

Supplementary Appendix for “Private Gains, Public Office: A Vignette Experiment in India”

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A1 Bihar and Madhepura Characteristics

To what extent is Madhepura representative of the rest of the state of Bihar? In Table A1, we compare a number of key statistics about the district to the statistics about the Bihar state. The data come from three sources: the Census of India, the election Commission of India, and the National Crime Records Bureau.

Madhepura does not stand out compared to the rest of the state of Bihar on the majority of the dimensions shown in Table A1. Like the state of Bihar, Madhepura is predominantly rural, with a significant proportion of the Scheduled Castes,¹ and relatively low levels of literacy and development, as proxied by the share of agricultural workers (“cultivators”) and “marginal” workers.

Recent electoral data show that voters in Madhepura followed state-wide trends in the latest pre-experiment state elections in 2010. Candidates from the JD(U) and BJP were overwhelmingly preferred in Madhepura as well as in Bihar. While Madhepura was once known as a Yadav and RJD stronghold, this is no longer the case.

Official crime data suggest that Madhepura was somewhat below state averages in terms of murders, kidnapping, riots and thefts, which is not surprising given that Madhepura is mostly rural. While crime data is not broken down between rural and urban crime, there are good reasons to believe that recorded crimes non-proportionally take place in cities.

Finally, and importantly, the last two rows rely on publicly available data from official pre-election affidavits (from 2010) to show that Madhepura incumbents accumulated wealth in office at a similar pace as the state legislators from the rest of Bihar.

Moreover, Figure A1 shows that Bihar is ranked squarely in the middle in terms of MLA’s wealth accumulation. The graph ranks states in terms of average wealth accumulation among rerunning incumbents for the latest pair of elections in each state.² Bihar is ranked as 15th, among 31 states for which the data are available.

A2 Sample Demographics

Table A2 shows the demographics of our sample of respondents.

A3 Summary of Manipulations

Table A3 summarizes our experimental manipulations. The second column shows the text presented to the respondents. The third column shows the text that the interviewer read out to the respondents.

¹While no official data exists, the rest of the population consists of a variety of other groups including Brahmins, Thakurs, and Banyas as well as “backward caste” groups such as Kurmis, and Yadavs.

²State assembly elections in India are staggered, and therefore not all pairs of elections are from the same years.

A4 Estimating the Treatment Effect of Co-Ethnicity

As described in the text, our ethnicity treatment is somewhat different from the other treatments. Namely, we ensured that one of the three vignettes featured a candidate with the same ethnicity as the one stated by the respondent in the pre-experiment survey. Since we are interested not in the effect of ethnicity per se, but of co-ethnicity, this choice ensured that each respondent rated at least one co-ethnic profile. For the remaining two vignettes, the candidate ethnicity was determined by a simple random draw from a list of 11 ethnicities. One might wonder if we would not also achieve a sufficient number of co-ethnic profiles by having a simple randomization for all three vignettes. Unfortunately, this is infeasible, because the number of ethnicities (or “communities”) in Bihar, which correspond to various sub-castes, is very large. Therefore, using a simple random draw would almost certainly not give us enough co-ethnic profiles. Indeed, in our data, the respondents declared 56 different ethnicities, and as a result only around 7 percent of the two vignettes with a simple random draw featured a co-ethnic.

There are two implications of our design for the analysis of the average marginal component effects (AMCE) of co-ethnicity. The first implication is the subtle difference in the interpretation of the co-ethnicity AMCE compared to the other AMCEs. For the AMCEs of the other attributes, the average is taken over the joint distribution of all the possible combinations of the remaining attributes. This joint distribution is determined fully by the random draws in the experiment. For the ethnicity AMCE, the fact that one of the vignettes did not feature a random draw changes slightly the interpretation of the average in the definition of the co-ethnicity AMCE. Namely, the distribution of ethnicity over which the averages are taken is a mixture of the observed distribution of respondent ethnicity, as well as the experimentally-produced distribution of our pre-specified set of main subcastes.³

The second implication of our design is in terms of the estimation of the co-ethnicity AMCE. There are two ways that a respondent can get a co-ethnic politician profile: through the co-ethnic vignette (i.e. one of the three vignettes where we ensure a co-ethnic profile), and possibly through the luck of the draw in the remaining two vignettes. To properly account for this distinction, we use an indicator variable for the co-ethnic vignette as an instrument for the actual co-ethnicity status of the politician profile. This instrument is valid. First, it is strong, because roughly 90% of the co-ethnic profiles are generated through the co-ethnic vignette. Second, it satisfies the exclusion restriction, because the treatment is orthogonal to all the other treatments, and hence can influence outcomes only through the actual co-ethnicity status of the politician profile.⁴ The calculation of the quantities of interest for ethnicity are therefore based on the two-stage least squares estimates, but otherwise follow the same calculation as the quantities of interest for the other treatments.⁵ We should note that the results are substantively very similar if we use a simpler OLS model instead of the two-stage model. Also, the results for the other treatments are very similar if

³We thank Teppei Yamamoto for helpful comments on this issue.

⁴This changes somewhat the interpretation of the ethnicity effects, as it is confined to those respondents whose co-ethnicity with the politician was induced by the co-ethnicity vignette.

⁵We thank Dan Hopkins for helpful comments on this issue.

we exclude the round which featured a co-ethnic vignette, or if we estimate them separately from the ethnicity effects.

A5 Diagnostic Tests

This section reports several diagnostics tests of the validity of our experimental manipulations. Table A4 suggests that our experimental manipulations were successfully randomized. The table shows that a number of pre-treatment respondent characteristics are balanced in the conjoint experiment. The entries in column 1 represent the p -values of an F -test, from a regression of each pre-treatment characteristic indicated in the left-most column on all conjoint treatment conditions. None of the p -values in column 1 is below the conventional level of $p < 0.05$, implying that the treatment conditions are not jointly statistically significant predictors of any of the listed pre-treatment variables. Column 2 takes a different approach, and reports the p -value of the effect of each pre-treatment characteristic on the profile rated by respondents in the conjoint experiment. Again, all p -values are greater than 0.05, implying that profiles rated did not differ systematically across respondents' pre-treatment characteristics.

As discussed in the main text, the conjoint experiment involved respondents rating three politician profiles (or vignettes). The ordering of the profiles was randomized. Table A5 examines how much the treatment effects vary from one vignette to another, i.e. whether there are any profile order effects. The main entries in columns 1-3 report the average marginal component effects (AMCEs) for each profile separately; the entries in parentheses are the respondent-clustered standard errors. The main entries in column 4 represent the F -statistic from the test of whether the treatment effects for vignettes 2 and 3 are jointly statistically significantly different from the treatment effects in vignette 1; the entries in brackets are the p -values from this test. Overall, there are no systematic order effects, as the AMCEs for each treatment component in the conjoint experiment are similar across the three vignettes. None of the p -values in column 4 give statistically significant results at conventional levels, implying that the treatment effects are overall not statistically different from each other across the three vignettes. There are two instances, however, where the treatment effects based on the last profile rated are somewhat different from the first two profiles: the AMCE for a politician coming from a rich family, and the AMCE for the above-75th percentile initial wealth. Our results are substantively very similar to those in the main text when we reestimate these AMCEs based only on the first two vignettes. It is therefore plausible that these differing patterns may have arisen by chance, due to multiple testing.

In addition to the order of the vignettes, the order of the profile attributes was also randomized. Similar to the diagnostic tests shown in Table A5, which compare the treatment effects across the vignettes, we can evaluate the successfulness of the attribute order randomization by comparing the treatment effects across the profile rows. As there are seven bullet points (and ten attributes) shown in each profile, we can compare seven AMCEs for each treatment component – one for each row. To keep the presentation of the diagnostic results tractable, Figure A2 compares the seven AMCEs only for our wealth accumulation

attribute.⁶ The left panel shows the AMCEs for each row for a politician profile with below-median wealth increase (relative to the no-increase condition). The right panel shows the seven AMCEs for a politician profile with above-median wealth increase (relative to the no-increase condition). Both panels show that the treatment effects are quite stable across rows, indicating that the position on the profile in which the wealth attributes appear does not systematically affect the respondents’ representation rating.

Because of the large number of treatment components, the concern is that some of the statistically significant AMCEs we report in the main text may have arisen simply by chance as a consequence of performing multiple comparisons. Figure A3 shows the results when a Benjamini-Hochberg multiple-comparison correction is applied (Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995). This procedure controls the false discovery rate, by ordering the p -values of all the AMCEs from lowest to highest, and designating as statistically significant only those p -values that satisfy the condition $p_k \leq \frac{k}{m}\alpha$, where k is the position in the order of each p -value, m is the number of AMCEs, and α is the target significance level. In other words, this correction makes it increasingly harder to pass a significance test as the number of tests grows. We focus on $\alpha = 0.05$. In Figure A3, the plotted dots represent the p -values of all the AMCEs shown in the main text. The full dots indicate the AMCEs that remain significant after the correction (i.e. the p -value satisfies the Benjamini-Hochberg criterion), the hollow dots indicate the AMCEs that are not statistically significant according to this correction. The top panel plots the AMCE p -values for the representativeness rating, the middle panel for the corruption rating, and the bottom panel for the violence rating, respectively. The results show that all of our main results are substantively unchanged when the potential multiple-comparison problem is addressed. For example, all of the wealth increase AMCEs remain statistically significant at the corrected $p < 0.05$.

A6 Additional Results

For greater clarity, in the main text we grouped the initial wealth and wealth increase treatment conditions into three groups of each (for initial wealth, the groups are: below median, median–75th percentile, and above 75th percentile; for wealth increase, the groups are: no increase, below median, and above median). As can be seen in Table A3, the profiles actually featured one of seven distinct values of both initial wealth and wealth accumulation. Figure A4 shows the main results – the treatment effects on the respondents’ representation ratings – for all seven categories of each wealth treatment. The results are quite similar to those for the grouped treatments. While richer politicians are viewed less favorably as political representatives, the initial wealth treatment effects are generally statistically indistinguishable from zero. Also, there is no gradient to the initial wealth effect – very rich politicians (those with the 2010 wealth of 4 crore) are not viewed differently than those with below-median initial wealth (20 lakhs). The initial wealth AMCEs are also noticeably smaller in magnitude than the wealth increase AMCEs, as in the main

⁶The results for the other treatment components are available upon request.

results showed in the text. It is interesting that the wealth increase treatment effects become larger in approximately linear fashion.

In the main text, we reported the results for three outcomes: the representation, corruption and violence ratings. We also recorded another outcome: whether the respondent would consider voting for the politician.⁷ Figure A5 shows the main results for this vote outcome. The main take away is that the results are very similar to those for the representation outcome. These results are reassuring for at least two reasons. First, the main results in the text show that the strongest AMCE is for the record in office attribute. One may worry that this result is driven by the similarity in the wording of that attribute and the representation outcome variable, both of which refer to the politician’s success in addressing constituent issues. The fact that the record in office AMCE is also the strongest effect for the vote outcome variable (and among the strongest for the corruption and violence outcome variables) increases our confidence that the politician’s record is a very important aspect of the respondents’ evaluations. Second, our preferred outcome is the representation rating, because the vote question does not refer to real voting and thus may fail to capture the respondents’ true electoral preferences. However, the similarity in the results suggests that our experiment may have elicited cohesive voting intentions which are linked to the respondents’ evaluations of the quality of representation.

We omitted the AMCEs for photograph and district attributes from the main text to avoid cluttering the presentation, and because we do not have clear theoretical priors about the direction and magnitude of potential effects. Table A6 shows the AMCEs for these attributes across the three outcomes examined in the main text. We chose six photographs of men approximately 40 years of age who can pass as members of different castes. The profiles contain a random draw from these six photographs, without replacement to avoid repetition across the three vignettes. The district in each vignette was chosen from a list of eight real districts from a different sub-region in Bihar; none of the eight districts are geographically very close to Madhepura, where the experiment took place. The table shows that for the most part, the AMCEs are statistically insignificant.⁸ There is a consistently strong effect of a politician being from Jahanabad (relative to a politician from Banka, a district arbitrarily chosen as the base category); respondents seem to rate politicians from this district as a better representative, who is less corrupt and less violent. We do not have a clear explanation for this. However, these patterns do not seem consequential for our key findings about the effects of wealth accumulation. The last two rows of Table A6 show the p -values from an F -test of joint significance of the interactions between the photograph or district treatments and the wealth increase treatments. Neither of the two sets of interactions are jointly statistically significant.

As discussed briefly in the text, there is little evidence of interactions between the wealth increase attributes and some of the other attributes. Table A7 shows the interaction effects between the wealth increase treatments and the initial wealth, family background, and

⁷We also asked how good a representative a politician would be for the respondent *personally*. The results are very similar to the main representation outcome.

⁸This is even more the case when the multiple-testing correction is applied (Figure A3).

criminality, respectively. The first row of each set of interactions, indicated with a bold-face caption, shows the wealth increase AMCE at the base category of the interacting treatment component (the rows indicated with “@”); the other rows represent the interaction terms (i.e. the difference from the first row) for the remaining treatment conditions for each set of attributes (the rows indicated with “×”). The results clearly indicate that the wealth increase treatment effects do not vary significantly with the other attributes – the AMCEs for wealth increase are similar for politicians with smaller and greater 2010 wealth, for politicians with poor, middle-class and rich family backgrounds, and for politicians with and without criminal charges to their name.

We also find little evidence of an interaction between the wealth increase effects and *respondent* income. Table A8 shows the interaction between the wealth increase treatments and quartiles of respondent income; the first row of each set of interactions shows the wealth increase AMCE for the respondents with income in the lowest quartile (the rows indicated with “@”), the remaining rows show the interaction terms for the higher quartiles (i.e. the difference from the wealth increase AMCE for the lowest quartile; the rows indicated with “×”). There is no consistent evidence that richer respondents view greater wealth increase in either a more negative or more positive light than poorer respondents.

In Section 6.2.4, we briefly discuss the comparison of our treatment AMCEs for Yadavs and non-Yadavs, as well as the partisans of the RJD and partisans of other parties. Here, we show those results in Figures A6 and A7, respectively. The difference in the wealth accumulation AMCEs between Yadavs and non-Yadavs is statistically indistinguishable from zero; however, the wealth accumulation AMCEs for the RJD supporters are statistically significantly lower than for the non-RJD supporters (at $p < .027$ for the below-median wealth increase AMCE, and at $p < .093$ for the above-median wealth increase AMCE).

A7 Survey Instruments

This section replicates the background pre-treatment survey, the post-treatment survey, the recruitment flyer, and the information survey questions about wealth and wealth accumulation.

Background Pre-Treatment Survey
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Please answer the following questions

1. **Gender (DO NOT ASK):** _____
2. **In which year were you born?** _____
3. **For how many years have you lived at your current location:** _____
4. **Are you currently married?**
 1. Yes
 0. No
 98. Refuses to answer
5. **Did you go to school?**
 1. Yes (Go to next question)
 0. No (Skip next question)
 99. Not sure/Does not apply/No answer (Go to question 8)
6. **Until which class did you complete school?**
 1. Class 1
 2. Class 2
 3. Class 3
 4. Class 4
 5. Class 5
 6. Class 6
 7. Class 7
 8. Class 8
 9. Class 9
 10. Class 10
 11. Intermediate (Class 11 & 12)
 12. Graduate (College or University)
 13. Post-graduate (Masters or Doctorate/Ph.D.)
7. **What is your community?**
(AS REPORTED BY THE RESPONDENT): _____
8. **Current occupation:**
 1. Farmer
 2. Agricultural worker
 3. Shop-owner
 4. Government Employee (specify): _____
 5. Private sector job (specify): _____
 6. Other (specify): _____

9. Total Agricultural land owned by household

1. 0 – 3 bigha
2. 3 – 6 bigha
3. 6 – 9 bigha
4. 9 – 12 bigha
5. 12 – 15 bigha
6. 15 – 18 bigha
7. 18 – 21 bigha
8. 21 – 25 bigha
9. 25+ bigha

10. Type of House:

1. Pucca (both wall and roof made of pucca material)
2. Pucca-kucha (Either wall or roof is made of pucca material and of other kutch material)
3. Kutch (both wall and roof are made of kutch material other than materials mentioned in category 4)
4. Hut (both wall and roof are made of grass, leaves, mud, un-burnt brick or bamboo)
99. NA

11. Number of rooms: _____

12. Number of Members in Household: _____

13. Do you or your family member have the following: Yes (1) No (0)

- | | | |
|--|---|---|
| a. Car/Jeep/Van/Tractor | 1 | 0 |
| b. Colour or B/W Television | 1 | 0 |
| c. Scooter/Motorcycle/Moped | 1 | 0 |
| d. Bicycle | 1 | 0 |
| e. Mobile phone | 1 | 0 |
| f. Electric fan/cooler | 1 | 0 |
| g. Radio/Transistor | 1 | 0 |
| h. Pumping set | 1 | 0 |
| i. Fridge | 1 | 0 |
| j. Cow (enter actual number) _____ | | |
| k. Buffalo (enter actual number) _____ | | |
| l. Goat or sheep (enter actual number) _____ | | |

14. Total monthly household income? (In rupees) _____

Post-treatment Survey

1. Which party do you *usually* support in elections?

- 1. RJD
- 2. JD(U)
- 3. BJP
- 4. Congress
- 5. LJP
- 6. BSP
- 7. Other (specify): _____
- 88. Don't know/don't remember
- 98. Refuses to say
- 99. NA

2. Did you vote in 2010 (last state assembly elections)?

- 1. Yes.
- 0. No
- 88. Don't know/don't remember
- 98. Refuses to say
- 99. NA (if respondent was not of voting age in 2010)

3. If yes, could you tell me which party you voted for?

- 1. RJD
- 2. JD(U)
- 3. BJP
- 4. Congress
- 5. LJP
- 6. BSP
- 7. Other (specify): _____
- 88. Don't know/don't remember
- 98. Refuses to say
- 99. NA

4. Did you vote in 2014 (Lok Sabha elections)?

- 1. Yes.
- 0. No
- 88. Don't know/don't remember
- 98. Refuses to say
- 99. NA (if respondent was not of voting age in 2010)

5. If yes, could you tell me which party you voted for?

1. RJD
2. JD(U)
3. BJP
4. Congress
5. LJP
6. BSP
7. Other (specify): _____
88. Don't know/don't remember
98. Refuses to say
99. NA

6. Let me now ask you about politicians here in *Madhepura*. Let's start with your MLA.

- a. **Can you identify the name of your current MLA for me?**
(NAME IS: _____)

1. Cannot identify
2. Wrongly identifies
3. Partially identifies
4. Identifies correctly
88. Don't know/don't remember
98. Refuses to answer

- b. **Can you identify his party?**
(PARTY IS: _____)

1. Cannot identify
2. Wrongly identifies
3. Partially identifies
4. Identifies correctly
88. Don't know/don't remember
98. Refuses to answer

7. Let us now speak about your MP.

- a. **Can you identify the name of your current MP for me?**
(NAME IS: _____)

1. Cannot identify
2. Wrongly identifies
3. Partially identifies
4. Identifies correctly
88. Don't know/don't remember
98. Refuses to answer

b. **Can you identify his party?**
(PARTY IS: _____)

- 1. Cannot identify
- 2. Wrongly identifies
- 3. Partially identifies
- 4. Identifies correctly
- 88. Don't know/don't remember
- 98. Refuses to answer

8. In general, how often do you follow news about politics in the papers or on TV?

- 1. Every day
- 2. Every Few days (several times a week)
- 3. Once a week
- 4. Once a month
- 5. Almost never
- 6. Never
- 88. Don't know
- 98. Refuses to say

9. In general, how often do you discuss news about politics with others around you?

- 1. Every day
- 2. Every Few days (several times a week)
- 3. Once a week
- 4. Once a month
- 5. Almost never
- 6. Never
- 88. Don't know
- 98. Refuses to say

10. On a scale from 1 to 5 (5 being the most), how much do you trust news about politicians in the media?

- 1. Not at all
- 2. Somewhat not
- 3. Neither trust nor distrust
- 4. Somewhat
- 5. Very Much
- 88. Don't know
- 98. Refuses to say

11. On a scale from 1 to 5 (5 being the most), how much do you believe that accusations brought against politicians in the media?

- 1. Not at all
- 2. Somewhat not
- 3. Neither trust nor distrust
- 4. Somewhat
- 5. Very Much
- 88. Don't know
- 98. Refuses to say

12. Who is the current chief minister of Bihar? _____

13. Who is the current prime minister of India? _____

14. Which party currently holds the majority in the state assembly in Bihar?

15. Which party currently holds the majority in the *lok sabha*? _____

16. QUESTIONS TO INTERVIEWERS

(INTERVIEWERS: DO NOT ASK TO RESPONDENTS. RESPOND YOURSELF AFTER THE RESPONDENT HAS LEFT)

a. How confident are you that the respondent perceived these politicians to be REAL politicians?

1. Not at all / 2. Somewhat / 3. Very much

b. How honest do you feel that the respondent was when giving responses?

1. Not at all / 2. Somewhat / 3. Very much

c. How focused/attentive do you feel that the respondent was when giving responses?

1. Not at all / 2. Somewhat / 3. Very much

Study Participation

Name: _____

Thank you for agreeing to participate in the study. The study will ask your opinions on social and cultural issues. The study is expected to take to more than _____ hrs. You will be given **Rs 50/-** for participation in the study. The location and time of the study is given below:

Address: _____

Time: _____

1. It is very important that you bring this invitation with you.
2. Please note that this invitation is only for the person whose name is listed above. Another person cannot come instead of this person for the study.

Thinking about [MLAs in general (on average)/your *own* MLA right here in Madhepura], what is your best guess of their total assets in 2010 among the following options?

1. 5 lakhs
2. 8 lakhs
3. 20 lakhs
4. 45 lakhs
5. 85 lakhs
6. 2 crores
7. 4 crores
88. Don't know/don't remember
98. Refuses to answer

Do you think the [average MLA in Bihar/ your MLA] has gotten richer since then?

0. No (skip to 18)
1. Yes


IF YES, What is your best guess of approximately how much [the average Bihar MLA's/your MLA's] assets have increased since then among the following options?

1. slightly increased
2. increased two times
3. increased three times
4. increased 5 times
5. increased 10 times
6. increased thirty times
88. Don't know/don't remember
98. Refuses to answer

References


Benjamini, Yoav and Yosef Hochberg. 1995. “Controlling the False Discovery Rate: a Practical and Powerful Approach to Multiple Testing.” *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series B (Methodological)* 57(1):289–300.

Figure A1: Wealth accumulation among state legislators in Indian States




Source: myneta.info.

Figure A2: Row order estimates for wealth increase effects




The left panel shows the AMCEs for each row for a politician profile with below-median wealth increase (relative to the no-increase condition). The right panel shows the seven AMCEs for a politician profile with above-median wealth increase (relative to the no-increase condition).

Figure A3: Multiple comparison corrected results




The figure shows the results of a Benjamini-Hochberg multiple-comparison correction. This procedure orders the p -values of all the AMCEs from lowest to highest, and designates as statistically significant only those p -values that satisfy the condition $p_k \leq \frac{k}{m} \alpha$, where k is the position in the order of each p -value, m is the number of AMCEs, and α is the target significance level. We focus on $\alpha = 0.05$. The plotted dots represent the p -values of all the AMCEs shown in the main text. The full dots indicate the AMCEs that remain significant after the correction (i.e. the p -value satisfies the Benjamini-Hochberg criterion), the hollow dots indicate the AMCEs that are not statistically significant according to this correction. The top panel plots the AMCE p -values for the representativeness rating, the middle panel for the corruption rating, and the bottom panel for the violence rating, respectively.

Figure A4: Attribute AMCEs with all levels of initial wealth and wealth increase




The dots are the average marginal component effects. The horizontal bars are the 95% confidence intervals based on respondent clustered standard errors.

Figure A5: Attribute AMCEs for vote outcome




The dots are the average marginal component effects. The horizontal bars are the 95% confidence intervals based on respondent clustered standard errors.

Figure A6: Attribute AMCEs for Yadavs and non-Yadavs



The dots are the average marginal component effects. The horizontal bars are the 95% confidence intervals based on respondent clustered standard errors.

Figure A7: Attribute AMCEs for RJD and non-RJD supporters



The dots are the average marginal component effects. The horizontal bars are the 95% confidence intervals based on respondent clustered standard errors.

Table A1: Bihar and Madhepura Characteristics

	Bihar (Entire state)	Madhepura district
% Rural Population*	88.70	95.58
% Scheduled castes*	15.91	17.29
% Literate*	63.82	53.78
% Workers classified as “Marginal” Workers”*	38.48	42.96
% Workers classified as Cultivators*	15.58	17.45
Winning alliance 2010 elections (seats won) [°]	JD(U)/BJP (204/243)	JD(U)/BJP (3/4)
% Vote share winning alliance [°]	39.15	45.73
% Murders per 100,000 inhabitants (2014) [†]	3.26	2.19
Kidnappings per 100,000 inhabitants (2014) [†]	6.31	3.89
Riots per 100,000 inhabitants (2014) [†]	13.03	11.24
Thefts per 100,000 inhabitants (2014) [†]	21.98	9.24
Mean wealth increase for rerunning incumbents, 2010–2015 [°]	412%	302%
Median wealth increase for rerunning incumbents, 2010–2015 [°]	247%	277%

Sources:

* 2011 Census of India

° Election Commission of India

† Crime in India (2014), National Crime Records Bureau.

Table A2: Sample demographics

	Mean	St. Dev.
Age in years	39.39	14.03
Years in residence	38.05	14.91
Urban residence	0.23	0.42
Years of schooling	6.35	4.90
Female	0.09	0.29
Household size	6.05	2.64
House type: pucca	0.11	0.32
House type: pucca kutcha	0.32	0.47
House type: kutcha	0.11	0.32
House type: hut	0.46	0.50
Rooms in house	2.26	1.49
Car	0.02	0.15
TV	0.15	0.35
Motorcycle	0.13	0.34
Bicycle	0.67	0.47
Cell phone	0.84	0.37
Fan	0.30	0.46
Radio	0.08	0.27
Water pump	0.05	0.21
Refrigerator	0.04	0.19
Cows (count)	0.49	0.70
Buffalos (count)	0.22	0.54
Goats (count)	0.38	0.82
Yadav	0.41	0.49
Muslim	0.10	0.30
Harijan	0.07	0.25
Musahar	0.06	0.24
Farmer	0.23	0.42
Shop owner	0.06	0.24
Government worker	0.01	0.10
Private job	0.04	0.18
Income (rupees)	6,333.62	6,979.59
<i>N</i>	1,020	

The modal land size is 0-3 bigha.

Table A3: Summary of experimental manipulations

Manipulation	Text on the vignette which respondents can see	What the interviewer says to respondents
District	Random draw among: Samastipur, Lakhisharai, Katihar, Kishanganj, Muzzafarpur, Jahanabad, Nawada, Banka	“This politician was elected in <i>district name</i> district.”
Wealth at beginning of term	Random draw among: 5 lakhs, 8 lakhs, 20 lakhs, 45 lakhs, 85 lakhs, 2 crores, 4 crores	“Candidates for office are required to report their assets and the assets of their immediate family members as they declare their candidacy. At the beginning of his term in 2010, this politician had <i>initial wealth amount</i> rupees in assets.”
Wealth accumulation during current term	Random draw among: Did not increase, slightly increased, increased two times, increased three times, increased five times, increased ten times, increased thirty times	“The wealth of this incumbent increased <i>number of times</i> during his term in office. Since he had <i>initial wealth amount</i> in 2010, he now has <i>current amount</i> .”
Perceived legality of wealth accumulation	Random draw, conditional on wealth accumulation not being “Did not increase,” among: No suspicion of illegality, suspicion of illegality	“Wealth increase is mainly due to successful business deals and real estate operations in the district, none of which/many of which have been deemed suspicious by the press.”
Social background	Random draw among: poor family, middle-income family, rich family	“The politician hails from a poor/middle-income/rich family.”
Record in office	Random draw among: disappointing record, good record	“According to reports in the press, he was/was not very active in terms of development and infrastructures and he did not do very much for his constituency.”
Ethnicity	Draw between: respondent’s self-reported ethnicity and other salient ethnicities in Madhepura, according to the procedure detailed in the text	“This politician belongs to the <i>group name</i> community.”
Party	Random draw among: JD(U), RJD, BJP, INC	“This politician is from <i>party name</i> .”
Criminal charges	Random draw among: No criminal charges, several criminal charges	“This politician is not charged in any criminal cases / This politician is charged in several criminal cases.”

Table A4: Balance tests

	Omnibus test	Profile rated
Age	0.713	0.825
Married	0.873	0.196
Years of schooling	0.146	0.061
Occupation	0.386	0.484
Household size	0.236	0.867
Size of land owned	0.347	0.816
House type	0.629	0.558
Number of rooms	0.861	0.120
Household income	0.386	0.173
Ethnicity	0.325	0.882

The entries in column 1 represent the p -values of an F -test from a regression of each pre-treatment characteristic on all conjoint treatment conditions. Column 2 reports the p -value of the effect of each pre-treatment characteristic on the profile rated by respondents in the conjoint experiment.

Table A5: Variability in attribute effects on representation rating by vignette

	Vignette 1	Vignette 2	Vignette 3	F-test
Co-partisanship				
<i>Base: Yes</i>				
No	-0.333*** (0.083)	-0.156* (0.090)	-0.265*** (0.084)	1.103 [0.332]
Co-ethnicity				
<i>Base: Yes</i>				
No	-0.117 (0.079)	-0.355*** (0.079)	-0.233*** (0.079)	2.095 [0.124]
Record				
<i>Base: Good</i>				
Bad	-1.231*** (0.075)	-1.332*** (0.076)	-1.300*** (0.075)	0.539 [0.583]
Criminality				
<i>Base: No</i>				
Yes	-0.313*** (0.075)	-0.358*** (0.076)	-0.425*** (0.074)	0.574 [0.563]
Background				
<i>Base: Poor</i>				
Middle-income	0.076 (0.093)	0.047 (0.093)	-0.092 (0.090)	0.983 [0.375]
Rich	-0.020 (0.092)	0.014 (0.092)	-0.177* (0.093)	1.204 [0.300]
2010 wealth				
<i>Base: Below median</i>				
Median-75 pctl	-0.013 (0.089)	-0.016 (0.090)	-0.136 (0.089)	0.584 [0.558]
Above 75 pctl	-0.069 (0.095)	0.016 (0.092)	-0.217** (0.091)	1.670 [0.189]
Wealth increase				
<i>Base: No increase</i>				
Below median	-0.368*** (0.131)	-0.478*** (0.143)	-0.483*** (0.127)	0.247 [0.781]
Above median	-0.609*** (0.118)	-0.682*** (0.123)	-0.888*** (0.112)	1.596 [0.203]
Illegal wealth incr.				
<i>Base: No</i>				
Yes	-0.280*** (0.097)	-0.365*** (0.096)	-0.251*** (0.091)	0.345 [0.708]

The main entries in columns 1-3 report the average marginal component effects for each profile separately; the entries in parentheses are the respondent-clustered standard errors. The main entries in column 4 represent the F -statistic from the test of whether the treatment effects for vignettes 2 and 3 are jointly statistically significantly different from the treatment effects in vignette 1; the entries in brackets are the p -values from this test.

Table A6: Photo and district effects

	Representation	Corruption	Violence
Photograph			
<i>Base: Photo 1</i>			
Photo 2	0.054 (0.071)	-0.026 (0.077)	-0.044 (0.073)
Photo 3	-0.004 (0.075)	-0.018 (0.078)	-0.083 (0.076)
Photo 4	0.197*** (0.071)	0.059 (0.076)	-0.043 (0.074)
Photo 5	0.026 (0.073)	0.039 (0.075)	-0.049 (0.073)
Photo 6	0.141* (0.074)	-0.020 (0.075)	-0.039 (0.077)
District			
<i>Base: Banka</i>			
Jahanabad	0.223*** (0.080)	-0.269*** (0.093)	-0.265*** (0.091)
Katihar	0.117 (0.081)	-0.168* (0.088)	-0.179** (0.087)
Lakhisarai	0.075 (0.083)	-0.129 (0.090)	-0.171* (0.089)
Madhubani	0.123 (0.083)	-0.134 (0.088)	-0.121 (0.086)
Muzaffarpur	0.078 (0.088)	-0.155 (0.103)	-0.194** (0.095)
Navada	0.049 (0.084)	-0.037 (0.089)	-0.068 (0.088)
Samastipur	0.056 (0.085)	-0.097 (0.086)	-0.077 (0.088)
Photo \times wealth increase	0.406	0.773	0.790
District \times wealth increase	0.536	0.433	0.965

The main entries are the average marginal component effects. The entries in parentheses are the respondent-clustered standard errors. The last two rows show the p -values from an F -test of joint significance of the interactions between the photograph or district treatments and the wealth increase treatments.

Table A7: Interaction between wealth increase and initial wealth, and family and criminal background

	Representation	Corruption	Violence
2010 wealth			
<i>Below median wealth increase</i>			
@ Below median 2010 wealth	-0.472*** (0.139)	0.782*** (0.131)	0.542*** (0.127)
× Median – 75th pctl	-0.036 (0.218)	0.287 (0.206)	0.212 (0.200)
× Above 75th pctl	-0.195 (0.214)	0.187 (0.205)	-0.156 (0.201)
<i>Above median wealth increase</i>			
@ Below median 2010 wealth	-0.651*** (0.119)	1.230*** (0.117)	0.687*** (0.108)
× Median – 75th pctl	-0.188 (0.187)	0.235 (0.173)	0.208 (0.168)
× Above 75th pctl	-0.326* (0.190)	0.163 (0.172)	0.175 (0.169)
Family background			
<i>Below median wealth increase</i>			
@ Poor family	-0.567*** (0.145)	1.004*** (0.144)	0.592*** (0.136)
× Middle-class family	-0.004 (0.203)	-0.097 (0.212)	-0.063 (0.207)
× Rich family	0.089 (0.215)	-0.163 (0.203)	-0.045 (0.203)
<i>Above median wealth increase</i>			
@ Poor family	-0.889*** (0.134)	1.440*** (0.131)	0.911*** (0.123)
× Middle-class family	0.120 (0.183)	-0.128 (0.177)	-0.196 (0.174)
× Rich family	0.153 (0.192)	-0.152 (0.179)	-0.134 (0.172)
Criminality			
<i>Below median wealth increase</i>			
@ No criminal record	-0.586*** (0.123)	0.977*** (0.113)	0.569*** (0.105)
× Criminal record	0.107 (0.181)	-0.127 (0.167)	-0.038 (0.169)
<i>Above median wealth increase</i>			
@ No criminal record	-0.831*** (0.104)	1.467*** (0.096)	0.886*** (0.092)
× Criminal record	0.073 (0.156)	-0.247* (0.140)	-0.178 (0.139)

The first row of each set of interactions, indicated with a bold-face caption, shows the wealth increase AMCE at the base category of the interacting treatment component (the rows indicated with “@”); the other rows represent the interaction terms (i.e. the difference from the first row) for the remaining treatment conditions for each set of attributes (the rows indicated with “×”).

Table A8: Interaction between wealth increase and respondent income

	Representation	Corruption	Violence
Below median wealth increase			
@ Lowest income quartile	-0.701*** (0.152)	1.064*** (0.165)	0.588*** (0.151)
× 2nd income quartile	0.101 (0.215)	-0.062 (0.230)	-0.086 (0.224)
× 3rd income quartile	0.431* (0.223)	-0.340 (0.234)	-0.184 (0.224)
× Highest income quartile	0.330 (0.234)	-0.285 (0.251)	0.039 (0.223)
Above median wealth increase			
@ Lowest income quartile	-0.561*** (0.122)	1.212*** (0.146)	0.797*** (0.128)
× 2nd income quartile	-0.305* (0.184)	0.290 (0.198)	-0.129 (0.189)
× 3rd income quartile	-0.250 (0.187)	0.141 (0.212)	0.105 (0.192)
× Highest income quartile	-0.164 (0.199)	0.005 (0.217)	-0.045 (0.197)

The first row of each set of interactions shows the wealth increase AMCE for respondents with income in the lowest quartile (the rows indicated with “@”), the remaining rows show the interaction terms for the higher quartiles (i.e. the difference from the wealth increase AMCE for the lowest quartile; the rows indicated with “×”).