Online Appendix for "A Rich Woman's World? Wealth and Gendered Paths to Office"

Contents

A   Data Sources and Descriptives

A.1   Wealth in Congress

Our data on wealth of members of Congress comes from the Financial Disclosure Reports (FDRs) that each member has been required to file since 1978 on or before April 15th of each year serving in Congress, as well as upon the completion of their term. We acquired scanned FDRs from ProQuest Congressional[1] (for the period 1980-2002) and from the Office of the Clerk of the House of Representatives (2014-2018), and had them transcribed or automatically parsed for even-numbered years. We combined this with data from FDRs for 2004-2012 that have been transcribed by the Center for Responsive Politics.[2]

   We focus on the portion of the FDRs that contain information on members' household's financial assets (Schedule A) and liabilities (Schedule D). We exclude other parts of the FDRs which contain information on the flows rather than stock of wealth (earned income, gifts, paid travel and reimbursements and honoraria) or other types of information (outside positions). For assets, members report the value of stocks and bonds worth more than $1,000, savings accounts worth more than $5,000, and real estate or property held for income. They are not required to report smaller holdings, home(s) for own use, movable assets such as vehicles or equipment, life insurance policies, or federal retirement accounts. Members report liabilities of more than $10,000, not including home mortgages, auto loans, and family or household loans. In the paper, we focus only on gross assets, but the results are quite similar for assets net of liabilities.

   Because many FDRs are handwritten, we occasionally encountered transcription issues. Where possible, when we have missing data from these issues, we imputed missing asset values by locating the values of the asset in the closest previous or subsequent years. After doing so, approximately 1.8% of assets and 0.18% of liabilities are missing, but these patterns are uncorrelated with members' gender.[3]

   Typically, assets (and liabilities) are reported in value bands (e.g., $1,000-$5,000), though occasionally members report exact values.[4] To calculate wealth given these asset bands, we use the mid-point of the value range for each asset reported. For instance, an asset estimated at $10,000-$20,000 would be recorded as $15,000. For the highest band, "over $50,000,000," we record the value as $50,000,000. This means that we generally underestimate the wealth of the wealthiest members of Congress.

   For each asset, members also indicate whether it is owned personally, by their spouse, jointly, or by their dependents. We recorded this information as well, which allows us to evaluate the household composition of the members' financial wealth and our gendered earnings hypothesis. This provides us with unique intra-household wealth data in the U.S., because the publicly available data on wealth in the U.S. population, from datasets such as the Survey of Consumer Finances, is recorded only at the aggregate household level and elicited only from household heads, who are overwhelmingly men, thus making it impossible

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   1. https://congressional.proquest.com/

   2. See: https://www.opensecrets.org/personal-finances.

   3. In more difficult cases we are missing a member's FDR altogether because the House archive fails to include them or because a member failed to disclose. The proportion of missing FDRs is 5% on average over the whole period.

   4. Approximately 4% of assets and 1% of liabilities are reported as exact values.

to disentangle the intra-household distribution of wealth by gender.

A.2   District Confounds

To examine the district confounds mechanism, we added the information about *district median income*, the *proportion of households with income above $200k, district urbanness* and *district conservatism* from Adler (2013), Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2013), and Foster-Molina (2016). Median income is calculated for a district's households for a given year; district urbanness was calculated as the share of the population living in an urban area, as designated by the Census; district conservatism is the district-level two-party Republican presidential vote share from the most recent presidential election.

A.3   Compensating Factors

To examine the compensating factors mechanism, we collected additional data on MCs' background and districts that reflect the obstacles women may have had to overcome to reach Congress, which may also plausibly contribute to the observed gender wealth gap.

We capture district *conservatism* in the same way as above. As mentioned in the paper, our main proxy for district *sexism* is based on the responses to two survey questions from the 2018 Cooperative Congressional Election Study: (1) "When women lose to men in a fair competition, they typically complain about being discriminated against," (2) "Feminists are making entirely reasonable demands of men," with the response categories ranging from "strongly agree" (1) to "strongly disagree" (5). We average the responses to the two items within each district (with sample size ranging from 33 to 233) and assume that this sexism measure is stable over time. We therefore date back the same value to 1992 for districts that were sufficiently unchanged across decennial redistricting cycles.

The CCES measure of sexism is obviously a crude proxy. We therefore assemble two other (though similarly imprecise) sexism proxies. First, we take a difference between the two-party vote share for Hillary Clinton in the 2016 presidential election and the average of the two-party Democratic vote share in the preceding election (2012, when Barack Obama was the nominee) and the subsequent election (2020, when Joseph Biden was the nominee). To make it comparable to our main measure, we also date back this proxy to 1992 where feasible. The second sexism proxy is the ratio of male to female median earnings in a district, from the U.S. Census.[5] The results with these two alternative proxies, shown in Figure B4 below, are substantively the same as with our main sexism measure.

We further collected information on MCs' households, pre-congressional careers and family backgrounds to assess two hypotheses related to the compensating factors mechanism: (a) that the gender wealth gap may be higher in households with greater caretaking responsibilities (i.e. households with more children), and (b) that women who make it to Congress may have come from more lucrative careers, dynastic families, or are more educated and/or have had a more prestigious education relative to men, giving them an advantage in generating wealth.

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5. We used American Community Survey (ACS) estimates for 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018, and 2020; we used the 2010 ACS for 2002-2010; we used the 2000 decennial census for 1992-2000.

To collect information on the number of children, our research assistants started with data on members of Congress from the Congressional Bioguides, Votesmart, and Wikipedia, and if they could not find the needed information, searched for that information on the internet. Common sources of information included members' campaign websites, news media reporting, and public social media accounts (e.g., Twitter). We were able to find information about children for all but one MC in our data (99.4%). Figure A1 shows the distribution of children by MC gender; it indicates that Congresswomen are more likely than Congressmen to have zero, one, or two children, and less likely to have three, four, or five children.


Figure A1: Raw distribution of family size by gender

The information on members' pre-Congressional occupation and their education is available from the Congressional Bioguides. We grouped the professions and rank-ordered them by the average salary in that occupational category according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics' National Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates.[6] Since they may report multiple professions, MCs may appear in more than one occupational category. The distribution of MCs' occupation by gender is shown in the left panel of Figure A2; educational attainment by gender and decade is shown in Figure A3. We identified elite educational institutions as the members of the Ivy Plus Admissions group – the Ivy League (Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Penn, Cornell, Dartmouth, Brown, Columbia) plus Stanford, Duke, and MIT.

To collect more granular data on pre-Congressional achievements, we focused on members of Congress who hailed from the legal profession, as our analyses indicate that it is one of the professions with the largest positive gender wealth gap (see Figure B8 below), and also the profession most represented among members of both genders (22 percent of Congresswomen and 38 percent of Congressmen in our sample report the legal profession as their pre-Congressional occupation). Focusing on those in the legal profession also enables us to draw upon publicly available information about the perceived prestige of each JD-granting school and the average salaries of its graduates.

6. See: https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes_nat.htm.

Figure A2: Occupational frequencies by MC gender for both the MC (left) and MC's spouse (right).

NOTE: In many cases we record more than one occupation for both MCs and spouses. The proportions at left/right are the answer to the question, "What proportion of MCs/MCs' spouses have (at least) this occupation?" Therefore proportions do not add up 1. The gaps reported in Figure 6 and Figure 7 in the paper differ from the raw differences shown here because the former gaps are from a model with decade-party fixed effects.


Figure A3: Educational attainment by MC gender and decade.

We began by scraping data from the Biographical Data of the US Congress, Votesmart, and Wikipedia to obtain information on the JD-granting institution each member of Congress in the legal profession attended. Where needed, the research assistants searched for missing information and cleaned the data to avoid errors (e.g., "Loyola" could refer to multiple schools, requiring to verify which). We merged this data with publicly available data from the US World and News Report and PublicLegal on the characteristics of the top 200 JD-granting universities, including their law school ranking and median public and private law salaries of its graduates.[7] Following convention in the field of law, we code universities as "Top-14" (the most elite tier of universities, which has not changed much over time) or not.

Next, we asked our research assistants to search for information on whether each member had served in public law (e.g., as a judge, public defender, or district attorney) or private law (e.g., in a corporation, private firm, or as a self-employed lawyer). It proved fairly easy to find information on public appointments, as those usually generate some sort of public record, but for those in the private sector it was quite difficult in many cases to ascertain the employer. Some websites like OpenSecrets provide information on previous employment for members of Congress, but only after 2008, which means we have more missing data before then. Where we were not able to find employment information, we coded the individual as working in private law.

Figure A4 shows that among MCs with legal backgrounds, we do not find that Congresswomen were more likely to attend a top 14 law school or a law school with a higher average private law salary, nor were they more or less likely to have help public law positions.


Figure A4: Congresswomen did not have higher attainment in the legal profession.

To examine whether women may be more likely than men to hail from wealthier dynastic families, we obtained data on whether members had a relative who had previously served in Congress. We began with data collected by Dal Bó, Dal Bó, and Snyder (2009), which

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7. 7.5% of these universities did not provide information on their graduates' salaries. In a small percentage of cases, we were unable to match a member's school to a university in this list, either because the institution had gone out of business or because the university was not included (e.g., non-US institutions like the University of Oxford).

covers all members through 1996, and added data from Folke, Rickne, and Smith (2021), which covers members through 2016. Our research assistants collected data on members serving after 2016 (through 2018). Since there are several discrepancies between the Dal Bó and Folke et al. datasets, we perform analyses both with the combined data and only with the Folke et al. data (see Figure 6 in the text). 11% of MCs have dynastic ties based on the combined measure, and 8% based on the Folke et al. data alone.

A.4   Gendered Earnings

To examine the possibility that the gender wealth gap may be driven by a gendered household composition of wealth, in addition to the information from the FDRs about spousal and jointly-owned assets mentioned above, we also collected data on spousal occupation.

Our research assistants used the same strategy as for finding the information about MCs' children, profession, and education. We were much more likely to find information on spousal employment in recent years than in the beginning of the dataset. For members where one research assistant could not find a spouse, a second research assistant would conduct an independent search to attempt to find information; when that failed, we attempted searches ourselves. In total, we found that 82% of members were currently married during their term of office, 10% had previously been married, and 8% either were not married or were missing data. Among those members who had a spouse at some point, we were able to find occupational data for 77% of spouses. Perhaps most importantly, the missing data is not missing at random; Congressmen were more likely to have missing data for a spouse than Congresswomen. We and our research assistants were frequently able to find the name of the wife of a Congressman, and sometimes even personal information like birth dates, but no occupation (and note unpaid positions like homemaker, primary caregiver, volunteer, mother/father, etc. were coded as occupations when they were listed explicitly). In total, of the MCs' with a current or former spouse, we were not able to identify the spouse's occupation for 10% of Congresswomen and 18% of Congressmen. The right panel of Figure A2 shows the distribution of occupations for MC spouses by MC gender.

B   Additional Analyses

This appendix contains a series of additional analyses referred to in the paper but for which there is insufficient space to provide the full results.

B.1   Detail on the distribution of wealth

Figure B1 shows the distribution of reportable wealth by gender, decade, and party across four bands of asset values. Differences are not extremely pronounced, but we note that women are less likely than men to be in the lowest category of reportable wealth (less than $400k) in all but one decade-party combination (Republicans in the 1980s). Similarly, women are more likely than men to be in the second-highest category ($1M to $3M) in all but one decade-party combination (Democrats in the 1980s), and are less likely than men to be in the highest category (over $3M) in only two decade-party combinations (Republicans in the 1980s and 2000s).

Figure B1: Histogram of wealth categories by gender, party, and decade

B.2 Differences in Outcomes Other Than Wealth

Figure B2 shows the probability of the spouse having a lucrative career is higher for Congresswomen than Congressmen across levels of district conservatism (top panel) and district sexism (middle panel) as well as family size (bottom panel). The gap does not appear to depend much on any of these moderators, whether or not we control for district characteristics.

Figure B3 shows that the proportion of assets in the spouse's name is higher for Congresswomen than Congressmen on average (as shown in the paper). The gap is larger for families with more children; it may also be larger in more conservative and more sexist districts, though this effect is less clear.

B.3 Alternative Measures of Sexism

Figure B4 shows that the gender wealth gap does not depend consistently on sexism measured in two additional ways: using the ratio of male to female median earnings in the district (top) or using voting support for Biden (2020) and Obama (2012) relative to Clinton (2016).

B.4 Wealth Accumulation in Office

Table B1 shows that the gender wealth gap is smaller in members' first year, though not in a statistically significant way; thus the evidence that women MCs accumulate wealth faster while in office is only suggestive.

Figure B5 shows that controlling for district characteristics does not reduce the extent to which Congresswomen's spouses are in more lucrative professions (left); it slightly reduces

Figure B2: Spouses of Congresswomen hold distinct jobs from those of Congressmen.

Figure B3: The gender gap in spousal assets.

Figure B4: No sexism measure shows a relationship with the gender wealth gap.

Table B1: The gender wealth gap is (insignificantly) smaller in members' first year.

	DV: Log household wealth	
	1	2
Female	0.399*	0.430*
	(0.168)	(0.183)
First year served (post-1980)		−0.171**
		(0.063)
Interaction		−0.123
		(0.170)
Decade-party FEs	Yes	Yes
N	8157	8157
R-squared	0.10	0.10

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table B2: Gender wealth gap for all assets and separately for assets listed jointly or under spouse's name.

	All household assets	Assets under own name	Assets listed jointly or under spouse's name
Female	0.399*	−0.024	1.032**
	(0.168)	(0.180)	(0.328)
R2	0.103	0.020	0.170
Num.Obs.	8157	8026	6900

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

the extent to which Congresswomen have more of the assets under the spouse's name or in joint names, but the difference is not significant.

Figure B5: District characteristics don't predict spouse characteristics.

B.5   Spouses, Dynasties, and Districts

Table B2 shows the basic distribution of household assets among members of Congress.

Figure B6 shows that Congressmen and Congresswomen hold similar individual assets, but the latter possess more joint and spouse assets. Each coefficient is from a different regression where the variable at left is regressed on a gender dummy and decade-party fixed effects (standard errors clustered by member). The first estimate reproduces the baseline gender wealth gap.

Examining spouse characteristics by family type (rather than *differences* in spouse characteristics by family type as in Figure 9 of the main manuscript), we observe that the gap in spouse's share of assets is increasing in the number of children because Congresswomen's spouses account for a larger share of assets, not because Congressmen's spouses account for a smaller share. The same could be said for the share of spouses with a lucrative profession, though the difference is smaller. For each dependent variable, estimates come from a single regression in which MC gender is interacted with family type and dummies for the party-decade are included; levels shown correspond to Republicans in the 2000s.

Figure B6: Congresswomen have more joint and spousal assets than Congressmen.

Figure B7: Spousal wealth gaps between Congressmen and Congresswomen increase as the number of children increase.

Table B3: Dynastic MCs are not wealthier than non-dynastic MCs.

	Folke, Rickne, & Smith measure	Our measure
Female	0.574**	0.581**
	(0.196)	(0.196)
Dynasty member	0.136	−0.006
	(0.187)	(0.168)
Decade-party FEs	Yes	Yes
Num.Obs.	8632	8632
R2	0.111	0.111

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Figure B8 shows that no gender wealth gap is found among MCs with backgrounds in either business or medicine/financial services; a gender wealth gap is found only among lawyers and those with other professions. (Note the same MC may appear in more than one category.)

Figure B8: No gender wealth gap in business, engineering or medicine.

Figure B9 shows the results of the more extended gap closing exercise: we estimate the gender wealth gap that would remain if the gap in spousal occupations between Congresswomen and Congressmen were eliminated. We include estimates here where the distribution over spouse occupations is drawn from the predictions of a multinomial logit model fit on the Congressman subsample and using own occupation, own education, and decade-party as predictors.

Table B3 shows that conditional on decade-party fixed effects and the MC's gender, members of political dynasties are not wealthier than other MCs.

Figure B9: Spouses close the gender wealth gap.

Figure B10 shows gender gaps in spouse profession and joint/spouse assets both with and without the nine congresswomen who won their deceased husband's office. The results barely depend on the inclusion of these nine women.

C   The Gender Wealth Gap beyond Congress

To see how far the gender wealth gap extends beyond Congress, we turn to the triennial Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), which contains detailed information on wealth for a representative sample of U.S. households. The publicly available SCF data does not provide much detail on the jobs held by respondents, so we cannot condition on the specific job held by the men and women in the survey. Instead, we use the SCF to check whether there is a gender wealth gap among women and men who earn the same amount. That is, we ask: Do women who earn e.g. $100,000 have higher household wealth on average than men who earn $100,000? If women earning $100k have higher earning spouses than men earning $100k, then (assuming a relatively fixed savings rate across earnings levels) they should also have higher household wealth; if achieving a position that pays $100k is also an achievement that, like being elected to Congress, relies on wealth (or its correlates) more for women than for men, then this would also contribute to a gender wealth gap.

Figure C1 shows the gender gap in the SCF pooled from 2001 to 2019 for household net worth (black) as well as for spouse income (gray) separately for five income bands running from $25,000 to $200,000. Specifically, we run a regression like:

$$Y_i = \beta_1 \text{Female}_i + \sum_j \beta_j \text{IncomeBand}_{ij} + \sum_j \gamma_j \text{Female}_i \times \text{IncomeBand}_{ij} + g(\text{Income}_i) + \varepsilon_i \quad (3)$$

where Y_i is the outcome (log household net worth or log spousal income, both in 2012 USD), Female_i is an indicator variable for person i's reported gender, IncomeBand_{ij} is an

Figure B10: Women MCs are more likely to have spouses in more lucrative professions and a larger share of household assets listed jointly or in their spouse's name; the differences barely depend on whether we include congresswomen who won their deceased husband's seat. Each coefficient is from a different regression where the variable at left is regressed on a gender dummy and decade-party fixed effects (standard errors clustered by member).

indicator for whether person i is in income category j, and $g()$ is a flexible function (here, fourth-degree polynomial). We focus on households led by a mixed-gender couple and we use survey weights.[8] As above, we combine the main effect and interactions to present the implied gender gap within each income category in Figure C1.

We find clear evidence of a gender gap in log wealth (household net worth). The gap is larger (in proportional terms) for respondents in lower income categories. Predicted log net worth for women earning $20k-$50k is larger than that for men earning $20k-$50k (conditional on a flexible function of the actual income earned) by almost .75, i.e. more than double. The gender wealth gap in the next three income categories is similar to the gender

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8. In each imputation of the SCF, we randomly divide the data in half; we compare women in the first half to men in the second half in one set of analysis and do the reverse in another set of analysis. Thus across the five imputed datasets we have ten sets of analyses, which we combine using Rubin's Rules for multiple imputation.

Figure C1: The gender gap in wealth and spouse income in the American public.

gap in wealth[9] that we find in Congress (indicated by the vertical dashed line in Figure C1); the predicted gap in the highest income bracket we examine is slightly smaller and, uniquely, not significantly different from zero.

We find the opposite pattern when we focus on spouse income (gray dots in Figure C1). These gaps are even bigger and get larger with respondent income. For example, we find that predicted log spousal income among respondents earning $100k-$175k is larger for women than for men by about 1.5, indicating that the husbands of women in this income category earn 3.5 times as much on average as the wives of men in this income category. Note that spousal income is not consistently reported in MCs' financial disclosure forms, which is why we focused on occupation rather than income in the analyses in the paper.

In Figure C2 we examine whether the gender wealth gap in the SCF varies according to how many children the family has. In the whole sample (top left panel), we find (using an equation like 3, substituting family type for income categories) a similar gender wealth gap across family types, unlike in Congress. We then extend Equation 3 by adding a triple inter-action (gender × income category × family type), which allows us to see how the wealth gap depends on family type differently across income categories. In one income category ($100k-$175k), the gender wealth gap varies across family types as it does in Congress (though the magnitude of the difference is smaller, and again the differences are not significant); in the categories above and below this one, however, the pattern is, if anything, reversed.

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9. Note that net worth in the SCF includes liabilities, but also a broader range of assets than those reported in the Federal Financial Disclosure Reports; notably, net worth includes the value of the respondent's main residence(s), pensions, and bank accounts beneath $10k in value, all of which are excluded from the Financial Disclosure Reports.

Figure C2: Unlike in Congress, the gender wealth gap in the SCF is not larger among families with more children. Vertical dashed lines show the gender wealth gap in Congress.

Taken together, our analysis of the Survey of Consumer Finances suggests that a gender wealth gap may be found not just in Congress but in many other workplaces and communities. In a group of women and men who have the same job and/or earnings, the women are likely to have higher household wealth, because their spouses likely earn more and possibly also because wealth and its correlates were an especially important ingredient to their success.

D Regression Tables for Figures in the Paper

- Table D1 is the regression table corresponding to Figure 2.

- Table D2 is the regression table corresponding to Figure 4.

- Table D3 is the regression table corresponding to Figure 5.

- Table D4 is the regression table corresponding to Figure 6.

- Table D5 is the regression table corresponding to Figure 7.

- Table D6 reports the coefficients for the outcome regression models behind Figure 8.

Table D1: Correlates of household wealth in Congress

	DV: Log household wealth
	(1)
Female	0.516**
	(0.159)
NOT member of Cong. Black Caucus	1.352***
	(0.224)
Business owner or manager	0.744***
	(0.123)
Doctor, engineer, financial services	0.330*
	(0.134)
Lawyer	0.338**
	(0.105)
Age: 40s	0.418***
	(0.110)
Age: 50s	0.891***
	(0.123)
Age: 60s	1.351***
	(0.134)
Age: 70+	1.378***
	(0.196)
N	8157
R-squared	0.20

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

- Table D7 is the regression table corresponding to Figure 9.

- Table D8 is the regression table corresponding to Figure 10.

Table D2: Gender wealth gap with varying approaches to controlling for district characteristics

	DV: log of household wealth			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female	0.399*	0.412*	0.432*	0.483**
	(0.168)	(0.172)	(0.168)	(0.167)
Decade-party FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y
Splines of time-varying district controls	N	Y	N	Y
District FEs	N	N	Y	Y
R2	0.103	0.149	0.654	0.668
Num.Obs.	8157	8023	8146	8023

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table D3: Heterogeneity in gender wage gap by potential gendered obstacles to obtaining office

	DV: log of household assets								
Moderator:	District GOP PVS			District CCES sexism			Number of children		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Female	0.545*	0.558*	0.732**	0.993*	1.024*	0.328	−0.001	0.177	0.284
	(0.254)	(0.254)	(0.242)	(0.474)	(0.460)	(0.488)	(0.277)	(0.273)	(0.420)
Middle group	0.255*	0.136	0.062	0.578*	0.449+	0.596	0.212	0.225	0.041
	(0.115)	(0.155)	(0.096)	(0.255)	(0.271)	(0.415)	(0.158)	(0.160)	(0.180)
Upper group	0.388**	0.469*	0.142	0.341	0.140	0.354	0.174	0.183	0.151
	(0.137)	(0.223)	(0.126)	(0.301)	(0.334)	(0.652)	(0.152)	(0.154)	(0.169)
Female x middle	−0.093	−0.095	−0.136	−0.783	−0.633	0.315	0.251	0.130	−0.302
	(0.329)	(0.322)	(0.296)	(0.636)	(0.627)	(0.670)	(0.351)	(0.346)	(0.497)
Female x upper	−0.426	−0.452	−0.634+	−0.753	−0.756	−0.048	0.765+	0.569	0.738
	(0.362)	(0.364)	(0.338)	(0.593)	(0.577)	(0.947)	(0.427)	(0.434)	(0.471)
Decade-party FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Splines of dist. ctrls	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N
District FEs	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
R2	0.106	0.121	0.663	0.050	0.079	0.677	0.107	0.122	0.657
Num.Obs.	8100	8023	8090	2100	2041	2100	8155	8021	8144

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table D4: Gaps in MC characteristics

Dependent variable	Estimate	Std Err	p-value	N	R^2
Lucrative profession (business, law, medicine, finance, engineering)	-0.255	0.047	0.000	8157	0.044
Business owner or manager	-0.011	0.039	0.776	8157	0.046
Doctor; engineer; financial services	-0.042	0.028	0.129	8157	0.010
Lawyer	-0.237	0.037	0.000	8157	0.045
Scientist, professor; arts/broadcasting entertainment; farmer	-0.007	0.034	0.831	8157	0.004
Sales; manufacturing and construction	-0.002	0.026	0.940	8157	0.013
Public sector; education; politics	0.266	0.046	0.000	8157	0.050
Admin; healthcare support; menial; homemaker; not found	0.050	0.028	0.078	8157	0.013
Part of a political dynasty (Folke, Rickne, and Smith coding)	0.047	0.033	0.161	8157	0.007
Part of a political dynasty (combined coding)	0.032	0.035	0.375	8157	0.005
BA from elite institution	-0.052	0.025	0.038	7880	0.011
Obtained advanced degree (JD, MD, MBA, PhD)	-0.221	0.041	0.000	7880	0.031
Advanced degree from elite institution	-0.032	0.017	0.064	7880	0.018

Table D5: Gaps in spouse characteristics

Dependent variable	Estimate	Std Err	p-value	N	R^2
Spouse has lucrative profession (business, law, medicine, finance, engineering)	0.359	0.046	0.000	8157	0.107
Business owner or manager	0.020	0.021	0.338	8157	0.008
Doctor; engineer; financial services	0.169	0.037	0.000	8157	0.044
Lawyer	0.170	0.038	0.000	8157	0.069
Scientist, professor; arts/broadcasting entertainment; farmer	0.008	0.028	0.780	8157	0.005
Sales; manufacturing and construction	0.008	0.023	0.738	8157	0.008
Public sector; education; politics	-0.103	0.037	0.006	8157	0.009
Admin; healthcare support; menial; homemaker; not found	-0.256	0.042	0.000	8157	0.051
Proportion of household assets held jointly or under spouse's name	0.124	0.027	0.000	6900	0.103

Table D6: Additive and interactive outcome models from gap closing exercise (standard errors in parentheses.)

	Additive model	Interactive model
Female	0.432 (0.073)	−0.678 (0.141)
BA from elite institution	0.755 (0.078)	0.743 (0.078)
Advanced degree	−0.003 (0.055)	0.012 (0.055)
Advanced degree from elite institution	0.562 (0.113)	0.543 (0.113)
One or two children	0.149 (0.070)	0.131 (0.070)
Three or more children	0.172 (0.069)	0.154 (0.069)
MC occupation: Doctor; engineer; financial services	−0.470 (0.078)	−0.485 (0.078)
MC occupation: Lawyer	−0.567 (0.066)	−0.583 (0.066)
MC occupation: Scientist, professor; arts/broadcasting entertainment; farmer	−0.726 (0.083)	−0.700 (0.083)
MC occupation: Sales; manufacturing and construction	−0.597 (0.108)	−0.554 (0.108)
MC occupation: Public sector; education; politics	−0.873 (0.074)	−0.905 (0.073)
MC occupation: Admin; healthcare support; menial; homemaker; not found	−1.429 (0.144)	−1.404 (0.144)
Spouse occupation: Business owner or manager	0.423 (0.111)	0.220 (0.120)
Spouse occupation: Doctor; engineer; financial services	0.509 (0.087)	0.264 (0.103)
Spouse occupation: Lawyer	0.176 (0.102)	−0.084 (0.130)
Spouse occupation: Scientist, professor; arts/broadcasting entertainment; farmer	−0.153 (0.086)	−0.264 (0.092)
Spouse occupation: Sales; manufacturing and construction	−0.023 (0.097)	−0.128 (0.104)
Spouse occupation: Public sector; education; politics	0.116 (0.054)	0.053 (0.056)
Female × Spouse occupation: Business owner or manager		1.957 (0.311)
Female × Spouse occupation: Doctor; engineer; financial services		1.603 (0.211)
Female × Spouse occupation: Lawyer		1.530 (0.228)
Female × Spouse occupation: Scientist, professor; arts/broadcasting entertainment; farmer		1.475 (0.267)
Female × Spouse occupation: Sales; manufacturing and construction		1.337 (0.284)
Female × Spouse occupation: Public sector; education; politics		1.170 (0.208)
Decade-party FEs	Y	Y
R2	0.152	0.162
Num.Obs.	7876	7876

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table D7: Heterogeneity in gender gap in spouse characteristics by family type

	DV: spouse has lucrative profession			DV: spouse's share of assets		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	0.245*	0.259*	0.474***	−0.026	−0.033	0.054
	(0.101)	(0.104)	(0.100)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.075)
One or two kids	0.091***	0.085**	0.089*	−0.017	−0.019	0.018
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.038)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.019)
Three or more kids	0.065**	0.062*	0.073+	−0.023	−0.026	−0.009
	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.039)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.019)
Female x 1-2 kids	0.128	0.114	−0.127	0.127*	0.122*	−0.049
	(0.121)	(0.122)	(0.118)	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.081)
Female x 3+ kids	0.151	0.126	−0.123	0.237***	0.238***	0.172*
	(0.126)	(0.128)	(0.125)	(0.062)	(0.061)	(0.086)
Decade-party FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Splines of dist. ctrls	N	Y	N	N	Y	N
District FEs	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
R2	0.117	0.129	0.698	0.116	0.120	0.582
Num.Obs.	8155	8021	8144	6898	6819	6888

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table D8: Differences in distribution of family size by gender adjusting for different sets of covariates

DV:	No children			One or two children			Three or more children		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Female	0.052	0.055	0.002	0.021	0.009	0.097*	−0.073	−0.064	−0.099*
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.050)
Decade-party FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Age & age^2	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Splines of dist. ctrls	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N
District FEs	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
R2	0.026	0.031	0.661	0.029	0.033	0.691	0.045	0.049	0.683
Num.Obs.	8155	8021	8144	8155	8021	8144	8155	8021	8144

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001