may complement public institutions by providing a more differenti- 605 ated service to sub-groups. The separation of research universities from 606 teaching-only universities helps meet the greater demand for teaching 607 than research in a system in which close to 70% of high-school graduates 608 attend some form of higher education, with community colleges playing 609 a particularly important role in absorbing this demand for education 610 [49]. For-profits are relative late-comers, and were originally focused 611 on vocational training [50]. They now provide generalist diplomas, but 612 are still focused on professional training and cater to the growing share

613 of working and adult students, who have substantially different needs 614 than traditional students.

615 Our analysis can help shed light on the tradeoffs students face as 616 they consider schools of different size and in different sectors, and as 617 they evaluate the odds of being admitted, the tuition costs and their 618 expected earnings. Figure 4 combines the data on tuition with addi- 619 tional data on the mean SAT scores of incoming students and the mean 620 earnings of students ten years after attending school, using the data 621 assembled from tax returns by [51] (see SI Appendix H). Figures 4a 622 and 4b show that average mid-career earnings increase with a school's 623 selectivity and its out-of-state tuition costs (i.e. the market price of at- 624 tending the school without accounting for financial aid and state fund- 625 ing). These relationships are not surprising since being admitted to and 626 graduating from more selective schools contributes in multiple ways to 627 workplace success: 1) via signaling of ability, and 2) by learning from 628 other high-ability peers and from well-paid faculty. In turn, selective 629 schools can charge more in light of these high future expected earnings 630 and, consequently, can spend more on students, further enhancing their 631 future success. The fact that schools fall on a common curve suggests 632 that schools from different sectors are competing in a common market 633 to enroll students. While there is a common trend, we see that some 634 sectors are highly clustered, and make a staged entry onto this lad- 635 der of educational cost and selectivity. The least selective schools are 636 the for-profit private universities and professional schools, followed by 637 state and community colleges. Non-profit private colleges span a large 638 range of selectivity scores and earnings. Then come the public research 639 universities, which are selective and hold a high earning potential, and 640 finally the private research universities, which are the most selective, 641 most expensive and generate the highest earnings.

642 Of course, many students do not pay the full cost of out-of-state 643 tuition. In-state tuition of public state schools is much lower than 644 out-of-state tuition and students also receive fellowships and grants. 645 Figure 4c shows average mid-career earnings as a function of the net 646 tuition students actually pay on average, once state funding and grants 647 are taken into account. The monotonic relationship of Figure 4a re- 648 mains, but with a much steeper slope: state funding and grants make a 649 large difference to students' return on educational investment. Sectors 650 clearly differ in the financial added value they provide. Public schools 651 tend to offer a higher return on investment. At the high end, public 652 and private research universities are indistinguishable. On the other 653 end of the spectrum, professional schools and private for-profit schools 654 cost a lot relative to other sectors given the low expected earnings they 655 provide. Figure 4b shows that in part, this is related to their very 656 low selectivity. Yet, at low selectivity, community colleges offer better 657 prospects to students, costing very little and providing higher expected 658 earnings than private for-profit and professionals schools [50]. Non- 659 profit private colleges (including liberal arts colleges) display extremely 660 heterogeneous behavior, some of them rivaling the financial added value 661 of research universities, while others resemble the behavior of for-profit 662 private schools, and display high tuition costs relative to public schools 663 with similar selectivity and earning potential.

664 One might wonder how certain sectors are able to maintain pres- 665 ence in the market when they offer lower earnings at the same tuition 666 level. It would seem that the answer is that they provide educational 667 options for students with lower scores, and it might be the case that 668 these schools would struggle to compete if the public sector were to ex- 669 pand in size at the low-tuition and low-selectivity end of the spectrum.

670 We saw earlier that several sectors achieve substantial economies 671 of scale in teaching, and that this is achieved by sublinear scaling in the 672 number of faculty. In other words, sectors that achieve economies of 673 scale in teaching do so by increasing average class sizes or faculty teach- 674 ing load. Yet, this does not predict the scaling behavior of graduation 675 rates, or of potential earnings, as shown in Table 2. Indeed, we see that 676 sectors that display these deep cuts in teaching expenditure with size 677 either display linear or superlinear graduation rates and linear average 678 earnings, suggesting that class size or faculty burden are not funda- 679 mental factors in explaining the performance of universities and that 680 economies of scale can be achieved in teaching without jeopardizing the 681 performance of non-research schools.

682 The organizational diversity of universities would suggest that no 683 form is inherently more efficient and therefore diversity persists despite 684 competition to enroll students. Our analysis nonetheless suggests that 685 some sectors are more scalable than others. In particular, public re- 686 search universities scale superlinearly in research funds and in student

687 outcomes, while remaining more affordable than their private counter- 718
 688 part. In a complementary fashion, state colleges and community col- 719 U.S. sources as measures of educational output. First, we use the
 689 leges offer drastic economies of scale. This translates into cost reduc- 720 IPEDS Graduation Rate Survey, included in the Delta dataset [45].
 690 tions to students or taxpayers while maintaining a constant or improv- 721 This dataset tracks six-year completions for cohorts of first-time first-
 691 ing standard for student outcomes. Thus, to simultaneously optimize 722 year degree-seeking students (FTFT) (see SI Appendix G). Second, we
 692 research output and access to education, our analysis suggests that in- 723 use student outcome data on cohorts of Federal Student Aid-receiving
 693 vesting in the growth of schools in these sectors is a valid strategy. In 724 (FSA) students which is collected via FAFSA reporting and managed
 694 light of this, it is noteworthy that larger state and community colleges 725 through the Department of Education's College Scorecard project [53].
 695 receive proportionally much less public funding. A future research goal 726 The Department of Education considers these data usable for research,
 696 is to identify how this has changed over time, and what the consequences 727 but excludes them from their consumer tool due to possible reporting
 697 have been for schools in these sectors and their ability to provide an 728 inaccuracies ([53] p. 23–24). Both graduation rates describe cohorts
 698 affordable generalist education to a large number of students. Finally, 729 that enrolled in 2007 and assess six-year outcomes by 2013 (excepting
 699 it should be noted that there is significant variation around the central 730 professional schools, where only a three-year rate was available). See SI
 700 scaling relationships, which indicates that individual schools are able to 731 Appendix E and G for details of the cross-dataset merging procedures
 701 achieve positive and negative shifts in performance at a given scale (see 732 and overall data limitations (specifically Table E1–E4 and G3 and Fig-
 702 SI Figures D2–D11 and Tables D3–D4 for analysis of outliers). These 733 ures E1–E2 and G1–G2 on robustness of results to various aggregation
 703 outliers are indicative of institutions that may be experimenting with 734 problems). In particular, both FSA and FTFT cohorts used for our
 704 novel strategies and which deserve in-depth analysis in order to under- 735 completion analysis can exclude or misrepresent portions of the IPEDS
 705 stand how internal streatgies lead to these deviations in outcomes and 736 total enrollment, and may therefore introduce error into our analysis of
 706 infer the constraints and options facing schools in a particular sector at 737 overall institutional performance. Here we favor FSA results, because
 707 a particular size. 738 we assume that aid-receiving cohorts are less prone to systematically
 739 misrepresenting the student body composition than traditional student
 740 cohorts.

708 Materials and Methods

709 The original source of this data is the Integrated Postsecondary Edu- 710 cation Data System, or IPEDS [52], where we use the 2013 Delta Cost
 711 Project [45] refinement of the IPEDS data. Spanning nearly the entire
 712 U.S. higher education system, it includes over 20 million students, from
 713 5,800+ accredited universities. We use total enrollment (undergrad-
 714 uate and graduate) as our measure of size (see SI Appendix C). We
 715 supplement this main data source with several other databases [51, 53]
 716 discussed below and in Appendix A, with the list and definitions of all
 717 variables in SI Table B1.

We use completion data from two of the most-widely reported
 718 U.S. sources as measures of educational output. First, we use the
 719 IPEDS Graduation Rate Survey, included in the Delta dataset [45].
 720 This dataset tracks six-year completions for cohorts of first-time first-
 721 year degree-seeking students (FTFT) (see SI Appendix G). Second, we
 722 use student outcome data on cohorts of Federal Student Aid-receiving
 723 (FSA) students which is collected via FAFSA reporting and managed
 724 through the Department of Education's College Scorecard project [53].
 725 The Department of Education considers these data usable for research,
 726 but excludes them from their consumer tool due to possible reporting
 727 inaccuracies ([53] p. 23–24). Both graduation rates describe cohorts
 728 that enrolled in 2007 and assess six-year outcomes by 2013 (excepting
 729 professional schools, where only a three-year rate was available). See SI
 730 Appendix E and G for details of the cross-dataset merging procedures
 731 and overall data limitations (specifically Table E1–E4 and G3 and Fig-
 732 ures E1–E2 and G1–G2 on robustness of results to various aggregation
 733 problems). In particular, both FSA and FTFT cohorts used for our
 734 completion analysis can exclude or misrepresent portions of the IPEDS
 735 total enrollment, and may therefore introduce error into our analysis of
 736 overall institutional performance. Here we favor FSA results, because
 737 we assume that aid-receiving cohorts are less prone to systematically
 738 misrepresenting the student body composition than traditional student
 739 cohorts.

741 For our analysis of mid-career earnings we rely on the data provided
 742 by the Mobility Reports Card project, part of the broader Equality of
 743 Opportunity project [51]. Data on incomes were obtained from tax fil-
 744 ings and linked to individual students. The data that is made available
 745 is aggregated at the school level. We use the mean 2014 incomes of
 746 students who attended the school for at least one year, focusing on the
 747 cohort born in 1984.

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


Fig. 1: The scaling relationships between total revenue (subscript “r”) and student enrollment, and total expenditure (subscript “e”) and student enrollment, combining all schools in the dataset. Note that revenue and expenditure are generally very well matched so both the data points and the regression lines overlap, which explains why much of the revenue data and the revenue regression line are hidden under the expenditure data and regression line.

Sector name	Control	Level	N (schools)	Avg enrollment	Sector enrollment	% Sector enrollment
Public Research Universities	Public	4yr+, Doc	160	28,114	4,498,249	21.16
Private Research Universities	Private	4yr+, Doc	102	11,656	1,188,915	5.59
State Colleges	Public	4yr+	382	9,569	3,655,440	17.19
Community Colleges	Public	2yr	908	7,177	6,517,164	30.65
Non-Profit Private Colleges	Private N-P	4yr+	1,373	1,839	2,524,604	11.87
Professional Schools	For-Profit	2yr, 2yr-	2,230	312	695,753	3.27
For-Profit Colleges	For-Profit	4yr+	647	1,902	1,230,372	5.79

Table 1: Description of sectors and their descriptive statistics. N-P: the school is not-for-profit; Doc: the school grants research doctoral degrees.




Fig. 2: The scaling of total revenue (subscript “r”) and total expenditure (subscript “e”) as a function of total enrollment by sector. The regression lines may overlap, with expenditure hiding the revenue regression line.




Fig. 3: Variation in the internal composition of revenue and expenditure, shown per student and as a function of institution size. This stacked representation makes clear that different sectors display dramatically different total economic streams. Note that an increase in the total height of a bar with institution size indicates superlinear scaling, and a decrease indicates sublinear scaling. See SI Figure J1 for the regression coefficients underlying each plot.

Variable	Public Research Universities	Private Research Universities	State Colleges	Community Colleges	Non-profit Private Colleges	Professional Schools	For-profit Colleges
Teaching expenditure	1.2 ± 0.1	1.44 ± 0.18	0.9 ± 0.04	0.81 ± 0.02	0.99 ± 0.02	0.97 ± 0.03	0.93 ± 0.04
Tuition revenue	1.18 ± 0.09	1.2 ± 0.09	1.04 ± 0.06	0.89 ± 0.03	1.15 ± 0.02	1.09 ± 0.03	0.99 ± 0.03
Research expenditure	1.52 ± 0.31	1.75 ± 0.61	0.89 ± 0.27	-	-	-	-
Research revenue	1.29 ± 0.23	1.94 ± 0.49	0.65 ± 0.1	0.71 ± 0.05	0.85 ± 0.08	-	-
Maintenance	1.07 ± 0.11	1.33 ± 0.18	0.8 ± 0.05	0.88 ± 0.02	0.89 ± 0.02	-	$0.75^* \pm 0.15$
Total faculty	1.16 ± 0.09	1.18 ± 0.14	0.88 ± 0.04	0.84 ± 0.02	0.89 ± 0.02	0.76 ± 0.02	0.83 ± 0.04
Faculty pay	1.2 ± 0.1	1.4 ± 0.17	0.91 ± 0.04	0.82 ± 0.02	0.98 ± 0.02	-	$0.92^* \pm 0.24$
FSA completions	1.09 ± 0.07	1.09 ± 0.09	1.11 ± 0.05	$1. \pm 0.03$	0.99 ± 0.04	$0.96^* \pm 0.06$	$1.06^* \pm 0.09$
FTFT completions	1.24 ± 0.06	1.17 ± 0.04	1.11 ± 0.04	0.79 ± 0.04	1.09 ± 0.02	$1.02^* \pm 0.02$	$0.96^* \pm 0.05$
Mid-career earnings	1.09 ± 0.11	$1.16 \pm .15$	1 ± 0.03	0.97 ± 0.02	$1.18^* \pm 0.04$	$0.96^* \pm 0.1$	0.95 ± 0.05

Table 2: Scaling exponents for maintenance and production variables, as well as number and pay of personnel, and some measures of student outcomes as a function of university size. A blank space indicates absence of usable data, and a * indicates that over half of the universities in that sector are missing. FSA : students receiving Federal Student Aid. FTFT: First-time Full-time students. For all variables, university size is measured as total enrollment, except in the case of completions, where the scaling relationship is with respect to cohort size (see SI Tables G1-G2). See SI Figures I1-I14 for a complete analysis of the tradeoffs amongst sectors based on the scales at which features with different scaling exponents intersect. See SI Table H1 for sensitivity of mid-career earnings scaling to the year chosen to measure the size of the school. See SI Table J1 for a summary of all scaling results.




Fig. 4: Relationship between mid-career earnings of graduates and schools' tuitions and selectivity (See SI Figures H1-H2 for robustness of relationships to alternative choices of some of these variables).