GERGELY & CSIBRA (2003) TICS

6 JAN 2021

Theory of Mind - stillty to conceive of & attribute independent mental states le.g. intentions, betrefs, desires) to others -> kids pass more advanced ToM koh ~ 4;0

Apparent early competence of ToM tasks demonstrated in a range of restricted contexts in the first year of life under restricted contests... how can we explain this?

(imitation, joint attn & violation of expectation studies indicate by 12 mo kids can

2) evaluate efficiency of alternative means -acts to achieving the good of the carriers of open of most efficient means act to achieving the good of the carriers constraints: OBSTENCTION

Explanation 1: The mentalistic stance

The ToM, atributions of desire & belief via modular ToM structures or Zoe.g. ul innate ives of gazelmotion, etc. Via simulation

Explanation 2: The teleological stance

Reality-based action interpretation w/o mentalizing - sense making wit the infant's own understanding of the world. Still lesses room for interpretation via innote triggering over & Simulation; but adds interences about rational action ("the rationality principle" given the goal & site honal constraints

> La apply shiendity principle to contents not to mental states (so still breaks down u/ pretense, labe beliek, etc)

dependence of later ToMon this skill is undear though saisible possibility

Rechanges & vole of experience still inches to me: why ~ (year? why not 6 mo? 1 mo? Would be nice to see of more untival (complex string (is Is Woodward) & X-cult dats

