Symbols

General color codina

Best to Worst: TBD:

Symbols

- Recommendations differ depending on organization
- ☼ Parameter set
- Encryption
- Sianina
- Not yet standardized by NIST
- Implementation Code
- Implementation size

- Key Generation ▲ Decryption
- Verification
- E CPU Cycles
- Implementation complexity


Security categories of parameter sets











Higher means more secure.

Implementation complexity and size









Low/Medium/High implementation complexity

Low/Medium/High implementation size

Lower is better.

Rating scales for parameter sizes and performance

Best to Worst: n < 2, n < 3, 4, $n \in \{5, 6\}$, $n \in \{7, 8\}$, n > 9



 $\mathcal{O}(5^n)$ CPU kilo cycles for key generation



 $\mathcal{O}(5^n)$ CPU kilo cycles for signing

 $\mathcal{O}(5^n)$ CPU kilo cycles for signature verification

 $\mathcal{O}(5^n)$ CPU kilo cycles for encryption / key encapsulation

 $\mathcal{O}(5^n)$ CPU kilo cycles for decryption / key decapsulation

 $\mathcal{O}(2^n)$ KB of signature size

 $\mathcal{O}(2^n)$ KB of ciphertext size

 $\mathcal{O}(2^{(n-5)})$ KB of signature algorithm public key size

 $\mathcal{O}(2^n)$ KB of encryption algorithm public key size

How To Interpret This Cheat Sheet

The goal of this cheat sheet is to make it as easy as possible to figure out which algorithm to pick for a given use case. Algorithm ID cards break down algorithm parameter sets, their important values and performance characteristics. The cheat sheet is intended to help users primarily in technical roles, such as engineers, architects or software developers working with post-augntum cryptography.

The focus is to avoid giving specific numbers measured in bits, bytes or cycles as this makes makes comparing numbers across algorithms difficult. Instead, this complexity is simplified by only providing a colorcoded number indicating the order of magnitude of each metric.


This approach prioritizes easy interpretation and comparability of metrics and in general quick informational gain over absolute precision of data - remember this is a cheat sheet, not a standard! This document is not intended to replace the study of algorithm specifications. It just aims to point you in the right direction quickly.

The approach of focusing on orders of magnitude walks a fine line between treating too many things as "equal" and not simplifying things enough to be easy to read and compare. "In the same order of magnitude" usually refers to "equal up to a factor of at most 10", which is a very coarse way of comparing numbers. Treating metrics that differ by a factor of e.g. 9.9 as "equal" because 9.9 < 10 paints a distorted picture. In cryptography, factors of 5 or even 2 can make a significant difference in performance, both in theory and in practice. In order to still tease out the differences in metrics without throwing too many things together that actually differ significantly, this cheat sheet applies different scaling and "orders of magnitude" (i.e., not regarding base 10) for different metrics.

It turns out that for metrics measured in (kilo) CPU cycle counts, i.e. algorithm performance, "up to a factor of 5" is a scale that is granular enough to work out the differences between algorithms while maintaining easy comparability. Those cycle counts heavily depend on the CPU used during measurement, hence the numbers need to be taken with a grain of salt, even if given exactly and not in terms of orders of magnitude.

For signature and ciphertext sizes as well as key sizes, measuring numbers in kilobytes "up to a factor of 2" is well suited to work out the differences between algorithms while allowing for quick comparison. Specifically for signature public key sizes only, we offset the corresponding color coding by 5 orders of magnitude. This is because SLH-DSA has extremely small pubic keys compared to all other signature algorithms, which would extend the scale into negative numbers (e.g., for SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s, the public key has 32=2⁵ bytes, which corresponds to an order of magnitude of -5 when measuring in orders maanitude of factor 2 and in kilobytes). This phenomenon of algorithm metrics spanning a very large range of orders of (base 2) magnitudes does not occur to this extent for encryption algorithms, making an offset unnecessary.

All values thus have a lower bound of 0. We do not limit the upper end of scales, but don't distinguish values areater than 10 anymore in terms of color codina. Please refer to the definitions on the left for symbol explanations, color coding and interpretation of numeric values.



PURE PQC VS PQ/T HYBRID

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
This topic depends on too many factors (e.g. cost of migration, security considerations, risk profile, GRC requirements) to give general advice. For PQ/T hybrids, consider ECC (e.g. secp256r1, Curve25519) over RSA for the traditional component.


SECURITY CATEGORY CHOICES

- First, consider using \mathfrak{m} as a baseline.
- Use IV or Vo for more security if possible (i.e., if a decrease in performance is not a concern and if no constraints apoly).
- Use or if and only if or higher is not an option due to constraints (e.g. performance, memory, etc.).

Pure vs. Pre-Hashing

- First, consider using pure (i.e., without pre-hashing) as this is the general recommendation.
- Pre-Hashing may be considered if one or more of the following applies:
- The message M is too large to be sent to cryptographic module (CM) for hashing without significantly impacting performance. This may be the case e.g. in CMS related use cases such as S/MIME or code signing, or in cases of very narrow communication channels to the CM (e.g. between APDUs exchanged between smartcard and smartcard reader).
- The hash needs to be signed with different algorithms and would be computed repeatedly without pre-hashing.
- The specific hash function is not supported in a CM.





SLH-DSA (Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard) Goog VERSION OID SECURITY PERFORMANCE SIGNATURE PUBLIC KEY SUITABLE POOT CATEGORY SIZE SIZE PRE-HASHING 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3.20 SHA-256, SHA3-256 SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s SLH-DSA-SHA2-128F 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3.21 SHA-256, SHA3-256 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3.22 SLH-DSA-SHA2-192s SHA-384, SHA3-384 Algorithm Overall Usability Score SLH-DSA-SHA2-192F 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3.23 SHA-384, SHA3-384 SLH-DSA-SHA2-256s 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3.24 SHA-512, SHA3-512 PREVIOUS NAME SPHINCS+ **SPECIFICATION 9** FIPS 205 SLH-DSA-SHA2-256F 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3.25 SHA-512, SHA3-512 TYPE Signature SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128s 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3.26 SHA-256, SHA3-256 Hash (stateless) FAMILY STANDARDIZATION STATUS Standardized SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128F 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3.27 SHA-256, SHA3-256 RECOMMENDED BY NIST, BSI, ANSSI SLH-DSA-SHAKE-192s 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3.28 SHA-384, SHA3-384 HASHING Pure, Pre-Hashing based on various characteristics NAMING SLH-DSA-SHAKE-192F 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3.29 SHA-384, SHA3-384 (*s=small signatures, *f=fast) SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3.30 SHA-512, SHA3-512 SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256F 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3.31 SHA-512, SHA3-512 ALGORITHM IMPLEMENTATION COMPLEXITY SIZE / Pros / Use If: / Cons / Don't Use If: Alternative to ML-DSA and Falcon that is not based on lattices Poor key generation and signing performance compared to other algorithms • High complexity of the algorithm and the implementation Very small public keys

 Possible interoperability issues due to the many variants that may not all be supported everywhere

Note: Cycle counts for key generation, signing and verification depend on the CPU used. Values may vary on different CPUs and thus only a rough indicator.

XMSS / XMSS-MT (eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme / eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme Multi Tree)



Algorithm Overall Usability Score

PREVIOUS NAME SPECIFICATION TYPE FAMILY STANDARDIZATION STATUS RECOMMENDED BY HASHING NAMING

XMSS/XMSSMT
Signature
Merkle Trees (stateful hash trees)
Standardized
NIST, BSI, ANSSI
TBD
XMSS-[Hashfamily]_[h]_[n]
XMSSMT-[Hashfamily]_[h]/[d]_[n]
where h is the tree height,
d is the number of layers, and

eful hash trees)
[h][n] ily]_[h]/[d]_[n] e height, of layers, and length in bits

Version	NUMERIC IDENTIFIER	SECURITY CATEGORY	PER	FORMAN	ICE	SIGNATURE SIZE	MAXIUMUM SIGNATURES	NUMBER OF LAYERS
XMSS-SHA2_10_256	0x00000001	V	??	??	?0	?^	2 ¹⁰	1
XMSS-SHA2_16_256	0x00000002	V	₹	? <u>?</u>	70	?	216	1
XMSS-SHA2_20_256	0x00000003	V®	?8	78	?0	?	2 ²⁰	1
XMSSMT-SHA2_20/2_256	0x00000001	V	?	? ?	?0	?	2 ²⁰	2
XMSSMT-SHA2_20/4_256	0x00000002	V	? <u>?</u> ?	?	70	?	2 ²⁰	4
XMSSMT-SHA2_40/2_256	0x00000003	V	?	?	? 0	?	2 ⁴⁰	2
XMSSMT-SHA2_40/4_256	0x00000004	V	??	?	70	?	2 ⁴⁰	4
XMSSMT-SHA2_40/8_256	0x00000005	V	? <u>?</u> ?	?	? 0	?	2 ⁴⁰	8
XMSSMT-SHA2_60/3_256	0x00000006	V	?	? 8	70	?	2 ⁶⁰	3
XMSSMT-SHA2_60/6_256	0x00000007	V	₹	?	? 0	?	260	6
XMSSMT-SHA2_60/12_256	0x00000008	V	?8	? 8	₹	?	2 ⁶⁰	12

Complexity	
0	

ALGORITHM IMPLEMENTATION



n is the message

§SP 800-208 defines further parameter sets not listed in
§§ RFC 8391 using other hash functions (SHA256/192,) SHAKE256/256, SHAKE256/192). Furthermore, ORFC 8391 lists optional parameter sets that are not approved in § SP 800-208. All of those variants are omitted here as they are not likely to be widely used, in particular not after. ML-DSA and SLH-DSA have been standardized in the meantime.

/ Pros / Use If:

- You can predict the maximum number of signatures that are going to be required
- Firmware signing use cases

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- You want a signature scheme where the security only relies on the security of the hash function used without assuming the hardness of another mathematical problem.
- Cf. SP 800-208, Section 1.1 for additional explanations

/ Cons / Don't Use If:

- You require an algorithm for general use
- You cannot predict the maximum number of signatures that are going to be required, or the number of required signatures exceeds the maximum number of signatures enabled through the approved parameter sets
- Your application does not allow for the careful state management and tracking of signatures performed that is required with this algorithm

NOTE: Cycle counts for key generation, signing and verification depend on the CPU used. Values may vary on different CPUs and thus only a rough indicator.

LMS (Leighton-Micali Signature)

TBD

▲ ENCRYPTION ALGORITHM OVERVIEW & ID CARDS



CLASSIC MCELIECE

TBD

Note: Cycle counts for key generation, encryption and decryption depend on the CPU used. Values may vary on different CPUs and thus only a rough indicator.

BIKE

TBD

Note: No data available for BIKE-1.5 for cycle counts. Algorithm score is computed over BIKE-1.1 and BIKE-1.3 only.

NOTE: Cycle counts for key generation, encryption and decryption depend on the CPU used. Values may vary on different CPUs and thus only a rough indicator.

HQC

TBD

Note: Cycle counts for key generation, encryption and decryption depend on the CPU used. Values may vary on different CPUs and thus only a rough indicator.

FRODOKEM

TBD

Note: Cycle counts for key generation, encryption and decryption depend on the CPU used. Values may vary on different CPUs and thus only a rough indicator.

ALGORITHM SCORING: ALGORITHM OVERALL USABILITY SCORE

We try to measure an algorithm's overall usability by calculating a single number between 0 (worst) and 10 (best), taking into account all performance and size metrics, the number of security categories provided and whether or not is it is suitable for general use.

An algorithm's overall score is computed as

$$score_{\textit{algorithm}} = \max \left\{ 0; \, \text{avg}\{score_v \, | \, v \text{ is variant of } \textit{algorithm}\} - \frac{1}{8} \cdot \left(5 - \gamma_{\textit{algorithm}}\right) - \delta_{\textit{algorithm}} \right\}$$

where score variant is a score for an individual algorithm variant computed as

$$\mathsf{score}_{\textit{signature-variant}} = 10 - \mathsf{avg} \left(\begin{array}{ccc} \mathbf{n_O^o} & + & \mathbf{n_O^o} & + & \mathbf{n_O^o} \end{array} \right) + \\ \mathbf{n_O^o} + & \mathbf{n_O^o} & + & \mathbf{n_O^o} \end{array} \right)$$

respectively

$$score_{encryption-variant} = 10 - avg \left(\begin{array}{cccc} \mathbf{n_O^o} & + & \mathbf{n_O^o} & + & \mathbf{n_O^o} \end{array} + \begin{array}{ccccc} \mathbf{n_O^o} & + & \mathbf{n_O^o} \end{array} \right)$$

and where $1 \le \gamma_{algorithm} \le 5$ describes the number of different security categories offered by algorithm. Finally, $\delta_{algorithm} = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } algorithm \text{ is a general purpose algorithm} \\ 2 & \text{else} \end{cases}$ takes into account if the algorithm is suitable for general use.

TBD: Improve formular by taking into account implementation complexity and size.

Example: ML-DSA Overall Usability Score

We calculate

$$score_{ML-DSA-44} = 10 - avg\left(\frac{32}{100} + \frac{32}{100} +$$

Similarly, we obtain $score_{ML-DSA-65} = 7$ and $score_{ML-DSA-87} = 6.2$. Furthermore, $\gamma_{ML-DSA} = 3$ since ML-DSA offers the three security categories , and $\delta_{ML-DSA} = 0$ since ML-DSA is a general purpose signature algorithm. This results in an overall usability score of 6.55:



ML-DSA Overall Usability Score

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$$\begin{split} \text{score}_{\textit{ML-DSA}} &= \max \left\{ (0; \, \text{avg} \{ \text{score}_{\textit{ML-DSA-44}}, \text{score}_{\textit{ML-DSA-65}}, \text{score}_{\textit{ML-DSA-87}} \} - \frac{1}{8} \cdot (5 - \gamma_{\textit{ML-DSA}}) - \delta_{\textit{ML-DSA}} \right\} \\ &= \max \left\{ 0; \, \text{avg} \{ 7.2; \, 7; \, 6.2 \} - \frac{1}{8} \cdot (5 - 3) - 0 \right\} \\ &= \max \left\{ 0; \, 6.8 - 0.25 - 0 \right\} \\ &= \max \left\{ 0; \, 6.55 \right\} \\ &= 6.55 \end{split}$$