$\begin{array}{c} \text{Introduction} \\ ICL \\ ICL \stackrel{\mathcal{B}}{>} \\ ICL \stackrel{\mathcal{B}}{>} \\ \text{From } ICL \stackrel{\Rightarrow}{\rightarrow} \text{ to } ICL \stackrel{\mathcal{B}}{>} \\ \text{On Second-Order Quantification} \\ \text{Conclusion} \end{array}$

A Modal Deconstruction of Access Control Logics Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro

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Outline

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Introduction
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ICL

ICL⇒

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From ICL^{\Rightarrow} to $ICL^{\mathcal{B}}$

On Second-Order Quantification

Conclusion

Article

 Deepak Garg e Martín Abadi. A Modal Deconstruction of Access Control.

Introduction

- Translation from Access control logics to S4;
- Relying on the theory of *S*4, they obtain Kripke semantics for the logics;
- Their translation are partly based on a translation from intuitionistic logic to S4 that goes back to Gödel;
- ICL can be seen as a rather direct generalization of lax logic;
- Curry, Fairtlough and Mendler suggested interpreting lax logic in intuitionistic logic by mapping $\bigcirc s$ to $C \lor s$ or to $C \supset s$. These interpretations are sound but not complete. Compose them with a translation from intuitionistic logic to S4, one can map $\bigcirc s$ to $\square((\square C) \lor s)$ or to $\square((\square C) \supset s)$.

ICL

- Extends propositional intuitionistic logic with the operator says;
- Indexed version of CD, common propositional fragment of CDD;
- A says is a lax modality.

Logic

$$s ::= p \mid s_1 \land s_2 \mid s_1 \lor s_2 \mid s_1 \supset s_2 \mid \top \mid \bot \mid \mathsf{A} \text{ says } s$$

- Inherits all the inference rules of intuitionistic propositional logic;
- for each principal A, the formula A says s satisfies the following axioms:
 - $\vdash s \supset (A \text{ says } s) \quad (unit)$
 - \vdash (A says $(s \supset t)$) \supset (A says s) \supset (A says t) (cuc)
 - \vdash (A says A says s) \supset A says s (idem)

Example

Consider a file-access scenario with the following policy:

- If admin says that file1 should be deleted, then this must be the case.
- 2 admin trusts Bob to decide whether file1 should be deleted.
- **3** Bob wants to delete file1.

Logical presentation:

- ① (admin says deletefile1) ⊃ deletefile1
- ② admin says ((Bob says deletefile1) ⊃ deletefile1)
- 3 Bob says deletefile1

Using (unit) and (cuc), (1)-(3) imply deletefile1.

ICL to S4

•
$$\lceil p \rceil = \square p$$

•
$$\lceil s \wedge t \rceil = \lceil s \rceil \wedge \lceil t \rceil$$

•
$$\lceil s \lor t \rceil = \lceil s \rceil \lor \lceil t \rceil$$

•
$$\lceil s \supset t \rceil = \square (\lceil s \rceil \supset \lceil t \rceil)$$

•
$$\lceil A \text{ says } s \rceil = \square (A \vee \lceil s \rceil)$$

Decidability

In the case of *ICL*, Theorem (soundness and completeness) implies PSPACE decidability since the same complexity bound is known for *S*4.

Kripke Model

- A Kripke model for *ICL* is a tuple $\langle W, \leq, \rho, \theta \rangle$ where
 - W is a set:
 - \leq is a binary relation on W called the accessibility relation;
 - ρ is a mapping from atomic formulas of *ICL* to $\mathcal{P}(W)$ (assignment);
 - θ is a mapping from principals of *ICL* to $\mathcal{P}(W)$ (view map).

Satisfaction

- Given an *ICL* formula s and a Kripke model $\mathcal{K} = \langle W, \leq, \rho, \theta \rangle$, we define the satisfaction relation at a particular world $(w \models s)$ by induction s.
 - $w \models p \text{ iff } w \in \rho(p)$
 - $w \models s \land t$ iff $w \models s$ and $w \models t$
 - $w \models s \lor t$ iff $w \models s$ or $w \models t$
 - $w \models s \supset t$ iff for each $w' \ge w$, $w' \models s$ implies $w' \models t$
 - $w \models \top$ for every w
 - $not(w \models \bot)$ for every w
 - $w \models A$ says s iff for every $w' \ge w$, either $w' \in \theta(A)$ or $w' \models s$

 $\begin{array}{c} \text{Introduction} \\ ICL \\ ICL^{\Rightarrow} \\ ICL^{B} \\ \end{array}$ From ICL^{\Rightarrow} to ICL^{B} On Second-Order Quantification Conclusion

ICL⇒

 Extends the logic *ICL* to include a primitive "speaks for" relation (⇒).

Logic

- $\vdash A \Rightarrow A \quad (refl)$
- \vdash (A \Rightarrow B) \supset (B \Rightarrow C) \supset (A \Rightarrow C) (trans)
- \vdash (A \Rightarrow B) \supset (A says s) \supset (B says s) (speaking for)
- \vdash (B says (A \Rightarrow B)) \supset (A \Rightarrow B) (handoff)

Example

The example was modified: instead of having **Bob** says deletefile1 directly, **Bob** delegates his authority to **Alice** (fact 3), who wants to delete **file1** (fact 4).

- ① (admin says deletefile1) ⊃ deletefile1
- ② admin says ((Bob says deletefile1) ⊃ deletefile1)
- **8** Bob says Alice \Rightarrow Bob
- 4 Alice says deletefile1

Using (handoff) and (speaking-for), we can again derive deletefile1.

ICL^{\Rightarrow} to S4

They extend to ICL^{\Rightarrow} the translation from ICL to S4 by adding the clause:

•
$$\lceil A \Rightarrow B \rceil = \square (A \supset B)$$

A and B are interpreted as atomic formulas in S4, and these atomic formulas are assumed distinct from the atomic propositions of ICL^{\Rightarrow} .

Decidability and Kripke Model

- Much as for ICL, Theorem (soundness and completeness) implies PSPACE decidability;
- Kripke models are the same as those for *ICL*;
- The satisfaction relation for A ⇒ B at world w given by the clause:
 - $w \models A \Rightarrow B$ iff for every $w' \ge w$, $w' \in \theta(A)$ implies $w' \in \theta(B)$

$ICL^{\mathcal{B}}$

- Principals in ICL and ICL[⇒] are atomic and cannot be composed in logically meaningful way;
- They describe and study a systematic extension ICL^B to ICL that allows arbitrary Boolean combinations of principals with the connectives ∧, ∨, ⊃, ⊤, ⊥.

Logic

$$A, B ::= a \mid A \wedge B \mid A \vee B \mid A \supset B \mid \top \mid \bot$$

- Write \neg A for $(A \supset \bot)$;
- *ICL*^B inherits all the inference rules of *ICL*, and also includes the following additional rules:
 - $\vdash (\bot \text{ says } s) \supset s \quad (trust)$
 - If $A \equiv T$ then $\vdash A$ says \bot (untrust)
 - \vdash ((A \supset B) says s) \supset (A says s) \supset (B says s) (cuc')

Example

The following policy is analogous to that of Example in *ICL*:

- $oldsymbol{0}$ (admin $\supset \bot$) says *deletefile*1
- ② (admin says (Bob ⊃ admin) says deletefile1
- 3 Bob says deletefile1

$ICL^{\mathcal{B}}$ to S4

The translation from *ICL* to *S*4 works virtually unchanged for $ICL^{\mathcal{B}}$. In the clause $\lceil A \text{ says } s \rceil = \square (A \vee \lceil s \rceil)$, they interpret A as a formula in *S*4 in the most obvious way: each Boolean connective in A is mapped to the corresponding connective in *S*4.

Decidability

• Once more we obtain the same decidability result:

Corollary: There is a polynomial space procedure that decides whether a given $ICL^{\mathcal{B}}$ formula is provable or not.

Kripke Model

Kripke models for $ICL^{\mathcal{B}}$ may be obtained by generalizing those for ICL.

- $\hat{\theta}(a) = \theta(a)$
- $\hat{\theta}(A \wedge B) = \hat{\theta}(A) \cap \hat{\theta}(B)$
- $\hat{\theta}(A \vee B) = \hat{\theta}(A) \cup \hat{\theta}(B)$
- $\hat{\theta}(A \supset B) = (W \hat{\theta}(A)) \cup \hat{\theta}(B)$
- $\hat{\theta}(\top) = W$
- $\hat{\theta}(\perp) = \emptyset$

From ICL^{\Rightarrow} to ICL^{β}

They prove that $A \Rightarrow B$ can be encoded as $(A \supset B)$ says \bot .

•
$$\overline{p} = p$$

•
$$\overline{s \wedge t} = \overline{s} \wedge \overline{t}$$

•
$$\overline{s \lor t} = \overline{s} \lor \overline{t}$$

•
$$\overline{s \supset t} = \overline{s} \supset \overline{t}$$

$$\bullet \ \overline{\perp} = \perp$$

•
$$\overline{\mathsf{A}} \ \mathsf{says} \ \overline{\mathsf{s}} = \mathsf{A} \ \mathsf{says} \ \overline{\mathsf{s}}$$

•
$$\overline{\mathsf{A} \Rightarrow \mathsf{B}} = (\mathsf{A} \supset \mathsf{B} \mathsf{ says } \bot)$$

From ICL^{\Rightarrow} to $ICL^{\mathcal{B}}$

• $\vdash s$ in ICL^{\Rightarrow} iff $\vdash \lceil s \rceil$ in S4 iff $\vdash \lceil \overline{s} \rceil$ in S4 iff $\vdash \overline{s}$ in $ICL^{\mathcal{B}}$

•
$$\lceil A \Rightarrow B \rceil = \square \ (A \supset B) \equiv \square \ ((A \supset B) \lor \bot) = \overline{\lceil A \Rightarrow B \rceil}$$

On Second-Order Quantification

 In this logic, A ⇒ B has a well-known, compelling definition, as an abbreviation for:

$$\forall X \text{ A says } X \supset \text{B says } X$$

Logic

- The second-order logic is the straightforward extension of *ICL* with universal quantification over propositions, with the rules of System F;
- It has previously been defined and used under the name CDD, but they call it ICL[∀] for the sake of uniformity;
- It immediately leads to undecidability as well as to other difficulties;
- This logic is an obvious and elegant extension of ICL.

There is an obvious embedding of ICL^{\Rightarrow} into ICL^{\forall}

- $\bullet \llbracket p \rrbracket = p$
- $\llbracket s \wedge t \rrbracket = \llbracket s \rrbracket \wedge \llbracket t \rrbracket$
- $\bullet \ \llbracket s \lor t \rrbracket \ = \ \llbracket s \rrbracket \lor \llbracket t \rrbracket$
- $\bullet \ \llbracket s \supset t \rrbracket \ = \ \llbracket s \rrbracket \supset \llbracket t \rrbracket$
- [T] = T
- [□] = □
- [A says s] = A says [s]
- $[A \Rightarrow B] = \forall X \text{ A says } X \supset B \text{ says } X$

- They define a translation from ICL^{\forall} to second-order S4 (called $S4^{\forall}$), adding maps $\forall X \cdot s$ to $\Box \forall X \cdot \lceil s \rceil$ in ICL translation;
- $\vdash \lceil [s] \rceil$ in $S4^{\forall}$ implies $\vdash \lceil s \rceil$ in S4. They try to prove this by induction on s. The argument fails for a formula of the form $A \Rightarrow B$, since

•
$$\vdash \sqcap A \Rightarrow B \sqcap = \square \forall X \square (\square (A \vee \square X) \supset \square (B \vee \square X))$$

•
$$\vdash \ulcorner A \Rightarrow B \urcorner = \Box (A \supset B)$$

Two observations allow the proof to go through:

- $\textbf{0} \ \, \text{On all acyclic models,} \ \, \vdash \ulcorner \llbracket A \Rightarrow B \rrbracket \urcorner \ \, \text{implies} \vdash \ulcorner A \Rightarrow B \urcorner;$
- Quantifier-free S4 is sound and complete with respect to acyclic models.

Using these observations to complete their proof as follows.

- Suppose that ⊢ [s] in ICL[∀];
- By the soundness of the translation from ICL[∀] to S4[∀], they obtain ⊢ 「[s]¬ in S4[∀];
- Therefore every acyclic model of $S4^{\forall}$ satisfies $\lceil \llbracket s \rrbracket \rceil$;
- By (1), every acyclic model of S4[∀] satisfies ¬s¬;
- Since, for S4 formulas, the models of S4[∀] are the same as the models of S4, every acyclic model of S4 satisfies ¬s¬;
- By (2), every model of S4 satisfies $\lceil s \rceil$;
- By the completeness of S4 for its models, it follows that
 ⊢ 「s¬ in S4;
- By soundness and completeness Theorem (ICL[⇒] to S4), they conclude that ⊢ s in ICL[⇒].

Conclusion

- Their results may serve as the basis for theorem provers for logics of access control, with the help of existing algorithms and provers for S4;
- The translation lead to decidability results and semantics, and also to comparison of the logics.