

“The Same PIN, Just Longer”: On the (In)Security of Upgrading PINs from 4 to 6 digits

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Motivation

- ❖ 4-digit PINs have previously been the default method of mobile authentication.
- ❖ Companies like Apple now encourage users to select a 6-digit over 4-digit PINs.

Is this a good
thing?





Photo: Philipp Markert | This PIN Can Be Easily Guessed (IEEE S&P 20')

Research Questions



1. How do users **select a 6-digit PIN** having previously selected a 4-digit PIN?
2. How does the **upgrade process and justification** provided impact security and usability?
3. How **predictable** is a user's 6-digit PIN if their previous 4-digit PIN is known?

Study Design




4-digit PIN Selection

Device Use Questions

6-digit PIN Instructions

6-digit PIN Selection

Follow-up Questions



6-digit PIN Treatments

Neutral

"To **continue** the study, now you must select a 6-digit PIN."

Upgrade

"Imagine you are **upgrading** your smartphone that requires PINs longer than 4 digits, so now you must select a 6-digit PIN."

Security

"Research has shown that the 4-digit PIN you selected is **insecure** and can **easily be guessed**. To continue the study, now you must select a 6-digit PIN."

Breach

"Imagine someone **learned** your 4-digit PIN and to protect your smartphone, now you must select a 6-digit PIN."

No-sub

Blocklist was enforced.



1234

001234

120034


123456

Recruitment & Demographics

- ❖ Recruited 1,010 participants from the US using Prolific.
- ❖ Each treatment was assigned at least 200 participants.
- ❖ Participants used their **own** smartphones for the study.



What did we find?






Untargeted Attacker

- ❖ Used to guess both 4- and 6-digit PINs.
- ❖ Attacker has no information about the victim.
- ❖ Use datasets from prior work [1,2] to do guessing.
- ❖ Guesses the PINs in descending frequency order.


[1] <https://www.danielamitay.com/blog/2011/6/13/most-common-iphone-passcodes>

[2] <https://wiki.skullsecurity.org/index.php/Passwords>


Guessability Results




4- digit PINs' Security




4- v 6-digit PINs' Security




Impact of Treatment on 6-digit



Impact of Treatment on 6-digit



Impact of Treatment on 6-digit



Targeted Attacker



- ❖ The attacker knows the victim's 4-digit PIN.
- ❖ Initial guesses by the attacker are targeted.
- ❖ Other guesses are in descending frequency order.
- ❖ Attacker is aware of blocklist for no-subsequence.

Transition from 4- to 6-digit PINs

Appends

1. First two digits:
7733 → 773377

2. Last digit twice:
4576 → 457666

3. Last two digits:
5109 → 510909

Common PINs

123456

654321

159357


Prepends

1. Prepend 00:
9997 → 009997




Targeted Attack

Untargeted Attack




Targeted Attack




Targeted Attack

Untargeted Attack



Targeted Attack



Summary

- ❖ 6-digit offer a **minimal security** improvement over 4-digit PINs.
- ❖ Users select 6-digit PINs that are **related** to their 4-digit PINs.
- ❖ Security-oriented upgrade messages can **improve** security.
- ❖ Overall, **encouraging a secure** PIN once is more beneficial.

Thank You! Questions?



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