

# Supplementary Material

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## A Populations, Samples, and Weights

### A.1 Survey Weights and Representativeness

Survey non-response is somewhat uneven across socio-economic groups in the four populations. Using demographic, geographic, and socio-economic register data, Statistics Denmark has analyzed which groups are over- or underrepresented in the samples relative to the samples. To recreate the representativeness of the survey data, Statistics Denmark subsequently calculated survey weights, using register data on gender, age, education, ethnic origin, family type, employment status, and income. The weights sum to the population (for each strata) and ensures that the weighted sample data is representative and reflect the population strata more accurately. Table A.1 shows descriptive statistics for the weight variable by strata in the population/survey. For each of the four strata, the mean shows the number of people that each respondent represents using the weight. For instance, each respondent in the top 1% income strata represents around 19 persons in the population.

Table A.1: Survey Weights by Sample

Sample	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
1. Top 1% income	1,696	19.45873	8.23728	5.737656	56.75938
2. Top 1% wealth	2,004	16.08034	7.41087	4.897887	54.76712
3. Top 1% income & wealth	724	19.34530	8.50718	10.71723	57.44998
4. General population	1,225	3786.207	2262.416	592.1724	12455.62

**Note:** Table shows value of the survey weights by sample. Mean/min/max values shows the average/minimum/maximum number of persons in the population that each respondent in the sample represents.

Table A.2 shows descriptive statistics for populations, samples, and weighted samples for selected variables in the survey (gender and education). The table illustrates how the weights balance sample descriptives relative to population descriptives.

Table A.2: Representativeness: Populations and Samples by Strata  
Examples: Gender and Education

	Top 1% Income			Top 1% Wealth			Top 1% Income & Wealth			General Public		
	Pop.	Sample	Weighted	Pop.	Sample	Weighted	Pop.	Sample	Weighted	Pop.	Sample	Weighted
Men	81.90	85.73	81.90	70.40	79.09	70.42	81.20	87.57	81.17	48.90	53.14	48.94
Women	18.10	14.27	18.10	29.60	20.91	29.58	18.80	12.43	18.83	51.10	46.86	51.06
Primary school	5.60	5.60	5.62	11.00	6.49	10.96	7.70	4.56	7.72	25.40	14.04	25.44
Secondary school	25.80	22.23	25.77	32.50	23.95	32.45	28.60	24.31	28.19	40.90	41.06	40.86
Post-secondary	20.90	23.29	20.89	20.90	21.56	20.92	17.30	20.30	18.02	20.70	27.76	19.76
University degree	47.70	48.88	47.71	35.70	48.00	35.66	46.50	50.83	46.07	13.00	17.14	13.95

**Note:** The table shows proportions of gender (men/women) and education (four-group split) for each strata. Post-secondary education corresponds to the sum of tertiary short and medium-long in Table A.3. For each strata, proportions are show for the population, sample, and weighted sample. Population data are from the register data.

## A.2 Population Descriptive Statistics: Four Strata

Table A.3 shows descriptive statistics (frequencies) by the populations of the four strata: Top 1% Income; top 1% wealth; top 1% income & wealth; and general population (bottom 99%).

Table A.3: Population Frequencies: Four Strata

	Top 1% Income	Top 1% Wealth	Top 1% Income & Wealth	General Population
	Pct.	Pct.	Pct.	Pct.
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>Gender</b>				
Men	81.9	70.4	81.2	48.9
Women	18.1	29.6	18.8	51.1
<b>Age group (2)</b>				
18-49 yrs	40.7	5.7	12.8	49.9
50+ yrs	59.3	94.3	87.2	50.1
<b>Age groups (4)</b>				
18-34 yrs	3.6	0.8	1.1	27.5
35-49 yrs	37.2	4.9	11.7	22.5
50-64 yrs	48.3	29.3	47.8	24.4
65+ yrs	10.9	65.0	39.4	25.7
<b>Region</b>				
Northern Jutland	6.6	7.2	6.7	10.2
Mid-Jutland	18.9	18.8	19.0	22.8
Southern Denmark	15.4	14.8	14.0	21.1
Capital (Copenhagen)	48.9	47.5	49.7	31.4
Zealand	10.2	11.7	10.4	14.5
<b>Origin</b>				
Danish	90.2	96.5	96.4	85.6
Immigrant	9.1	3.2	3.2	12.3
Immigrant (>=2nd gen)	0.7	0.3	0.4	2.1
<b>Completed education</b>				
Primary	5.6	11.0	7.7	25.4
Secondary (~high school)	25.8	32.5	28.6	40.9
Tertiary (short)	6.0	4.2	3.7	4.9
Tertiary (medium-long)	14.9	16.7	13.6	15.8
Tertiary (university-level)	47.7	35.7	46.5	13.0
<b>Family type</b>				
Single, no children	13.7	31.1	19.8	32.4
Single, w. children	3.4	1.6	2.4	5.4
Couple, no children	29.5	55.7	50.2	33.5
Couple w. children	53.4	11.6	27.6	28.7
<b>Socio-economic status</b>				
Own business	17.8	26.3	42.8	3.1
Wage earner (middle +)	60.1	21.9	31.8	22.3
Wage earner (basic)	17.4	10.0	11.2	27.5
Student	0.1	0.2	0.1	10.8
Not working	4.5	41.7	14.1	36.3

**Note:** Numbers show percent for each strata in the population, e.g., on gender, 81.9% of the population are men. Data are from the registry data of Statistics Denmark.

## B Measuring Ideology

Table B.1 show the items used for creating the left-right ideology scale. All items have a response key ranging from 1 to 5, where 1 denotes “Strongly Agree” and 5 denotes “Strongly Disagree.” We obtain a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.83. The index is coded such that 0 indicates a *left* position and 1 a *right* position. Table B.2 shows the descriptive statistics for ideology across strata, and Table B.3 shows a test of differences in means across the four strata.

Table B.1: Items in Ideology Index

Danish	English
“Regeringen bør gøre mere for at omfordele fra de rigeste personer til de fattigste personer.”	“The government should do more to redistribute from the richest persons to the poorest persons.”
“Regeringen bør gøre mere for at reducere den økonomiske ulighed.”	“The government should do more to reduce economic inequality.”
“Store virksomheder tjener primært ejernes interesser fremfor de ansattes.”	“Large cooperations serve the interests of owners over interests of employees.”
“Almindelige lønmodtagere får ikke en fair andel af landets velstand.”	“Ordinary wage earners do not get a fair share of the country’s wealth.”
“Stærke fagforeninger er nødvendige for at beskytte medlemmernes arbejds- og løn vilkår.”	“Strong unions are necessary to protect the wage and working conditions of their members.”

Table B.2: Ideology: Mean and Standard Deviation by Strata

Strata	Mean	SD	$n$	$N$ (weighted)
Top 1 % Income	0.63	0.20	2,762	32,784
Top 1 % Wealth	0.56	0.21	3,373	32,247
Top 1 % Income & wealth	0.66	0.19	1,263	14,029
Population	0.35	0.20	2,169	4,635,221

**Note:** Means and standard deviations (SD) calculated using survey weights (see section A.1).  $n$  is the sample size;  $N$  is the weighted number of observations.

Table B.3: Ideology: Pairwise Comparisons of Means

Comparison	Diff-in-means	Lower CI	Upper CI	<i>p</i> -value (adj.)
Top 1% Wealth vs Top 1% Income	-0.065	-0.069	-0.060	0.000
Top 1% Inc. & Wealth vs Top 1% Inc.	0.030	0.025	0.035	0.000
General Pop. vs Top 1% Inc.	-0.277	-0.280	-0.275	0.000
Top 1% Inc. & Wealth vs Top 1% Wealth	0.095	0.090	0.100	0.000
General Pop. vs Top 1% Wealth	-0.213	-0.216	-0.210	0.000
General Pop. vs Top 1% Inc. & Wealth	-0.308	-0.312	-0.303	0.000

**Note:** Estimates are weighted pairwise differences in means for ideology with Bonferroni-adjusted 95% confidence intervals and *p*-values (adj.). All differences are significant at  $p < 0.001$ . Positive (negative) values indicate higher (lower) mean ideology score, corresponding to more right (left) leaning for the first group relative to the second group.

## C Experimental Validity Checks

Table C.1 evaluates whether the average marginal component effects (AMCEs) in the conjoint experiment on average vary across the three conjoint tasks our respondents were given. In other words, we examine whether our respondents changed their policy preferences as they repeated the conjoint tasks. The cells in the table represent *p*-values from a joint Wald test of the difference in a policy’s AMCE across the tasks for each of the three elite strata relative to the general population. That is, we evaluate whether AMCEs for a policy attribute in the second and third rating tasks are jointly statistically significantly different from the same AMCE in the first task, for an elite stratum compared to the general population. A low *p*-value (e.g. below 0.05) indicates that there are statistical differences in AMCEs across tasks, and vice versa. The columns in the table refer to the tests for our three key outcomes: platform preference (column 1), choice of which platform is more effort-incentivizing (column 2), and more equitable (column 3). The results generally indicate no presence of task order effects.

Table C.2 evaluates whether the AMCEs vary with respect to the order in which the policies appeared in platform profiles. The cells are the *p*-values from a joint Wald test of the difference in a policy attribute AMCE for a given elite stratum relative to the general population, when the attribute is ordered first in the platform compared to any other po-

Table C.1: Conjoint Experiment Task Order Effects

	Platform Preference	More Effort- Incentivizing Platform	More Equitable Platform
<b>Cash Aid for the Poor</b>			
Top 1% income	0.86	0.61	0.96
Top 1% wealth	0.60	0.30	0.19
Top 1% both	0.38	0.47	0.42
<b>Spending on Tertiary Education</b>			
Top 1% income	0.34	0.65	0.08
Top 1% wealth	0.43	0.19	0.07
Top 1% both	0.66	0.55	0.10
<b>Top Income Tax Rate</b>			
Top 1% income	0.23	0.06	0.92
Top 1% wealth	0.06	0.09	0.78
Top 1% both	0.19	0.01	0.40
<b>Wealth Tax Rate</b>			
Top 1% income	0.05	0.59	0.81
Top 1% wealth	0.08	0.11	0.05
Top 1% both	0.36	0.68	0.24
<b>Real Estate Tax Rate</b>			
Top 1% income	0.22	0.41	0.44
Top 1% wealth	0.76	0.09	0.51
Top 1% both	0.86	0.05	0.63
<b>High-Skilled Immigration</b>			
Top 1% income	0.13	0.45	0.72
Top 1% wealth	0.42	0.52	0.61
Top 1% both	0.87	0.93	0.55
<b>Climate Change Mitigation</b>			
Top 1% income	0.39	0.98	0.90
Top 1% wealth	0.88	0.58	0.73
Top 1% both	0.69	0.72	0.79

sition. In other words, the Wald test evaluates the significance of all the interaction terms between an AMCE and the variable indicating the attribute's order in a platform. As above, large  $p$ -values indicate a failure to reject the null hypothesis of no attribute order effects, and vice versa. The different columns test the order effects for each of the same three outcomes as in the previous table. The results indicate generally no presence of attribute order effects.

Table C.2: Conjoint Experiment Attribute Order Effects

	Platform Preference	More Effort- Incentivizing Platform	More Equitable Platform
<b>Cash Aid for the Poor</b>			
Top 1% income	0.42	0.72	0.97
Top 1% wealth	0.93	0.92	0.66
Top 1% both	0.02	0.44	0.30
<b>Spending on Tertiary Education</b>			
Top 1% income	0.36	0.04	0.08
Top 1% wealth	0.15	0.28	0.04
Top 1% both	0.36	0.48	0.37
<b>Top Income Tax Rate</b>			
Top 1% income	0.48	0.65	0.83
Top 1% wealth	0.96	0.68	0.96
Top 1% both	0.64	0.55	0.40
<b>Wealth Tax Rate</b>			
Top 1% income	0.03	0.74	0.47
Top 1% wealth	0.01	0.67	0.24
Top 1% both	0.13	0.92	0.30
<b>Real Estate Tax Rate</b>			
Top 1% income	0.14	0.84	0.97
Top 1% wealth	0.05	0.52	0.69
Top 1% both	0.80	0.65	0.91
<b>High-Skilled Immigration</b>			
Top 1% income	0.46	0.10	0.36
Top 1% wealth	0.04	0.02	0.81
Top 1% both	0.73	0.80	0.75
<b>Climate Change Mitigation</b>			
Top 1% income	0.38	0.03	0.39
Top 1% wealth	0.16	0.42	0.03
Top 1% both	0.92	0.45	0.41



## D Adjusting Conjoint Experiment Results for Multiple Testing

Because we have many treatments in the conjoint experiment, and are evaluating their effects for four sample strata, some of the AMCEs we report as statistically significant may be false positives due to the large number of hypothesis tests (Liu and Shiraito, 2023). We therefore apply a multiple-testing adjustment procedure that controls the false discovery rate (FDR).<sup>16</sup> In particular, we use the two-step FDR adjustment procedure by Benjamini et al. (2006) and report the “sharpened”  $q$ -values (as derived by Anderson 2008), which represent a multiple testing-adjusted analog to the standard  $p$ -value.<sup>17</sup>

We report these adjusted estimates for the same three outcomes as above: platform preference (Table D.1), choice of which platform is more effort-incentivizing (Table D.2) and more equitable (Table D.3). The tables show that our inferences are substantively unchanged. In fact, because the unadjusted  $p$ -values tend to be positively dependent (i.e. rejecting one null tends to be positively correlated with rejecting another null), the adjusted  $q$ -values are in many instances lower than the unadjusted values, strengthening our inferences.

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<sup>16</sup>In other words, we apply an adjustment that controls the share of potential Type I errors, or falsely rejected null hypotheses. An alternative approach is to control the family-wise error rate (FWER), or the probability that *any* rejected null hypothesis is a Type I error. However, as the number of tests grows, FWER lowers statistical power much more substantively than FDR. Since we are not basing our conclusions on a small number of tests, we believe it is justified to use an FDR adjustment (i.e. allow for some potential false positives in exchange for greater power).

<sup>17</sup>Specifically, a sharpened  $q$ -value is the maximum value that satisfies the inequality  $p_k \leq (k/\hat{m}_0)q$ , where  $p_k$  is the conventional  $p$ -value for a treatment effect;  $k$  is that  $p$ -value’s rank (ordered from lowest to highest across all  $p$ -values);  $\hat{m}_0$  is the estimated share of true null hypotheses such that  $\hat{m}_0 = M - c$ , where  $M$  is the set of all hypotheses tested and  $c$  is the number of rejected hypotheses,  $p_k \leq (k/M)q'$ , for  $q' = q/(1 + q)$ .

Table D.1: Multiple Testing Adjustment—Program choice

	Gen. Pop.	Top 1% Income	Top 1% Wealth	Top 1% Both
<b>Cash Aid for the Poor</b> (Base: unchanged)				
<i>Decrease</i>				
Unadjusted $p$ -value	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01
Sharpened $q$ -value	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
<i>Increase</i>				
Unadjusted $p$ -value	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.00
Sharpened $q$ -value	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
<b>Spending on Tertiary Education</b> (Base: unchanged)				
<i>Decrease</i>				
Unadjusted $p$ -value	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Sharpened $q$ -value	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
<i>Increase</i>				
Unadjusted $p$ -value	0.39	0.12	0.03	0.24
Sharpened $q$ -value	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.05)
<b>Top Income Tax Rate</b> (Base: unchanged)				
<i>Decrease</i>				
Unadjusted $p$ -value	0.07	0.00	0.97	0.00
Sharpened $q$ -value	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.14)	(0.00)
<i>Increase</i>				
Unadjusted $p$ -value	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Sharpened $q$ -value	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
<b>Wealth Tax Rate</b> (Base: unchanged)				
<i>Increase</i>				
Unadjusted $p$ -value	0.18	0.00	0.00	0.00
Sharpened $q$ -value	(0.04)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
<b>Real Estate Tax Rate</b> (Base: unchanged)				
<i>Increase</i>				
Unadjusted $p$ -value	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Sharpened $q$ -value	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
<b>High-Skilled Immigration</b> (Base: decrease)				
<i>Increase</i>				
Unadjusted $p$ -value	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Sharpened $q$ -value	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
<b>Climate Change Mitigation</b> (Base: decrease)				
<i>Increase</i>				
Unadjusted $p$ -value	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Sharpened $q$ -value	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)

Table D.2: Multiple Testing Adjustment—Effort Effects

	Gen. Pop.	Top 1% Income	Top 1% Wealth	Top 1% Both
<b>Cash Aid for the Poor</b> (Base: unchanged)				
<i>Decrease</i>				
Unadjusted $p$ -value	0.10	0.66	0.06	0.82
Sharpened $q$ -value	(0.04)	(0.17)	(0.03)	(0.20)
<i>Increase</i>				
Unadjusted $p$ -value	0.08	0.00	0.00	0.00
Sharpened $q$ -value	(0.03)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
<b>Spending on Tertiary Education</b> (Base: unchanged)				
<i>Decrease</i>				
Unadjusted $p$ -value	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.00
Sharpened $q$ -value	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
<i>Increase</i>				
Unadjusted $p$ -value	0.19	0.89	0.55	0.73
Sharpened $q$ -value	(0.07)	(0.22)	(0.15)	(0.18)
<b>Top Income Tax Rate</b> (Base: unchanged)				
<i>Decrease</i>				
Unadjusted $p$ -value	0.34	0.00	0.00	0.00
Sharpened $q$ -value	(0.11)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
<i>Increase</i>				
Unadjusted $p$ -value	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Sharpened $q$ -value	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
<b>Wealth Tax Rate</b> (Base: unchanged)				
<i>Increase</i>				
Unadjusted $p$ -value	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00
Sharpened $q$ -value	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
<b>Real Estate Tax Rate</b> (Base: unchanged)				
<i>Increase</i>				
Unadjusted $p$ -value	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Sharpened $q$ -value	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
<b>High-Skilled Immigration</b> (Base: decrease)				
<i>Increase</i>				
Unadjusted $p$ -value	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Sharpened $q$ -value	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
<b>Climate Change Mitigation</b> (Base: decrease)				
<i>Increase</i>				
Unadjusted $p$ -value	0.03	0.00	0.02	0.29
Sharpened $q$ -value	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.09)

Table D.3: Multiple Testing Adjustment—Equity Effects

	Gen. Pop.	Top 1% Income	Top 1% Wealth	Top 1% Both
<b>Cash Aid for the Poor</b> (Base: unchanged)				
<i>Decrease</i>				
Unadjusted $p$ -value	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Sharpened $q$ -value	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
<i>Increase</i>				
Unadjusted $p$ -value	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.29
Sharpened $q$ -value	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.03)	(0.12)
<b>Spending on Tertiary Education</b> (Base: unchanged)				
<i>Decrease</i>				
Unadjusted $p$ -value	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.08
Sharpened $q$ -value	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.05)
<i>Increase</i>				
Unadjusted $p$ -value	0.03	0.16	0.16	0.03
Sharpened $q$ -value	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.03)
<b>Top Income Tax Rate</b> (Base: unchanged)				
<i>Decrease</i>				
Unadjusted $p$ -value	0.00	0.13	0.00	0.32
Sharpened $q$ -value	(0.00)	(0.06)	(0.00)	(0.12)
<i>Increase</i>				
Unadjusted $p$ -value	0.63	0.40	0.03	0.57
Sharpened $q$ -value	(0.19)	(0.12)	(0.03)	(0.18)
<b>Wealth Tax Rate</b> (Base: unchanged)				
<i>Increase</i>				
Unadjusted $p$ -value	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.01
Sharpened $q$ -value	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.05)	(0.01)
<b>Real Estate Tax Rate</b> (Base: unchanged)				
<i>Increase</i>				
Unadjusted $p$ -value	0.35	0.03	0.01	0.08
Sharpened $q$ -value	(0.12)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.05)
<b>High-Skilled Immigration</b> (Base: decrease)				
<i>Increase</i>				
Unadjusted $p$ -value	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02
Sharpened $q$ -value	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.02)
<b>Climate Change Mitigation</b> (Base: decrease)				
<i>Increase</i>				
Unadjusted $p$ -value	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.88
Sharpened $q$ -value	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.24)

## E Conjoint Results with Additional Income and Wealth Groups

In the paper, we show the conjoint results with the general population as a single group. Below, we show the conjoint results for platform preferences with the general population further split into five income or wealth groups. First, we use income registry data to split the population into quintiles based on personal income (Figure E.1). This allows us to check to what extent the top 20% in the income distribution responds more—or less—similar to the remainder of the population (bottom 80%) or the economic elites. Second, we use the wealth registry data to do a similar exercise, where we split the general population into quintiles based on their net wealth (Figure E.2). To make the results easier to inspect, we shown results by attribute in panels (a)-(g), e.g., Top Income Tax Rate and Wealth Tax Rate, in both Figures E.1 and E.2. Note that Statistics Denmark observes strict rules regarding access to and sharing of data and results obtained using registry data. This is for reasons of data protection for the Danish population. Therefore, the registry data used to split the population into quintiles on income and wealth in Figures E.1 and E.2 cannot be submitted as replication data.

Figure E.1: Conjoint with 5 General Population Income Groups: Platform Preference





Figure E.2: Conjoint with 5 General Population Wealth Groups: Platform Preference



## F Conjoint Results with Marginal Means

In the paper, we show the average marginal component effects (AMCEs). Figures [F.1-F.6](#) instead show the marginal means for the same outcome variables.

Figure F.1: Conjoint Results with Marginal Means—Platform Preference






Figure F.2: Conjoint Results with Marginal Means—Platform Rating




Figure F.3: Conjoint Results with Marginal Means—Effort Effects




Figure F.4: Conjoint Results with Marginal Means—Growth Effects




Figure F.5: Conjoint Results with Marginal Means—Equity Effects




Figure F.6: Conjoint Results with Marginal Means—Effects on the Poor

