

## Presentation 14: Framing

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### Norms, points of reference, etc.

Framing often presupposes ...

- normal (vs. abnormal) states
- standard (vs. non-standard) states
- points of reference, landmarks
- immutable (vs. mutable) states

We *prefer* to frame ideas in relation to ...

- normal, standard, immutable states
- points of reference, landmarks

The story of

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### What is framing?

Many ideas have *alternative framings*

Example 1:

"Susan is better at tennis than Pam"

"Susan isn't as bad at tennis as Pam"

Example 2:

"48 is essentially 50"

"50 is essentially 48"

People *choose the framing* to suit their current purposes

What are the *consequences of framing*?

### Examples of framing

1. Negation
  - Entrenched
  - Denials
2. Conceptual reference points
3. Social norms
4. Gain and loss
5. Expected, unexpected

### Framing an idea

To frame an idea is ...


to *assume* certain concepts in common ground  
to *represent* the idea *in relation to* those concepts

But what concepts?


### Negation



### Take a universe. Divide it in two.



### Take a universe. Divide it in two.



#### Two-part relations

whole	"A <i>and</i> B"
possibilities	"A <i>or</i> B"
parts	"A" "B" " <i>not</i> -B" " <i>not</i> -A"

#### Two-part relation of interest

negation	" <i>not</i> -A"
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## Two types of negation

### Part 1: Entrenched negation

*kind-unkind*  
*many-few*

### Part 2: Pragmatic negation

"Ann isn't here"  
"I'm not a crook" (Richard M. Nixon, president of the US)  
"I'm not a witch" (Christine O'Donnell, 2010 candidate for Senate)

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## Entrenched negation

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## Dual states tend to be asymmetric

- It's hard to **divide** wholes into **equal parts**
- It's hard to **maintain** dual states of **equal size**
- Dual states become **asymmetric**




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## How best to label dual states

### 1. Binomial system:

- A. primary label ("blue")
- B. secondary label ("red")



Optimal when:  $\text{size}(A) = \text{size}(B)$

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## How best to label dual states

### 2. Primary-stem system:

- A. primary stem alone ("blue")
- B. primary stem + **negation** ("unblue")



Optimal when:  $\text{size}(A) \gg \text{size}(B)$

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## How best to label dual states

### 3. Secondary-stem system:

- A. secondary stem + **negation** ("unred")
- B. secondary stem alone ("red")



Optimal: never

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## Three systems of labels



System	A	B
1. Binomial	"blue"	"red"
2. Primary-stem	"blue"	"unblue"
3. Secondary-stem	"unred"	"red"

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
## Same system for concepts



System	A	B
1. Binomial	[blue]	[red]
2. Primary-stem	[blue]	[not [blue]]
3. Secondary-stem	[not [red]]	[red]

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
## Big questions



**Entrenched, conventional codes** reflect ...  
*optimal solutions to recurrent problems of coordination* (Lewis, 1959)  
**So ...**

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## Big question



**Why** do dual states become *asymmetric*?  
**Why** have all languages evolved ...

- *happy-unhappy*, but not *sad-unsad*?
- *true-untrue*, but not *false-unfalse*?
- and many other such pairs

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## Lexical negation

1. Words with **negative prefixes, suffixes**  
*happy-unhappy*  
*fruitful-fruitless*
2. Words with **negative interpretations**  
*long-short*  
*many-few*
3. Words with **negative entailments**  
*remember-forget*  
*with-without*

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## Negative prefixes

Adjectives	un-	<i>able-unable</i>
	in-	<i>possible-impossible</i>
	a-	<i>typical-atypical</i>
	dis-	<i>honest-dishonest</i>
Verbs	non-	<i>intuitive-non-intuitive</i>
	un-	<i>button-unbutton</i>
	dis-	<i>mount-dismount</i>
	mis-	<i>understand-misunderstand</i>
Nouns	de-	<i>emphasize-deemphasize</i>
	non-	<i>human-nonhuman</i>
	un-	<i>truth-untruth</i>

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## Zimmer's hypothesis (Zimmer, 1964)

Adjectives that allow *un-*, *in-*, etc., are primarily:

1. **positive in evaluation** (good, desirable)
2. **not negative in evaluation** (bad, undesirable)

Examples:

- You find: *unhappy, unintelligent*
- You don't find: *unsad, unstupid*

Strong evidence from:

- English, German, Russian, French
- other languages

Actually: von Jhering, 1883; Wundt, 1886; Jespersen, 1942; Zimmer, 1964.

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## Greenberg's refinement


Positive-negative pairs (like *happy-unhappy*) belong to a large set of pairs (like *happy-sad*) in which:

- A is semantically **unmarked**
- B is semantically **marked**

Greenberg, 1966; see also Lyons, 1977

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
## Long is unmarked, short is marked



1. **Neutral** question      How *long* is the line?
2. **Non-neutral** question      How *short* is the line?
3. **Name** of dimension      *length* (not *shortness*)
4. **Antonym** may be **missing**      (there is no *unsteep*)

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
## Long, short as concepts (Clark, 1969)



	<b>Long and short</b>	<b>measurement</b>
<b>Standard</b> measurement		in <i>long</i> direction
<b>Non-standard</b> measurement		in <i>short</i> direction

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## Long as *positive*, short as *negative* (Clark, 1972)



Type	Word	Concept
unmarked term	"long"	[long-wise]
marked term	"short"	[ <b>not</b> [long-wise]]

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## Common conceptual asymmetries

<b>Perception</b>		<b>Evaluation</b>	
amount	<i>much-little</i>	goodness	<i>good-bad</i>
number	<i>many-few</i>	happiness	<i>happy-sad</i>
distance	<i>far-near</i>	strength	<i>strong-weak</i>
height	<i>high-low</i>	health	<i>healthy-sick</i>
length	<i>long-short</i>	cleanliness	<i>clean-dirty</i>
height	<i>tall-short</i>	honesty	<i>honest-dishonest</i>
width	<i>wide-narrow</i>	kindness	<i>kind-unkind</i>
thickness	<i>thick-thin</i>	politeness	<i>polite-impolite</i>
depth	<i>deep-shallow</i>	morality	<i>moral-immoral</i>
loudness	<i>loud-soft</i>	legality	<i>legal-illegal</i>

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## Evidence in processing time


### Comprehension time for:

Unmarked adjective  
Abel is *better* than Baker  
Marked adjective  
Abel is *worse* than Baker

### Similar times for:

high-low, tall-short, deep-shallow, thick-thin  
more-less, many-few  
good-bad, happy-sad

Comprehension times (sec)



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## Times for other entrenched negatives

### Verbs

John **remembered** to let the dog out  
John **forgot** to let the dog out

### Adjectives

It was **thoughtful** of John to let the dog out  
It was **thoughtless** of John to let the dog out

### Adjectives

The hole is **present**  
The hole is **absent**

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## Times for other entrenched negatives

### Prepositions

The star is **above** the line  
The star is **below** the line

### Conjunctions

Flip the switch **and** the fan goes on  
Flip the switch **or** the fan goes on

### Implicatures

**Can you** make the circle blue?  
**Must you** make the circle blue?

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## What makes some states *base states*?

Base states are ...	primary	secondary
1. standard	healthy	unhealthy
2. expected	student	non-student
3. good	good	bad
4. specifiable	Christian	non-Christian
5. extendable	long	short
6. majority	many	a few
	others?	

Cultural norms, common points of reference

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## Unmet challenges

**Why** do dual states tend to be **asymmetric**?

**Why** do word pairs reflect this asymmetry?

positive word → primary state

negative word → secondary state

**Why** are negative words (and concepts) ...

harder to process?

more complex?

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## Pragmatic negation

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## Two types of syntactic negation

### Simple denials

The boy *isn't* happy  
I'm *not* a witch

### Quantified denials

Few of my friends went to the party (vs. a few)  
Not all of the students voted last week

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## Affirmative assertions



A to B: "The boy is sad"

I assert x:

x = [boy is sad]

This **updates** A and B's current common ground

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## Supposition-denial model



A to B: "The boy isn't happy"

You might suppose:

x = [boy is happy]

I assert:

[not [x]]

This **matches** A and B's assumed state in common ground



This **updates** A and B's common ground


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## Supposition-denial model



A to B: "The boy isn't happy"

specifies



**Base state** is the state expressed in the utterance  
**Counter state** is the other part of the dual state

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## Counter states often vague



base state

counter state



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## Implications

**Supposition** is expected to ...  
 match addressee's *current* beliefs or assumptions  
 or be *plausible* in current common ground  
**Actual state** is generally *not inferable*  
 not blue → {unknown color}  
 not happy → {neutral, sad}  
 not closed → open

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## Evidence



**Instruction:**  
 Is the sentence true of the picture?  
 yes no

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## Evidence



specifies




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## Evidence



specifies




1. base **matches** picture
2. "yes" so far
3. but base is **denied**
4. hence "no"

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## Evidence



base matches picture




base mismatches picture

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## Evidence



base is affirmed



base is denied

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## Other evidence (Clark, Chase, Just, Carpenter)

### Types of denials

Plus isn't above line  
 Line isn't below plus  
 Plus isn't present  
 Plus isn't east  
 Few of the dots are red

### Viewing conditions


Read sentence first  
 View picture first  
 Hide top or bottom of display

### Measurements

Verification time  
 Eye gaze  
 Spontaneous descriptions

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## Evidence of plausibility (Wason, 1965)



Supposition: "Circle of interest is probably red"

1. Plausible denial: "Number 3 isn't red"
2. Implausible denial: "Number 4 isn't blue"

"Fill in the blank"

1. Number 3 is not ... **1.96 sec**
2. Number 4 is not ... **2.53 sec**

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## Case studies of pragmatic negation

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## Case study 1: What we believe (Gilbert, 1991)

### Daniel Gilbert

"Is there a difference between believing and merely understanding an idea?"

### Descartes says, "yes"

Acceptance and rejection of idea are outcomes of effortful assessment

### Spinoza says, "no"

Acceptance of idea is **automatic** in comprehension  
Rejection comes **later** with effort

### Gilbert's claim:

Spinoza is right

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## Gilbert's evidence is dubious

### Evidence (Wegner et al.)

People read "Bob Talbert is not linked to the Mafia"  
People later report **negative impression** of Talbert

### Gilbert's account

People "occasionally end up believing the very assertions they hear denied!"

### Alternative account

Speaker supposes:  
"You may think Talbert is linked to Mafia" (base)  
Speaker implies:  
It is **plausible** that Talbert is linked to Mafia  
Hence speaker implies: Talbert is **suspect**

## Case study 2: Monitoring thoughts (Wegner, 1994)

"Don't think of a white bear"

People report thinking of white bears **more often**



"Don't think of pink elephants"

People report thinking of pink elephants **more often**



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## Supposition-denial account

### Wegner account

Monitoring thoughts is special process with "ironic effects"

### Denial: "I am not to think of a white bear"

base state:  $x = [I \text{ think of a white bear}]$   
command: **not [x]**

### Test: Am I thinking of a white bear?

I compare **current thought** against:

To do that, I need: **[I think of a white bear]**  
Hence: I am thinking of a white bear

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## Case 3: Trying to eliminate "not"

### Kaup & Zwaan's simulation model

In understanding a denial,  
"first, **simulate** the negated state of affairs"  
"second, **simulate** the actual state of affairs"

### Example

Laura was wearing either a pink or blue dress  
"Laura wasn't wearing her pink dress"  
1. simulate image with pink dress  
2. simulate image with blue dress

### Evidence

early: probe fast to **pink**  
later: probe fast to **blue**

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## Case 3: Can "not" really be eliminated?

### Problem 1: People retain suppositions

"A few of Ed's friends left. They were mad at him."  
they = the friends who left  
"Few of Ed's friends left. They wanted more beer."  
they = the friends who didn't leave  
Same denotation, **but** different focus  
You need base + denial to represent this

### Problem 2: Two simulations incompatible

"There is no eagle in the sky"  
You need to represent two scenes simultaneously:  
1. A scene **with an eagle**  
2. A scene **without an eagle**  
How do you know which scene is which?

## Negation in many psychological theories:

Concept	Example	Comparison
Regret	I shouldn't have gone	I should have gone
Inaction	I didn't do that	I did that
Risk	It isn't safe to do that	It's safe to do that
Fiction	I like Rhett Butler	I like Clark Gable
Make-believe	I'm not Herb Clark. I'm Clark Kent, and soon I'll be Superman	I'm Herb Clark. I'm not Clark Kent or Superman
Irony	How nice he was!	How mean he was!
Imagining	I am imagining seeing a dog barking at me	I am seeing a dog barking at me

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## Summary

Denials have two parts

1. **base state**, expressing a current supposition
2. **denial** of base state

Problems arise when ...

**pragmatics** of denials **ignored**  
**counter state** assumed to be **identifiable**

The proposition [**not**] isn't itself ...

picturable  
embodiable

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## Norms and regret

## Undoing a fatal road accident

Subjects were given a story describing a ***fatal road accident***, in which a truck driven by a drug-crazed teenager ran a red light and crashed into a passing car, killing Mr. Jones, its occupant.

The following instructions were given:

As commonly happens in such situations, the Jones family and their friends often thought and often said "If only ..." during the days that followed the accident. How did they continue that thought?

Please write one or more likely completions.

(Kahnemann, Miller)

## Undoing a fatal road accident

### ***Abnormal route version***

On the day of the accident, Mr. Jones left his office at the regular time. He sometimes left early to take care of home chores at his wife's request, but this was not necessary on that day. Mr. Jones did not drive home by his regular route. The day was exceptionally clear and Mr. Jones told his friends at the office that he would drive along the shore to enjoy the view.

Over 80% responses mentioned ***abnormal route***:

"If only he hadn't gone by the shore"

## Undoing a fatal road accident

### ***Abnormal time version***

On the day of the accident, Mr. Jones left the office earlier than usual, to attend to some household chores at his wife's request. He drove home along his regular route. Mr. Jones occasionally chose to drive along the shore, to enjoy the view on exceptionally clear days, but that day was just average.

Over 80% responses mentioned ***abnormal time***

"If only he hadn't left early"

## Regret is based on actions taken

Mr. Jones almost never takes hitch-hikers in his car.

Yesterday he gave a man a ride and was robbed.

Mr. Smith frequently takes hitchhikers in his car.

Yesterday he gave a man a ride and was robbed.

Who do you expect to experience greater regret over the episode?

Mr. Jones 88%

Mr. Smith 12%

Who will be criticized most severely by others?

Mr. Jones 23%

Mr. Smith 77%

(N = 138)

(Kahnemann, Miller)

## Normal vs. abnormal

States are often judged as either ...

1. **normal** [***x is normal***]
2. **abnormal**, exception [***not [x is normal]***]

How *could* things be different?

We prefer to undo ***abnormal*** states

[***not [x is normal]***] → [***x is normal***]

We have more *regret* over ***abnormal*** actions taken

## Social norms

## Questions imply a social norm (Schwarz)

German students asked,

1. "How many hours do you watch TV daily?"
2. "How many hours does the average German watch TV daily?"
3. "How important is TV in your leisure time?" (0 to 10 scale)

"Hours" estimated on two scales

Low category range

High category range

## “How many hours do you watch TV daily?”

hours	percent	hours	percent
up to ½	7.4	up to 2½	62.5
½ to 1	17.7	2½ to 3	23.4
1 to 1½	26.5	3 to 3½	7.8
1½ to 2	14.7	3½ to 4	4.7
2 to 2½	17.7	4 to 4½	1.6
over 2½	16.2	over 4½	0.0

	low range	high range
TV by average German	2.7 hours	3.2 hours
Importance of TV	4.6	3.8

## Questions imply a social norm (Schwarz)

German students asked:

1. “How frequently do you have sexual intercourse?” or “masterbate?”
2. “How satisfied are you with your current relationship with your partner?” (1 to 11 scale)
3. “How frequently does the typical student have intercourse?” or “masterbate?”

Frequency estimated on two scales

Low frequency range

High frequency range

## “How often do you have sex/masterbate?”

High frequency range	low frequency range
several times a day	several times a week
once a day	once a week
3 to 4 times a week	once every two weeks
twice a week	once a month
once a week	less than once a month
less than once a week	never

	intercourse		masterbate	
Frequency range	high	low	high	low
at least once a week	77%	38%	69%	42%
typical student freq/week	10.6	7.8	9.1	7.1
satisfied with relationship?	8.6	8.6	9.8	7.3

## Social norms

1. Questions are framed in terms of social norms
2. Respondents ...
  - a) recognize the norms
    - on TV watching
    - on sexual behavior
  - b) make judgments based on these norms
    - of satisfaction with leisure activity
    - of satisfaction with their current relationship

## Decision frames

## Framing influences decisions

How does framing of a decision influence people’s choice?

Classic demonstration by Tversky, Kahneman (1981)

One problem, two framings

1. Positive framing
2. Negative framing

## Asian disease: Positive framing

Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed.

Assume that the exact scientific estimate of the consequences of the programs are as follows:

If **Program A** is adopted, 200 people will be saved.

If **Program B** is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved, and 2/3 probability that no people will be saved.

Which of the two programs would you favor?

A	72%
B	28%

## Asian disease: Negative framing

Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed.

Assume that the exact scientific estimate of the consequences of the programs are as follows:

If **Program C** is adopted 400 people will die.

If **Program D** is adopted there is 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and 2/3 probability that 600 people will die.

Which of the two programs would you favor?

C	22%
D	78%

## Two treatments for lung cancer

### Survival frame

**Surgery:** Of 100 people having surgery

- 90 live through the post-operative period,
- 68 are alive at the end of the first year and
- 34 are alive at the end of five years.

**Radiation Therapy:** Of 100 people having radiation therapy

- all live through the treatment,
- 77 are alive at the end of one year, and
- 22 are alive at the end of five years.



## Two treatments for lung cancer

### ***Mortality frame***

*Surgery:* Of 100 people having surgery

- 10 die during surgery or the post-operative period,
- 32 die by the end of the first year and
- 66 die by the end of five years.

*Radiation Therapy:* Of 100 people having radiation therapy,

- none die during treatment,
- 23 die by the end of one year and
- 78 die by the end of five years.

## Preferences for treatment

### ***Survival frame***

Surgery 82%

Radiation therapy 18%

### ***Mortality frame***

Surgery 56%

Radiation therapy 44%

## Framing in decisions

Tversky, Kahneman:

“Outcomes are commonly perceived as positive or negative in relation to a reference outcome that is judged neutral.

Variations of the reference point can therefore determine whether a given outcome is evaluated as a gain or as a loss.”

Same effects in ...

medical diagnoses

choice of medical treatments

choices in union bargaining

## Conclusions

## Framing

Two common alternative framings:

positive → base, normal state

“The boy is sad”

“400 people will live”

negative → not-base, abnormal state

“The boy isn’t happy”

“200 people will die”

Positive, negative framings differ in ...

meaning, processing

decisions, undoing, regret