

MAJOR EPISODES OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE (MEPV) AND CONFLICT REGIONS, 1946-2016

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July 25, 2017

VARIABLE LIST – MEPVv2016.sav (SPSS) and MEPVv2016.xls (Excel); also, MEPV2012ex.sav (SPSS) and MEPV2012ex.xls (Excel) expanded versions
Annual Time-Series Data Set, compilation of “war magnitude” scores from the CSP War List

Refer to the CSP War List for a brief description of individual events included and a more detailed explanation of the methodology used <www.systemicpeace.org/warlist.htm>

Identification Variables:

SCODE (3-alpha)	INSCR standard alpha-character country code
CCODE (3-numeric)	INSCR standard numeric country code
COUNTRY (x-alpha)	INSCR standard country name
YEAR (4-numeric)	Year
IND (1-numeric)	“Independent State” indicator 0 = non-independent state; 1 = independent state

Major Episodes of Political Violence Variables:

Variables in this section were taken from the list of Center for Systemic Peace (CSP) Major Episodes of Political Violence, 1946-2016, URL: www.systemicpeace.org/warlist.htm. That comprehensive list of all types of major armed conflict episodes is a regularly updated version of Appendix C in Monty G. Marshall, *Third World War*, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999) and further detailed in Monty G. Marshall, “Measuring the Societal Impact of War,” in F. O. Hampson and D. M. Malone, eds., *From Reaction to Prevention* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002).

The war list underwent a substantial revision during the year 2008 update cycle (changes are listed in Addendum A following). Several changes were made to the list in regard to cases that previously had been included with unknown “estimates of directly-related deaths.” As new sources of information have become available in recent years, and particularly with the expansion of Keesings Online news archives, all episodes listed with “unknown” deaths were investigated in early 2009 to confirm or disconfirm their listing. As a result, several episodes have been delisted and some others were refined.

Coding Scheme and Conventions: Major episodes of political violence are defined by the systematic and sustained use of lethal violence by organized groups that result in at least 500 directly-related deaths over the course of the episode. Episodes are coded for time span and magnitude and assigned to one of seven categories of armed conflict: international violence (IV), international war (IW), international independence war (IN), civil violence (CV), civil war (CW), ethnic violence (EV), and ethnic war (EW). Each episode is designated to span a certain number of years (“inclusive years”) and judged to have been of a certain, general “magnitude of societal-systemic impact” (an eleven-point scale, 0-10; magnitude scores are considered consistent and comparable across categories and cases, that is, approximating a *ratio scale*). The episode’s “magnitude of impact” score is entered for each year of the designated time span and for each country considered to have been directly affected by the warfare experience. Countries that engage in military intervention in an episode taking place solely in another country are generally not considered to be “directly affected” by the violence. When more than one episode of a particular MEPV category occurs in a single country in a single year, the episode scores are summed and the sum is entered for that category variable in the data set. See Annex 1, following, “Notes on Reading the MEPV War List,” for brief descriptions of the categories and meaning of the magnitude scores.

Coding Considerations: A considerable difference in interpretation of the several parameters of armed conflicts exists among sources consulted in compiling and referencing the War List. Each episode was researched, analyzed, and coded by the author, who is solely responsible for all decisions made in reconciling the differences among sources. As some episodes are quite complex and, in some cases, detailed information on the episode is quite limited; therefore, some cases are difficult to assign to a single category. Particularly problematic are the designations of societal (intrastate) conflicts as either “civil” or “ethnic” as there is often a mixture of political and social identity attributes, especially in regard to episodes of greater magnitude and longer duration. In addition, some may see the distinction made in the compilation of episodes between “violence” and “war” as somewhat arbitrary. In making this distinction, information regarding the degree of militant organization, tactical and strategic characteristics, and expressed level of commitment to the use of violence are taken into consideration; the designation of “war” carries with it a stronger institutional, or institutionalized, component and more definite objectives. Those who are concerned about the validity of these distinctions should use the aggregated categories (intrastate episodes are combined in the CIVTOT variable and both interstate episodes are combined in the INTTOT variable). The category of “independence wars” also requires special consideration; these episodes are fought prior to the “official” recognition of the affected state to the world community of independent, sovereign states. Magnitude scores for these episodes are coded for the colonized state only on whose territory the violence actually takes place (not for the remote, imperial state); these magnitude scores are not included in the aggregate totals. Independence wars are properly considered armed interventions by the imperial state.

Constant Universe of Analysis: The universe of analysis for the MEPV data set is the **global system**; the universe of analysis remains fundamentally constant over the entire study period. The global system comprises a basically unchanging configuration of territorial units, termed countries or states (i.e., the state system). Major episodes of political violence that take place in non-independent territories are assigned to the post-independence country that is (later) recognized as including the territory affected by the violence; non-independent “state” units are flagged with a value of “0” on the IND variable. As such, “states” are considered to be constant units in a comprehensive political architecture that defines the global system; these “state” units are treated consistently across the entire study period, regardless of whether or not they are “officially recognized” as “sovereign” states in any given year. Legal, territorial changes made in cases of dissolution or separation affecting the territorial integrity of an existing that result in the creation of new “state” units are recognized in the data by the appearance of new “state” units. In order to keep the MEPV data set compatible with other cross-national time series data sets, “state” units generally appear in the data set beginning with their first year of independence. “Non-state” units are only listed for years during which a MEPV actually takes place; these cases are easily removed by selecting on the IND variable.

INTIND (2-numeric)	<p>Magnitude score of episode of warfare episode occurring in a non-independent state and/or associated with an attempt to gain independence for the state (i.e., war of independence)</p> <p>Scale: 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest) for each MEPV; Magnitude scores for multiple MEPV are summed; 0 denotes no episodes (INTIND is not added to aggregate totals, see below)</p>
INTVIOL (2-numeric)	<p>Magnitude score of episode(s) of international violence involving that state in that year</p> <p>Scale: 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest) for each MEPV; Magnitude scores for multiple MEPV are summed; 0 denotes no episodes</p>
INTWAR (2-numeric)	<p>Magnitude score of episode(s) of international warfare involving that state in that year</p> <p>Scale: 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest) for each MEPV; Magnitude scores for multiple MEPV are summed; 0 denotes no episodes</p>
CIVVIOL (2-numeric)	<p>Magnitude score of episode(s) of civil violence involving that state in that year</p> <p>Scale: 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest) for each MEPV; Magnitude scores for multiple MEPV are summed; 0 denotes no episodes</p>

CIVWAR (2-numeric)	Magnitude score of episode(s) of civil warfare involving that state in that year Scale: 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest) for each MEPV; Magnitude scores for multiple MEPV are summed; 0 denotes no episodes
ETHVIOL (2-numeric)	Magnitude score of episode(s) of ethnic violence involving that state in that year Scale: 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest) for each MEPV; Magnitude scores for multiple MEPV are summed; 0 denotes no episodes
ETHWAR (2-numeric)	Magnitude score of episode(s) of ethnic warfare involving that state in that year Scale: 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest) for each MEPV; Magnitude scores for multiple MEPV are summed; 0 denotes no episodes
INTTOT (2-numeric)	Total summed magnitudes of all interstate MEPV $INTTOT = INTVIOL + INTWAR$
CIVTOT (2-numeric)	Total summed magnitudes of all societal MEPV $CIVTOT = CIVVIOL + CIVWAR + ETHVIOL + ETHWAR$
ACTTOTAL (2-numeric)	Total summed magnitudes of all (societal and interstate) MEPV $ACTTOTAL = INTTOT + CIVTOT$

THE FOLLOWING VARIABLES ARE INCLUDED WITH THE MEPV EXPANDED VERSION ONLY

Armed Conflict in Neighboring States Variables:

The MEPV scores described above were aggregated on a unit-specific (state) annual scheme. The security of any state is affected not only by its own conflict dynamics and outbreaks of MEPV but, also, by MEPV in immediate proximity (i.e., in neighboring states) and in general proximity (i.e., in the “politically-relevant” regional system). The following set of variables records the number of neighboring states (i.e., states sharing a contiguous land border or water border of two miles width or less) and the general magnitude of MEPV in neighboring countries in a given year. See Annex 2, following, for a listing of the neighboring states for each state in the study.

nBORDER (2-numeric)	Number of neighboring states sharing a border with the identified state
TOTINT (2-numeric)	Sum of all interstate MEPV magnitude scores for all neighboring states
TOTCIV (2-numeric)	Sum of all societal (civil and ethnic) MEPV magnitude scores for all neighboring states
TOTALAC (2-numeric)	Sum of all societal and interstate MEPV magnitude scores for all bordering states
nINT (2-numeric)	Number of bordering states with interstate MEPV
nCIV (2-numeric)	Number of bordering states with societal (civil or ethnic) MEPV
nAC (2-numeric)	Number of bordering states with any type (societal or interstate) MEPV

Regional Armed Conflict Variables:

For this suite of variables, each state was assigned to a “politically relevant” geopolitical region and the MEPV magnitude scores for each state in a designated region were summed to derive a “regional context” score for each year; these same regional context scores are then assigned to each state in that region. This is done in order to measure the relative stability/instability of the geopolitically-relevant regional context, or environment, for each state. Each region has unique scores for the variables listed in this section, while each state assigned to that region has the same scores for the regional variables. Some states are identified as “straddle states”; these states “straddle” more than one geopolitical regions and, so, were assigned to two or more regions. For this subset of states, the regional MEPV event count and magnitude scores are summed and averaged across the multiple regions in which the specific state was included. Finally, some states are island states that have been well-insulated from the regional effects of armed conflict; these states are considered “isolated states” and have no regional context scores. See Annex 3 for a listing of the regions and the states assigned to each region.

REGION (2-numeric)

Code designation for affective geopolitical region, as follows (see addendum):

0....European (East/West)	5....Middle East
1....West Africa	6....South-central Asia
2....North Africa	7....East Asia
3....East Africa	8....South America
4....South Africa	9....Central America

“Straddle state” codes: For states straddling two regions, region codes are designated by a two-digit combination of the single-digit region codes in which they are included; for states straddling three regions (SUD and ZAI) a unique two-digit region code has been assigned

12.....MAA MLI NIR CHA	53.....SUD (235)
14.....CON	56.....IRN
23.....ETH ERI ETI SOM	67.....CHN MYA
25.....EGY	89.....PAN COL
41.....ZAI (134)	90.....MEX
50.....TUR	

“Isolated states” (i.e., island states) are coded 99

nREGION (2-numeric)	Number of states in the designated geopolitical region.
REGINT (2-numeric)	Sum of all interstate MEPV magnitude scores for all regional states
REGCIV (2-numeric)	Sum of all societal (civil or ethnic) MEPV magnitude Scores for all regional states
REGAC (2-numeric)	Sum of all MEPV (societal and interstate) magnitude scores for all regional states
nRINT (2-numeric)	Number of regional states with interstate MEPV
nRCIV (2-numeric)	Number of regional states with societal (civil or ethnic) MEPV
nRAC (2-numeric)	Number of regional states with any type (societal or interstate) MEPV

Annex 1: Notes on Reading the MEPV War List

The Center for Systemic Peace (CSP) "War List" (Major Episodes of Political Violence, 1946-2016; MEPV) comprises 328 episodes of armed conflict (including 36 ongoing cases) that constitute a comprehensive accounting of all forms of major armed conflicts in the world over the contemporary period: 1946-2016. This list is updated regularly and can be found on the CSP Web site at <www.systemicpeace.org/warlist.htm>. "Major episodes of political violence" involve at least 500 "directly-related" fatalities and reach a level of intensity in which political violence is both systematic and sustained (a base rate of 100 "directly-related deaths per annum). Episodes may be of any general type: inter-state, intra-state, or communal; they include all episodes of international, civil, ethnic, communal, and genocidal violence and warfare. Episodes are coded on a scale of one to ten according to an assessment of the full impact of their violence on the societies that directly experience their effects. The effects of political violence and warfare include fatalities and casualties, resource depletion, destruction of infrastructure, and population dislocations, among other things such as the psychological trauma to individuals and adverse changes to the social psychology and political culture of affected social identity groups. The resulting categories represent standardized event magnitudes based on levels of societal affect (i.e., a measure of the general magnitude that a society's normal networking and functioning is affected by violent disruption); the scaled categories are considered comparative units of measurement. Global and regional trends in warfare are visualized graphically by aggregating the coded scores for all ongoing episodes of major armed conflict in a given year; see the CSP Conflict Trends Web page at <www.systemicpeace.org/conflict.htm>. The magnitude coding categories are described in greater detail below.

The variables listed in the "Major Episodes of Political Violence" table are as follows:

Inclusive years (Begin and End): The beginnings and endings of most political violence episodes are difficult to determine exactly; various researchers "pinpoint" and denote various dates. The "begin" and "end" years listed for each episode (below) are those considered by the author to be those most likely to capture the transformative "moments" (beginning and ending) of the episodes, according to a comparison of the varying claims of the sources noted. No "end" year is listed for episodes that began and ended in the same year.

Episode type (Type): Episode type is listed according to two character codes. The first character denotes either a (C)ivil-intrastate involving rival political groups; (E)thnic-intrastate involving the state agent and a distinct ethnic group; or (I)nternational event-interstate, usually two or more states, but may denote a distinct polity resisting foreign domination (colonialism). The second character connotes either an episode of (V)iolence-the use of instrumental violence without necessarily exclusive goals; (W)ar-violence between distinct, exclusive groups with the intent to impose a unilateral result to the contention; or i(N)dependence-an attempt to forcibly remove an existing foreign domination.

Magnitude of societal-systemic impact (Mag): The rationale and methodology for assessing the societal and systemic impact of warfare episodes is discussed and described in detail in the accompanying text. The number listed represents a scaled indicator of the destructive impact, or magnitude, of the violent episode on the directly-affected society or societies on a scale of 1 (smallest) to 10 (greatest). Magnitude scores reflect multiple factors including state capabilities, interactive intensity (means and goals), area and scope of death and destruction, population displacement, and episode duration. Scores are considered to be consistently assigned (i.e., comparable) across episode types and for all states directly involved. See the more detailed explanation below.

Episode location (States Directly Involved): Countries listed are only those upon whose territory the political violence episode actually takes place, that is, those state-societies directly affected by the warfare. Countries intervening in the episodes are not listed as the violence does not take place on their territory and, so, these intervening actors are considered to be indirectly, or remotely, affected by the violence.

Estimates of "directly-related" deaths (Deaths): Accountings of the number of deaths resulting directly from an episode of political violence are difficult to determine and estimates often vary widely. This difficulty is especially problematic as the distinction between combatants and non-combatants has grown increasingly obscure as "less formal" civil conflict interactions in less institutionalized societal systems predominate in the contemporary era. As argued in the text, such estimates of "battle-related deaths" should be regarded simply as estimates of the general magnitude of the violence. The numbers listed here reflect the median or mean of often widely disparate estimates listed in the various sources and are provided solely as a referent point. Casualties among non-combatants directly related to the violent conflict are inconsistently estimated (if at all) in the various source estimates. Far more problematic than "battle-related deaths" for societal systems are the much larger numbers of persons directly and indirectly, physically and psychologically, distorted and disturbed by violence during episodes of armed conflict (for this we have no estimation procedure). **NOTE: These estimates are provided for general reference and are not included in the MEPV annual time-series data set.**

Societal Effects of Warfare

Among the societal effects that must be considered in a comprehensive assessment of warfare are the following:

Human Resources:

direct deaths (combatant and non-combatant); indirect deaths (e.g., from collateral fire, induced-famines and droughts, epidemics, medical shortages); direct injuries (both physical and psychological, permanent and temporary); indirect injuries (e.g., crime and victimization, experiential trauma, grief, diminished health and capabilities, increased insecurity); sexual crimes and intimidation (e.g., rape, prostitution, child molestation, gender domination).

Population Dislocations:

costs, traumas, inefficiencies, and indirect effects associated with the displacement, whether for personal-safety, logistic, predatory, retaliatory, or strategic-policy considerations, of large numbers of domiciled people, either within the parameters of the affected society (e.g., internally displaced, forcibly relocated, or sequestered persons) or across societal borders (e.g., refugees, asylum-seekers, emigrants)(the practice commonly known as "ethnic cleansing" contains elements of both as group boundaries are redrawn by conflict).

Societal Networks:

damage and distortions to the fragile fabric of inter-personal associations and the disintegration of relationships and identities based on amity, trust, exchange, mutual-benefit, comity, reciprocity, and deferred gratification, relations necessary for the proper and effective functioning of normative systems (social cooperation, cohesion, coherence, and coordination in politico-legal, economic, professional, and socio-cultural sub-systems).

Environmental Quality:

direct and indirect damage and destruction to general ecosystem; use or release of explosive, corrosive, and devegetative chemical compounds and mechanical devices that limit utilization of agricultural resources, foul surface and subterranean water resources, pollute atmosphere, disseminate toxic substances, and destroy wildlife and habitats.

Infrastructure Damage and Resource Diversions:

direct damage, destruction, and over-consumption of material and mechanical infrastructure, resources, and surpluses such as production facilities, storage, transport networks, vehicles, water supplies, croplands, food, medical supplies, etc.; indirect damage to the society's resource and infrastructure bases (opportunity costs) through the official diversion of resources and funding to the war effort and away from infrastructure construction and maintenance and the provision of social services and unofficial diversions to illicit trade in tangible, transportable commodities such as drugs, gold and diamonds, labor and sex, weapons, art and treasures, etc.

Diminished Quality of Life and Non-reciprocal Resource Transfers:

tangible and intangible losses (both short- and long-term) associated with general deterioration in the immediate, aesthetic quality of life, access to basic needs, and future prospects in affected societies; humanitarian crises; capital outflows (e.g., "brain drain," "capital flight"); devaluation and unequal terms of exchange; lack of investment and exchange; losses in human potential due to lowered self-esteem and lowered expectations, self-destructive behaviors, alienation and introversion, and within-group factionalization and victimization.

Warfare Categories

A ten-point scale is used for assessing the magnitude of warfare events and their impact on societal-systems. The scale values are considered to be comparable across time, place, and typologies of warfare (e.g., interstate warfare, wars of independence, civil warfare, ethnic warfare, genocide). The scale is roughly logistical and the orders of magnitude can be considered a ratio scale for analytic purposes. Warfare, like most human collective endeavors, exhibits "economies of scale" at the greater magnitudes; immediate effects such as deaths, dislocations, and physical damage increase dramatically at higher magnitudes whereby the long-term social costs of providing security and attendant damage to societal networks and human capabilities are more strongly affected at the lower magnitudes. In holistic terms, then, warfare's effects on societal-systems are additive, that is, two category 03 events are roughly equivalent to one category 06 event and, so, the values can be aggregated and compared in meaningful ways.

Assessments have been made and scale values have been assigned for all states directly involved in major episodes of political violence in the world since 1946. The coded values can and have been compiled and recorded in a dataset for comparative analysis. The data have been aggregated annually for presentation in a series of global and regional warfare trends graphs and used for assessing global, regional, and local contexts and their effects in quantitative conflict research (i.e., event interdependence and the quality of "neighborhoods"). The data also can be used in assessing systemic trends in conflict management.

In order to aid comprehension of the ten-point categorical warfare scale, descriptive, representative scenarios of the several categorical values are included. Referent figures for population displacements and direct deaths are listed for each category but it must be emphasized that these figures are approximate for conventional scenarios under "standard" conditions. The total effects of warfare result from intensity over time and vary accordingly. For example, direct deaths may be inflated under conditions where combatants' lives are under-valued and refugee flows and humanitarian crises will be much higher under conditions of general poverty, the brutal victimization of civilians, and/or more transient or subsistence livelihoods. What is more important in determining the magnitude of the impact of warfare on a society are the relational goals, available technologies, and relative means of the combatant groups. Of course, the combination and levels of effects vary from case to case but levels across effects will usually coincide. The recent development and application of precision guidance systems to the targeting and delivery of ordnance create unique warfare effects whereby the societal infrastructure may be destroyed while casualty and displacement figures remain low. Contrast this to the development of the "neutron bomb" which has been touted to produce maximum casualties with minimal infrastructure damage. In these futuristic scenarios, one or more of the traditional measures of effects (death, damage, and displacement) may be strongly disproportionate to the holistic effects. The dynamism of human ingenuity confounds generalities, in general. Human reason, however imperfectly, largely restrains the most extreme impulses to deploy destructive technologies.

The range of contemporary events (1946-2016), fortunately, does not provide any examples of categorical values greater than seven (7) as the necessary military technologies are not present in most contemporary warfare locations; some historical events are used for illustration of these more extreme values. Warfare is an inherently self-limiting event. Population and technical capabilities determine the potential for warfare intensity while actual warfare's consumption and destruction of material infrastructure and human resources makes the continuation of warfare dependent on the continued production, procurement, or capture of sufficient quantities of essential war materials. As such, both the conduct and resolution of warfare are especially dependent on external sources of support and recovery, both strategic and humanitarian. Unfortunately, there has been little, systematic study of the external

"sustenance" of protracted warfare and, so, both the capacities of war actors and external linkage dynamics remain implicit in the following categories.

Category 10 -- Extermination and Annihilation

Extensive, systematic, and indiscriminate destruction of human resources and/or physical infrastructure with persistent, adverse effects. The social identity itself is the target of destruction. Greatly disparate power and weapons' technologies and singularity of intent between adversarial groups make this category possible. Historical events that illustrate this category include Japan for a period when it became the location of nuclear warfare in 1945 and German territories during the Holocaust.

Category 09 -- Total Warfare

Massive, mechanized destruction of human resources and physical infrastructure in a war of attrition, with intentional targeting of both combatant and non-combatant societal factors resulting in widespread destruction and long-term effects. Whole societies are the target for destruction, that is, their capacity for both action and reaction; adversaries are of comparable strength and compromise is unacceptable. Population dislocations often exceed twenty million; deaths exceed five million. Ninety to one hundred percent of societal production is consumed in the war effort. Military victory (unconditional surrender) is prioritized over all other societal and humanitarian values. Historical examples include Germany 1941-45 and the Soviet Union 1940-44.

Category 08 -- Technological Warfare

Massive, mechanized destruction of human resources and physical infrastructure in a war of attrition with medium-term effects, non-combatants are not systematically targeted although great numbers are directly affected by violence. The adversary's military capabilities are the target for destruction; adversaries are of comparable strength. Population dislocations often exceed ten million; deaths often exceed two million. Sixty to ninety percent of societal production is consumed by the war effort. Society and human capital are prioritized over military victory (capitulation or stalemate are possible). Historical examples are France 1914-18, Germany 1914-18, and Russia 1914-17.

Category 07 -- Pervasive Warfare

Technology of destruction is extensive but resources and productive capacity are limited and, so, continuation of the war effort is often dependent on supplemental resources from external suppliers. Effects are persistent and development is arrested over the medium- to long-term. Social roles and mobilization are almost entirely determined by the culture of warfare. No location within the society is secure from attack, including the largest cities. Population dislocations often exceed five million; deaths exceed one million. Over fifty percent of societal production is consumed by the war effort. Core issues are considered non-negotiable. Contemporary examples include Vietnam 1958-75, Afghanistan 1978-present, and Rwanda 1994.

Category 06 -- Extensive Warfare

Technology of destruction is extensive but limited; supplemental resources from external supporters are limited. Effects are persistent and development is arrested over the medium-term. Social mobilization is largely determined by the warfare event but crucial areas are fairly secure from attack. Population dislocations often exceed two million; deaths often range from five hundred thousand to one million. Over forty percent of societal production is consumed by the war effort. Issues of contention are perceived as vital but terms are somewhat negotiable as neither war party has the capacity to unilaterally impose and enforce a lasting settlement. "Ethnic cleansing" is often viewed as a strategic imperative in the struggle to control a territorial and resource base. Contemporary examples include Ethiopia 1974-91, Iran-Iraq 1980-88, Sudan 1983-present, and Bosnia 1992-95.

Category 05 -- Substantial and Prolonged Warfare

Technology of destruction is at a high level but goals are limited and often ill-defined. Impetus to warfare is often sustained by issue complexities that make negotiation and compromise difficult. Warfare is intense but mostly confined to particular regions. Population dislocations may exceed one million; deaths range from one hundred

thousand to half-a-million. Over twenty-five percent of societal production is consumed by the war effort. For challengers, local autonomy may be preferred over complete separation or predominance, allowing negotiated outcomes. Contemporary examples include Guatemala 1966-96, Lebanon 1975-91, Sri Lanka 1983-present, and Somalia 1988-present.

Category 04 -- Serious Warfare

Available technologies of destruction are at a lower level and/or applications remain limited; challenger groups' authority, discipline, and objectives are often diffuse and/or indistinct. Areas affected by warfare may be extensive but the intensity and the effects are limited, otherwise, warfare is confined to distinct areas and/or periods of time. If armed conflict is protracted, long periods of dormancy will be punctuated by sporadic operations (re)establishing opposing group boundaries. Population dislocations may exceed one hundred thousand in affected regions; deaths range from fifty thousand to one hundred thousand. Contemporary examples include Angola 1961-75, Israel 1967-70, and Liberia 1990-97.

Category 03 -- Serious Political Violence

Technologies of destruction are limited; objectives are usually focused on strategic authority, including control of human and/or material resources. Long periods of relative quiescence may be punctuated by focused operations targeting armed factions, group leaders, or symbols of defiance. Population dislocations respond to specific, localized operations and may be counted in the tens of thousands; deaths range from ten to fifty thousand. Effects of political violence are unevenly distributed, mainly targeting militias, leaders, and symbolic targets. Contemporary examples include Chile 1974-76, Turkey 1984-present, and Sierra Leone 1991-98.

Category 02 -- Limited Political Violence

Applied technologies are limited. Objectives may be limited and clearly defined allowing warfare to remain confined or the general support for warfare and/or the nature of the opposition may be weak or resistant to provocation. Events are confined to short periods or specific areas of operation or may involve sporadic acts of terrorism over longer periods. Population dislocations of short duration may occur; attributable deaths range from three thousand to ten thousand. Contemporary examples include Cuba 1957-59, UK 1969-1994, Cyprus 1974, Georgia 1991-93.

Category 01 -- Sporadic or Expressive Political Violence

Applied technologies are relatively low level; objectives are often diffuse and ill-defined and violent actions occur mainly as an expression of general dissatisfaction and/or social control. Oppositional violence is achieved mostly by small militant groups or confined to a very specific time, target, or location. Small population dislocations of short duration may occur from areas directly affected by violence; deaths usually are less than two thousand. Contemporary examples include US 1965-68, Argentina-UK 1982, and Moldova 1991-97.

Annex 2: Listing of Neighboring States for Each State (Pre- and Post-1990 Countries)

AFG	CHN,IRN,PAK,USR,(TAJ,TKM,UZB)
ALB	GRC,YUG,(MAC,MNT,KOS)
ALG	LIB,MAA,MLI,MOR,NIR,TUN
ANG	CON,ZAI,ZAM
ARG	BOL,BRA,CHL,PAR,URU
AUL	
AUS	CZE,GFR,(GMY),HUN,ITA,SWZ,YUG,(SLV)
BAH	SAU
BEL	FRN,GFR,(GMY),LUX,NTH
BEN	BFO,NIG,NIR,TOG
BFO	BEN,GHA,IVO,MLI,NIR,TOG
BHU	CHN,IND
BNG	IND,MYA
BOL	ARG,BRA,CHL,PAR,PER
BOT	SAF,ZAM,ZIM
BRA	ARG,BOL,COL,GUY,PAR,PER,SUR,URU,VEN
BUI	RWA,TAZ,ZAI
BUL	GRC,RUM,TUR,YUG,(MAC,SER)
CAM	(RVN),VIE,LAO,THI
CAN	USA
CAO	CEN,CHA,CON,GAB,NIG
CAP	
CEN	CAO,CHA,CON,SUD,(SDN,SSU),ZAI
CHA	CAO,CEN,LIB,NIR,SUD,(SDN)
CHL	ARG,BOL,PER
CHN	AFG,BHU,(DRV),VIE,IND,LAO,MON,MYA,NEP,PAK,PRK,USR,(KYR,KZK,RUS,TAJ)
COL	BRA,ECU,PER,VEN
COM	
CON	ANG,CAO,CEN,GAB,ZAI
COS	NIC,PAN
CUB	
CYP	TUR
CZE	AUS,GDR,GFR,(GMY),HUN,POL,USR
DEN	GFR,(GMY)
DJI	ETH,(ERI,ETI),SOM
DOM	HAI
DRV	CHN,LAO,RVN
ECU	COL,PER
EGY	ISR,LIB,SUD,(SDN)
EQG	CAO,GAB
ETH	DJI,KEN,SOM,SUD
FIN	NOR,SWD,USR
FJI	
FRN	BEL,GFR,(GMY),ITA,LUX,SPN,SWZ
GAB	CAO,CON
GAM	SEN
GDR	CZE,GFR,POL
GFR	AUS,BEL,CZE,DEN,FRN,GDR,LUX,NTH,SWZ
GHA	BFO,IVO,TOG

GNB	GUI,SEN
GRC	ALB,BUL,TUR,YUG,(MAC)
GUA	MEX,SAL,HON
GUI	GNB,IVO,LBR,MLI,SEN,SIE
GUY	BRA,SUR,VEN
HAI	DOM
HON	GUA,SAL,NIC
HUN	AUS,CZE,(SLO),RUM,USR,(UKR),YUG,(CRO,SER,SLV)
IND	BHU,BNG,CHN,MYA,NEP,PAK
INS	MAL,PNG
IRE	UKG
IRN	AFG,IRQ,PAK,TUR,USR,(ARM,AZE,TKM)
IRQ	IRN,JOR,KUW,SAU,SYR,TUR
ISR	EGY,JOR,LEB,SYR
ITA	AUS,FRN,SWZ,YUG,(SLV)
IVO	BFO,GHA,GUI,LBR,MLI
JAM	
JOR	IRQ,ISR,SAU,SYR
JPN	
KEN	ETH,(ETI),SOM,SUD,(SSU),TAZ,UGA
KUW	IRQ,SAU
LAO	CAM,CHN,(DRV,RVN),VIE,MYA,THI
LBR	GUI,IVO,SIE
LEB	ISR,SYR
LES	SAF
LIB	ALG,CHA,EGY,NIR,SUD,(SDN),TUN
LUX	BEL,FRN,GFR,(GMY)
MAA	ALG,MLI,MOR,SEN
MAG	
MAL	INS,SIN,THI
MAS	
MAW	MZM,TAZ,ZAM
MEX	USA,GUA
MLI	ALG,BFO,GUI,IVO,MAA,NIR,SEN
MON	CHN,USR,(RUS)
MOR	ALG,MAA,SPN
MYA	BNG,CHN,IND,LAO,THI
MZM	MAW,SAF,SWA,TAZ,ZAM,ZIM
NAM	ANG,BOT,SAF,ZAM
NEP	CHN,IND
NEW	
NIC	HON,COS
NIG	BEN,CAO,NIR
NIR	ALG,BEN,BFO,CHA,LIB,MLI,NIG
NOR	FIN,SWD,USR,(RUS)
NTH	BEL,GFR,(GMY)
OMA	SAU,UAE,YPR,(YEM)
PAK	AFG,CHN,IND,IRN
PAN	COL,COS
PAR	ARG,BOL,BRA
PER	BOL,BRA,CHL,COL,ECU

PHI	
PKS	AFG,CHN,IND,IRN,MYA
PNG	INS
POL	CZE,(CZR,SLO),GDR,(GMY),USR,(BLR,LIT,RUS)
POR	SPN
PRK	CHN,ROK,USR,(RUS)
QAT	SAU
ROK	PRK
RUM	BUL,HUN,USR,(MLD,UKR),YUG,(SER)
RVN	CAM,DRV,LAO
RWA	BUI,TAZ,UGA,ZAI
SAF	BOT,LES,MZM,SWA,ZIM
SAL	GUA,HON
SAU	BAH,IRQ,JOR,KUW,OMA,UAE,YAR,YPR,(YEM)
SEN	GAM,GNB,GUI,MAA,MLI
SIE	GUI,LBR
SIN	MAL
SOL	
SOM	DJI,ETH,(ETI),KEN
SPN	FRN,MOR,POR
SRI	
SUD	CEN,CHA,EGY,ETH,(ERI,ETI),KEN,LIB,UGA,ZAI
SUR	BRA,GUY
SWA	MZM,SAF
SWD	FIN,NOR
SWZ	AUS,FRN,GFR,(GMY),ITA
SYR	IRQ,ISR,JOR,LEB,TUR
TAW	
TAZ	BUI,KEN,MAW,MZM,RWA,UGA,ZAM
THI	CAM,LAO,MAL,MYA
TOG	BEN,BFO,GHA
TRI	
TUN	ALG,LIB
TUR	BUL,CYP,GRC,IRN,IRQ,SYR,USR,(ARM,GRG)
UAE	OMA,SAU
UGA	KEN,RWA,SUD,(SSU),TAZ,ZAI
UKG	IRE
URU	ARG,BRA
USA	CAN,MEX
USR	AFG,CHN,CZE,FIN,HUN,IRN,MON,NOR,POL,PRK,RUM,TUR
VEN	BRA,COL,GUY
VIE	CAM,CHN,LAO
YAR	SAU,YPR
YPR	OMA,SAU,YAR
YUG	ALB,AUS,BUL,GRC,HUN,ITA,RUM
ZAI	ANG,BUI,CEN,CON,RWA,SUD,UGA,ZAM
ZAM	ANG,BOT,MAW,MZM,TAZ,ZAI,ZIM
ZIM	BOT,MZM,SAF,ZAM
ARM	AZE,GRG,IRN,TUR
AZE	ARM,GRG,IRN,RUS,TUR

BLR	LAT,LIT,POL,RUS,UKR
EST	LAT,RUS
GMY	AUS,BEL,CZE,(CZR),DEN,FRN,LUX,NTH,POL,SWZ
GRG	ARM,AZE,RUS,TUR
KYR	CHN,KZK,TAJ,UZB
KZK	CHN,KYR,RUS,TKM,UZB
LAT	BLR,EST,LIT,RUS
LIT	BLR,LAT,POL,RUS
MLD	RUM,UKR
RUS	AZE,BLR,CHN,EST,FIN,GRG,KZK,LAT,LIT,MON,NOR,POL,PRK,UKR
TAJ	AFG,CHN,KYR,UZB
TKM	AFG,IRN,KZK,UZB
UKR	BLR,CZE,(SLO),HUN,MLD,POL,RUM,RUS
UZB	AFG,KYR,KZK,TAK,TRM
YEM	OMA,SAU
BOS	CRO,YGS,(MNT,SER)
CRO	BOS,HUN,SLV,YGS,(SER)
SLV	AUS,CRO,HUN,ITA
YGS	ALB,BOS,BUL,CRO,GRC,(MAC),HUN,RUM
CZR	AUS,GMY,POL,SLO
ERI	DJI,ETI,SUD,(SDN)
ETI	DJI,ERI,KEN,SOM,SUD,(SDN,SSU)
MAC	ALB,BUL,GRC,YGS,(KOS,SER)
SLO	AUS,CZR,HUN,POL,UKR
ETM	INS
SER	ALB,BOS,BUL,CRO,(KOS),MAC,MNT,HUN,RUM
MNT	ALB,BOS,CRO,(KOS),SER
KOS	ALB,MAC,MNT,SER
SDN	CEN,CHA,EGY,ERI,ETI,LIB,SSU
SSU	CEN,ETI,KEN,SDN,UGA,ZAI

Annex 3: Country Listings for Each of the Ten Politically Relevant Regions

Region 1 – West Africa

BEN	Benin
BFO	Burkina Faso
CAO	Cameroon
CAP	Cape Verde
CEN	Central African Republic
CHA	Chad**
CON	Congo-Brazzaville**
EQG	Equatorial Guinea
GAB	Gabon
GAM	Gambia
GHA	Ghana
GNB	Guinea-Bissau
GUI	Guinea
IVO	Ivory Coast
LBR	Liberia
MAA	Mauritania**
MLI	Mali**
NIG	Nigeria
NIR	Niger**
SEN	Senegal
SIE	Sierra Leone
TOG	Togo
ZAI	Congo-Kinshasa***

Region 2 – North Africa

ALG	Algeria
CHA	Chad**
DJI	Djibouti
EGY	Egypt**
ERI	Eritrea**
ETH	Ethiopia**
ETI	Ethiopia**
LIB	Libya
MAA	Mauritania**
MLI	Mali**
MOR	Morocco
NIR	Niger**
SOM	Somalia**
SDN	(North) Sudan***
SUD	Sudan***
TUN	Tunisia

Region 3 – East Africa

BUI	Burundi
ERI	Eritrea**
ETH	Ethiopia**
ETI	Ethiopia**
KEN	Kenya
RWA	Rwanda
SOM	Somalia**
SDN	(North) Sudan***
SUD	Sudan***
SSU	South Sudan
TAZ	Tanzania
UGA	Uganda
ZAI	Congo-Kinshasa***

Region 4 – South Africa

ANG	Angola
BOT	Botswana
CON	Congo-Brazzaville**
LES	Lesotho
MAW	Malawi
MZM	Mozambique
NAM	Nambia
SAF	South Africa
SWA	Swaziland
ZAM	Zambia
ZAI	Congo-Kinshasa***
ZIM	Zimbabwe

Region 5 – Middle East

ARM	Armenia
AZE	Azerbaijan
BAH	Bahrain
CYP	Cyprus
EGY	Egypt**
GRG	Georgia
IRN	Iran**
IRQ	Iraq
ISR	Israel
JOR	Jordan
KUW	Kuwait
LEB	Lebanon
OMA	Oman
QAT	Qatar
SAU	Saudi Arabia
SDN	(North) Sudan***
SUD	Sudan***
SYR	Syria
TUR	Turkey**
UAE	United Arab Emirates
YAR	North Yemen
YEM	Yemen
YPR	South Yemen

Region 6 – South Asia

AFG	Afghanistan
BHU	Bhutan
BNG	Bangladesh
CHN	China**
IND	India
IRN	Iran**
KYR	Kyrgyzstan
KZK	Kazakhstan
MYA	Burma**
NEP	Nepal
PAK	Pakistan
PKS	Pakistan
SRI	Sri Lanka
TAJ	Tajikistan
TKM	Turkmenistan
UZB	Uzbekistan

Region 7 – East Asia

CAM	Cambodia
CHN	China**
DRV	Vietnam, North
INS	Indonesia
JPN	Japan
LAO	Laos
MAL	Malaysia
MON	Mongolia
MYA	Burma**
PHI	Philippines
PNG	Papua New Guinea
PRK	Korea, North
ROK	Korea, South
SIN	Singapore
TAW	Taiwan
THI	Thailand
RVN	Vietnam, South
VIE	Vietnam

Region 8 – South America

ARG	Argentina
BOL	Bolivia
BRA	Brazil
CHL	Chile
COL	Colombia**
ECU	Ecuador
GUY	Guyana
PAN	Panama**
PAR	Paraguay
PER	Peru
SUR	Suriname
TRI	Trinidad
URU	Uruguay
VEN	Venezuela

Region 9 – Central America

COL	Colombia**
COS	Costa Rica
CUB	Cuba
DOM	Dominican Republic
GUA	Guatemala
HAI	Haiti
HON	Honduras
JAM	Jamaica
MEX	Mexico*#
NIC	Nicaragua
PAN	Panama**
SAL	El Salvador
USA	United States**

Region 0 – Europe/North America

ALB	Albania
AUS	Austria
BEL	Belgium
BLR	Belarus
BOS	Bosnia and Herzegovina
BUL	Bulgaria
CAN	Canada
CRO	Croatia
CZE	Czechoslovakia
CZR	Czech Republic
DEN	Denmark
EST	Estonia
FIN	Finland
FRN	France
GDR	Germany, East
GMY	Germany
GFR	Germany, West
GRC	Greece
HUN	Hungary
IRE	Ireland
ITA	Italy
KOS	Kosovo
LAT	Latvia
LIT	Lithuania
LUX	Luxembourg
MAC	Macedonia
MLD	Moldova
MNT	Montenegro
NTH	Netherlands
NOR	Norway
POL	Poland
POR	Portugal
RUM	Romania
RUS	Russia
SER	Serbia
SLO	Slovakia
SLV	Slovenia
USA	United States**
USR	Soviet Union
SPN	Spain
SWD	Sweden
SWZ	Switzerland
TUR	Turkey**
UKG	United Kingdom
UKR	Ukraine
YGS	Serbia and Montenegro
YUG	Yugoslavia

Note:

- **** Indicates that the “straddle country” is listed and affected in two regions.
- ***** Indicates that the “straddle country” is listed and affected in three regions.
- *#** Indicates that the “straddle country” is listed in one region but affected by two.