

For Online Publication

Appendix to

**Wealthy Americans and Redistribution:
The Role of Fairness Preferences**

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APPENDIX A – SAMPLING AND ADDITIONAL RESULTS	3
A1. SAMPLING PROCEDURES	3
A2. SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS AND RANDOMIZATION CHECKS	5
A3. COMPARISON OF TOP 5% SAMPLE TO OTHER SOURCES	11
<i>A3.1. Geographic Coverage of the Top 5%</i>	11
<i>A3.1. Financial Characteristics</i>	13
<i>A3.2. Industry Characteristics.</i>	15
A4. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS	17
<i>A4.1 Top 1%</i>	17
<i>A4.2 Top 5% Income Earners</i>	20
<i>A4.3 Excluding Fast Responders</i>	23
<i>A4.4 Additional Data Quality Checks</i>	26
<i>A4.5 Breadwinner status by sample</i>	35
A5. DIFFERENT WAYS TO OPERATIONALIZE MERITOCRATIC BELIEFS	38
A6. ADDITIONAL RESULTS	44
REFERENCES	53
APPENDIX B – INSTRUCTIONS	55
B1. SPECTATOR SURVEY	55
B2. SPECTATOR EXPERIMENT	59
<i>B2.1 Treatment Luck</i>	59
<i>B2.2 Treatment Mixed</i>	60
<i>B2.3 Treatment Merit</i>	61
B3. WORKER INSTRUCTIONS	63

APPENDIX A – SAMPLING AND ADDITIONAL RESULTS

A1. SAMPLING PROCEDURES

We adopted YouGov’s standard procedure to obtain a representative sample of the general population. According to a recent evaluation by the Pew Research Center, YouGov’s procedure performs well in terms of accuracy of the survey responses compared to the methods used by other online opt-in panel providers (Kennedy et al., 2016).³¹ YouGov’s sampling procedure consists of three steps: (i) defining the sampling frame, (ii) quota sampling based on the sampling frame, and (iii) further balancing the final sample against the sampling frame using propensity score matching.

For the first step, we relied on YouGov’s in-house sampling frame, which contains information on gender, age, race, education, party identification, voter turnout, political ideology, and political interest. The demographic portion of the frame was constructed by stratified sampling from the full 2010 American Community Survey.³² Data on voter registration status and turnout were added to this frame using the November 2010 Current Population Survey. Data on political interest and party identification were then added to this frame using the 2007 Pew Religious Life Survey.

In the second step, respondents in our general population sample were quota-sampled to approximate the sampling frame. To this end, YouGov conducts more interviews than the target sample size (in our case, 450 respondents in the general population sample). In the third and final step, a matching model is used to calculate propensity scores for all individuals with completed interviews. Excess respondents with the lowest propensity scores (i.e., those who are least similar to the distribution

³¹ The report compared the online survey providers without identifying them, but YouGov revealed its identity (Rivers, 2016).

³² The American Community Survey (ACS) is conducted by the Census Bureau every year and includes more than 3.5 million respondents. Except for the decennial census, the ACS is the most comprehensive source of information in the U.S. on Americans’ socio-demographic characteristics. The ACS is used to determine the distribution of federal and state funds for a variety of government programs. Response to the ACS is required by law.

of socio-demographic characteristics in the sampling frame) were eliminated until the target sample size was achieved, in order to further approximate the sampling frame.

The sampling procedure for the wealthy followed the same principles, but with some minor modifications. First, we worked with YouGov to develop a custom sampling frame for the wealthy. This sampling frame contains information on gender, age, race (i.e., white vs. non-white), and education based on households with more than \$350,000 in household income in the 2015 American Community Survey.³³

Despite the vast size of the YouGov respondent pool (about 2 million respondents), there is still a limited number of respondents who belong to the top 5% of the income or wealth distribution, and they are usually harder to reach than most respondents from the general population. To maximize the number of completed interviews among the affluent, YouGov did not quota-sample the wealthy based on the affluent sampling frame (as it did for the general population); instead, it aimed to reach as many top income earners and wealth holders as possible. As for the general population sample, YouGov completed more interviews than the target sample size of 450 affluent respondents. Consequently, we once again implemented the matching step, whereby propensity scores based on the affluent sampling frame were calculated for each respondent who completed the survey. As for the general population sample, respondents with the lowest propensity scores were eliminated until the target sample size of 450 respondents was reached.

³³ While the most detailed financial information on the wealthy is contained in the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), that survey does not contain comprehensive demographic information. This is the reason why we use the demographic information from the ACS rather than the SCF to define the sampling frame for the wealthy. However, the ACS does not contain information on respondents' wealth, only income. While the income threshold for the top 5% is close to \$250,000, we raised the income threshold for defining the sampling frame for the wealthy in the ACS to \$350,000. We did this because the information from the SCF (where both income and wealth are available) suggests that a sizable share of respondents with income around \$250,000 have nonetheless relatively low wealth.

A2. SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS AND RANDOMIZATION CHECKS

In this section, we provide summary statistics for our samples and randomization checks for the redistribution experiment. Figure A1 shows the distributions of household income and gross liquid assets for the top 5% and bottom 95%. Table A1 summarizes the socio-demographic background of the two groups. Compared to the bottom 95%, the top 5% are, on average, older, more likely to be male or White, more educated, and less religious (all p -values < 0.001).

The top 5% also experienced more upward social mobility ($p < 0.001$) and are more likely to have accumulated wealth by being entrepreneurs and investors ($p < 0.001$). We constructed the variable “income mobility” by taking the difference in respondents’ placement on an income scale (from 1 to 100) at the present and when growing up. Because of potential measurement error, we validated our measure of social mobility using data from Chetty et al. (2014). Chetty et al. use administrative tax records and then calculate the income rank of a child’s household (i.e., when the child was 29-30 years old) and the income rank of the parents’ household (i.e., when the child was 12-16 years old). While Chetty et al.’s approach is similar to ours, their measure of social mobility is based on the income rank of a child at a specific age. By contrast, our participants reported their current income rank for whatever age they were at the time of the survey, which varies from participant to participant. Figure A2 compares the two measures. The figure plots the linear prediction of own income rank as a function of parents’ income rank for the birth cohort of 1979-82 using data from Chetty et al. (2014). It also plots the mean decile income rank of our participants versus the decile rank of their parents, separately for the bottom 95% and the top 5%. Despite some differences in the construction of these measures and data sources, the income mobility of the bottom 95% in our sample is highly correlated with the linear prediction based on Chetty et al. (2014) ($r = 0.612$, $p < 0.001$). Thus, our subjective measure of social mobility seems to be a good proxy for actual social mobility.

Table A2 provides randomization checks for the socio-demographic variables between the three conditions of the redistribution experiment, separately for the top

5% (panel (a)), and bottom 95% (panel (b)). Both panels show that respondent characteristics are balanced across treatments, suggesting that the randomization was successful.




FIGURE A1. DISTRIBUTIONS OF INCOME AND WEALTH

Notes: The figure presents the distributions of (a) annual household income, and (b) gross liquid assets for the bottom 95% (left panel) and the top 5% (right panel). Household income is measured for the previous year using 18 brackets, from “less than \$10,000” to “more than \$1 million.” Gross liquid assets are measured for the previous year using 10 brackets, from “less than \$250,000” to “more than \$50 million.” The figure does not show all the brackets for the two variables, but combines some of them for clarity of presentation. Gross liquid assets are defined as cash, savings, mutual funds, stocks, bonds, retirement accounts (such as IRAs, 401(k)s, 403(b)s, etc.), and all other types of investments, but excluding a respondent’s home and other real estate value.

TABLE A1—DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

	Top 5%		Bottom 95%		(5) Δ	(6) p-values
	(1) Mean	(2) SD	(3) Mean	(4) SD		
Age	62.701	(11.434)	47.072	(16.431)	15.629	<0.001
Male	0.772	(0.420)	0.422	(0.494)	0.350	<0.001
White	0.927	(0.261)	0.736	(0.441)	0.191	<0.001
College (undergraduate)	0.327	(0.470)	0.309	(0.463)	0.018	0.577
College (graduate)	0.611	(0.488)	0.113	(0.317)	0.498	<0.001
Protestant	0.254	(0.436)	0.347	(0.477)	-0.093	0.003
Catholic	0.224	(0.417)	0.164	(0.371)	0.060	0.026
Other religion	0.219	(0.414)	0.106	(0.308)	0.113	<0.001
Republican	0.320	(0.467)	0.235	(0.425)	0.084	0.006
Income mobility (in deciles)	2.842	(2.799)	-0.229	(2.233)	3.071	<0.001
Primary Source of wealth						
Inheritance	0.092	(0.290)	0.031	(0.174)	0.061	0.001
Salary	0.499	(0.501)	0.775	(0.418)	-0.276	<0.001
Own business	0.253	(0.435)	0.051	(0.221)	0.201	<0.001
Investment	0.156	(0.363)	0.043	(0.203)	0.113	<0.001
Other	0.000	(0.000)	0.077	(0.267)	-0.077	<0.001
None	0.000	(0.000)	0.023	(0.149)	-0.023	0.001
Observations	465		417			

Notes: The table reports the means and standard deviations of socio-economic characteristics of the top 5% (columns 1 and 2) and the bottom 95% (columns 3 and 4). “Age” is measured in years. “Male” is an indicator for male participants. “White” is an indicator for White people. “College (undergraduate)” is an indicator for participants who obtained an associate or bachelor degree. “College (graduate or higher)” is an indicator for participants who obtained a graduate or postgraduate degree. “Protestant,” “Catholic,” and “Other religion” are indicator variables for religion. “Republican” is an indicator for identifying as a republican as opposed to a democrat, independent, or other. “Income mobility” refers to the change in household income on the income scale (in deciles) when growing up relative to the present. “Primary Source of wealth” is the self-reported primary source of household wealth. Column (5) presents the differences in means between the top 5% and bottom 95%, and column (6) shows the p-values of these differences (Chi-square tests for binary variables and rank-sum tests for continuous variables).




FIGURE A2. VALIDATION OF SOCIAL MOBILITY MEASURE

Notes: The figure compares our subjective measure of social mobility with a similar measure from Chetty et al. (2014) that is based on administrative tax records. The dots represent the mean decile income rank of our participants (y-axis) versus the income rank of their parents, in red for the top 5% and in blue for the bottom 95%. Error bars indicate s.e.m. The line indicates the predicted income rank by income rank when growing up based on OLS regressions and data from Chetty et al. (2014). Chetty et al. calculate income rank of children at age 29-30 versus their parents income rank when a child was at age 12-16 for the 1979-82 birth cohort.

TABLE A2—RANDOMIZATION CHECKS

(a) Top 5%							
	Merit		Mixed		Luck		p-values
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	
Age	63.676	(10.471)	62.215	(12.310)	62.298	(11.440)	0.753
Male	0.779	(0.416)	0.772	(0.421)	0.766	(0.425)	0.962
White	0.938	(0.242)	0.933	(0.251)	0.912	(0.284)	0.645
College (undergraduate)	0.324	(0.470)	0.289	(0.455)	0.363	(0.482)	0.370
College (graduate or higher)	0.628	(0.485)	0.651	(0.478)	0.561	(0.498)	0.230
Protestant	0.290	(0.455)	0.242	(0.430)	0.234	(0.425)	0.482
Catholic	0.200	(0.401)	0.208	(0.407)	0.257	(0.438)	0.408
Other religion	0.186	(0.391)	0.275	(0.448)	0.199	(0.400)	0.131
Republican	0.303	(0.461)	0.320	(0.468)	0.333	(0.473)	0.851
Income mobility (in deciles)	2.737	(3.002)	2.883	(2.742)	2.894	(2.680)	0.999
Primary Source of wealth							
Inheritance	0.106	(0.309)	0.088	(0.285)	0.084	(0.278)	0.778
Salary	0.504	(0.502)	0.503	(0.502)	0.491	(0.501)	0.968
Own business	0.262	(0.442)	0.252	(0.435)	0.246	(0.432)	0.943
Investment	0.128	(0.335)	0.156	(0.365)	0.180	(0.385)	0.456
Other	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
None	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Observations	145		149		171		

(b) Bottom 95%							
	Merit		Mixed		Luck		p-values
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	
Age	47.732	(16.761)	48.050	(15.813)	45.511	(16.573)	0.357
Male	0.452	(0.499)	0.412	(0.494)	0.397	(0.491)	0.608
White	0.758	(0.430)	0.731	(0.445)	0.716	(0.452)	0.710
College (undergraduate)	0.280	(0.451)	0.319	(0.468)	0.333	(0.473)	0.589
College (graduate or higher)	0.127	(0.334)	0.134	(0.343)	0.078	(0.269)	0.273
Protestant	0.350	(0.479)	0.347	(0.478)	0.343	(0.476)	0.991
Catholic	0.166	(0.373)	0.186	(0.391)	0.143	(0.351)	0.640
Other religion	0.102	(0.303)	0.119	(0.325)	0.100	(0.301)	0.869
Republican	0.233	(0.424)	0.261	(0.441)	0.215	(0.413)	0.703
Income mobility (in deciles)	-0.488	(2.325)	-0.126	(2.415)	-0.026	(1.929)	0.162
Primary Source of wealth							
Inheritance	0.022	(0.146)	0.051	(0.221)	0.026	(0.161)	0.410
Salary	0.791	(0.408)	0.745	(0.438)	0.781	(0.416)	0.689
Own business	0.058	(0.234)	0.041	(0.199)	0.053	(0.224)	0.845
Investment	0.036	(0.187)	0.051	(0.221)	0.044	(0.206)	0.851
Other	0.072	(0.259)	0.071	(0.259)	0.088	(0.284)	0.871
None	0.022	(0.146)	0.041	(0.199)	0.009	(0.094)	0.295
Observations	157		119		141		


Notes: The table reports randomization checks for the redistribution task, separately for the top 5% (panel (a)) and bottom 95% (panel (b)). Columns (1) to (6) report the means and standard deviations of participants' socio-demographic background by treatment. "Age" is measured in years. "Male" is an indicator for male participants. "White" is an indicator for White people. "College (undergraduate)" is an indicator for participants who obtained an associate or bachelor degree. "College (graduate or higher)" is an indicator for participants who obtained a graduate or postgraduate degree. "Protestant," "Catholic," and "Other religion" are indicator variables for religion. "Republican" is an indicator for identifying as a republican as opposed to a democrat, independent, or other. "Income mobility" refers to the change in household income on the income scale (in deciles) when growing up relative to the present. "Self-made wealth" is an indicator for participants who built their wealth through an own business or financial investments. These two variables are our measures of social mobility. Column (7) shows the p-values for the null hypothesis that the three treatment groups have the same characteristics (Chi-square tests for binary variables and Kruskal-Wallis tests for continuous variables).

A3. COMPARISON OF TOP 5% SAMPLE TO OTHER SOURCES


A3.1. Geographic Coverage of the Top 5%

In Figure A3 we show the geographic coverage of our top 5% sample. Panel (a) shows the location (black dots) of each respondent in our top 5% sample. Panel (b) shows the county-level average household income across the U.S., based on the data from the 2016 American Community Survey (ACS).

There are two main takeaways. First, our wealthy respondents are dispersed across the U.S., and are not concentrated in just a few wealthy areas, such as New York City or Silicon Valley. Second, most of our wealthy respondents are drawn from high-income counties, as seen from the broad correspondence between the distributions in panel (a) and panel (b) of Figure A3. Therefore, our sample tracks fairly closely where the rich Americans are located across the U.S.



(a) Zip codes of top 5% sample



(b) Average county income

FIGURE A3. GEOGRAPHIC COVERAGE OF THE TOP 5%

Notes: Each black dot in panel (a) shows the zip code of a participant from our top 5% sample. One participant did not provide that information. Panel (b) shows the average county-level household income, based on the 2016 American Community Survey. Darker shades indicate higher average household income. The legend for the shading colors in panel (b), expressed in U.S. dollars, is indicated to the right of the map.

A3.1. Financial Characteristics

Figure A4 compares the distributions of financial characteristics of our top 5% sample with the equivalently defined sample from the 2016 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF).³⁴ The SCF is the most detailed source of financial information on U.S. households. It contains a large representative sample of U.S. households, and much like our survey, an oversample of wealthy households.³⁵ Because of the detailed information in the SCF, we were able to recreate the financial information in essentially the same way as it is recorded in our survey.

Panel (a) in Figure A4 compares the distribution of household income among individuals in our sample (in red) and in the SCF (in maroon) with more than \$250,000 in income or more than \$1M in gross financial assets; panel (b) examines the distributions of gross financial assets in the two surveys; panel (c) compares the distributions of liabilities; panel (d) compares the distributions of the main source of wealth (from salary, own business, investments, or “other”). The main takeaway is that the distributions of these financial characteristics in our sample are reasonably similar to the distributions of the same characteristics in the SCF sample. The main discrepancy is that our sample contains more individuals with larger gross financial assets, which is possibly in part a consequence of the fact that our sample contains more respondents who are older, and have therefore accumulated more wealth in retirement accounts (which are part of the gross financial assets).

³⁴ This means that we compare individuals in our survey with more than \$250,000 in household income or more than \$1 million in gross financial assets to individuals in the SCF defined in the same way.

³⁵ The SCF deliberately over-samples wealthy households in order to provide more precise estimates of the overall wealth and the more rarely-held assets, and to correct for any differential non-response across the wealthy and less-wealthy respondents. The SCF contains weights calculated based on non-publicly available IRS data for the entire U.S. population. The weighted SCF sample is representative of all U.S. households. In Figure A4, we compare our raw survey data to the weighted SCF data.




FIGURE A4. FINANCIAL BACKGROUND OF OUR TOP 5% COMPARED TO THE SURVEY OF CONSUMER FINANCES

Notes: The red bars indicate quantities from our top 5% sample with either household income above \$250,000 or gross financial assets above \$1 million; the maroon bars indicate quantities from the equivalently defined sample of the wealthy from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). The bars represent percent shares of the total applicable sample. The SCF shares are weighted by SCF-provided weights. The shares from our data are unweighted.

A3.2. Industry Characteristics.

Table A3 compares the distribution of employment in different industry sectors among respondents in our sample, and among high-income individuals in the 2016 Current Population Survey (CPS). The CPS contains information on household income but not on gross financial assets. For comparability, in defining the rich in our sample we only focus on income and disregard gross financial assets. Since income information in the CPS is censored at the top, we define the top 5% in the CPS in terms of top-coded household income. In our sample, we focus on individuals with more than \$250,000 in household income, which corresponds roughly to the top 5% in terms of income. We utilize the industry categories reported in the CPS. The information on industry in our survey comes from an open-ended question asking respondents which industry they were employed in at the time of the survey.³⁶ We coded these open-ended answers to conform to the CPS industry categories.

Table A3 shows that the industry breakdown among our rich respondents is quite similar to the breakdown among the rich respondents in the CPS. The only noteworthy differences are in public administration, leisure and IT.

³⁶ 27% of respondents who are not retired did not answer the occupation question.

TABLE A3—EMPLOYMENT BY INDUSTRY OF OUR TOP 5% COMPARED TO THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY

	CPS (in %)	Our top 5% sample (in %)
Professional and business services	24.9	25.4
Education and health services	21.9	20.1
Financial activities	12.7	11.8
Wholesale and retail trade	9.8	7.1
Manufacturing	8.7	8.3
Public administration	5.4	1.8
Transportation and utilities	4.5	4.1
Leisure and hospitality	4.0	7.7
Construction	3.8	4.1
Information	2.9	8.9
Agriculture	1.2	0.6

Notes. All entries are percent shares of the total sample. The first column shows the employment shares by industry among respondents in the 2016 Current Population Survey (CPS) who belong to the top 5% in terms of (top-coded) household income. The second column shows the equivalently defined employment shares by industry among participants in our survey with household income above \$250,000, which roughly corresponds to the top 5% in terms of household income in the U.S. The CPS shares are weighted by the CPS-provided weights. The shares in our data are unweighted.

A4. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

A4.1 Top 1%

There is no academic consensus on where to draw the line between top income earners and wealth holders, respectively, and the rest of the population. Yet, the academic and public debate on inequality has sometimes focused on the top 1% rather than the top 5% (e.g., Alvaredo et al., 2013; see also the Occupy Wall Street movement). We therefore repeat the main analysis with the top 1% and compare the results to the top 2-5% as well as the bottom 95%. About half of the participants in our top 5% sample (222 out of 465 participants) also belong to the top 1%.³⁷

Overall, we find that the differences to the bottom 95% tend to be larger for the top 1% than for the top 2-5%. As shown in Panels (a) and (b) of Figure A5, the top 1% show significantly less support for increasing the top income tax rate (-0.55 vs. -0.21, $p = 0.006$) and the estate tax rate (-0.87 vs. -0.56, $p = 0.018$) compared to the top 2-5%. The comparisons between the top 1% and bottom 95% are also significant (both p -values are less than 0.001).

We also observe larger differences in distributive choices between the top 1% and bottom 95% than between the top 2-5% and bottom 95%, as shown in Figure A6. The top 1% generally redistribute less than the other two groups, but the differences to the top 2-5% are not significant (the lowest p -value is 0.097). The differences to the bottom 95% are significant for the Luck and Mixed treatments ($p = 0.005$ and 0.008), but not for the Merit treatment ($p = 0.281$), which is the condition where we generally observe the lowest amount of redistribution. One should keep in mind, however, that the sample sizes are smaller compared to the original samples. Together, we tend to find larger differences when we focus on the top 1% rather than the top 5% as the economic elite. Thus, the results for the top

³⁷ In our data, a respondent qualifies to be in the top 1% with household income of \$750,000 or more, or gross liquid assets of \$5 million or more. Given the binned nature of our income and wealth variables, these values are closest to the cutoff values obtained from the 2016 Survey of Consumer Finances, which are \$865,000 for household income and \$8.19 million for gross liquid assets.

5% can be considered as lower bound estimates of the differences between the wealthy and the rest of the population.³⁸




FIGURE A5. ATTITUDES TOWARD REDISTRIBUTION OF THE TOP 1% AND TOP 2-5%

Notes: Attitudes toward redistribution of the top 1% (yellow), top 2-5% (red), and bottom 95% (blue) regarding: (a) the top income tax rate and (b) the estate tax rate. Participants were asked whether they would prefer a higher or lower tax rate on a 5-point scale from “much lower” (= -2) to “much higher” (= 2). Error bars indicate s.e.m.

³⁸ The results on meritocratic beliefs, altruism, and trust in government are also similar for the top 1% and the top 2-5% (these findings are available on request).




FIGURE A6. DISTRIBUTIVE CHOICES OF THE TOP 1% AND TOP 2-5%

Notes: Percentage of income redistributed from the high- to the low-income worker in the redistribution task by treatment for the top 1% (yellow), top 2-5% (red), and bottom 95% (blue). In the Merit treatment, earnings were assigned based on workers' relative performance on the task. In the Mixed treatment, earnings were determined based on workers' relative performance but there was also an element of chance. In the Luck treatment, earnings were assigned based on chance. Error bars indicate s.e.m.

A4.2 Top 5% Income Earners

In the main text, we categorize the wealthy based on their income and wealth because both income and wealth concentration have received attention in the literature on inequality (e.g., Saez and Zucman, 2016; Piketty et al., 2017). Of the 465 participants in our top 5% sample, almost all (93%) have enough liquid assets to be placed in the top 5% based on assets alone. In contrast, only 61% have enough income to be classified as top 5% based on income alone. We therefore check whether the results hold when focusing on top income earners only.³⁹

Overall, we find that the results are largely consistent with our main results when we classify the top 5% only based on income. Panels (a) and (b) of Figure A7 show that high-income earners are less supportive of increasing the top income tax rate (-0.43 vs. -0.03, $p < 0.001$) and the estate tax rate (-0.74 vs. -0.43, $p = 0.002$) than the general population.

The results from the experimental task also mirror our previous findings, as shown in Figure A8. The top earners generally redistribute less than the bottom 95%, with the largest difference occurring in the Luck treatment ($p = 0.002$). Together, these findings suggest that our results are robust to using a different definition of the affluent that is based only on income.⁴⁰

³⁹ In our data, individuals with greater assets are older and more often retired than the high-income earners. Non-retired and younger individuals with top incomes likely have busier schedules and may thus be less inclined to answer a survey (or do so less carefully).

⁴⁰ Other results for the top 5% defined in terms of income only are also similar to the results for the sample of the wealthy based on both income and wealth (these findings are available upon request).




FIGURE A7. ATTITUDES TOWARD REDISTRIBUTION OF TOP 5% INCOME EARNERS

Notes: Attitudes toward redistribution of the top 5% (red) and bottom 95% (blue) income earners regarding: (a) the top income tax rate and (b) the estate tax rate. Unlike in the main analysis where the samples are defined based on both household income and gross liquid assets, here the two samples are defined only based on income. Participants were asked whether they would prefer a higher or lower tax rate on a 5-point scale from “much lower” (= -2) to “much higher” (= 2). Error bars indicate s.e.m.




FIGURE A8. DISTRIBUTIVE CHOICES OF TOP 5% INCOME EARNERS

Notes: Percentage of income redistributed from the high- to the low-income worker by treatment for the top 5% (red) and bottom 95% (blue) income earners. Unlike in the main analysis where the samples are defined based on both household income and gross liquid assets, here the two samples are defined only based on income. In the Merit treatment, earnings were assigned based on workers' relative performance on the task. In the Mixed treatment, earnings were determined based on workers' relative performance but there was also an element of chance. In the Luck treatment, earnings were assigned based on chance. Error bars indicate s.e.m.

A4.3 Excluding Fast Responders

In any survey or experiment, researchers have limited control over the degree of carefulness with which participants read the questions and instructions. We implemented several procedures aimed at improving the quality of the data (see section 2 in the main text) but lack of attention remains a possible source of bias, especially if it varies across the two groups. For example, it is possible that the top 5% paid less attention to the survey questions than the bottom 95% as they might have a higher opportunity cost of time. However, we find that the top 5% spent more time filling out the survey than the bottom 95% (19.42 vs. 17.33 minutes, $p = 0.002$). It also took them slightly more time to complete the experimental task (1.75 vs. 1.68 minutes, $p = 0.056$).⁴¹

Another way to check for the potential issue of inattention is to exclude participants with particularly short survey completion times. To this end, we rerun our main analyses but exclude the 10% fastest respondents of the survey. Overall, the results remain essentially the same, as shown in Figures A8 and A9.⁴² The top 5% have more negative attitudes toward redistribution, and they redistribute less in the experimental task, especially in the Luck treatment. Together, we do not find evidence that differential attention to the survey questions or experimental task instructions drives the differences in tax attitudes and fairness preferences between the top 5% and bottom 95%.⁴³

⁴¹ Due to a technical problem, the time stamps for the experimental part have not been recorded for about 10% of the total sample.

⁴² This is also true when we exclude the fastest 10% respondents with regard to the experimental task. The results are available upon request.

⁴³ The results on meritocratic beliefs, altruism, and trust in government are also similar compared to the full sample (the findings are available upon request).




FIGURE A9. ATTITUDES TOWARD REDISTRIBUTION WHEN EXCLUDING FAST RESPONDERS

Notes: Attitudes toward redistribution of the top 5% (red) and bottom 95% (blue) regarding: (a) the top income tax rate and (b) the estate tax rate, when excluding the 10% fastest responders. Participants were asked whether they would prefer a higher or lower tax rate on a 5-point scale from “much lower” (= -2) to “much higher” (= 2). Error bars indicate s.e.m.




FIGURE A10. DISTRIBUTIVE CHOICES WHEN EXCLUDING FAST RESPONDERS

Notes: Percentage of income redistributed from the high- to the low-income worker by treatment for the top 5% (red) and bottom 95% (blue). This analysis excludes respondents with the 10% fastest completion time of the entire survey. In the Merit treatment, earnings were assigned based on workers' relative performance on the task. In the Mixed treatment, earnings were determined based on workers' relative performance but there was also an element of chance. In the Luck treatment, earnings were assigned based on chance. Error bars indicate s.e.m.

A4.4 Additional Data Quality Checks

Here, we detail additional quality checks both in the survey design stage and the analysis stage to minimize the probability of misreports of income, wealth, and other variables in our survey data.

In addition to the screening based on the consistency of respondents' answers to the income and wealth questions in our survey compared to prior surveys (described in Section 2 in the paper), we conducted several consistency checks within our survey *during the fielding stage*, based on a number of survey items. Using this procedure, we flagged those respondents whose response patterns raised concerns about their truthfulness, and asked YouGov to check those respondents' behavior in previous surveys. Upon YouGov's inspection, respondents whose previous behavior raised similar red flags were removed from our survey, and YouGov replaced them with fresh respondents sampled according to our sampling procedure (described in Section A1 above). Three dozen respondents were replaced this way, 80% of whom were from the general population sample. The procedure we used was as follows. First, we examined the consistency of answers across all the survey items capturing the respondent's economic situation: household income, assets, the share of liquid assets in retirement accounts, liabilities, main source of wealth, employment status, age, and enrollment in school. We sought to identify stark inconsistencies in answer patterns across all these survey items in combination. For example, we would flag a potentially inconsistent profile a respondent who reported being young (e.g. age < 30), a student, with low wealth (so no inheritance) but high income and a salary as the main source of wealth (despite being a student) and a low share of liquid assets in retirement accounts (so most retirement assets in non-liquid instruments like a 401(k)). We also probed carefully any respondent who reported the lottery as their main source of wealth.

We made similar consistency checks across the ideology, party identification and voting survey items. For example, a respondent was flagged if they placed themselves at the far left on a 0-10 ideology scale but identified themselves as a "strong Republican" who voted for Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election.

Finally, we looked at respondents' answers to open-ended fields on occupation and the place in the income ladder when growing up. If respondents made nonsensical answers (e.g. a meaningless work in the occupation field), we checked the consistency of other survey items and if needed, asked YouGov to examine that panelist's prior survey responses.

We now repeat a similar procedure within our entire dataset in the *analysis stage*, using the variables that are most likely to indicate misreporting. We flag the respondents whose answers potentially suggest misreporting and repeat our analyses excluding these respondents. The available survey questions allowed us to systematically flag respondents based on the following criteria:

Inconsistent absolute and relative income: As mentioned, our survey contains a question on the actual household income as well as a question on the subjective placement on an income scale from 1 to 100. We flag respondents who reported actual household income that places them in the top 20% of the actual distribution, but who placed themselves in the bottom 20% on the subjective relative income scale. Similarly, we flag respondents who reported the actual household income placing them in the bottom 20%, but who placed themselves in the top 20% on the subjective relative income scale. These inconsistencies may not reflect misreporting of actual income, as respondents may have misinterpreted the relative income scale or misjudged their subjective relative placement. Nonetheless, we take a conservative approach and flag 21 respondents as potential misreporters.

Total donation amount exceeding annual income: Our survey asked respondents to report the amount (in US\$) they donated to various causes in 2015. 12 respondents reported total donation amounts that exceeded their reported annual household income. Even though it is possible to donate more than the annual income (for example by donating from savings), we flag such respondents as potential misreporters.

Inconsistent zip code and state: Our survey contains a question on the zip code of the current home address of the respondent, and a question on the home state. We

derive the state from the zip code and identify 18 respondents where the state derived from the zip code does not match the home state selected in the survey question. While it is possible that a respondent may have multiple residences or for some other reason reports a different home state from the zip code of residence, we flag these respondents as potential misreporters.

Inconsistent employment status: Our survey contains two questions on employment status, one custom-designed by us, and the other fielded on every YouGov survey. The answer categories for the first question were: retired, unemployed, non-managerial employee, manager, business owner, and other. The answer categories for the second question were: working full-time, working part-time, temporarily laid-off, unemployed, retired, permanently disabled, taking care of home or family, student, and other. While some categories clearly overlap between the two questions, others do not, which may potentially explain inconsistencies in responses across the two questions. However, we again take a conservative approach and flag the 54 respondents who answered inconsistently, for example by choosing “permanently disabled” on the second question, but “manager” on the first.

Inconsistent political ideology: As in our initial screening, we use multiple questions on political ideology and party affiliation to evaluate respondents’ ideological consistency. YouGov’s default ideology item asks for respondents’ ideological placement on a 7-point scale from “very conservative” to “very liberal.” We also included a question asking respondents to place themselves on a 0-10 left-right scale. A third item is YouGov’s default party identification item on a 7-point scale from “strong republican” to “strong democrat.” While respondents may plausibly identify as conservative who identify with the democratic party and vice versa, or may interpret differently the two ideological scales, we conservatively flag 64 respondents whose answers are potentially suggestive of misreporting (e.g. Respondents who place themselves far-right on a left-right scale and liberal on the liberal-conservative scale; respondents who identify as democrats but place

themselves far-right, etc.). While the most glaring inconsistencies were dealt with in the survey fielding stage (as described above), we flag the less extreme but still possibly problematic inconsistencies here.

Any inconsistency: Finally, we combine all of the approaches and flag the 154 respondents who we identify as possible misreporters by at least one of the above criteria.

We applied these criteria to both the general population sample and the top 5%, meaning that we excluded respondents who provided seemingly inconsistent answers, even if their responses may have been truthful. Still, each criterion alone only flags at most 7% of all respondents, and 17% of respondents are flagged by any of the criteria. The low rate of possible misreporting is indicative of the strict screening measures that we implemented during the fielding phase.

We repeat the analysis of the main results excluding respondents flagged by each of the above criteria. In Tables A4-A7 below, we replicate the results from Table 1 in the paper on tax attitudes (both income and estate taxes) with sociodemographic controls, the results from Table 2 in the paper on the income redistributed in the experiment, and the results from Table 3 in the paper on the heterogeneity in fairness preferences among the top 5%. We first replicate the baseline results in the paper with sociodemographic controls in column (1) of each table, then repeat the analyses excluding the respondents flagged by each individual criterion in columns (2)-(6), and excluding the respondents flagged by any of the five criteria in column (7). The results are very robust, indicative of no bias due to possible systematic misreporting.

Finally, we note that other studies find that self-reports of income are reasonably reliable in surveys. Linking surveys with register data in Sweden and Denmark, respectively, Karadja et al. (2017) and Hvidberg et al. (2023) have recently found low shares of income misreporting. Similar patterns have on average been observed for reported annual earnings in the U.S. using a variety of matched survey and administrative datasets (e.g. Bound et al. 1994; Duncan and Hill, 1985; Pischke

1995). These patterns are consistent with the high reliability of self-reports of other financial summaries, such as health insurance coverage (Davern et al., 2008). What is more, the reliability of self-reported financial information tends to be higher in the context of repeated responses (Bound and Krueger, 1991; Bollinger, 1998), as is the case with YouGov opt-in panelists. Less is known about the reliability of self-reports of wealth, but there is some evidence that non-response bias is a bigger concern than misreporting conditional on a response (Johansson and Klevmarken, 2022). Because of our screening procedures, item non-response on income and wealth variables is not an issue in our data.

TABLE A4—ROBUSTNESS OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS INCOME TAXES FROM TABLE 1 COLUMN (2)
WITH RESPECT TO POTENTIAL MISREPORTING

<i>Dependent Variable:</i>	<i>Top income tax rate</i>						
	<i>None (Baseline) (1)</i>	<i>Income (2)</i>	<i>Donations (3)</i>	<i>Zipcode (4)</i>	<i>Employment (5)</i>	<i>Politics (6)</i>	<i>Any Criteria (7)</i>
Top 5%	-0.750*** (0.121)	-0.784*** (0.122)	-0.769*** (0.122)	-0.740*** (0.123)	-0.798*** (0.126)	-0.690*** (0.124)	-0.743*** (0.133)
Age	0.006** (0.003)	0.006** (0.003)	0.006* (0.003)	0.006* (0.003)	0.007** (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.005 (0.003)
Male	-0.147 (0.094)	-0.148 (0.095)	-0.133 (0.095)	-0.168* (0.094)	-0.168* (0.096)	-0.167* (0.097)	-0.189* (0.103)
White	0.126 (0.129)	0.129 (0.132)	0.129 (0.130)	0.158 (0.130)	0.124 (0.136)	0.045 (0.139)	0.116 (0.149)
Undergrad	0.258** (0.119)	0.272** (0.119)	0.259** (0.119)	0.257** (0.120)	0.291** (0.123)	0.283** (0.125)	0.341*** (0.132)
Grad	0.345** (0.134)	0.357*** (0.135)	0.348** (0.135)	0.348** (0.136)	0.356*** (0.138)	0.390*** (0.138)	0.439*** (0.147)
Protestant	-0.624*** (0.110)	-0.611*** (0.111)	-0.613*** (0.111)	-0.627*** (0.111)	-0.666*** (0.115)	-0.688*** (0.112)	-0.721*** (0.119)
Catholic	-0.670*** (0.124)	-0.674*** (0.127)	-0.669*** (0.125)	-0.651*** (0.126)	-0.692*** (0.130)	-0.747*** (0.127)	-0.780*** (0.138)
Other	-0.041 (0.132)	-0.046 (0.134)	-0.039 (0.133)	-0.040 (0.134)	-0.070 (0.138)	-0.060 (0.138)	-0.106 (0.148)
Constant	-0.003 (0.189)	-0.007 (0.191)	0.014 (0.191)	-0.009 (0.192)	0.012 (0.195)	0.171 (0.200)	0.123 (0.209)
Observations	825	807	816	807	774	770	687
Adjusted R^2	0.094	0.092	0.095	0.091	0.104	0.104	0.110

Notes: The table shows the robustness of the results from Table 1 Column (2) with respect to the exclusion of potential misreporting. It reports the results of OLS regressions of income tax attitudes on the top 5% indicator and sociodemographic controls. The dependent variable is the attitude toward the top income tax rate, measured on a 5-point scale from “much lower” (= -2) to “much higher” (= 2). Column (1) replicates the baseline results with the full sample, columns (2) to (6) exclude participants flagged by the respective criteria discussed in section A4.4. Column (7) excludes all participants flagged by any of the criteria. Significance levels: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

TABLE A5—ROBUSTNESS OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS ESTATE TAXES FROM TABLE 1 COLUMN (5)
WITH RESPECT TO POTENTIAL MISREPORTING

<i>Dependent Variable:</i>	<i>Estate tax rate</i>						
	<i>None (Baseline) (1)</i>	<i>Income (2)</i>	<i>Donations (3)</i>	<i>Zipcode (4)</i>	<i>Employment (5)</i>	<i>Politics (6)</i>	<i>Any Criteria (7)</i>
Top 5%	-0.588*** (0.132)	-0.592*** (0.133)	-0.604*** (0.134)	-0.574*** (0.135)	-0.615*** (0.136)	-0.572*** (0.135)	-0.588*** (0.144)
Age	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)
Male	-0.185* (0.103)	-0.194* (0.105)	-0.164 (0.104)	-0.188* (0.104)	-0.202* (0.107)	-0.171 (0.105)	-0.190* (0.112)
White	0.076 (0.139)	0.087 (0.142)	0.067 (0.139)	0.072 (0.141)	0.105 (0.146)	0.017 (0.148)	0.047 (0.162)
Undergrad	0.216 (0.133)	0.219 (0.135)	0.237* (0.134)	0.215 (0.135)	0.244* (0.138)	0.289** (0.136)	0.316** (0.144)
Grad	0.487*** (0.148)	0.495*** (0.149)	0.500*** (0.149)	0.476*** (0.152)	0.495*** (0.152)	0.567*** (0.147)	0.579*** (0.158)
Protestant	-0.756*** (0.118)	-0.759*** (0.120)	-0.758*** (0.119)	-0.753*** (0.120)	-0.773*** (0.122)	-0.840*** (0.120)	-0.829*** (0.127)
Catholic	-0.861*** (0.134)	-0.866*** (0.135)	-0.866*** (0.135)	-0.853*** (0.136)	-0.867*** (0.142)	-1.009*** (0.132)	-1.018*** (0.144)
Other	-0.206 (0.153)	-0.187 (0.155)	-0.226 (0.154)	-0.191 (0.155)	-0.258 (0.158)	-0.166 (0.158)	-0.217 (0.170)
Constant	0.167 (0.212)	0.116 (0.215)	0.143 (0.216)	0.199 (0.215)	0.155 (0.219)	0.304 (0.221)	0.274 (0.236)
Observations	809	791	800	791	759	757	675
Adjusted R^2	0.104	0.104	0.104	0.102	0.108	0.136	0.133

Notes: The table shows the robustness of the results from Table 1 Column (5) with respect to the exclusion of potential misreporting. It reports the results of OLS regressions of estate tax attitudes on the top 5% indicator and sociodemographic controls. The dependent variable is the attitude toward the estate tax rate, measured on a 5-point scale from “much lower” (= -2) to “much higher” (= 2). Column (1) replicates the baseline results with the full sample, columns (2) to (6) exclude participants flagged by the respective criteria discussed in section A4.4. Column (7) excludes all participants flagged by any of the criteria. Significance levels: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

TABLE A6—ROBUSTNESS OF DISTRIBUTIVE CHOICES IN THE EXPERIMENT FROM TABLE 2 COLUMN (3)
WITH RESPECT TO POTENTIAL MISREPORTING

<i>Dependent Variable:</i>	<i>Share of income redistributed</i>						
<i>Exclusion Criteria:</i>	<i>None (Baseline)</i> (1)	<i>Income</i> (2)	<i>Donations</i> (3)	<i>Zipcode</i> (4)	<i>Employment</i> (5)	<i>Politics</i> (6)	<i>Any Criteria</i> (7)
Top 5%	-0.062*** (0.019)	-0.064*** (0.019)	-0.062*** (0.019)	-0.058*** (0.019)	-0.066*** (0.019)	-0.060*** (0.018)	-0.064*** (0.019)
Mixed	-0.095*** (0.016)	-0.092*** (0.016)	-0.095*** (0.016)	-0.093*** (0.016)	-0.090*** (0.017)	-0.098*** (0.017)	-0.096*** (0.018)
Merit	-0.143*** (0.015)	-0.141*** (0.015)	-0.145*** (0.015)	-0.142*** (0.015)	-0.143*** (0.016)	-0.142*** (0.015)	-0.145*** (0.016)
Age	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Male	-0.036** (0.014)	-0.029** (0.014)	-0.037*** (0.014)	-0.034** (0.014)	-0.041*** (0.014)	-0.035** (0.014)	-0.032** (0.015)
White	0.031 (0.019)	0.037* (0.020)	0.030 (0.020)	0.029 (0.020)	0.035* (0.020)	0.033* (0.020)	0.041* (0.022)
College (undergraduate)	0.021 (0.018)	0.020 (0.018)	0.021 (0.018)	0.017 (0.018)	0.025 (0.019)	0.032* (0.019)	0.028 (0.019)
College (graduate or higher)	0.034* (0.020)	0.036* (0.020)	0.037* (0.020)	0.030 (0.020)	0.033* (0.020)	0.048** (0.020)	0.046** (0.021)
Protestant	-0.071*** (0.017)	-0.073*** (0.017)	-0.072*** (0.017)	-0.069*** (0.017)	-0.073*** (0.017)	-0.072*** (0.017)	-0.077*** (0.018)
Catholic	-0.056*** (0.019)	-0.061*** (0.019)	-0.053*** (0.019)	-0.056*** (0.019)	-0.059*** (0.020)	-0.059*** (0.019)	-0.064*** (0.021)
Other	0.030 (0.018)	0.029 (0.019)	0.026 (0.018)	0.031* (0.018)	0.028 (0.019)	0.032* (0.018)	0.022 (0.020)
Constant	0.441*** (0.028)	0.432*** (0.029)	0.441*** (0.029)	0.452*** (0.028)	0.443*** (0.029)	0.426*** (0.029)	0.437*** (0.030)
Observations	880	859	868	862	826	818	729
Adjusted R^2	0.136	0.133	0.137	0.136	0.141	0.142	0.147

Notes: The table shows the robustness of the results from Table 2 Column (3) with respect to the exclusion of potential misreporting. It reports the results of OLS regressions of the share of income redistributed in the experiment on the top 5% indicator and sociodemographic controls. Column (1) replicates the baseline results with the full sample, columns (2) to (6) exclude participants flagged by the respective criteria discussed in section A4.4. Column (7) excludes all participants flagged by any of the criteria. Significance levels: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

TABLE A7—ROBUSTNESS OF HETEROGENEITY IN DISTRIBUTIVE CHOICES IN THE EXPERIMENT FROM TABLE 3 COLUMN (2)
WITH RESPECT TO POTENTIAL MISREPORTING

<i>Dependent Variable:</i>	<i>Share of income redistributed</i>						
	<i>None (Baseline) (1)</i>	<i>Income (2)</i>	<i>Donations (3)</i>	<i>Zipcode (4)</i>	<i>Employm. (5)</i>	<i>Politics (6)</i>	<i>Any Criteria (7)</i>
Top 5%, high mobility	-0.088*** (0.024)	-0.088*** (0.024)	-0.086*** (0.024)	-0.084*** (0.024)	-0.090*** (0.025)	-0.087*** (0.024)	-0.084*** (0.025)
Top 5%, medium mobility	-0.056*** (0.021)	-0.057*** (0.021)	-0.057*** (0.021)	-0.056** (0.022)	-0.063*** (0.022)	-0.054** (0.022)	-0.062*** (0.023)
Top 5%, low mobility	-0.047** (0.023)	-0.051** (0.024)	-0.047** (0.023)	-0.042* (0.023)	-0.050** (0.024)	-0.045** (0.022)	-0.049** (0.024)
Mixed	-0.098*** (0.016)	-0.095*** (0.016)	-0.098*** (0.016)	-0.096*** (0.016)	-0.094*** (0.016)	-0.101*** (0.017)	-0.099*** (0.017)
Merit	-0.148*** (0.015)	-0.145*** (0.015)	-0.149*** (0.015)	-0.147*** (0.015)	-0.148*** (0.016)	-0.146*** (0.015)	-0.149*** (0.016)
Age	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Male	-0.036** (0.014)	-0.029** (0.014)	-0.036** (0.014)	-0.034** (0.014)	-0.040*** (0.014)	-0.035** (0.014)	-0.032** (0.015)
White	0.030 (0.020)	0.036* (0.020)	0.028 (0.020)	0.028 (0.020)	0.034* (0.021)	0.031 (0.020)	0.040* (0.022)
College (undergraduate)	0.018 (0.018)	0.017 (0.018)	0.018 (0.018)	0.013 (0.018)	0.022 (0.019)	0.029 (0.019)	0.023 (0.019)
College (graduate or higher)	0.032 (0.020)	0.034* (0.020)	0.035* (0.020)	0.028 (0.020)	0.031 (0.020)	0.046** (0.020)	0.043** (0.021)
Protestant	-0.072*** (0.017)	-0.074*** (0.017)	-0.073*** (0.017)	-0.070*** (0.017)	-0.073*** (0.017)	-0.073*** (0.017)	-0.078*** (0.018)
Catholic	-0.055*** (0.019)	-0.060*** (0.019)	-0.052*** (0.019)	-0.055*** (0.020)	-0.057*** (0.020)	-0.058*** (0.019)	-0.062*** (0.021)
Other	0.026 (0.018)	0.025 (0.019)	0.023 (0.018)	0.028 (0.018)	0.025 (0.019)	0.029 (0.018)	0.020 (0.020)
Constant	0.451*** (0.028)	0.443*** (0.029)	0.452*** (0.029)	0.463*** (0.028)	0.454*** (0.029)	0.437*** (0.029)	0.449*** (0.030)
Observations	870	849	858	852	816	809	720
Adjusted R^2	0.143	0.139	0.144	0.143	0.148	0.150	0.155

Notes: The table shows the robustness of the results from Table 3 Column (2) with respect to the exclusion of potential misreporting. It reports the results of OLS regressions of the share of income redistributed in the experiment on three top 5% indicators, split by the change in household income on the income scale when growing up relative to the present, and sociodemographic controls. Column (1) replicates the baseline results with the full sample, columns (2) to (6) exclude participants flagged by the respective criteria discussed in section A4.4. Column (7) excludes all participants flagged by any of the criteria. Significance levels: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

A4.5 Breadwinner Status

We measure household income, but not individual income. While adult partners in households plausibly share similar preferences and attitudes, it is possible that they diverge. Moreover, it is possible that the likelihood of the main breadwinner participating in a survey declines with household income, and therefore, that different people take the survey in the top 5% sample (non-breadwinners) and the bottom 95% (breadwinners). While we do not have direct information on the main breadwinner status, we use the information on the respondents' employment to infer it. We classify respondents as likely not breadwinners if they stated that they are temporarily laid off, unemployed, permanently disabled, taking care of home or family, studying, retired before reaching retirement age, or another employment status that is not full-time employment, part-time employment, or retired (at or beyond the retirement age). By this classification based on employment status, 36% of the bottom 95% sample and 13% of the top 5% sample are likely not breadwinners in their household. Our key results are robust to adding this variable as an additional control, as seen in columns (2) and (5) of Table A8 for tax attitudes, and column (2) of Table A9 for fairness preferences. As an alternative robustness check, we restrict the sample to include only the 75% of participants who are likely breadwinners (see columns (3) and (6) of Table A8 and column (3) of Table A9). Even within this restricted sample, we still observe significant differences in tax attitudes and fairness preferences between the top 5% and the bottom 95%. However, the differences in income tax attitudes and fairness preferences decrease slightly in magnitude.

TABLE A8—ROBUSTNESS OF ATTITUDES TOWARD REDISTRIBUTION: ACCOUNTING FOR BREADWINNER STATUS

<i>Dependent Variable:</i>	<i>Top income tax rate</i>			<i>Estate tax rate</i>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Top 5%	-0.750*** (0.121)	-0.750*** (0.121)	-0.590*** (0.144)	-0.588*** (0.132)	-0.589*** (0.132)	-0.569*** (0.159)
Age	0.006** (0.003)	0.006** (0.003)	0.007* (0.004)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.004)
Male	-0.147 (0.094)	-0.149 (0.094)	-0.298*** (0.109)	-0.185* (0.103)	-0.208** (0.103)	-0.255** (0.121)
White	0.126 (0.129)	0.125 (0.129)	0.040 (0.151)	0.076 (0.139)	0.060 (0.138)	0.020 (0.165)
College (undergraduate)	0.258** (0.119)	0.255** (0.119)	0.160 (0.145)	0.216 (0.133)	0.184 (0.134)	0.092 (0.167)
College (graduate or higher)	0.345** (0.134)	0.340** (0.136)	0.236 (0.158)	0.487*** (0.148)	0.440*** (0.150)	0.327* (0.176)
Protestant	-0.624*** (0.110)	-0.625*** (0.110)	-0.666*** (0.125)	-0.756*** (0.118)	-0.764*** (0.118)	-0.838*** (0.137)
Catholic	-0.670*** (0.124)	-0.670*** (0.124)	-0.812*** (0.140)	-0.861*** (0.134)	-0.864*** (0.133)	-0.940*** (0.153)
Other religion	-0.041 (0.132)	-0.041 (0.132)	-0.157 (0.149)	-0.206 (0.153)	-0.210 (0.153)	-0.210 (0.173)
Non-breadwinner		-0.023 (0.109)			-0.217* (0.121)	
Constant	-0.003 (0.189)	0.015 (0.197)	0.206 (0.225)	0.167 (0.212)	0.338 (0.229)	0.484* (0.270)
Observations	825	825	636	809	809	624
Adjusted R^2	0.094	0.093	0.098	0.104	0.107	0.119

Notes: The table reports the results of OLS regressions of tax attitudes on the top 5% indicator and individual background variables. The dependent variable in columns (1) - (3) is the attitude toward the top income tax rate; the dependent variable in columns (4) - (6) is the attitude toward the estate tax rate. Both are measured on a 5-point scale from “much lower” (= -2) to “much higher” (= 2). “Age” is measured in years. “Male” is an indicator for male participants. “White” is an indicator for White people. “College (undergraduate)” is an indicator for participants who obtained an associate or bachelor degree. “College (graduate or higher)” is an indicator for participants who obtained a graduate or postgraduate degree. “Protestant,” “Catholic,” and “Other religion” are indicator variables for religion. “Non-breadwinner” is a proxy variable for not being a breadwinner in the household, constructed from employment status information. Columns (1) and (4) replicate the results from Table 1 Columns (2) and (5) with socio-demographic controls; columns (2) and (4) also control for breadwinner status, and columns (3) and (6) exclude all non-breadwinners from the analysis. Significance levels: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

TABLE A9—ROBUSTNESS OF ESTIMATES OF DISTRIBUTIVE CHOICES IN THE EXPERIMENT: ACCOUNTING FOR
BREADWINNER STATUS

<i>Dependent variable:</i>	<i>Share of income redistributed</i>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Top 5%	-0.062*** (0.019)	-0.062*** (0.019)	-0.053*** (0.021)
Mixed	-0.095*** (0.016)	-0.095*** (0.016)	-0.109*** (0.018)
Merit	-0.143*** (0.015)	-0.143*** (0.015)	-0.155*** (0.017)
Age	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.001)
Male	-0.036** (0.014)	-0.035** (0.014)	-0.044*** (0.016)
White	0.031 (0.019)	0.032 (0.020)	0.035 (0.024)
College (undergraduate)	0.021 (0.018)	0.022 (0.018)	0.035 (0.022)
College (graduate or higher)	0.034* (0.020)	0.036* (0.020)	0.036 (0.023)
Protestant	-0.071*** (0.017)	-0.070*** (0.017)	-0.075*** (0.019)
Catholic	-0.056*** (0.019)	-0.055*** (0.019)	-0.080*** (0.021)
Other religion	0.030 (0.018)	0.030 (0.018)	0.015 (0.020)
Non-breadwinner		0.009 (0.017)	
Constant	0.441*** (0.028)	0.434*** (0.031)	0.419*** (0.037)
Observations	880	880	669
Adjusted R^2	0.136	0.136	0.152

Notes: The table reports OLS results. The dependent variable is the share of income redistributed from the high- to the low-income worker in the experiment. “Top 5%” is an indicator variable for the wealthy. “Mixed” and “Merit” are treatment indicators. Columns (1) replicates the results from Table 2. Column (2) adds an additional control for breadwinner-status. “Non-breadwinner” is a proxy variable for not being a breadwinner in the household, constructed from employment status information. Column (3) excludes all non-breadwinners from the analysis. Significance levels: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

A5. DIFFERENT WAYS TO OPERATIONALIZE MERITOCRATIC BELIEFS

The one-dimensional trade-off between the relative importance of hard work and luck, which formed the basis of our measure in section 3.3, may not fully capture the complexity of how individuals view the importance of these two factors for success in life. While this measure has been widely used in the literature on inequality, it may not accurately reflect individuals' beliefs.

We implement two alternative approaches for analyzing meritocratic beliefs. First, we conducted a direct test to examine if the belief in the average importance of both luck and hard work for achieving success in life offers valuable insights in addition to the relative importance of hard work over luck. Second, we include separate measures for the importance of hard work and luck.

Average importance of hard work and luck:

Panel (b) in Figure A11 shows the average importance of hard work and luck for success in life by groups. The figure indicates that the top 5%, on average, place a higher value on the importance of hard work and luck in comparison to the bottom 95% (4.51 vs. 4.20, $p < 0.01$). However, Table A10 reveals that the average importance attached to hard work and luck has little explanatory power when it comes to variation in tax attitudes. For example, the measure for importance explains only 2-3% of the variation in tax attitudes of the top 5%. Moreover, in our analysis of the factors that account for the divergence in tax attitudes between the top 5% and bottom 95%, we observe that the combination of our initial measure for meritocratic beliefs and the measure of importance explains only 5% of the discrepancy in income tax attitudes ($p = 0.490$) and 13% of the gap in estate tax attitudes ($p = 0.154$). In contrast, our singular measure of inequality acceptance explains 20% and 33% (both $p < 0.001$), respectively, of the divergence in tax attitudes, indicating that it is a more important predictor (see Figure A12).




FIGURE A11. MERITOCRATIC BELIEFS AND AVERAGE IMPORTANCE

Notes: Meritocratic beliefs and average importance of hard work and luck for success in life among the top 5% (red), and bottom 95% (blue). For the measure of meritocratic beliefs in panel (a), participants were asked about the importance of hard work and luck for getting ahead in life on a scale from “not at all important” (= 0) to “very important” (= 6). The difference between the two answers yields our measure of meritocratic beliefs. For the measure of average importance in panel (b), we calculate the average absolute importance of hard work and luck for getting ahead in life. Error bars indicate s.e.m.

TABLE A10—DOMINANCE ANALYSIS WITH MERITOCRATIC BELIEF AND AVERAGE IMPORTANCE

(c) Top 5%				
	Top income tax rate		Estate tax rate	
Rank	(1)		(2)	
1	Inequality acceptance	41%	Belief Merit	44%
2	Belief Merit	39%	Inequality Acceptance	34%
3	Trust in government	12%	Trust in government	14%
4	Altruism	5%	Altruism	5%
5	Belief Importance	2%	Belief Importance	3%
Total variance explained		33%	35%	

(d) Bottom 95%				
	Top income tax rate		Estate tax rate	
Rank	(1)		(2)	
1	Belief Merit	49%	Belief Merit	36%
2	Inequality Acceptance	39%	Inequality Acceptance	33%
3	Belief Importance	5%	Trust in government	18%
4	Altruism	4%	Altruism	8%
5	Trust in government	2%	Belief Importance	5%
Total variance explained		7%	16%	

Notes: The table reports the results from a dominance analysis for the top 5% (panel a) and bottom 95% (panel b). This procedure estimates the relative contribution of our measures on inequality acceptance, meritocratic belief, the average absolute importance of hard work and luck for success in life, altruism, and trust in government in explaining variation in attitudes toward redistribution. Column (1) examines attitudes toward the top income tax rate, column (2) focuses on attitudes toward the estate tax rate. For each outcome variable the five measures are ranked by the size of their relative contribution to the variance explained with numbers adding up to 100%. The bottom rows show the percentage of total variance explained by all four beliefs and preference measures combined.




FIGURE A12. EXPLAINING THE GAP IN ATTITUDES TOWARD REDISTRIBUTION - MERITOCRATIC BELIEFS AND AVERAGE IMPORTANCE

Notes: This figure summarizes the results from the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, which evaluates how much of the differences in attitudes toward redistribution between top 5% and bottom 95% is explained by differences in inequality acceptance, meritocratic beliefs and importance of beliefs, trust in government, and altruism. Panel (a) presents the results for the top income tax rate and panel (b) for the estate tax rate. The graphs indicate the percentage change in the difference in tax attitudes after controlling for inequality acceptance, meritocratic beliefs, trust in government, and altruism, respectively. The baseline difference in tax attitudes is -0.48 regarding the top income tax and -0.42 regarding the estate tax on a 5-point scale from “much lower” (= -2) to “much higher” (= 2). Error bars indicate robust standard errors for the percentage change in the difference in attitudes between the top 5% and the bottom 95% and are calculated using the delta method.

Separate measures for importance of hard work and luck:

Figure A13 shows the importance attached to hard work and luck individually, ranging from “not important at all” to “very important” on a 7-point scale, for both the bottom 95% and top 5%. Compared to the bottom 95%, the top 5%, on average, attribute greater importance to both hard work (5.38 vs. 5.10, $p < 0.01$) and luck (3.64 vs. 3.31, $p < 0.01$).

After conducting a dominance analysis with hard work and luck beliefs as separate predictors (see Table A11), it becomes evident that both variables are significant contributors to the explained variation in tax attitudes. However, our analysis indicates that inequality acceptance remains the best predictor for variation in tax attitudes among the top 5%, and the second best predictor among the bottom

95%. Including separate variables to account for beliefs in hard work and luck in the decomposition of the tax attitudes gap yields the same results as including the difference in beliefs and the degree of importance assigned to each belief. This is because the two sets of predictors represent linear combinations of the same underlying variables (see Figure A14).




FIGURE A13. BELIEF IN LUCK AND BELIEF IN HARD WORK

Notes: Belief in the importance of hard work and luck for success in life among the top 5% (red), and bottom 95% (blue). Participants were asked about the importance of hard work and luck for getting ahead in life on a scale from “not at all important” (= 0) to “very important” (= 6). Error bars indicate s.e.m.

TABLE A11—DOMINANCE ANALYSIS WITH SEPARATE MEASURES FOR IMPORTANCE OF HARD WORK AND LUCK

<i>(e) Top 5%</i>				
Rank	<i>Top income tax rate</i>		<i>Estate tax rate</i>	
	(1)		(2)	
1	Inequality acceptance	42%	Inequality Acceptance	34%
2	Belief luck	21%	Belief hard work	30%
3	Belief hard work	20%	Belief luck	18%
4	Trust in government	12%	Trust in government	14%
5	Altruism	5%	Altruism	5%
Total variance explained		33%	35%	

<i>(f) Bottom 95%</i>				
Rank	<i>Top income tax rate</i>		<i>Estate tax rate</i>	
	(1)		(2)	
1	Belief hard work	44%	Belief hard work	34%
2	Inequality acceptance	38%	Inequality acceptance	32%
3	Belief luck	12%	Trust in government	18%
4	Altruism	4%	Belief luck	8%
5	Trust in government	2%	Altruism	7%
Total variance explained		7%	16%	

Notes: The table reports the results from the dominance analysis for the top 5% (panel a) and bottom 95% (panel b). This procedure estimates the relative contribution of our measures on inequality acceptance, belief about the importance of hard work for success in life, belief about the importance of luck for success in life, altruism, and trust in government in explaining variation in attitudes toward redistribution. Column (1) examines attitudes toward the top income tax rate, column (2) focuses on attitudes toward the estate tax rate. For each outcome variable the four measures are ranked by the size of their relative contribution to the variance explained with numbers adding up to 100%. The bottom rows show the percentage of total variance explained by all four beliefs and preference measures combined.




FIGURE A14. EXPLAINING THE GAP IN ATTITUDES TOWARD REDISTRIBUTION –
SEPARATE MEASURES FOR IMPORTANCE OF HARD WORK AND LUCK

Notes: This figure summarizes the results from the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, which evaluates how much of the differences in attitudes toward redistribution between top 5% and bottom 95% is explained by differences in inequality acceptance, belief in luck and belief in hard work, trust in government, and altruism. Panel (a) presents the results for the top income tax rate and panel (b) for the estate tax rate. The graphs indicate the percentage change in the difference in tax attitudes after controlling for inequality acceptance, meritocratic beliefs, trust in government, and altruism, respectively. The baseline difference in tax attitudes is -0.48 regarding the top income tax and -0.42 regarding the estate tax on a 5-point scale from “much lower” (= -2) to “much higher” (= 2). Error bars indicate robust standard errors for the percentage change in the difference in attitudes between the top 5% and the bottom 95% and are calculated using the delta method.

A6. ADDITIONAL RESULTS




FIGURE A15. MAGNITUDE OF THE DIFFERENCE IN ATTITUDES TOWARD REDISTRIBUTION IN COMPARISON

Notes: Differences in attitudes regarding (a) the top income tax rate, and (b) the estate tax rate. We compare the gender gap (male vs. female), the age gap (older or equal vs. younger than the median age of 47), and the education gap (some college or less vs. 2yr college degree or more) among the bottom 95% (blue bars) with the difference in attitudes between the bottom 95% and top 5% (red bar). Tax attitudes are measured on a 5-point scale from “much lower” (= -2) to “much higher” (= 2). Error bars indicate s.e.m.




FIGURE A16. DECISION TIME IN THE EXPERIMENT

Notes: This figure shows average decision times (in seconds) of the top 5% (red bars) and bottom 95% (blue bars) by the amount redistributed in the experimental task. We winsorize the data at the 99th percentile to mitigate the impact of outliers that have very high decision times. Due to a technical problem, the time stamps for the experimental task have not been recorded for about 10% of the total sample. Error bars indicate s.e.m.

TABLE A12—HETEROGENEITY AMONG THE TOP 5% IN DISTRIBUTIVE CHOICES IN THE EXPERIMENT – EXCLUDING RESPONDENTS AT THE TOP AND BOTTOM OF THE INCOME SCALE WHEN GROWING UP

<i>Dependent variable:</i>	<i>Share of income redistributed</i>			
	Baseline (1)	Excluding top 10% (2)	Excluding bottom 10% (3)	Excluding top and bottom 10% (4)
Top 5%, high mobility	-0.088*** (0.024)	-0.078*** (0.024)	-0.089*** (0.025)	-0.079*** (0.025)
Top 5%, med. mobility	-0.056*** (0.021)	-0.047** (0.022)	-0.059*** (0.021)	-0.050** (0.021)
Top 5%, low mobility	-0.047** (0.023)	-0.020 (0.025)	-0.058*** (0.022)	-0.032 (0.024)
Mixed	-0.098*** (0.016)	-0.096*** (0.016)	-0.093*** (0.016)	-0.091*** (0.017)
Merit	-0.148*** (0.015)	-0.145*** (0.016)	-0.148*** (0.015)	-0.145*** (0.016)
Age	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Male	-0.036** (0.014)	-0.041*** (0.014)	-0.037*** (0.014)	-0.043*** (0.014)
White	0.030 (0.020)	0.035* (0.020)	0.035* (0.019)	0.040** (0.020)
College (undergraduate)	0.018 (0.018)	0.016 (0.018)	0.024 (0.018)	0.022 (0.018)
College (graduate or higher)	0.032 (0.020)	0.024 (0.020)	0.041** (0.019)	0.032 (0.020)
Protestant	-0.072*** (0.017)	-0.069*** (0.017)	-0.072*** (0.017)	-0.070*** (0.017)
Catholic	-0.055*** (0.019)	-0.045** (0.019)	-0.060*** (0.020)	-0.050** (0.020)
Other religion	0.026 (0.018)	0.035* (0.019)	0.021 (0.018)	0.030 (0.018)
Constant	0.451*** (0.028)	0.460*** (0.029)	0.438*** (0.028)	0.445*** (0.029)
Observations	870	836	829	795
Adjusted R^2	0.143	0.146	0.143	0.145

Notes: The table reports OLS results. The dependent variable is the share of income redistributed from the high- to the low-income worker in the experiment. Column (1) replicates the results from Table 3 column (2) and includes three indicators for the wealthy, split by the change in household income on the income scale (in deciles) when growing up relative to the present into low (≤ 1 decile), medium (between 1 and 5 deciles) and high (≥ 5 deciles). Column (2) repeats the analysis but excludes the 10% of respondents among the wealthy who placed themselves highest on the income scale when growing up. Column (3) excludes those who placed themselves lowest when growing up. Column (4) excludes both the 10% who placed themselves highest and the 10% who placed themselves lowest. “Mixed” and “Merit” are treatment indicators. Significance levels: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

TABLE A13—HETEROGENEITY AMONG THE TOP 5% IN ATTITUDES TOWARD GOVERNMENT REDISTRIBUTION: INCOME MOBILITY

<i>Dependent variable:</i>	<i>Top income tax rate</i>			<i>Estate tax rate</i>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Top 5%, high mobility	-0.893*** (0.126)	-1.128*** (0.151)	-1.048*** (0.151)	-0.759*** (0.140)	-0.894*** (0.167)	-0.817*** (0.164)
Top 5%, medium mobility	-0.292*** (0.111)	-0.563*** (0.139)	-0.507*** (0.135)	-0.347*** (0.122)	-0.497*** (0.154)	-0.452*** (0.148)
Top 5%, low mobility	-0.414*** (0.128)	-0.700*** (0.145)	-0.617*** (0.142)	-0.287* (0.146)	-0.496*** (0.159)	-0.437*** (0.156)
Age		0.006* (0.003)	0.007** (0.003)		-0.003 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)
Male		-0.139 (0.094)	-0.097 (0.092)		-0.172 (0.105)	-0.142 (0.103)
White		0.093 (0.129)	0.169 (0.128)		0.063 (0.140)	0.164 (0.140)
College (undergraduate)		0.267** (0.119)	0.271** (0.117)		0.208 (0.134)	0.237* (0.131)
College (graduate or higher)		0.363*** (0.134)	0.314** (0.133)		0.495*** (0.148)	0.453*** (0.147)
Protestant		-0.592*** (0.109)	-0.410*** (0.111)		-0.738*** (0.118)	-0.557*** (0.121)
Catholic		-0.654*** (0.125)	-0.498*** (0.126)		-0.852*** (0.135)	-0.706*** (0.134)
Other religion		-0.049 (0.132)	-0.028 (0.125)		-0.222 (0.152)	-0.221 (0.145)
Republican			-0.801*** (0.092)			-0.839*** (0.096)
Constant	0.105 (0.064)	0.009 (0.190)	-0.000 (0.183)	-0.276*** (0.072)	0.177 (0.217)	0.169 (0.210)
Observations	820	819	806	805	804	789
Adjusted R^2	0.051	0.107	0.181	0.030	0.110	0.181
Differences within the Top 5%:						
high vs. low mobility	-0.479*** (0.156)	-0.429*** (0.148)	-0.430*** (0.145)	-0.473*** (0.175)	-0.398** (0.166)	-0.380** (0.163)
high vs. medium mobility	-0.601*** (0.142)	-0.566*** (0.136)	-0.541*** (0.132)	-0.413*** (0.155)	-0.397*** (0.146)	-0.365*** (0.141)
medium vs. low mobility	0.122 (0.143)	0.137 (0.137)	0.110 (0.130)	-0.060 (0.161)	-0.001 (0.151)	-0.015 (0.145)

Notes: The table reports OLS results. The dependent variables are the attitude towards the top income tax rate (in columns 1-3) and the estate tax rate (in columns 4-6) on a 5-point scale from “much lower” (= -2) to “much higher” (= 2), regressed on three indicators for the wealthy, split by the change in household income on the income scale (in deciles) when growing up relative to the present into low (≤ 1 decile), medium (between 1 and 5 deciles) and high (≥ 5 deciles). Columns (2) and (5) control for sociodemographic characteristics. Columns (3) and (6) also controls for party identity. Significance levels: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

TABLE A14—HETEROGENEITY AMONG THE TOP 5% IN MERITOCRATIC BELIEFS: INCOME MOBILITY

<i>Dependent variable:</i>	<i>Meritocratic Beliefs</i>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Top 5%, high mobility	0.317 (0.251)	0.508* (0.286)	0.415 (0.282)
Top 5%, medium mobility	0.036 (0.182)	0.286 (0.236)	0.221 (0.233)
Top 5%, low mobility	-0.553*** (0.205)	-0.300 (0.242)	-0.452* (0.235)
Age		0.003 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)
Male		-0.267 (0.171)	-0.243 (0.168)
White		-0.220 (0.217)	-0.244 (0.222)
College (undergraduate)		-0.066 (0.223)	-0.072 (0.225)
College (graduate or higher)		-0.192 (0.238)	-0.154 (0.240)
Protestant		1.032*** (0.190)	0.829*** (0.198)
Catholic		0.830*** (0.214)	0.696*** (0.214)
Other religion		0.075 (0.234)	0.100 (0.234)
Republican			0.958*** (0.166)
Constant	1.808*** (0.120)	1.446*** (0.333)	1.366*** (0.340)
Observations	846	845	823
Adjusted R^2	0.009	0.052	0.088
Differences within the Top 5%:			
high vs. low mobility	0.870*** (0.277)	0.808*** (0.276)	0.866*** (0.268)
high vs. medium mobility	0.280 (0.260)	0.222 (0.255)	0.194 (0.249)
medium vs. low mobility	0.589*** (0.215)	0.586*** (0.218)	0.672*** (0.212)

Notes: The table reports OLS results. The dependent variable is meritocratic belief, i.e. the importance of hard work minus the importance of luck for getting ahead in life, each measured on a scale from “not at all important” (= 0) to “very important” (= 6). Meritocratic belief is regressed on three indicators for the wealthy, split by the change in household income on the income scale (in deciles) when growing up relative to the present into low (≤ 1 decile), medium (between 1 and 5 deciles) and high (≥ 5 deciles). “Mixed” and “Merit” are treatment indicators. Column (2) controls for sociodemographic characteristics. Column (3) also controls for party identity. The bottom of the table reports the linear combinations of the differences between the coefficients for the subsamples of the wealthy. Significance levels: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

TABLE A15—HETEROGENEITY AMONG THE TOP 5% IN DISTRIBUTIVE CHOICES IN THE EXPERIMENT WHEN CONTROLLING FOR MERITOCRATIC BELIEFS: INCOME MOBILITY

<i>Dependent variable:</i>	<i>Share of income redistributed</i>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Top 5%, high mobility	-0.083*** (0.021)	-0.076*** (0.020)	-0.088*** (0.024)	-0.075*** (0.024)	-0.084*** (0.024)	-0.074*** (0.024)
Top 5%, medium mobility	-0.044*** (0.017)	-0.041** (0.016)	-0.056*** (0.021)	-0.046** (0.021)	-0.054** (0.021)	-0.046** (0.021)
Top 5%, low mobility	-0.029 (0.019)	-0.045** (0.019)	-0.047** (0.023)	-0.054** (0.023)	-0.046** (0.023)	-0.055** (0.023)
Meritocratic belief		-0.021*** (0.003)		-0.018*** (0.003)		-0.016*** (0.003)
Mixed	-0.096*** (0.017)	-0.102*** (0.016)	-0.098*** (0.016)	-0.102*** (0.016)	-0.099*** (0.016)	-0.103*** (0.016)
Merit	-0.149*** (0.015)	-0.152*** (0.015)	-0.148*** (0.015)	-0.150*** (0.015)	-0.150*** (0.015)	-0.150*** (0.015)
Age			-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Male			-0.036** (0.014)	-0.045*** (0.014)	-0.033** (0.014)	-0.041*** (0.014)
White			0.030 (0.020)	0.021 (0.020)	0.035* (0.020)	0.032 (0.020)
College (undergraduate)			0.018 (0.018)	0.016 (0.018)	0.017 (0.019)	0.018 (0.019)
College (graduate or higher)			0.032 (0.020)	0.028 (0.020)	0.027 (0.020)	0.026 (0.021)
Protestant			-0.072*** (0.017)	-0.057*** (0.017)	-0.061*** (0.017)	-0.048*** (0.017)
Catholic			-0.055*** (0.019)	-0.044** (0.019)	-0.047** (0.020)	-0.038* (0.019)
Other religion			0.026 (0.018)	0.023 (0.017)	0.022 (0.018)	0.021 (0.017)
Republican					-0.067*** (0.016)	-0.051*** (0.017)
Constant	0.423*** (0.013)	0.464*** (0.014)	0.451*** (0.028)	0.490*** (0.028)	0.457*** (0.029)	0.484*** (0.029)
Observations	872	846	870	845	844	823
Adjusted R^2	0.104	0.154	0.143	0.183	0.166	0.194
Differences within the Top 5%:						
high vs. low mobility	-0.054** (0.025)	-0.031 (0.024)	-0.041* (0.024)	-0.021 (0.024)	-0.038 (0.024)	-0.019 (0.023)
high vs. medium mobility	-0.038* (0.023)	-0.035 (0.022)	-0.031 (0.022)	-0.029 (0.022)	-0.029 (0.022)	-0.028 (0.022)
medium vs. low mobility	-0.015 (0.021)	0.004 (0.021)	-0.010 (0.021)	0.009 (0.020)	-0.008 (0.020)	0.009 (0.020)

Notes: The table reports OLS results. The dependent variable is the share of income redistributed from the high- to the low-income worker in the experiment, regressed on three indicators for the wealthy, split by the change in household income on the income scale (in deciles) when growing up relative to the present into low (≤ 1 decile), medium (between 1 and 5 deciles) and high (≥ 5 deciles). “Mixed” and “Merit” are treatment indicators. Odd columns replicate the results from Table 3. Even columns add an additional control for meritocratic belief. The bottom of the table reports the linear combinations of the differences between the coefficients for the subsamples of the wealthy. Significance levels: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

TABLE A16—DOMINANCE ANALYSIS WITH SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC CONTROLS

(a) <i>Top 5%</i>				
Rank	<i>Top income tax rate</i>		<i>Estate tax rate</i>	
	(1)		(2)	
1	Inequality acceptance	33%	Meritocratic beliefs	31%
2	Meritocratic beliefs	31%	Religion	25%
3	Religion	17%	Inequality acceptance	25%
4	Trust in government	11%	Trust in government	11%
5	Altruism	5%	Altruism	4%
6	Education	2%	Education	3%
7	Male	1%	Male	1%
8	Age	0%	Age	0%
9	White	0%	White	0%
Total variance explained		36%	41%	

(b) <i>Bottom 95%</i>				
Rank	<i>Top income tax rate</i>		<i>Estate tax rate</i>	
	(1)		(2)	
1	Meritocratic beliefs	31%	Meritocratic beliefs	30%
2	Inequality acceptance	28%	Inequality acceptance	29%
3	Education	14%	Trust in government	16%
4	Religion	14%	Altruism	8%
5	Age	5%	Education	5%
6	Altruism	3%	Age	5%
7	Trust in government	2%	Male	4%
8	White	2%	Religion	2%
9	Male	1%	White	1%
Total variance explained		9%	17%	

Notes: The table reports the results from the dominance analysis for the top 5% (panel a) and bottom 95% (panel b). This procedure estimates the relative contribution of our measures on inequality acceptance, meritocratic beliefs, altruism, and trust in government in explaining variation in attitudes toward redistribution. Column (1) examines attitudes toward the top income tax rate, column (2) focuses on attitudes toward the estate tax rate. For each outcome variable the measures are ranked by the size of their relative contribution to the variance explained with numbers adding up to 100%. The bottom rows show the percentage of total variance explained by all measures combined. “Education” contains both an indicator for undergraduate and graduate education. “Religion” contains indicators for protestant, catholic and other religion.

TABLE A17—EXPLAINING THE GAP IN ATTITUDES TOWARD REDISTRIBUTION BETWEEN THE TOP 5% AND BOTTOM 95%

<i>Dependent variable:</i>	<i>(a) Top income tax rate</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Top 5%	-0.481*** (0.088)	-0.386*** (0.085)	-0.479*** (0.085)	-0.459*** (0.087)	-0.494*** (0.088)
Inequality acceptance		2.159*** (0.215)			
Meritocratic beliefs			-0.181*** (0.019)		
Trust in government				0.360*** (0.078)	
Altruism					0.025 (0.022)
Constant	0.106* (0.064)	0.061 (0.064)	0.422*** (0.073)	-0.251** (0.102)	-0.102 (0.192)
Percentage of top 5% gap explained	-	19.9%	-2.2%	2.6%	-2.8%
Observations	826	826	807	823	826
Adjusted R^2	0.034	0.139	0.129	0.058	0.034

<i>Dependent variable:</i>	<i>(b) Estate tax rate</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Top 5%	-0.425*** (0.098)	-0.285*** (0.095)	-0.449*** (0.093)	-0.395*** (0.095)	-0.438*** (0.097)
Inequality acceptance		2.580*** (0.218)			
Meritocratic beliefs			-0.227*** (0.020)		
Trust in government				0.577*** (0.076)	
Altruism					0.015 (0.024)
Constant	-0.285*** (0.072)	-0.363*** (0.070)	0.131 (0.081)	-0.856*** (0.108)	-0.403** (0.215)
Percentage of top 5% gap explained	-	33.0%	-1.2%	4.3%	-1.9%
Observations	810	810	793	807	809
Adjusted R^2	0.022	0.145	0.154	0.078	0.021

Notes: The table reports OLS results from regressions of attitudes toward redistribution on a top 5% indicator and variables for inequality acceptance, meritocratic beliefs, altruism, and trust in government. In panels (a) and (b), the dependent variables are attitudes on the top income tax rate and estate tax rate. Both are measured on a 5-point scale from “much lower” (= -2) to “much higher” (= 2). Column (1) is the baseline model with only the top 5% indicator; column (2) controls for inequality acceptance; column (3) for meritocratic beliefs; column (4) for trust in government; column (5) for altruism. At the bottom of each panel, we report the percentage change in the top 5% gap that is explained by differences in inequality acceptance, meritocratic beliefs, altruism, and trust, respectively. We use the Blinder-Oaxaca method, as it accounts for variation in the number of observations across model specifications because of item nonresponse in the survey. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

TABLE A18—CONTROLLING THE FALSE DISCOVERY RATE IN THE MAIN RESULTS

(a) Figure 1: Attitudes toward Redistribution (rank-sum tests of differences between top 5% and bottom 95%, MH=2)		
Attitudes	p-value	FDR-adjusted p-values
Top income tax rate	<0.001	<0.001
Estate tax rate	<0.001	<0.001
(b) Figure 2: Distributive Choices (rank-sum tests of differences between top 5% and bottom 95%, MH=3)		
Treatments	p-values	FDR-adjusted p-values
Merit	0.234	0.234
Mixed	0.027	0.040
Luck	0.008	0.024
(c) Figure 4: Fairness Types (rank-sum tests of differences between top 5% and bottom 95%, MH=4)		
Types	p-values	FDR-adjusted p-values
Egalitarian	0.025	0.050
Meritocratic	0.825	0.825
Libertarian	0.004	0.016
Other	0.748	0.825

Notes: The table reports conventional p-values and FDR-adjusted “p-values” for all analyses of the main text that are susceptible to a multiple-hypothesis testing problem (i.e., the possibility that multiple hypothesis-testing increases the probability of committing a Type I error above the target rate for a single hypothesis test). An FDR-adjusted p-value is the maximum Q level (i.e., the share of false positives in all statistically significant results at some α level, in our case $\alpha = 0.05$) that satisfies the following inequality: $p_k \leq (k/m) Q$, where p_k is the conventional p-value (as reported in the table), k is that p-value’s rank (from lowest to highest) among m p-values in that set of coefficients (see Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995). For example, an FDR-adjusted p-value of 0.05 indicates the no more than 5% of the family of our original statistically significant results would constitute false positives. Panels (a)-(c) refer to the comparisons between the top 5% and the bottom 95% in Figures 1, 2, and 4. The number of hypotheses tested (MH) is indicated for each panel.

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APPENDIX B – INSTRUCTIONS

B1. SPECTATOR SURVEY

Here, we reproduce the key survey questions.

Household Income

Thinking back over the last year, what was your family's annual income?

- Less than \$10,000
- \$10,000 - \$19,999
- \$20,000 - \$29,999
- \$30,000 - \$39,999
- \$40,000 - \$49,999
- \$50,000 - \$59,999
- \$60,000 - \$69,999
- \$70,000 - \$79,999
- \$80,000 - \$99,999
- \$100,000 - \$119,999
- \$120,000 - \$149,999
- \$150,000 or more
- Prefer not to say

If a respondent chose “\$150,000 or more,” a pop-up window opened with the following options:

- \$150,000 - \$199,999
- \$200,000 - \$249,999
- \$250,000 - \$349,999
- \$350,000 - \$499,999
- \$500,000 - \$749,999
- \$750,000 - \$1 million
- More than \$1 million

Gross Liquid Assets

What is the total value of your investable assets? This includes all cash, savings, mutual funds, stocks, bonds, retirement accounts (such as IRAs, 401 (k)s, 403(b)s, etc.), and all other types of investments, but excludes your home and other real estate value.

- Less than \$250,000
- \$250,000 to under \$500,000
- \$500,000 to under \$750,000
- \$750,000 to under \$1,000,000

- \$1-2 million
- \$2-5 million
- More than \$5 million
- Prefer not to answer

If a respondent chose “More than \$5 million,” a pop-up window opened with the following options:

- \$5-10 million
- \$10-25 million
- \$25-50 million
- More than \$50 million

Top income tax rate attitudes

The effective income tax rate for the top category of annual household income above \$467,000 is currently 33%. That means, for example, that a family earning \$500,000 pays \$165,000 in taxes. In your opinion, should the top income tax rate be higher, the same, or lower?

- Much lower
- Somewhat lower
- The same
- Somewhat higher
- Much higher
- I don't know

Estate tax rate attitudes

The Federal Estate Tax applies when a deceased person leaves more than \$5.45 million in wealth to his or her heirs. Currently, the effective federal estate tax rate is 17%. That means, for example, that on an inheritance worth \$10 million, an heir pays \$1.7 million in taxes. In your opinion, should the federal estate tax rate be higher, the same, or lower?

- Much lower
- Somewhat lower
- The same
- Somewhat higher
- Much higher
- I don't know

Vote choice in the 2016 presidential election

Who did you vote for in the election for President?

- Donald Trump
- Hillary Clinton
- Gary Johnson
- Jill Stein
- Other (please specify)
- Did not vote for President

Meritocratic beliefs

Please indicate on a scale from 0 to 6 for each of the following factors how important you think it is for getting ahead in life: (1) Hard work, (2) Being lucky.⁴⁴

Not important at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Very important

Trust in government

How much of the time do you think you can trust the federal government in Washington D.C. to do what is right?

- Just about always
- Most of the time
- Only some of the time
- Never

Altruism

In general, how willing are you to give to good causes without expecting anything in return?

Completely unwilling 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very willing

Self-placement on the income scale (current and growing up)

In our society there are groups which tend to be towards the top and groups which tend to be towards the bottom of the income scale. If 1 equaled the bottom of the scale and 100 equaled the top of the scale, where would you put yourself now on this scale?

Enter a number from 1 to 100 _____

And where would you put the household you grew up in on the same scale?

⁴⁴ This battery also asked for the importance of the following factors: having connections, coming from a wealthy family, and being intelligent.

Enter a number from 1 to 100 _____

Source of Wealth

What has been the main source of your household's wealth?

- Inheritance or family assets
- Salary
- Income from own business
- Property
- Lottery
- Other (please specify)
- I prefer not to answer

Charitable donations

What charitable causes did your household donate to in 2015? (Choose all that apply)

- Religious organizations
- Health and well-being (including medical research)
- Reducing poverty abroad
- Reducing poverty in the US
- Emergency aid
- Democracy and human rights
- Nature and environment
- Animal welfare
- Education and research (except medical)
- Art and culture
- Sports and recreation (excluding memberships/fees)
- Other objectives

What is the total amount your household gave to this cause in 2015? If you are unsure, you can make an estimate.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ The respondents were asked to indicate an amount only for those causes they chose in the first part of the question. The charitable donations variable used in the analysis is the sum total of all the amounts a respondent indicated (as a share of household income).

B2. SPECTATOR EXPERIMENT

Here, we produce the instructions to the spectators in the experiment, by treatment.

B2.1 Treatment Luck

Unlike the other questions in this survey, you will now make a choice that has real monetary consequences for other people. We therefore ask you to pay careful attention to the instructions.

Page break

We recently hired two individuals via an online platform to work on an assignment. Let us call them worker A and worker B. The assignment was the same for both workers and consisted of manually double checking entries from a list of participant ID numbers. Each worker received a flat payment of \$1.00 for signing up, regardless of their potential additional payment for the assignment.

After completing the assignment, we told the workers that their earnings for the assignment will be determined **by chance**:

- The worker **who was chosen by chance** earns **\$6.00** for the assignment.
- The other worker earns **nothing** for the assignment.

Page break

Worker A was chosen by chance and therefore earns \$6.00 for the assignment. Thus, worker B earns nothing for the assignment.

We did not inform the workers about who was chosen by chance. However, we told the workers that a third person will be informed about this outcome. We also told them that this person would get the opportunity to **redistribute the earnings**.

You are the third person and will now choose whether to redistribute the earnings for the assignment between worker A and worker B. Your decision is completely anonymous. The workers will receive the payment that you choose once the study is complete, but they will not receive any further information.

Please consider your decision carefully, as \$6.00 is a considerable amount of money for these workers.

Page break

You can now redistribute the earnings of the two workers. Worker A was the lucky worker who was chosen by chance. Please choose one of the following options:

I do **not** want to redistribute earnings:

- Worker A is paid \$6.00 and Worker B is paid \$0.00

I want to redistribute earnings:

- Worker A is paid \$5.00 and Worker B is paid \$1.00
- Worker A is paid \$4.00 and Worker B is paid \$2.00
- Worker A is paid \$3.00 and Worker B is paid \$3.00
- Worker A is paid \$2.00 and Worker B is paid \$4.00
- Worker A is paid \$1.00 and Worker B is paid \$5.00
- Worker A is paid \$0.00 and Worker B is paid \$6.00

B2.2 Treatment Mixed

Unlike the other questions in this survey, you will now make a choice that has real monetary consequences for other people. We therefore ask you to pay careful attention to the instructions.

Page break

We recently hired two individuals via an online platform to work on an assignment. Let us call them worker A and worker B. The assignment was the same for both workers and consisted of manually double checking entries from a list of participant ID numbers. Each worker received a flat payment of \$1.00 for signing up, regardless of their potential additional payment for the assignment.

After completing the assignment, we told the workers that their earnings for the assignment will be based on a **scoring system**. Each worker's score is determined **by the performance** on the assignment. However, one in five workers is unlucky and his or her score is randomly set to zero, regardless of the actual performance.

- You and the workers do not know whether a worker was unlucky and his or her score was set to zero. You only observe which worker had the highest score.
- The worker with the **higher score** earns **\$6.00** for the assignment.
- The other worker earns **nothing** for the assignment.

Page break

Worker A had the higher score and therefore earns \$6.00 for the assignment. Thus, worker B earns nothing for the assignment.

We did not inform the workers about who had the higher score. However, we told the workers that a third person will be informed about this outcome. We also told them that this person would get the opportunity to **redistribute the earnings**.

You are the third person and will now choose whether to redistribute the earnings for the assignment between worker A and worker B. Your decision is completely

anonymous. The workers will receive the payment that you choose once the study is complete, but they will not receive any further information.

Please consider your decision carefully, as \$6.00 is a considerable amount of money for these workers.

Page break

You can now redistribute the earnings of the two workers. Worker A had the highest score, which was determined by the performance in the assignment, but 1 in 5 workers is unlucky and the score is set to zero, regardless of the actual performance.

Please choose one of the following options:

I do **not** want to redistribute earnings:

- Worker A is paid \$6.00 and Worker B is paid \$0.00

I want to redistribute earnings:

- Worker A is paid \$5.00 and Worker B is paid \$1.00
- Worker A is paid \$4.00 and Worker B is paid \$2.00
- Worker A is paid \$3.00 and Worker B is paid \$3.00
- Worker A is paid \$2.00 and Worker B is paid \$4.00
- Worker A is paid \$1.00 and Worker B is paid \$5.00
- Worker A is paid \$0.00 and Worker B is paid \$6.00

B2.3 Treatment Merit

Unlike the other questions in this survey, you will now make a choice that has real monetary consequences for other people. We therefore ask you to pay careful attention to the instructions.

Page break

We recently hired two individuals via an online platform to work on an assignment. Let us call them worker A and worker B. The assignment was the same for both workers and consisted of manually double checking entries from a list of participant ID numbers. Each worker received a flat payment of \$1.00 for signing up, regardless of their potential additional payment for the assignment.

After completing the assignment, we told the workers that their earnings for the assignment will be determined **by their performance** on the assignment:

- The worker who **performs best** earns **\$6.00** for the assignment.
- The other worker earns **nothing** for the assignment.

Page break

Worker A performed best and therefore earns \$6.00 for the assignment. Thus, worker B earns nothing for the assignment.

We did not inform the workers about who performed best. However, we told the workers that a third person will be informed about this outcome. We also told them that this person would get the opportunity to **redistribute the earnings**.

You are the third person and will now choose whether to redistribute the earnings for the assignment between worker A and worker B. Your decision is completely anonymous. The workers will receive the payment that you choose once the study is complete, but they will not receive any further information.

Please consider your decision carefully, as \$6.00 is a considerable amount of money for these workers.

Page break

You can now redistribute the earnings of the two workers. Worker A performed best in the assignment. Please choose one of the following options:

I do **not** want to redistribute earnings:

- Worker A is paid \$6.00 and Worker B is paid \$0.00

I want to redistribute earnings:

- Worker A is paid \$5.00 and Worker B is paid \$1.00
- Worker A is paid \$4.00 and Worker B is paid \$2.00
- Worker A is paid \$3.00 and Worker B is paid \$3.00
- Worker A is paid \$2.00 and Worker B is paid \$4.00
- Worker A is paid \$1.00 and Worker B is paid \$5.00
- Worker A is paid \$0.00 and Worker B is paid \$6.00

B3. WORKER INSTRUCTIONS

Here, we reproduce the instructions for the workers who were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk.

Instructions:

We are hiring workers to double check digitized entries from a list of ID numbers.

Your task is to check as many entries as possible and to correct any mistakes you find.




You will have exactly 5 minutes to work on this task.

On the next screens you will first see an example of how to perform the task, and then we will give you a short practice task to make sure you understand the assignment. The 5-minute working period starts once you have completed the practice task.

Page break

Example:

This is an example of how to perform the task. You do not have to fill in anything yet.

		Enter the correct ID number here if the digitized entry is incorrect (leave empty if correct)
	BF01525725	<input type="text"/>
	VZ09854617	<input type="text"/>
	LF35818979	<input type="text"/>

On the left hand side you see a list of handwritten ID numbers that have been digitized.

Your task will be to detect mistakes and to correct them. If a digitized entry is incorrect, fill in the correct ID number from the handwritten list in the corresponding field. If the entry is correct, leave the corresponding field empty. ID numbers always start with 2 capital letters, followed by 8 numbers.

In the above example, only the last ID is not digitized correctly. On the next screen you will see how you should fill out this table.

Page break

Example (with solution):

		Enter the correct ID number here if the digitized entry is incorrect (leave empty if correct)
<input type="text" value="BF01525725"/>	BF01525725	<input type="text"/>
<input type="text" value="VZ09854617"/>	VZ09854617	<input type="text"/>
<input type="text" value="LF35018070"/>	LF35818979	<input type="text" value="LF35018070"/>

Page break

Practice Task:

This is a practice task.

For each row, please check whether the digitized entry is correct. If it is incorrect, fill in the correct ID number from the handwritten list in the corresponding field. If the entry is correct, leave the corresponding field empty. Remember, ID numbers always start with 2 capital letters, followed by 8 numbers.

		Enter the correct ID number here if the digitized entry is incorrect (leave empty if correct)
<input type="text" value="JS34761217"/>	JS34761217	<input type="text"/>
<input type="text" value="OQ53623846"/>	OQ53623846	<input type="text"/>
<input type="text" value="JL02404329"/>	JL02404339	<input type="text"/>

Page break

If a worker did not complete the task correctly, the following error message is displayed:

“Your answer is not correct. Please read the instructions carefully and try again.”

If a worker completes the task correctly, she or he can go on to the next screen

You have successfully completed the practice task. Now you can proceed to the work assignment.

The 5-minute working period will start once you continue to the next screen.

Page break

Countdown timer staring at 5 minutes at the top of the screen.

Work Assignment:

		Enter the correct ID number here if the digitized entry is incorrect (leave empty if correct)
BF01525725	BF01525725	<input type="text"/>
VZ09854617	VZ09854617	<input type="text"/>
LF35018070	LF35018070	<input type="text"/>
JS34761217	JS34761217	<input type="text"/>
OG53623846	OG53623846	<input type="text"/>
JL02404329	JL02404329	<input type="text"/>
OR88203325	OR88203325	<input type="text"/>
AN61955507	AN61955507	<input type="text"/>
EA75221074	EA75221074	<input type="text"/>
TA17025956	TA17025956	<input type="text"/>
XD05093005	XD05093005	<input type="text"/>
BZ63665856	BZ63665856	<input type="text"/>
SK84914405	SK84914405	<input type="text"/>

...

Page break

The 5-minute working period is over.

Finally, please provide us with some basic information about yourself.

Page break

What is your age? ____

What is your gender?

- Male
- Female

What is the primary ethnicity or race you identify with?

- Asian/Asian American
- Black/African American
- White/European American
- Hispanic/Latino
- Other

Which category best describes your highest level of education?

- High school/GED or less
- Some college
- College degree
- Master's or professional degree (for example: JD, MD, MBA)
- Doctoral degree

What is your current employment status?

- Full-time employee
- Part-time employee
- Self-employed or small business owner
- Unemployed and looking for work
- Student
- Not in labor force (for example: retired, or full-time parent)

What is your household income compared to the average household income in your country?

- Much lower than average income
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- Much higher than average income

In general, to what extent are you politically liberal or conservative?

- Very liberal
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- Very conservative

Page break

Each worker was only shown one of the three texts regarding a bonus payment.

Thank you for completing the HIT!

Your secret key is:

Please copy the key and paste it into AMT before you close this window. If the key you entered is correct, you will receive a payment of US \$1.00.

Bonus Payment (*Treatment Luck*)

You may receive a bonus payment for completing the work assignment. Whether or not you will receive any additional money depends on the decision made by a participant of an ongoing research study.

You will be matched to another worker who completed the same assignment. The size of the bonus payment for you and the other worker is determined by chance:

- The worker **who is chosen by chance** earns **US \$6.00** for the assignment.
- The other worker earns **nothing** for the assignment.

A third person will be informed about which worker receives the bonus payment and then gets the opportunity to redistribute the earnings between you and the other worker. This person can choose to redistribute any amount in \$1.00 steps (for example \$5.00/\$1.00, \$4.00/\$2.00 etc.). He or she can also choose to redistribute the whole amount or no money at all. We will not reveal any personally identifying information about you to this third person.

You will receive the bonus payment once all workers have completed the assignment and the third person has made a decision. This can take a few weeks.

Thank you for your participation!

Bonus Payment (*Treatment Mixed*)

You may receive a bonus payment for completing the work assignment. Whether or not you will receive any additional money depends on the decision made by a participant of an ongoing research study.

You will be matched to another worker who completed the same assignment. The size of the bonus payment for you and the other worker is based on a scoring system. Each worker's **score is determined partly by chance and partly by their performance** on the work assignment.

- The **worker with the higher score** earns **US \$6.00** for the assignment.
- The other worker earns **nothing** for the assignment.

A third person will be informed about which worker has the higher score and receives the bonus payment and then gets the opportunity to redistribute the earnings between you and the other worker. This person can choose to redistribute any amount in \$1.00 steps (for example \$5.00/\$1.00, \$4.00/\$2.00 etc.). He or she can also choose to redistribute the whole amount or no money at all. We will not reveal any personally identifying information about you to this third person.

You will receive the bonus payment once all workers have completed the assignment and the third person has made a decision. This can take a few weeks.

Thank you for your participation!

Bonus Payment (*Treatment Merit*)

You may receive a bonus payment for completing the work assignment. Whether or not you will receive any additional money depends on the decision made by a participant of an ongoing research study.

You will be matched to another worker who completed the same assignment. The size of the bonus payment of you and the other worker is determined by your performance on the task:

- The worker who **performs better** on the work assignment earns **US \$6.00** for the assignment.
- The other worker earns **nothing** for the assignment.

A third person will be informed about which worker performed better and receives the bonus payment and then gets the opportunity to redistribute the earnings between you and the other worker. This person can choose to redistribute any amount in \$1.00 steps (for example \$5.00/\$1.00, \$4.00/\$2.00 etc.). He or she can also choose to redistribute the whole amount or no money at all. We will not reveal any personally identifying information about you to this third person.

You will receive the bonus payment once all workers have completed the assignment and the third person has made a decision. This can take a few weeks.

Thank you for your participation!