# INFORMATION SECURITY DURING MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS

Issues, Safety Measures and Need-to-Know Solutions

Marco Ermini, 2017

### WHY?

- ➤ Why does it need Cyber Security support?
- ➤ Aren't they just ordinary business transactions?
- ➤ They seem to occur nearly every day, so what is so special about them that they require special security support, or any security support at all?
- ➤ What value does a security professional bring to the team?

# THE ACADEMIC MINUTE...

Black's Law Dictionary defines mergers and acquisitions as the following:

- Merger: The union of two or more corporations by the transfer of property of all, to one of them, which continues in existence, the others being swallowed up or merged therein...
- Acquisition: The act of becoming the owner of a certain property...
- Divestiture: to deprive; to take away; to withdraw

# THE ACADEMIC MINUTE...

It is all about...

- 1. Costs Control,
- 2. Market Share,
- 3. Regulatory Landscape, &
  - 4. Many Others

# KEY BUSINESS DRIVERS

- ➤ Confidentiality
- **≻**Speed
- ➤ Business as usual
  - ➤ Zero Impact
- ➤ Informed Business Decision on Risk

## WHY M&A FAIL?

- ➤ The acquiring company does not properly assess the value of the target company
- ➤ Inability of the acquiring company to successfully integrate the target company that leads to a failed acquisition

"It is well known in the M&A community that most acquisitions fail to create shareholder value, that is, they end up as a negative sum after paying acquisition premium and banker fees, impossible to get synergies to make up loss. The acquisitions that do create value are either a version of corporate venture capital (large company scooping tiny team), or mid-cap industrials buying a supplier. Few and far between..."

# THE FOUR "C"s

# THE FOUR Cs

- **≻**Capture
- **≻**Connect
- **≻**Combine
- **➤**Consolidate

# THREATS AND RESPONSE

# SCOPING THE THREATS

- ➤ Special Interest Groups gain from the Operation
  - ➤ Financial Criminals
  - ➤ Competitors
  - Acquisition / Merger Company
  - Disgruntled Employees
- ➤ General Interest Groups gain from Impact
  - Script Kiddies / Hackers
  - ➤ Hacktivists / Terrorists
  - ➤ Spies

### SCOPING THE RISKS

- Publicity, raising profile your interest gets attacker's interest!
- ➤ Impact on:
  - ➤ Resources
  - ➤ Technologies
  - ➤ Infrastructure
- ➤ Disgruntled Employees
- Change in threat and risk model
- ➤ Absorbing unknown / Confusion
- Creating new attack vectors and window of opportunity
- ➤ Business drivers can force this the Security Manager very quickly
- ➤ Are we all really equipped for change?

# THE SECURITY MANAGER

## THE ROLE OF A SECURITY MANAGER

- ➤ Protecting the effort itself
  - ➤ Confidentiality of the total effort
  - ➤ Confidentiality of the team's work
- ➤ Evaluating the security condition of the target company
  - ➤ Impact on the deal's value
  - ➤ Asking the right questions
- ➤ Providing subject matter expertise
  - ➤ Identify Security Requirements for the New Company
  - ➤ Controlling Rumors
  - ➤ Managing Global/International Aspects
  - ➤ "Team Consultant"
  - ➤ Low Hanging Fruits

# IMPORTANCE OF CONFIDENTIALITY

- ➤ Premature Disclosure of Intent
  - ➤ Loss of key employees
  - ➤ Bidding wars
  - ➤ SEC Liability
  - ➤ Loss of Initiative
  - ➤ Loss of Goodwill
    - ➤ Target Company
    - 3rd Parties relationships
    - Customer relationships

# PROTECTING THE OPERATION

- ➤ Unintended Release
- ➤ Unauthorized Release
- ➤ Protection from competitive intelligence efforts
- ➤ Documents Control

## THE SECURITY MANAGER IN ACTION

- Preliminary background investigations
  - ➤ Collection of Open-Source information
- ➤ Due diligence
  - ➤ More in-depth look
  - Estimation of Costs of Cyber Security
- ➤ Operations security
  - Protect operational activities
  - Develop and implement protective measures
  - ➤ Appropriate for each phase of the acquisition

# PRELIMINARY WAR WORK

### HOW CAN I VERIFY AN M&A TARGET CANDIDATE?


- ➤ You cannot explicitly test your acquisition's candidate
- ➤ You cannot simply ask them for their vulnerability assessments' results
- ➤ Not all companies have a structured and mature security program
- ➤ You cannot silently test them either

# EXTERNAL SOURCES

- ➤ Professional Associations
- ➤ Service Providers
- ➤ Public (Open) Sources
- ➤ Job Applications/Job Postings

# HOW THAT DOES LOOK FOR REAL...





# DUE DILIGENCE

Toolkit: https://github.com/markoer73/M-A

# "CAPTURE" OF SECURITY CONTROLS

- ➤ 13 Domains to verify
  - 1. Digital Identities
  - 2. Admin Accounts
  - 3. Endpoints/Client Systems
  - 4. Servers
  - 5. Networks
  - 6. Hosting
  - 7. Email
  - 8. Data Recovery
  - 9. Boundary Defenses
  - 10. Assets Inventory
  - 11. Operational Security
  - 12. Physical Security
  - 13. Wireless Networks

# EXAMPLE OF POLICY REQUIREMENT

Domain	Verification	How-to	Objectives	Minimum Acceptable Level
Digital Identities	Verify status of identities in main identity store (use of unique IDs, generic accounts, password policy, Groups' usage, GPOs, Federations, etc.).  Verify if anything is outside of the main identity store (e.g. VPN accounts, Cloud accounts, supplier accounts, etc.).	<ul> <li>Interview with IT admins from Target.</li> <li>Snapshot of information from AD/LDAP.</li> <li>Interview with business units which manage other tools (Cloud etc.), to understand how this is managed</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Ensure appropriate controls are in place to protect Target environment and data</li> <li>Get an idea of the complexity of the DI structure of the Target.</li> <li>Understand usage of Cloud applications and identities.</li> <li>Understand how restriction of access to information happens in Target.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>There is a Directory Service</li> <li>Unique IDs are used</li> <li>Permissions are assigned via Groups in the Directory Service</li> <li>Service and Cloud accounts are gathered, minimized, and under control</li> <li>Sensitive files are shared in a secure way</li> </ul>
Admin	Verify status of admin account management in main identity store, if managed there.  Verify if anything is outside of the main identity store (e.g. VPN accounts, Cloud accounts, supplier accounts, etc.)	<ul> <li>Interview with IT admins from Target.</li> <li>Snapshot of information from AD/LDAP and other tools.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Ensure admin account controls are defined, implemented and reviewed to protect systems and data</li> <li>Understand how IT administrative actions are performed, what the</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Admin accounts are managed under a Directory Service</li> <li>Admin accounts are unique for each admin</li> <li>Central ownership of who gets appropriate rights</li> <li>Process for removing rights as appropriate</li> </ul>

# EXAMPLE OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Domain	Minimum Acceptable Level	Key Topics for Discussion
Digital Identities	<ul> <li>Directory Services of any kind are used</li> <li>Unique IDs are used</li> <li>Permissions are assigned via Groups in the Directory Service</li> <li>There is an adequate password policy in place</li> <li>Service and Cloud accounts are gathered, minimized, and under control</li> <li>Sensitive files are shared in a secure way</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>How many people are present in the company? Get overview of employees' org chart/roles, and how many people are in IT and Security.</li> <li>How old is the company? Get brief history, acquisitions, etc.</li> <li>Which DS is used? (AD, which version?)</li> <li>Get overview of Groups, GPOs, shared accounts, shared mailboxes, federated services, password policy (for AD, request screenshots).</li> <li>Is every system and device connected to DS and follow password policy, or there are systems which have their own passwords (e.g. Wi-Fi, network devices, etc.)?</li> <li>What is the process by which Group ownership, permissions and accesses to systems and applications are granted?</li> <li>Get overview of Cloud services used and how accounts are managed, if SSO is used and how, especially concerning files and documents sharing with third parties.</li> <li>Is Cloud Sharing such as Box, Dropbox etc. being used?</li> </ul>
Admin Accounts	<ul> <li>Admin accounts are managed under a Directory Service</li> <li>Admin accounts are unique for each admin</li> <li>Central ownership of who gets appropriate rights</li> <li>Process for removing rights as appropriate</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Get overview of how administration is performed, if AD Groups and GPOs are used, if shared accounts and/or shared mailboxes are used for admin accounts</li> <li>Understand how permissions are granted and removed from users as their work and function changes in the company</li> </ul>

#### 1. Control Required Practice Validation Area: General IT Controls Reference No. Company: Assigned To: Marco Ermini Targeted Completion Date: Phone: Closed Date: Date of Validation: Validation Completed By: From: Period Tested To: Reviewed By: Date: 2. Summary of the Outcomes Overall Status Description In March 2016 we have tested the target for acquisition in project in order to perform M&A due diligence activities. The results are the followings: Security Impact High security Impact – to be addresses with more urgency: Endpoint/Client Systems, Operational Security Medium security impact – to be addressed with normal priority: Data Recovery functions, Remote Terminal Services access, Servers Environment, Networks, Email Low security impact – to be addresses with lower priority: Digital Identities, Administrative Accounts, Hosting, Inventory, Wireless, Boundary defenses Processes impact: Green Hosting, Inventory, Wireless, Procurement process for equipment, Servers Environment, Networks, Email, Boundary defenses, Operational Security Low impact on processes: Digital Identities, Administrative Accounts, Data Recovery functions Cost impact: May not incur an additional costs: Digital Identities, Administrative Accounts, Hosting, Inventory, Wireless, Servers Environment, Email, Physical Security May incur in additional costs: additional storage for backup, dedicated network connectivity towards wireless equipment (not urgent), possible replacement/reimage of all client system, network equipment and firewalls aligned to current standards, additional feeds into the SIEM and external MSSP

# RISK ASSESSMENT

- ➤ Management Summary with a clear status
- ➤ Clearly indicate the area that will need additional attention
- ➤ Especially indicate where the additional costs will incur (e.g. new wireless equipment, re-imaging of the endpoints, reimplementation of firewall, etc.)

#### 4. Controls which will require more adjustments (insufficient)

#### 7. Endpoint/Client Systems

- Endpoints require being standardised to
- Endpoints will require disk level encryption.
- Endpoints will require antimalware protection to be elevated to
- Remote access via Terminal Services need to receive a security assessment, can be potentially insecure.

#### Evaluation:

- Security Impact: high.
- Process impact: medium.
- Cost impact: the cost of client replacement, processes alignment including procurement, and field service will have a cost impact.

#### 8. Servers Environment

- Servers will need to be aligned with standards in terms of patch distribution (SCCM) and receive periodic and urgent security patches when available.
- Servers will require antimalware protection to be elevated to

#### Evaluation:

- Security Impact: medium.
- Process impact: medium.
- . Cost impact: it may not incur an additional cost, and actually concur into a consolidation.

#### Networks

- Linux Firewall and SOHO equipment such as FritzBox will need to be upgraded to standard.
- Should be evaluated wether the DMZ is still required once joining

  or should it be moved to

#### Evaluation:

- Security Impact: medium.
- Process impact: medium.
- Cost impact: the cost of new network equipment must be budgeted, as well as connectors to and other required licenses.

# IMPACT ASSESSMENT Indicate the kind of impact:

- Security
- Processes
- ➤ Costs
- Indicate expected remediation, aligned with IT
- ➤ If not possible to estimate costs immediately, indicate how they should be calculated (e.g. need to provision new firewall cluster)

### SUMMARIZE FINDINGS ALIGNED WITH IT IN ONE SLIDE

# Due Diligence / Integration – IT

- No significant IT issues to acquisition or challenges to integration found
  - Microsoft server software license transfer not completed jet
  - Maintenance contracts expired for major infrastructure components
- Desktop Environment
  - Small (24) workforce with company owned laptops/desktops (3 yrs averge)
     and mobile devices; Remote desktop access for most users; Office 2013
- Server / Infrastructure Environment
  - Minimal on premise computer systems (small data room / 2 racks)
  - Microsoft Small Business 2008 Premium (Exchange, AD, DNS, etc.)
  - Most equipment EOL (4+ years)
  - 10x virtual servers on local hardware
- Production Systems
  - ERP: Microsoft Dynamics C5 on premise
  - CRM: Microsoft Dynamics CRM hosted at DataCenter
  - Old CRM: Superoffice to be retired in 12/2015
  - Webshop: www
     .dk hosted at

2014 1	
2014 1	2.1

# COSTS ALIGNED WITH IT FOR THE INTEGRATION

FY	/2016	
Item	Capital	recurring/monthly
Day o	ne need	
Vodafone MPLS Line (10Mbit)	2.000,00 €	1.500,00 €
Firewall (Palo Alto)	12.000,00 €	100,00€
Cisco Core Switch	20.000,00 €	100,00 €
Cisco Bridging Router	2.000,00 €	***************************************
Cisco Wireless Controller	2.500,00 €	
Cisco Access Point (3x)	1.500,00 €	
Consulting (ext. Resources)	5.000,00 €	
	45.000,00 €	1.700,00 €
FY Item	<b>'2017</b> Capital	recurring/monthly
10x Notebook EOL Replacement	11.000,00 €	recurringrinontity
TOX HOLEDOON EGE REPLACEMENT	11.000,00 €	
Option 1: Build up	T Infrastructure on	premise
SCCM Server (Distribution Point)	4.000,00 €	50,00 €
2x physical servers (VMWare)	10.000,00 €	100,00 €
Storage (VNX)	30.000,00 €	250,00 €
Backup Data Domain		500,00 €
	44.000,00 €	900,00 €
Option 2: Move applications into	s Managed Data	Cener (
5x hosted virtual servers		3.000,00 €
Storage for hosted applications		1.000,00 €
o especial manus de la	0,00 €	4.000,00 €

# CONNECT

# STARTING TO WORK IN CLEAR SIGHT

- ➤ The news is out
- ➤ Information Completeness is paramount
- ➤ An Integration Plan is proposed
  - ➤ Technical Integration
    - ➤ Networks, PCs, applications, data centers, hosting...
  - ➤ Business Processes and Systems
  - **➤** Timing
- ➤ The Integration Plan must also negotiate from an "as-is" to a "to-be" state for the Target.

# COMBINE

Target Characteristics	Security Guidelines	SLAs
<ul> <li>SMALL</li> <li>➤ Small employee base (&lt; 200 employees)</li> <li>➤ Low complexity</li> <li>➤ Private ownership</li> <li>➤ Little to no geographical diversity</li> <li>➤ No separate legal entities</li> <li>➤ No/limited need to keep the same facilities</li> <li>➤ No/limited to keep the existing technologies</li> <li>➤ Purchased for limited product portfolio, technology, talent, or local presence</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Baseline security controls Target is fully absorbed into IT infrastructure</li> <li>All IT labor is absorbed into IT global business units</li> </ul>	➤ Security controls established or confirmed in less than 100 days
<ul> <li>MEDIUM</li> <li>➤ Similar to previous kind, but Target has certain identifiable complexities that require specific sensitivity during integration</li> <li>➤ Fewer than 500 employees</li> <li>➤ Needs to be stand-alone for a certain period of time</li> <li>➤ During stand-alone time, Target maintains defined non-compliances</li> <li>➤ Supports its own IT infrastructure during the stand-alone phase</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Integration of Target may be full, hybrid, or standalone</li> <li>All IT labor is absorbed into IT global business units</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Operation integration of some IT infrastructure may take +180 days</li> <li>Processes may take 3 to 9 months</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>LARGE</li> <li>More than 500 employees</li> <li>Relatively large operations</li> <li>Significant multinational presence and subsidiaries</li> <li>Target contains certain identifiable complexities that require specific sensitivity during integration</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Integration of Target may be full, hybrid, or standalone</li> <li>IT labor can stay funded by Target company</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Operation integration of some IT infrastructure may take +180 days</li> <li>Customized integration plan</li> <li>IT Support is shared</li> <li>Processes take more than 12 months</li> </ul>

## COMBINING THE TWO COMPANIES

- Resources, staffing, processes, and systems are combined
- Business processes are as much as possible leveled
- ➤ IT tools are unified
- Active Directory merging strategy is key!
- ➤ The Target company has comparable / same security
- Exceptions are documented and signed off by leadership (executives, CISO)
- Agreed-upon designs are implemented
- ➤ Operations including InfoSec are turned to standard support
- ➤ Weekly or recurring meetings can be setup to assess progresses

### PLANNING THE ACTIVE DIRECTORY INTEGRATION

- ➤ Training for the technicians performing the migration
- Scheduled outages
- ➤ Companies' cultural differences such as who's allowed access to AD and Exchange, or how file system security is set
- ➤ Network differences between the two sites
- ➤ Network, AD, or Exchange anomalies
- Customer and employee communication

### PAIN POINTS IN ACTIVE DIRECTORY INTEGRATION

- ➤ Deciding the strategy
  - ➤ Integrate the Target into the Acquiring
  - ➤ Build a new, combined AD
  - ➤ Migrate legacy objects into a new AD
- ➤ One Company, One Email!
  - ➤ Free/Busy Information
  - Exchange/Lync/Office/AD versions
  - ➤ Office 365?
- ➤ External Federations/Partners/ADFS?
- ➤ DNS configuration/forwarding
- ➤ SID history/filtering
- ➤ Evaluate purchase of a dedicated AD migration/upgrade tool

# ADJUSTING POLICIES

## MERGING POLICIES

- Safeguards against disgruntled employees
- New employee contracts
  - Are existing Policies still relevant?
  - Are we "dumbing down" their security?
- Existing employee contracts
  - Do they protect you?
  - Do they meet new relationship?
- Identify key policies yours vs theirs
  - Work with Legal Departments

# MERGING INFOSEC

# THE NEW SECURITY DEPARTMENT


- Cost/Budgeting
  - ➤ Pre-merger: OpEx
  - ➤ Merger: CapEx, Processes
  - ➤ Post-merger: Optimization
- ➤ Communications

# WHAT IF I AM ON THE WEAK SIDE?


- 1. Identify specific strengths that can be useful in the merging
  - ➤ Experience from security incidents
  - ➤ Technological implementations
  - ➤ Local knowledge and compliance
- 2. Be prepared to learn
  - What is the current Cyber Security philosophy?
  - ➤ Who is taking security-related decisions?
- 3. Don't rush your career decisions
  - ➤ Can bring new opportunities
  - ➤ Meet the new management

# LEVERAGING THE CLOUD

# **CLOUD EMAIL GATEWAYS**



# SAAS WAF/CDN




#### MOVING TO A CLOUD-BASED ERP OR EMAIL SOLUTION

- ➤ Traditional M&A dogma is "transition, then transform"
- Companies however are leveraging migration to key technologies to the Cloud during the M&A process as an enabler
- Can simultaneously replace aging, capital-intensive technology with a subscription-based operating model
- ➤ Ideal also for divestitures
- ➤ Boarding is considerably faster and cheaper than traditional on-premise solutions (Accenture estimate: 30% for both)
- Ultimate flexibility during a post-deal transition

# BACKUP SLIDES: OPEN SOURCE INFORMATION GATHERING


# **OSINT Framework**




#### OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE

- Collection of free tools and source of information
- ➤ They divide into
  - ➤ Tools which can run locally
  - Search Engine "dorking" (e.g. Google hacking)
  - ➤ Semi-closed sources
  - ➤ Exploitation of sites which have originally other purposes (e.g. social networks, dating sites...)


# METASPLOIT RECON-NG




# FOCA SEARCH




# JOB POSTING'S HARVESTING




# JOB POSTING'S HARVESTING



# JOB INTERVIEWS' HARVESTING




# ROBTEX.COM




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
# **ROBTEX.COM**



# HARVESTING OF CORPORATE EMAILS



## GATHERING OF DOMAIN NAMES





# GATHERING OF DOMAIN NAMES


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root@kali2: ~
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
 oot@kali2:~# dnsrecon -d
                                  . com
 * | Performing General Enumeration of Domain:
   DNSSEC is not configured for
        SOA I
                                                .35.18
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                          mail.protection.outlook.com
        MX
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                         mail.protection.outlook.com
                                                             180.106
                        45.79.185.240
        A
                                                             .194.4 ip4: 246.30 ip4:
                         n v=spfl ip4:
                                            .255.114 ip4:
        TXT
 74.204.0/22 ip4:
                                                  com include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:
                        .168.0/23 include:
m -all
[*] Enumerating SRV Records
        SRV sip. tls.
                                 com sipdir.online.lync.com 52.112.192.139 443 1
        SRV sip. tls.
                                 com sipdir.online.lync.com 2603:1027:0:4::b 443 1
                                 com sipdir.online.lync.com 2603:1027:0:8::b 443 1
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                                              com sipfed.online.lync.com 2603:1027:0:4::b 5061 1
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        SRV sipfederationtls. tcp.
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        SRV sipfederationtls. tcp.
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     (ali2:~#
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
# OLD (AND NEW) FASHION SCANNING


```
root@kali2: ~
 File Edit View Search Terminal Help
 oot@kali2:~# nmap
                          246.204
Starting Nmap 7.40 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2017-04-04 10:26 CEST
Nmap scan report for
                           246.204
Host is up (0.20s latency).
Not shown: 997 closed ports
                  SERVICE vac (gnucitizen.org)
PORT
        STATE
22/tcp filtered ssh
554/tcp open
                  rtsp
                 realserver second(s) between requests
7070/tcp open
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 27.33 seconds
     kali2:-#
root@kali2:~# zmap
                         246.204 -p 123
Apr 04 10:30:04.616 [WARN] blacklist: ZMap is currently using the default blacklist located at /etc/zmap/black
list.conf. By default, this blacklist excludes locally scoped networks (e.g. 10.0.0.0/8, 127.0.0.1/8, and 192.
168.0.0/16). If you are trying to scan local networks, you can change the default blacklist by editing the def
ault ZMap configuration at /etc/zmap/zmap.conf.
Apr 04 10:30:04.621 [WARN] zmap: too few targets relative to senders, dropping to one sender
Apr 04 10:30:04.795 [INFO] zmap: output module: csv
Apr 04 10:30:04.796 [INFO] csv: no output file selected, will use stdout
0:00 0%; send: 0 0 p/s (0 p/s avg); recv: 0 0 p/s (0 p/s avg); drops: 0 p/s (0 p/s avg); hitrate: 0.00%
 0:01 13%; send: 1 done (29 p/s avg); recv: 0 0 p/s (0 p/s avg); drops: 0 p/s (0 p/s avg); hitrate: 0.00%
 0:02 25%; send: 1 done (29 p/s avg); recv: 0 0 p/s (0 p/s avg); drops: 0 p/s (0 p/s avg); hitrate: 0.00%
0:03 38%; send: 1 done (29 p/s avg); recv: 0 0 p/s (0 p/s avg); drops: 0 p/s (0 p/s avg); hitrate: 0.00%
 0:04 50%; send: 1 done (29 p/s avg); recv: 0 0 p/s (0 p/s avg); drops: 0 p/s (0 p/s avg); hitrate: 0.00%
0:05 63% (3s left); send: 1 done (29 p/s avg); recv: 0 0 p/s (0 p/s avg); drops: 0 p/s (0 p/s avg); hitrate:
0.00%
0:06 75% (2s left); send: 1 done (29 p/s avg); recv: 0 0 p/s (0 p/s avg); drops: 0 p/s (0 p/s avg); hitrate:
0.00%
0:07 88% (1s left); send: 1 done (29 p/s avg); recv: 0 0 p/s (0 p/s avg); drops: 0 p/s (0 p/s avg); hitrate:
0.00%
0:08 100% (Os left); send: 1 done (29 p/s avg); recv: 0 0 p/s (0 p/s avg); drops: 0 p/s (0 p/s avg); hitrate:
0.00%
Apr 04 10:30:13.870 [INFO] zmap: completed
 oot@kali2:~#
```















### **NMAP**




ecure https://www.censys.io/certificates?q=					
S					
-2.demo.hybris.com					
, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=Let's Encrypt Authority X3					
1441100ecea8904ae728d609993a2469604d24a1ed523add81d780f451f2					
ed Leaf Certificate					
T=New South Wales, L=Sydney, O= Inc., OU=IT, CN=store. com , L=Amsterdam, O=Verizon Enterprise Solutions, OU=Cybertrust, CN=Verizon Akamai SureServer CA G14-SH E5a179d4bc445c2ec865585b4d16cfded149e7f26ba43ef9b6e154bef431					
d.subject.organization: Inc.					
d.Subject.organization.					
T=Bavaria, L=Martinsried, O= Germany Inc., CN=*.apuat.ccg. com  O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert SHA2 High Assurance Server CA  2cb129e8c2c7437b65e7f0884db8e5f847d8a03f0effa34f0d55c99e682d					
ed Leaf Certificate					
d.subject.organization: Germany Inc.					
Γ=California, L=San Diego, O= Corp, CN=rms. com					
, O=Symantec Corporation, OU=Symantec Trust Network, CN=Symantec Class 3 Secure Server CA - G4					
046b20c54305795f285527165f888419f8abc273745578cf5b3d861f9b69					
ed Leaf Certificate					
d.subject.organization: Corp					
T=Bavaria, L=Martinsried, O= Germany Inc., OU=IT Infrastructure Europe, CN=sslvpn					
, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert SHA2 High Assurance Server CA					
5ee487d0d1622e2e6bd08ed1cc777c450a2a907302e2d6610344981c6f5c					
ed Leaf Certificate					
d.subject.organization: Germany Inc.					
T=Bavaria, L=Martinsried, O= Germany Inc., OU=IT Infrastructure Europe, CN=sslvpn.					
, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert SHA2 High Assurance Server CA					
96dc3f712b0354cec2405475a1a240328955324b36b2e11d4dbc61449653					
ed Leaf Certificate					
d.subject.organization: Germany Inc.					


#### CENSYS.IO (SEMI-FREE)


- Parsing and collection of various publically-available information
- ➤ Example: certificates
  - SSLVPN in France and Munich
  - Date Center presence in Munich, San Diego, Sydney
  - Demo-site of Hybrid (ecommerce technology)
  - Using Akamai services in Sydney


# **CENSYS.IO - GEOLOCATION**





# **SHODAN.IO**


















3-30-2017 04-02-20	017	com /ENTS 🔥	SPF	WARN	Effective but allows a large number of hosts	SQ
First Seen	Last Seen	Impacts Grade	Grade	De	etails	
03-24-2017	03-29-2017	×	WARN	Effective but allows a large number of hosts		Q
06-06-2016	03-23-2017	×	BAD	SI	PF record is ineffective	Q
3-30-2017 04-02-20	017 ✓ spf2.  3 PAST EV	com /ENTS 🔥	SPF	WARN	Effective but allows a large number of hosts	09
First Seen	Last Seen	Impacts Grade	Grade	De	etails	
03-24-2017	03-29-2017	×	WARN	2 30	fective but allows a large imber of hosts	Q
08-20-2016	03-23-2017	×	BAD	SI	PF record is ineffective	Q
06-06-2016	08-19-2016	×	BAD	SI	PF record is ineffective	Q








# DATA BREACHES



Troy Hunt, the security researcher who I spoke with



#### NETPROSPEX - 2016-SEP-01


#### Description

In 2016, a list of over 33 million individuals in corporate America sourced from Dun & Bradstreet's NetProspex service was leaked online. D&B; believe the targeted marketing data was lost by a customer who purchased it from them. It contained extensive personal and corporate information including names, email addresses, job titles and general information about the employer.

#### **Disclosed Attributes**

Email Addresses, Name, Phone numbers, Physical Address

Domain(s)	Record(s)
com	845
com	204
.com	44
com	11
net	7
com	7
.com	7
com	7



#### Web Application Security

YOUR SCORE ISS

**ISSUES FOUND** 



1

Web apps are the engine of the online experience.

Boasting cloud storage and dynamic use, web apps have become a part of daily life as people increasingly rely on them for business, productivity, and entertainment.

How web apps get exploited >

#### **DNS Health**

YOUR SCORE

**ISSUES FOUND** 





DNS health is all about the quality and authenticity of the emails that fill your inbox. The Domain Name System (DNS) is critical for identifying mail exchange servers. It is also how we do attribution via email addresses, and not obscure IP addresses.

Why email security matters >

#### IP Reputation

YOUR SCORE

**ISSUES FOUND** 

#### **Network Security**

YOUR SCORE

**ISSUES FOUND** 



# THANK YOU!

Marco Ermini, 2017