Latex test

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Table 1: Are campaign limits and corruption convictions correlated?

	Dependent variable:			
	Corruption Convictions Index			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Individual limit amounts	−0.00004			−0.000
	(0.00005)			(0.0001
Individual limits (dummy)	−4.021			−2.98
	(4.572)			(5.076
Individual-to-party limit amount		−0.00000		0.0000
		(0.00001)		(0.0000
Individual-to-party limits (dummy)		−0.019		0.363
		(0.626)		(0.684
PAC limit amounts			−0.00002	−0.000
			(0.00002)	(0.0000
PAC limits (dummy)			−1.762	−1.33
			(1.519)	(1.743
Observations	1,149	1,149	1,149	1,149
R^2	0.002	0.00002	0.002	0.002
Adjusted R^2	−0.066	−0.068	−0.066	−0.06
F Statistic	0.826 (df = 2; 1075)	0.012 (df = 2; 1075)	0.843 (df = 2; 1075)	0.426 (df =

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***

Table 2: Are campaign limits and corruption reflections correlated?

	Dependent variable:			
	Corruption Reflections Index			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(
Individual limit amounts	−0.00000			−0.0
	(0.00000)			(0.00
Individual limits (dummy)	−0.316			−0.
	(0.257)			(0.2
Individual-to-party limit amount		−0.00000		−0.0
		(0.00000)		(0.00
Individual-to-party limits (dummy)		−0.087**		−0.09
		(0.035)		(0.
PAC limit amounts			0.00000	0.00
			(0.00000)	(0.00
PAC limits (dummy)			0.009	0.0
			(0.085)	(0.0
Observations	1,150	1,150	1,150	1,1
R^2	0.002	0.007	0.0001	0.0
Adjusted R^2	−0.066	−0.060	−0.068	−0.
F Statistic	0.842 (df = 2; 1076)	3.937** (df = 2; 1076)	0.037 (df = 2; 1076)	1.858* (df

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05;

Table 3:

	Dependent variable:		
	Corruption Convictions Index		Corruption Reflectio
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Divided government	−0.371*	−0.332	0.012
	(0.208)	(0.211)	(0.014)
Binding one-term limit	0.228	−0.294	0.056
	(1.399)	(1.494)	(0.093)
Binding two-term limit	0.013	0.048	0.002
	(0.232)	(0.234)	(0.015)
Real per capita income (thousands)	−0.001**	−0.001**	0.00001
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.00002)
AUSAs per million population	0.064	0.077	0.0003
	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.004)
Unemployment	0.007	0.029	0.015
	(0.155)	(0.161)	(0.010)
Citizen ideology measure	−0.001	0.001	−0.001
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.001)
Percent high school graduates	−2.187	−1.955	−0.707
	(7.236)	(7.455)	(0.477)
Real per capita gov revenues (thousands)	0.002	0.002*	0.0002**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0001)
Inequality: Male wages	0.131***	0.125***	−0.004
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.003)
Relative government wages	32.384	28.128	4.163
	(45.126)	(47.558)	(2.984)
Urbanization	0.074	0.073	−0.013*
	(0.114)	(0.115)	(0.007)
Log of population (millions)	3.883	2.988	0.098
	(3.032)	(3.231)	(0.200)
Individual limit amounts		0.0001	
		(0.0001)	
Individual limits (dummy)		8.012	
		(8.409)	
Individual-to-party limit amount		0.00000	
		(0.00001)	
Individual-to-party limits (dummy)		0.260	
		(0.744)	
PAC limit amounts		−0.00002	
		(0.00004)	

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Table 4: Do changes in limits lead to lower levels of corruption?

	Dependent varia
	Corruption Convictions Index

	(1)	(2)	(3)	
Individual limits removed	27.590 (117.102)			
Individual limits imposed	4.038 (25.993)			
Individual limit amount	0.00001 (0.0001)			
Individual limits removed*amount	−0.0003 (0.001)			
Individual limits imposed*amount	0.00004 (0.0003)			
PAC limits removed		−4.699 (42.691)		
PAC limits imposed		−0.977 (2.786)		
PAC limit amount		−0.00001 (0.0001)		
PAC limits removed*amount		0.0001 (0.0004)		
PAC limits imposed*amount		0.00000 (0.0001)		
Individual-to-party limits removed			−1.944 (3.317)	
Individual-to-party limits imposed			−0.252 (1.133)	
Individual-to-party limit amount			−0.00001 (0.00002)	
Individual-to-party limits removed*amount				
Individual-to-party limits imposed*amount			0.00000 (0.00002)	
Constant	3.198*** (0.090)	3.196*** (0.090)	3.184*** (0.089)	
Observations	1,099	1,099	1,099	
R^2	40.001	0.001	0.003	
Adjusted R^2	−0.004	−0.004	−0.001	
Residual Std. Error	2.939 (df = 1093)	2.939 (df = 1093)	2.935 (df = 1094)	0.19
F Statistic	0.172 (df = 5; 1093)	0.111 (df = 5; 1093)	0.691 (df = 4; 1094)	0.706