

# Post-Quantum Cryptography Algorithm Cheat Sheets

## SYMBOLS






### General color coding

Best to Worst:     TBD: 

### Symbols







- |  |   |
|--|---|
|  Recommendations differ depending on organization |  Key Generation            |
|  Parameter set                                    |  Decryption                |
|  Encryption / Ciphertext                          |  Verification              |
|  Signing / Signature                              |  CPU Cycles                |
|  Not yet standardized by NIST                     |  Implementation complexity |
|  Implementation Code                              |  Implementation size       |

### Security categories of parameter sets

     NIST Security Categories V, IV, III, II, I

Higher is more secure.










### Implementation complexity and size

   Low/Medium/High implementation complexity  
   Low/Medium/High implementation size

Lower is better.

### Rating scales for parameter sizes and performance

Best to Worst:   $n \leq 2$ ,   $n \in \{3, 4\}$ ,   $n \in \{5, 6\}$ ,   $n \in \{7, 8\}$ ,   $n \geq 9$

- |   |   |
|---|---|
|  | $\mathcal{O}(5^n)$ CPU kilo cycles for key generation                 |
|  | $\mathcal{O}(5^n)$ CPU kilo cycles for signing                        |
|  | $\mathcal{O}(5^n)$ CPU kilo cycles for signature verification         |
|  | $\mathcal{O}(5^n)$ CPU kilo cycles for encryption / key encapsulation |
|  | $\mathcal{O}(5^n)$ CPU kilo cycles for decryption / key decapsulation |
|  | $\mathcal{O}(2^n)$ KB of signature size                               |
|  | $\mathcal{O}(2^n)$ KB of ciphertext size                              |
|  | $\mathcal{O}(2^{(n-5)})$ KB of signature algorithm public key size    |
|  | $\mathcal{O}(2^n)$ KB of encryption algorithm public key size         |

## HOW TO INTERPRET THIS CHEAT SHEET

The goal of this cheat sheet is to make it as easy as possible to figure out which algorithm to pick for a given use case. Algorithm ID cards break down algorithm parameter sets, their important values and performance characteristics. The cheat sheet is intended to help users primarily in technical roles, such as engineers, architects or software developers working with post-quantum cryptography.

The focus is to avoid giving specific numbers measured in bits, bytes or cycles as this makes comparing numbers across algorithms difficult. Instead, this complexity is simplified by only providing a **color-coded number indicating the order of magnitude of each metric**.

**This approach prioritizes easy interpretation and comparability of metrics and in general quick informational gain over absolute precision of data – remember this is a cheat sheet, not a standard! This document is not intended to replace the study of algorithm specifications. It just aims to point you in the right direction quickly.**

The approach of focusing on orders of magnitude walks a fine line between treating too many things as “equal” and not simplifying things enough to be easy to read and compare. “In the same order of magnitude” usually refers to “equal up to a factor of at most 10”, which is a very coarse way of comparing numbers. Treating metrics that differ by a factor of e.g. 9.9 as “equal” because  $9.9 < 10$  paints a distorted picture. In cryptography, factors of 5 or even 2 can make a significant difference in security or performance, both in theory and in practice. In order to still tease out the differences in metrics without throwing too many things together that actually differ significantly, this cheat sheet applies different scaling and “orders of magnitude” (i.e., not regarding base 10) for different metrics.

It turns out that for **metrics measured in (kilo) CPU cycle counts, i.e. algorithm performance**, “up to a factor of 5” is a scale that is granular enough to work out the differences between algorithms while maintaining easy comparability. Those cycle counts heavily depend on the CPU used during measurement, hence the numbers need to be taken with a grain of salt, even if given exactly and not in terms of orders of magnitude.

For **signature and ciphertext sizes as well as key sizes, measuring numbers in kilobytes** “up to a factor of 2” is well suited to work out the differences between algorithms while allowing for quick comparison. Specifically for signature public key sizes only, we offset the corresponding color coding by 5 orders of magnitude. This is because SLH-DSA has extremely small public keys compared to all other signature algorithms, which would extend the scale into negative numbers (e.g. for SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s, the public key has  $32=2^5$  bytes, which corresponds to an order of magnitude of -5 when measuring in orders of magnitude of base 2 and in kilobytes). This phenomenon of algorithm metrics spanning a very large range of orders of (base 2) magnitudes does not occur to this extent for encryption algorithms, making an offset unnecessary.

All values thus have a lower bound of 0. We do not limit the upper end of scales, but don’t distinguish values greater than 10 anymore in terms of color coding. Please refer to the definitions on the left for symbol explanations, color coding and interpretation of numeric values.

# Post-Quantum Cryptography Algorithm Cheat Sheets

## ALGORITHM CHOICE GUIDANCE: RULES OF THUMB

The following orders of preference should be considered as general rules of thumb applicable to most use cases. They should however not be considered to be universal truths. Unstandardized algorithms are listed for the sake of completeness.

### SIGNATURE ALGORITHMS

Objective: Best All-Around Package **TBV**



Objective: Performance of Key Generation **TBV**



Objective: Performance of Signing **TBV**



Objective: Performance of Verification **TBV**



Objective: Small Signatures **TBV**



Objective: Small Public Keys **TBV**



\* XMSS/LMS is not suitable for general purpose signatures

\*\* Security still unclear, none recommended yet at the moment

### ENCRYPTION/KEY ENCAPSULATION ALGORITHMS

Objective: Best All-Around Package **TBV**



Objective: Performance of Key Generation **TBV**



Objective: Performance of Encryption **TBV**



Objective: Performance of Decryption **TBV**









Objective: Small Ciphertext **TBV**



Objective: Small Public Keys **TBV**



## SECURITY CATEGORY CHOICES

- First, consider using  as a baseline.
- Use  or  for more security if possible (i.e., if a decrease in performance is not a concern and if no constraints apply).
- Use  or  if and only if  or higher is not an option due to constraints (e.g. performance, memory, etc.).
- Comparing post-quantum security categories of algorithms to their traditional security level in bits is a complex subject and like comparing apples and oranges to some degree.

## PURE VS. PRE-HASHING

- First, consider using pure (i.e., without pre-hashing) as this is the general recommendation.
- Pre-Hashing may be considered if one or more of the following applies:
  - The message  $M$  is too large to be sent to cryptographic module (CM) for hashing without significantly impacting performance. This may be the case e.g. in CMS related use cases such as S/MIME or code signing, or in cases of very narrow communication channels to the CM (e.g. between APDUs exchanged between smartcard and smartcard reader).
  - The hash needs to be signed with different algorithms and would be computed repeatedly without pre-hashing.
  - The specific hash function is not supported in a CM.

## PURE PQ vs PQ/T HYBRID

This topic depends on too many factors (e.g. cost of migration, security considerations, risk profile, GRC requirements) to give general advice. Those aspects will differ greatly between different organizations. The main reasons to adopt PQ/T hybrids are to still have traditional algorithms in place in case a new algorithm turns out to be insecure, and that PQ/T might help to avoid a big bang migration as systems could simply ignore the PQ component if they do not support it yet. Consider recommendations from different government agencies: BSI and ANSSI recommend PQ/T hybrid strategies, whereas NIST is more reserved towards PQ/T. **If using PQ/T hybrids, preferably use ECC (e.g. secp256r1, brainpoolP256r1, Curve25519) instead of RSA for the traditional component to keep key sizes as small as possible.**

# Post-Quantum Cryptography Algorithm Cheat Sheets

## SIGNATURE ALGORITHM OVERVIEW & ID CARDS

ML-DSA (MODULE-LATTICE-BASED DIGITAL SIGNATURE ALGORITHM)

Unusable

Poor

Good

Perfect

1-3

4-5

6-8

9-10

6.55

Algorithm Overall Usability Score

PREVIOUS NAME

SPECIFICATION

TYPE

FAMILY

SUITABLE FOR GENERAL USE

STANDARDIZATION STATUS

RECOMMENDED BY

HASHING

NAMING

CRYSTALS-DILITHIUM

[FIPS 204](#)

Signature

Lattice

Yes

Standardized

NIST, BSI, ANSSI

Pure, Pre-Hashing

by  $k \times l$  matrix  $A$

(e.g.  $6 \times 5 \rightarrow$  ML-DSA-65)

IMPLEMENTATION

?

?

?

COMPLEXITY

?

?

?

SIZE

?

?

?

👍 / Pros / Use If:

- You need a general-purpose signature algorithm with decent specs in all categories

👎 / Cons / Don't Use If:

- You don't want a lattice-based algorithm

PARAMETER SET	OID	SECURITY CATEGORY	PERFORMANCE	SIGNATURE SIZE	PUBLIC KEY SIZE	SUITABLE PRE-HASHING
ML-DSA-44	2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3.17	II	<div><div>3</div><div>3</div><div>2</div></div>	<div><div>1</div></div>	<div><div>5</div></div>	SHA-256, SHA3-256
ML-DSA-65	2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3.18	III	<div><div>3</div><div>3</div><div>3</div></div>	<div><div>1</div></div>	<div><div>5</div></div>	SHA-384, SHA3-384
ML-DSA-87	2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3.19	V	<div><div>4</div><div>4</div><div>3</div></div>	<div><div>2</div></div>	<div><div>6</div></div>	SHA-512, SHA3-512

# Post-Quantum Cryptography Algorithm Cheat Sheets

FALCON (FAST-FOURIER LATTICE-BASED COMPACT SIGNATURES OVER NTRU)

Unusable

Poor

Good

Perfect

1-3

4-5

6-8

9-10

5.73

Algorithm Overall Usability Score

PREVIOUS NAME

Falcon

SPECIFICATION

[Project Page](#)

TYPE

Signature

FAMILY

Lattice

SUITABLE FOR GENERAL USE

Yes

STANDARDIZATION STATUS

Pending

RECOMMENDED BY

TBD

HASHING

TBD

NAMING

TBD

IMPLEMENTATION

COMPLEXITY

H

C

4p

H

C

4p

?

C

4p

SIZE

?

S

4p

?

S

4p

?

S

4p

PARAMETER SET	OID	SECURITY CATEGORY	PERFORMANCE	SIGNATURE SIZE	PUBLIC KEY SIZE	SUITABLE PRE-HASHING
FALCON-512	TBD	I	<div><div>8</div><div></div></div> <div><div>4</div><div></div></div> <div><div>2</div><div></div></div>	<div><div>0</div><div></div></div>	<div><div>4</div><div></div></div>	TBD
FALCON-1024	TBD	V	<div><div>9</div><div></div></div> <div><div>4</div><div></div></div> <div><div>3</div><div></div></div>	<div><div>0</div><div></div></div>	<div><div>5</div><div></div></div>	TBD

👍 / Pros / Use If:

- Falcon has smaller signature sizes than ML-DSA:

0

 vs. 

1

 resp. 

2
- Falcon has smaller public key sizes than ML-DSA:

4

 vs. 

5

 on Level I, 

5

 vs. 

6

 on Level V.

👎 / Cons / Don't Use If:

- You need a medium security category between 

I

 and 

V
- The algorithm is not yet standardized
- The algorithm requires expensive floating point arithmetic
- Key generation and signing are slower than for ML-DSA

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
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NO RESPONSIBILITY IS TAKEN FOR THE CORRECTNESS OF THIS INFORMATION.

4

# Post-Quantum Cryptography Algorithm Cheat Sheets

## SLH-DSA (STATELESS HASH-BASED DIGITAL SIGNATURE STANDARD)



**PREVIOUS NAME** SPHINCS+  
**SPECIFICATION** [FIPS 205](#)  
**TYPE** Signature  
**FAMILY** Hash (stateless)  
**SUITABLE FOR GENERAL USE** Yes  
**STANDARDIZATION STATUS** Standardized  
**RECOMMENDED BY** NIST, BSI, ANSSI  
**HASHING** Pure, Pre-Hashing  
**NAMING** based on various characteristics (\*s=small signatures, \*f=fast)

IMPLEMENTATION			
COMPLEXITY			
SIZE			

PARAMETER SET	OID	SECURITY CATEGORY	PERFORMANCE	SIGNATURE SIZE	PUBLIC KEY SIZE	SUITABLE PRE-HASHING
SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s	2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3.20					SHA-256, SHA3-256
SLH-DSA-SHA2-128f	2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3.21					SHA-256, SHA3-256
SLH-DSA-SHA2-192s	2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3.22					SHA-384, SHA3-384
SLH-DSA-SHA2-192f	2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3.23					SHA-384, SHA3-384
SLH-DSA-SHA2-256s	2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3.24					SHA-512, SHA3-512
SLH-DSA-SHA2-256f	2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3.25					SHA-512, SHA3-512
SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128s	2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3.26					SHA-256, SHA3-256
SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128f	2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3.27					SHA-256, SHA3-256
SLH-DSA-SHAKE-192s	2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3.28					SHA-384, SHA3-384
SLH-DSA-SHAKE-192f	2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3.29					SHA-384, SHA3-384
SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s	2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3.30					SHA-512, SHA3-512
SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256f	2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3.31					SHA-512, SHA3-512

### 👍 / Pros / Use If:

- Alternative to ML-DSA and Falcon that is not based on lattices
- Very small public keys

### 👎 / Cons / Don't Use If:

- Poor key generation and signing performance compared to other algorithms
- High complexity of the algorithm and the implementation
- Possible interoperability issues due to the many variants that may not all be supported everywhere

# Post-Quantum Cryptography Algorithm Cheat Sheets

## XMSS / XMSS-MT (eXTENDED MERKLE SIGNATURE SCHEME / eXTENDED MERKLE SIGNATURE SCHEME MULTI TREE)



**PREVIOUS NAME** XMSS/XMSSMT  
**SPECIFICATION** [SP 800-208](#), [RFC 8391](#)  
**TYPE** Signature  
**FAMILY** Merkle Trees (stateful hash trees)  
**SUITABLE FOR GENERAL USE** No  
**STANDARDIZATION STATUS** Standardized  
**RECOMMENDED BY** NIST, BSI, ANSSI  
**HASHING** TBD  
**NAMING** XMSS-[Hashfamily]\_[h]\_[n]  
XMSSMT-[Hashfamily]\_[h]/[d]\_[n]  
where h is the tree height,  
d is the number of layers, and  
n is the message length in bits

IMPLEMENTATION			
COMPLEXITY			
SIZE			

PARAMETER SET	NUMERIC IDENTIFIER	SECURITY CATEGORY	PERFORMANCE	SIGNATURE SIZE	MAXIMUM SIGNATURES	NUMBER OF LAYERS
XMSS-SHA2_10_256	0x00000001				2 <sup>10</sup>	1
XMSS-SHA2_16_256	0x00000002				2 <sup>16</sup>	1
XMSS-SHA2_20_256	0x00000003				2 <sup>20</sup>	1
XMSSMT-SHA2_20/2_256	0x00000001				2 <sup>20</sup>	2
XMSSMT-SHA2_20/4_256	0x00000002				2 <sup>20</sup>	4
XMSSMT-SHA2_40/2_256	0x00000003				2 <sup>40</sup>	2
XMSSMT-SHA2_40/4_256	0x00000004				2 <sup>40</sup>	4
XMSSMT-SHA2_40/8_256	0x00000005				2 <sup>40</sup>	8
XMSSMT-SHA2_60/3_256	0x00000006				2 <sup>60</sup>	3
XMSSMT-SHA2_60/6_256	0x00000007				2 <sup>60</sup>	6
XMSSMT-SHA2_60/12_256	0x00000008				2 <sup>60</sup>	12

**NOTE:**  
[SP 800-208](#) defines further parameter sets not listed in [RFC 8391](#) using other hash functions (SHA256/192, SHAKE256/256, SHAKE256/192). Furthermore, [RFC 8391](#) lists optional parameter sets that are not approved in [SP 800-208](#). All of those variants are omitted here as they are not likely to be widely used, in particular not after ML-DSA and SLH-DSA have been standardized in the meantime.

### 👍 / Pros / Use If:

- You can predict the maximum number of signatures that are going to be required
- Firmware signing use cases
- You want a signature scheme where the security only relies on the security of the hash function used without assuming the hardness of another mathematical problem.
- Cf. [SP 800-208, Section 1.1](#) for additional explanations

### 👎 / Cons / Don't Use If:

- You require an algorithm for general use
- You cannot predict the maximum number of signatures that are going to be required, or the number of required signatures exceeds the maximum number of signatures enabled through the approved parameter sets
- Your application does not allow for the careful state management and tracking of signatures performed that is required with this algorithm



# Post-Quantum Cryptography Algorithm Cheat Sheets

## LMS/HSS (LEIGHTON-MICALI SIGNATURE / HIERARCHICAL SIGNATURE SYSTEM)



**PREVIOUS NAME** LMS, LMS/HSS  
**SPECIFICATION** [SP 800-208](#), [RFC 8554](#)  
**TYPE** Signature  
**FAMILY** Merkle Trees (stateful hash trees)  
**SUITABLE FOR GENERAL USE** No  
**STANDARDIZATION STATUS** Standardized  
**RECOMMENDED BY** NIST, BSI, ANSSI  
**HASHING** TBD  
**NAMING** LMS\_SHA256\_M32\_[h]  
where h is the tree height

IMPLEMENTATION			
COMPLEXITY			
SIZE			

PARAMETER SET	NUMERIC IDENTIFIER	SECURITY CATEGORY	PERFORMANCE	SIGNATURE SIZE	MAXIMUM SIGNATURES
LMS_SHA256_M32_H5	0x00000005				2 <sup>5</sup>
LMS_SHA256_M32_H10	0x00000006				2 <sup>10</sup>
LMS_SHA256_M32_H15	0x00000007				2 <sup>15</sup>
LMS_SHA256_M32_H20	0x00000008				2 <sup>20</sup>
LMS_SHA256_M32_H25	0x00000009				2 <sup>25</sup>

**NOTE:** [SP 800-208](#) defines further parameter sets not listed in [RFC 8554](#) using other hash functions (SHA256/192, SHAKE256/256, SHAKE256/192). Those variants are omitted here as they are not likely to be widely used, in particular not after ML-DSA and SLH-DSA have been standardized in the meantime. Similar to XMSS multi-tree variants, a comparable structure exists with Hierarchical Signature System (HSS) variants of LMS that involves a number of LMS instances.

### 👍 / Pros / Use If:

- You can predict the maximum number of signatures that are going to be required
- Firmware signing use cases
- You want a signature scheme where the security only relies on the security of the hash function used without assuming the hardness of another mathematical problem.
- Cf. [SP 800-208, Section 1.1](#) for additional explanations

### 👎 / Cons / Don't Use If:

- You require an algorithm for general use
- You cannot predict the maximum number of signatures that are going to be required, or the number of required signatures exceeds the maximum number of signatures enabled through the approved parameter sets
- Your application does not allow for the careful state management and tracking of signatures performed that is required with this algorithm

# Post-Quantum Cryptography Algorithm Cheat Sheets

## 🔒 ENCRYPTION ALGORITHM OVERVIEW & ID CARDS

ML-KEM (MODULE-LATTICE-BASED KEY-ENCAPSULATION MECHANISM STANDARD)

Unusable

Poor

Good

Perfect

1-3

4-5

6-8

9-10

8.28

Algorithm Overall Usability Score

PREVIOUS NAME

CRYSTALS-KYBER

SPECIFICATION

[FIPS 203](#)

TYPE

Encryption/KEM

FAMILY

Lattice

SUITABLE FOR GENERAL USE

Yes

STANDARDIZATION STATUS

Standardized

RECOMMENDED BY

NIST, BSI, ANSSI

NAMING

TBD

IMPLEMENTATION

🔑

✎

?

COMPLEXITY

?

?

?

SIZE

?

?

?

PARAMETER SET

OID

SECURITY CATEGORY

PERFORMANCE

CIPHERTEXT SIZE

PUBLIC KEY SIZE

ML-KEM-512

2.16.840.1.101.3.4.4.7

I

2

2

2

0

0

ML-KEM-768

2.16.840.1.101.3.4.4.2

III

2

2

3

0

0

ML-KEM-1024

2.16.840.1.101.3.4.4.3

V

3

3

3

0

0

👍 / Pros / Use If:

👎 / Cons / Don't Use If:

Currently the only post-quantum encryption /key encapsulation algorithm standardized by NIST


Need a general-purpose encryption / key-encapsulation algorithm with decent specs in all categories

You don't want a lattice-based algorithm



# Post-Quantum Cryptography Algorithm Cheat Sheets

## BIKE (BIT FLIPPING KEY ENCAPSULATION)



**PREVIOUS NAME** BIKE  
**SPECIFICATION** [Project Page](#)  
**TYPE** Encryption/KEM  
**FAMILY** Codes  
**SUITABLE FOR GENERAL USE** Yes  
**STANDARDIZATION STATUS** 4th round candidate  
**RECOMMENDED BY NAMING** TBD  
after security categories I, III and V

IMPLEMENTATION			
COMPLEXITY			
SIZE			

PARAMETER SET	OID	SECURITY CATEGORY	PERFORMANCE			CIPHERTEXT SIZE	PUBLIC KEY SIZE
BIKE-L1	TBD						
BIKE-L3	TBD						
BIKE-L5	TBD						

**NOTE:**  
No data available for BIKE-L5 for cycle counts. The algorithm overall usability score is computed over BIKE-L1 and BIKE-L3 only.

### / Pros / Use If:

- Possible alternative to ML-KEM not based on lattices.

### / Cons / Don't Use If:

- Not yet standardized. Note that NIST intends to standardize at most one of the algorithms HQC and BIKE.
- Metrics not as good as the ones of ML-KEM.

# Post-Quantum Cryptography Algorithm Cheat Sheets

HQC (HAMMING-QUASI-CYCLIC)

Unusable

Poor

Good

Perfect

1-3

4-5

6-8

9-10

6.95

Algorithm Overall Usability Score

PREVIOUS NAME

HQC

SPECIFICATION

[Project Page](#)

TYPE

Encryption/KEM

FAMILY

Codes

SUITABLE FOR GENERAL USE

Yes

STANDARDIZATION STATUS

4th round candidate

RECOMMENDED BY

TBD

NAMING

128, 192 and 256 bits of security in reference to security categories I, III and V

IMPLEMENTATION

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?

?

COMPLEXITY

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SIZE

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?

PARAMETER SET	OID	SECURITY CATEGORY	PERFORMANCE			CIPHERTEXT SIZE	PUBLIC KEY SIZE
HQC-128	TBD						
HQC-192	TBD						
HQC-256	TBD						

👍 / Pros / Use If:

- Possible alternative to ML-KEM not based on lattices.

👎 / Cons / Don't Use If:

- Not yet standardized. Note that NIST intends to standardize at most one of the algorithms HQC and BIKE.
- Metrics not as good as the ones of ML-KEM.

# Post-Quantum Cryptography Algorithm Cheat Sheets

FRODOKEM

Unusable

Poor

Good

Perfect

1-3

4-5

6-8

9-10

5.42

Algorithm Overall Usability Score

PREVIOUS NAME

SPECIFICATION

TYPE

FAMILY

SUITABLE FOR GENERAL USE

STANDARDIZATION STATUS

RECOMMENDED BY

NAMING

FrodoKEM

[Project Page](#)

Encryption/KEM

Lattice

Yes

Disregarded by NIST

BSI, ANSSI

FrodoKEM-[n]-[AES | SHAKE]

where n is a matrix dimension

IMPLEMENTATION

COMPLEXITY

SIZE

🔑

✍️

?

?

?

?

?

?

?

PARAMETER SET

OID

SECURITY CATEGORY

PERFORMANCE

CIPHERTEXT SIZE

PUBLIC KEY SIZE

FRODOKEM-640-AES

TBD

I

4

4

4

3

3

FRODOKEM-640-SHAKE

TBD

I

5

5

5

3

3

FRODOKEM-976-AES

TBD

III

4

4

4

3

3

FRODOKEM-976-SHAKE

TBD

III

6

6

6

3

3

FRODOKEM-1344-AES

TBD

V

5

5

5

4

4

FRODOKEM-1344-SHAKE

TBD

V

6

6

6

4

4

NOTE:

There are also ephemeral versions of FrodoKEM (eFrodoKEM-640, etc.), but BSI only recommends FrodoKEM-976 and FrodoKEM-1344 versions for long-term protection. The algorithm score also only includes the non-ephemeral versions listed above.

👍 / Pros / Use If:

👎 / Cons / Don't Use If:

• More conservative than ML-KEM since it is based on unstructured grids

• Not standardized by NIST because ML-KEM is more efficient.

# Post-Quantum Cryptography Algorithm Cheat Sheets

CLASSIC McElIECE

Unusable

Poor

Good

Perfect

1-3

4-5

6-8

9-10

3.31

Algorithm Overall Usability Score

PREVIOUS NAME

SPECIFICATION

TYPE

FAMILY

SUITABLE FOR GENERAL USE

STANDARDIZATION STATUS

RECOMMENDED BY

NAMING

Classic McEliece

[Project Page](#)

Encryption/KEM

Codes

No / With Limitations

4th round candidate (NIST)

BSI

$mceliece[n][deg(F(y))][[f]]$   
where  $n, F(y)$  are parameters  
non-f versions:  $(\mu, \nu) = (0, 0)$   
f versions:  $(\mu, \nu) = (32, 64)$

IMPLEMENTATION

COMPLEXITY

SIZE

🔑

✎

?

?

C

4b

?

C

4b

?

C

4b

?

S

4b

?

S

4b

?

S

4b

PARAMETER SET	OID	SECURITY CATEGORY	PERFORMANCE	CIPHERTEXT SIZE	PUBLIC KEY SIZE
MCElIECE348864	TBD	I	6	2	3
MCElIECE348864F	TBD	I	6	n/a	n/a
MCElIECE460896	TBD	III	7	2	3
MCElIECE460896F	TBD	III	7	n/a	n/a
MCElIECE6688128	TBD	V	8	3	3
MCElIECE6688128F	TBD	V	7	n/a	n/a
MCElIECE6960119	TBD	V	7	3	3
MCElIECE6960119F	TBD	V	7	n/a	n/a
MCElIECE8192128	TBD	V	8	3	3
MCElIECE8192128F	TBD	V	8	n/a	n/a

NOTE:

No data available for the f versions for encryption/decryption cycle counts. The algorithm overall usability score is computed over non-f versions only. Non-f and f versions are interoperable, with f versions offering faster key generation and non-f versions having simpler key generation.

👍 / Pros / Use If:

- Possible alternative to ML-KEM not based on lattices.
- Considered safe and recommended by BSI even though not standardized by NIST.
- Use cases that allow for pre-sharing of keys where the large public key size is not a concern.

👎 / Cons / Don't Use If:

- Not yet standardized by NIST.
- Not suitable for general use due to the very large public keys and poor performance of key generation.
- Due to aforementioned point, likely not suitable for embedded devices.

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12

# Post-Quantum Cryptography Algorithm Cheat Sheets

## TRADITIONAL VS. POST-QUANTUM SECURITY LEVEL COMPARISON [TBV](#)

TRADITIONAL PRE-QUANTUM SECURITY		ATTACK IN TERMS OF BIT SIZE N	ALGORITHM EXAMPLES	NIST SECURITY CATEGORIES DEFINED THROUGH ATTACK	CLASSICAL ATTACK IMPROVEMENT	QUANTUM ATTACK COMPLEXITY	POST-QUANTUM SECURITY	SIGNATURE PARAMETER SETS	ENCRYPTION/KEM PARAMETER SETS
Security [Bits]	CLASSICAL ATTACK COMPLEXITY						Security [Bits]		
$n$	$\mathcal{O}(2^n)$	$n$ -BIT KEY SPACE EXHAUSTIVE KEY SEARCH			GROVER	$\mathcal{O}\left(2^{\frac{n}{2}}\right)$	$\frac{n}{2}$		
$n$	$\mathcal{O}(2^n)$	$n$ -BIT HASH PRE-IMAGE ATTACK			GROVER	$\mathcal{O}\left(2^{\frac{n}{2}}\right)$	$\frac{n}{2}$		
$n$	$\mathcal{O}(2^n)$	$n$ -BIT HASH 2ND-PRE-IMAGE ATTACK			GROVER	$\mathcal{O}\left(2^{\frac{n}{2}}\right)$	$\frac{n}{2}$		
$\frac{n}{2}$	$\mathcal{O}\left(2^{\frac{n}{2}}\right)$	$n$ -BIT HASH COLLISION ATTACK			BRASSARD ET AL.	$\mathcal{O}\left(2^{\frac{n}{3}}\right)$	$\frac{n}{3}$		
128	$\mathcal{O}(2^{128})$	128-BIT KEY SPACE EXHAUSTIVE KEY SEARCH	AES-128	CATEGORY 1	GROVER	$\mathcal{O}(2^{64})$	64	FALCON-512, SLH-DSA 128 VARIANTS	ML-KEM-512, BIKE-L1, HQC-128, FRODOKEM-640
		128-BIT HASH PRE-IMAGE ATTACK	N/A		GROVER	$\mathcal{O}(2^{64})$	64		
		128-BIT HASH 2ND-PRE-IMAGE ATTACK	N/A		GROVER	$\mathcal{O}(2^{64})$	64		
		256-BIT HASH COLLISION ATTACK	SHA-256, SHA3-256	CATEGORY 2	BRASSARD ET AL.	$\mathcal{O}(2^{85})$	85	MLA-DSA-44	
192	$\mathcal{O}(2^{192})$	192-BIT KEY SPACE EXHAUSTIVE KEY SEARCH	AES-192	CATEGORY 3	GROVER	$\mathcal{O}(2^{96})$	96	ML-DSA-67, SLH-DSA 192 VARIANTS	ML-KEM-768, BIKE-L3, HQC-192, FRODOKEM-976
		192-BIT HASH PRE-IMAGE ATTACK	N/A		GROVER	$\mathcal{O}(2^{96})$	96		
		192-BIT HASH 2ND-PRE-IMAGE ATTACK	N/A		GROVER	$\mathcal{O}(2^{96})$	96		
		384-BIT HASH COLLISION ATTACK	SHA-384, SHA3-384	CATEGORY 4	BRASSARD ET AL.	$\mathcal{O}(2^{128})$	128		
256	$\mathcal{O}(2^{256})$	256-BIT KEY SPACE EXHAUSTIVE KEY SEARCH	AES-256	CATEGORY 5	GROVER	$\mathcal{O}(2^{128})$	128	ML-DSA-85, SLH-DSA 256 VARIANTS XMSS**	ML-KEM-1024, BIKE-L5, HQC-256, FRODOKEM-1344
		256-BIT HASH PRE-IMAGE ATTACK	N/A		GROVER	$\mathcal{O}(2^{128})$	128		
		256-BIT HASH 2ND-PRE-IMAGE ATTACK	N/A		GROVER	$\mathcal{O}(2^{128})$	128		
		512-BIT HASH COLLISION ATTACK	SHA-512, SHA3-512		BRASSARD ET AL.	$\mathcal{O}(2^{170})$	170		
384	$\mathcal{O}(2^{384})$	384-BIT KEY SPACE EXHAUSTIVE KEY SEARCH	N/A		GROVER	$\mathcal{O}(2^{192})$	192		
		384-BIT HASH PRE-IMAGE ATTACK	SHA-384, SHA3-384		GROVER	$\mathcal{O}(2^{192})$	192		
		384-BIT HASH 2ND-PRE-IMAGE ATTACK	SHA-384, SHA3-384		GROVER	$\mathcal{O}(2^{192})$	192		
		768-BIT HASH COLLISION ATTACK	N/A		BRASSARD ET AL.	$\mathcal{O}(2^{256})$	256		
512	$\mathcal{O}(2^{512})$	512-BIT KEY SPACE EXHAUSTIVE KEY SEARCH	N/A		GROVER	$\mathcal{O}(2^{256})$	256		
		512-BIT HASH PRE-IMAGE ATTACK	SHA-512, SHA3-512		GROVER	$\mathcal{O}(2^{256})$	256		
		512-BIT HASH 2ND-PRE-IMAGE ATTACK	SHA-512, SHA3-512		GROVER	$\mathcal{O}(2^{256})$	256		
		1024-BIT HASH COLLISION ATTACK	N/A		BRASSARD ET AL.	$\mathcal{O}(2^{341})$	341		

[TBD](#) ADDITIONAL COMMENTS AND EXPLANATIONS TO READERS FOR HOW THIS IS TO BE INTERPRETED; EXPLAIN LIGHTER COLORS. XMSS, LMS?

# Post-Quantum Cryptography Algorithm Cheat Sheets

## ALGORITHM OVERALL USABILITY SCORE

We try to measure an algorithm's overall usability for a general use case without any special characteristics by calculating a single number between 0 (worst) and 10 (best) for the algorithm. This calculation is taking into account all parameter sets, performance metrics, public key size, signature/ciphertext size, the number of security categories provided, whether or not it is suitable for general use, and the complexity and size of its implementation. We define an algorithm's overall score as

$$\text{score}_{\text{algorithm}} = \max \left\{ 0, \text{avg} \left\{ \text{score}_{\text{parameterSet}} \mid \text{parameterSet is a parameter set of algorithm} \right\} - \frac{1}{8} \cdot (5 - \text{categories}_{\text{algorithm}}) - \frac{1}{4} \cdot \text{impl}_{\text{algorithm}} - \text{generality}_{\text{algorithm}} \right\}$$

where  $\text{score}_{\text{parameterSet}}$  is a score for an individual algorithm parameter set. Depending on the type of algorithm,  $\text{score}_{\text{parameterSet}}$  is defined as

$$\text{score}_{\text{signature-parameterSet}} = 10 - \text{avg} \left\{ \text{no}, \text{no}, \text{no}, \text{no}, \text{no} \right\}$$

respectively

$$\text{score}_{\text{encryption-parameterSet}} = 10 - \text{avg} \left\{ \text{no}, \text{no}, \text{no}, \text{no}, \text{no} \right\}.$$

Furthermore,  $1 \leq \text{categories}_{\text{algorithm}} \leq 5$  denotes the number of different NIST security categories offered by *algorithm*. By assigning numeric values of  $0 = \text{L}_{\text{cp}}^{\text{c}} = \text{L}_{\text{cp}}^{\text{s}}$ ,  $1 = \text{M}_{\text{cp}}^{\text{c}} = \text{M}_{\text{cp}}^{\text{s}}$  and  $2 = \text{H}_{\text{cp}}^{\text{c}} = \text{H}_{\text{cp}}^{\text{s}}$ , we set

$$\text{impl}_{\text{algorithm}} = \text{avg} \left\{ \text{L}_{\text{cp}}^{\text{c}}, \text{M}_{\text{cp}}^{\text{c}}, \text{H}_{\text{cp}}^{\text{c}}, \text{L}_{\text{cp}}^{\text{s}}, \text{M}_{\text{cp}}^{\text{s}}, \text{H}_{\text{cp}}^{\text{s}} \right\}.$$

Finally, we define

$$\text{generality}_{\text{algorithm}} = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } \text{algorithm} \text{ is a general purpose algorithm} \\ 2 & \text{else} \end{cases}$$

to take into account if the algorithm is suitable for general use.


TBD: In the algorithm scores given in ID cards, we currently use  $\text{impl}_{\text{algorithm}} = 0$  in the respective computations because the necessary values for implementation complexity and size are still TBD. This will be corrected later.

## EXAMPLE: ML-DSA OVERALL USABILITY SCORE

We calculate

$$\text{score}_{\text{ML-DSA-44}} = 10 - \text{avg} \left\{ 3, 3, 2, 1, 5 \right\} = 10 - 2.8 = 7.2$$

Similarly, we obtain  $\text{score}_{\text{ML-DSA-65}} = 7.0$  and  $\text{score}_{\text{ML-DSA-87}} = 6.2$ . Furthermore,  $\text{categories}_{\text{ML-DSA}} = 3$  since ML-DSA offers the three security categories  $\text{III}_{\text{cp}}$ ,  $\text{III}_{\text{sp}}$ , and  $\text{V}_{\text{cp}}$ , and  $\text{generality}_{\text{ML-DSA}} = 0$  since ML-DSA is a general purpose signature algorithm. This results in an overall usability score of 6.55:



ML-DSA Overall Usability Score

$$\begin{aligned} \text{score}_{\text{ML-DSA}} &= \max \left\{ 0, \text{avg} \left\{ \text{score}_{\text{ML-DSA-44}}, \text{score}_{\text{ML-DSA-65}}, \text{score}_{\text{ML-DSA-87}} \right\} - \frac{1}{8} \cdot (5 - \text{categories}_{\text{ML-DSA}}) - \frac{1}{4} \cdot \text{impl}_{\text{ML-DSA}} - \text{generality}_{\text{ML-DSA}} \right\} \\ &= \max \left\{ 0, \text{avg} \{ 7.2, 7.0, 6.2 \} - \frac{1}{8} \cdot (5-3) - 0 - 0 \right\} \\ &= \max \{ 0, 6.8 - 0.25 \} \\ &= \max \{ 0, 6.55 \} \\ &= 6.55 \end{aligned}$$

TBD: We use  $\text{impl}_{\text{ML-DSA}} = 0$  because the necessary values to compute it are still TBD, cf. ML-DSA ID card. This will be corrected later.