



OECD Economics Department Working Papers No. 1714

Fighting climate change: International attitudes toward climate policies

**Antoine Dechezleprêtre,
Adrien Fabre,
Tobias Kruse,
Blueberry Planterose,
Ana Sanchez Chico,
Stefanie Stantcheva**

<https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/3406f29a-en>



Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

ECO/WKP(2022)15

Unclassified

English - Or. English

27 June 2022

ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT

FIGHTING CLIMATE CHANGE: INTERNATIONAL ATTITUDES TOWARD CLIMATE POLICIES

ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT WORKING PAPERS NO. 1714

By Antoine Dechezleprêtre, Adrien Fabre, Tobias Kruse, Blueberry Planterose, Ana Sanchez Chico, and Stefanie Stantcheva

OECD Working Papers should not be reported as representing the official views of the OECD or its member countries. The opinions expressed and arguments employed are those of the author(s).

Authorised for publication by Laurence Boone, Deputy Secretary-General and Chief Economist.

All Economics Department Working Papers are available at www.oecd.org/eco/workingpapers

JT03498535

OECD Working Papers should not be reported as representing the official views of the OECD or of its member countries. The opinions expressed and arguments employed are those of the author(s).

Working Papers describe preliminary results or research in progress by the author(s) and are published to stimulate discussion on a broad range of issues on which the OECD works.

Comments on Working Papers are welcomed, and may be sent to OECD Economics Department, 2 rue André Pascal, 75775 Paris Cedex 16, France, or by e-mail to eco.contact@oecd.org.

All Economics Department Working Papers are available at www.oecd.org/eco/workingpapers

This document and any map included herein are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area.

© OECD (2022)

You can copy, download or print OECD content for your own use, and you can include excerpts from OECD publications, databases and multimedia products in your own documents, presentations, blogs, websites and teaching materials, provided that suitable acknowledgment of OECD as source and copyright owner is given. All requests for commercial use and translation rights should be submitted to PubRights@oecd.org

ABSTRACT / RESUME

Fighting Climate Change: International Attitudes toward Climate Policies

Using new surveys on more than 40 000 respondents in twenty countries that account for 72% of global CO₂ emissions, we study the understanding of and attitudes toward climate change and climate policies. We show that, across countries, support for climate policies hinges on three key factors: the perceived effectiveness of the policies in reducing emissions, their perceived distributional impacts on lower-income households (inequality concerns), and their own household's gains and losses. We also show that information that specifically addresses these key concerns can substantially increase the support for climate policies in many countries. Explaining how policies work and who can benefit from them is critical to foster policy support. Simply making people more worried about climate change is not an effective strategy to foster policy support. Furthermore, we identify several socioeconomic and lifestyle factors – most notably education, political leanings, car usage, and availability of public transportation – that are significantly correlated with both policy views and overall reasoning and beliefs about climate policies. Yet, it is difficult to predict beliefs or policy views based on these characteristics only.

Keywords: climate change, climate policies, carbon tax, perceptions, survey, experiment

JEL classification codes: Q54, Q58, D78, H23, P48

Lutter contre le changement climatique : Attitudes internationales à l'égard des politiques climatiques

À l'aide de nouvelles enquêtes portant sur plus de 40 000 répondants dans vingt pays qui représentent 72% des émissions mondiales de CO₂, nous étudions la compréhension et les attitudes à l'égard du changement climatique et des politiques climatiques. Nous montrons que, dans tous les pays, le soutien aux politiques climatiques dépend des perceptions des citoyens concernant trois facteurs clés : l'efficacité perçue des politiques en matière de réduction des émissions, leur impact distributif présumé sur les ménages à faibles revenus (préoccupations en matière d'inégalité), et leur impact direct anticipé (gains et pertes) sur le revenu disponible du ménage. Nous montrons également que la mise à disposition d'informations qui répondent spécifiquement à ces préoccupations-clés peuvent augmenter considérablement le soutien aux politiques climatiques dans de nombreux pays. En outre, nous identifions plusieurs facteurs socio-économiques et de style de vie – notamment l'éducation, les tendances politiques, l'utilisation d'une voiture et la disponibilité des transports publics – qui sont significativement corrélés à la fois aux préférences pour les politiques climatiques et aux croyances générales sur ces politiques. Pourtant, il est difficile de prédire les croyances ou les opinions politiques concernant le climat sur la base de ces seules caractéristiques.

Mots clés : changement climatique, politiques climatiques, taxe carbone, perceptions, enquête, l'expérience

Classification JEL : Q54, Q58, D78, H23, P48

Table of contents

Fighting Climate Change: International Attitudes toward Climate Policies	6
1. Introduction	6
1.1. Related Literature	8
2. The survey	10
2.1. Survey data collection and sample	10
2.2. The questionnaire	11
2.3. Outline of the analysis	15
3. Knowledge about climate change	16
3.1. Knowledge across countries	16
3.2. Who has better knowledge?	17
3.3. Expectations about climate change	19
3.4. Willingness to adopt climate-friendly behaviours	19
4. Support for climate action across and within countries	20
4.1. Support for different types of policies	20
4.2. Cross-country comparison	22
4.3. Individual characteristics correlated with support for climate policies	23
5. Reasoning about climate policies	25
5.1. Perceived distributional and efficiency impacts across countries	25
5.2. How do different groups of respondents reason about climate policies?	27
6. What reasoning underlies support for climate policies?	29
6.1. Factors correlated with policy support	29
6.2. Information and pedagogical treatments	31
7. Conclusion	34
References	36
Annex A.	40

Tables

Table 1. The 20 countries covered in the survey	7
Table A.1. Summary Statistics – High-income countries 1	40
Table A.2. Summary Statistics – High-income countries 2	41
Table A.3. Summary Statistics – High-income countries 3	42
Table A.4. Summary Statistics – Middle-income countries 1	43
Table A.5. Summary Statistics – Middle-income countries 2	44

Figures

Figure 1. Share of respondents who somewhat to strongly agree that “Climate change is an important problem” and that their country “should take measures to fight climate change.”	7
Figure 2. Survey outline	12
Figure 3. Climate video	14
Figure 4. Knowledge about climate change (share of correct answers)	16
Figure 5. Who has better knowledge about climate change?	18
Figure 6. Share of people willing to adopt climate-friendly behaviours	20
Figure 7. Share of respondents who support climate change policies (somewhat to strongly)	21
Figure 8. Which respondents support climate action?	24
Figure 9. Perceived characteristics of the main policies	26
Figure 10. How different groups perceive the effectiveness and distributional effects of the three main climate policies	28
Figure 11. Reasons underlying support for main climate policies	30
Figure 12. Effects of the Treatment on Support for Climate Action	32
Figure 13. Effects of the treatments on beliefs	33

Fighting Climate Change: International Attitudes toward Climate Policies


By Antoine Dechezleprêtre, Adrien Fabre, Tobias Kruse, Blueberry Planterose,
Ana Sanchez Chico, and Stefanie Stantcheva¹

1. Introduction

1. Limiting average temperature increase to less than 2°C above pre-industrial levels requires drastically reducing global emissions by 2050 (IPCC 2021). Judging by publicly announced long-term commitments and goals, policymakers appear to be taking this imperative seriously: Over 100 countries have so far declared targets of carbon neutrality by mid-century. Yet, while climate mitigation ambitions are strong, bold policy measures to achieve them are lagging. Given current policies, average temperatures are still expected to rise by about 2.7°C by 2100, increasing the likelihood of catastrophic impacts for societies and economies (Climate Action Tracker 2021; IPCC 2022).
2. Climate policies have often been difficult to pass and implement even when the objective of limiting global warming is broadly accepted. Our new large-scale international survey across 20 countries shows that at least three-quarter of respondents in each country agree that “climate change is an important problem” and that their country “should take measures to fight” it (see Figure 1). However, this often does not translate into agreement on which climate policies to support.

¹ Corresponding author: Stantcheva: Harvard, CEPR, and NBER (e-mail: sstantcheva@fas.harvard.edu). Dechezleprêtre: OECD and LSE (e-mail: antoine.dechezlepretre@oecd.org); Fabre: ETH Zürich (e-mail: fabre.adri1@gmail.com); Kruse: OECD and LSE (e-mail: tobias.kruse@oecd.org); Planterose: Social Economics Lab and EU Tax Observatory (email: blueberry.planterose@sciencespo.fr); Sanchez Chico: Harvard and Opportunity Insights (e-mail: anasanchezchico@g.harvard.edu). We are grateful for financial support from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the French Conseil d’Analyse Economique and the Spanish Ministry for the Ecological Transition and the Demographic Challenge (MITECO). We thank Laurence Boone, Aimee Aguilar Jaber, Aida Caldera, Boris Cournède, Filippo Maria D’Arcangelo, Kate Farrow, Tomasz Kozluk, Philippe Martin, Isabella Neuweg, Hélène Paris, and Mauro Pisu, as well as Delegates to the OECD Economic Policy Committee, the OECD Economic and Development Review Committee, and the OECD Working Party 1 for their valuable comments and feedback. We also thank Purvi Bidasaria, Davide Dreon, Alice Ghidossi, Valeria Glebova, Anna Iakymenko, Euiyoung Jung, Guadalupe Manzo, Olena Maslyukivska, Yuliia Oharenko, Behrang Shirizade, Charlotte Wang, and Dana Weissberg for their review of the translations of the questionnaire. We thank Celia Rutkoski for excellent editorial assistance. The project is approved by IRB at Harvard University (IRB21-0137), and was preregistered in the AER RCT Registry (AEARCTR-0007300).

Figure 1. Share of respondents who somewhat to strongly agree that “Climate change is an important problem” and that their country “should take measures to fight climate change.”



Note: The figure shows the Share of respondents who somewhat to strongly agree that “Climate change is an important problem” and that their country “should take measures to fight climate change.”

3. In this paper, we seek to understand what drives support for or opposition to important climate policies across the world. Do climate policy views simply stem from a lack of knowledge about the impacts of climate change? Are citizens worried about the effects of policies on their own budget and lifestyle? Do they hold broader concerns about the effects of climate policies on others and on the economy? Or do they have trouble assessing how any given policy will influence climate change? Our goal is to offer new cross-country evidence on people’s perceptions of, understanding of, and attitudes toward climate change and climate policies. Climate change is a global problem with disparate impacts across countries and people. It is thus necessary to study these issues internationally.

4. We conduct large-scale international surveys on over 40 000 respondents in the twenty countries listed in Table 1. These countries span different income levels and social and economic contexts. Taken together, they account for 72% of global 2017 CO₂ emissions (JRC 2018) and include 18 out of the 21 largest emitters of greenhouse gases (GHG). We elicit respondents’ knowledge and understanding of climate change and their views on a broad range of climate mitigation policies. Importantly, we ask specific questions about their understanding and perceptions of how these policies work, in terms of their effectiveness, economic impacts, distributional consequences, and effects on their own household. In addition, a random sub-sample of respondents is shown pedagogical videos on the impacts of climate change in their country and/or on how three key climate policies – a ban on combustion-engine cars, a carbon tax with cash transfers, and a green infrastructure program – work.

Table 1. The 20 countries covered in the survey

High-income countries		Middle-income
Australia	South Korea	Brazil
Canada	Spain	China
Denmark	United Kingdom	India
France	United States	Indonesia
Germany		Mexico
Italy		South Africa
Japan		Turkey
Poland		Ukraine

Note: The table lists the countries that are covered in the survey.

5. Our main findings are as follows. First, we shed light on the factors that foster people’s support for more climate action. There are three key beliefs that are major predictors of whether people support a given climate policy: i) its perceived effectiveness in reducing emissions (effectiveness), ii) its perceived

distributional impacts on lower-income households (tributational concerns), and iii) its perceived impact on people's own household (self-interest). Many people already have deep concerns about climate change but these concerns are not major predictors of their policy views. Similarly, even though respondents exhibit varying degrees of knowledge about climate change, this type of knowledge does not significantly correlate with their policy views.

6. Consequently, support for climate policies strongly depends on their specific modalities. There is more support for policy designs that are perceived to be more effective and progressive. These include targeted investment programs (e.g. in green infrastructure or low-carbon technologies) that are financed by progressive taxes or public debt, carbon taxes with a strongly progressive use of revenues (such as cash transfers to the poorest or vulnerable households), and regulations rather than corrective taxes in some settings (such as bans on polluting vehicles from city centres or dense areas and the mandatory insulation of buildings).

7. The importance of the three core beliefs outlined is confirmed experimentally. Respondents who see the video on the impacts of climate change do not significantly change their views on climate policies. On the contrary, respondents who see a video that explains how the three main policies work and what their distributional implications are exhibit stronger support for them and related climate policies. Thus, information and explanations work, but only if they actually address the main concerns people have.

8. We also explore the extent to which personal socioeconomic characteristics, lifestyle, and energy usage are correlated with policy views. More educated and left-leaning respondents are generally more supportive of climate policies. Higher household income is correlated with stronger climate action support only in some countries.² There are mixed patterns across countries for age; it is thus not the case that young respondents are systematically more favourable to climate policies. Opposition to climate policies is strongly correlated with lower availability of public transportation, more reliance on cars, and, to a lesser extent, higher gas expenses. Furthermore, these respondent characteristics are also significantly correlated with beliefs about the effectiveness and distributional impacts of climate policies, not only with the perceived beliefs on one's own household (self-interest). Yet, it is difficult to predict either beliefs or policy views based on socioeconomic and lifestyle characteristics only. Put differently, it is not the case that we are easily able to infer people's policy views or beliefs based on their age, country, gender, education, income, political leanings, or how much they rely on polluting sources of energy.

1.1. Related Literature

9. Our work adds to a growing literature that studies the determinants of support for climate action. Our key contribution is new evidence on the understanding of climate change and climate policies and how citizens reason about them. We offer comparable cross-country evidence covering 20 countries and can explore distinct climate policies and policy designs broadly and more in-depth.

10. Our paper builds on the theoretical literature on the political economy of environmental and climate change policies. A first strand of the literature focuses on the role of interest groups and other political obstacles to environmental regulation (see Hahn and Stavins (1992) and Anthoff and Hahn (2010), as well as Oates and Portney (2003) for a review). This literature has shown that some of the most efficient climate policies according to economists, such as a comprehensive pricing of carbon emissions, often face political obstacles that can lead to the adoption of less efficient policies and sometimes regressive policies, including for example the regulation of vehicle fuel efficiency (Davis and Knittel 2019; Levinson 2019) or of residential energy use (Fowlie, Greenstone and Wolfram 2018). In recent work, Besley and Persson (2022) provide a new dynamic model to study under what circumstances a green transition can happen despite political forces. Across countries, Shapiro (2021) shows that import tariffs and non-tariff barriers

² Brazil, India, Indonesia, Italy, Poland, and Ukraine.

are substantially lower on emissions-intensive industries than on clean industries, which the author attributes to stronger lobbying power of upstream sectors – an important political economy barrier to efficient policies.

11. A second strand of the literature focuses on how citizens' beliefs and perceptions are formed, and how these translate into demand for environmental regulation through political institutions. Millner and Ollivier (2016) synthesize this literature and show that biases in risk perception and informational distortions to the policy process are particularly important for global environmental problems such as climate change, which is characterized by the lack of first-hand experience of impacts, logical complexity, and the diffuse nature of the causes and consequences of the problem.

12. Our paper also contributes to the literature which empirically explores the drivers of support for climate policies. Whitmarsh and Capstick (2018) summarize attitudes over climate change, Maestre-Andrés, Drews and van den Bergh (2019) review how climate policies are perceived, and Drews and van den Bergh (2016) what determine their support. Carattini, Carvalho and Fankhauser (2018) offer a comprehensive overview on attitudes towards a carbon tax, while Klenert et al. (2018) provides a synthesis on the topic. Finally, Fairbrother (2022) gives a complete review of public opinion about (all types of) climate policies. Existing studies largely focus on Nordic- and Western European countries or the United States, and as regards environmental policy instruments, on carbon taxes or carbon pricing. They show that people often reject carbon pricing because they perceive it as ineffective (Sælen and Kallbekken (2011) for Norway; Carattini et al. (2017) for Switzerland), because they overestimate the costs, while underestimating its benefits (e.g. Thalmann (2004) for Switzerland; Jagers and Hammar (2009) for Sweden), or because they perceive it to be regressive (Brannlund and Persson (2012) for Sweden; Dietz and Atkinson (2010) for the United Kingdom; Sommer, Mattauch and Pahle (2022) for Germany). Douenne and Fabre (2022) show that opposition to carbon pricing in France during the Yellow Vests movement was driven by misperceptions of how the policy would impact people, its effectiveness, and distributional impacts. This paper also demonstrates a causal link from beliefs to support for policies which are similar in magnitude to the correlations. Bergquist, Mildenberger and Stokes (2020) find that in the United States, the concern for distributional impacts can be mitigated and the support for carbon pricing increased by linking it to social and redistributive policies.

13. A few studies have focused on cross-country comparisons, using various methodologies, ranging from the collection of voluntary responses (UNDP 2021), public opinion polls (Ipsos 2020; Stokes, Wike and Carle 2015), surveys ran through Facebook (Leiserowitz et al. 2021), and surveys which focus on a small subset of policies or countries (Bechtel, Scheve and van Lieshout 2020; Umit and Schaffer 2020). Umit and Schaffer (2020) use one question from the European Social Survey conducted in 2016 (ESS 2016), showing that support for an increase in fossil fuel taxation varies with the overall level of trust across European countries. Bechtel, Scheve and van Lieshout (2020) analyse public support for different carbon pricing trajectories across four high-income countries (France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States), showing that carbon price trajectories which gradually increase over time are less popular than stable carbon prices.

14. Building upon these branches of the literature, our paper makes several contributions to existing work. We investigate preferences across a comprehensive set of varied climate policies that have different characteristics. We cover 20 countries with different levels of income, across several continents and provide standardized, detailed, and rigorous survey questions to elicit not only policy views, but also the underlying reasoning of respondents. Thanks to our questionnaire, we can identify which individual characteristics and beliefs impact policy preferences. We also design pedagogical video treatments to causally test the impact of providing information on climate change policy and on the impacts of climate change. We can thus provide causal evidence that information about policies' characteristics can impact people's willingness to support the policies covered and related ones. We thus contribute to the ongoing discussions surrounding the importance of information for the acceptance of climate policies (e.g. Boon-Falleur et al. 2022; Kahn 2015; Sunstein et al. 2017).

15. Methodologically, our work draws from the literature on the formation of political beliefs and preferences for public policies. Using large-scale representative online survey experiments, existing work has looked at public preferences for redistribution (Alesina, Stantcheva and Teso 2018; Kuziemko et al. 2015), immigration (Alesina, Miano and Stantcheva 2022) and taxation (Stantcheva 2021). Our paper builds in particular upon Stantcheva (2021), which analyses how people understand mechanisms of tax policy in the United States, showing that the perceived policy efficiency, distributional effects and fairness considerations shape support for and opposition to policies.

16. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data collection, the sample, and the questionnaires. The subsequent sections present our main results: Section 3 focuses on knowledge about and attitudes toward climate change; Section 4 describes the support for policies across respondents and countries; Section 5 analyses the beliefs and reasoning about the main climate policies covered; and Section 6 studies the factors that shape support for climate change action. The Appendix provides additional information on the survey and results.

2. The survey

2.1. Survey data collection and sample

2.1.1. Data collection

17. We collected our survey data between March 2021 and March 2022 using the survey companies Dynata and Respondi. The survey companies maintain panels of respondents, send survey links to panellists with targeted socioeconomic characteristics, and reward the respondents who fully complete the survey. Compensation takes various forms, ranging from cash, donations to charities, frequent flyer points, or hotel points at partner companies. In total, we collected 56,781 responses. Excluding inattentive respondents that failed our attention check questions or who completed the survey too fast (as explained below), we are left with our main analysis sample of 40,680 respondents, with the number of respondents per country ranging from 1,465 to 2,488.

18. We first channel respondents through screening questions that ensure that the final sample is nationally representative along the dimensions of gender, age, income, region, and area of residence (urban versus rural). Appendix A-2.1 gives more details on our sampling procedure.

2.1.2. Sample

19. Tables 1-5 show that our sample is relatively representative in high-income countries. One dimension where representativeness is less good in some countries is education: In Italy, Japan, South Korea, and Spain – the share of college-educated respondents is 15 to 25 p.p. higher than the actual population share. This is a common occurrence in online survey samples (see, for example, Alsan et al. (2021) or Stantcheva (2021)).

20. In middle-income countries (Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, Turkey, and Ukraine), we faced constraints due to the online nature of the survey and the pandemic related restrictions on door-to-door surveys. College-educated people are overrepresented, and respondents aged 50 and older or living in rural areas tend to be underrepresented. Indeed, these types of respondents are always hard to reach in countries with similar characteristics. For these countries, the results should therefore be interpreted with caution, as they do not accurately reflect the attitudes of the population at large but rather those of the “online population,” which tends to be skewed toward the middle and upper classes, residing mainly in urban areas.

21. Throughout the paper, we re-weighted the samples within each country along the dimensions of gender, age, income, region, urbanity, education, and employment.³

2.1.3. Data Quality

22. We took several steps to ensure the best possible data quality. Native speakers translated and reviewed the survey into the main national languages of each country and ensured that it was in line with local context and understanding.

23. On the introductory consent page, we appeal to people's social responsibility by asking them to answer carefully and honestly for the sake of research. We also warn them that we would withhold monetary compensation if their answers did not pass our quality checks. We record the time spent on different blocks and the survey overall. The median time is 28 minutes (see Appendix A-2 for the entire distribution of survey times).

24. We also added a question to screen out inattentive respondents. The representative samples (as shown in Tables 1-5) are obtained after excluding inattentive respondents who failed the attention check question (18% of respondents) and those who rushed to complete the survey in less than 11 minutes (16% of respondents).⁴ In total, because there is overlap between those who rushed and those who failed the attention question, we end up excluding 25% of all respondents who started the survey. We show in Appendix A-6.2 that our results are robust to the inclusion of these 25% of respondents and robust to a longer duration cut-off (20 min).

25. We test for differential attrition in Table A20. In total, 19% of respondents drop out at some point during the survey. However, most of those who drop out do so before or during the socioeconomic questions (11.5%), i.e., very early on in the survey. This means that they drop out before knowing the topic of the survey and that this attrition is not differential based on interest in and views on climate change. Female, younger, lower-income, and less educated respondents are more likely to drop out, but the differences in attrition rates are not large.


26. *Ex post*, we checked that there were only few careless response patterns (such as choosing the same answer for all items in a matrix of questions; see Appendix A-2.2). At the end of the survey, we ask whether our survey was politically biased and allow respondents to provide some feedback. Seventy-four per cent of the respondents found the survey unbiased (15% found it left wing biased, and 11% found it right wing biased).

2.2. The questionnaire

27. As shown in Figure 2, the questionnaire is structured in four parts, described below: questions on household characteristics, information experiments, questions on climate change, and elicitation of views on climate policies. We kept the questionnaires as similar as possible across countries while allowing for some appropriate variations. For example, in some countries, we added questions about specific policies (e.g. a ban on deforestation in Brazil and Indonesia). We omit some questions that are inappropriate (e.g. heating expenses in tropical countries or cattle-related policies in India). Finally, necessary adjustments were made to country-specific figures and examples (e.g. the gasoline price increase implied by a carbon tax). Appendix A-5 provides the full questionnaire as well as links to each country's questionnaire in the original language.

³ We trim weights so that no respondent receives a weight below 0.25 or above 4. Overall, trimming affects 3% of the respondents in high-income countries and 19% in middle-income countries.

⁴ The duration is picked based on the distribution of times to complete the survey.

Figure 2. Survey outline

2.2.1. Household characteristics

28. We ask the respondents about their basic socioeconomic information, including their age, income, gender, zip code, size of agglomeration, household composition, highest level of education achieved, occupation, wealth, and whether they are homeowners. We measure political leanings through several questions: voting behaviour in the latest national election, general interest in politics, leaning on economic policy issues, and interest and participation in environmental causes.

29. An important set of questions centres around energy usage and lifestyle as related to climate change. The answers to these questions allow us to assess how respondents may personally be affected by climate policies. We ask households about their housing characteristics (heating source and expenses and the quality of insulation), transportation means (fuel expenditures, modes of transport used, availability of public transportation, frequency of flying), and their beef consumption.

2.2.2. Informational and Pedagogical Video Experiments

30. In the experimental part of the paper, we show respondents in randomly selected subsamples one or both of two videos. The “control group” sees no video. The *Climate impacts* video, which is 2-3 minutes long, centres on the impacts of climate change, with information that is tailored to the country of the respondent. The *Climate policies* video (five minutes long) focuses on three major climate policies and is also adapted to each country’s specifics.⁵ The objective of these treatments is to understand how perceptions change after receiving salient information on the effects of climate change or climate policies and how these perceptions and beliefs causally translate into policy support. Appendix A-5 contains the scripts and links to the videos; Appendix A-7 contains the data sources used. Table A21 shows that our treatment assignment is balanced across socioeconomic and energy usage characteristics.

31. The video on *Climate impacts* starts by explaining that climate change is anthropogenic and is likely to have adverse impacts on the country of the respondent if nothing is done to reduce it. Some of the impacts presented include more severe heatwaves, frequent forest fires, and growing numbers of areas at

⁵ Because we compute all descriptive statistics using the control group, we chose to make it 25% larger than the other groups. It contains 29.4% of the sample, while the three treatment branches each contain 23.5% of the sample.

risk of being permanently flooded due to sea level rise (see Panel A in Figure 3).⁶ The video concludes that it is necessary to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to tackle climate change.

32. The video on *Climate policies* focuses on three major climate policies that have been implemented in many countries over the past years. It describes both some of their advantages and drawbacks. First, it presents a ban on the production and sale of new combustion engine cars that emit more than a given (time-varying) threshold of CO₂ per kilometre.⁷ The threshold is progressively lowered so that only electric (or hydrogen) vehicles can be sold by 2030. The video also alerts respondents to the fact that electric vehicles may have a lower range and be more expensive.

33. Second, the video describes a carbon tax with cash transfers that taxes all products that emit greenhouse gases. We directly tell the respondents about the increase in the implied price of gasoline in local currency (e.g. USD 0.40 per gallon in the US and EUR 0.10 per litre in the EU).⁸ The video explains that the tax makes fossil fuels more expensive. Hence, companies and individuals are likely to reduce their fossil fuel consumption and, thus, CO₂ emissions. It also informs the respondents about the cash transfer per adult that can be financed (see Appendix A-7.1.1 for how we compute this). Furthermore, the video explains that equally redistributing the revenues across all people means that low-income earners will, on average, receive more in cash transfers than they pay in taxes. The reverse holds true for high-income earners (see Panel B in Figure 3).

34. Third, the video discusses the effects of an extensive public investment program in green infrastructures in transportation, energy, insulation, and agriculture financed by public debt. It provides estimates of the number of jobs created in green sectors and of jobs lost in brown sectors.⁹ Finally, the video reminds the respondents that although we have focused on three essential policies, many others will be useful and needed to combat climate change.

⁶ In Canada and Denmark, we also mention potential positive effects on crop production.


⁷ This policy is similar to fuel economy standards that have been implemented in many countries, including the United States, the European Union, China, and India (Anderson and Sallee 2016).

⁸ Implicitly, we use a price of carbon USD 45 per ton of CO₂, close to estimates of the social cost of carbon in Marron and Maag (2018).

⁹ Economists have advocated for green infrastructure investment programs for many years to accelerate the transition towards a low-carbon economy (Hepburn et al. 2020; High Level Commission on Carbon Prices 2017). Over the past years, many governments have started to launch such programs, including the EU's Green Deal (EC 2019) and programs adopted in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, such as the Next Generation EU Fund (EC 2020) and the US Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (US Congress 2021).

Figure 3. Climate video

Panel A: Climate impacts video



Today, the concentration of CO₂ in the atmosphere is higher than any time over the last 800,000 years.



Air pollution caused by the burning of fossil fuels is already responsible for 6 million annual deaths worldwide.



In the North-East, the risk of heavy rain has already increased by 55%.

Panel B: Climate policies video



For example, the price of gasoline would increase by 40 cents per gallon.



To compensate people for the higher prices, the revenues of the carbon tax would be redistributed to all households, regardless of their income.



Does this policy work? Yes! The Canadian province of British Columbia has a carbon tax with cash transfers since 2008.

2.2.3. Knowledge of and attitudes toward climate change.

35. We measure the respondent's knowledge and understanding of climate change by asking a series of general and more technical questions. These include whether climate change is human-caused, what are possible impacts, and which greenhouse gases (GHGs) contribute to it. We also ask respondents to rank different activities, modes of transportation, foods, and world regions in terms of GHG emissions.

36. Furthermore, we elicit respondents' attitudes on private climate action by asking how climate change affects their lifestyle, the extent to which they are willing to adopt different climate-friendly behaviours, and what factors would facilitate this adoption.

2.2.4. Views on climate policies

37. One of our core contributions is to elicit detailed reasoning about climate change policies. In the final block of the survey, we explore how respondents think about the three main climate policies explained in the videos (a ban on combustion engine cars, an investment program in green infrastructures, and a carbon tax with cash transfers) and range of other climate policies.

38. Importantly, rather than only asking respondents about their support for the main policies, we also elicit their perceptions about the policy's effectiveness in reducing emissions and changing behaviours, effects on the economy and employment, distributional impacts (which groups will lose or win?), impacts on their own household (will they lose or win?), and fairness. We further ask them about variations related to the sources of funding (in the case of the green infrastructure program), how the revenue is spent (in the case of the carbon tax), and policy bundles (e.g. a ban on combustion-engine cars with alternative modes of transportation).

39. The set of policies that we test is informed by the literature and the policy discussions. We intentionally do not limit the policies to only cover first-best instruments because of potential trade-offs between efficiency and social acceptability or political economy. In addition to the three main policies described above, we test several other policies.

40. First, we assess support for several variants of carbon taxes, which differ in the way the revenues are earmarked. Second, we include several variants of bans on polluting cars, motivated by existing bans or restrictions for combustion-engine cars for example in Mexico City (Davis 2008), or in cities across Germany (Wolff 2014). A third group of policies includes support for investments in low-carbon technologies and green infrastructures. Fourth, we elicit support for policies to reduce emissions from residential energy use.¹⁰ Fifth, we test support for policies to reduce emissions from the agricultural sector, in particular cattle farming.¹¹ Furthermore, we also assess support for a tax on flights (increasing ticket prices by 20%).

41. In addition to self-reported policy support, we also ask two "real-stakes" questions requiring the respondent to incur a cost to express their support for climate action: a donation and a petition question. In the donation question, we inform respondents that they are automatically entered into a lottery to win USD 100 (or the equivalent in their local currency). Before they know whether they have won the lottery, they have to decide which share of their potential win, if any, to donate to the non-profit Gold Standard, which fights deforestation. The respondent can also choose to sign the petition for climate action (expressing the view that "immediate action for climate change is critical") and is told that information about the share of respondents who signed this petition will be shared with the government of their country.

2.3. Outline of the analysis

42. All variables constructed based on the questionnaire and used in the analysis are defined in Appendix A-1. The descriptive statistics shown in Sections 3, 4, 5, and appendices use the control group sample only, i.e. respondents who see no information video. In the analysis, we usually correlate individual views and reasoning with two sets of individual covariates: i) individual socio-economic characteristics (e.g. age, gender, or income) and ii) lifestyle and energy usage characteristics (e.g. car usage or heating source), "energy usage" for short. Whenever the effects of these covariates are relatively homogeneous across countries, we only show one figure and point out exceptions in the text. If patterns are heterogeneous, we do not show the main effect of a given variable, but rather zoom in on the coefficients in different countries. The results by country for our main analyses are in Appendix A-4. The full analysis is repeated for each country in the country-specific online Appendices.

¹⁰ In the United States (Goldstein, Gounaris and Newell 2020) and in the European Union (Eurostat 2020), households account for about 20% of total greenhouse gas emissions.

¹¹ Globally, livestock accounts for nearly 15% of greenhouse gas emissions with beef and cattle milk production accounting for the majority of livestock emissions, contributing 41% and 20% respectively (Gerber et al. 2013).

3. Knowledge about climate change

43. This section describes respondents' knowledge and understanding of climate change.


3.1. Knowledge across countries

44. Less than one-tenth of people outright deny the existence of climate change, except in Australia, France, and the United States (where the share is 12 or 13%). Most people believe that climate change is anthropogenic: one-third know that "most" (if not all) of it is due to human activity, and, depending on the country, 60% to 90% of respondents believe that human activity causes "a lot" or "most" of climate change.

3.1.1. Consequences of climate change.

45. Most respondents (75-94%) correctly foresee some of the consequences of unabated climate change, such as severe sea-level rise or droughts and heatwaves (see Figure 4). At the same time, most also believe that climate change will entail more frequent volcanic eruptions, which is not in line with climate science. People seem to bundle several types of disasters together.

Figure 4. Knowledge about climate change (share of correct answers)



Note: Share of respondents who agree with the statements listed on the left. The statements are oriented so that they represent the correct answer, according to the current scientific literature (see the sources in Appendix A-7). For the formulation of each question, see Appendix A-5.

3.1.2. Sources of greenhouse gas emissions.

46. Respondents are generally too optimistic about the decarbonisation needed. One-half of the high-income countries' respondents correctly believe that cutting GHG emissions by half would not suffice to stop global warming, and this share is less than one-third in middle-income countries.

47. Respondents are relatively well aware of the factors that cause climate change, especially in high-income countries. Eighty per cent correctly recognize that CO₂ is a greenhouse gas, 56% that methane is one, and 67% that particulate matter is not. Most of the classifications for different types of food and power generation in terms of GHG footprint are also correct. However, a non-trivial share of respondents, especially in middle-income countries, believe that nuclear power has a higher footprint than gas or coal.

48. The answers are less accurate on transportation modes, especially in countries where the difference in emissions between trains and cars is smaller because of the lack of low-carbon trains. We ask respondents to imagine a family journey between two large cities in their country and rank the possible modes of transportation according to their greenhouse gas emissions. The options are Plane, Car, and Train (or Bus, in countries without railways: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Mexico, South Africa, Turkey, the United States).¹² Respondents rank options more accurately in countries like Denmark or Germany where trains are very low-carbon. They are less accurate in countries such as Indonesia or India, where trains are not unambiguously less carbon-intensive than the other options.

3.1.3. Ranking countries of the world by emissions.

49. We also ask respondents to rank China, the United States, the European Union, and India by total and per capita emissions.¹³ Respondents rank regions and countries quite accurately in terms of total emissions. However, many overestimate the footprint of the average Chinese resident and underestimate that of the average European.¹⁴

3.2. Who has better knowledge?

50. To summarize a respondent's knowledge about climate change, we construct a *Knowledge index* that summarizes the variables mentioned above and increases the more accurate a respondent's answers are (see Appendix A-1). We construct all indices in the paper in two steps. First, we transform each underlying variable into a z-score (subtracting the control group mean and dividing by the control group standard deviation). Second, we average the z-scores and standardize again using the average's mean and standard deviation. In Figure 5, we regress the Knowledge index on respondents' socioeconomic characteristics and variables that proxy for their energy usage.


51. Across most countries, having a college degree is significantly associated with more accurate knowledge. Also consistent across many countries is that respondents with left-leaning economic views have more accurate perceptions than those with right-leaning views. On the other hand, women are generally less accurate, except in Australia, South Korea, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Ukraine, and the United States (where there are no apparent differences by gender), in particular because they tend to perceive more negative potential impacts of climate change (which are not always accurate, such as, e.g. more frequent volcanic eruptions). The association between income and knowledge, conditional on education, is either significantly positive or insignificant, except in China (see Table A1).

52. The effect of age varies across countries (see Figure 5): while age is positively correlated with knowledge in Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Spain, Poland, India, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the correlation is negative in South Korea. Finally, respondents living with young children are somewhat less accurate too.

¹² In countries such as Indonesia, where trains rely on coal, the advantage of trains is less clear. Respondents are thus asked about a family of two traveling 800 km from Surabaya to Jakarta instead of a family of four since a fully occupied car would be more efficient than the train. Featuring two passengers instead of four also blurs the comparison between the GHG footprint per passenger of a plane versus a car, as the two are comparable when there is only one passenger in the car.


¹³ The respondent's country was also added for the GHG footprint, except for European Union countries.

¹⁴ The actual ranking for total emissions is China, the United States, the European Union, and India. The true ranking for the per capita GHG footprint is as follows: United States, European Union, China, and India. To avoid any systematic priming, we randomized the order in which countries/regions were displayed.

Figure 5. Who has better knowledge about climate change?(A) Correlation between knowledge (*Knowledge index*) and socioeconomic characteristics

(b) Heterogeneous effects of age across countries

• Not significant, p-val>0.10 • Nationally representative ▲ Online representative



Note: Panel A shows the coefficients from an OLS regression of the Knowledge index on indicators for individual socioeconomic characteristics. Country fixed effects, treatment indicators, and age are included. The coefficients on age are displayed separately in Panel B for each country to highlight the heterogeneity. The omitted categories in Panel A are “male” for gender (gender: “other” is not displayed), lowest income quartile for income, “no schooling, or highest level achieved is primary or lower secondary education” for education; “left leaning” for economic leaning. In Panel B, the omitted category is “18-34 years old” for age. The R² is 0.16. See Appendix A-1 for variable definitions.

3.3. Expectations about climate change

53. Overall, expectations about the future are relatively bleak in high-income countries (see Panel A of Appendix Figure A3). Typically, less than 40% of respondents think that it is technically feasible to stop GHG emissions by the end of the century while maintaining satisfactory living standards or that it is likely that humans will halt climate change by the end of the century. Less than one-fifth of respondents in high-income countries think that the world will be more prosperous than today in a hundred years. A substantial share of respondents think that climate change, if nothing is done to limit it, can cause the extinction of humankind. Respondents in middle-income countries are more worried about the effects of unfettered climate change overall and on themselves; however they are also more optimistic on humans' ability to halt climate change and in the technical abilities to do so while sustaining reasonable living standards.

54. The share of people who think that climate change will affect their own life and humankind in general is systematically higher in countries that are actually more vulnerable to climate change, e.g. 72% in India compared to 16% in Denmark. Both these perceptions are positively correlated with the University of Notre Dame vulnerability index (Chen et al. 2015) and exposure to PM2.5 from the OECD (see Appendix Figure A2). Thus, subjective beliefs about the impacts of climate change are related to the country's actual vulnerability.


55. Within countries, certain groups of people tend to be more worried about unbridled climate change: female, younger, more educated, and left-leaning (see Panel B of Appendix Figure A3). Higher-income, college-educated, older, or left-leaning respondents are significantly more optimistic about humans' technical ability to halt climate change.

3.4. Willingness to adopt climate-friendly behaviours

56. Our paper focuses on people's understanding of and support for climate policies. However, climate action can also take the form of individual behaviour changes, which are conceptually different. The correlation between indices of "Willingness to change behaviours" and "Support for climate policies" (which we describe in more detail later) is positive, but below 1 (0.6). It is interesting to compare and contrast respondents' willingness to adopt climate-friendly behaviours with their support of public policies.

57. Just around half of the respondents say they are willing to have a fuel-efficient car or electric vehicle or to limit flying, given current incentives (see Figure 6). Furthermore, except in Italy and India, respondents are generally unwilling to limit their beef or meat consumption significantly. Few are willing to limit driving or heating or cooling their homes by a lot.

58. We also asked people about their willingness to adopt these behaviours under different circumstances. It is important to people that they receive enough financial support to make these changes and that others, especially the most well-off, also change their behaviours.

Figure 6. Share of people willing to adopt climate-friendly behaviours

Note: Willingness to adopt climate-friendly behaviours are answers to the question “To what extent would you be willing to adopt the following behaviours?” and Factors that would encourage behaviour adoption correspond to answers to the question “How important are the factors below in order for you to adopt a sustainable lifestyle (i.e. limit driving, flying, and consumption, cycle more, etc.)?”. Both questions use a 5-point scale: “Not at all”, “A little”, “Moderately”, “A lot”, “A great deal”. Depicted are the shares of respondents who answer “A lot” or “A great deal.” Real-stakes questions include the signature of a petition to “stand up for real climate action” and an indicator equal to one if the respondent chose to donate any amount of their survey lottery prize of USD 100 in case they win the lottery. The shares represented are based on the control group respondents.

4. Support for climate action across and within countries


59. This section describes support for climate policies across countries and respondents. One complicating factor is that a given policy (e.g. a carbon tax) may generate different levels of support than bundles of policies (e.g. revenues from a carbon tax used to fund low carbon technologies). While it would be convenient to think of the tax side as separate from the revenue side, respondents’ views on tax-based policies depend on the use of the revenue. Vice-versa, for each policy requiring funding, the funding source matters. Policy bundles are complicated to study because there are many different combinations. Our approach is, therefore, as follows. First, we provide evidence on several key policies. Second, we shed light on the possible uses of revenue in the case of carbon taxes, the sources of funding for the green infrastructure program, and policy bundles in the case of combustion-engine car bans. Third, in Section 5, we analyse the fundamental factors shaping support for policies. This analysis can provide guidance for the evaluation and prediction of support for other combinations and types of policies.

4.1. Support for different types of policies

4.1.1. Support for infrastructure policies

60. Figure 7 shows clear patterns in how respondents rank the different types of policies. Subsidies for low-carbon technologies and public investments in green technologies and infrastructures (financed by public debt) receive more than 55% support in high-income countries and more than 65% support in middle-income countries. There is equally high support for the mandatory and subsidized insulation of residential buildings across countries.

Figure 7. Share of respondents who support climate change policies (somewhat to strongly)



Note: Policy views are elicited on a 5-point scale "Strongly oppose," "Somewhat oppose," "Neither support nor oppose," "Somewhat support," "Strongly support." The figure shows the share of respondents to answer "Somewhat support" or "Strongly support." The shares represented are based on the control group respondents. For the exact phrasing of each question, see Appendix A-5.

61. The source of funding clearly matters. Appendix Figure A6 shows the answers to the question about which sources of funding respondents would consider appropriate for public investments in green infrastructures. Respondents tend to agree that appropriate funding sources are higher taxes on the wealthiest and a carbon tax. They are much less likely to agree with additional public debt, reductions in social or military spending, or increases in the sales taxes as appropriate sources of funding. These views are consistent with our results below that people care about policies' progressivity and effectiveness.

4.1.2. Bans of polluting vehicles

62. Many respondents also support banning polluting vehicles in city centres or dense areas (60% in high-income countries and 71% in middle-income ones). Support is 20% lower (12 percentage points) for a ban on (the production of) combustion-engine cars even when alternatives are available and 28% lower for a simple ban on combustion-engine cars (without alternatives specified). We highlight the importance of having alternative transportation modes available for support for climate policies overall in Section 6. Furthermore, in Germany, Italy, Poland, and Spain, we also asked about an alternative policy, namely support for a monetary penalty (of either EUR 10 000 or EUR 100 000) for the purchase of combustion-engine cars. Bans generate consistently higher support than penalties (see Appendix Figure A5). Support for regulation over price mechanisms highlights some of the limits of "paying to pollute" principles, which people may deem to be unfair, as the richest are able to pay their way out of it. Bans, on the contrary, affect everyone.

4.1.3. Carbon taxes

63. At first glance, carbon taxes and especially taxes on fossil fuels appear to be among the least popular policies. Taxes on fossil fuels and carbon taxes funding equal transfers to everyone only generate 36-38% support in high-income countries and 48-61% support in middle-income ones. However, the use of revenue matters substantially. In fact, carbon taxes with revenue used to fund environmental infrastructures, subsidize low-carbon technologies, or reduce income taxes benefit from around 70% higher support in high-income countries (for a level of support around 55%) and 25% higher support in middle income countries (70%). The same goes for carbon taxes with transfers to the poorest or the most constrained households. On the contrary, carbon taxes used to reduce corporate taxes generate similarly low support as carbon taxes with equal transfers or taxes on fossil fuels (for which the use of revenues is not specified).

4.1.4. Agriculture-targeted policies

64. Finally, policies that aim to reduce cattle farming are ranked among the least popular in all countries. Bans on intensive cattle farming enjoy somewhat higher support than either the removal of subsidies for cattle farming or a high tax on cattle products overall.

4.1.5. Support and opposition versus indifference

65. An important point when trying to map these survey findings to real-world support for a policy is that around one-third of respondents say that they neither support nor oppose a given policy. Appendix Figure A4 shows the share of respondents who support a policy out of all respondents who express either support or opposition (but not indifference). Although the ranking of policies and the relative cross-country patterns are unchanged, among non-indifferent respondents, a majority is in favour rather than against most policies. Appendix Figure A10 shows that respondents who are female, lower-income, with a lower degree of education completed, politically centre-leaning are more likely to be indifferent.

66. These patterns suggest that indifference to climate policies may be a critical aspect to consider. It is important to also focus on the citizens who express a lack of opinion on these issues. This expression may reflect a lack of interest in the topic, lack of knowledge, or actual ambiguity and hesitation about climate action. In that sense, indifferent respondents may be akin to “swing voters” and those whose views are most malleable. Their views could change if a policy is actually proposed, discussed, and they are asked to vote on it. Section 6 highlights the factors shaping people’s support for various policies and can be informative about what pieces of information are needed to sway people’s views on average.

4.2. Cross-country comparison

67. We continue with a cross-country comparison in support for climate action, bearing in mind that we have to be cautious when comparing absolute levels of support between high-income and middle-income countries, given the differences in sampling highlighted.¹⁵

68. Overall, support for the three central policies considered is lowest in Australia, France, and Germany, followed by Denmark, Japan, and the United States, and, to some extent, Poland and the United Kingdom Canada, Italy, South Korea, and Spain stand out as having overall higher support and are on par with Brazil, South Africa, Turkey, and Ukraine (with the lowest degree of support among middle-income

¹⁵ Although we control for country fixed effects, differences in context and other policies already in place may influence views heterogeneously among different groups of people. For instance, the statu quo level of taxes may heterogeneously influence how much appetite there is for more taxation across different groups.

countries). Indonesia and Mexico have higher levels of support, and support is almost consistently highest in China and India.

69. Support for the carbon tax (and its variations) is particularly low in Australia, Denmark, Germany, Poland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Bans on combustion-engine cars see their lowest support in Denmark, France, Germany, and the United States and their highest support in China and India.

70. Cattle-related policies are unpopular in Australia, Denmark, Japan, Turkey, South Africa, and Ukraine. Support for green infrastructure programs, and carbon taxes used to fund environmental infrastructures or low-carbon technologies are highest in Italy and middle income countries, especially in Brazil, China, Indonesia, Mexico, and South Africa. Furthermore, although we focus on climate policies at the national level, when asked the level at which climate policies need to ideally be put in place, 73% to 93% of people choose the global level. Less than half of all respondents think that policies should be enacted mainly at the federal (or European), the national (or state), or the local levels.

4.3. Individual characteristics correlated with support for climate policies


71. To summarize support for climate policies, we construct a *Support for Main Climate Policies index* based on the three main policies studied (see Appendix A-1 for details). In Figure 8, we regress the *Support for Main Climate Policies index* on the complete set of individual socioeconomic and energy usage characteristics and country fixed effects (to see these results for each of the three main policies separately, see Appendix Figure A7). Whenever the average effects are relatively homogeneous across countries, we do not discuss country heterogeneity specifically (although all results are in Appendix Tables A5-A6).

4.3.1. Individual characteristics


72. Figure 8 shows that political leaning is one of the strongest predictors of views on climate action: in most countries, left-leaning respondents support more climate action. The exceptions are China, Indonesia, Mexico, and Ukraine. In most countries, college-educated respondents are more likely to support climate action (Australia, Brazil, China, Denmark, Indonesia, India, Italy, Mexico, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States). Income has mixed effects, as illustrated in Panel B. Higher-income respondents support more climate action in Brazil, India, Indonesia, Italy, Poland, and Ukraine. There are no clear patterns by income for the other countries. Age also has mixed effects. Older respondents in China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Poland, South Korea, and Turkey are more supportive of climate action. Bear in mind, however, that in the online-representative samples, older respondents (especially those above 65 years old) represent only a small and possibly selected share of the population. In some high-income countries such as Australia, France, and the United States, younger respondents are more likely to favour climate policies. There is no significant heterogeneity by age in the United Kingdom or other European Union countries. In addition, respondents who live with children below the age of 14 are more supportive of climate policies.

Figure 8. Which respondents support climate action?

(a) Correlation between “Support for main climate policies index” and socioeconomic and energy usage characteristics



(b) Heterogeneous effects of gender, age & income across countries



Note: Panel A shows the coefficients from a regression of the Support for main climate policies index on socioeconomic indicators (left panel) and energy usage indicators (right panel). In the right panel, we control for but do not display the coefficients on socioeconomic indicators. Country fixed effects, indicators for age, gender, income, and each treatment are included but not displayed. The R² is 0.18. The omitted category for Place characteristics is “Rural or very small agglomeration.” For a list of all omitted categories, see the notes to Figure 5. Panel B reports the coefficients on being 50 years and older (relative to being aged between 18 and 34 years), being female (relative to being male), and being in top two quartiles of the income distribution (relative to being in the first quartile). See Appendix A-1 for more precise definitions of the variables.

4.3.2. Lifestyle and energy usage factors

73. Access to public transportation has one of the strongest correlations with support for climate policy; the correlation is insignificant only in China, Japan, Mexico, and Ukraine. Conditional on access to public transportation, living in a large agglomeration only has a significantly positive correlation with policy support in Denmark, the United Kingdom, and the United States, but not in most countries. Thus, the availability of public transport seems to be the first-order concern related to the area of residence. For all high-income countries except the United States, using a car regularly is associated with lower support for climate action. However, in China, India, and Indonesia, car usage is positively associated with policy support (see Appendix Figure A7 for detailed cross-country heterogeneity in the effect of car usage). Conditional on car usage, high gas expenses matter only marginally in Canada, Denmark, Germany, Italy, and Mexico. Frequent flyers tend to support more climate action overall, except for a tax on flying (see Appendix Figure A11). Respondents who consume beef weekly or more are less likely to support climate policies in Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, and Spain.

74. Appendix Figure A11 shows the correlations between support for a range of other climate policies and individual characteristics. They are overall similar to the ones described for the main policies. Car-dependent respondents are less supportive of bans on polluting cars (whether those are overall bans, with alternatives, and in dense areas). They also exhibit lower support for taxes on fossil fuels and carbon taxes with cash transfers (only in Australia, France, Japan, Poland, and the United Kingdom, see Appendix Figure A7). They do not have different views on taxes on flying, green infrastructure programs, subsidies for low carbon technologies, or mandatory and subsidized insulation of buildings. Homeowners and landlords are less supportive of mandatory insulation but not less supportive of other climate change actions.

4.3.3. Can policy views be explained by socioeconomic and lifestyle characteristics?

75. An important question is how much of the variation in policy views we can predict using these observable socioeconomic and energy usage characteristics. The R² from the regression in Figure 8 is 0.18, and would be 0.09 omitting country fixed effects. It increases to 0.24 if we add a large set of interactions between the covariates (0.12 without country fixed effects). Thus, while there are meaningful and significant differences within countries, it is not easy to predict policy views from observable socioeconomic and energy usage characteristics only. Put differently, it is difficult to delineate specific groups based on observables that are for or against climate policies. We next turn to the beliefs that shapes views on climate action.

5. Reasoning about climate policies

76. In this section, we study respondents' understanding of climate policies, particularly, how they perceive the policies' effectiveness, economic effects, distributional consequences, and impacts on themselves.

5.1. Perceived distributional and efficiency impacts across countries

77. Figure 9 summarizes how respondents think about the effects of the three main policies. We distinguish between high-income countries, middle-income countries, and consider China, India, and Indonesia separately (for a country-by-country plot, see Appendix Figures A13-A15).

Figure 9. Perceived characteristics of the main policies

Share of respondents who agree with statements

	Green Infrastructure Program			Carbon Tax w. Cash Transfers			Ban on Combustion-Engine Cars					
	High Income	Indonesia	India	Other Middle Income	High Income	Indonesia	India	Other Middle Income	High Income	Indonesia	India	Other Middle Income
Effectiveness of Main Climate Policies												
Reduce air pollution	76	84	82		68	84	77		79	85	83	
Reduce GHG emissions/Reduce CO ₂ emissions from cars		64	80	71					73	80	77	
Make electricity production greener	70	80	77									
Encourage insulation of buildings		64	72	67								
Increase the use of public transport/Encourage less driving	60	77	67		51	75	64					
Positive effect on economy and employment	37	45	45		31	41	41		35	41	39	
Costless way to fight climate change	30	39	38		27	37	34		39	38	37	
Distributional Impacts of Main Climate Policies												
<i>Believes the following groups would gain</i>												
Those living in rural areas	25	62	41		21	58	32		16	51	24	
Low-income earners	21	57	40		22	57	31		12	51	24	
The middle class	22	54	43		21	51	31		15	47	26	
High-income earners	39	52	50		33	45	37		40	50	47	
Self-Interest												
Believes own household would gain	23	62	40		20	58	28		15	51	24	
Perceived Fairness and Support												
Support main climate policies	57	81	76		37	73	50		43	72	60	
Main climate policies are fair	51	77	67		35	67	47		39	68	53	

Note: Questions use 5-point scales: Disagree/Agree for Effects and Is fair, Lose/Win for Distributional impacts, and Oppose/Support for Support. For results excluding the middle answers “Neither agree nor disagree”, “Neither win nor lose” nor “Indifferent”. For the formulation of each question, see Appendix A-5.

5.1.1. Perceived environmental benefits.

78. The environmental benefits of climate policies are largely acknowledged: in both high-income and middle-income countries, a majority of respondents agree that the three policies would reduce air pollution and GHG emissions. France ranks as the most pessimistic country regarding perceived effectiveness, followed closely by Germany and the United States, and Denmark to a lesser extent. Most optimistic about effectiveness are respondents in India, Indonesia, Japan, and South Africa. Respondents in high-income countries are divided about the behavioural effects of the policies, such as driving less or using more public transportation. In contrast, respondents in middle-income countries tend to believe in these effects. For instance, in Poland, South Korea, and Spain more than 55% of respondents believe that a carbon tax would encourage people to drive less, but this share is only around 40% in France or Germany.

5.1.2. Perceived economic effects

79. Few respondents think that climate policies will have positive impacts on the economy and employment, although this share is somewhat higher in middle-income countries. When asked about whether each of the policies is a cost-effective versus costly way to fight climate change, respondents rank the carbon tax as the most costly, followed by the green infrastructure program and then the ban on combustion-engine cars. Perceived costs and negative economic impacts of the carbon tax are particularly high in the United States, France, Denmark, the United Kingdom, and Germany (in this order).

5.1.3. Perceived distributional impacts

80. In most countries, the three main policies are often considered regressive. In high-income countries, at most one-quarter of respondents believe that low-income earners, the middle class, and those

living in rural areas would gain from a green infrastructure program and a carbon tax with transfers. The largest perceived losses relate to the ban on combustion-engine cars: in high-income countries, only about 15% of the respondents think that each of these groups will win. In contrast, around 40% of the respondents believe that high-income earners will be net positive from these three policies. In middle-income countries (excluding China, India, and Indonesia), respondents perceive the distributional impacts of the green infrastructure program significantly more positively, but they are still wary of the possible effects of the carbon tax and combustion-engine bans on low-income, rural, and middle-class households. In India, Indonesia, and China, these patterns are quite different, and respondents are substantially less likely to consider the three main policies as regressive. The share of respondents who think that policies will benefit high-income households is generally smaller than the share who think they will benefit lower income households, especially for the carbon tax with transfers.

5.1.4. Perceived impacts on one's own household

81. Overall, respondents are similarly pessimistic about the financial effects of the three policies on their own household as they are about their effects on middle-class or rural households. Less than one-fifth of respondents in high-income countries think their household would financially gain from these policies. Respondents in middle-income countries are somewhat more optimistic about the effects on their household, and respondents in China, India, and Indonesia are significantly more optimistic.

82. To sum up, many respondents see these three key policies as environmentally effective but regressive and against their own financial interest.

5.2. How do different groups of respondents reason about climate policies?

83. Figure 10 regresses the perceived effectiveness, distributional impacts, and own impacts of the main policies on individual socioeconomic and lifestyle indicators and country fixed effects.¹⁶

84. Higher-income respondents tend to be more optimistic about the policies' effectiveness in reducing emissions. Respondents with young children are less likely to think that they will personally lose from these policies or that the policies are regressive.


85. Age has mixed effects. In middle-income countries, older respondents tend to be more likely to believe that policies reduce emissions and less likely to think that they or low-income earners will lose. In some high-income countries (Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States), older respondents are more likely to think that they or low-income earners will lose. Gender typically has small and insignificant effects. Although not consistently significant, having a college degree is associated with more optimism about the effectiveness of policies in reducing emissions and less pessimism about the impact on oneself and lower-income households.

86. In high-income countries, there is a clear political gradient for most perceptions: Left-leaning respondents are more likely to believe that policies will have positive economic impacts, reduce emissions, and less likely to believe that high-income or low-income earners would lose. Differences by political leaning are usually not significant in middle-income countries.

87. Some lifestyle and energy usage characteristics are strongly correlated with a more positive outlook on the policies' effectiveness, progressivity, and own financial impacts, namely having public transportation available, being a frequent flyer, not being car-dependent and not having high gas expenses (conditional on car usage).

¹⁶ For unconditional average perceptions by socioeconomic group, see Appendix Figures A16-A17.

Figure 10. How different groups perceive the effectiveness and distributional effects of the three main climate policies



Note: The figure shows the coefficients from two regressions. In the left panel, the indices listed in the legend are regressed on indicator variables for socioeconomic characteristics, as well as country fixed effects and treatment indicators (not shown). In the right panel, the same indices are regressed on energy usage indicators, as well as country fixed effects, treatment indicators, and socioeconomic characteristics (not shown). Each index is constructed by averaging the z-scores of the answers to a given question (e.g. "believes policies would have economic effects") across all three main policies and standardizing again. See Appendix A-1 for more detailed variable definitions. See the notes to Figure 8 for a list of the omitted categories.

88. As was the case for policy views, the set of socioeconomic and energy usage characteristics and country fixed effects (including a large set of interactions of these variables) can only explain around 16% of the variation in perceptions about policies' effectiveness, 26% of perceived impact on low-income households, and 25% of the own perceived impact, with country fixed effects accounting for about half of all the variation explained. Therefore, these individual characteristics are important in shaping reasoning, but are not the full story.

89. It is particularly interesting that respondents' perceptions of their own gains and losses are significantly correlated with and predicted by socioeconomic and energy usage characteristics, but the prediction is imperfect. Thus, respondents' perceived threat from climate policies depends on more than just these factors.

6. What reasoning underlies support for climate policies?

6.1. Factors correlated with policy support

90. To determine which beliefs are correlated with support for climate policy, we regress support for each of the three main climate policies on the respondents' socioeconomic characteristics and on a set of standardized variables and indices measuring beliefs about climate change and climate policies. The results are shown in Panel A of Figure 11.¹⁷ Panel B reports the share of the variance in support for the three policies (as summarized by the Support for Climate Policies index) that is explained by each variable.¹⁸ Overall, 70% of policy views are explained by these beliefs and socioeconomic and lifestyle characteristics, compared to only 24% explained by individual characteristics only.

91. The perceived distributional impacts of climate policies are strongly correlated with policy support. First comes self-interest: those who think they will themselves lose from a given policy are much less likely to support it. This belief alone explains 15% of the variation in policy views. Related to self-interest, the belief that one will suffer from climate change accounts for 4% of differences in policy support.

92. Second, the perceived effectiveness of a policy is also strongly correlated with support for it, especially the belief that it will reduce emissions and pollution. Beliefs in the effectiveness of policies to reduce emissions and pollution account for 24% of differences in policy support.

93. Third, the perceived progressivity of a policy also matters substantially: respondents who believe that low-income earners will lose are less supportive of the policy. In a few countries (France, India, Indonesia, Spain, Turkey, and Ukraine), the belief that the high-income earners will lose is actually positively associated with support for it (see Appendix Tables A8-A9). Across countries, the belief that poor people will lose from climate policies accounts for 8% of the variation in policy views. Besides, the belief that a policy is fair and the support for this policy are highly correlated (correlation of 0.89).

94. Broader perceived economic effects or concerns about the impacts of climate change overall are not as strongly correlated with policy support. Knowledge about climate change is a weak predictor of favouring climate policies, although there is a small significant effect of the belief that climate change is human-made. Our results for 20 countries confirm some of the patterns for specific countries, where the importance of perceived fairness, effectiveness, and self-interest has been highlighted (Carattini, Carvalho and Fankhauser 2018; Douenne and Fabre 2022; Klenert et al. 2018).


95. Support for climate policies and individual willingness to change behaviour are not driven by the same beliefs. Compared to the support for public policy action, respondents' willingness to privately adopt climate-friendly behaviours is much more driven by concerns about the consequences of climate change and that they will suffer from the main climate policies (see Appendix Figure A18). It is less correlated with perceptions of the efficiency or distributional impacts of those policies.

¹⁷ For country-by-country results, see Tables A8 and A9.


¹⁸ We follow Grömping (2007) and Lindeman, Merenda and Gold (1980). To overcome the dependency of a simple ANOVA on the order of the covariates in the regression, this method averages ANOVAs over all permutations of the covariates.

Figure 11. Reasons underlying support for main climate policies

(A) Correlation between support for the three main policies and beliefs



(B) Share of the variation in Support for main policies explained by different beliefs



Note: Panel A shows the coefficients from a regression of support for each policy (indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent supports the policy somewhat or strongly) on standardized variables measuring respondents' beliefs and perceptions. Country fixed effects, treatment indicators, and individual socioeconomic characteristics are included but not displayed. The R² is 0.7. Panel B depicts the share of the variance in the Support for main policies index that is explained by each belief and perception, conditional on country fixed effects. We use the LMG method (see Grömping 2007). See Appendix A-1 for detailed variable definitions.

6.2. Information and pedagogical treatments

6.2.1. Treatment effects on support for main policies

96. The effects of the informational and pedagogical video treatments confirm the correlations just outlined experimentally. These are depicted in Figure 12 on the pooled sample. For treatment effects by country, see Tables A11-A12.

97. In the cross-country pooled data, the *Climate impacts* treatment has the smallest effects on support for each of the policies. It is significant in very few individual countries. The effects of the *Climate policies* treatment are much stronger, especially on support for the carbon tax with cash transfers and, to a lesser extent, for the ban on combustion-engine cars. The strongest impacts come from the combination of the *Climate impacts* and *Climate policies* treatments, which are roughly equal to the sum of the two treatments' impacts. The treatment effects are largest for the carbon tax with cash transfers, followed by the ban on combustion-engine cars, and the green infrastructure program. All three treatments have significant and large effects on the perceived fairness of the three policies.

98. Support for the green infrastructure program has the highest baseline level and sees the smallest treatment effects among the three policies. The combination of the Climate impacts and Climate policies treatments increases support for it in Australia, Canada, Denmark, India, Spain, and the United Kingdom, and the treatment effect represents on average 14% of the control group's support in these countries. The apparently small treatment effect is actually equivalent to 54% of the share of those who oppose the program in the control group.


99. Turning to the ban on combustion-engine cars, seeing the *Climate policies* alone is significant only in few countries (France, Italy, and South Africa). But seeing both treatments is significant in Australia, Brazil, China, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, South Africa, Spain, and the United Kingdom, as is the pooled effect across countries. In those countries, the effect of both treatments is equivalent to 24% of the control group mean on average, ranging from 14% in China (which starts with a high level of baseline support) to 43% in Australia. The treatment effect size is also equivalent to 60% of the share who oppose the policy in the control group and to 102% of the gap in support between left- and right-wing respondents in the above listed countries.

100. Finally, on the carbon tax with transfers, seeing the *Climate policies* increases support significantly in all countries except India, Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea. The magnitudes correspond to 29% of the control group mean (ranging from 11% in China to 50% in Germany), 66% of the share who oppose this program, and on average to 40% of the gap between left- and right-wing respondents in countries where it is significant. Seeing both the *Climate impacts* and *Climate policies* treatments has even stronger effects in all countries (except India and Turkey). The effects are equivalent to 35% of the control group mean (ranging from 9% in China to 65% in Denmark) and to 74% of the opposition in countries where the effect is significant.

101. Thus, the treatments have a larger effect on policies that start with a lower support and that have more room for improving support. They sway sizable shares of respondents as benchmarked against the share who oppose each policy in the control group. Furthermore, the effects of the combined treatment are the strongest.

102. We systematically explored potential heterogeneous treatment effects by socioeconomic and lifestyle characteristics and did not find significant or systematic heterogeneity in treatment effects along these dimensions.

Figure 12. Effects of the Treatment on Support for Climate Action



Note: The figure shows the coefficients from a regression of the indicator variables listed on the left, capturing support for various policies and willingness to change behaviours, on indicators for each treatment, controlling for country fixed effects and socioeconomic characteristics (not shown). See Appendix A-1 for variable definitions.

6.2.2. Treatment effects on other policies' support

103. There are significant treatment effects on support for policies other than our main ones too, specifically those that are most closely related. The *Climate policies* and the combination treatment both significantly increase support for carbon taxes under all scenarios for how the revenues from it will be used (see Appendix Figure A19). These two treatments also significantly increase support for the tax on fossil fuels (with an effect size equal to around 30% of the control group mean) and a tax on flying, presumably because it is also associated with reducing fuel usage (see Figure 12). A ban on combustion-engine cars with alternatives made available or a ban of polluting cars in city centres, which are more popular than the simple ban on combustion engine cars, see significant treatment effect as well. However, policies that are not closely related to the ones presented in the video, such as mandatory building insulation, do not see significantly higher levels of support in the treatment group than in the control group.


6.2.3. Interpretation of the treatment effects

104. To interpret these treatment effects, consider Figure 13 that shows the treatment effects on a range of beliefs. The *Climate impacts* treatment increases concerns about climate change and improves understanding of it (e.g. that it is real and caused by humans, which GHGs and which activities contribute to it). However, these beliefs were shown (above) to not be strong predictors of support for more climate policies. This treatment does not shift the key mechanisms that matter for policy support, namely their perceived effectiveness, distributional impacts, and impacts on one's household. The *Climate policies* and the combination treatment shift exactly the beliefs that we showed to be most predictive of policy support, namely, the perceived impacts on others and oneself and effectiveness of the policies. Thus, explaining how policies work and who can benefit from them (or how losers can be compensated) is critical to foster policy support. Simply making people more worried about climate change is not an effective strategy to


foster policy support. Furthermore, as can be seen from the weaker effects on support for policies other than the ones covered in the videos, it is important to provide information about and explain the workings of a given specific or closely related policy. It is not immediate for respondents to extrapolate from one policy's effect to another.

Figure 13. Effects of the treatments on beliefs

(A) Effects of the treatments on reasoning



(B) Effects of the treatments on beliefs about properties of the main climate policies



Note: The figure shows the coefficients from a regression of indices listed on the left, capturing respondents' beliefs and perceptions, on indicators for each treatment, controlling for country fixed effects and socioeconomic characteristics (not shown). Panel A displays the coefficients from the regressions for reasoning, while panel B displays the coefficients from regressions of beliefs about properties of each of the three policies. See Appendix A-1 for variable detailed definitions.

6.2.4. Private action versus public policy

105. The treatment effects of the *Climate policies* or the combination treatment on willingness to change own behaviour are marginally significant in the pooled sample, as well as in some individual countries (Australia, Japan, Mexico, Poland, South Africa, Spain, and the United Kingdom, see Appendix Tables A11-A12). There is a small significant effect on the willingness to sign the petition supporting climate action, but no effect on donations. This suggests that simply informing people about *Climate impacts* is not very effective in stimulating demand for private action, the same way it was not effective in generating more support for public policies. At the same time, discussing *Climate policies* generates demand for policies, not private action.¹⁹ Recall from Section 4 that two of the most important factors for respondents to be willing to adapt their own behaviour were if others adapted too and if they received financial support. Hence, without changing these two key factors, there is no reason to expect that private behaviours should change.

7. Conclusion

106. Our international survey documents widespread concerns about climate change but also disagreement between different people about which measures should be taken to fight it. Our major results centre around the factors that make people support more climate action. We show that support for a given climate policy depends on three key beliefs, namely that the policy i) is effective in reducing emissions (effectiveness); ii) does not have adverse distributional impacts by hurting lower-income households (distributional concerns); and iii) does not financially hurt the respondents' household (self-interest). Stronger concerns or better knowledge about climate change are not strong predictors of support for climate action.

107. Accordingly, in many countries, there is strong majority baseline support for policies perceived to be effective, progressive, or both, namely green infrastructure programs, subsidies for low-carbon technologies, carbon taxes with a strongly progressive use of revenues (such as cash transfers to the poorest or most impacted households), and policies centred around regulations such as bans on polluting vehicles from city centres or dense areas, and the mandatory insulation of buildings.

108. These findings are confirmed experimentally. Providing people with information about the implications of climate change in their country does not significantly shift their support for climate policies. On the contrary, explaining to them the effectiveness and distributional implications of a policy (e.g. that it will not hurt poorer households) does significantly improve support. The treatment effects for the three main policies covered in the informational treatments – a green infrastructure program, a ban on combustion-engine cars, and a carbon tax with cash transfers – differ in magnitude but for all three policies a significant share of the baseline opposition can be swayed by explanations of how the policies work and who they impact.

109. Left wing and college-educated respondents, as well as those with public transport availability, low car usage and gas expenses are more supportive of climate action. The differences between groups that support more climate change action and those that support less can also be traced back to the three core beliefs outlined. For instance, college-educated respondents are generally more supportive of climate action because they believe that it will be effective in reducing emissions and that they or lower income households will not lose from them as much. Nevertheless, socioeconomic and lifestyle characteristics alone do not explain a large share of the variation in policy views across respondents.

¹⁹ The patterns of the effects of the videos suggest that the effects of the treatment are due to their specific informational content rather than to experimenter demand or priming about climate change.

110. The policy lessons emerging from these international surveys and experiments are, first, that the specific policies proposed need to be progressive and that citizens need to be made aware of that. A corollary is that how revenues from environmental taxes are spent critically influences citizens' support for them. Second, explanations and information are needed. They can be very effective in improving climate policies' support if they address the three key concerns outlined. Information on the dangers of climate change alone without a corresponding explanation of the policies that can help has only limited impacts on policy support. Third, some of the key concerns people have relate to their own possible losses from the implementation of climate action. Their own experience shapes their broader perceptions and beliefs about climate change and policies. This highlights the importance of making environmentally friendly alternatives, e.g. public transportation, more widely available ahead of taxation.

111. Future research could shed light on the best way to convey information on how climate policies work. Furthermore, while our sample includes a substantial number of countries, many more are missing and would be valuable to survey in an expanded analysis.

References

- Alesina, Alberto, Armando Miano, and Stefanie Stantcheva (2022). Immigration and Redistribution. *Review of Economic Studies* (Forthcoming) [also NBER Working Paper 24733].
- Alesina, Alberto, Stefanie Stantcheva, and Edoardo Teso (2018). Intergenerational Mobility and Preferences for Redistribution. *American Economic Review*, 108(2): 521–554. 00021.
- Alsan, Marcella, Luca Braghieri, Sarah Eichmeyer, Minjeong Joyce Kim, Stefanie Stantcheva, and David Y Yang (2021). Civil liberties in times of crisis. *NBER Working Paper* 27972. National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Anderson, Soren T., and James M. Sallee (2016). Designing Policies to Make Cars Greener. *Annual Review of Resource Economics*, 8(1): 157–180.
- Anthoff, David, and Robert Hahn (2010). Government failure and market failure: on the inefficiency of environmental and energy policy. *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, 26(2): 197–224.
- Bechtel, Michael M., Kenneth F. Scheve, and E. van Lieshout (2020). Constant carbon pricing increases support for climate action compared to ramping up costs over time. *Nature Climate Change*, 10: 1004–1009.
- Bergquist, Parrish, Matto Mildenberger, and Leah C. Stokes (2020). Combining climate, economic, and social policy builds public support for climate action in the US. *Environmental Research Letters*, 15(5): 054019. Publisher: IOP Publishing.
- Besley, Timothy J, and Torsten Persson (2022). *The Political Economics of Green Transitions*.
- Boon-Falleur, Mélusine, Aurore Grandin, Nicolas Baumard, and Coralie Chevallier (2022). Leveraging social cognition to promote effective climate change mitigation. *Nature Climate Change*, 1–7. Publisher: Nature Publishing Group.
- Brannlund, Runar, and Lars Persson (2012). To tax, or not to tax: preferences for climate policy attributes. *Climate Policy*, 12(6): 704–721.
- Carattini, Stefano, Andrea Baranzini, Philippe Thalmann, Frédéric Varone, and Frank Vöhringer (2017). Green Taxes in a Post-Paris World: Are Millions of Nays Inevitable? *Environmental and Resource Economics*, 68(1): 97–128.
- Carattini, Stefano, Maria Carvalho, and Sam Fankhauser (2018). Overcoming public resistance to carbon taxes. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: *Climate Change*, 9(5): e531.
- Chen, C, I Noble, J Hellmann, J Coffee, M Murillo, and N Chawla (2015). University of Notre Dame Global Adaptation Index. University of Notre Dame.
- Climate Action Tracker (2021). Warming Projections Global Update.
- Davis, Lucas W. (2008). The Effect of Driving Restrictions on Air Quality in Mexico City. *Journal of Political Economy*, 116(1): 38–81.

- Davis, Lucas W., and Christopher R. Knittel (2019). Are Fuel Economy Standards Regressive? *Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists*, 6(S1): S37–S63.
- Dietz, Simon, and Giles Atkinson (2010). The Equity-Efficiency Trade-off in Environmental Policy: Evidence from Stated Preferences. *Land Economics*, 86: 423–443.
- Douenne, Thomas, and Adrien Fabre (2022). Yellow Vests, Pessimistic Beliefs, and Carbon Tax Aversion. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*.
- Drews, Stefan, and Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh (2016). What explains public support for climate policies? A review of empirical and experimental studies. *Climate Policy*, 16(7): 855–876.
- EC (2019). Communication from the European Commissions: The European Green Deal. EC.
- EC (2020). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Europe's moment: Repair and Prepare for the Next Generation. EC.
- ESS (2016). European Social Survey Round 8 Data. Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway—Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ERIC.
- Eurostat (2020). Climate change driving forces - Statistics Explained.
- Fairbrother, Malcolm (2022). Public opinion about climate policies: A review and call for more studies of what people want. *PLOS Climate*, 1(5): e0000030. Publisher: Public Library of Science.
- Fowlie, Meredith, Michael Greenstone, and Catherine Wolfram (2018). Do Energy Efficiency Investments Deliver? Evidence from the Weatherization Assistance Program. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 133(3): 1597–1644.
- Gerber, P.J., H. Steinfeld, B. Henderson, A. Mottet, C. Opio, J. Dijkman, A. Falcucci, and G. Tempio (2013). Tackling climate change through livestock – A global assessment of emissions and mitigation opportunities.
- Goldstein, Benjamin, Dimitrios Gounaris, and Joshua P. Newell (2020). The carbon footprint of household energy use in the United States. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 117(32): 19122–19130.
- Green, Jessica F. (2021). Does carbon pricing reduce emissions? A review of ex-post analyses. *Environmental Research Letters*.
- Grömping, Ulrike (2007). Estimators of Relative Importance in Linear Regression Based on Variance Decomposition. *The American Statistician*, 61(2): 139–147. Publisher: Taylor & Francis.
- Hahn, Robert W., and Robert N. Stavins (1992). Economic Incentives for Environmental Protection: Integrating Theory and Practice. *The American Economic Review*, 82(2): 464–468.
- Hepburn, Cameron, Brian O'Callaghan, Nicholas Stern, Joseph Stiglitz, and Zenghelis Dimitri (2020). Will COVID-19 fiscal recovery packages accelerate or retard progress on climate change? *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, 36(1): S359–S381.
- High Level Commission on Carbon Prices (2017). Report of the High Level Commission on Carbon Prices. IPCC (2022). Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
- IPCC, AR6 (2021). Summary for Policymakers. In Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
- Ipsos, EDF (2020). Obs'COP – Climate Change and Public Opinion.
- Jagers, Sverker C., and Henrik Hammar (2009). Environmental taxation for good and for bad: the efficiency and legitimacy of Sweden's carbon tax. *Environmental Politics*, 18(2): 218–237.
- JRC, European Commission (2018). Fossil CO₂ emissions of all world countries: 2018 report.

- LU:Publications Office.
- Kahan, Dan M. (2015). Climate-Science Communication and the Measurement Problem. *Political Psychology*, 36(S1): 1–43. 00369.
- Klenert, David, Linus Mattauch, Emmanuel Combet, Ottmar Edenhofer, Cameron Hepburn, Ryan Rafaty, and Nicholas Stern (2018). Making carbon pricing work for citizens. *Nature Climate Change*, 8(8): 669–677. Publisher: Nature Publishing Group.
- Kuziemko, Ilyana, Michael I. Norton, Emmanuel Saez, and Stefanie Stantcheva (2015). How Elastic Are Preferences for Redistribution? Evidence from Randomized Survey Experiments. *American Economic Review*, 105(4): 1478–1508. 00368.
- Labandeira, Xavier, José M. Labeaga, and Xiral López-Otero (2017). A metaanalysis on the price elasticity of energy demand. *Energy Policy*, 102: 549–568. 00243.
- Leiserowitz, Anthony, Jennifer Carman, Nicole Buttermore, Xinran Wang, Seth Rosenthal, Jennifer Marlon, and Kelsey Mulcahy (2021). International Public Opinion on Climate Change. Yale Program on Climate Change Communication and Facebook Data for Good., New Haven, CT.
- Levinson, Arik (2019). Energy Efficiency Standards Are More Regressive Than Energy Taxes: Theory and Evidence. *Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists*, 6(S1): S7–S36.
- Lindeman, Richard Harold, Peter Francis Merenda, and Ruth Z Gold (1980). Introduction to bivariate and multivariate analysis. Glenview, Ill.:Scott, Foresman. OCLC: 5310754.
- Maestre-Andrées, Sara, Stefan Drews, and Jeroen van den Bergh (2019). Perceived fairness and public acceptability of carbon pricing: a review of the literature. *Climate Policy*, 19(9): 1186–1204. Publisher: Taylor & Francis.
- Marron, Donald B., and Elaine Maag (2018). How to Design Carbon Dividends. Social Science Research Network SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 3305124, Rochester, NY. 00000.
- Millner, Antony, and Hélène Ollivier (2016). Beliefs, Politics, and Environmental Policy. *Review of Environmental Economics and Policy*, 10(2): 226–244.
- NPUC, (2021). Race to Net Zero: Carbon Neutral Goals by Country. <https://www.motive-power.com/npuc-resource/carbon-neutral-goals-by-country/>.
- Oates, Wallace E, and Paul R Portney (2003). The political economy of environmental policy. In *Handbook of environmental economics*. Vol. 1, 325–354. Elsevier.
- Shapiro, Joseph (2021). The Environmental Bias of Trade Policy. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 136(2): 831–886.
- Sommer, Stephan, Linus Mattauch, and Michael Pahle (2022). Supporting carbon taxes: The role of fairness. *Ecological Economics*, 195: 107359.
- Stantcheva, Stefanie (2021). Understanding Tax Policy: How Do People Reason? *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, (qjab033).
- Stokes, Bruce, Richard Wike, and Jill Carle (2015). Global Concern about Climate Change, Broad Support for Limiting Emissions. 00109.
- Sunstein, Cass R, Sebastian Bobadilla-Suarez, Stephanie C Lazzaro, and Tali Sharot (2017). How People Update Beliefs about Climate Change: Good News and Bad News. *CORNELL LAW REVIEW*, 102: 14. 00000.
- Sælen, Hakon, and Steffen Kallbekken (2011). A choice experiment on fuel taxation and earmarking in Norway. *Ecological Economics*, 70(11): 2181–2190.
- Thalmann, Philippe (2004). The Public Acceptance of Green Taxes: 2 Million Voters Express Their Opinion. *Public Choice*, 119(1/2): 179–217.
- Umit, Resul, and Lena Maria Schaffer (2020). Attitudes towards carbon taxes across Europe: The role of

- perceived uncertainty and self-interest. *Energy Policy*, 140: 111385. Publisher: Elsevier.
- UNDP, Oxford University (2021). *The Peoples' Climate Vote*.
- US Congress (2021). Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act.
- Whitmarsh, Lorraine, and Stuart Capstick (2018). 2 - Perceptions of climate change. In *Psychology and Climate Change*. ed. Susan Clayton and Christie Manning, 13–33. Academic Press. 00000.
- Wolff, Hendrik (2014). Keep Your Clunker in the Suburb: Low-Emission Zones and Adoption of Green Vehicles. *The Economic Journal*, 124(578): F481–F512.

Annex A.

Table A.1. Summary Statistics – High-income countries 1

	Australia		Canada		Denmark		France	
	Population	Sample	Population	Sample	Population	Sample	Population	Sample
Sample size	NA	1,978	NA	2,022	NA	2,013	NA	2,006
Male	0.49	0.56	0.49	0.45	0.50	0.50	0.48	0.44
18-24 years old	0.11	0.10	0.10	0.09	0.11	0.09	0.12	0.10
25-34 years old	0.19	0.19	0.17	0.14	0.16	0.12	0.15	0.15
35-49 years old	0.26	0.27	0.24	0.25	0.23	0.25	0.24	0.25
More than 50 years old	0.44	0.44	0.48	0.52	0.50	0.54	0.49	0.50
Income Q1	0.25	0.45	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.29	0.25	0.31
Income Q2	0.25	0.31	0.25	0.28	0.23	0.25	0.25	0.31
Income Q3	0.25	0.17	0.25	0.28	0.28	0.26	0.25	0.23
Income Q4	0.25	0.07	0.25	0.20	0.22	0.19	0.25	0.14
Region 1	0.33	0.30	0.07	0.06	0.32	0.30	0.19	0.19
Region 2	0.20	0.23	0.06	0.07	0.23	0.23	0.22	0.24
Region 3	0.07	0.10	0.26	0.23	0.10	0.10	0.20	0.22
Region 4	0.28	0.28	0.39	0.39	0.14	0.16	0.25	0.20
Region 5	0.11	0.09	0.23	0.24	0.21	0.21	NA	NA
Urban	0.72	0.76	0.83	0.89	0.53	0.53	0.60	0.59
College education (25-64)	0.49	0.46	0.60	0.56	0.36	0.44	0.40	0.42
Share of voters	0.72	0.86	0.56	0.83	0.76	0.89	0.70	0.78
Voters: Left	0.44	0.44	0.60	0.65	0.44	0.48	0.28	0.24
Voters: Center	NA	NA	NA	NA	0.09	0.06	0.24	0.12
Voters: Right	0.41	0.41	0.39	0.30	0.43	0.37	0.47	0.53
Voters: Other	0.15	0.08	0.01	0.00	0.04	0.03	0.01	0.02
Voters: Not reported	NA	0.06	NA	0.05	NA	0.06	NA	0.08
Inactivity rate (15-64)	0.22	0.22	0.23	0.29	0.21	0.28	0.29	0.25
Unemployment rate (15-64)	0.07	0.12	0.10	0.12	0.06	0.12	0.08	0.10
Employment rate (15-64)	0.73	0.69	0.70	0.63	0.74	0.63	0.65	0.67

Note: This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside nationally representative statistics. For College education (25-64), the sample statistics are provided for respondents aged between 25 and 64 years old. For the Share of voters, the sample statistics include the share of people who indicated having voted. For the Voters variables, the sample statistics include the share of respondents who indicated voted for a party/candidate classified in each category, among respondents who indicated having voted. The Voters: Not reported category includes people who indicated having voted but did not report the candidate/party they voted for. For Inactivity rate (15-64), the sample statistics include the share of respondents aged between 15 and 64 years old who indicated being either “Inactive (not searching for a job),” a “Student,” or “Retired.” For Unemployment rate (15-64), the sample statistics include the share of respondents aged between 15 and 64 years old who indicated being “Unemployed (searching for a job),” among active people (“Unemployed (searching for a job),” “Full-time employed,” “Part-time employed,” or “Self-employed”). For Employment rate (15-64), the sample statistics include the share of respondents aged between 15 and 64 years old who indicated being either “Full-time employed,” “Part-time employed,” or “Self-employed.” Detailed sources for each variable and country, as well as the definitions of regions, college education, urban, and voting categories are available in Appendix A-7.

Table A.2. Summary Statistics – High-income countries 2

	Germany		Italy		Japan		Poland	
	Population	Sample	Population	Sample	Population	Sample	Population	Sample
Sample size	NA	2,006	NA	2,088	NA	1,990	NA	2,053
Male	0.49	0.48	0.48	0.49	0.48	0.54	0.48	0.44
18-24 years old	0.09	0.06	0.08	0.09	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.09
25-34 years old	0.15	0.16	0.12	0.13	0.12	0.13	0.17	0.18
35-49 years old	0.22	0.22	0.24	0.26	0.24	0.27	0.28	0.30
More than 50 years old	0.54	0.56	0.56	0.52	0.56	0.53	0.46	0.42
Income Q1	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.22
Income Q2	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.27
Income Q3	0.25	0.23	0.25	0.23	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.27
Income Q4	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.21	0.25	0.19	0.25	0.25
Region 1	0.10	0.10	0.20	0.20	0.17	0.18	0.12	0.10
Region 2	0.15	0.16	0.11	0.12	0.18	0.19	0.14	0.13
Region 3	0.18	0.16	0.19	0.17	0.35	0.38	0.23	0.21
Region 4	0.29	0.27	0.27	0.30	0.11	0.10	0.29	0.33
Region 5	0.28	0.31	0.23	0.21	0.20	0.16	0.22	0.23
Urban	0.80	0.76	0.83	0.89	0.70	0.76	0.57	0.66
College education (25-64)	0.31	0.32	0.20	0.38	0.53	0.72	0.33	0.46
Share of voters	0.67	0.86	0.59	0.87	0.54	0.79	0.63	0.87
Voters: Left	0.41	0.42	0.24	0.31	0.29	0.22	0.02	0.06
Voters: Center	0.07	0.07	0.36	0.20	0.31	0.15	0.16	0.13
Voters: Right	0.49	0.40	0.39	0.32	0.35	0.44	0.81	0.76
Voters: Other	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.07	0.05	0.05	0.00	NA
Voters: Not reported	NA	0.06	NA	0.10	NA	0.14	NA	0.05
Inactivity rate (15-64)	0.21	0.23	0.36	0.19	0.20	0.22	0.29	0.18
Unemployment rate (15-64)	0.04	0.07	0.09	0.17	0.03	0.05	0.03	0.09
Employment rate (15-64)	0.76	0.72	0.58	0.67	0.77	0.74	0.69	0.75

Note: This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside nationally representative statistics. See notes to Table 1. Detailed sources for each variable and country, as well as the definitions of regions, college education, urban, and voting categories are available in Appendix A-7.

Table A.3. Summary Statistics – High-income countries 3

	South Korea		Spain		United Kingdom		United States	
	Population	Raw sample	Population	Raw sample	Population	Raw sample	Population	Raw sample
Sample size	NA	1,932	NA	2,268	NA	2,025	NA	2,218
Male	0.50	0.56	0.49	0.49	0.50	0.52	0.50	0.47
18-24 years old	0.10	0.09	0.08	0.10	0.10	0.09	0.12	0.12
25-34 years old	0.16	0.19	0.12	0.14	0.17	0.19	0.18	0.18
35-49 years old	0.27	0.31	0.28	0.29	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.25
More than 50 years old	0.47	0.40	0.51	0.48	0.49	0.48	0.46	0.45
Income Q1	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.27	0.20	0.26
Income Q2	0.25	0.28	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.24	0.28
Income Q3	0.25	0.32	0.25	0.23	0.25	0.21	0.24	0.26
Income Q4	0.25	0.13	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.27	0.31	0.20
Region 1	0.25	0.24	0.19	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.20
Region 2	0.34	0.37	0.30	0.28	0.13	0.13	0.17	0.18
Region 3	0.19	0.23	0.11	0.10	0.24	0.23	0.38	0.39
Region 4	0.22	0.17	0.13	0.15	0.11	0.10	0.24	0.23
Region 5	NA	NA	0.28	0.26	0.31	0.33	NA	NA
Urban	0.92	0.95	0.70	0.75	0.82	0.84	0.73	0.72
College education (25-64)	0.51	0.74	0.40	0.57	0.49	0.62	0.61	0.60
Share of voters	0.75	0.87	0.63	0.85	0.60	0.82	0.62	0.82
Voters: Left	0.47	0.63	0.41	0.45	0.39	0.37	0.51	0.57
Voters: Center	0.21	0.11	0.07	0.09	0.12	0.11	NA	NA
Voters: Right	0.31	0.17	0.36	0.25	0.46	0.47	0.47	0.36
Voters: Other	0.01	NA	0.16	0.14	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.02
Voters: Not reported	NA	0.09	NA	0.07	NA	0.03	NA	0.05
Inactivity rate (15-64)	0.31	0.17	0.28	0.18	0.21	0.24	0.27	0.26
Unemployment rate (15-64)	0.04	0.08	0.16	0.14	0.05	0.09	0.08	0.13
Employment rate (15-64)	0.66	0.76	0.62	0.71	0.75	0.69	0.67	0.64

Note: This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside nationally representative statistics. See notes to Table 1. For college education (25-64) in the United States, the sample statistics is provided for all respondents and not only respondents aged between 25 and 64 years old. Detailed sources for each variable and country, as well as the definitions of regions, college education, urban, and voting categories are available in Appendix A-7.

Table A.4. Summary Statistics – Middle-income countries 1

	Brazil		China		India		Indonesia	
	Population	Sample	Population	Sample	Population	Sample	Population	Sample
Sample size	NA	1,860	NA	1,717	NA	2,472	NA	2,488
Male	0.49	0.45	0.51	0.54	0.51	0.58	0.50	0.52
18-24 years old	0.15	0.16	0.10	0.12	0.18	0.23	0.17	0.19
25-34 years old	0.22	0.23	0.20	0.26	0.24	0.27	0.23	0.26
35-49 years old	0.30	0.32	0.28	0.35	0.29	0.24	0.31	0.31
More than 50 years old	0.34	0.29	0.42	0.27	0.28	0.26	0.29	0.24
Income Q1	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.13	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.28
Income Q2	0.25	0.30	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.24
Income Q3	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.33	0.25	0.26	0.25	0.25
Income Q4	0.25	0.22	0.25	0.29	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.23
Region 1	0.08	0.07	0.29	0.31	0.27	0.20	0.08	0.07
Region 2	0.09	0.04	0.12	0.17	0.26	0.25	0.30	0.31
Region 3	0.27	0.28	0.08	0.05	0.13	0.15	0.13	0.11
Region 4	0.14	0.15	0.29	0.23	0.20	0.24	0.21	0.20
Region 5	0.42	0.45	0.22	0.24	0.14	0.17	0.27	0.31
Urban	0.69	0.77	0.63	0.53	0.36	0.46	0.57	0.62
College education (25-64)	0.20	0.64	0.10	0.59	0.09	0.72	0.13	0.45
Share of voters	0.67	0.92	NA	NA	0.65	0.79	0.74	0.90
Voters: Left	0.30	0.24	NA	NA	0.39	0.27	0.19	0.42
Voters: Center	0.19	0.10	NA	NA	NA	NA	0.17	0.06
Voters: Right	0.50	0.52	NA	NA	0.46	0.61	0.54	0.39
Voters: Other	0.01	0.06	NA	NA	0.16	0.03	0.10	NA
Voters: Not reported	NA	0.08	NA	NA	NA	0.08	NA	0.13
Inactivity rate (15-64)	0.34	0.12	0.23	0.10	0.46	0.20	0.30	0.20
Unemployment rate (15-64)	0.14	0.11	0.03	0.01	0.09	0.04	0.06	0.05
Employment rate (15-64)	0.57	0.79	0.75	0.89	0.49	0.76	0.66	0.76

Note: This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside nationally representative statistics. See notes to Table 1. Detailed sources for each variable and country, as well as the definitions of regions, college education, urban, and voting categories are available in Appendix A-7.

Table A.5. Summary Statistics – Middle-income countries 2

	Mexico		Turkey		South Africa		Ukraine	
	Population	Raw sample	Population	Raw sample	Population	Raw sample	Population	Raw sample
Sample size	NA	2,045	NA	1,932	NA	2,003	NA	1,564
Male	0.48	0.49	0.49	0.43	0.49	0.46	0.45	0.61
18-24 years old	0.18	0.18	0.16	0.18	0.21	0.21	0.08	0.12
25-34 years old	0.23	0.24	0.21	0.24	0.28	0.29	0.18	0.25
35-49 years old	0.30	0.31	0.30	0.34	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.40
More than 50 years old	0.29	0.27	0.33	0.24	0.22	0.22	0.46	0.24
Income Q1	0.25	0.26	0.25	0.14	0.25	0.16	0.25	0.17
Income Q2	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.28	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.24
Income Q3	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.28	0.25	0.32	0.25	0.24
Income Q4	0.25	0.22	0.25	0.30	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.36
Region 1	0.33	0.38	0.25	0.28	0.12	0.09	0.31	0.37
Region 2	0.22	0.18	0.18	0.12	0.24	0.29	0.21	0.17
Region 3	0.10	0.10	0.30	0.34	0.18	0.17	0.22	0.26
Region 4	0.13	0.12	0.26	0.26	0.33	0.26	0.25	0.20
Region 5	0.23	0.22	NA	NA	0.13	0.18	NA	NA
Urban	0.64	0.81	0.87	0.96	0.49	0.63	0.70	0.88
College education (25-64)	0.19	0.66	0.16	0.65	0.16	0.49	NA	0.67
Share of voters	0.53	0.86	0.83	0.88	0.44	0.67	0.53	0.76
Voters: Left	0.56	0.54	0.35	0.30	0.68	0.45	0.16	0.19
Voters: Center	0.18	0.10	0.10	0.07	0.21	0.32	0.67	0.69
Voters: Right	0.19	0.20	0.55	0.50	0.06	0.04	0.13	0.03
Voters: Other	0.07	0.02	0.00	NA	0.05	0.04	0.03	NA
Voters: Not reported	NA	0.14	NA	0.14	NA	0.15	NA	0.10
Inactivity rate (15-64)	0.35	0.12	0.45	0.21	0.45	0.16	0.38	0.15
Unemployment rate (15-64)	0.04	0.07	0.13	0.12	0.29	0.16	0.10	0.10
Employment rate (15-64)	0.59	0.81	0.48	0.69	0.38	0.71	0.56	0.76

Note: This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside nationally representative statistics. See notes to Table 1. Detailed sources for each variable and country, as well as the definitions of regions, college education, urban, and voting categories are available in Appendix A-7.

,

Appendix

List of Figures	46
List of Tables	46
A-1 Variable Definition	48
A-2 Data collection and survey information	56
A-2.1 Data collection	56
A-2.2 Data quality	56
A-3 Additional figures	58
A-4 Regression tables	79
A-5 Questionnaire	90
A-6 Robustness checks	108
A-6.1 Treatment effects among attentive respondents	108
A-6.2 Main results on different samples	108
A-7 Data sources	116
A-7.1 References	116
A-7.1.1 Computations of the country-specific cash transfers	116
A-7.2 Quotas	116
A-7.2.1 Detailed Regional Brackets	116
A-7.2.2 Detailed urban-rural categories	120
A-7.2.3 Detailed education brackets	122
A-7.2.4 Detailed voting categories	124
A-7.3 Correct answers to knowledge questions	128
Appendix References	129

List of Figures

A1	Distribution of duration of responses	57
A2	Correlation between perceptions and reality	59
A3	Expectations about the future	60
A4	Share of non-indifferent respondents who support policies (somewhat or strongly)	61
A5	Support for variants of the ban on combustion-engine cars	62
A6	Share of respondents who find the following sources of funding appropriate for public investments in green infrastructure? (Multiple answers possible)	63
A7	Support for main climate policies	64
A8	Share who support the main climate policies by socioeconomic, energy usage characteristics, and treatment group in high-income countries	65
A9	Share who support the main climate policies by socioeconomic, energy usage characteristics, and treatment group in middle-income countries	66
A10	Correlation between indifference towards the main climate policies and socioeconomic and energy usage characteristics	67
A11	Correlation between support for the other climate policies and socioeconomic and energy usage characteristics	68
A12	Perceived characteristics of a ban on combustion-engine cars	69
A13	Perceived characteristics of a carbon tax with cash transfers	70
A14	Perceived characteristics of a green infrastructure program	71
A15	Share of respondents who hold key beliefs about the main climate policies by socioeconomic characteristics, energy usage, and treatment group in high-income countries	72
A16	Share of respondents who hold key beliefs about the main climate policies by socioeconomic characteristics, energy usage, and treatment group in middle-income countries	74
A17	Beliefs underlying policy support, views on fairness, and willingness to change behaviors	76
A18	Climate attitudes by treatment group	77
A19	Effects of the treatments on the support for a carbon tax depending on the use of its revenue	78

List of Tables

A1	Correlation between knowledge and individual characteristics	80
A2	Correlation between <i>Knowledge index</i> and individual characteristics in high-income countries	81
A3	Correlation between <i>Knowledge index</i> and individual characteristics in middle-income countries	82
A4	Correlation between support for the main climate policies and individual characteristics	83
A5	Correlation between <i>Support for main climate policies index</i> and individual characteristics in high-income countries	84
A6	Correlation between <i>Support for main climate policies index</i> and individual characteristics in middle-income countries	85
A7	Correlation between support for the three main climate policies and beliefs	86
A8	Correlation between <i>Support for main climate policies index</i> and beliefs in high-income countries	86
A9	Correlation between <i>Support for main climate policies index</i> and beliefs in middle-income countries	87
A10	Effects of the treatments on support for climate action	87
A11	Effects of the treatments on main outcomes – High-income countries	88
A12	Effects of the treatments on main outcomes – Middle-income countries	89
A13	Effects of the treatments on support for climate action, among respondents who respond correctly to at least one of the comprehension questions	108
A14	Correlation between knowledge and individual characteristics on the extended sample	109
A15	Correlation between support for the main climate policies and individual characteristics on the extended sample	110

A16 Correlation between <i>Support for main climate policies index</i> and individual characteristics in high-income countries on the extended sample	111
A17 Correlation between <i>Support for main climate policies index</i> and individual characteristics in middle-income countries on the extended sample	112
A18 Correlation between knowledge or support for the main climate policies and beliefs on the extended sample	113
A19 Effects of the treatments on support for climate action on the extended sample	113
A20 Attrition analysis	114
A21 Balance analysis	115

A-1 Variable Definition

Indices

The summary indices that aggregate information over the same domain are constructed following the methodology in [Kling, Liebman and Katz \(2007\)](#). Each index consists of an equally weighted average of the z-scores of its components with signs oriented consistently within domain (e.g., the higher the *Knowledge index*, the higher the belief of the climate knowledge of the respondent). Variables are transformed into z-scores by subtracting the control group mean and dividing by the control group standard deviation, so that each z-score has mean 0 and standard deviation 1 for the control group. To further ease interpretation, the resulting index is itself standardized by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation, so that each index has mean zero and standard deviation one.

Set A: Socioeconomic characteristics (indicator variables)

Female: respondent is a female.

Other: respondent's gender is neither female nor male.

Lives with child(ren) under 14: respondent lives with at least one child below 14 (or has at least one child, for the U.S.).

Age 18-24: respondent's age is between 18 and 24 years (usually omitted category in the regressions).

Age 25-34: respondent's age is between 25 and 34 years.

Age 35-49: respondent's age is between 35 and 49 years.

Age 50+: respondent's age is more than 50 years old.

Income Q1: respondent's household income (before withholding tax) is in the first quartile of her country distribution (usually omitted category in the regressions).

Income Q2: respondent's household income (before withholding tax) is between the first and second quartiles of her country distribution.

Income Q3: respondent's household income (before withholding tax) is between the second and third quartiles of her country distribution.

Income Q4: respondent's household income (before withholding tax) is above the third quartile of her country distribution.

Has little to no schooling: respondent received no schooling or highest level achieved is primary or lower secondary education (usually the omitted category for the regressions).

Has vocational or high-school degree: respondent's highest degree is either a vocational or a high-school degree and has at least achieved primary or lower secondary education.

Has a college degree: respondent has at least a college degree.

Very Left leaning: respondent's economic policy leaning is very left.

Left leaning: respondent's economic policy leaning is either left (usually omitted category in the regressions).

Center leaning: respondent's economic policy leaning is center.

Right leaning: respondent's economic policy leaning is right.

Very Right leaning: respondent's economic policy leaning is very right.

Treatment: None: respondent was randomized to see no information treatment, i.e., the control group (usually omitted category in the regressions).

Treatment: Climate impacts: respondent was randomized to see the information treatment focused on the effects of climate change.

Treatment: Climate policies: respondent was randomized to see the information treatment focused on the climate policies.

Treatment: Both: respondent was randomized to see the information treatment focused on both climate policies and the effects of climate change.

Set B: Energy usage and lifestyle characteristics (indicator variables)

Rural area: respondent lives in a rural area, i.e., a town of less than 5,000 inhabitants (for China in a town

of less than 10,000 inhabitants, for Denmark in a town of less than 1,000 inhabitants).

Small agglomeration: respondent indicates living in a town between 5,000 and 10,000 inhabitants (for China in a town between 10,000 and 100,000 inhabitants, for Denmark in a town between 1,000 and 20,000 inhabitants).

Medium agglomeration: respondent indicates living in an agglomeration between 50,000 and 250,000 inhabitants (for China in an agglomeration between 100,000 and 1,000,000 inhabitants, for Denmark in an agglomeration between 20,000 and 100,000 inhabitants).

Large agglomeration: respondent lives in an agglomeration of more than 500,000 inhabitants (for China more than 1,000,000 inhabitants, for Denmark in an agglomeration of more than 100,000 inhabitants).

Public transport available: respondent indicates that the availability of public transport are “very poor” or “poor” where she lives.

Uses car: respondent indicates she uses a car or a motorbike for at least one activity (work, leisure, or shopping).

High gas expenses: respondent’s monthly gas expenses are above the median expenses of the respondent’s income quartile in her country.

High heating expenses: respondent’s yearly heating or cooling expenses are above the median expenses of the respondent’s income quartile in her country.

Flies more than once a year: respondent takes on average more than one round-trip flight per year.

Polluting Sector: respondent’s economic works in a polluting sector.

Eats beef/meat weekly or more: respondent indicates eating beef (meat in India) weekly or daily.

Owner or landlord: respondent is a homeowner or a landlord renting out property.

Set C: Reasoning and perceptions of climate change and policies (index variables)

Trusts the government: index based on the following variable:

- *Trust govt:* respondent’s answer to the question: “*Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: ‘Over the last decade the [Country] government could generally be trusted to do what is right.,’*” coded on a -2 to 2 scale, where -2 is “Strongly disagree,” 0 is “Neither agree nor disagree,” and 2 is “Strongly agree.”

Believes inequality is an important problem: index based on the following variable:

- *Ineq. problem:* respondent’s answer to the question: “*How big of an issue do you think income inequality is in [Country]?*” coded on a -2 to 2 scale, where -2 is “Not an issue at all,” 0 is “An issue,” and 2 is “A very serious issue.”

Worries about the consequences of CC: index based on the following variables:

- Respondent’s answers to the questions “*If nothing is done to limit climate change, how likely do you think it is that climate change will lead to [consequences]*” coded on a -2 to 2 scale, where -2 is “Very unlikely,” there is no 0, and 2 is “Very likely.” Where [consequence] is *larger immigration flows, more armed conflicts, the extinction of humankind, or drop in standards of livings*
- *Climate change problem:* respondent’s answer to the question: “*Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: ‘Climate change is an important problem.’*” coded on a -2 to 2 scale, where -2 is “Strongly disagree,” 0 is “Neither agree nor disagree,” and 2 is “Strongly agree.”
- *Climate change end:* respondent’s answer to the question: “*How likely is it that human kind halts climate change by the end of the century?*” coded on a -2 to 2 scale, where -2 is “Very unlikely,” there is no 0, and 2 is “Very likely.”
- *Environmentalist:* respondent is a member of an environmental organization.

Believe will suffer from climate change: index based on the following variable:

- *Suffers from CC:* respondent's answer to the question: “*To what extent do you think climate change already affects or will affect your personal life negatively?*” coded on a -2 to 2 scale, where -2 is “*Not at all*,” 0 is “*Moderately*,” and 2 is “*A great deal*.”

Understands emissions across activities/regions: index based on the following variables:

- *Score footprint transport:* respondent's Kendall distance with true ranking on knowledge questions about transport emissions.
- *Score footprint electricity:* respondent's Kendall distance with true ranking on knowledge questions about electricity production emissions.
- *Score footprint food:* respondent's Kendall distance with true ranking on knowledge questions about food emissions.
- *Score footprint countries per capita:* respondent's Kendall distance with true ranking on knowledge questions about countries' emissions per capita.
- *Score footprint countries per region:* respondent's Kendall distance with true ranking on knowledge questions about total regions' emissions.

Knows climate change real: index based on the following variables:

- *Climate change real:* respondent indicates that climate change is real.
- *Cutting emissions by half insufficient to stop global warming:* indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent thinks that cutting global greenhouse gas emissions by half would not be sufficient to eventually stop temperatures from rising.
- *Climate change exists, is anthropogenic:* respondent indicates that “*A lot*” or “*Most*” of climate change is due to human activity.

Knows which gases cause CC: index based on the following variables:

- *Methane is a greenhouse gas:* respondent indicates that methane is a GHG.
- *CO₂ is a greenhouse gas:* respondent indicates that CO₂ is a GHG.
- *H₂ is not a greenhouse gas:* respondent indicates that H₂ is not a GHG.
- *Particulates are not a greenhouse gas:* respondent indicates that particulates are not a GHG.

Understands impacts of CC: index based on the following variables:

- *Severe droughts and heatwaves are likely:* respondent indicates that it is “*Somewhat likely*” or “*Very likely*” that climate change will lead to severe droughts and heatwaves.
- *Sea-level rise is likely:* respondent indicates that it is “*Somewhat likely*” or “*Very likely*” that climate change will lead to rising sea levels.
- *More frequent volcanic eruptions are unlikely:* respondent indicates that it is “*Somewhat unlikely*” or “*Very unlikely*” that climate change will lead to more frequent volcanic eruptions.

For each [policy] = *a ban on combustion-engine cars; a green infrastructure program; or a carbon tax with cash transfers*, we define the following indices:

Believes [policy] would have positive econ. effect: index based on the following variable:

- respondent's answer to the question: "*Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? [Policy] would have a positive effect on the [Country] economy and employment*" coded on a -2 to 2 scale, where -2 is "Strongly disagree," 0 is "Neither agree nor disagree," and 2 is "Strongly agree." When defined as an indicator variable, equals 1 if the respondent "somewhat agrees" or "strongly agrees."

Believes [policy] would reduce pollution: index based on the following variable:

- respondent's answer to the question: "*Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? [Policy] would reduce air pollution*" coded on a -2 to 2 scale, where -2 is "Strongly disagree," 0 is "Neither agree nor disagree," and 2 is "Strongly agree." When defined as an indicator variable, equals 1 if the respondent "somewhat agrees" or "strongly agrees."

Believes the policy would reduce emissions – Ban on combustion-engine cars: index based on the following variable:

- respondent's answer to the question: "*Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? A ban on combustion-engine cars would reduce CO₂ emissions from cars*" coded on a -2 to 2 scale, where -2 is "Strongly disagree," 0 is "Neither agree nor disagree," and 2 is "Strongly agree." When defined as an indicator variable, equals 1 if the respondent "somewhat agrees" or "strongly agrees."

Believes the policy would reduce emissions – Green infrastructure program: index based on the following variables:

- respondent's answer to the question: "*Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? A green infrastructure program would make electricity production greener*" coded on a -2 to 2 scale, where -2 is "Strongly disagree," 0 is "Neither agree nor disagree," and 2 is "Strongly agree." When defined as an indicator variable, equals 1 if the respondent "somewhat agrees" or "strongly agrees."
- respondent's answer to the question: "*Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? A green infrastructure program would increase the use of public transport*" coded on a -2 to 2 scale, where -2 is "Strongly disagree," 0 is "Neither agree nor disagree," and 2 is "Strongly agree." When defined as an indicator variable, equals 1 if the respondent "somewhat agrees" or "strongly agrees."

Believes the policy would reduce emissions – Carbon tax with cash transfers: index based on the following variables:

- respondent's answer to the question: "*Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? A carbon tax with cash transfers would reduce the use of fossil fuels and GHG emissions*" coded on a -2 to 2 scale, where -2 is "Strongly disagree," 0 is "Neither agree nor disagree," and 2 is "Strongly agree." When defined as an indicator variable, equals 1 if the respondent "somewhat agrees" or "strongly agrees."
- respondent's answer to the question: "*Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? A carbon tax with cash transfers would encourage people to drive less*" coded on a -2 to 2 scale, where -2 is "Strongly disagree," 0 is "Neither agree nor disagree," and 2 is "Strongly agree." When defined as an indicator variable, equals 1 if the respondent "somewhat agrees" or "strongly agrees."
- respondent's answer to the question: "*Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? A carbon tax with cash transfers would reduce encourage people and companies to insulate buildings*" coded on a -2 to 2 scale, where -2 is "Strongly disagree," 0 is "Neither agree nor disagree," and 2 is "Strongly agree." When defined as an indicator variable, equals 1 if the respondent "somewhat agrees" or "strongly agrees."

Believes own household would lose from [policy]: index based on the following variable:

- respondent's answer to the question: "*Do you think that your household would win or lose financially from [policy]?*" coded on a -2 to 2 scale, where -2 is "Lose a lot," 0 is "Neither win nor lose," and 2 is "Win a lot." When defined as an indicator variable, equals 1 if the respondent answers "mostly win" or "win a lot."

Believes low-income earners will lose from [policy]: index based on the following variable:

- respondent's answer to the question: "*In your view, would the low-income earners win or lose if [policy] was implemented in [Country]?*" coded on a -2 to 2 scale, where -2 is "Lose a lot," 0 is "Neither win nor lose," and 2 is "Win a lot." When defined as an indicator variable, equals 1 if the respondent answers "mostly win" or "win a lot."

Believes high-income earners will lose from [policy]: index based on the following variables:

- respondent's answer to the question: "*In your view, would the high-income earners win or lose if a ban on combustion-engine cars was implemented in [Country]?*" coded on a -2 to 2 scale, where -2 is "Lose a lot," 0 is "Neither win nor lose," and 2 is "Win a lot." When defined as an indicator variable, equals 1 if the respondent answers "mostly win" or "win a lot."

Set Cbis: Reasoning and perceptions of climate change and policies (indices based on the variables of other indices)

We use the underlying variables of some indices of Set C to construct the indices of Set Cbis (using the same methodology to construct indices).

Believes policies would have positive econ. effects: index based on the following variables:

- *Econ. effects halting CC:* respondent's answer to the question: "*If we decide to halt climate change through ambitious policies, what would be the effects on the [Country] economy and employment?*" coded on a -2 to 2 scale, where -2 is "Very negative effects," 0 is "No noticeable effects," and 2 is "Very positive effects."
- The underlying variables of the three *Believes [policy] would have positive econ. effect* indices.

Believes policies would reduce pollution: index based on the following variable:

- The underlying variables of the three *Believes [policy] would reduce pollution:* indices.

Believes policies would reduce emissions: index based on the underlying variables of the following indices:

- *Believes the policy would reduce emissions – Ban on combustion-engine cars:* index based on the following variable
- *Believes the policy would reduce emissions – Green infrastructure program:* index based on the following variable
- *Believes the policy would reduce emissions – Carbon tax with cash transfers:* index based on the following variable

Believes will personally lose: index based on the following variable:

- The underlying variables of the three *Believes own household would lose from [policy]* indices.

Believes poor people will lose: index based on the following variable:

- The underlying variables of the three *Believes low-income earners will lose from [policy]* indices.

Believes rich people will lose: index based on the following variable:

- The underlying variables of the three *Believes high-income earners will lose from [policy]* indices.

Set D: Outcomes

Distributional Impacts – The middle class (Green infrastructure/Carbon tax w. transfers/Ban on combustion-engine cars): indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent considers that the middle class would “mostly win” or “win a lot” from a green infrastructure program/a carbon tax with cash transfers/a ban on combustion-engine cars.

Distributional Impacts – Those living in rural areas (Green infrastructure/Carbon tax w. transfers/Ban on combustion-engine cars): indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent considers that those living in rural areas would “mostly win” or “win a lot” from a green infrastructure program/a carbon tax with cash transfers/a ban on combustion-engine cars.

Effects – Costless way to fight climate change (Green infrastructure/Carbon tax w. transfers/Ban on combustion-engine cars): indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent “somewhat agrees” or “strongly agrees” that a green infrastructure program/a carbon tax with cash transfers/a ban on combustion-engine cars would be a costless way to fight climate change.

Factors – Ambitious climate policies: indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent indicates that it is “a lot” or “a great deal” important for them to adopt a sustainable life (i.e. limit driving, flying, and consumption, bike more, etc.) to have ambitious climate policies.

Factors – Having enough financial support: indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent indicates that it is “a lot” or “a great deal” important for them to adopt a sustainable life (i.e. limit driving, flying, and consumption, bike more, etc.) that they have enough financial support.

Factors – People around you also changing their behavior: indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent indicates that it is “a lot” or “a great deal” important for them to adopt a sustainable life (i.e. limit driving, flying, and consumption, bike more, etc.) that the people around them also change their behavior.

Factors – The most well off also changing their behavior: indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent indicates that it is “a lot” or “a great deal” important for them to adopt a sustainable life (i.e. limit driving, flying, and consumption, bike more, etc.) that the most well-off also change their behavior.

Fairness of main climate policies: index based on the following variables. When defined as an indicator variable, equals 1 if the numerical mean of those variables is greater than or equal to 1.

- *[Policy] fairness:* respondent’s answer to the question: “Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: ‘[Policy] is fair.’” Coded on a -2 to 2 scale, where -2 is “Strongly disagree,” 0 is “Neither agree nor disagree,” and 2 is “Strongly agree.” Where [Policy] is a ban on combustion-engine cars, a green infrastructure program, or a carbon tax with cash transfers.”

GHG footprint of beef/meat is higher than chicken or pasta: indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent considers that a beef steak (or lamb chop in India) of 200g emits more greenhouse gases than 200g of a serving of pasta or chicken wings.

GHG footprint of nuclear is lower than gas or coal: indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent considers that a nuclear power plant emits less greenhouse gases to provide electricity for a house than a gas-fired power plant or a coal-fired power station.

GHG footprint of plane is higher than car or train/bus: indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent considers that for a trip of 700 km family of four emits more greenhouse gases travelling by plane than by travelling by car or a train/bus.

Knowledge index: index based on the variables used for the *Understands emissions across activities/regions*, *Knows climate change real*, *Knows which gases cause CC*, and *Understands impacts of CC* indices listed above.

Indifferent – All main climate policies: indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent “neither supports nor opposes” a ban on combustion-engine cars, a carbon tax with cash transfers, and a green infrastructure program.

Indifferent – Ban on combustion-engine cars: indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent “neither supports nor opposes” a ban on combustion-engine cars.

Support – Carbon tax with cash transfers: indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent “neither supports

nor opposes" a carbon tax with cash transfers.

Indifferent – Green infrastructure program: indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent "*neither supports nor opposes*" a green infrastructure program.

Per capita emissions of the U.S. are higher than other regions: indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent considers that the consumption of an average person in the U.S. contributes more to global greenhouse gas emissions than the consumption of an average person in the European Union, China, or India.

Perceived Fairness and Support – Support (Green infrastructure/Carbon tax w. transfers/Ban on combustion-engine cars): indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent "*somewhat supports*" or "*strongly supports*" a green infrastructure program/a carbon tax with cash transfers/a ban on combustion-engine cars.

Perceived Fairness and Support – Is fair (Green infrastructure/Carbon tax w. transfers/Ban on combustion-engine cars): indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent "*somewhat agrees*" or "*strongly agrees*" that a green infrastructure program/a carbon tax with cash transfers/a ban on combustion-engine cars is fair.

Support – A high tax on cattle products, doubling beef prices: indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent "*somewhat supports*" or "*strongly supports*" a high tax on cattle products, so that the price of beef doubles.

Support – Ban of intensive cattle farming: indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent "*somewhat supports*" or "*strongly supports*" the ban of intensive cattle farming.

Support – Ban of polluting vehicles in dense areas: indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent "*somewhat supports*" or "*strongly supports*" a ban of polluting vehicles in dense areas, like city centers.

Support – Ban on combustion-engine cars: indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent "*somewhat supports*" or "*strongly supports*" a ban on combustion-engine cars.

Support – Ban on combustion-engine cars w. alternatives available: indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent "*somewhat supports*" or "*strongly supports*" a ban on combustion-engine cars where alternatives such as public transports are made available to people.

Support – Carbon tax with cash transfers: indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent "*somewhat supports*" or "*strongly supports*" a carbon tax with cash transfers.

Support – Cash transfers to the constrained households: indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent "*somewhat supports*" or "*strongly supports*" a carbon tax that would raise gasoline prices by 8 cents per liter, if the government used this revenue to finance cash transfers to households with no alternative to using fossil fuels.

Support – Cash transfers to the poorest households: indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent "*somewhat supports*" or "*strongly supports*" a carbon tax that would raise gasoline prices by 8 cents per liter, if the government used this revenue to finance cash transfers to the poorest households.

Support – Equal cash transfers to all households: indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent "*somewhat supports*" or "*strongly supports*" a carbon tax that would raise gasoline prices by 8 cents per liter, if the government used this revenue to finance equal cash transfers to all households.

Support – Funding environmental infrastructures: indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent "*somewhat supports*" or "*strongly supports*" a carbon tax that would raise gasoline prices by 8 cents per liter, if the government used this revenue to fund environmental infrastructure projects (public transport, cycling ways, etc.).

Support – Green infrastructure program: indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent "*somewhat supports*" or "*strongly supports*" a green infrastructure program.

Support – Mandatory and subsidized insulation of buildings: indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent "*somewhat supports*" or "*strongly supports*" a policy where the governments makes it mandatory for all residential buildings to have insulation that meets a certain energy efficiency standard before 2040 and where it would subsidize half of the insulation costs.

Support – Reduction in corporate income taxes: indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent "*somewhat supports*" or "*strongly supports*" a carbon tax that would raise gasoline prices by 8 cents per liter, if the government used this revenue to finance a reduction in corporate income taxes.

Support – Reduction in personal income taxes: indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent "*somewhat supports*" or "*strongly supports*" a carbon tax that would raise gasoline prices by 8 cents per liter, if the government used this revenue to finance a reduction in personal income taxes.

Support – Reduction in the public deficit: indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent “somewhat supports” or “strongly supports” a carbon tax that would raise gasoline prices by 8 cents per liter, if the government used this revenue to finance a reduction in the public deficit.

Support – Removal of subsidies for cattle farming: indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent “somewhat supports” or “strongly supports” the removal of subsidies for cattle farming.

Support – Subsidies for low-carbon technologies: indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent “somewhat supports” or “strongly supports” subsidies for low-carbon technologies (renewable energy, capture and storage of carbon. . .).

Support – Subsidies on organic and local vegetables: indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent “somewhat supports” or “strongly supports” subsidies on organic and local vegetables, fruits, and nuts.

Support – Subsidies to low-carbon tech.: indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent “somewhat supports” or “strongly supports” a carbon tax that would raise gasoline prices by 8 cents per liter, if the government used this revenue to subsidize low-carbon technologies, including renewable energy.

Support – Tax on flying (+20%): indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent “somewhat supports” or “strongly supports” a tax on flying (that increases ticket prices by 20%).

Support – Tax on fossil fuels (\$45/tCO₂): indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent “somewhat supports” or “strongly supports” a national tax on fossil fuels (increasing gasoline prices by the equivalent of 8 cents per liter).

Support – Tax rebates for the most affected firms: indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent “somewhat supports” or “strongly supports” a carbon tax that would raise gasoline prices by 8 cents per liter, if the government used this revenue to finance tax rebates for the most affected firms.

Support main climate policies index: index based on the following variables:

- *Ban on combustion-engine cars support:* respondent’s answer to the question: “Do you support or oppose a ban on combustion-engine cars?” coded on a -2 to 2 scale, where -2 is “Strongly oppose,” 0 is “Neither support nor oppose,” and 2 is “Strongly support.”
- *Carbon tax with cash transfers support:* respondent’s answer to the question: “Do you support or oppose a carbon tax with cash transfers?” coded on a -2 to 2 scale, where -2 is “Strongly oppose,” 0 is “Neither support nor oppose,” and 2 is “Strongly support.”
- *Green infrastructure program support:* respondent’s answer to the question: “Do you support or oppose a green infrastructure program?” coded on a -2 to 2 scale, where -2 is “Strongly oppose,” 0 is “Neither support nor oppose,” and 2 is “Strongly support.”

Total emissions of China are higher than other regions: indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent considers that the total emissions of China are higher than those of the U.S., the European Union, or India.

Willingness to adopt climate-friendly behavior: index based on the following variables. When defined as an indicator variable, equals 1 if the numerical mean of those variables is greater than or equal to 1 and where missing values are replaced with 0 when all the variables are not missing.

- *Limit flying:* respondent’s answer to the question: “Here are possible behaviors that experts say would help reduce greenhouse gas emissions. To what extent would you be willing to limit flying” coded on a -2 to 2 scale, where -2 is “Not at all,” 0 is “Moderately,” and 2 is “A great deal.” When defined as an indicator variable, equals 1 if the respondent answers “a lot” or “a great deal.”
- *Limit driving:* respondent’s answer to the question: “Here are possible behaviors that experts say would help reduce greenhouse gas emissions. To what extent would you be willing to limit driving” coded on a -2 to 2 scale, where -2 is “Not at all,” 0 is “Moderately,” and 2 is “A great deal.” When defined as an indicator variable, equals 1 if the respondent answers “a lot” or “a great deal.”
- *Have a fuel-efficient or electric vehicle:* respondent’s answer to the question: “Here are possible behaviors that experts say would help reduce greenhouse gas emissions. To what extent would you be willing to have an electric vehicle” coded on a -2 to 2 scale, where -2 is “Not at all,” 0 is “Moderately,”

and 2 is “*A great deal*.” When defined as an indicator variable, equals 1 if the respondent answers “*a lot*” or “*a great deal*.”

- *Limit beef/meat consumption*: respondent’s answer to the question: “*Here are possible behaviors that experts say would help reduce greenhouse gas emissions. To what extent would you be willing to limit beef consumption*” coded on a -2 to 2 scale, where -2 is “*Not at all*,” 0 is “*Moderately*,” and 2 is “*A great deal*.” When defined as an indicator variable, equals 1 if the respondent answers “*a lot*” or “*a great deal*.”
- *Limit heating or cooling your home*: respondent’s answer to the question: “*Here are possible behaviors that experts say would help reduce greenhouse gas emissions. To what extent would you be willing to limit heating or cooling your home*” coded on a -2 to 2 scale, where -2 is “*Not at all*,” 0 is “*Moderately*,” and 2 is “*A great deal*.” When defined as an indicator variable, equals 1 if the respondent answers “*a lot*” or “*a great deal*.”

Willing to sign petition: indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent supports the petition. *Willing to donate to reforestation cause*: indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent is willing to give a share of the lottery prize.

A-2 Data collection and survey information

A-2.1 Data collection

Socioeconomic composition The respondents who choose to respond are first channeled through screening questions that ensure that the final sample is representative along the dimensions of gender, age, income (by quartile), region, and urban versus rural place of residence.¹

Duration We launched the survey in 2021 at different dates for each country, starting with the U.S. in March, Denmark and France in May, Germany in August, and the other countries in the Fall. Although the duration of data collection varied from country to country, on average we collected 81% of our data less than one month after the launch.


Median duration of responses is 28 minutes (excluding responses below 11 minutes), with some heterogeneity within and between countries. Figure A1 shows the distribution of durations on the whole sample as well as on some specific countries, including those with the lowest and the highest median durations (India and South Africa).

A-2.2 Data quality

Careless responses Ex post, we checked that there were few careless response patterns. There are several matrices in the questionnaires, where respondents have to choose a response among a 4- or 5-point scale for each item. Respondents who rush carelessly through the survey tend to choose the same answer for all items in a given matrix. Thus, the number of matrices answered with the same response to all items is a good indicator of the quality of a response. On average over all respondents, 20% of the matrices are concerned (with a maximum of 27% in Turkey). Because in some cases, respondents may genuinely give the same answer to all items of a matrix, we may focus on respondents who give the same answer to at least half of the 14 matrices of the survey: there are 11% such respondents overall, with a maximum of 19% in Indonesia. Respondents with more matrices with the same answer are significantly more indifferent to policy support;

¹An additional quota variable was used in two countries: ethnicity in the U.S. and education in France. Whenever possible, we recover region and rural/urban category from the zipcode. The income variable used is the standard of living (or equivalised disposable income as defined per [Eurostat](#)). We ask for the household income and adjust the categories displayed to the respondent to the number of consumption units in their household (e.g., we multiply the income thresholds by 1.5 for a childless couple). See Appendix A-7 for details on the data sources.

Figure A1: Distribution of duration of responses




Note: The vertical line represents the rushed-response threshold, of 11.5 min, below which responses are taken out of the final sample.

they are also less likely to support and less likely to oppose policies. For example, indifference to the support of a carbon tax with cash transfers is 24 p.p. more likely as the share of same-answer matrices goes from 0 to 1. Given the relatively low number of respondents concerned by this careless response patterns, the impact on our results is likely small, and tends to overestimate the indifference to policies, if anything. Other evidence confirms a share of careless answers below one fifth. 15% of respondents do not answer to the open field (with a maximum of 30% in Mexico). Two questions in the survey ask for the support for a carbon tax with equal cash transfers: a standalone question in the corresponding block, and a matrix item in the question that compares different revenue-use of a carbon tax: 14% of respondents express their support at one occurrence and their opposition at the other, with a maximum of 17% in Mexico. Finally, all respondents rank from first to fourth the four regions proposed in terms of total emissions, although they could have ranked no country first as they were able to express ties.

A-3 Additional figures


Figure A2: Correlation between perceptions and reality



Note: The figure shows the regression results of indices on reality indicators. As reality measures, we use the the University of Notre Dame vulnerability index (?) in Panels A and B, and the exposure to PM2.5 from the OECD in Panels C and D. The two indices used are the *Worries about the consequences of CC* and the *Believes will suffer from climate change* indices. See Appendix A-1 for more precise definitions of the variables.

Figure A3: Expectations about the future


(A) Shares of respondents who agree (somewhat to strongly) with each statement by country



(B) Correlation between expectations about the future and socioeconomic characteristics


- Likely that an unbridled CC causes extinction of humankind
- ▲ Net-zero with satisfactory standards of living not technically feasible
- ◆ World will be poorer in 100 years

60



Note: For Panel A, answers to questions about CC impacts are “Very unlikely”, “Unlikely”, “Likely”, or “Very likely”, for the other questions respondents are asked if they “Strongly disagree”, “Somewhat disagree”, “Neither agree nor disagree”, “Somewhat agree”, or “Strongly agree” with the statement. Depicted are the shares that find the statement “Likely” or “Very likely”, or “Somewhat agree” or “Strongly agree” with it. The shares represented are based on respondents in the control group only (who did not see any pedagogical videos). Panel B shows the coefficients from a regression of holding negative views about the future (as indicator variables) on indicator variables for socioeconomic characteristics, as well as country fixed effects and treatment indicators (not shown). For a list of all omitted categories, see the notes to Figure ???. See Appendix A-1 for more precise definitions of the variables.

Figure A4: Share of non-indifferent respondents who support policies (somewhat or strongly)




Note: Policy views are elicited on a 5-point scale “Strongly oppose,” “Somewhat oppose,” “Neither support nor oppose,” “Somewhat support,” “Strongly support.” The figure shows the share of respondents to answer “Somewhat support,” or “Strongly support” among those who did not answer “Neither support nor oppose.” The shares represented are based on respondents in the control group only (who did not see any pedagogical videos). For the exact phrasing of each question, see Appendix A-5.

Figure A5: Support for variants of the ban on combustion-engine cars

	EU	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain
Supports a ban	46	32	54	44	54
Supports a 10,000€ fine	23	25	28	19	22
Supports a 100,000€ fine	23	26	26	17	22
Prefers a ban	64	43	79	62	71
Prefers a 10,000€ fine	25	45	12	24	19
Places a 10,000€ fine as second-preferred option	62	39	72	67	66
Places a 100,000€ fine as least-preferred option	66	53	75	68	69
Places a ban as least-preferred option	20	31	9	23	17

Note: After the support for a ban, respondents are randomly allocated to three groups: the first two are asked whether they support a variant where the ban is replaced by a €10,000 or €100,000 penalty, and the third is asked to rank the three variants of the ban. Policy support is elicited on a 5-point scale “Strongly oppose,” “Somewhat oppose,” “Neither support nor oppose,” “Somewhat support,” and “Strongly support.” The figure shows the share of respondents to answer “Somewhat support,” or “Strongly support”. The shares represented are based on respondents in the control group only (who did not see any pedagogical videos). For the exact phrasing of each question, see Appendix A-5.


Figure A6: Share of respondents who find the following sources of funding appropriate for public investments in green infrastructure? (Multiple answers possible)



Note: Share of respondents who find the listed sources of funding appropriate. The carbon tax did not appear in the possible options; the figures for the carbon tax are taken from another question, and correspond to people who “*Support*” or “*Strongly support*” a carbon tax that would raise gasoline prices by 40 cents (or equivalent) per gallon, if the government used its revenue for funding environmental infrastructure projects. The shares represented are based on respondents in the control group only (who did not see any pedagogical videos).

Figure A7: Support for main climate policies


(A) Correlation between support for the main climate policies and socioeconomic and energy usage characteristics



64


(B) Heterogeneous effects of car-dependency across countries

• Not significant, p-val>0.10 • Nationally representative ▲ Online representative




Note: Panel A shows the coefficients from regressions of support for climate policies (indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent supports the policy somewhat or strongly) on socioeconomic indicators (left panel) and on socioeconomic and energy usage indicators (right panel). Country fixed effects and treatment indicators are included but not displayed, likewise for individual socioeconomic characteristics in the right panel. For a list of all omitted categories, see the notes to Figure ???. Panel B reports the coefficients on car-dependency across countries, using the same controls as in panel A. See Appendix A-1 for variable detailed definitions. Control group means are .52 for *Ban on combustion-engine cars*, .66 for *Green infrastructure program*, and .46 for *Carbon tax with cash transfers*.

Figure A8: Share who support the main climate policies by socioeconomic, energy usage characteristics, and treatment group in high-income countries




Note: The figure shows the share of respondents who support (somewhat or strongly) each of the three main policies, by group. Except for the rows labeled “Treatment,” all means are taken over respondents in the control group only (who did not see any pedagogical videos). A 95% confidence interval is displayed. See Appendix A-1 for detailed variable definitions.

Figure A9: Share who support the main climate policies by socioeconomic, energy usage characteristics, and treatment group in middle-income countries




Note: The figure shows the share of respondents who support (somewhat or strongly) each of the three main policies, by group. Except for the rows labeled “Treatment” all means are taken over respondents in the control group only (who did not see any pedagogical videos). A 95% confidence interval is displayed. See Appendix A-1 for variable detailed definitions.

Figure A10: Correlation between indifference towards the main climate policies and socioeconomic and energy usage characteristics




Note: The figure shows the coefficients from a regression of being indifferent to the three main climate policies (indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent neither support nor oppose the policy). In the right panel, we control for but do not display the coefficients on socioeconomic indicators. Country fixed effects and indicators for each treatment are included but not displayed. The omitted category for *Place characteristics* is “Rural or very small agglomeration.” For a list of all omitted categories, see the notes to Figure ???. See Appendix A-1 for detailed variable definitions.

Figure A11: Correlation between support for the other climate policies and socioeconomic and energy usage characteristics




Note: The figure shows the results of regressions of support for climate policies (indicators) on socioeconomic indicators (left panel) and on socioeconomic and energy usage indicators (right panel). Country fixed effects and treatment indicators are included but not displayed, likewise for individual socioeconomic characteristics in the right panel. See Appendix A-1 for variable detailed definitions. Control group means are .57 for *Ban on combustion-engine cars w. alternatives available*, .65 for *Ban of polluting vehicles in dense areas*, .42 for *Tax on fossil fuels*, .48 for *Tax on flying (raising price by 20%)*, .71 for *Subsidies for low-carbon technologies*, and .62 for *Support of mandatory and subsidized insulation of buildings*.

Figure A12: Perceived characteristics of a ban on combustion-engine cars




Note: The questions on the effectiveness and fairness have answer options *Strongly disagree/Somewhat disagree/Neither agree nor disagree/Somewhat agree/Strongly agree*. We report the share of respondents who answer “Somewhat agree” or “Strongly agree.” Questions on the distributional impacts and self-interest have answer options *Lose a lot/Mostly lose/Neither win nor lose/Mostly win/Win a lot*. Depicted is the share of respondents who say “Mostly win” or “Win a lot.” “Support main climate policies” has answer options *Strongly oppose/Somewhat oppose/Neither support nor oppose/Somewhat support/Strongly support*. We show the share of respondents who “Somewhat support” or “Strongly support.” The shares represented are based on respondents in the control group only (who did not see any pedagogical videos). For the exact phrasing of each question, see the Questionnaire in Appendix A-5.

Figure A13: Perceived characteristics of a carbon tax with cash transfers




Note: The questions on the effectiveness and fairness have answer options *Strongly disagree/Somewhat disagree/Neither agree nor disagree/Somewhat agree/Strongly agree*. We report the share of respondents who answer “Somewhat agree” or “Strongly agree.” Questions on the distributional impacts and self-interest have answer options *Lose a lot/Mostly lose/Neither win nor lose/Mostly win/Win a lot*. Depicted is the share of respondents who say “Mostly win” or “Win a lot.” “Support main climate policies” has answer options *Strongly oppose/Somewhat oppose/Neither support nor oppose/Somewhat support/Strongly support*. We show the share of respondents who “Somewhat support” or “Strongly support.” The shares represented are based on respondents in the control group only (who did not see any pedagogical videos). For the exact phrasing of each question, see the Questionnaire in Appendix A-5.

Figure A14: Perceived characteristics of a green infrastructure program




Note: The questions on the effectiveness and fairness have answer options *Strongly disagree/Somewhat disagree/Neither agree nor disagree/Somewhat agree/Strongly agree*. We report the share of respondents who answer “Somewhat agree” or “Strongly agree.” Questions on the distributional impacts and self-interest have answer options *Lose a lot/Mostly lose/Neither win nor lose/Mostly win/Win a lot*. Depicted is the share of respondents who say “Mostly win” or “Win a lot.” “Support main climate policies” has answer options *Strongly oppose/Somewhat oppose/Neither support nor oppose/Somewhat support/Strongly support*. We show the share of respondents who “Somewhat support” or “Strongly support.” The shares represented are based on respondents in the control group only (who did not see any pedagogical videos). For the exact phrasing of each question, see the Questionnaire in Appendix A-5.

Figure A15: Share of respondents who hold key beliefs about the main climate policies by socioeconomic characteristics, energy usage, and treatment group in high-income countries




(C) Share who believes low-income earners would lose from [policy]




Note: The figure shows the share of respondents who agree (somewhat or strongly) with the statement. Means are shown by socioeconomic characteristics, treatment group, and energy usage. Except for the rows labeled “Treatment,” the means are taken over respondents in the control group only (who did not see any pedagogical videos). A 95% confidence interval is displayed. See Appendix A-1 for variable detailed definitions.

Figure A16: Share of respondents who hold key beliefs about the main climate policies by socioeconomic characteristics, energy usage, and treatment group in middle-income countries



(C) Share who believes low-income earners would lose from [policy]




Note: The figure shows the share of respondents who agree (somewhat or strongly) with the statement. Means are shown by socioeconomic characteristics, treatment group, and energy usage. Except for the rows labeled “Treatment,” the means are taken over respondents in the control group only (who did not see any pedagogical videos). A 95% confidence interval is displayed. See Appendix A-1 for variable detailed definitions.


Figure A17: Beliefs underlying policy support, views on fairness, and willingness to change behaviors

(A) Correlation between the “*Fairness of main climate policies*,” “*Support for main climate policies*,” and “*Willingness to adopt climate-friendly behavior*” indices and beliefs

● Fairness of main climate policies index ♦ Support for main climate policies index ▲ Willingness to adopt climate-friendly behavior index




(B) Share of the variation in “*Fairness of main climate policies*” (left, $R^2: 0.70$) and “*Willingness to adopt climate-friendly behavior*” (right, $R^2: 0.50$) indices explained by different beliefs




Note: Panel A shows the results of regressions of indices on standardized variables measuring respondent's beliefs and perceptions. Country fixed effects, treatment indicators, and individual socioeconomic characteristics are included but not displayed. Panel B depicts the share of the variance in the *Fairness of main climate policies* and *Willingness to adopt climate-friendly behaviors* indices that is explained by each belief and perception, conditional on country fixed effects, treatment indicators, and individual socioeconomic characteristics. See Figure ?? for the variance decomposition of the support and details on the method. See Appendix A-1 for detailed variable definitions.

Figure A18: Climate attitudes by treatment group



Note: This figure displays the mean of indicator variables by treatment group. Support for policy is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent supports the policy somewhat or strongly. Fairness of main climate policies is an indicator variable equal to 1 if on average the respondent somewhat or strongly agrees that each climate policy is fair. Willing to donate to reforestation cause equals 1 if the respondent is willing to donate a share of the money prize. Willing to adopt climate-friendly behavior is an indicator variable equal 1 if on average the respondent is willing to adopt each climate-friendly behavior a lot or a great deal. Willing to sign petition supporting climate action equals 1 if the respondent is willing to sign a petition supporting climate action.

Figure A19: Effects of the treatments on the support for a carbon tax depending on the use of its revenue



Note: The figure shows the coefficients from a regression of the indicator variables listed on the left, capturing support for a carbon tax depending on the use of its revenue, on indicators for each treatment, controlling for country fixed effects and socioeconomic characteristics (not shown). Control group mean support is given in the legend. See Appendix A-1 for variable definitions.

A-4 Regression tables

Table A1: Correlation between knowledge and individual characteristics

	Knowledge of climate change				
	Knowledge index	Footprint	Fundamentals	Greenhouse gases	Impacts
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Control group mean	-0.075	-0.033	-0.034	-0.118	-0.003
Panel A: Socio-economic indicators					
Gender: Female	-0.139*** (0.012)	-0.084*** (0.012)	-0.004 (0.012)	-0.133*** (0.012)	-0.127*** (0.012)
Lives with child(ren) under 14	-0.122*** (0.013)	-0.093*** (0.014)	-0.026* (0.014)	-0.092*** (0.015)	-0.087*** (0.014)
Age: 25 - 34	-0.084*** (0.022)	-0.009 (0.021)	-0.107*** (0.021)	-0.071*** (0.024)	-0.042* (0.023)
Age: 35 - 49	-0.062*** (0.020)	0.010 (0.020)	-0.101*** (0.020)	-0.099** (0.023)	0.018 (0.022)
Age: 50 or older	0.092*** (0.019)	0.151*** (0.019)	-0.080*** (0.019)	0.005 (0.021)	0.119*** (0.020)
Household income: Q2	0.093*** (0.016)	0.034** (0.016)	0.045*** (0.017)	0.099*** (0.017)	0.064*** (0.017)
Household income: Q3	0.116*** (0.017)	0.067** (0.017)	0.046*** (0.018)	0.102*** (0.018)	0.076*** (0.018)
Household income: Q4	0.188*** (0.018)	0.125*** (0.018)	0.059*** (0.019)	0.137*** (0.019)	0.145*** (0.018)
Highest diploma: College	0.402*** (0.023)	0.222*** (0.023)	0.217*** (0.023)	0.284*** (0.025)	0.295*** (0.024)
Highest diploma: High school	0.235*** (0.022)	0.100** (0.023)	0.143*** (0.022)	0.180*** (0.025)	0.185*** (0.024)
Economic Leaning: Very Left	-0.031 (0.028)	-0.048* (0.027)	0.083*** (0.029)	-0.026 (0.029)	-0.075*** (0.027)
Economic Leaning: Center	-0.213*** (0.017)	-0.159*** (0.017)	-0.168*** (0.018)	-0.091*** (0.018)	-0.102*** (0.017)
Economic Leaning: Right	-0.292*** (0.020)	-0.169*** (0.020)	-0.318*** (0.021)	-0.102** (0.021)	-0.144*** (0.021)
Economic Leaning: Very Right	-0.420*** (0.022)	-0.275*** (0.023)	-0.294*** (0.025)	-0.168*** (0.024)	-0.309*** (0.024)
Treatment: Climate Impacts	0.146*** (0.016)	0.059*** (0.016)	0.101*** (0.017)	0.173*** (0.017)	0.040** (0.016)
Treatment: Climate Policies	0.039** (0.016)	0.020 (0.016)	-0.008 (0.017)	0.124*** (0.018)	-0.041** (0.017)
Treatment: Both	0.102*** (0.016)	0.030* (0.016)	0.044*** (0.017)	0.188*** (0.017)	0.002 (0.017)
Panel B: Energy usage indicators					
Agglomeration size: Small	-0.002 (0.019)	0.021 (0.019)	-0.018 (0.020)	-0.037* (0.020)	0.021 (0.020)
Agglomeration size: Medium	0.048** (0.021)	0.041* (0.021)	0.035 (0.022)	0.002 (0.022)	0.037* (0.022)
Agglomeration size: Large	0.056*** (0.020)	0.044** (0.020)	0.051** (0.021)	-0.007 (0.021)	0.050** (0.021)
Public transport available	0.028** (0.012)	-0.023* (0.013)	0.036*** (0.013)	0.029** (0.013)	0.047*** (0.013)
Uses car	0.052*** (0.015)	0.004 (0.016)	0.035** (0.016)	0.043** (0.017)	0.061*** (0.017)
High gas expenses	-0.072*** (0.013)	-0.055*** (0.012)	-0.027** (0.013)	-0.045*** (0.014)	-0.049*** (0.013)
High heating expenses	-0.019 (0.013)	-0.034*** (0.013)	0.002 (0.014)	0.006 (0.014)	-0.014 (0.014)
Flies more than once a year	0.037*** (0.013)	0.018 (0.013)	0.056** (0.014)	-0.003 (0.014)	0.024* (0.014)
Works in polluting sector	-0.153*** (0.017)	-0.096*** (0.017)	-0.061*** (0.017)	-0.103*** (0.018)	-0.123*** (0.018)
Eats beef/meat weekly or more	-0.045*** (0.012)	-0.055*** (0.013)	-0.070*** (0.013)	0.045*** (0.013)	-0.021 (0.013)
Owner or landlord	0.004 (0.014)	-0.021 (0.014)	-0.009 (0.015)	0.024 (0.015)	0.027* (0.015)
Observations	40,680	40,680	40,680	40,680	40,680
R ²	0.170	0.154	0.050	0.076	0.074

Note: The table shows the results of regressions of knowledge indices on socioeconomic indicators (Panel A) and on energy usage indicators (Panel B), controlling for country fixed effects. Panel B also controls for socioeconomic indicators, but the coefficients are not displayed. The dependent variable in column 1 is the *Knowledge index*, whose components are the indices in the remaining columns. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. See Appendix A-1 for variable definitions.

Table A2: Correlation between *Knowledge index* and individual characteristics in high-income countries

Control group mean	-0.044	-0.07	-0.02	0.004	-0.065	-0.163	-0.021	-0.032	0.013	-0.065	-0.035	-0.022
	Knowledge Index											
	AUS	CAN	DEU	DNK	ESP	FRA	GBR	ITA	JPN	KOR	POL	USA
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Panel A: Socio-economic indicators												
female	-0.054 (0.056)	-0.201*** (0.049)	-0.136*** (0.052)	-0.128** (0.056)	-0.244*** (0.044)	-0.316*** (0.059)	-0.001 (0.052)	-0.163*** (0.047)	-0.262*** (0.054)	-0.081 (0.056)	-0.176*** (0.048)	-0.102* (0.053)
other	0.279 (0.423)	0.321 (0.417)	0.383** (0.172)	0.080 (0.591)	1.551*** (0.205)	0.442 (0.369)	1.114*** (0.183)	0.276 (0.442)	-0.238 (0.791)	-0.213 (0.185)	0.841*** (0.229)	0.486** (0.222)
children	-0.202*** (0.067)	-0.216*** (0.055)	-0.247*** (0.072)	-0.090 (0.069)	-0.113** (0.051)	-0.210*** (0.070)	-0.262*** (0.064)	-0.194*** (0.064)	-0.075 (0.060)	-0.131* (0.068)	-0.057 (0.052)	-0.255*** (0.056)
age_control25-34	-0.218** (0.090)	-0.063 (0.114)	-0.325*** (0.116)	0.025 (0.135)	-0.178** (0.090)	-0.055 (0.112)	0.028 (0.089)	-0.169 (0.106)	0.266** (0.124)	-0.395*** (0.107)	-0.234** (0.103)	0.013 (0.099)
age_control35-49	-0.223** (0.091)	-0.019 (0.107)	-0.168 (0.113)	-0.005 (0.130)	-0.076 (0.080)	-0.023 (0.106)	0.145 (0.090)	-0.142 (0.093)	0.149 (0.116)	-0.418*** (0.098)	-0.064 (0.097)	-0.062 (0.097)
age_control50+	-0.023 (0.083)	0.129 (0.100)	0.017 (0.107)	0.300** (0.125)	0.122* (0.073)	0.025 (0.100)	0.283*** (0.084)	-0.101 (0.085)	0.178* (0.108)	-0.449*** (0.097)	0.052 (0.092)	0.292*** (0.093)
income_factorQ2	0.091 (0.056)	0.151** (0.070)	0.016 (0.070)	-0.075 (0.084)	0.161*** (0.061)	-0.034 (0.072)	0.098 (0.065)	0.196*** (0.063)	-0.013 (0.077)	0.100 (0.066)	0.216*** (0.069)	-0.038 (0.068)
income_factorQ3	0.086 (0.068)	0.237*** (0.071)	0.064 (0.077)	0.056 (0.075)	0.224*** (0.065)	0.051 (0.079)	0.256*** (0.072)	0.268*** (0.068)	-0.035 (0.072)	0.082 (0.065)	0.267*** (0.067)	0.014 (0.075)
income_factorQ4	0.291*** (0.092)	0.436*** (0.079)	0.153** (0.075)	0.151* (0.085)	0.189*** (0.066)	-0.079 (0.100)	0.256*** (0.072)	0.285*** (0.070)	0.082 (0.074)	0.043 (0.074)	0.346*** (0.073)	0.099 (0.084)
educ_categCollege degree	0.306*** (0.096)	0.105 (0.078)	0.701*** (0.090)	0.579*** (0.111)	0.367*** (0.071)	0.400*** (0.092)	0.257*** (0.092)	0.413*** (0.080)	0.698*** (0.080)	0.640*** (0.082)	0.486*** (0.082)	0.385*** (0.125)
educ_categHigh-school non-College	0.095 (0.091)	0.032 (0.076)	0.467*** (0.079)	0.331*** (0.103)	0.245*** (0.072)	0.112 (0.081)	0.182** (0.079)	0.167** (0.072)	0.546** (0.261)	0.344* (0.199)	0.313 (0.202)	0.286** (0.122)
econ_leaningVery left	-0.010 (0.144)	-0.079 (0.109)	-0.114 (0.138)	0.343** (0.150)	0.122* (0.073)	-0.611** (0.286)	-0.054 (0.107)	0.106 (0.080)	-0.195 (0.144)	-0.160 (0.183)	-0.205** (0.098)	-0.121 (0.109)
econ_leaningCenter	-0.323*** (0.079)	-0.378*** (0.070)	-0.376*** (0.062)	-0.103 (0.065)	-0.211*** (0.052)	0.073 (0.084)	-0.472*** (0.064)	-0.206*** (0.060)	-0.297*** (0.077)	-0.285*** (0.072)	-0.200*** (0.082)	-0.232*** (0.078)
econ_leaningRight	-0.638*** (0.094)	-0.570*** (0.087)	-0.566*** (0.091)	-0.298*** (0.074)	-0.415*** (0.074)	-0.183** (0.070)	-0.494*** (0.087)	-0.162** (0.065)	-0.260*** (0.087)	-0.227** (0.094)	-0.265*** (0.086)	-0.546*** (0.089)
econ_leaningVery right	-0.681*** (0.107)	-0.926*** (0.112)	-0.600*** (0.134)	-0.600*** (0.178)	-0.526*** (0.089)	-0.407*** (0.122)	-0.962*** (0.119)	-0.329*** (0.093)	-0.414*** (0.125)	-0.379*** (0.134)	-0.491*** (0.087)	-0.760*** (0.093)
econ_leaningPNR	0.025 (0.207)	-0.431*** (0.186)	-0.548* (0.315)	-0.364*** (0.093)	-0.081 (0.199)	-0.245*** (0.089)	-0.647*** (0.149)	0.025 (0.137)	-0.372 (0.259)	-0.265 (0.182)	-0.583*** (0.229)	-0.576*** (0.130)
treatmentClimate impacts	0.126* (0.075)	0.097 (0.067)	0.130** (0.065)	0.052 (0.070)	0.073 (0.064)	0.243*** (0.075)	0.121* (0.068)	0.129** (0.068)	0.079 (0.064)	0.162** (0.068)	0.125** (0.076)	0.116 (0.062)

Panel B: Energy usage indicators												
treatmentClimate policy	-0.005 (0.072)	0.101 (0.066)	-0.068 (0.068)	-0.040 (0.069)	0.114* (0.061)	0.042 (0.081)	0.050 (0.065)	0.003 (0.065)	-0.047 (0.067)	0.028 (0.072)	0.056 (0.079)	-0.017 (0.063)
treatmentBoth	0.059 (0.074)	0.088 (0.066)	-0.0002 (0.067)	0.028 (0.075)	0.120** (0.058)	0.194*** (0.071)	0.003 (0.069)	0.116* (0.063)	-0.043 (0.072)	0.076 (0.073)	0.093 (0.064)	0.058 (0.072)
Observations	1,978	2,022	2,006	2,013	2,268	2,006	2,025	2,088	1,990	1,932	2,053	2,218
R ²	0.109	0.123	0.134	0.116	0.108	0.110	0.124	0.076	0.057	0.065	0.084	0.116

Note: The table shows the results of regressions of the *Knowledge index* on socioeconomic indicators (Panel A) and on energy usage indicators (Panel B). Panel B also controls for socioeconomic indicators, but the coefficients are not displayed. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. See Appendix A-1 for variable definitions.

Table A3: Correlation between *Knowledge index* and individual characteristics in middle-income countries

Control group mean	-0.161	-0.104	-0.106	-0.052	-0.097	-0.051	-0.185	-0.098
	Knowledge Index							
	BRA	CHN	IDN	IND	MEX	TUR	UKR	ZAF
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Socio-economic indicators								
female	-0.179*** (0.062)	-0.127** (0.064)	-0.091* (0.048)	-0.184*** (0.058)	-0.194*** (0.064)	-0.128** (0.065)	-0.101 (0.063)	-0.180*** (0.057)
other	-0.206 (0.201)	-0.813*** (0.291)	-0.684*** (0.103)	0.031 (0.268)	0.124 (0.375)	0.124 (0.375)	-0.010 (0.262)	
children	-0.135** (0.069)	-0.057 (0.073)	-0.033 (0.068)	-0.088 (0.066)	-0.173** (0.072)	0.094 (0.072)	-0.096 (0.064)	-0.235*** (0.062)
age_control25-34	-0.226** (0.099)	0.141 (0.112)	-0.042 (0.075)	-0.036 (0.089)	0.150 (0.099)	-0.238** (0.098)	0.225 (0.140)	-0.343*** (0.080)
age_control35-49	-0.032 (0.089)	-0.022 (0.099)	-0.076 (0.077)	-0.075 (0.090)	-0.030 (0.092)	-0.300*** (0.095)	0.333** (0.131)	-0.427*** (0.080)
age_control50+	-0.062 (0.087)	0.135 (0.098)	0.016 (0.086)	0.066 (0.078)	0.046 (0.113)	0.138 (0.095)	0.379*** (0.127)	-0.328*** (0.085)
income_factorQ2	0.261*** (0.082)	0.269*** (0.093)	0.201*** (0.072)	0.294*** (0.088)	-0.050 (0.086)	0.106 (0.099)	0.134 (0.093)	0.053 (0.087)
income_factorQ3	0.347*** (0.092)	-0.119 (0.109)	0.141 (0.086)	0.214** (0.098)	-0.093 (0.098)	0.027 (0.110)	0.133 (0.095)	0.100 (0.091)
income_factorQ4	0.438*** (0.113)	0.027 (0.103)	0.143* (0.076)	0.369*** (0.082)	-0.005 (0.095)	0.081 (0.119)	0.291*** (0.095)	0.241*** (0.091)
educ_categCollege degree	0.614*** (0.175)	0.521*** (0.091)	0.460*** (0.112)	0.240** (0.119)	0.508*** (0.103)	0.198* (0.113)	0.473*** (0.167)	0.451*** (0.137)
educ_categHigh-school non-College	0.433** (0.172)	0.268*** (0.084)	0.362*** (0.110)	0.345*** (0.123)	0.420*** (0.093)	0.055 (0.116)	0.141 (0.169)	0.370*** (0.132)
econ_leaningVery left	0.075 (0.136)	0.251** (0.122)	-0.174 (0.203)	0.456** (0.206)	-0.278* (0.146)	-0.066 (0.135)	0.074 (0.148)	0.216* (0.116)
econ_leaningCenter	-0.081 (0.113)	-0.262*** (0.082)	-0.280*** (0.085)	-0.043 (0.147)	-0.245** (0.098)	-0.093 (0.103)	0.137 (0.105)	-0.098 (0.089)
econ_leaningRight	-0.138 (0.131)	-0.351*** (0.095)	-0.319*** (0.099)	-0.005 (0.153)	-0.241** (0.117)	-0.034 (0.136)	0.221* (0.121)	0.024 (0.102)
econ_leaningVery right	-0.141 (0.119)	-0.367*** (0.120)	-0.141 (0.095)	-0.288* (0.152)	-0.476*** (0.135)	-0.328** (0.137)	0.087 (0.125)	-0.107 (0.108)
econ_leaningPNR	-0.344* (0.199)	0.454* (0.239)	-0.863*** (0.308)	-0.118 (0.207)	-0.289 (0.187)	-0.199 (0.165)	-0.069 (0.222)	-0.523* (0.277)
treatmentClimate impacts	0.238*** (0.083)	0.139 (0.094)	0.234*** (0.063)	0.049 (0.077)	0.194** (0.078)	0.049 (0.090)	0.294*** (0.085)	0.257*** (0.078)
Panel B: Energy usage indicators								
treatmentClimate policy	0.232*** (0.090)	0.119 (0.089)	0.053 (0.059)	0.027 (0.080)	0.070 (0.095)	0.047 (0.091)	0.088 (0.092)	0.020 (0.075)
treatmentBoth	0.189** (0.086)	0.058 (0.085)	0.184*** (0.059)	0.134* (0.081)	0.124 (0.083)	0.091 (0.083)	0.270*** (0.085)	0.153* (0.083)
Observations	1,860	1,717	2,488	2,472	2,045	1,932	1,564	2,003
R ²	0.098	0.097	0.040	0.077	0.066	0.051	0.102	0.089

Note: The table shows the results of regressions of the *Knowledge index* on socioeconomic indicators (Panel A) and on energy usage indicators (Panel B). Panel B also controls for socioeconomic indicators, but the coefficients are not displayed. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. See Appendix A-1 for variable definitions.

Table A4: Correlation between support for the main climate policies and individual characteristics

	Support			
	Main climate policies index	Ban on combustion-engine cars	Green infrastructure program	Carbon tax with cash transfers
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Control group mean	-0.081	0.656	0.517	0.46
Panel A: Socio-economic indicators				
Gender: Female	0.048*** (0.012)	0.010* (0.006)	0.006 (0.006)	-0.011* (0.006)
Lives with child(ren) under 14	0.123*** (0.013)	0.034*** (0.007)	0.051** (0.007)	0.057*** (0.007)
Age: 25 - 34	0.019 (0.020)	-0.0004 (0.010)	0.008 (0.011)	0.004 (0.011)
Age: 35 - 49	0.046** (0.019)	0.014 (0.010)	0.032** (0.011)	0.022** (0.010)
Age: 50 or older	0.125*** (0.018)	0.061*** (0.009)	0.083*** (0.010)	0.074*** (0.010)
Household income: Q2	0.053*** (0.016)	0.033*** (0.008)	0.030** (0.008)	0.012 (0.008)
Household income: Q3	0.073*** (0.017)	0.043*** (0.008)	0.040*** (0.009)	0.021** (0.009)
Household income: Q4	0.061*** (0.018)	0.045*** (0.009)	0.041*** (0.010)	0.025*** (0.009)
Highest diploma: College	0.141*** (0.022)	0.097*** (0.011)	0.090*** (0.012)	0.070*** (0.012)
Highest diploma: High school	0.079*** (0.021)	0.060*** (0.011)	0.053*** (0.011)	0.045*** (0.011)
Economic Leaning: Very Left	0.111*** (0.027)	0.0003 (0.012)	0.026* (0.014)	0.030* (0.014)
Economic Leaning: Center	-0.223*** (0.016)	-0.111*** (0.008)	-0.103*** (0.009)	-0.098*** (0.009)
Economic Leaning: Right	-0.329*** (0.019)	-0.120*** (0.009)	-0.104*** (0.010)	-0.077*** (0.010)
Economic Leaning: Very Right	-0.268*** (0.025)	-0.136*** (0.011)	-0.089*** (0.012)	-0.079*** (0.012)
Treatment: Climate Impacts	0.052*** (0.015)	0.021*** (0.008)	0.019** (0.008)	0.030*** (0.008)
Treatment: Climate Policies	0.120*** (0.016)	0.025*** (0.008)	0.043*** (0.008)	0.097*** (0.008)
Treatment: Both	0.194*** (0.016)	0.049*** (0.008)	0.072*** (0.008)	0.128*** (0.008)
Panel B: Energy usage indicators				
Agglomeration size: Small	0.047** (0.019)	0.015* (0.009)	0.009 (0.009)	-0.006 (0.009)
Agglomeration size: Medium	0.049** (0.021)	0.027*** (0.010)	0.014 (0.011)	0.001 (0.011)
Agglomeration size: Large	0.084*** (0.020)	0.030*** (0.009)	0.029*** (0.010)	0.007 (0.010)
Public transport available	0.252*** (0.012)	0.085*** (0.006)	0.089*** (0.006)	0.102*** (0.006)
Uses car	-0.147*** (0.015)	-0.023*** (0.007)	-0.059*** (0.008)	-0.044*** (0.008)
High gas expenses	-0.066*** (0.012)	-0.021*** (0.006)	-0.022*** (0.007)	-0.019*** (0.006)
High heating expenses	0.037*** (0.013)	0.031*** (0.006)	0.026*** (0.007)	0.025*** (0.007)
Flies more than once a year	0.125*** (0.014)	0.044*** (0.006)	0.057*** (0.007)	0.065*** (0.007)
Works in polluting sector	0.011 (0.016)	0.001 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.008)	0.012 (0.008)
Eats beef/meat weekly or more	-0.078*** (0.012)	-0.034*** (0.006)	-0.032*** (0.006)	-0.013** (0.006)
Owner or landlord	0.026* (0.014)	0.011 (0.007)	0.013* (0.007)	0.018** (0.007)
Observations	40,680	40,680	40,680	40,680
R ²	0.177	0.115	0.110	0.120

Note: The table shows the results of regressions of the variables listed in the columns on socioeconomic characteristics (Panel A) and on energy usage characteristics (Panel B), controlling for country fixed effects. Panel B also controls for socioeconomic characteristics, but the coefficients are not displayed. The dependent variable in column 1 is the *Support for main policies index*, while the remaining columns are indicator variables equal to 1 if the respondent (somewhat or strongly) supports each of the policies. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. See Appendix A-1 for variable definitions.

Table A5: Correlation between *Support for main climate policies index* and individual characteristics in high-income countries

Control group mean	-0.206	-0.099	-0.095	-0.138	-0.1	-0.088	-0.11	-0.187	-0.101	-0.054	-0.048	0.03
	Support for main climate policies index											
	AUS	CAN	DEU	DNK	ESP	FRA	GBR	ITA	JPN	KOR	POL	USA
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Panel A: Socio-economic indicators												
female	-0.008 (0.057)	-0.105** (0.049)	-0.061 (0.052)	0.162*** (0.043)	0.058 (0.057)	0.077 (0.053)	0.051 (0.047)	0.024 (0.055)	0.199*** (0.055)	-0.061 (0.054)	0.059 (0.047)	0.045 (0.053)
other	0.220 (0.275)	0.124 (0.417)	0.152 (0.199)	0.420** (0.189)	-0.268* (0.151)	0.738* (0.446)	-0.541*** (0.147)	-0.534 (0.349)	-0.151 (0.533)	-2.378*** (0.178)	-0.102 (0.259)	0.002 (0.224)
children	0.169*** (0.063)	0.167*** (0.055)	0.056 (0.069)	-0.055 (0.065)	0.109* (0.049)	0.201*** (0.065)	0.121* (0.063)	0.149** (0.069)	0.079 (0.069)	0.049 (0.071)	0.176*** (0.053)	0.033 (0.055)
age_control25-34	-0.080 (0.087)	-0.024 (0.098)	-0.156 (0.105)	0.012 (0.108)	0.038 (0.079)	-0.133 (0.101)	-0.037 (0.089)	-0.189* (0.101)	0.133 (0.108)	0.063 (0.107)	-0.120 (0.088)	0.102 (0.088)
age_control35-49	-0.099 (0.091)	-0.214** (0.094)	-0.093 (0.103)	-0.075 (0.099)	-0.084 (0.072)	-0.319*** (0.094)	0.134 (0.089)	-0.107 (0.090)	0.223** (0.105)	0.149 (0.101)	-0.026 (0.080)	0.089 (0.090)
age_control50+	-0.223*** (0.085)	-0.092 (0.088)	-0.134 (0.100)	-0.033 (0.097)	0.032 (0.066)	-0.397*** (0.094)	-0.045 (0.083)	-0.110 (0.083)	0.418*** (0.083)	0.417*** (0.097)	0.227*** (0.076)	-0.199** (0.083)
income_factorQ2	0.072 (0.054)	0.042 (0.071)	-0.066 (0.075)	-0.062 (0.074)	0.107* (0.060)	-0.078 (0.068)	-0.047 (0.070)	0.072 (0.061)	0.141** (0.066)	0.066 (0.070)	0.158** (0.067)	0.013 (0.063)
income_factorQ3	0.150** (0.072)	0.026 (0.073)	0.018 (0.075)	-0.005 (0.074)	0.119* (0.063)	-0.034 (0.079)	0.011 (0.071)	0.119* (0.067)	0.157** (0.069)	0.134** (0.067)	0.115* (0.066)	-0.029 (0.078)
income_factorQ4	0.018 (0.093)	0.030 (0.081)	-0.106 (0.076)	-0.078 (0.089)	0.090 (0.064)	-0.089 (0.088)	0.034 (0.073)	0.194*** (0.073)	0.107 (0.079)	0.118 (0.079)	0.155** (0.072)	0.080 (0.085)
educ_categCollege degree	0.263** (0.109)	-0.020 (0.085)	0.021 (0.084)	0.223** (0.100)	0.159** (0.069)	0.029 (0.097)	0.303*** (0.081)	0.187** (0.083)	0.316 (0.198)	-0.683*** (0.170)	-0.160 (0.177)	0.275** (0.117)
educ_categHigh-school non-College	0.035 (0.102)	-0.139* (0.081)	-0.122 (0.075)	0.164* (0.093)	0.128* (0.070)	-0.082 (0.084)	0.134* (0.076)	0.113 (0.069)	0.179 (0.196)	-0.751*** (0.174)	-0.164 (0.174)	0.137 (0.110)
econ_leaningVery left	0.023 (0.124)	0.088 (0.103)	0.097 (0.139)	0.491*** (0.141)	0.099 (0.073)	-0.444** (0.224)	0.042 (0.128)	0.018 (0.082)	0.264 (0.199)	0.047 (0.170)	-0.093 (0.101)	0.284*** (0.096)
econ_leaningCenter	-0.502*** (0.075)	-0.366*** (0.069)	-0.398*** (0.068)	-0.254*** (0.067)	-0.279*** (0.052)	-0.094 (0.086)	-0.446*** (0.068)	-0.284*** (0.068)	-0.206*** (0.076)	-0.441*** (0.072)	-0.107* (0.064)	-0.331*** (0.065)
econ_leaningRight	-0.697*** (0.092)	-0.585*** (0.085)	-0.746*** (0.090)	-0.661*** (0.076)	-0.583*** (0.068)	-0.274*** (0.085)	-0.440*** (0.068)	-0.287*** (0.068)	-0.305*** (0.097)	-0.484*** (0.087)	-0.332*** (0.081)	-0.757*** (0.083)
econ_leaningVery right	-0.731*** (0.155)	-0.695*** (0.130)	-0.776*** (0.166)	-0.682*** (0.194)	-0.730*** (0.095)	-0.581*** (0.120)	-0.393*** (0.127)	-0.549*** (0.106)	-0.695*** (0.161)	-0.480*** (0.160)	-0.428*** (0.102)	-0.824*** (0.096)
econ_leaningPNR	-0.125 (0.178)	0.085 (0.182)	-0.249 (0.309)	-0.614*** (0.084)	0.065 (0.135)	-0.446*** (0.082)	-0.337 (0.249)	-0.017 (0.141)	-0.547*** (0.199)	0.258 (0.209)	0.095 (0.160)	-0.557*** (0.102)
treatmentClimate impacts	0.221*** (0.077)	0.003 (0.069)	0.022 (0.068)	0.151** (0.060)	0.010 (0.072)	0.058 (0.067)	0.060 (0.067)	0.141** (0.069)	0.046 (0.072)	-0.007 (0.069)	0.042 (0.062)	-0.097 (0.068)

Panel B: Energy usage indicators												
treatmentClimate policy	0.272*** (0.074)	0.222*** (0.068)	0.189*** (0.072)	0.128* (0.069)	0.107* (0.062)	0.058 (0.075)	0.128* (0.069)	0.300*** (0.061)	0.171** (0.070)	0.077 (0.074)	0.102 (0.064)	-0.031 (0.071)
treatmentBoth	0.334** (0.081)	0.193*** (0.066)	0.183*** (0.068)	0.288*** (0.072)	0.284*** (0.058)	0.207*** (0.080)	0.311*** (0.069)	0.350*** (0.069)	0.189*** (0.072)	0.199*** (0.070)	0.124* (0.064)	0.061 (0.072)
Observations	1,978	2,022	2,006	2,013	2,268	2,006	2,025	2,088	1,990	1,932	2,053	2,218
R ²	0.114	0.077	0.080	0.123	0.092	0.084	0.078	0.066	0.065	0.093	0.042	0.173

Note: The table shows the results of regressions of *Support for main policies index* on socioeconomic indicators (Panel A) and on energy usage indicators (Panel B). Panel B also controls for socioeconomic indicators, but the coefficients are not displayed. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. See Appendix A-1 for variable definitions.

Table A6: Correlation between *Support for main climate policies index* and individual characteristics in middle-income countries

Control group mean	-0.161	-0.117	-0.054	-0.059	-0.067	-0.041	-0.117	-0.113
	Support for main climate policies index							
	BRA	CHN	IDN	IND	MEX	TUR	UKR	ZAF
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Socio-economic indicators								
female	0.100 (0.064)	0.031 (0.066)	0.081* (0.042)	0.054 (0.056)	-0.119* (0.064)	-0.011 (0.066)	0.026 (0.063)	-0.143** (0.061)
other	0.323* (0.172)	0.226 (0.240)	-2.081*** (0.093)		0.558 (0.340)	0.215 (0.416)		0.486* (0.251)
children	0.147** (0.071)	-0.117 (0.087)	0.289** (0.057)	0.075 (0.063)	0.141** (0.064)	0.363*** (0.072)	-0.061 (0.067)	0.098 (0.066)
age_control25-34	-0.006 (0.094)	0.364*** (0.124)	0.097 (0.063)	0.196** (0.088)	0.065 (0.091)	0.065 (0.098)	0.045 (0.116)	-0.066 (0.084)
age_control35-49	0.287*** (0.084)	0.470*** (0.114)	0.237*** (0.061)	0.160* (0.087)	0.083 (0.085)	0.034 (0.087)	0.174* (0.098)	-0.099 (0.083)
age_control50+	0.242*** (0.083)	0.688*** (0.108)	0.532*** (0.072)	0.500*** (0.074)	0.358*** (0.090)	0.521*** (0.089)	0.167 (0.103)	0.060 (0.092)
income_factorQ2	0.045 (0.086)	-0.015 (0.109)	0.282*** (0.060)	0.254*** (0.087)	0.023 (0.085)	0.111 (0.092)	0.239** (0.099)	0.033 (0.088)
income_factorQ3	0.250*** (0.095)	0.094 (0.119)	0.332*** (0.069)	0.371*** (0.093)	0.023 (0.094)	-0.056 (0.101)	0.192* (0.105)	-0.057 (0.089)
income_factorQ4	0.168 (0.102)	0.193* (0.102)	0.429*** (0.067)	0.309*** (0.073)	0.007 (0.104)	0.194* (0.107)	0.246** (0.101)	-0.173* (0.098)
educ_categCollege degree	0.312** (0.142)	0.370*** (0.106)	0.466*** (0.107)	0.726*** (0.135)	0.263*** (0.092)	0.181* (0.093)	0.131 (0.238)	0.070 (0.132)
educ_categHigh-school non-College	0.250* (0.138)	0.394*** (0.101)	0.422*** (0.105)	0.500*** (0.133)	0.218** (0.087)	-0.069 (0.100)	0.261 (0.238)	0.031 (0.124)
econ_leaningVery left	0.155 (0.117)	0.420** (0.164)	0.117 (0.161)	0.376** (0.186)	0.082 (0.153)	0.342*** (0.119)	0.090 (0.169)	0.475*** (0.135)
econ_leaningCenter	-0.224** (0.091)	0.225** (0.088)	-0.124 (0.078)	0.105 (0.122)	-0.158 (0.111)	0.032 (0.100)	0.141 (0.119)	-0.009 (0.092)
econ_leaningRight	-0.225** (0.108)	0.186** (0.094)	0.009 (0.085)	0.182 (0.129)	0.124 (0.116)	0.047 (0.121)	0.427*** (0.129)	0.100 (0.107)
econ_leaningVery right	-0.265** (0.110)	0.557*** (0.169)	0.479*** (0.089)	0.264* (0.136)	-0.075 (0.139)	-0.145 (0.133)	0.520*** (0.127)	0.157 (0.126)
econ_leaningPNR	-0.094 (0.160)	-0.247 (0.249)	0.105 (0.279)	-0.541** (0.231)	-0.232 (0.235)	-0.002 (0.197)	0.209 (0.214)	-0.313** (0.160)
treatmentClimate impacts	0.142* (0.085)	0.154* (0.091)	0.051 (0.053)	0.018 (0.076)	0.097 (0.081)	-0.114 (0.087)	0.039 (0.081)	0.110 (0.082)
Panel B: Energy usage indicators								
treatmentClimate policy	0.187** (0.088)	0.074 (0.093)	0.075 (0.055)	0.116 (0.076)	0.040 (0.090)	0.137 (0.089)	0.173** (0.088)	0.186** (0.082)
treatmentBoth	0.348*** (0.087)	0.239*** (0.092)	0.141*** (0.053)	0.073 (0.081)	0.164** (0.082)	0.115 (0.082)	0.227** (0.091)	0.253*** (0.086)
Observations	1,860	1,717	2,488	2,472	2,045	1,932	1,564	2,003
R ²	0.073	0.101	0.306	0.145	0.048	0.123	0.063	0.043

Note: The table shows the results of regressions of the *Support for main policies index* on socioeconomic indicators (Panel A) and on energy usage indicators (Panel B). Panel B also controls for socioeconomic indicators, but the coefficients are not displayed. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. See Appendix A-1 for variable definitions.

Table A7: Correlation between support for the three main climate policies and beliefs

	Support			
	Main climate policies index	Ban on combustion-engine cars	Green infrastructure program	Carbon tax with cash transfers
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Control group mean	-0.081	0.656	0.517	0.46
Trusts the government	0.039*** (0.004)	0.008*** (0.003)	0.007** (0.003)	0.024*** (0.003)
Believes inequality is an important problem	0.038*** (0.005)	0.013*** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.027*** (0.003)
Worries about the consequences of CC	0.044*** (0.005)	0.019*** (0.003)	0.012*** (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)
Believes net-zero is technically feasible	0.021*** (0.005)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)
Believes will suffer from climate change	0.051*** (0.005)	0.020*** (0.003)	0.028*** (0.003)	0.009*** (0.003)
Understands emission across activities/regions	0.011*** (0.004)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.007** (0.003)	0.006** (0.003)
Knows CC is real & caused by human	0.067*** (0.004)	0.023*** (0.003)	0.020*** (0.003)	0.007*** (0.003)
Knows which gases cause CC	0.011*** (0.004)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.003)
Understands impacts of CC	0.003 (0.004)	0.004 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.006** (0.003)
Believes policies entail positive econ. effects	0.077*** (0.004)	0.023*** (0.002)	0.019*** (0.003)	0.018*** (0.003)
Believes policies would reduce pollution	0.118*** (0.007)	0.089*** (0.005)	0.051*** (0.005)	0.021*** (0.005)
Believes policies would reduce emissions	0.266*** (0.008)	0.083*** (0.005)	0.089*** (0.005)	0.122*** (0.005)
Believes own household would lose	-0.337*** (0.007)	-0.087*** (0.004)	-0.119*** (0.004)	-0.116*** (0.004)
believes low-income earners will lose	-0.062*** (0.006)	-0.0004 (0.004)	-0.014*** (0.004)	-0.038*** (0.004)
believes high-income earners will lose	0.015*** (0.004)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.006** (0.003)	0.009*** (0.003)
Observations	40,680	40,680	40,680	40,680
R ²	0.699	0.389	0.357	0.378

Note: The table shows the results of regressions of variables listed in the columns on standardized variables measuring respondents' beliefs and perceptions. Country fixed effects, treatment indicators, and individual socioeconomic characteristics are included but not displayed. Dependent variables are indices (columns 1, 2), or indicator variables equal to 1 if the respondent (somewhat or strongly) supports each of the main climate policies (3, 4, 5). Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. See Appendix A-1 for variable definitions.

Table A8: Correlation between *Support for main climate policies index* and beliefs in high-income countries

	Support for main climate policies index											
	AUS	CAN	DEU	DNK	ESP	FRA	GBR	ITA	JPN	KOR	POL	USA
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	
Control group mean	-0.206	-0.099	-0.095	-0.138	-0.1	-0.088	-0.11	-0.187	-0.101	-0.054	-0.048	0.03
Trusts the government	-0.003 (0.018)	0.039** (0.015)	0.032* (0.017)	0.028 (0.017)	0.040*** (0.014)	0.066*** (0.020)	0.018 (0.016)	0.038** (0.017)	0.020 (0.019)	0.067*** (0.020)	0.060*** (0.015)	0.025 (0.016)
Believes inequality is an important problem	-0.001 (0.021)	0.035** (0.016)	0.030** (0.015)	0.090*** (0.019)	0.008 (0.014)	-0.006 (0.020)	0.031* (0.017)	0.021 (0.016)	0.015 (0.019)	0.066*** (0.020)	0.024* (0.015)	0.064*** (0.020)
Worries about the consequences of CC	0.071*** (0.022)	0.037** (0.017)	0.035** (0.018)	0.060*** (0.019)	0.010 (0.016)	0.026 (0.023)	0.065*** (0.021)	0.034* (0.018)	0.025 (0.019)	0.044** (0.021)	0.044** (0.018)	0.094*** (0.021)
Believes net-zero is technically feasible	0.052*** (0.020)	0.022 (0.017)	0.009 (0.017)	0.041** (0.018)	0.032** (0.015)	-0.006 (0.022)	0.058*** (0.019)	0.0002 (0.018)	0.026 (0.018)	-0.008 (0.021)	-0.003 (0.020)	0.016 (0.020)
Believes will suffer from climate change	0.048* (0.025)	0.046*** (0.016)	0.046*** (0.017)	0.060*** (0.015)	0.017 (0.020)	0.006 (0.019)	0.003 (0.020)	0.014 (0.022)	0.063*** (0.021)	0.080*** (0.017)	0.062*** (0.021)	0.061*** (0.020)
Understands emission across activities/regions	-0.015 (0.014)	0.050*** (0.013)	0.016 (0.017)	0.016 (0.017)	0.019 (0.014)	0.018 (0.018)	0.014 (0.015)	0.025 (0.016)	0.026 (0.017)	-0.006 (0.017)	0.015 (0.017)	0.002 (0.014)
Knows CC is real & caused by human	0.081*** (0.020)	0.087*** (0.014)	0.066*** (0.016)	0.040** (0.018)	0.092*** (0.015)	0.094*** (0.023)	0.092*** (0.016)	0.078*** (0.017)	0.016 (0.017)	0.039* (0.020)	0.067*** (0.015)	0.059*** (0.015)
Knows which gases cause CC	-0.003 (0.014)	0.012 (0.013)	0.013 (0.018)	0.012 (0.018)	0.012 (0.012)	0.020 (0.018)	0.008 (0.014)	0.026* (0.015)	-0.005 (0.016)	0.012 (0.017)	0.010 (0.013)	-0.012 (0.014)
Understands impacts of CC	0.018 (0.016)	-0.003 (0.015)	-0.036** (0.016)	-0.006 (0.018)	0.017 (0.014)	0.028 (0.018)	0.001 (0.014)	-0.012 (0.015)	0.021 (0.018)	-0.045** (0.018)	-0.027* (0.014)	-0.022 (0.015)
Believes policies entail positive econ. effects	0.141*** (0.020)	0.131*** (0.018)	0.107*** (0.019)	0.087*** (0.018)	0.108*** (0.018)	0.054** (0.022)	0.160*** (0.018)	0.117*** (0.016)	0.068*** (0.018)	0.076*** (0.021)	0.102*** (0.017)	0.070*** (0.016)
Believes policies would reduce pollution	0.147*** (0.029)	0.121*** (0.027)	0.056** (0.028)	0.147*** (0.030)	0.116*** (0.028)	0.125*** (0.028)	0.115*** (0.027)	0.197*** (0.031)	-0.015 (0.031)	0.149*** (0.033)	0.074*** (0.028)	0.049* (0.029)
Believes policies would reduce emissions	0.144*** (0.034)	0.196*** (0.029)	0.261*** (0.031)	0.241*** (0.032)	0.265*** (0.029)	0.345*** (0.030)	0.233*** (0.031)	0.334*** (0.032)	0.485*** (0.035)	0.347*** (0.035)	0.311*** (0.030)	0.187*** (0.035)
Believes own household would lose	-0.329*** (0.030)	-0.388*** (0.023)	-0.373*** (0.024)	-0.294*** (0.027)	-0.341*** (0.024)	-0.248*** (0.028)	-0.344*** (0.027)	-0.211*** (0.025)	-0.300*** (0.027)	-0.279*** (0.027)	-0.374*** (0.023)	-0.342*** (0.030)
believes low-income earners will lose	-0.085*** (0.029)	-0.061*** (0.023)	-0.119*** (0.023)	-0.102*** (0.024)	-0.077*** (0.024)	-0.120*** (0.026)	-0.046* (0.026)	-0.016 (0.026)	-0.089*** (0.026)	-0.037 (0.027)	-0.070*** (0.021)	-0.147*** (0.024)
believes high-income earners will lose	-0.035** (0.017)	0.020 (0.014)	0.012 (0.016)	-0.029 (0.019)	0.029** (0.013)	0.038* (0.019)	0.014 (0.015)	0.014 (0.016)	0.031 (0.016)	0.028 (0.019)	0.016 (0.020)	-0.017 (0.014)
Observations	1,978	2,022	2,006	2,013	2,268	2,006	2,025	2,088	1,990	1,932	2,053	2,218
R ²	0.773	0.766	0.726	0.660	0.707	0.619	0.743	0.646	0.620	0.619	0.696	0.764

Note: The table shows the results of regressions of the *Support for main policies index* on standardized variables measuring respondents' beliefs and perceptions. Treatment indicators and individual socioeconomic characteristics are included but not displayed. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. See Appendix A-1 for variable definitions.

Table A9: Correlation between *Support for main climate policies index* and beliefs in middle-income countries

	Support for main climate policies index							
	BRA	CHN	IDN	IND	MEX	TUR	UKR	ZAF
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Control group mean	-0.161	-0.117	-0.054	-0.059	-0.067	-0.041	-0.117	-0.113
Trusts the government	-0.012 (0.020)	0.085*** (0.033)	0.085*** (0.022)	0.048** (0.024)	0.052** (0.025)	0.039 (0.024)	0.081*** (0.022)	0.062** (0.027)
Believes inequality is an important problem	0.064*** (0.023)	0.072*** (0.026)	0.066*** (0.018)	0.090*** (0.028)	0.060** (0.024)	0.007 (0.028)	0.037 (0.023)	0.026 (0.021)
Worries about the consequences of CC	0.044* (0.023)	0.099*** (0.027)	0.043** (0.019)	-0.022 (0.028)	0.044* (0.025)	0.057** (0.025)	0.018 (0.024)	0.058** (0.023)
Believes net-zero is technically feasible	0.017 (0.021)	0.013 (0.031)	0.034 (0.023)	0.021 (0.029)	0.013 (0.023)	0.047** (0.023)	0.035 (0.022)	0.017 (0.025)
Believes will suffer from climate change	0.050** (0.023)	0.004 (0.027)	0.046*** (0.017)	0.045 (0.029)	0.078*** (0.025)	0.082*** (0.029)	0.072** (0.024)	0.015 (0.023)
Understands emission across activities/regions	0.044** (0.020)	0.009 (0.023)	0.008 (0.013)	0.004 (0.018)	0.027 (0.018)	-0.015 (0.021)	-0.011 (0.019)	-0.011 (0.020)
Knows CC is real & caused by human	0.026 (0.022)	-0.016 (0.024)	0.033** (0.016)	0.086*** (0.019)	0.062*** (0.024)	0.067** (0.028)	0.063*** (0.020)	0.053** (0.022)
Knows which gases cause CC	0.018 (0.024)	-0.029 (0.023)	-0.002 (0.014)	0.019 (0.020)	0.044** (0.021)	0.043** (0.021)	-0.012 (0.021)	0.050** (0.022)
Understands impacts of CC	0.024 (0.021)	0.019 (0.022)	0.015 (0.014)	0.069*** (0.024)	-0.006 (0.022)	0.013 (0.021)	0.027 (0.021)	0.021 (0.021)
Believes policies entail positive econ. effects	0.052** (0.021)	0.013 (0.023)	0.015 (0.011)	-0.014 (0.019)	0.070*** (0.022)	0.008 (0.019)	0.116*** (0.023)	0.079*** (0.025)
Believes policies would reduce pollution	0.161*** (0.030)	-0.052 (0.035)	0.092*** (0.023)	0.178*** (0.036)	0.107*** (0.036)	0.230*** (0.046)	0.155*** (0.037)	0.125*** (0.038)
Believes policies would reduce emissions	0.293*** (0.033)	0.289*** (0.042)	0.301*** (0.033)	0.270*** (0.043)	0.256*** (0.038)	0.237*** (0.051)	0.244*** (0.041)	0.279*** (0.038)
Believes own household would lose	-0.307*** (0.038)	-0.332*** (0.040)	-0.351*** (0.038)	-0.377*** (0.044)	-0.365*** (0.033)	-0.270** (0.030)	-0.349*** (0.031)	-0.366*** (0.034)
believes low-income earners will lose	-0.035 (0.029)	-0.113*** (0.034)	-0.037 (0.034)	0.074* (0.040)	-0.051* (0.027)	-0.123*** (0.031)	-0.020 (0.028)	-0.015 (0.034)
believes high-income earners will lose	-0.002 (0.020)	-0.043 (0.028)	0.023 (0.018)	0.069*** (0.025)	0.043** (0.021)	0.036* (0.019)	0.036* (0.021)	-0.025 (0.021)
Observations	1,860	1,717	2,488	2,472	2,045	1,932	1,564	2,003
R ²	0.650	0.574	0.716	0.607	0.618	0.668	0.642	0.577

Note: The table shows the results of regressions of the *Support for main policies index* on standardized variables measuring respondents' beliefs and perceptions. Treatment indicators and individual socioeconomic characteristics are included but not displayed. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. See Appendix A-1 for variable definitions.

Table A10: Effects of the treatments on support for climate action

	Support or Agreement				
	Ban on combustion-engine cars	Green infrastructure program	Carbon tax with cash transfers	Fairness of main climate policies index	Adopt climate-friendly behaviors
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Control group mean	0.656	0.517	0.46	-0.08	-0.034
Treatment: Climate impacts	0.020*** (0.008)	0.018** (0.008)	0.028*** (0.008)	0.042*** (0.016)	0.053*** (0.017)
Treatment: Climate policy	0.025*** (0.008)	0.043*** (0.008)	0.097*** (0.008)	0.128*** (0.016)	0.020 (0.017)
Treatment: Both	0.048*** (0.008)	0.072*** (0.008)	0.128*** (0.008)	0.188*** (0.016)	0.080*** (0.016)
Observations	40,680	40,680	40,680	40,680	40,680
R ²	0.101	0.093	0.104	0.145	0.101

Note: The table shows the results of regressions of variables listed in the columns on socioeconomic characteristics, controlling for country fixed effects. Only the coefficients for the treatment effects are displayed. Dependent variables are indicator variables equal to 1 if the respondent (somewhat or strongly) supports each of the main climate policies (columns 1, 2, 3), or indices (4, 5). Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. See Appendix A-1 for variable definitions.

Table A11: Effects of the treatments on main outcomes – High-income countries

		Support or Agreement										
		Ban on combustion-engine cars	Green infrastructure program	Carbon tax with cash transfers	Main policies are fair	Willing to adopt climate-friendly behaviors	Ban on combustion-engine cars with alternatives	Tax on fossil fuels	Ban on polluting cars in city centers	Tax on flights	Subsidies to low-carbon technologies	Mandatory and subsidized insulation
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Australia	Control group mean	0.354	0.493	0.343	-0.186	-0.112	0.383	0.357	0.526	0.353	0.617	0.698
	Treatment: Climate impacts	0.493*** (0.037)	0.687** (0.038)	0.508*** (0.038)	0.503*** (0.078)	0.557** (0.075)	0.480*** (0.039)	0.631 (0.039)	0.604* (0.038)	-0.005 (0.038)	0.672** (0.036)	0.610 (0.048)
	Treatment: Climate policy	0.068* (0.037)	0.084** (0.037)	0.144*** (0.075)	0.246*** (0.073)	0.197*** (0.073)	0.063* (0.037)	0.053 (0.037)	0.054 (0.037)	0.015 (0.037)	0.010 (0.036)	-0.010 (0.048)
	Treatment: Both	0.153*** (0.037)	0.109*** (0.037)	0.169*** (0.081)	0.283*** (0.076)	0.096 (0.038)	0.149*** (0.038)	0.127*** (0.037)	0.080** (0.038)	0.068* (0.038)	0.037 (0.038)	0.019 (0.049)
Canada	Control group mean	0.474	0.562	0.414	-0.091	-0.008	0.471	0.399	0.604	0.443	0.646	0.643
	Treatment: Climate impacts	-0.023 (0.035)	-0.009 (0.034)	0.019 (0.034)	-0.014 (0.069)	-0.026 (0.070)	-0.011 (0.034)	-0.029 (0.034)	-0.029 (0.034)	-0.004 (0.034)	-0.017 (0.034)	0.087** (0.043)
	Treatment: Climate policy	0.016 (0.035)	0.091*** (0.034)	0.111*** (0.034)	0.221*** (0.067)	0.040 (0.069)	0.045 (0.035)	0.069* (0.034)	0.024 (0.033)	0.048 (0.033)	0.045 (0.032)	0.045 (0.045)
	Treatment: Both	0.020 (0.035)	0.075** (0.034)	0.105*** (0.034)	0.196*** (0.066)	0.048 (0.071)	0.046 (0.035)	0.054 (0.035)	0.067 (0.034)	0.061* (0.035)	0.032 (0.033)	0.112** (0.043)
Denmark	Control group mean	0.405	0.534	0.296	-0.154	0.041	0.42	0.431	0.661	0.6	0.672	0.698
	Treatment: Climate impacts	0.074** (0.036)	0.052	0.070** (0.035)	0.177*** (0.068)	0.005 (0.068)	0.085** (0.036)	0.004 (0.036)	0.007 (0.036)	-0.037 (0.036)	-0.020 (0.035)	0.024 (0.045)
	Treatment: Climate policy	0.055 (0.035)	-0.016 (0.036)	0.101*** (0.033)	0.163** (0.069)	-0.140** (0.071)	0.025 (0.035)	-0.007 (0.035)	-0.099*** (0.035)	-0.078** (0.035)	-0.017 (0.034)	-0.073 (0.048)
	Treatment: Both	0.112*** (0.035)	0.080** (0.036)	0.192*** (0.036)	0.281*** (0.074)	-0.073 (0.074)	0.076** (0.037)	0.101*** (0.036)	0.00003 (0.035)	-0.034 (0.035)	0.051 (0.034)	0.010 (0.048)
France	Control group mean	0.278	0.571	0.289	-0.05	-0.045	0.425	0.309	0.568	0.455	0.563	0.641
	Treatment: Climate impacts	0.038 (0.034)	0.050 (0.038)	0.061* (0.035)	-0.003 (0.071)	0.082 (0.075)	-0.012 (0.038)	0.005 (0.035)	0.035 (0.038)	0.069* (0.038)	0.054 (0.038)	0.046 (0.051)
	Treatment: Climate policy	0.079** (0.036)	0.036	0.084** (0.036)	0.030	-0.031 (0.074)	0.034 (0.038)	-0.002 (0.035)	-0.018 (0.038)	0.004 (0.038)	0.019 (0.038)	-0.050 (0.052)
	Treatment: Both	0.118*** (0.037)	0.062 (0.039)	0.152*** (0.038)	0.131 (0.081)	0.121 (0.082)	0.020 (0.039)	0.064* (0.037)	0.036 (0.039)	0.004 (0.040)	0.097** (0.038)	-0.006 (0.055)
Germany	Control group mean	0.318	0.42	0.279	-0.093	-0.037	0.413	0.311	0.495	0.528	0.636	0.596
	Treatment: Climate impacts	0.003 (0.032)	0.035 (0.034)	0.039 (0.031)	0.050 (0.070)	0.068 (0.070)	-0.007 (0.034)	0.050 (0.032)	0.035 (0.034)	0.003 (0.032)	0.009 (0.032)	-0.003 (0.049)
	Treatment: Climate policy	0.026 (0.034)	0.026 (0.025)	0.138*** (0.034)	0.147*** (0.074)	0.016 (0.074)	0.054 (0.036)	0.079** (0.034)	-0.019 (0.036)	0.027 (0.035)	-0.026 (0.050)	-0.025 (0.050)
	Treatment: Both	0.011 (0.033)	0.025 (0.035)	0.092*** (0.033)	0.195*** (0.069)	0.082 (0.067)	0.048 (0.035)	0.067** (0.034)	0.049 (0.035)	0.052 (0.035)	-0.036 (0.035)	0.040 (0.051)
Italy	Control group mean	0.541	0.781	0.47	-0.181	-0.026	0.577	0.381	0.758	0.414	0.788	0.726
	Treatment: Climate impacts	0.030 (0.033)	0.021 (0.026)	0.043 (0.033)	0.099 (0.067)	0.004 (0.068)	0.032 (0.032)	0.017 (0.032)	-0.027 (0.029)	0.034 (0.032)	-0.010 (0.027)	0.012 (0.040)
	Treatment: Climate policy	0.080** (0.032)	0.035	0.154*** (0.032)	0.291*** (0.062)	-0.010 (0.064)	0.073** (0.032)	0.087** (0.032)	0.032 (0.028)	0.047 (0.033)	0.014 (0.027)	0.013 (0.040)
	Treatment: Both	0.120*** (0.032)	0.039 (0.026)	0.189*** (0.032)	0.359*** (0.065)	0.094 (0.064)	0.096*** (0.032)	0.130*** (0.031)	0.063 (0.028)	0.089*** (0.032)	0.012 (0.026)	0.048 (0.039)
Japan	Control group mean	0.407	0.475	0.351	-0.121	-0.081	0.512	0.353	0.645	0.468	0.691	0.588
	Treatment: Climate impacts	0.007 (0.035)	0.032 (0.036)	0.009 (0.035)	0.079 (0.070)	0.156** (0.071)	-0.011 (0.036)	0.006 (0.034)	-0.035 (0.034)	0.019 (0.036)	-0.037 (0.034)	0.003 (0.049)
	Treatment: Climate policy	0.067* (0.036)	0.054 (0.037)	0.094*** (0.036)	0.168** (0.072)	0.042 (0.073)	0.082** (0.036)	0.081** (0.036)	0.007 (0.036)	-0.002 (0.035)	-0.015 (0.035)	-0.019 (0.051)
	Treatment: Both	0.074** (0.035)	0.046 (0.035)	0.124*** (0.035)	0.220*** (0.072)	0.153** (0.070)	0.032 (0.036)	0.043 (0.035)	-0.010 (0.035)	0.030 (0.034)	-0.053 (0.034)	-0.076 (0.049)
Poland	Control group mean	0.439	0.58	0.356	-0.038	-0.061	0.478	0.275	0.609	0.44	0.75	0.724
	Treatment: Climate impacts	0.032 (0.032)	0.035 (0.032)	0.045 (0.031)	0.040 (0.062)	0.121** (0.061)	0.068* (0.032)	0.024 (0.029)	0.020 (0.031)	0.027 (0.032)	0.011 (0.028)	-0.023 (0.043)
	Treatment: Climate policy	0.032 (0.032)	0.040 (0.031)	0.086*** (0.031)	0.073 (0.064)	0.097 (0.065)	0.041 (0.032)	0.114*** (0.030)	0.033 (0.031)	0.055* (0.032)	-0.046 (0.029)	0.005 (0.041)
	Treatment: Both	0.034 (0.033)	0.025 (0.032)	0.084*** (0.032)	0.095 (0.066)	0.113* (0.064)	0.024 (0.032)	0.123*** (0.031)	0.002 (0.032)	0.072** (0.031)	-0.036 (0.033)	-0.028 (0.044)
South Korea	Control group mean	0.517	0.685	0.526	-0.084	0.015	0.585	0.421	0.52	0.42	0.709	0.716
	Treatment: Climate impacts	-0.035 (0.037)	-0.024 (0.040)	-0.015 (0.038)	0.028 (0.062)	0.054 (0.061)	-0.019 (0.038)	-0.007 (0.037)	0.009 (0.037)	0.027 (0.035)	-0.016 (0.045)	0.004 (0.048)
	Treatment: Climate policy	-0.125 (0.038)	-0.006 (0.034)	0.006 (0.034)	0.107 (0.063)	-0.096* (0.076)	0.023 (0.037)	0.028* (0.037)	-0.029 (0.037)	0.067 (0.038)	0.011 (0.041)	-0.100 (0.049)
	Treatment: Both	0.047 (0.036)	0.009 (0.034)	0.130*** (0.036)	0.248*** (0.073)	0.031 (0.072)	0.025 (0.036)	0.096*** (0.037)	0.022 (0.037)	0.104*** (0.037)	-0.006 (0.034)	-0.032 (0.046)
Spain	Control group mean	0.542	0.706	0.438	-0.062	-0.048	0.568	0.394	0.639	0.442	0.735	0.711
	Treatment: Climate impacts	0.009 (0.031)	0.004 (0.028)	0.012 (0.031)	-0.025 (0.061)	0.057 (0.061)	0.027 (0.031)	0.006 (0.030)	-0.007 (0.030)	0.040 (0.031)	0.020 (0.027)	0.014 (0.050)
	Treatment: Climate policy	0.025 (0.031)	0.017 (0.028)	0.091*** (0.031)	0.056 (0.062)	-0.004 (0.063)	0.050 (0.031)	0.058* (0.030)	-0.003 (0.030)	0.048 (0.031)	0.025 (0.027)	0.058 (0.047)
	Treatment: Both	0.084*** (0.030)	0.078** (0.026)	0.132*** (0.030)	0.218*** (0.059)	0.127** (0.059)	0.084*** (0.030)	0.112*** (0.030)	0.075** (0.030)	0.032 (0.030)	0.063 (0.026)	0.063 (0.046)
U.K.	Control group mean	0.451	0.544	0.339	-0.1	-0.066	0.52	0.376	0.646	0.456	0.652	0.702
	Treatment: Climate impacts	0.005 (0.035)	0.029 (0.035)	0.022 (0.032)	0.039 (0.067)	0.039 (0.070)	-0.018 (0.035)	0.046 (0.034)	-0.029 (0.035)	0.031 (0.035)	-0.001 (0.048)	-0.040 (0.048)
	Treatment: Climate policy	0.037 (0.035)	0.018 (0.035)	0.104*** (0.033)	0.110 (0.064)	0.064 (0.070)	0.001 (0.035)	0.071** (0.033)	-0.018 (0.034)	0.026 (0.035)	-0.057* (0.034)	-0.089* (0.048)
	Treatment: Both	0.091*** (0.035)	0.083** (0.035)	0.189*** (0.034)	0.308*** (0.069)	0.173** (0.069)	0.033 (0.035)	0.133*** (0.034)	0.030 (0.035)	0.088** (0.034)	-0.006 (0.035)	-0.078 (0.048)
U.S.	Control group mean	0.388	0.5	0.328	0.026	0.019	0.435	0.338	0.486	0.329	0.565	0.528
	Treatment: Climate impacts	0.002 (0.035)	-0.070* (0.030)	-0.001 (0.034)	-0.084 (0.068)	-0.055 (0.072)	-0.008** (0.033)	-0.040 (0.032)	-0.030 (0.032)	-0.034 (0.032)	-0.021 (0.035)	-0.015 (0.050)
	Treatment: Climate policy	0.038 (0.034)	-0.020 (0.035)	0.077** (0.034)	-0.019 (0.072)	-0.002 (0.072)	-0.029 (0.034)	0.038 (0.032)	0.044 (0.032)	0.063* (0.033)	-0.034 (0.034)	-0.033 (0.050)
	Treatment: Both	0.047 (0.036)	0.034 (0.038)	0.099** (0.037)	0.048 (0.071)	0.014 (0.071)	0.018 (0.036)	0.025 (0.036)	0.095** (0.037)	0.045 (0.034)	0.006 (0.036)	0.065 (0.053)

Note: The table shows the results of regressions of variables listed in the columns on socioeconomic characteristics. Only the coefficients for the treatment effects are displayed. Dependent variables are indicator variables equal to 1 if the respondent (somewhat or strongly) supports each of the main climate policies (columns 1-3 and 6-11), or standardized indices (4-5). Robust standard errors are in parentheses; * $p<0.1$; ** $p<0.05$; *** $p<0.01$. See Appendix A-1 for variable definitions.

Table A12: Effects of the treatments on main outcomes – Middle-income countries

	Ban on combustion-engine cars	Green infrastructure program	Carbon tax with cash transfers	Main policies are fair	Willing to adopt climate-friendly behaviors	Ban on combustion-engine cars with alternatives	Tax on fossil fuels	Ban on polluting cars in city centers	Tax on flights	Subsidies to low-carbon technologies	Mandatory and subsidized insulation
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Brazil	Control group mean	0.604	0.766	0.473	-0.136	-0.055	0.597	0.346	0.649	0.387	0.772
	Treatment: Climate impacts	0.039 (0.041)	0.034 (0.034)	0.056 (0.042)	0.100 (0.085)	0.077 (0.087)	0.087** (0.040)	0.096** (0.041)	0.024 (0.040)	0.105** (0.042)	0.026 (0.035)
	Treatment: Climate policy	0.046 (0.043)	0.012 (0.037)	0.121*** (0.043)	0.199** (0.085)	0.045 (0.090)	0.077* (0.042)	0.086** (0.042)	0.088** (0.040)	0.098** (0.043)	0.066* (0.034)
	Treatment: Both	0.096** (0.042)	0.039 (0.036)	0.226*** (0.041)	0.261*** (0.086)	0.086 (0.084)	0.092** (0.040)	0.166*** (0.042)	0.078* (0.041)	0.142*** (0.043)	0.049 (0.036)
China	Control group mean	0.72	0.815	0.801	-0.138	-0.009	0.782	0.584	0.73	0.608	0.745
	Treatment: Climate impacts	0.054 (0.011)	0.051 (0.014)	0.073** (0.033)	0.122 (0.091)	-0.013 (0.098)	0.022 (0.039)	0.077* (0.030)	0.052 (0.030)	0.045 (0.030)	0.019 (0.029)
	Treatment: Climate policy	0.035 (0.042)	0.010 (0.037)	0.031** (0.034)	0.151* (0.091)	0.069 (0.098)	0.036 (0.046)	0.060 (0.040)	0.051 (0.040)	0.104** (0.044)	0.068 (0.048)
	Treatment: Both	0.087** (0.040)	0.067* (0.035)	0.046 (0.034)	0.262*** (0.092)	-0.025 (0.093)	0.027 (0.039)	0.042 (0.046)	0.092** (0.039)	-0.022 (0.045)	0.053 (0.041)
India	Control group mean	0.775	0.8	0.709	-0.008	0.012	0.77	0.637	0.735	0.635	0.675
	Treatment: Climate impacts	-0.033 (0.034)	0.025 (0.030)	0.011 (0.034)	-0.071 (0.074)	-0.056 (0.075)	0.009 (0.033)	-0.029 (0.037)	0.003 (0.036)	-0.024 (0.037)	0.024 (0.038)
	Treatment: Climate policy	0.034 (0.032)	0.036 (0.029)	0.073** (0.034)	0.071 (0.076)	-0.045 (0.076)	0.027 (0.033)	0.015 (0.038)	0.037 (0.034)	-0.007 (0.038)	0.072* (0.037)
	Treatment: Both	0.018 (0.033)	0.030 (0.030)	0.060* (0.033)	0.009 (0.082)	0.063 (0.074)	0.032 (0.032)	0.059 (0.038)	0.059* (0.033)	0.049 (0.037)	0.102** (0.036)
Indonesia	Control group mean	0.655	0.803	0.671	-0.09	-0.02	0.725	0.583	0.852	0.676	0.792
	Treatment: Climate impacts	0.029 (0.026)	0.012 (0.023)	0.0004 (0.026)	0.078 (0.053)	0.068 (0.050)	0.034 (0.025)	0.027 (0.026)	0.008 (0.021)	0.010 (0.026)	-0.002 (0.024)
	Treatment: Climate policy	0.044* (0.027)	0.016 (0.024)	0.071*** (0.027)	0.147*** (0.055)	-0.001 (0.052)	0.012 (0.026)	0.083*** (0.027)	0.002 (0.022)	0.023 (0.027)	0.026 (0.024)
	Treatment: Both	0.047* (0.026)	0.062** (0.022)	0.062** (0.025)	0.093*** (0.051)	0.204*** (0.049)	0.081* (0.025)	0.060** (0.026)	0.079*** (0.026)	0.020 (0.021)	0.023 (0.026)
Mexico	Control group mean	0.666	0.836	0.552	-0.07	-0.081	0.66	0.407	0.724	0.509	0.663
	Treatment: Climate impacts	0.010 (0.040)	0.002 (0.032)	0.035 (0.041)	0.113 (0.081)	0.173** (0.087)	0.059 (0.039)	0.008 (0.041)	0.032 (0.037)	0.007 (0.042)	0.089** (0.037)
	Treatment: Climate policy	0.034 (0.040)	0.024 (0.031)	0.064 (0.042)	0.066 (0.088)	0.097 (0.086)	0.053 (0.040)	0.060 (0.042)	0.005 (0.038)	0.046 (0.043)	0.104** (0.037)
	Treatment: Both	0.077* (0.040)	0.008 (0.032)	0.150*** (0.041)	0.133 (0.083)	0.114 (0.092)	0.034 (0.041)	0.125*** (0.043)	0.031 (0.039)	0.034 (0.043)	0.107*** (0.039)
South Africa	Control group mean	0.527	0.726	0.523	-0.112	-0.09	0.619	0.379	0.66	0.428	0.747
	Treatment: Climate impacts	0.025 (0.041)	0.049 (0.035)	0.043 (0.040)	0.037 (0.082)	0.171** (0.083)	-0.003 (0.041)	0.028 (0.039)	-0.012 (0.039)	0.044 (0.041)	-0.006 (0.036)
	Treatment: Climate policy	0.034 (0.040)	0.021 (0.037)	0.064 (0.040)	0.066 (0.080)	0.097 (0.084)	0.053 (0.040)	0.060 (0.042)	0.005 (0.038)	0.046 (0.043)	0.104** (0.037)
	Treatment: Both	0.133*** (0.041)	0.070* (0.036)	0.104** (0.041)	0.262*** (0.083)	0.151* (0.086)	0.083** (0.040)	0.154*** (0.041)	0.058 (0.039)	0.078* (0.042)	0.080** (0.033)
Turkey	Control group mean	0.618	0.759	0.554	-0.081	-0.074	0.637	0.516	0.601	0.454	0.747
	Treatment: Climate impacts	0.004 (0.042)	-0.007 (0.038)	-0.074* (0.043)	-0.064 (0.089)	-0.017 (0.089)	-0.047 (0.043)	-0.004 (0.044)	-0.022 (0.043)	-0.012 (0.042)	-0.006 (0.036)
	Treatment: Climate policy	0.059 (0.042)	-0.001 (0.040)	0.109** (0.044)	0.256*** (0.085)	0.155* (0.084)	0.046 (0.042)	0.139*** (0.043)	0.112*** (0.042)	0.155*** (0.044)	0.065* (0.038)
	Treatment: Both	0.075* (0.042)	0.021 (0.039)	0.073 (0.044)	0.136* (0.082)	0.142* (0.084)	0.047 (0.041)	0.019 (0.045)	-0.021 (0.044)	0.030 (0.044)	-0.056 (0.042)
Ukraine	Control group mean	0.575	0.688	0.393	-0.15	-0.077	0.631	0.275	0.671	0.358	0.684
	Treatment: Climate impacts	0.014 (0.045)	0.003 (0.042)	0.035 (0.044)	0.058 (0.086)	0.079 (0.087)	0.002 (0.043)	0.050 (0.042)	-0.060 (0.040)	0.012 (0.044)	-0.014 (0.041)
	Treatment: Climate policy	0.048 (0.046)	0.063 (0.041)	0.179*** (0.046)	0.234*** (0.087)	0.058 (0.093)	-0.001 (0.046)	0.181*** (0.044)	0.039 (0.041)	0.134*** (0.046)	0.003 (0.043)
	Treatment: Both	0.032 (0.045)	0.046 (0.040)	0.201*** (0.043)	0.269*** (0.090)	0.132 (0.096)	0.023 (0.044)	0.165*** (0.042)	0.068* (0.038)	0.075* (0.044)	0.039 (0.041)

Note: The table shows the results of regressions of variables listed in the columns on socioeconomic characteristics. Only the coefficients for the treatment effects are displayed. Dependent variables are indicator variables equal to 1 if the respondent (somewhat or strongly) supports each of the main climate policies (columns 1-3 and 6-11), or standardized indices (4-5). Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. See Appendix A-1 for variable definitions.

A-5 Questionnaire

Survey links

Here are links to the questionnaires of each country:

- Australia: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_0HrxQpnzN85dR2K?Q_Language=EN-GB
- Brazil: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_bjhZJbHP1U820tE?Q_Language=PT-BR
- Canada (English): https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_9FveryHcJFsYfoq?Q_Language=EN
- Canada (French): https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_9FveryHcJFsYfoq?Q_Language=FR-CA
- China: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_3ad13wqkW9bBvfw?Q_Language=ZN
- Denmark: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_1MiPDLoaLlx9X0?Q_Language=DA
- France: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_8CfmrUXhHRZJT14?Q_Language=FR
- Germany: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_0cWAJE2W8bdBPkG?Q_Language=DE
- India (English): https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_07HaTFCaGAklSrI?Q_Language=EN
- India (Hindi): https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_07HaTFCaGAklSrI?Q_Language=HI
- Indonesia: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_3mV8QUArjqZ0htc?Q_Language=ID
- Italy: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_bpIAr7NzB8u0wS?Q_Language=IT
- Japan: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_6FE480tnfRWabRQ?Q_Language=JA
- Mexico: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_8csgJ7Uuymp7irY?Q_Language=ES
- Poland: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_7Qc5KCPcIVv5qFE?Q_Language=PL
- South Africa (English): https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_bvC37FRXIyGewKi?Q_Language=EN-US
- South Africa (Zulu): https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_bvC37FRXIyGewKi?Q_Language=ZU
- South Korea: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_bwNjSPYjPojukuk6?Q_Language=KO
- Spain: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_0d0TZD6KT4L2S0i?Q_Language=ES-ES
- Turkey: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_3krmyMYsIsDFBI2?Q_Language=TR
- Ukraine (Ukrainian): https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_3gdsY6iHV06IKNg?Q_Language=UK
- Ukraine (Russian): https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_3gdsY6iHV06IKNg?Q_Language=RU
- United Kingdom: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_40Dm4ZTOR8mlzaS?Q_Language=EN-GB
- United States: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_1ST7y8mzlEib9iu

Below is the benchmark questionnaire, with country-specific variations indicated in square brackets.

Consent

1. This is a survey conducted for academic research purposes by researchers from Harvard University and the OECD. It will take approximately 25 minutes to complete. The survey data is used for research purposes only, and the research is non-partisan. You will be compensated for this survey if you complete the survey and your responses pass our survey quality checks. These checks use statistical control methods to detect incoherent and rushed responses. It is very important for the validity of our research that you answer honestly and read the questions carefully before answering.

The survey collects personal data, including socioeconomic characteristics and political views. All of the answers you provide will remain anonymous and be treated with absolute confidentiality. The personal data we collect will be transferred and stored on secure servers. Only researchers working on the project will have access to the anonymized data. Your participation in this survey is completely voluntary. You are entitled to choose not to take part. If at first you agree to take part, you can later change your mind. Your decision will not be held against you in any way. Your refusal to participate will not result in any consequences or any loss of benefits that you are otherwise entitled to receive. You can ask any questions before you decide whether to participate.

If you have questions, concerns, or complaints, or think the research has offended you, you can contact the research team at social.economics.research2020@gmail.com or call the Harvard University Area Institutional Review Board ("IRB") at +1 (617) 496-2847. The OECD is committed to protecting the personal data it processes, in accordance with its Personal Data Protection Rules (<https://www.oecd.org/general/data-protection.htm>). If you have further queries or complaints related to the processing of your personal data, please contact the Data Protection Officer (DPO@oecd.org). If you need further assistance in resolving claims related to personal data protection you can contact the Data Protection Commissioner (DPC@oecd.org).

Do you agree to participate in the survey?

Yes; No

Background questions

2. What is your gender?

Male; Female; Other

3. How old are you?

Below 18; 18 to 24; 25 to 24; 35 to 49; 50 to 64; 65 and above

4. What is your zipcode?

5. What type of agglomeration do you live in?

A rural area; A small town (5,000 - 20,000 inhabitants); A large town (20,000 - 50,000 inhabitants); A small city or its suburbs (50,000 - 250,000 inhabitants); A large city or its suburbs (250,000 - 3,000,000 inhabitants); A very large city or its suburbs (more than 3 million inhabitants)

6. What is the nationality of your parents? (Multiple answers allowed) [For the U.S. and South Africa, we asked the ethnicity instead; and for India, the religion.]

[Country]; [Continent except Country]; Other; Prefer not to say

7. Do you live with your partner (if you have one)?

Yes; No or I don't have a partner

8. What is your marital status?

Single; Married; Divorced or legally separated; Widowed

9. How many people are in your household? The household includes: you, the members of your family who live with you (including children), and your dependants. This excludes flatmates.

1; 2; 3; 4; 5 or more

10. How many children below 14 live with you?
0; 1; 2; 3; 4 or more
11. What is the highest level of education you have completed?
No schooling completed; Primary school; Lower secondary school; Vocational degree; High school; College degree; Master's degree or above
12. What is your employment status?
Full-time employed; Part-time employed; Self-employed; Student; Retired; Unemployed (searching for a job); Inactive (not searching for a job)
13. (If “Full-time employed”, “Part-time employed”, or “Self-employed” to 12) If you work in any of the following industries, please select one describing your industry best.
Oil, gas or coal; Other energy industries; Cement production; Construction; Automobile manufacturing; Iron and steel manufacturing; Chemical manufacturing; Plastics production; Pulp and paper production; Farming (crop or livestock); Air transport (e.g. airlines); No, none of the above
14. (If “Retired”, “Unemployed (searching for a job)”, “Inactive (not searching for a job)” to 12) If in your last job you worked in any of the following industries, please select one describing your industry best
Oil, gas or coal; Other energy industries; Cement production; Construction; Automobile manufacturing; Iron and steel manufacturing; Chemical manufacturing; Plastics production; Pulp and paper production; Farming (crop or livestock); Air transport (e.g. airlines); No, none of the above
15. (If “Full-time employed”, “Part-time employed”, or “Self-employed” to 12) What is the main activity of the company or organization where you work?
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, hunting; Mining, quarrying, oil, gas, extraction; Utilities; Construction; Manufacturing; Wholesale trade; Retail trade; Transportation and warehousing; Information technology (IT); Finance and insurance; Real estate and rental and leasing; Professional, scientific and technical; Management of companies and enterprises; Administrative and support activities; Waste management and remediation; Educational services; Healthcare and social assistance; Arts, entertainment and recreation; Accommodation and food services; Other services; Public administration; Homemaker; None of the above / Other
16. (If “Retired”, “Unemployed (searching for a job)”, “Inactive (not searching for a job)” to 12) What was the main activity of the company or organization at which you last worked?
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, hunting; Mining, quarrying, oil, gas, extraction; Utilities; Construction; Manufacturing; Wholesale trade; Retail trade; Transportation and warehousing; Information technology (IT); Finance and insurance; Real estate and rental and leasing; Professional, scientific and technical; Management of companies and enterprises; Administrative and support activities; Waste management and remediation; Educational services; Healthcare and social assistance; Arts, entertainment and recreation; Accommodation and food services; Other services; Public administration; Homemaker; None of the above / Other
17. What was the annual income of your household in 2019 (before withholding tax)? [Depending on the country, we ask this question in monthly or yearly terms. Except in the U.S., we adjust the quartile thresholds by multiplying them by the number of consumption units in the households.]
[quartiles thresholds are given for the U.S.] *Less than [\$35,000] ; between [\$35,000] - [\$70,000]; between [\$70,000] - [\$120,000]; More than [\$120,000]*
18. Have you or a member of your household been laid off or had to take a cut in your salary or wages due to the COVID-19 pandemic?
Yes; No
19. Are you a homeowner or a tenant? (Multiple answers are possible)
Tenant; Owner; Landlord renting out property

20. What is the estimated value of your assets, or the assets of your household if you are married (in [currency])? Include here all your possessions (home, car, savings, etc.) net of debt. For example, if you own a house worth [\$300,000] and you have [\$100,000] left to repay on your mortgage, your assets are [\$200,000]. I estimate my assets net of debt to be:
[Quintiles thresholds are given for the U.S.] *Less than [\$0]; Between [\$0] - [\$4,000]; Between [\$4,000] - [\$120,000]; Between [\$120,000] - [\$380,000]; More than [\$380,000]*

Political views

21. To what extent are you interested in politics?
Not at all; A little; Moderately; A lot; A great deal
22. Are you a member of an environmental organization?
Yes; No
23. Do you have any relatives who are environmentalists?
Yes; No
24. (In China, the next three questions were not asked, and the other questions from this block were asked at the end of the survey.) Did you vote in the [last] election?
Yes; No; I don't have the right to vote in [Country]; Prefer not to say
25. (If “Yes” to 24) Which candidate did you vote for in the [last] election?
[Main candidates or parties]; Other; Prefer not to say
26. (If not “Yes” to 24) Even if you did NOT vote in the [last] election, please indicate the candidate that you were most likely to have voted for or who represents your views more closely.
[Main candidates or parties]; Other; Prefer not to say
27. On economic policy matters, where do you see yourself on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is Left and 5 is Right? [in the U.S., Denmark and France, the formulation was different: “On economic policy matters, where do you see yourself on the liberal/conservative spectrum?” and the answers were *Very liberal; Liberal; Moderate; Conservative; Very conservative; Prefer not to say*]
1; 2; 3; 4; 5
28. [In the U.S. only] What do you consider to be your political affiliation, as of today?
Republican; Democrat; Independent; Other; Non-Affiliated

Household composition and energy characteristics

(In Brazil, Mexico, India, and Indonesia, the next two questions on heating were not asked.)

29. What is the main way you heat your home? Electricity; Gas; Heating oil; Coal; Wood, solar, geothermal, or heat pump; District heating; Don’t know, or prefer not to say
30. In a typical month [or year, depending on countries], how much do you spend on heating for your accommodation?
[Numbers are given for the U.S.] *I don't know; Less than [\$20]; [\$20]-[\$75]; [\$75]-[\$125]; [\$125]-[\$200]; [\$200]-[\$250]; [\$250]-[\$300]; More than [\$300]*
31. Good insulation can keep a building warm in the winter and cool in the summer. How do you rate the insulation of your accommodation?
Very poor; Poor; Fair; Good; Excellent

32. In a typical month, how much do you spend on gas for driving?
[Numbers are given for the U.S.] *Less than [\$5]; [\$5]-[\$25]; [\$25]-[\$75]; [\$75]-[\$125]; [\$125]-[\$175]; [\$175]-[\$225]; More than [\$225]*

33. How many round-trip flights did you take between 2017 and 2019?
0; 1; 2; 3 or 4; 5 to 7; 8 to 14; 15 or more

34. How often do you eat [beef / India: meat]?
Never; Less than once a week; One to four times per week; Almost or at least daily

35. Which mode of transport did you mainly use for each of the following trips in 2019?

- Commute to work or place of study
- Grocery shopping
- Recreational and leisure activities (excluding holiday travel)

Car or Motorbike; Public Transport; Walking or Cycling; Other; Not Applicable

36. How do you rate the availability (ease of access and frequency) of public transportation where you live?

Very poor; Poor; Fair; Good; Excellent

Open-ended question

37. When thinking about climate change, what are your main considerations? What should [country] government do regarding climate change? Please write as much as you would like, your response will be very useful.

Video treatments

Randomized groups of respondents see one of two videos, both videos, or neither.

Climate impacts video

Recent academic studies have assessed the effects of climate change in [country]. We will now show you a 3 minute video (with sound) that summarizes the results of these studies. Please pay attention to the information provided as you will be asked questions about it later. Do not skip forward or close the page while the video is running. Please proceed to the next page when you are ready.

[Here are the links to the video of each country:]

- Australia: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/File.php?F=F_6zC4wlmsEXrDnYq
- Brazil: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/File.php?F=F_571ND31Sz5SL4oK
- Canada (English): https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/File.php?F=F_9zxyasw9TTVFqx8
- Canada (French): https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/File.php?F=F_1QSWUKIYiJDNxfE
- China: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/File.php?F=F_9vHesDcevMYMffU
- Denmark: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/File.php?F=F_dgnXQoN84vq2YXs
- France: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/File.php?F=F_9YacIn03B7TVcGy
- Germany: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/File.php?F=F_3NN6u7MbEm738y
- India (English): https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/File.php?F=F_b9lU7goEX1iOFvM

- India (Hindi): https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/File.php?F=F_bvLcTKdd7WG8SZ8
- Indonesia: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/File.php?F=F_9QQCwEicwdwYp94
- Italy: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/File.php?F=F_1GpaU9AOp0uA246
- Japan: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/File.php?F=F_e3BFKqjnqsS0waW
- Mexico: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/File.php?F=F_cSdiidvle1QaeKs
- Poland: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/File.php?F=F_6SahJCEqAUd5bdc
- South Africa (English): https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/File.php?F=F_F_8iAWsyQlvy07iJg
- South Africa (Zulu): https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/File.php?F=F_4NHM2UHj6XttP70
- South Korea: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/File.php?F=F_2071FHigxMNs2rk
- Spain: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/File.php?F=F_4NsV0yDmpposo3I
- Turkey: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/File.php?F=F_8AKIwJiwMxyQnyu
- Ukraine (Ukrainian): https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/File.php?F=F_1Bz6VaDS6IzAMGq
- Ukraine (Russian): https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/File.php?F=F_bemd3trrg7wgFym
- United Kingdom: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/File.php?F=F_bj8yT5eiDpZCR82
- United States: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/File.php?F=F_cT8837yWYLScqLs

[Below is the script used for the U.S.]

Over the past decades, humans have been burning more and more fossil fuels like coal, gas or oil. Burning fossil fuels releases CO₂ into the atmosphere. Today, the concentration of CO₂ in the atmosphere is higher than at any point in time over the last 800,000 years. And it's the concentration of greenhouse gases like CO₂ that drives global temperature. Climate scientists agree: the build-up of greenhouse gases released by human activity in the atmosphere causes climate change. A rapid transition away from fossil fuels is possible and could contain global warming below +[2°C / 3.6°F], meaning 3.6°F. But if greenhouse gas emissions continue on their current trend, the average global warming will be +[4°C / 8°F] in 2100 and +[7°C / 13°F] in 2200. This may seem far away, but climate change is already affecting us right now in the places where we live.

- Because of climate change, in the U.S. hurricanes have become increasingly intense and cause much more harm and damages. Hurricane Katrina caused more than 1,800 deaths and more than 100 billion dollars in damages.
- The amount of air pollution generated by burning fossil fuels is already responsible for 200,000 deaths in the U.S. each year.
- Heatwaves are becoming longer, more frequent, and more severe. In the absence of ambitious action against climate change, the U.S. will experience 70 days of extreme heat per year (that is six times more than in the past) and up to 135 days a year in a State like Texas.
- In the South and in the Midwest, agricultural yields will decrease because of the heat.
- With the mix of more hurricanes, rising sea levels, more heatwaves, and lower agricultural output, the average income in Southern states will be 10 to 20% lower than it could be.

- In the North-East, the risk of heavy rain has already increased by 55%. More severe storms and rising sea levels will lead to more flooding.
- In the West, hotter and drier conditions are causing more wildfires. Since the mid 80s, the area burned by wildfires across the Western U.S. is estimated to have been twice what it would have been without climate change. This was even before accounting for the California wildfires last summer, which were by far the largest on record.

To tackle climate change, we need to bring greenhouse gas emissions close to zero. This is possible, but it requires a deep transformation in the sectors most responsible for emissions: energy, transport, and industry.

38. Were you able to watch and listen to the video until the end?

Yes; No, there was a technical problem; No, I skipped part of the video

39. From what was said in the video, if greenhouse gas emissions continue on their current trend, what will be the rise in global average temperature in 2100?

[1°C / 2°F]; [2°C / 3.6°F]; [4°C / 8°F]; [7°C / 15°F]; Don't know

40. [This question depends on the country, U.S. one is given] From what was said in the video, in the absence of ambitious action against climate change, how frequent will extreme temperatures (that is, temperature above 95°F) occur on average across the U.S. by the end of the century?

70 days per year; 80 days per year; 90 days per year; 100 days per year; Don't know

Climate policy video

We will now show you a 5 minute video (with sound) that summarizes the features of some policies proposed to fight climate change. Please pay attention to the information provided as you will be asked questions about it later. Do not skip forward or close the page while the video is running. Please proceed to the next page when you are ready.

- Australia: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/File.php?F=F_3gagRLUpgyAicVE
- Brazil: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/File.php?F=F_eCZzzoblKYpWKh0
- Canada (English): https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/File.php?F=F_9Lekk0zTPurlzkG
- Canada (French): https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/File.php?F=F_9twKmQCtMuJpfp4
- China: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/File.php?F=F_1ZhXvFBoUtvq7qK
- Denmark: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/File.php?F=F_390XHJ3gT6p4U74
- France: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/File.php?F=F_6F2lryw2eo1eQNU
- Germany: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/File.php?F=F_9SvqN0CSY8ywnHw
- India (English): https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/File.php?F=F_2mj1MdvMpAYJAuG
- India (Hindi): https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/File.php?F=F_00696ZTnBDTFQ10
- Indonesia: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/File.php?F=F_1RqbYYeT2c0nOPc
- Italy: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/File.php?F=F_6mMBZqNPLgvUKZo
- Japan: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/File.php?F=F_0rCwm2QnbEfaR1k
- Mexico: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/File.php?F=F_3UbhIz7hb99f0wu
- Poland: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/File.php?F=F_etk0tRoDmoSXkS

- South Africa (English): https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/File.php?F=F_9FD0xYLGIwdrYh0
- South Africa (Zulu): https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/File.php?F=F_1zij8ULej3rYsXs
- South Korea: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/File.php?F=F_402BSbDDYVUUhb8
- Spain: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/File.php?F=F_9ZCXWK6BphbFQWy
- Turkey: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/File.php?F=F_9RF3ckVwWR9MH1Y
- Ukraine (Ukrainian): https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/File.php?F=F_bDbSZHrj0tU9b7w
- Ukraine (Russian): https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/File.php?F=F_3wr99GUkUVgK3k
- United Kingdom: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/File.php?F=F_bg5w9RRYbGtMrwa
- United States: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsControlPanel/File.php?F=F_bj5mFN15bJnlUbk

Below is the script used for the U.S.]

To fight climate change and avoid an ever-warming climate, we need an array of policies. Climate policies are needed to transform the way we produce energy, to make buildings greener, to put greener cars on the roads and reduce our fuel consumption. But these policies also need to protect people's jobs and incomes. Let's have a closer look on three possible climate policies.

Let's start with a policy that forces car producers to produce greener cars – a ban on combustion-engine cars. With a ban on combustion-engine cars, car producers are first required by law to produce cars that emit less CO₂ per [kilometre/mile]. The emission limit is lowered every year, so that only electric or hydrogen vehicles can be sold after 2030. Note that electric vehicles currently cannot travel as far and can be more expensive than cars that run on petrol. Together with a plan to produce electricity from clean sources, a ban on combustion-engine cars would accomplish the transition needed in the car industry.

Now, let's turn to a policy that combines a tax on carbon emissions to reduce emissions and cash transfers to protect people's purchasing power. With a carbon tax, all products that emit greenhouse gases would be taxed. For example, the price of gasoline would increase by [40 cents per gallon]. With a carbon tax, companies and people pay for the greenhouse gases they emit. This pushes them to reduce their emissions. To compensate people for the price increases, the revenues of the carbon tax would be redistributed to all households, regardless of their income. Each adult would thus receive [600 dollar] per year. On average, poorer people own smaller cars, live in smaller houses and fly less, so they use less fossil fuels than average. [The previous sentence is adapted in middle-income countries.] As they would receive the same cash transfer as everyone else, poorer people will generally gain from a carbon tax with cash transfers. Conversely, rich people will tend to lose. Does this policy work? Yes! The Canadian province of British Columbia has a carbon tax with cash transfers since 2008. Research has shown that this policy has decreased carbon emissions, increased employment, and made a majority of people richer. The last policy is a large program of public investment in green infrastructure, which would be financed by additional debt taken up by the government. A green infrastructure program would bring about the transition in energy infrastructure needed to halt climate change but it could come at the expense of other possible projects funded by the government. In [the U.S.], such a programme could create [4 million] jobs in green sectors, such as public transportation, renewable power plants, buildings' insulation, or sustainable agriculture, but [2 million] of people could lose their job in the fossil fuel industry. In general, all climate policies have the potential to transform the economy into a greener, safer, less polluted world. This green transformation has some downsides: people will have to change their habits, and some people will even have to change job. For example, there will be less demand for polluting sectors such as coal mining. But re-training options would be offered to workers in these sectors to ensure that they could find a new job elsewhere. And the green

transition also comes with benefits: a safer world for future generations of course, but also less pollution. And climate policies can be designed to protect poor and middle-class households, as they can have more income with the carbon tax with cash transfers, and more jobs with a green infrastructure program. We have focused on three important policies, but many others would be useful to fight climate change, including funding research into green technologies, subsidising the insulation of buildings, or stopping deforestation. To stop climate change, we probably need all of them together.

41. Were you able to watch and listen to the video until the end?

Yes; No, there was a technical problem; No, I skipped part of the video

42. The video presented three climate policies. What was the first policy about?

A ban on combustion-engine cars; A ban on short-haul flights; A ban on coal power plants; A ban on single-use plastic bags; Don't know

43. The green infrastructure program described in the video would be financed by:

Additional government debt; Taxes on the wealthiest; Increase in the VAT (value-added tax); Reduction in social spending; Don't know

Climate knowledge

44. How often do you think or talk with people about climate change?

Almost never; Several times a year; Several times a month

45. In your opinion, is climate change real?

Yes; No

46. (If "Yes" to 45) What part of climate change do you think is due to human activity?

None; A little; Some; A lot; Most

47. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "Climate change is an important problem."

Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly agree

48. How knowledgeable do you consider yourself about climate change?

Not at all; A little; Moderately; A lot; A great deal

49. Greenhouse gases are gases that trap heat in the atmosphere and make the Earth warmer, causing climate change. In particular, the burning of fossil fuels and agricultural production emit greenhouse gases. Which of the following elements contribute to climate change? (Multiple answers are possible)

CO₂; Hydrogen; Methane; Particulate matter

50. Do you think that cutting global greenhouse gas emissions by half would be sufficient to eventually stop temperatures from rising?

Yes; No

For the next three questions we would like you to rank the items according to the greenhouse gas emissions they emit, to the best of your knowledge (where 1 is the item that emits the most and 3 the item that emits the least). The greenhouse gas emissions of a product are those emitted at all steps involved in its production and distribution.

51. If a [family of 4 or couple or person, depending on the country] travels [500 km from New York City to Toronto (for the U.S.)], with which mode of transportation do they emit the most greenhouse gases? Please rank the items from 1 (most) to 3 (least) (by clicking and dragging the items).

Car (running on diesel or gasoline); [Coach or Train, depending on the country]; Plane

52. Which dish emits the most greenhouse gases? We consider that each dish weighs half a pound. Please rank the items from 1 (most) to 3 (least) (by clicking and dragging the items).

A [beef] steak; One serving of [pasta]; Chicken wings

53. Which source of electric energy emits the most greenhouse gases to provide power for a house? Please rank the items from 1 (most) to 3 (least) (by clicking and dragging the items).

Gas-fired power plant; Nuclear power plant; Coal-fired power station

54. Which region contributes most to global greenhouse gas emissions? Please rank the regions from 1 (most) to 4 (least) and note that multiple regions may have the same rank.

- The U.S.
- The European Union
- China
- India

1; 2; 3; 4

55. Consider now per capita emissions: in which region does the consumption of an average person contribute most to greenhouse gas emissions? Please rank the regions from 1 (most) to [4 / 5] (least).

- The U.S.
- The European Union
- China
- India
- [Country, if not above or not in the E.U.]

1; 2; 3; 4; [5]

56. If nothing is done to limit climate change, how likely do you think it is that climate change will lead to the following events?

- Severe droughts and heatwaves
- More frequent volcanic eruptions
- Rising sea levels
- Lower agricultural production
- Drop in standards of living
- Larger migration flows
- More armed conflicts
- Extinction of humankind

Very unlikely; Somewhat unlikely; Somewhat likely; Very likely

Attitudes and risks

57. To what extent are the following groups responsible for climate change in [country]?

- Each of us
- The high income earners
- [country] government
- Companies
- Previous generations

Not at all; A little; Moderately; A lot; A great deal

58. To what extent do you think that it is technically feasible to stop greenhouse gas emissions by the end of the century while [maintaining / sustaining] satisfactory standards of living in [country]?

Not at all; A little; Moderately; A lot; A great deal

59. To what extent do you think climate change already affects or will affect your personal life negatively?

Not at all; A little; Moderately; A lot; A great deal

60. How likely is it that human kind halts climate change by the end of the century?

Very unlikely; Somewhat unlikely; Somewhat likely; Very likely

61. If we decide to halt climate change through ambitious policies, what would be the effects on [country] economy and employment?

Very negative effects; Somewhat negative effects; No noticeable effects; Somewhat positive effects; Very positive effects

62. If we decide to halt climate change through ambitious policies, to what extent do you think it would negatively affect your lifestyle?

Not at all; A little; Moderately; A lot; A great deal

63. Here are possible behaviors that experts say would help reduce greenhouse gas emissions. To what extent would you be willing to adopt the following behaviors?

- Limit flying
- Limit driving
- Have an electric vehicle
- Limit [beef / India: meat] consumption
- Limit heating or cooling your home

Not at all; A little; Moderately; A lot; A great deal

64. How important are the factors below in order for you to adopt a sustainable lifestyle (i.e. limit driving, flying, and consumption, cycle more, etc.)?

- Ambitious climate policies
- Having enough financial support
- People around you also changing their behavior
- The most well-off also changing their behavior

Not at all; A little; Moderately; A lot; A great deal

Policy 1: Ban on the sale of combustion-engine cars

To fight climate change, car producers can be required by law to produce cars that emit less CO₂ per [kilometer / mile] of the cars they sell. The emission limit is lowered every year so that only electric or hydrogen vehicles can be sold after 2030. This policy is called a ban on combustion-engine cars. We will now ask you a few questions regarding this specific policy.

65. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? A ban on combustion engine cars would...

- reduce CO₂ emissions from cars
- reduce air pollution
- have a

negative/positive(randomized)

effect on [country] economy and employment

- have a large effect on [country] economy and employment
- be a
costly/costless(randomized)

way to fight climate change

Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly agree

66. In your view, would the following groups win or lose if a ban on combustion-engine cars was implemented in [country]?

- Low-income earners
- The middle class
- High-income earners
- Those living in rural areas

Lose a lot; Mostly lose; Neither win nor lose; Mostly win; Win a lot

67. Do you think that your household would win or lose financially from a ban on combustion-engine cars?
Lose a lot; Mostly lose; Neither win nor lose; Mostly win; Win a lot

68. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “A ban on combustion-engine cars is fair”?
Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly agree

69. Do you support or oppose a ban on combustion-engine cars?

Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly support

70. Do you support or oppose a ban on combustion-engine cars where alternatives such as public transports are made available to people?

Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly support

Policy 2: Green infrastructure program

A green infrastructure program is a large public investment program, which would be financed by additional public debt, to accomplish the transition needed to cut greenhouse gas emissions. Investments would concern renewable power plants, public transport, thermal renovation of buildings, and sustainable agriculture. We will now ask you a few questions regarding this specific policy.

71. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? A green infrastructure program would...

- make electricity production greener
- increase the use of public transport
- reduce air pollution
- have a negative effect on [country] economy and employment
- have a large effect on [country] economy and employment
- be a costly way to fight climate change

Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly agree

72. In your view, would the following groups win or lose with a green infrastructure program?

- Low-income earners
- The middle class

- High-income earners
- Those living in rural areas

Lose a lot; Mostly lose; Neither win nor lose; Mostly win; Win a lot

73. Do you think that your household would win or lose financially from a green infrastructure program?
Lose a lot; Mostly lose; Neither win nor lose; Mostly win; Win a lot

74. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “A green infrastructure program is fair”?
Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly agree

75. Do you support or oppose a green infrastructure program?
Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly support

76. Until now, we have considered that a green infrastructure program would be financed by public debt, but other sources of funding are possible.

What sources of funding do you find appropriate for public investments in green infrastructure?
(Multiple answers are possible)

Additional public debt; Increase in the [sales tax / VAT (value-added tax)]; Increase in taxes on the wealthiest; Reduction in social spending; Reduction in military spending

Policy 3: Carbon tax with cash transfers

To fight climate change, [country] government can make greenhouse gas emissions costly, to make people and firms change their equipment and reduce their emissions. The government could do this through a policy called a carbon tax with cash transfers. Under such a policy, the government would tax all products that emit greenhouse gas. For example, the price of gasoline would increase by [40 cents per gallon]. To compensate households for the price increases, the revenues from the carbon tax would be redistributed to all households, regardless of their income. Each adult would thus receive [600 dollar] per year.² We will now ask you a few questions regarding this specific policy.

77. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? A carbon tax with cash transfers would...

- encourage people to drive less
- encourage people and companies to insulate buildings
- reduce the use of fossil fuels and greenhouse gas emissions
- reduce air pollution
- have a negative effect on [country] economy and employment
- have a large effect on [country] economy and employment
- be a costly way to fight climate change

Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly agree

78. In your view, would the following groups win or lose under a carbon tax with cash transfers?

- Low-income earners
- The middle class
- High-income earners
- Those living in rural areas

²The tax considered is (implicitly) set at \$45 per ton of CO₂ (see Appendix A-7.1.1 for details of the computation).

Lose a lot; Mostly lose; Neither win nor lose; Mostly win; Win a lot

79. Do you think that your household would win or lose financially under a carbon tax with cash transfers?
Lose a lot; Mostly lose; Neither win nor lose; Mostly win; Win a lot
80. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “A carbon tax with cash transfers is fair”?
Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly agree
81. Do you support or oppose a carbon tax with cash transfers?
Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly support
82. Now, we consider a variant of the policy where the cash transfers are higher for low-income people compared to high-income people. Do you agree or disagree that such a policy would be fair?
Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly agree
83. Do you support or oppose a carbon tax with cash transfers with higher transfers for low-income people compared to high-income people?
Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly support

Preferences on climate policies

84. [Attention check question] To show that you are attentive, please select “a little” in the following list: Not at all; A little; Moderately; A lot; A great deal
85. Do you support or oppose the following climate policies?
 - A tax on flying (that increases ticket prices by 20%)
 - A national tax on fossil fuels (increasing gasoline prices by [40 cents per gallon])
 - A ban of polluting vehicles in dense areas, like city centers
 - Subsidies for low-carbon technologies (renewable energy, capture and storage of carbon...)
 - A contribution to a global climate fund to finance clean energy in low-income countries
Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly support
86. Governments can use the revenues from carbon taxes in different ways. Would you support or oppose introducing a carbon tax that would raise gasoline prices by [40 cents per gallon], if the government used this revenue to finance...
 - Cash transfers to households with no alternative to using fossil fuels
 - Cash transfers to the poorest households
 - Equal cash transfers to all households
 - A reduction in personal income taxes
 - A reduction in corporate income taxes
 - Tax rebates for the most affected firms
 - Funding environmental infrastructure projects (public transport, cycling ways, etc.)
 - Subsidizing low-carbon technologies, including renewable energy
 - A reduction in the public deficit
Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly support

Willingness to pay and real stake questions

87. To fight global warming, [country] government could implement a policy package to reduce emissions, for example by investing in clean technologies (renewable energy, electric vehicles, public transport, more efficient insulation, etc.). The funding for these investments could be collected annually through an additional individual contribution for the foreseeable future. Assume that everyone in [country] as well as citizens of other countries would be required to contribute according to their means. Are you willing to pay ([\\$10 / \\$30 / \\$50 / \\$100 / \\$300 / \\$500 / \\$1,000]) annually through an additional individual contribution to limit global warming to safe levels (less than 2 degrees Celsius)?

Yes; No

88. By taking this survey, you are automatically entered into a lottery to win [\$100]. In a few days you will know whether you have been selected in the lottery. The payment will be made to you in the same way as your compensation for this survey, so no further action is required on your part. You can also donate a part of this additional compensation (should you be selected in the lottery) to a reforestation project through the charity The Gold Standard. This charity has already proven effective to reduce 151 million tons of CO₂ to fight climate change and has been carefully selected by our team. The Gold Standard is highly transparent and ensures that its projects feature the highest levels of environmental integrity and contribute to sustainable development. Should you win the lottery, please enter your donation amount using the slider below:

Slider going from 0 to [100]

International burden-sharing

89. At which level(s) do you think public policies to tackle climate change need to be put in place? (Multiple answers are possible)

Global; [Federal / European / ...]; [State / National]; Local

90. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “[country] should take measures to fight climate change.”

Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly agree

91. How should [country] climate policies depend on what other countries do?

- If other countries do more, [country] should do...
- If other countries do less, [country] should do...

Much less; Less; About the same; More; Much more

92. [In all countries but the U.S., Denmark and France] All countries have signed the Paris agreement that aims to contain global warming “well below +2 °C”. To limit global warming to this level, there is a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit globally, called the carbon budget. Each country could aim to emit less than a share of the carbon budget. To respect the global carbon budget, countries that emit more than their national share would pay a fee to countries that emit less than their share. Do you support such a policy?

Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly support

93. [In all countries but the U.S., Denmark and France] Suppose the above policy is in place. How should the carbon budget be divided among countries?

The emission share of a country should be proportional to its population, so that each human has an equal right to emit.; The emission share of a country should be proportional to its current emissions, so that those who already emit more have more rights to emit.; Countries that have emitted more over the past decades (from 1990 onwards) should receive a lower emission share, because they have already used some of their fair share.; Countries that will be hurt more by climate change should receive a higher emission share, to compensate them for the damages.

94. [In the U.S., Denmark, and France only] To achieve a given reduction of greenhouse gas emissions globally, costly investments are needed. Ideally, how should countries bear the costs of fighting climate change?

- Countries should pay in proportion to their income
- Countries should pay in proportion to their current emissions
- Countries should pay in proportion to their past emissions (from 1990 onwards)
- The richest countries should pay it all, so that the poorest countries do not have to pay anything
- The richest countries should pay even more, to help vulnerable countries face adverse consequences: vulnerable countries would then receive money instead of paying

Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly agree

95. Do you support or oppose establishing a global democratic assembly whose role would be to draft international treaties against climate change? Each adult across the world would have one vote to elect members of the assembly.

Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly support

96. Imagine the following policy: a global tax on greenhouse gas emissions funding a global basic income. Such a policy would progressively raise the price of fossil fuels (for example, the price of gasoline would increase by [40 cents per gallon] in the first years). Higher prices would encourage people and companies to use less fossil fuels, reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Revenues from the tax would be used to finance a basic income of [\$30] per month to each human adult, thereby lifting the 700 million people who earn less than \$2/day out of extreme poverty. The average British person would lose a bit from this policy as they would face [\$130] per month in price increases, which is higher than the [\$30] they would receive.

Do you support or oppose such a policy?

Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly support

97. Do you support or oppose a tax on all millionaires around the world to finance low-income countries that comply with international standards regarding climate action? This would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking water, healthcare, and education.

Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly support

Housing and cattle products

(In Brazil, Mexico, India, and Indonesia, these 5 questions on heating were not asked. In Australia, they were asked with *cooling* instead of *heating*.)

98. (If “Owner” or “Landlord renting out” at 19) How likely is it that you will improve the insulation or replace the heating system of your accommodation over the next 5 years?

Very unlikely; Somewhat unlikely; Somewhat likely; Very likely

99. (If “Owner” or “Landlord renting out” at 19) What are the main hurdles preventing you from improving the insulation or replace the heating system of your accommodation? (Multiple answers are possible)
The choice to insulate or replace the heating system is not mine; The upfront costs are too high; It is too much effort; It won’t improve its energy efficiency; My insulation and heating systems are already satisfactory

100. GROUP 1. Imagine that [country] government makes it mandatory for all residential buildings to have insulation that meets a certain energy efficiency standard before 2040. The government would subsidise half of the insulation costs to help households with the transition. Do you support or oppose such policy?

101. GROUP 2. Imagine that [country] government makes it mandatory for all residential buildings to have insulation that meets a certain energy efficiency standard before 2040. The government would subsidise half of the insulation costs to help households with the transition. Insulating your home can take long, may cause disruptions to your daily life during the renovation works, and may even require you to leave your home until the renovation is completed. Do you support or oppose such policy?

Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly support

102. Imagine that [country] government makes it mandatory for all residential buildings to have insulation that meets a certain energy efficiency standard before 2040. The government would subsidise half of the insulation costs to help households with the transition. Insulating your home can take long, may cause disruptions to your daily life during the renovation works, and may even require you to leave your home until the renovation is completed. Do you support or oppose such policy?

Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly support

103. (In India, this question was skipped.) Imagine that, in order to fight climate change, [country] government decides to limit the consumption of cattle products like beef and dairy. Do you support or oppose the following options?

- A high tax on cattle products, so that the price of beef doubles
- Subsidies on organic and local vegetables, fruits, and nuts
- The removal of subsidies for cattle farming
- The ban of intensive cattle farming

Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly support

Trust, perceptions of institutions, inequality, and the future

104. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “Most people can be trusted.”

Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly agree

105. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “Over the last decade, [country] government could generally be trusted to do what is right.”

Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly agree

106. Some people think the government is trying to do too many things that should be left to individuals and businesses. Others think that the government should do more to solve our country’s problems. Which come closer to your own view?

Government is doing too much; Government is doing just the right amount; Government should do more

107. How big of an issue do you think income inequality is in [country]?

Not an issue at all; A small issue; An issue; A serious issue; A very serious issue

108. Do you think that overall people in the world will be richer or poorer in 100 years from now?

Much poorer; Poorer; As rich as now; Richer; Much richer

Feedback

109. Do you feel that this survey was politically biased?

Yes, left-wing biased; Yes, right-wing biased; No, I do not feel it was biased

110. The survey is nearing completion. You can now enter any comments, thoughts or suggestions in the field below.

Petition

111. Finally, are you willing to sign a petition to “stand up for real climate action”? As soon as the survey is complete, we will send the results to the [head of state’s] office, informing him what share of people who took this survey were willing to support the following petition. “I agree that immediate action on climate change is critical. Now is the time to dedicate ourselves to a low-carbon future and prevent lasting damage to all living things. Science shows us we cannot afford to wait to cut harmful carbon emissions. I’m adding my voice to the call to world leaders in [country] and beyond – to act so we do not lose ground in combating climate change.” Do you support this petition (you will NOT be asked to sign, only your answer here is required and remains anonymous)?

Yes; No

A-6 Robustness checks

A-6.1 Treatment effects among attentive respondents

Table A13 shows that treatment effects are higher (often by about 50%) among respondents who pay attention to the video treatments and respond correctly to at least one of the comprehension questions after the video.

Table A13: Effects of the treatments on support for climate action, among respondents who respond correctly to at least one of the comprehension questions

	Support or Agreement				
	Ban on combustion-engine cars	Green infrastructure program	Carbon tax with cash transfers	Fairness of main climate policies index	Adopt climate-friendly behaviors
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Control group mean	0.656	0.517	0.46	-0.08	-0.034
Treatment: Climate impacts	0.049*** (0.008)	0.044*** (0.009)	0.051*** (0.009)	0.078*** (0.018)	0.105*** (0.018)
Treatment: Climate policy	0.046*** (0.008)	0.061*** (0.009)	0.117*** (0.009)	0.160*** (0.017)	0.030* (0.018)
Treatment: Both	0.082** (0.009)	0.107** (0.009)	0.169*** (0.009)	0.246*** (0.018)	0.117*** (0.018)
Observations	31,661	31,661	31,661	31,661	31,661
R ²	0.105	0.101	0.109	0.160	0.111

Note: The table shows the results of regressions of variables listed in the columns on socioeconomic characteristics, controlling for country fixed effects. Only the coefficients for the treatment effects are displayed. Dependent variables are indicator variables equal to 1 if the respondent (somewhat or strongly) supports each of the main climate policies (columns 1, 2, 3), or indices (4, 5). Robust standard errors are in parentheses *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. See Appendix A-1 for variable definitions.

A-6.2 Main results on different samples

After the questions on the three main policies, one question asked respondents to tick “A little” in a 5-point scale ranging from “Not at all” to “A lot” to test their attention. Among the 45,904 complete responses with a duration deemed sufficient (above 11 min),³ 40,680 succeed the attention test (89%). The latter constitute our benchmark sample. In Tables A14 to A19, we reproduce the main results among the extended sample that also includes respondents who failed the test of attention. All descriptive statistics and coefficients are very close in the extended sample, showing that our results are robust to the inclusion of respondents who lack attention.

Conversely, if we choose a higher cutoff for the minimal duration and retain only the 30,775 respondents who answered in more than 20 minutes, we also obtain descriptive statistics and coefficients very close to our benchmark results (tables are not shown for the sake of brevity).

³This duration cutoff was negotiated by the survey company, as one-third of the median duration is the usually cutoff.

Table A14: Correlation between knowledge and individual characteristics on the extended sample

	Knowledge of climate change				
	Knowledge index	Footprint	Fundamentals	Greenhouse gases	Impacts
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Control group mean	-0.065	-0.022	-0.035	-0.107	0.006
Panel A: Socio-economic indicators					
Gender: Female	-0.120*** (0.011)	-0.070*** (0.012)	-0.003 (0.012)	-0.123*** (0.012)	-0.105*** (0.012)
Lives with child(ren) under 14	-0.147*** (0.013)	-0.112*** (0.013)	-0.045*** (0.014)	-0.097*** (0.014)	-0.107*** (0.013)
Age: 25 - 34	-0.061*** (0.021)	0.001 (0.021)	-0.085*** (0.021)	-0.060*** (0.022)	-0.013 (0.022)
Age: 35 - 49	-0.016 (0.020)	0.043** (0.020)	-0.074*** (0.019)	-0.061*** (0.021)	0.054*** (0.020)
Age: 50 or older	0.178*** (0.019)	0.217*** (0.019)	-0.044** (0.018)	0.065*** (0.019)	0.177*** (0.019)
Household income: Q2	0.109*** (0.016)	0.031** (0.016)	0.048*** (0.016)	0.120*** (0.016)	0.073*** (0.016)
Household income: Q3	0.130*** (0.017)	0.066*** (0.017)	0.043** (0.017)	0.125*** (0.017)	0.095*** (0.017)
Household income: Q4	0.208*** (0.018)	0.128*** (0.018)	0.060*** (0.018)	0.161*** (0.018)	0.164*** (0.018)
Highest diploma: College	0.424*** (0.022)	0.227*** (0.022)	0.226*** (0.021)	0.288*** (0.023)	0.316*** (0.023)
Highest diploma: High school	0.268*** (0.021)	0.114*** (0.022)	0.151*** (0.021)	0.197*** (0.022)	0.211*** (0.022)
Economic Leaning: Very Left	-0.056** (0.027)	-0.079*** (0.027)	0.078*** (0.028)	-0.041 (0.027)	-0.096*** (0.026)
Economic Leaning: Center	-0.215*** (0.017)	-0.178*** (0.017)	-0.159*** (0.018)	-0.086*** (0.017)	-0.101*** (0.017)
Economic Leaning: Right	-0.294*** (0.020)	-0.195*** (0.020)	-0.299*** (0.020)	-0.106*** (0.020)	-0.144*** (0.020)
Economic Leaning: Very Right	-0.416*** (0.022)	-0.306*** (0.022)	-0.258*** (0.024)	-0.183*** (0.023)	-0.284*** (0.023)
Treatment: Climate Impacts	0.146*** (0.016)	0.059*** (0.016)	0.107*** (0.016)	0.163*** (0.016)	0.030* (0.016)
Treatment: Climate Policies	0.037** (0.016)	0.011 (0.016)	-0.003 (0.016)	0.119*** (0.017)	-0.041*** (0.016)
Treatment: Both	0.096*** (0.016)	0.031* (0.016)	0.041** (0.016)	0.171*** (0.016)	-0.010 (0.016)
Panel B: Energy usage indicators					
Agglomeration size: Small	-0.005 (0.019)	0.024 (0.019)	-0.022 (0.019)	-0.041** (0.019)	0.028 (0.019)
Agglomeration size: Medium	0.052** (0.021)	0.053** (0.021)	0.028 (0.021)	0.002 (0.021)	0.042** (0.021)
Agglomeration size: Large	0.077*** (0.019)	0.061*** (0.019)	0.067*** (0.020)	-0.005 (0.020)	0.063*** (0.019)
Public transport available	0.026** (0.012)	-0.034*** (0.013)	0.038*** (0.013)	0.018 (0.013)	0.061*** (0.013)
Uses car	0.098*** (0.015)	0.021 (0.015)	0.073*** (0.016)	0.068*** (0.016)	0.091*** (0.016)
High gas expenses	-0.084*** (0.012)	-0.068*** (0.012)	-0.027** (0.013)	-0.061*** (0.013)	-0.058*** (0.013)
High heating expenses	-0.013 (0.013)	-0.036*** (0.013)	0.004 (0.013)	0.020 (0.013)	-0.011 (0.013)
Flies more than once a year	0.026** (0.013)	0.018 (0.013)	0.032** (0.014)	-0.007 (0.013)	0.025* (0.013)
Works in polluting sector	-0.188*** (0.016)	-0.113*** (0.016)	-0.083*** (0.016)	-0.129*** (0.017)	-0.136*** (0.017)
Eats beef/meat weekly or more	-0.038*** (0.012)	-0.055*** (0.012)	-0.056*** (0.013)	0.037*** (0.013)	-0.016 (0.013)
Owner or landlord	0.005 (0.014)	-0.020 (0.014)	-0.008 (0.014)	0.020 (0.014)	0.028** (0.014)
Observations	45,904	45,904	45,904	45,904	45,904
R ²	0.075	0.037	0.024	0.036	0.042

Note: The table shows the results of regressions of the knowledge indices on socioeconomic indicators (Panel A) and on energy usage indicators (Panel B), controlling for country fixed effects. Panel B also controls for socioeconomic indicators, but the coefficients are not displayed. The dependent variable in column 1 is the *Knowledge index*, whose components are the indices in the remaining columns. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. See Appendix A-1 for variable definitions.

Table A15: Correlation between support for the main climate policies and individual characteristics on the extended sample

	Support			
	Main climate policies index (1)	Ban on combustion-engine cars (2)	Green infrastructure program (3)	Carbon tax with cash transfers (4)
Control group mean	-0.095	0.648	0.51	0.46
Panel A: Socio-economic indicators				
Gender: Female	0.060*** (0.012)	0.009* (0.005)	0.009 (0.006)	-0.006 (0.006)
Lives with child(ren) under 14	0.133*** (0.013)	0.031*** (0.006)	0.053*** (0.007)	0.058*** (0.007)
Age: 25 - 34	0.048** (0.020)	0.012 (0.010)	0.015 (0.010)	0.016 (0.010)
Age: 35 - 49	0.083*** (0.019)	0.027*** (0.009)	0.036*** (0.010)	0.034*** (0.010)
Age: 50 or older	0.179*** (0.017)	0.079*** (0.009)	0.090*** (0.009)	0.082*** (0.009)
Household income: Q2	0.070*** (0.016)	0.034*** (0.007)	0.037*** (0.008)	0.021*** (0.008)
Household income: Q3	0.089*** (0.017)	0.047*** (0.008)	0.045*** (0.008)	0.030*** (0.008)
Household income: Q4	0.083*** (0.018)	0.049*** (0.008)	0.047*** (0.009)	0.037*** (0.009)
Highest diploma: College	0.187*** (0.023)	0.105*** (0.010)	0.098*** (0.011)	0.076*** (0.011)
Highest diploma: High school	0.120*** (0.022)	0.066*** (0.010)	0.056*** (0.010)	0.045*** (0.010)
Economic Leaning: Very Left	0.114*** (0.027)	0.006 (0.012)	0.029** (0.013)	0.026* (0.013)
Economic Leaning: Center	-0.214*** (0.017)	-0.109*** (0.008)	-0.101*** (0.008)	-0.098*** (0.008)
Economic Leaning: Right	-0.302*** (0.019)	-0.112*** (0.009)	-0.097*** (0.010)	-0.071*** (0.010)
Economic Leaning: Very Right	-0.169*** (0.025)	-0.114*** (0.010)	-0.061*** (0.011)	-0.052*** (0.011)
Treatment: Climate Impacts	0.062*** (0.016)	0.017** (0.007)	0.021** (0.008)	0.031*** (0.008)
Treatment: Climate Policies	0.132*** (0.016)	0.026** (0.007)	0.047*** (0.008)	0.095*** (0.008)
Treatment: Both	0.198*** (0.016)	0.041*** (0.007)	0.072** (0.008)	0.117*** (0.008)
Panel B: Energy usage indicators				
Agglomeration size: Small	0.039** (0.019)	0.013 (0.008)	0.006 (0.009)	-0.004 (0.009)
Agglomeration size: Medium	0.040* (0.021)	0.022** (0.009)	0.014 (0.010)	0.006 (0.010)
Agglomeration size: Large	0.074*** (0.020)	0.025*** (0.009)	0.026*** (0.009)	0.009 (0.009)
Public transport available	0.287*** (0.013)	0.093*** (0.006)	0.098*** (0.006)	0.112*** (0.006)
Uses car	-0.132*** (0.015)	-0.015** (0.007)	-0.050*** (0.007)	-0.039*** (0.007)
High gas expenses	-0.057*** (0.013)	-0.022*** (0.006)	-0.022*** (0.006)	-0.016** (0.006)
High heating expenses	0.044*** (0.013)	0.034*** (0.006)	0.028*** (0.006)	0.028*** (0.006)
Flies more than once a year	0.128*** (0.014)	0.044*** (0.006)	0.056*** (0.006)	0.060*** (0.006)
Works in polluting sector	0.008 (0.016)	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.009 (0.008)	0.015** (0.008)
Eats beef/meat weekly or more	-0.057*** (0.012)	-0.024*** (0.006)	-0.026*** (0.006)	-0.007 (0.006)
Owner or landlord	0.038*** (0.014)	0.014** (0.006)	0.016** (0.007)	0.023*** (0.007)
Observations	45,904	45,904	45,904	45,904
R ²	0.068	0.110	0.107	0.117

Note: The table shows the results of regressions of the variables listed in the columns on socioeconomic characteristics (Panel A) and on energy usage characteristics (Panel B), controlling for country fixed effects. Panel B also controls for socioeconomic characteristics, but the coefficients are not displayed. The dependent variable in column 1 is the *Support for main policies index*, while the remaining columns are indicator variables equal to 1 if the respondent (somewhat or strongly) supports each of the policies. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. See Appendix A-1 for variable definitions.

Table A16: Correlation between *Support for main climate policies index* and individual characteristics in high-income countries on the extended sample

	Support for main climate policies index											
	AUS	CAN	DEU	DNK	ESP	FRA	GBR	ITA	JPN	KOR	POL	USA
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Control group mean	-0.203	-0.12	-0.092	-0.138	-0.1	-0.076	-0.119	-0.17	-0.095	-0.075	-0.06	0.026
Panel A: Socio-economic indicators												
Gender: Female	-0.005 (0.053)	-0.108** (0.047)	-0.064 (0.050)	0.144*** (0.050)	0.074* (0.042)	0.050 (0.054)	0.030 (0.049)	0.034 (0.045)	0.187*** (0.053)	-0.059 (0.052)	0.093** (0.045)	0.015 (0.047)
Lives with child(ren) under 14	0.211*** (0.061)	0.164*** (0.051)	0.135** (0.065)	-0.006 (0.062)	0.118** (0.048)	0.185*** (0.064)	0.177*** (0.059)	0.142** (0.059)	0.095 (0.066)	0.055 (0.066)	0.145*** (0.051)	0.075 (0.050)
Age: 25 - 34	-0.105 (0.079)	-0.006 (0.090)	-0.210** (0.095)	0.050 (0.076)	0.021 (0.092)	-0.009 (0.079)	-0.010 (0.094)	-0.170* (0.103)	0.101 (0.102)	0.067 (0.102)	-0.107 (0.084)	0.179** (0.076)
Age: 35 - 49	-0.106 (0.084)	-0.154* (0.086)	-0.183** (0.093)	-0.057 (0.089)	-0.083 (0.070)	-0.193** (0.085)	0.163** (0.079)	-0.103 (0.085)	0.189* (0.097)	0.124 (0.096)	0.001 (0.076)	0.153* (0.079)
Age: 50 or older	-0.233*** (0.080)	-0.057 (0.080)	-0.251*** (0.091)	-0.039 (0.087)	0.024 (0.084)	-0.297*** (0.084)	-0.041 (0.076)	-0.073 (0.077)	0.398*** (0.085)	0.405*** (0.086)	0.243*** (0.072)	-0.193*** (0.074)
Household income: Q2	0.118** (0.052)	0.065 (0.066)	-0.060 (0.071)	-0.047 (0.069)	0.103* (0.058)	-0.136** (0.062)	-0.048 (0.064)	0.075 (0.059)	0.118* (0.064)	0.068 (0.068)	0.163*** (0.063)	-0.002 (0.056)
Household income: Q3	0.199*** (0.066)	0.036 (0.067)	0.024 (0.072)	-0.017 (0.069)	0.125** (0.061)	-0.071 (0.075)	0.021 (0.065)	0.123* (0.064)	0.166** (0.068)	0.173*** (0.065)	0.111* (0.063)	-0.045 (0.070)
Household income: Q4	0.100 (0.090)	0.028 (0.074)	-0.080 (0.084)	-0.074 (0.084)	0.097 (0.083)	-0.099 (0.083)	0.047 (0.083)	0.203*** (0.072)	0.098 (0.084)	0.130 (0.084)	0.164** (0.084)	0.065 (0.080)
Highest diploma: College	0.281*** (0.099)	0.028 (0.084)	0.005 (0.078)	0.239*** (0.089)	0.156** (0.067)	0.073 (0.088)	0.345*** (0.075)	0.203** (0.079)	0.305* (0.168)	-0.505*** (0.156)	-0.112 (0.155)	0.346** (0.111)
Highest diploma: High school	0.065 (0.093)	-0.100 (0.081)	-0.139** (0.069)	0.164** (0.083)	0.131* (0.067)	-0.053 (0.067)	0.120* (0.077)	0.117* (0.071)	0.173 (0.066)	-0.606*** (0.167)	-0.132 (0.159)	0.188* (0.103)
Economic Leaning: Very Left	0.028 (0.119)	-0.025 (0.111)	0.109 (0.133)	0.484*** (0.135)	0.089 (0.135)	-0.296 (0.135)	0.091 (0.135)	-0.005 (0.135)	0.230 (0.135)	0.005 (0.135)	-0.154 (0.135)	0.309*** (0.083)
Economic Leaning: Center	-0.496*** (0.072)	-0.378*** (0.066)	-0.357*** (0.066)	-0.289*** (0.064)	-0.267*** (0.051)	-0.068 (0.080)	-0.425*** (0.068)	-0.270*** (0.056)	-0.180*** (0.073)	-0.411*** (0.072)	-0.098 (0.061)	-0.343*** (0.059)
Economic Leaning: Right	-0.653*** (0.089)	-0.510*** (0.080)	-0.656*** (0.087)	-0.666*** (0.073)	-0.560*** (0.065)	-0.233*** (0.080)	-0.373*** (0.081)	-0.265*** (0.066)	-0.271*** (0.093)	-0.460*** (0.086)	-0.330*** (0.079)	-0.777*** (0.076)
Economic Leaning: Very Right	-0.475*** (0.133)	-0.640*** (0.121)	-0.506*** (0.150)	-0.535*** (0.168)	-0.673*** (0.092)	-0.530*** (0.116)	-0.081 (0.111)	-0.502*** (0.102)	-0.616*** (0.156)	-0.463*** (0.153)	-0.420*** (0.097)	-0.755*** (0.085)
Economic Leaning: PNR	-0.225 (0.167)	0.104 (0.185)	-0.141 (0.285)	-0.602*** (0.077)	0.027 (0.129)	-0.372*** (0.077)	-0.386* (0.129)	0.038 (0.123)	-0.480*** (0.123)	0.132 (0.123)	0.045 (0.123)	-0.506*** (0.079)
Treatment: Climate Impacts	0.214*** (0.074)	0.014 (0.066)	0.025 (0.066)	0.147** (0.065)	0.012 (0.058)	0.020 (0.070)	0.065 (0.061)	0.128** (0.064)	0.044 (0.067)	0.039 (0.069)	0.064 (0.060)	-0.071 (0.061)
Treatment: Climate Policies	0.239*** (0.069)	0.246*** (0.066)	0.174** (0.070)	0.128* (0.065)	0.106* (0.060)	0.058 (0.071)	0.127** (0.064)	0.267*** (0.060)	0.156** (0.067)	0.100 (0.067)	0.128** (0.061)	-0.013 (0.064)

	Support for main climate policies index											
	AUS	CAN	DEU	DNK	ESP	FRA	GBR	ITA	JPN	KOR	POL	USA
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Observations	2,211	2,238	2,190	2,267	2,427	2,234	2,390	2,260	2,127	2,069	2,223	2,642
Panel B: Energy usage indicators												
Treatment: Both	0.332*** (0.077)	0.228*** (0.061)	0.166** (0.066)	0.261*** (0.068)	0.276*** (0.056)	0.187** (0.076)	0.284*** (0.062)	0.317*** (0.063)	0.190*** (0.069)	0.183*** (0.068)	0.129** (0.062)	0.053 (0.066)
Treatment: Both	0.308*** (0.074)	0.229*** (0.060)	0.168*** (0.065)	0.273*** (0.062)	0.269*** (0.055)	0.198*** (0.072)	0.285*** (0.061)	0.312*** (0.062)	0.204*** (0.069)	0.182*** (0.067)	0.138** (0.061)	0.047 (0.065)
Agglomeration size: Small	0.065 (0.103)	0.045 (0.084)	0.009 (0.075)	0.292*** (0.069)	0.035 (0.081)	0.097 (0.066)	0.088 (0.071)	0.228*** (0.067)	0.078 (0.078)	0.082 (0.150)	-0.019 (0.173)	0.068 (0.063)
Agglomeration size: Medium	0.073 (0.108)	0.086 (0.089)	0.032 (0.083)	0.283*** (0.070)	0.083 (0.083)	0.119 (0.087)	0.103 (0.083)	0.183** (0.078)	0.141 (0.150)	0.128 (0.179)	-0.004 (0.068)	-0.019 (0.076)
Agglomeration size: Large	0.063 (0.103)	0.063 (0.084)	0.026 (0.083)	0.270*** (0.075)	0.070 (0.081)	0.198** (0.099)	0.200*** (0.077)	0.053 (0.077)	0.115 (0.087)	0.061 (0.148)	-0.002 (0.171)	0.208** (0.070)
Public transport available	0.392*** (0.053)	0.316*** (0.049)	0.272*** (0.051)	0.317*** (0.049)	0.243*** (0.045)	0.232*** (0.057)	0.278*** (0.046)	0.229*** (0.057)	0.031 (0.057)	0.227*** (0.053)	0.183*** (0.049)	0.352** (0.048)
Uses car	-0.232*** (0.072)	-0.142** (0.066)	-0.289*** (0.059)	-0.106* (0.055)	-0.213*** (0.051)	-0.323*** (0.078)	-0.293*** (0.067)	-0.150** (0.068)	-0.208*** (0.067)	-0.148** (0.062)	-0.286*** (0.058)	-0.043 (0.060)
High gas expenses	-0.042 (0.053)	-0.143*** (0.050)	-0.184** (0.052)	-0.220*** (0.049)	0.047 (0.045)	-0.024 (0.056)	-0.075 (0.052)	0.129*** (0.046)	-0.083 (0.062)	-0.021 (0.056)	-0.070 (0.048)	-0.034 (0.048)
High heating expenses	0.109** (0.054)	0.050 (0.051)	0.117** (0.051)	0.051 (0.050)	-0.003 (0.044)	0.012 (0.055)	0.056 (0.045)	-0.049 (0.047)	0.090* (0.050)	0.149*** (0.053)	0.113** (0.049)	0.101** (0.047)
Flies more than once a year	0.161*** (0.055)	0.087 (0.053)	0.140** (0.057)	0.087* (0.048)	0.161*** (0.044)	0.026 (0.069)	-0.076 (0.049)	0.157*** (0.051)	0.168*** (0.059)	0.156*** (0.054)	0.136** (0.058)	0.155*** (0.049)
Polluting sector	-0.054 (0.071)	-0.108 (0.070)	0.128* (0.080)	-0.034 (0.065)	0.066 (0.072)	0.067 (0.072)	0.056 (0.070)	0.006 (0.080)	-0.040 (0.071)	0.058 (0.071)	0.050 (0.065)	0.115* (0.066)
Eats beef weekly or more	-0.095** (0.049)	-0.089* (0.047)	-0.160** (0.055)	-0.256*** (0.048)	-0.200*** (0.042)	-0.197*** (0.051)	-0.019 (0.046)	-0.046 (0.046)	0.026 (0.054)	-0.040 (0.054)	-0.070 (0.059)	-0.075 (0.060)
Owner or landlord	0.071 (0.056)	0.053 (0.054)	0.007 (0.055)	-0.063 (0.048)	-0.014 (0.048)	0.079 (0.063)	0.081 (0.053)	-0.005 (0.056)	0.162*** (0.056)	0.009 (0.057)	0.017 (0.057)	-0.071 (0.058)

Note: The table shows the results of regressions of *Support for main policies index* on socioeconomic indicators (Panel A) and on energy usage indicators (Panel B). Panel B also controls for socioeconomic indicators, but the coefficients are not displayed. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. See Appendix A-1 for variable definitions.

Table A17: Correlation between *Support for main climate policies index* and individual characteristics in middle-income countries on the extended sample

	Support for main climate policies index							
	BRA	CHN	IDN	IND	MEX	TUR	UKR	ZAF
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	
Control group mean	-0.119	-0.114	-0.044	-0.091	-0.082	-0.048	-0.112	-0.115
Panel A: Socio-economic indicators								
Gender: Female	0.071 (0.058)	0.037 (0.063)	0.115*** (0.038)	0.068 (0.051)	-0.086 (0.060)	-0.002 (0.062)	0.037 (0.059)	-0.105* (0.056)
Lives with child(ren) under 14	0.129** (0.064)	-0.124 (0.081)	0.285*** (0.050)	0.042 (0.058)	0.151** (0.060)	0.368*** (0.069)	-0.096 (0.063)	0.060 (0.061)
Age: 25 - 34	0.050 (0.084)	0.422*** (0.116)	0.033 (0.055)	0.214** (0.077)	0.125 (0.084)	0.113 (0.092)	0.228** (0.100)	-0.023 (0.075)
Age: 35 - 49	0.252*** (0.077)	0.501*** (0.109)	0.212*** (0.055)	0.208*** (0.077)	0.096 (0.078)	0.049 (0.079)	0.362*** (0.087)	-0.076 (0.076)
Age: 50 or older	0.222*** (0.077)	0.717*** (0.104)	0.524*** (0.065)	0.557*** (0.067)	0.395*** (0.085)	0.561*** (0.082)	0.353*** (0.091)	0.071 (0.083)
Household income: Q2	0.075 (0.078)	-0.002 (0.102)	0.277*** (0.052)	0.261*** (0.075)	0.019 (0.078)	0.184** (0.089)	0.159* (0.090)	0.097 (0.079)
Household income: Q3	0.253*** (0.091)	0.088 (0.113)	0.340*** (0.060)	0.324*** (0.081)	0.061 (0.085)	0.009 (0.096)	0.135 (0.095)	0.012 (0.080)
Household income: Q4	0.183** (0.091)	0.215** (0.097)	0.410*** (0.059)	0.257*** (0.068)	0.044 (0.095)	0.294*** (0.103)	0.155* (0.094)	-0.112 (0.090)
Highest diploma: College	0.386*** (0.121)	0.394*** (0.101)	0.507*** (0.086)	0.745*** (0.115)	0.253*** (0.086)	0.165* (0.088)	0.033 (0.205)	0.053 (0.120)
Highest diploma: High school	0.291** (0.116)	0.398*** (0.095)	0.443*** (0.083)	0.541*** (0.114)	0.200** (0.081)	-0.049 (0.092)	0.187 (0.204)	0.016 (0.111)
Economic Leaning: Very Left	0.118 (0.108)	0.427*** (0.160)	0.063 (0.140)	0.233 (0.179)	0.090 (0.141)	0.277** (0.117)	0.072 (0.156)	0.460*** (0.124)
Economic Leaning: Center	-0.205** (0.085)	0.225** (0.087)	-0.125* (0.071)	0.055 (0.102)	-0.162 (0.100)	0.029 (0.093)	0.139 (0.108)	-0.035 (0.085)
Economic Leaning: Right	-0.188* (0.101)	0.185** (0.093)	-0.033 (0.078)	0.187* (0.108)	0.062 (0.108)	0.071 (0.114)	0.432*** (0.119)	0.055 (0.100)
Economic Leaning: Very Right	-0.187* (0.100)	0.549*** (0.167)	0.452*** (0.081)	0.336*** (0.114)	-0.080 (0.124)	-0.019 (0.118)	0.454*** (0.116)	0.166 (0.119)
Economic Leaning: PNR	-0.514** (0.208)	-0.179 (0.125)	0.147 (0.201)	-0.476** (0.195)	-0.137 (0.206)	-0.062 (0.169)	0.222 (0.184)	-0.318** (0.138)
Treatment: Climate Impacts	0.117 (0.077)	0.142* (0.086)	0.045 (0.048)	0.015 (0.068)	0.116 (0.078)	-0.084 (0.082)	0.059 (0.077)	0.104 (0.074)
Treatment: Climate Policies	0.126 (0.079)	0.087 (0.089)	0.062 (0.049)	0.159** (0.066)	0.068 (0.083)	0.137 (0.083)	0.141* (0.082)	0.208*** (0.078)

	Support for main climate policies index							
	BRA	CHN	IDN	IND	MEX	TUR	UKR	ZAF
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	
Observations	2,193	1,871	2,965	3,024	2,288	2,125	1,791	2,369

Note: The table shows the results of regressions of *Support for main policies index* on socioeconomic indicators (Panel A) and on energy usage indicators (Panel B). Panel B also controls for socioeconomic indicators, but the coefficients are not displayed. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. See Appendix A-1 for variable definitions.

Table A18: Correlation between knowledge or support for the main climate policies and beliefs on the extended sample

	Knowledge or Support				
	Knowledge index	Main climate policies index	Ban on combustion-engine cars	Green infrastructure program	Carbon tax with cash transfers
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Control group mean	-0.065	-0.095	0.648	0.51	0.46
Trusts the governement	-0.0001 (0.0005)	0.037*** (0.004)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.005** (0.003)	0.019*** (0.002)
Believes inequality is an important problem	0.002*** (0.001)	0.040*** (0.004)	0.011*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.023*** (0.003)
Worries about the consequences of CC	-0.003*** (0.001)	0.043*** (0.005)	0.019*** (0.003)	0.017*** (0.003)	0.008** (0.003)
Believes net-zero is technically feasible	-0.003*** (0.001)	0.024*** (0.005)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)
Believes will suffer from climate change	0.002*** (0.001)	0.059*** (0.005)	0.022*** (0.003)	0.029*** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.003)
Understands emission across activities/regions	0.524*** (0.001)	0.009** (0.004)	0.011*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)
Knows CC is real & caused by human	0.375*** (0.001)	0.060*** (0.004)	0.020*** (0.003)	0.020*** (0.003)	0.006** (0.003)
Knows which gases cause CC	0.387*** (0.001)	0.010*** (0.004)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)
Understands impacts of CC	0.350*** (0.001)	0.001 (0.004)	0.005** (0.003)	-0.005* (0.003)	-0.008*** (0.003)
Believes policies entail positive econ. effects	-0.002*** (0.0005)	0.074*** (0.004)	0.025*** (0.002)	0.017*** (0.002)	0.017*** (0.003)
Believes policies would reduce pollution	-0.002** (0.001)	0.117*** (0.007)	0.085*** (0.004)	0.053*** (0.004)	0.025*** (0.004)
Believes policies would reduce emissions	0.003*** (0.001)	0.280*** (0.008)	0.080*** (0.005)	0.085*** (0.005)	0.117*** (0.005)
Believes own household would lose	-0.0002 (0.001)	-0.339*** (0.007)	-0.083*** (0.004)	-0.112*** (0.004)	-0.110*** (0.004)
believes low-income earners will lose	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.063*** (0.006)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.014*** (0.004)	-0.036*** (0.004)
believes high-income earners will lose	0.002*** (0.0005)	0.013*** (0.004)	0.004** (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)	0.009** (0.002)
Observations	45,904	45,904	45,904	45,904	45,904
R ²	0.995	0.650	0.385	0.359	0.377

Note: The table shows the results of regressions of the knowledge indices on socioeconomic indicators (Panel A) and on energy usage indicators (Panel B), controlling for country fixed effects. Panel B also controls for socioeconomic indicators, but the coefficients are not displayed. The dependent variable in column 1 is the *Knowledge index*, whose components are the indices in the remaining columns. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. See Appendix A-1 for variable definitions.

Table A19: Effects of the treatments on support for climate action on the extended sample

	Support or Agreement				
	Ban on combustion-engine cars	Green infrastructure program	Carbon tax with cash transfers	Fairness of main climate policies index	Adopt climate-friendly behaviors
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Control group mean	0.648	0.51	0.46	-0.094	-0.049
Treatment: Climate impacts	0.016** (0.007)	0.020*** (0.008)	0.030*** (0.008)	0.058*** (0.016)	0.068*** (0.016)
Treatment: Climate policy	0.026*** (0.007)	0.047*** (0.008)	0.095*** (0.008)	0.141*** (0.016)	0.035** (0.016)
Treatment: Both	0.041*** (0.007)	0.072*** (0.008)	0.117*** (0.008)	0.189*** (0.016)	0.094*** (0.016)
Observations	45,904	45,904	45,904	45,904	45,904
R ²	0.096	0.090	0.099	0.035	0.027

Note: The table shows the results of regressions of indicator or continuous variables on socioeconomic indicators and on energy usage indicators, controlling for country fixed effects. The dependent variable are indicator variables equal to 1 if the respondent (somewhat or strongly) supports each of the main climate policies (columns 1, 2, 3), or indices (4, 5). Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. See Appendix A-1 for variable definitions.

Table A20: Attrition analysis

	Dropped out	Dropped out after socio-eco	Failed attention test	Duration (in min)	Duration below 11.5 min
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Control group mean	0.196	0.078	0.157	35.712	0.322
Gender: Female	0.026*** (0.003)	0.020*** (0.002)	-0.027*** (0.003)	8.639*** (1.670)	0.006** (0.003)
Lives with child(ren)	0.007** (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.032*** (0.003)	-6.067*** (1.732)	0.026*** (0.003)
Age: 18 - 24	0.085* (0.043)	0.260*** (0.074)	0.131*** (0.024)	-44.953*** (9.702)	0.260*** (0.033)
Age: 25 - 34	0.027 (0.043)	0.209*** (0.074)	0.087*** (0.024)	-38.729*** (9.784)	0.179*** (0.033)
Age: 35 - 49	0.029 (0.043)	0.205*** (0.074)	0.055** (0.023)	-34.641*** (9.889)	0.124*** (0.033)
Age: 50 or older	0.046 (0.043)	0.217*** (0.074)	-0.024 (0.023)	-28.552*** (10.315)	0.047 (0.033)
Household income: Q2	-0.544*** (0.008)	0.118*** (0.010)	0.161*** (0.007)	-70.720*** (23.860)	-0.351*** (0.011)
Household income: Q3	-0.556*** (0.008)	0.105*** (0.010)	0.145*** (0.007)	-64.539*** (24.026)	-0.347*** (0.011)
Household income: Q4	-0.553*** (0.008)	0.106*** (0.010)	0.139*** (0.007)	-66.943*** (23.940)	-0.340*** (0.011)
Highest diploma: College	-0.060 (0.043)	-0.143* (0.074)	-0.004 (0.023)	89.445*** (20.617)	-0.142*** (0.033)
Highest diploma: High school	-0.054 (0.043)	-0.130* (0.074)	0.002 (0.023)	91.845*** (20.529)	-0.160*** (0.033)
Economic Leaning: Very Left	0.012* (0.007)	0.017*** (0.006)	0.041*** (0.007)	4.229 (3.211)	0.013* (0.007)
Economic Leaning: Center	0.004 (0.004)	0.008** (0.004)	0.010*** (0.004)	1.307 (1.867)	0.007 (0.005)
Economic Leaning: Right	-0.011** (0.004)	-0.006 (0.004)	0.019*** (0.005)	-0.809 (1.992)	0.021*** (0.005)
Economic Leaning: Very Right	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.005)	0.065*** (0.006)	-0.944 (2.327)	0.045*** (0.006)
Economic Leaning: PNR	0.161*** (0.007)	0.044*** (0.006)	0.038*** (0.007)	-3.789 (3.050)	0.231*** (0.008)
Treatment: Climate Impacts	0.034*** (0.003)	0.017*** (0.003)	-0.018*** (0.003)	4.532* (2.549)	-0.034*** (0.004)
Treatment: Climate Policies	0.038*** (0.003)	0.038*** (0.003)	-0.022*** (0.003)	7.183*** (2.667)	-0.044*** (0.004)
Treatment: Both	0.057*** (0.003)	0.042*** (0.003)	-0.027*** (0.003)	7.404*** (2.403)	-0.054*** (0.004)
Agglomeration size: Large	0.004 (0.009)	0.031*** (0.008)	0.014 (0.009)	44.212*** (10.170)	0.022 (0.021)
Agglomeration size: Medium	0.008 (0.009)	0.039*** (0.008)	0.025*** (0.009)	40.794*** (10.119)	0.024 (0.021)
Agglomeration size: Small	0.015* (0.009)	0.046*** (0.008)	0.047*** (0.009)	43.194*** (10.063)	0.052** (0.021)
Public transport available	-0.028*** (0.003)	-0.005* (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	-1.409 (1.446)	-0.042*** (0.003)
Car usage	-0.043*** (0.003)	0.017*** (0.003)	-0.033*** (0.003)	4.228*** (1.565)	-0.127*** (0.004)
Gas expenses	-0.072*** (0.003)	-0.060*** (0.003)	-0.001 (0.004)	1.328 (1.976)	-0.042*** (0.004)
Heating expenses	-0.054*** (0.003)	-0.047*** (0.003)	-0.003 (0.004)	-5.180** (2.233)	-0.047*** (0.004)
Flies more than once a year	-0.016*** (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.027*** (0.003)	0.744 (1.590)	0.015*** (0.004)
Sector of activity	-0.002 (0.003)	0.005 (0.003)	0.090*** (0.004)	-4.667*** (1.353)	0.096*** (0.004)
Eats beef/meat weekly or more	-0.024*** (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.007** (0.003)	0.800 (1.516)	-0.021*** (0.003)
Home ownership	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.009*** (0.003)	-0.005* (0.003)	-0.571 (1.378)	0.0004 (0.004)
Observations	70,124	70,124	70,124	70,124	70,124
R ²	0.412	0.072	0.093	0.005	0.332

Note: The table shows the results of regressions of indicators on socioeconomic indicators and on energy usage indicators, controlling for country fixed effects. The dependent variable are indicator variables equal to 1 if the respondent dropped out voluntarily (1), dropped out voluntarily after the questions on social, demographic, and energy characteristics (2), failed the attention test (3), or completed the survey in less than 11.5 minutes (4). All observations are used, including respondents who dropped out. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. See Appendix A-1 for variable definitions.

Table A21: Balance analysis

	Analysis sample			Full sample		
	Treatment Climate impacts	Treatment Climate policy	Treatment Both	Treatment Climate impacts	Treatment Climate policy	Treatment Both
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Control group mean	0	0	0	0	0	0
Gender: Female	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	0.009** (0.004)	-0.006* (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	0.010*** (0.004)
Lives with child(ren) under 14	-0.003 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	0.004 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)
Age: 25 - 34	0.008 (0.008)	0.013 (0.008)	-0.011 (0.008)	0.006 (0.006)	0.010* (0.006)	-0.006 (0.006)
Age: 35 - 49	0.014* (0.008)	-0.004 (0.008)	-0.014* (0.008)	0.010* (0.006)	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.005 (0.006)
Age: 50 or older	0.011 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.016** (0.007)	0.009 (0.006)	0.002 (0.006)	0.001 (0.006)
Household income: Q2	0.005 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.006)	0.003 (0.006)	0.003 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)
Household income: Q3	0.001 (0.006)	-0.005 (0.006)	0.006 (0.006)	0.003 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.006)	0.001 (0.005)
Household income: Q4	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.008 (0.007)	0.017** (0.007)	0.002 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.006)	0.008 (0.006)
Highest diploma: College	0.009 (0.008)	0.003 (0.009)	-0.013 (0.009)	0.002 (0.007)	0.006 (0.007)	-0.006 (0.007)
Highest diploma: High school	0.018** (0.008)	0.005 (0.008)	-0.024*** (0.008)	0.011 (0.007)	0.006 (0.007)	-0.014** (0.007)
Economic Leaning: Very Left	0.005 (0.010)	0.015 (0.010)	-0.024** (0.010)	0.007 (0.009)	0.010 (0.009)	-0.020** (0.009)
Economic Leaning: Center	0.003 (0.006)	0.006 (0.006)	-0.010 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.006)	0.003 (0.006)	-0.010* (0.006)
Economic Leaning: Right	0.001 (0.007)	0.006 (0.007)	-0.009 (0.007)	-0.006 (0.006)	0.004 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.006)
Economic Leaning: Very Right	0.006 (0.008)	0.012 (0.008)	-0.013 (0.008)	0.004 (0.007)	0.006 (0.007)	-0.015** (0.007)
Agglomeration size: Small	-0.002 (0.007)	0.002 (0.007)	0.008 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.006)	0.003 (0.006)
Agglomeration size: Medium	0.004 (0.008)	-0.005 (0.008)	-0.006 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.007)	-0.006 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.007)
Agglomeration size: Large	0.003 (0.007)	0.001 (0.007)	0.001 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.006)	0.001 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.006)
Public transport available	-0.010** (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	0.007 (0.005)	-0.007* (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)
Uses car	0.004 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.006)	-0.012** (0.006)	0.006 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)
High gas expenses	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.005)	0.006 (0.005)	0.005 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.005)	0.007 (0.005)
High heating expenses	-0.017*** (0.005)	0.007 (0.005)	0.010** (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)
Flies more than once a year	0.008 (0.005)	-0.0003 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.006 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)
Works in polluting sector	-0.0001 (0.006)	0.003 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.006)	0.001 (0.005)	0.001 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.005)
Eats beef/meat weekly or more	0.005 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	0.002 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)
Owner or landlord	0.005 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.0001 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)
Observations	40,680	40,680	40,680	53,469	53,469	53,469
R ²	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001

Note: The table shows the results of regressions of indicators on socioeconomic indicators and on energy usage indicators, controlling for country fixed effects. The dependent variable are indicators equal to 1 if the respondent was assigned to this treatment group. Columns (1)-(3) use the analysis sample restricted to those who did not rush through the survey and passed the attention check; columns (4)-(6) use the full sample (all respondents who did not drop out). Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. See Appendix A-1 for variable definitions.

A-7 Data sources

A-7.1 References

The supplementary spreadsheet *sources.xlsx* contains all sources used in the pedagogical videos or the questions, and sources for national statistics for quotas and sample representativeness. It also contains explanations for how we compute the cash transfers that can be funded by a carbon tax, which appear in the questions and videos. We provide a brief summary below.

A-7.1.1 Computations of the country-specific cash transfers

We directly tell respondents about the increase in fuel prices in local currency that would result from the carbon tax. To do so, we implicitly consider a carbon tax of \$45 per ton of CO₂ and compute the implied increase in fuel prices based on the carbon content of the fuel and the national fuel prices in each country. The revenues from this carbon tax are redistributed in the form of equal cash transfer to each adult. To compute the level of cash transfers, we assumed that the tax covers territorial CO₂ emissions from fossil fuels ([JRC 2018](#)) that consumers bear 80% of the incidence of the carbon tax, and that the elasticity of fuel consumption with respect to the tax is -0.2 (in line with the literature, e.g. ??).

A-7.2 Quotas

A-7.2.1 Detailed Regional Brackets

- **Australia:**

- Region 1: *Broad New South Wales* (Australian Capital Territory; New South Wales)
- Region 2: *Queensland*
- Region 3: *South Australia*
- Region 4: *Victoria-Tasmania* (Tasmania; Victoria; Other territories)
- Region 5: *West Australia* (Northern Territory; Western Australia)

- **Canada:**

- Region 1: *Central* (Manitoba; Saskatchewan)
- Region 2: *East* (New Brunswick; Newfoundland and Labrador; Nova Scotia; Prince Edward Island)
- Region 3: *North West* (Alberta; British Columbia; Northwest Territories; Nunavut; Yukon)
- Region 4: *Ontario*
- Region 5: *Quebec*

- **Denmark:**

- Region 1: *Hovedstaden*
- Region 2: *Midtjylland*
- Region 3: *Nordjylland*
- Region 4: *Sjælland*
- Region 5: *Syddanmark*

- **France:**

- Region 1: *Île de France*

- Region 2: *Nord-Est* (Bourgogne-Franche-Comté; Grand Est ; Hauts-de-France)
- Region 3: *Nord-Ouest* (Bretagne; Centre-Val de Loire; Normandie; Pays de la Loire ; Poitou-Charentes)
- Region 4: *Sud-Est* (Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes; PACA)
- Region 5: *Sud-Ouest* (Aquitaine; Languedoc-Roussillon; Limousin; Midi-Pyrénées)

- **Germany:**

- Region 1: *Central* (Hesse; Thuringia)
- Region 2: *Eastern* (Berlin; Brandenburg; Saxony; Saxony-Anhalt)
- Region 3: *Northern* (Bremen; Hamburg; Lower Saxony; Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania; Schleswig-Holstein)
- Region 4: *Southern* (Baden-Württemberg; Bavaria)
- Region 5: *Western* (North Rhine-Westphalia; Rhineland-Palatinate; Saarland)

- **Italy:**

- Region 1: *Centre*
- Region 2: *Islands*
- Region 3: *North-East*
- Region 4: *North-West*
- Region 5: *South*

- **Japan:**

- Region 1: *Chubu* (Aichi; Fukui; Gifu; Ishikawa; Nagano; Niigata; Shizuoka; Toyama; Yamanashi)
- Region 2: *Kansai* (Hyōgo; Kyōto; Mie; Nara; Ōsaka; Shiga; Wakayama)
- Region 3: *Kanto* (Chiba; Gunma; Ibaraki; Kanagawa; Saitama; Tochigi; Tōkyō)
- Region 4: *North* (Akita; Aomori; Fukushima; Hokkaido; Iwate; Miyagi; Yamagata)
- Region 5: *South* (Ehime; Fukuoka; Hiroshima; Kagawa; Kagoshima; Kōchi; Kumamoto; Miyazaki; Nagasaki; Ōita; Okayama; Okinawa; Saga; Shimane; Tokushima; Tottori; Yamaguchi)

- **Poland:**

- Region 1: *Central* (Lubusz; Greater Poland)
- Region 2: *Central-East* (Lesser Poland; Subcarpathian)
- Region 3: *North* (Podlaskie; Pomeranian; Kuyavian-Pomeranian; Warman-Masurian; West Pomeranian)
- Region 4: *South-East* (Holy Cross; Lodz; Lubin; Masovian)
- Region 5: *South-West* (Lower Silesian; Opole; Silesia)

- **South Korea:**

- Region 1: *East* (Busan; Daegu; North Gyeongsang; South Gyeongsang; Ulsan)
- Region 2: *North* (Gangwon; Gyeonggi; Incheon)
- Region 3: *Seoul*
- Region 4: *West* (Daejeon; Gwangju; Jeju; North Chungcheong; North Jeolla; Sejong; South Chungcheong; South Jeolla)

- **Spain:**

- Region 1: *Center* (Castilla-La Mancha; Comunidad de Madrid)
- Region 2: *East* (Cataluña; Comunidad Valenciana; Islas Baleares)
- Region 3: *North* (Aragón; Cantabria; La Rioja; Navarra; País Vasco)
- Region 4: *North-West* (Castilla y León; Galicia; Principado de Asturias)
- Region 5: *South* (Andalucía; Canarias; Ceuta (Ciudad Autónoma); Extremadura; Melilla (Ciudad Autónoma); Región de Murcia)

- **U.K.:**

- Region 1: *Central U.K.* (East Midlands; Wales; West Midlands)
- Region 2: *London*
- Region 3: *Northern England* (North East; North West; Yorkshire and The Humber)
- Region 4: *Northern U.K.* (Northern Ireland; Scotland)
- Region 5: *Southern England* (East of England; South East; South West)

- **U.S.:**

- Region 1: *Midwest* (Ohio; Illinois; Indiana; Iowa; Kansas; Michigan; Minnesota; Missouri; Nebraska; North Dakota; South Dakota; Wisconsin)
- Region 2: *Northeast* (Connecticut; Maine; Massachusetts; New Hampshire; New Jersey; New York; Pennsylvania; Rhode Islands; Vermont)
- Region 3: *South* (Alabama; Arkansas; Delaware; District of Columbia; Florida; Georgia; Kentucky; Louisiana; Maryland; Mississippi; North Carolina; South Carolina; Oklahoma; Tennessee; Texas; Virginia; West Virginia)
- Region 4: *West* (Alaska; Arizona; California; Colorado; Hawaii; Idaho; Montana; Nevada; New Mexico; Oregon; Utah; Washington; Wyoming)

- **Brazil:**

- Region 1: *Central-West*
- Region 2: *North*
- Region 3: *North-East*
- Region 4: *South*
- Region 5: *South-East*

- **China:**

- Region 1: *East*
- Region 2: *North*
- Region 3: *Northeast*
- Region 4: *South Central*
- Region 5: *West* (Northwest China; Southwest China)

- **India:**

- Region 1: *Central Zonal Council*
- Region 2: *Eastern Zonal Council* (Andaman and Nicobar Islands; North Eastern)
- Region 3: *Northern Zonal Council*

- Region 4: *Southern Zonal Council* (Lakshadweep)
- Region 5: *Western Zonal Council*

- **Indonesia:**

- Region 1: *Eastern Islands* (Bali; East Nusa Tenggara; Maluku; North Maluku; Papua; West Nusa Tenggara; West Papua)
- Region 2: *Eastern Java* (Central Java; East Java; Yogyakarta)
- Region 3: *Northern Islands* (Central Kalimantan; Central Sulawesi; East Kalimantan; Gorontalo; North Kalimantan; North Sulawesi; Southeast Sulawesi; South Kalimantan; South Sulawesi; West Kalimantan; West Sulawesi)
- Region 4: *Sumatra* (Aceh; Bangka Belitung Islands; Bengkulu; Jambi; Lampung; North Sumatra; Riau; Riau Islands; South Sumatra; West Sumatra)
- Region 5: *Western Java* (Banten; Jakarta; West Java)

- **Mexico:**

- Region 1: *Central-Eastern* (Federal District; Hidalgo; Mexico; Morelos; Puebla; Queretaro; Tlaxcala)
- Region 2: *Central-Western* (Aguascalientes; Colima; Jalisco; Guanajuato; Michoacan; Nayarit; San Luis Potosi; Zacatecas)
- Region 3: *North-East* (Coahuila; Nuevo Leon; Tamaulipas)
- Region 4: *North-West* (Baja California; Baja California Sur; Chihuahua; Durango; Sinaloa; Sonora)
- Region 5: *South* (Campeche; Chiapas; Guerrero; Oaxaca; Quintana Roo; Tabasco; Varacruz; Yucatan)

- **South Africa:**

- Region 1: *Center* (Free State; North West)
- Region 2: *Gauteng*
- Region 3: *North-East* (Limpopo; Mpumalanga)
- Region 4: *South-East* (Eastern Cape; KwaZulu-Natal)
- Region 5: *West* (Northern Cape; Western Cape)

- **Turkey:**

- Region 1: *Central* (Black Sea; Central Anatolia)
- Region 2: *East* (Eastern Anatolia; Southeastern Anatolia)
- Region 3: *Marmara*
- Region 4: *West* (Aegean; Mediterranean)

- **Ukraine:**

- Region 1: *Center* (Cherkasy; Chernihiv; Kirovohrad; Kyiv; Poltava; Sumy; Vinnytsya; Zhytomyr)
- Region 2: *East* (Donetsk; Kharkiv; Luhansk)
- Region 3: *South* (Dnipropetrovsk; Kherson; Mykolayiv; Odesa; Zaporizhzhya)
- Region 4: *West* (Chernivtsi; Ivano-Frankivsk; Khmelnytski; Lviv; Rivne; Ternopil; Volyn; Zakarpattyia)

A-7.2.2 Detailed urban-rural categories

- **Australia**

- Rural: Inner Regional Australia; Outer Regional Australia; Remote Australia; Very Remote Australia
- Urban: Major Cities of Australia

- **Canada**

- Rural: Forward Sortation Area second character is 0
- Urban: Forward Sortation Area second character is different from 0

- **Denmark**

- Rural: Live in town with less than 20,000 inhabitants
- Urban: Live in town with more than 20,000 inhabitants

- **France**

- Rural
 - * Rural category 1: Couronnes de Grand-Pôle
 - * Rural category 2: Autre
- Urban: Grand-Pôle

- **Germany**

- Rural: Rural areas
- Urban:
 - * Urban category 1: Cities
 - * Urban category 2: Towns and Suburbs

- **Italy**

- Rural: Rural areas
- Urban:
 - * Urban category 1: Cities
 - * Urban category 2: Towns and Suburbs

- **Japan**

- Rural: Living in a town of less than 100,000 inhabitants.
- Urban: Living in a town of more than 100,000 inhabitants.

- **Poland**

- Rural: Living in a town of less than 20,000 inhabitants.
- Urban: Living in a town of more than 20,000 inhabitants.

- **South Korea**

- Rural: Live in a District (i.e., “Gum”)
- Urban:
 - * Urban category 1: Live in a Town (i.e., “Si”)

- * Urban category 2: Live in a City (i.e., “Gu”)

- **Spain**

- Rural: Living in a town of less than 20,000 inhabitants.
- Urban: Living in a town of more than 20,000 inhabitants.

- **U.K.**

- Rural: Rural village; Rural hamlet and isolated dwellings; Rural town and fringe; Rural town and fringe in a sparse setting; Rural hamlet and isolated dwellings in a sparse setting; Rural village in a sparse setting; Accessible rural area; Remote rural area; Very remote rural area; Very remote small town; Accessible small town; Remote small town
- Urban:
 - * Urban category 1: Urban city and town; Urban city and town in a sparse setting
 - * Urban category 2: Urban major conurbation; Urban minor conurbation; Large urban area; Other urban area

- **U.S.**

- Rural: RUCA code different from 1 (core metropolitan)
- Urban: RUCA code 1 (core metropolitan)

- **Brazil**

- Rural: Live in a municipality with less than 50,000 inhabitants
- Urban: Live in a municipality with more than 50,000 inhabitants

- **China**

- Rural: Live in an agglomeration of less than 10,000 inhabitants
- Urban:
 - * Urban category 1: Live in an agglomeration of more than 10,000 inhabitants and less than 500,000 inhabitants
 - * Urban category 2: Live in an agglomeration of more than 500,000 inhabitants

- **India**

- Rural: Live in an agglomeration of more than 20,000 inhabitants
- Urban: Live in an agglomeration of more than 20,000 inhabitants

- **Indonesia**

- Rural: In a Kabupaten outside of the Capital town
- Urban: Kota; Capital town of a Kabupaten

- **Mexico**

- Rural
 - * Rural category 1: Rural
 - * Rural category 2: Semiurbano
- Urban: Urbano

- **South Africa**

- Rural: Live in a District municipality other than the District capital.
- Urban: Live in a metropolitan municipality or in a capital of a District municipality

- **Turkey**

- Rural: Living in a district with a share of rural population greater than the national average for districts.
- Urban: Living in a district with a share of rural population smaller than the national average for districts.

- **Ukraine**

- Rural: Living in a Village or a settlement
- Urban: Living in a City or an Urban settlement

A-7.2.3 Detailed education brackets

- **Australia:**

- Offical categories used (OECD): Tertiary education
- Corresponding questionnaire categories: College degree; Master's degree or above

- **Canada:**

- Offical categories used (OECD): Tertiary education
- Corresponding questionnaire categories: College degree; Master's degree or above

- **Denmark:**

- Offical categories used (OECD): Bachelor's or equivalent education; Master's or equivalent education; Doctoral or equivalent education
- Corresponding questionnaire categories: Professional bachelor's education; Bachelor's degree ; Master's degree or higher

- **France:**

- Offical categories used (OECD): Tertiary education
- Corresponding questionnaire categories: Bac + 2 or Bac + 3 (license, BTS, DUT, DEUG, etc.) ; Bac +5 or more (master's degree, engineering or business school, doctorate, medicine, master's degree, DEA, DESS ...)

- **Germany:**

- Offical categories used (OECD): Bachelor's or equivalent education; Master's or equivalent education; Doctoral or equivalent education
- Corresponding questionnaire categories: University degree (e.g. Bachelor) ; Master's degree or higher

- **Italy:**

- Offical categories used (OECD): Tertiary education
- Corresponding questionnaire categories: Professional degree ; Bachelor's degree ; Master's degree or higher

- **Japan:**

- Offical categories used (OECD): Tertiary education
- Corresponding questionnaire categories: Vocational school; University; Graduate school and above

- **Poland:**

- Offical categories used (OECD): Tertiary education
- Corresponding questionnaire categories: Bachelor's degree ; Master's degree or higher

- **South Korea:**

- Offical categories used (OECD): Tertiary education
- Corresponding questionnaire categories: Bachelor's degree ; Master's degree or higher

- **Spain:**

- Offical categories used (OECD): Tertiary education
- Corresponding questionnaire categories: University degree or higher vocational training ; Master's degree/doctoral degree

- **U.K.:**

- Offical categories used (OECD): Tertiary education
- Corresponding questionnaire categories: Vocational degree ; College degree ; Master's degree or above

- **U.S.:**

- Offical categories used (U.S. Census): Some college, no degree; Associate's degree; Bachelor's degree; Graduate or professional degree
- Corresponding questionnaire categories: College degree ; Master's degree or above

- **Brazil:**

- Offical categories used (OECD): Tertiary education
- Corresponding questionnaire categories: University education ; Graduate or higher

- **China:**

- Offical categories used (OECD): Tertiary education
- Corresponding questionnaire categories: Undergraduate ; Master and above

- **India:**

- Offical categories used (OECD): Tertiary education
- Corresponding questionnaire categories: College degree ; Master's degree or above

- **Indonesia:**

- Offical categories used (OECD): Tertiary education
- Corresponding questionnaire categories: Bachelor ; Master or higher

- **Mexico:**

- Offical categories used (OECD): Bachelor's or equivalent education; Master's or equivalent education; Doctoral or equivalent education

- Corresponding questionnaire categories: Technical or intermediate education ; University degree or higher vocational training ; Master's degree/doctorate

- **South Africa:**

- Official categories used (OECD): Tertiary education
- Corresponding questionnaire categories: College degree ; Master's degree or above

- **Turkey:**

- Official categories used (OECD): Bachelor's or equivalent education; Master's or equivalent education; Doctoral or equivalent education
- Corresponding questionnaire categories: Graduated from a University ; Master's degree or higher

- **Ukraine:**

- Official categories used (State Statistics Service of Ukraine): Primary level (short cycle) of higher education; The first (bachelor's) level of higher education; The second (master's) level of higher education; The third (educational-scientific / educational-creative) level of higher education; Scientific level of higher education
- Corresponding questionnaire categories: Specialist or bachelor's degree ; Master's or higher degree

A-7.2.4 Detailed voting categories

- **Australia:**

- Election considered: *2019 Australian federal election (House of Representatives)*
- Left: Greens; Labor
- Center: N/A
- Right: Liberal/National coalition
- Other: Other

- **Canada:**

- Election considered: *2021 Federal election*
- Left: Bloc Québécois; Green; Liberal; New Democratic
- Center: N/A
- Right: Conservative; People's Party
- Other: Other

- **Denmark:**

- Election considered: *Folketingsvalg (i 2019)*
- Left: Alternativet; Enhedslisten; Socialdemokratiet; Socialistisk Folkeparti
- Center: Radikale Venstre
- Right: Danske Folkeparti; Det Konservative Folkeparti; Liberal Alliance; Nye Borgerlige; Venstre
- Other: Other

- **France:**

- Election considered: *2017 Presidential Election*
- Left: Arthaud; Hamon; Melenchon; Poutou

- Center: Macron
- Right: Asselineau; Dupont-Aignan; Fillon; Le Pen
- Other: Cheminade; Lassalle; Other

- **Germany:**

- Election considered: *Bundestagswahl 2017*
- Left: Bundnis 90/Die Grünen; Die Linke; SPD
- Center: FDP
- Right: AfD; CDU/CSU
- Other: Other

- **Italy:**

- Election considered: *2018 Italian General Election*
- Left: Liberi e Uguali; Partito Democratico
- Center: Movimento 5 Stelle
- Right: Forza Italia; Fratelli d'Italia; Lega
- Other: Other

- **Japan:**

- Election considered: *2021 General elections*
- Left: Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan; Japanese Communist Party; Social Democratic Party
- Center: Democratic Party for the People; Komeito; Japan Innovation Party
- Right: Liberal Democratic Party
- Other: Other

- **Poland:**

- Election considered: *2020 Polish presidential election*
- Left: Robert Biedron; Waldemar Witkowski
- Center: Szymon Hołownia; Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz
- Right: Krzysztof Bosak; Andrzej Duda; Marek Jakubiak; Mirosław Piotrowski; Paweł Tanajno; Rafał Trzaskowski; Stanisław Żółtek
- Other: Other

- **South Korea:**

- Election considered: *2017 South Korean presidential election*
- Left: Moon Jae-in; Sim Sang-jung
- Center: Ahn Cheol-soo
- Right: Hong Joon-pyo; Yoo Seong-min
- Other: Other

- **Spain:**

- Election considered: *November 2019 Spanish General Election*

- Left: Esquerra Republicana; PSOE; Unidas Podemos
- Center: Ciudadanos
- Right: PP; VOX
- Other: Other

- **U.K.:**

- Election considered: *2019 General Election*
- Left: Green; Labour; SNP
- Center: Liberal Democrats
- Right: Brexit Party; Conservative
- Other: Other

- **U.S.:**

- Election considered: *2020 Presidential Election*
- Left: Biden
- Center: N/A
- Right: Trump
- Other: Hawkins; Jorgensen; Other

- **Brazil:**

- Election considered: *2018 Brazilian General Election*
- Left: Fernando Haddad; Marina Silva
- Center: Geraldo Alckmin; Alvaro Dias; Ciro Gomes; Henrique Meirelles
- Right: Joao Amoedo; Jair Bolsonaro; Cabo Daciolo
- Other: Other

- **India:**

- Election considered: *2019 Indian General Election*
- Left: AITC; BSP; CPO; DMK; INC; Other UPA; SP; YSR Congress
- Center: N/A
- Right: BJP; Other NDA; SS; TDP
- Other: Other

- **Indonesia:**

- Election considered: *2019 Indonesian General Election*
- Left: PDI-P
- Center: PAN; PKB
- Right: Demokrat; Gerindra; Golkar; Nasdem; PKS; PPP
- Other: Other

- **Mexico:**

- Election considered: *Elecciones Generales de Junio 2021*

- Left: MORENA; Movimiento Ciudadano; PRD; PT; VERDE
- Center: PRI
- Right: PAN
- Other: Other

- **South Africa:**

- Election considered: *2019 South African General Election*
- Left: ANC; EEF
- Center: DA
- Right: FF Plus; IFP
- Other: Other

- **Turkey:**

- Election considered: *2018 Turkish General Election*
- Left: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi; Halkların Demokratik Partisi; Vatan Partisi
- Center: İYİ Parti
- Right: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi; Hür Dava Partisi; Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi; Saadet Partisi
- Other: Other

- **Ukraine:**

- Election considered: *2019 Presidential Elections*
- Left: Petro Poroshenko
- Center: Iouri Boïko; Anatoliy Hrytsenko; Ioulia Tymochenko; Oleksandr Vilkul; Volodymyr Zelensky
- Right: Ruslan Koshulynskyi; Oleh Lyashko; Ihor Smeshko
- Other: Other

A-7.3 Correct answers to knowledge questions

Question	Correct Answer	Source
In your opinion, is climate change real?	Yes	IPCC (2021)
What part of climate change do you think is due to human activity?	Most (<i>if not all</i>)	IPCC (2021), Figure SPM.1
Which of the following elements contribute to climate change? (Multiple answers are possible)	CO ₂ ; Methane	IPCC (2021), Figure SPM.5
Do you think that cutting global greenhouse gas emissions by half would be sufficient to eventually stop temperatures from rising?	No (<i>net zero CO₂ emissions is required</i>)	IPCC (2021), D.1
If a family of 4 travels 700 km from A to B, with which mode of transportation do they emit the most greenhouse gases? Please rank the items from 1 (most) to 3 (least)	Plane (1) Car (running on diesel or gasoline) (2) Train / Coach (3)	Ecopassenger, U.S.: National Geographic Other: China (1), China (2), India, Indonesia
Which dish emits the most greenhouse gases? We consider that each dish weighs half a pound. Please rank the items from 1 (most) to 3 (least)	Beef [India: Lamb] (1) Chicken wings (2) Serving of Pasta [Asia: rice] (3)	Poore and Nemecek (2018)
Which source of electric energy emits the most greenhouse gases to provide power for a house? Please rank the items from 1 (most) to 3 (least)	Coal-fired power station (1) Gas-fired power plant (2) Nuclear power plant (3)	Pehl et al. (2017)
Which region contributes most to global greenhouse gas emissions? Please rank the regions from 1 (most) to 4 (least)	China (1); U.S. (2) E.U. (3); India (4)	JRC (2018)
In which region does the consumption of an average person contribute most to greenhouse gas emissions? Please rank the regions from 1 (most) to 5 (least).	U.S. (1); E.U. (2) China (3); India (4)	Global_Carbon_Project (2019)
If nothing is done to limit climate change, how likely do you think it is that climate change will lead to the following events?	Severe droughts and heatwaves (Likely) Rising sea levels (Likely) More frequent volcanic eruptions (Unlikely)	IPCC (2014)

Appendix References

- Global_Carbon_Project (2019).** Supplemental data of Global Carbon Project 2019. Version Number: 1.0 Type: dataset.
- IPCC, AR5, ed (2014).** *Climate change 2014: impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability: Working Group II contribution to the fifth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.* New York, NY:Cambridge University Press.
- IPCC, AR6 (2021).** Summary for Policymakers. In *Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.*
- JRC, European Commission (2018).** *Fossil CO₂ emissions of all world countries: 2018 report.* LU:Publications Office.
- Kling, Jeffrey R, Jeffrey B Liebman, and Lawrence F Katz (2007).** Experimental Analysis of Neighborhood Effects. *Econometrica*, 75(1): 83–119.
- Pehl, Michaja, Anders Arvesen, Florian Humpenöder, Alexander Popp, Edgar G. Hertwich, and Gunnar Luderer (2017).** Understanding future emissions from low-carbon power systems by integration of life-cycle assessment and integrated energy modelling. *Nature Energy*, 2(12): 939–945.
- Poore, J., and T. Nemecek (2018).** Reducing food's environmental impacts through producers and consumers. *Science*, 360(6392): 987–992.