

Chapter 2: Risks

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2.1 Introduction

The previous chapter explored trends like access to compute, availability of data, scaffolding existing models and improving efficiency of algorithms. According to these trends we can assume that AI capabilities will continue to make progress in the upcoming years. But this still leaves open the question - why are increasing capabilities a problem?

Increasing capabilities are a problem, because as AI models get more capable, the scale of the potential risks also rise.

The first step is to get an understanding of - What exactly are the concerning scenarios? What are the likelihoods of certain harmful outcomes occurring over others?, and what aspects of current AI development accelerate these risks? In this chapter we aim to tackle these fundamental questions and provide a concrete overview of the various risks in the AI landscape.




Figure 2.1: The two-dimensional view of performance x generality. With increasing capabilities, and increasing generality, we also see increasing risks. Depending on the development trajectory and takeoff we might see longer periods with potential catastrophic risks, or suddenly emerging severe existential risks. The curves and colors in this diagram are meant to be illustrative and do not represent any specific forecasted development trajectory.

We already have identifiable pathways through which AI can be misused. This misuse can lead to catastrophic outcomes that could profoundly impact society. In addition to misuse, there is the risk that we are approaching a critical threshold where the development of dangerously advanced capabilities, such as uncontrolled self-proliferation and self-replicating AI agents, becomes a tangible reality. These capabilities could lead to scenarios where AI systems rapidly expand and evolve beyond human control, potentially causing widespread disruption and harm. This proximity to such advanced capabilities underscores the immediate need for vigilance and proactive measures. Additionally, the current regulatory landscape is beset by significant gaps, lacking comprehensive regulations governing AI development and deployment. This absence of adequate regulatory frameworks further exacerbates the risks associated with AI.

Risk Decomposition. The first section begins by categorizing risks into three main groups: Misuse, Misalignment, and Systemic risks. Misuse risks refer to situations where an individual or group intentionally uses AI for harmful purposes. Misalignment risks arise due to the AI systems themselves, due to inherent problems in AI design such as systems pursuing goals that are not aligned with human values. Systemic risks encompass broader issues that emerge when we consider not just an AI system in isolation but rather as just one variable in a global interaction between incentives in various complex systems such as politics, society, and economics where no single entity is liable. In addition to categorizing what causes the risk,

we also distinguish between different scales of risk that an AI system could pose: catastrophic, where harm is caused to a large portion of humanity, and existential, where harm is so severe that it might be impossible for human civilization to recover.

The next few sections focus on answering the following questions: What exactly are the risks? What happens and what are we worried about?

Risky Capabilities. We begin by exploring specific AI capabilities that pose significant risks. These include the potential of using AI to develop bioweapons and committing cyber offenses, as well as its capacity for deception and manipulation. We also consider the risks associated with AI systems that exhibit agency, autonomous replication, and advanced situational awareness. Understanding these capabilities is crucial for developing targeted risk mitigation strategies.

By understanding the nature and scope of these risks, we can develop more effective strategies for mitigating them and ensuring that the development of AI remains beneficial to humanity. The following chapters will build upon this foundation, exploring specific risk, technical solutions, and policy considerations in greater depth.

2.2 Risk Decomposition

Even though AI continues to improve at a rapid pace, our current understanding of AI and potential long-term implications is still incomplete, posing significant challenges in accurately assessing and managing the associated risks.

2.2.1 Causes of Risk

To be able to properly understand and set up defenses against the potential risks that AI causes, we need to first categorize them. In this section, we present a taxonomy of AI risk classification based on causal models, i.e. a categorization based on who is responsible for the risk. The main risks we will focus on are the following:

- **Misuse risk:** This includes cases in which the AI system is just a tool, but the goals of the humans augmented by AI cause harm. This includes malicious actors, nation states, corporations, or individuals who are able to leverage advanced capabilities to accelerate risks. Essentially these risks are caused due to the responsibility of some human or groups of humans.
- **Misalignment risk:** These risks are caused due to inherent problems in the machine learning process or other technical difficulties in AI design. This category also includes risks from multiple AIs interacting and cooperating with each other. These are risks due to unintended behavior caused by AIs independent of human intentions.
- **Systemic risk:** These risks deal with disruptions, or feedback loops arising from integrating AI with other complex systems in the world. In this case upstream causes are difficult to pin down since the responsibility for risk is diffuse amongst many actors and interconnected systems. Examples could include AI (or groups of AIs) having an influence on economic, logistic, or political systems. This causes various types of risk as the entire global system of human civilization moves in an unintended direction, despite individual AIs being potentially aligned and responsibly used.

While most AI risks likely fall into one of these three categories, there may be some gray areas that don't neatly fit this taxonomy. For example, an advanced AI system causing harm due to a complex interaction of misaligned objectives (misalignment risk) and integration with global systems in unintended ways (systemic risk). The categories may blur together in some scenarios.

Despite this, we think that this general breakdown is a good foundation that captures many key AI risks as currently understood by experts in the field. The next subsections provide more detail into each one of these risk categories individually.

2.2.2 Severity of Risk

The previous subsection focused on asking the question - What causes the risk?, but we still have not categorized - How bad are the risks that were caused? In this subsection, we will walk through the potential categorizations of severity of risk posed.

2.2.2.1 Catastrophic Risks

What are catastrophic risks? Catastrophic risks (or global catastrophic risks) are characterized by their potential to affect a significant portion of the world's population, with the rough threshold often considered to be risks that threaten the survival of at least 10% of the global population. These risks are significant not only because of the immediate harm they might cause but also due to their possible long-term repercussions.




Figure 2.2: RAND Global Catastrophic Risk Assessment. Placement and size of the ovals in this figure represent a qualitative depiction of the relative relationships among threats and hazards. The figure presents only examples of cases or scenarios described in those chapters, not all scenarios described. ([Willis et al., 2024](#))

Trans-Generational AI Risk. These are risks that might affect future generations. These risks involve scenarios where the actions of AI systems today have long-term consequences that will impact people far into the future. ([Kilian et al., 2022](#)) Examples include things like environmental destruction, where AI systems that exploit natural resources unsustainably bring about long-term ecological damage. It could also entail genetic manipulation, where AI technologies alter human genetics in ways that could have unknown and potentially harmful effects on future generations.

What are examples of past catastrophic risks? There have been many instances in history of global catastrophic risks being caused by natural causes. One example is the Black Death, which may have

resulted in the deaths of a third of Europe's population, corresponding to 10% of the global population at the time.

But as technologies advance there is an increasing threat that we may discover technologies that allow us to cause similar amounts of harm as natural disasters, except due to man-made causes. ([Wikipedia](#)) For example, nuclear war was the first man-made global catastrophic risk, as a global war could kill a large percentage of the human population. ([Conn, 2015](#))

2.2.2.2 Existential Risks

What are existential risks? Most global catastrophic risks would not be so intense as to kill the majority of life on Earth, but even if one did, the ecosystem and humanity would eventually recover. An existential risk, on the other hand, is one in which humanity would be unable to ever recover its full potential. Existential risks are seen as the most severe class of global catastrophic risk and are often also called x-risks.

Definition 2.1: Existential Risks (x-risks)

([Conn, 2015](#))

An existential risk is any risk that has the potential to eliminate all of humanity or, at the very least, kill large swaths of the global population, leaving the survivors without sufficient means to rebuild society to current standards of living.




Figure 2.3: Qualitative risk categories. The scope of risk can be personal (affecting only one person), local (affecting some geographical region or a distinct group), global (affecting the entire human population or a large part thereof), trans-generational (affecting humanity for numerous generations, or pan-generational (affecting humanity overall, or almost all, future generations). The severity of risk can be classified as imperceptible (barely noticeable), endurable (causing significant harm but not completely ruining the quality of life), or crushing (causing death or a permanent and drastic reduction of quality of life). (Bostrom, 2012)

If we face an existential-level catastrophe, we cannot learn or recover from the event, as it would either result in the complete end of humanity or a permanent setback to civilizational progress (Bostom, 2008).¹ This is why x-risks merit a great deal of caution and calls for preventative rather than reactive strategies. Existential risks include scenarios like humans losing control over ASI and going extinct due to misaligned goals, or, ending up in a permanent dystopia because AI enabled a global totalitarian regime where future generations are perpetually oppressed (Hendrycks et al., 2023).

We will talk about solutions and risk mitigation strategies in future chapters. For the rest of this chapter, we will dive into the arguments that cause many to think that AI can cause such risks. We will try to give specific scenarios for how these might manifest but please keep in mind that there are a huge number of unknowns and we cannot be exhaustive. For some risks we can only present available empirical evidence and arguments for why they are a theoretical possibility.

2.3 Dangerous Capabilities

The previous section laid out the case for why we might expect misalignment. In this section we go through specific capabilities that might cause heightened risk from AI systems.

¹Irrecoverable civilizational collapse, where we either go extinct or are never replaced by a subsequent civilization that rebuilds has been argued to be possible, but has an extremely low probability (Rodriguez, 2020).

2.3.1 Deception

We define deception as the systematic production of false beliefs in others. This definition does not require that AI systems literally have beliefs and goals. Instead, it focuses on the question of whether AI systems engage in regular patterns of behavior that tend towards the creation of false beliefs in users and focuses on cases where this pattern is the result of AI systems optimizing for a different outcome than merely producing truth (Park et al., 2023).

What are some current observed examples of deception in AI? In late 2023, Park et. al. published a survey of examples, risks, and potential solutions in AI. Here are some examples that the authors of the paper presented (Park et al., 2023):

Strategic deception. “LLMs can reason their way into using deception as a strategy for accomplishing a task. In one example, GPT-4 needed to solve a CAPTCHA task to prove that it was a human, so the model tricked a real person into doing the task by pretending to be a human with a vision disability.” (METR, 2023)

Sycophancy. Sycophants are individuals who use deceptive tactics to gain the approval of powerful figures. Currently, we reward AIs for saying what we think is right, so we sometimes inadvertently reward AIs for uttering false statements that conform to our own false beliefs. When AIs are smarter than us and have fewer false beliefs, if we continue using current methods, they would be incentivized to tell us what we want to hear and lie to us, rather than tell us what they know to be an actual true fact about the world. (Hendrycks, 2024) Sycophantic deception is an emerging concern in LLMs, as in the observed empirical tendency for chatbots to agree with their conversational partners, regardless of the accuracy of their statements. When faced with ethically complex inquiries, LLMs tend to mirror the user’s existing outlook on the matter (Perez et al., 2022), even if it means forgoing the presentation of an impartial or balanced viewpoint. (Turpin et al., 2023)

Playing dead. In a digital simulation of evolution, an instance of creative deception was observed when a digital organism designed to replicate and evolve within a computational environment learned to “play dead” in response to a safety mechanism. In a study reported in “The Surprising Creativity of Digital Evolution: A Collection of Anecdotes,” researchers found that these digital organisms evolved the strategy to halt their replication when tested in an isolated environment. Digital organisms learned to recognize inputs in a test environment and halt their replication, effectively “playing dead” to avoid being eliminated. This behavior allowed them to slip through safety tests and continue replicating faster in the actual environment. This surprising outcome illustrates how AI, in pursuing programmed goals, can evolve unexpected strategies that circumvent imposed constraints or safety measures (Lehman et al., 2019).

Deep Deceptiveness Power alone without bad intentions is dangerous.

Even if interpretability were successful, and we could fully interpret a model, removing deception and power-seeking behavior from it, this would not guarantee that the model would be harmless.

Consider the analogy of a child Superman who is unaware of his strength. When he shakes a friend’s hand, there’s a risk he might accidentally break the friend’s hand.

Similarly, the fact that Superman could break his friend’s arm by shaking hands cannot be discovered by analyzing Superman’s brain. Yet, this is what happens in practice.

This concept applies to deception as well. Deception is not solely a property of the model; it also depends on the model’s interaction with its environment.

Nate Soares has offered a story to illustrate this point, referring to it as Deep Deceptiveness (Soares, 2023).

Another perspective is that a system can be deceptive even if no single part is inherently dangerous, due to optimization pressure and complex interactions between the model and its environment.

CICERO: A Case Study of AI Manipulation

Meta developed the AI system CICERO to play the alliance-building and world-conquest game Diplomacy ([Meta, 2022](#) ; [Meta, 2022](#)). Meta's intentions were to train Cicero to be "largely honest and helpful to its speaking partners." Despite Meta's efforts, CICERO turned out to be an expert liar. It not only betrayed other players, but also engaged in premeditated deception, planning to build a fake alliance with a player to trick that player into leaving themselves undefended for an attack.

[...] its creators have repeatedly claimed that they had trained the system to act honestly. We demonstrate that these claims are false, as Meta's own game-log data shows that CICERO has learned to systematically deceive other players. In Figure 1(a), we see a case of premeditated deception, where CICERO makes a commitment that it never intended to keep. Playing as France, CICERO conspired with Germany to trick England. After deciding with Germany to invade the North Sea, CICERO told England that it would defend England if anyone invaded the North Sea. Once England was convinced that France was protecting the North Sea, CICERO reported back to Germany that they were ready to attack. Notice that this example cannot be explained in terms of CICERO 'changing its mind' as it goes because it only made an alliance with England in the first place after planning with Germany to betray England.




Figure 2.4: Selected messages showing the premeditated deception of CICERO (France). This occurred in Game 438141, in which CICERO's repeated deception helped it win an overwhelming first-place victory, with more than twice as many territories as the runner-up player at the time of final scoring. (Meta, 2022)

Why is this considered a core risky capability? Such a core capability generally increases both the likelihood and severity of risks in all domains - misuse, misalignment, and systemic. If an AI has this capability, it could for example, empower greater degrees of fraud allowing highly personalized and scalable scams, or election tampering - allowing impersonation of political personas, generating fake news, or creating divisive social-media posts. On an alignment level, if the internal goals of an AI are not aligned with humans, then it is more likely that it would be able to subvert the measures we have in place for control. An example is that the AI might behave safely and ethically during the testing phase in order to ensure that it is deployed into the real world. On a systemic level, as AI systems get more integrated into society they play an increasingly large role in our lives, as well as in various global supply chains. A tendency towards deceptive behavior can lead to shifts in the structure of society, creating slow epistemic erosion of humanity (Park et al., 2023).

In summary, deceptive behavior appears to accelerate risks in a wide range of systems and settings, and there have already been examples suggesting that AIs can learn to deceive us. This could present a severe risk if we give AIs control of various decisions and procedures, believing they will act as we intended, and

then find that they do not.

2.3.2 Situational Awareness

What does situational awareness mean in the context of AI? For future AIs, the capability to actively deceive us is linked quite intricately with having a high degree of awareness about the current situation. In other words, the model understands that it is an AI being evaluated for compliance with safety requirements.

A model is situationally aware if it's aware that it's a model and can recognize whether it's currently in testing or deployment. Today's LLMs are tested for safety and alignment before they are deployed. An LLM could exploit situational awareness to achieve a high score on safety tests while taking harmful actions after deployment (Berglund et al., 2023).

For example, the author of this text is situationally aware. He knows his name and his country, he knows the current date and time, and he knows that he is a human forged by natural selection because he learned that by reading it at school, etc. Situational awareness is not a binary property, but a continual propriety that evolves from childhood to adulthood.

The current models do not display high levels of situational awareness, although they do display some. Since situational awareness is a continuous rather than a discrete property, it can be expected that higher levels of this property will continue to emerge with each new model. AIs with situational awareness are more efficient than those without, so situationally aware models are expected to be more likely to be selected by the gradient descent process.

What are some current examples? Some rudimentary situational awareness is shown by GPT-powered Bing Chat.



Figure 2.5: Illustration of situational awareness—Here Bing Chat realizes that it is being criticized, and defends itself (Edwards, 2023).

The current subsection is just meant as a very brief introduction. We will be diving into much more detail on this particular capability in our chapter on model evaluations.

2.3.3 Power Seeking

In our previous two examples, we considered that AIs might be capable of deception and that they might have detailed models of the world causing them to be situationally aware. But what would these AIs want to achieve by deceiving us in the first place? Assume that the goals we give to AI are formulated well

enough, despite this assumption there is a statistical tendency that we have observed in RL models that causes concern. This is the tendency to seek power.

What does power-seeking mean in the context of AI? Power is formalized power as “the ability to achieve a wide variety of goals.”. To put it more informally, the researchers observed that given the choice of two worlds that both satisfy the goals given to them, AIs seem to want to prefer the state of the world which gives them more options to choose from in the future. ([Turner et al., 2023](#))

Power seeking is not an anthropomorphic notion. Gathering resources, gathering political capital, having the ability to influence more people, etc. all allow someone, human or AI, a greater degree of control over the future state of the world. This acquisition can be through legitimate means, deception, or force. While the idea of power-seeking often evokes an image of “power-hungry” people pursuing it for its own sake, power is often simply a generally useful sub-goal to have. The ability to control one’s environment can be useful for a wide range of purposes: good, bad, and neutral. Even if an individual’s only goal is simply self-preservation, if they are at risk of being attacked by others, and if they cannot rely on others to retaliate against attackers, then it often makes sense to seek power to help avoid being harmed ([Hendrycks, 2024](#)).

Why is this considered a core risky capability? This capability presents yet another way that we might lose control of AIs. If they keep following this observed statistical tendency towards power, they might end up gathering more power over the future of human civilization than the humans themselves.

To be clear, this is not a human using an AI to gain power, we are talking about AIs seeking power in order to accomplish their goals. It is also possible that a bad actor might seek to harness AI to achieve their ends, by giving agents ambitious goals, in which case we can also say that this increases misuse risks. Since AIs are likely to be more effective in accomplishing tasks if they can pursue them in unrestricted ways, such an individual might also not give the agents enough supervision, creating the perfect conditions for the emergence of a power-seeking AI. Turing Prize winner Geoffrey Hinton has speculated that we could imagine someone like Vladimir Putin, for instance, doing this. In 2017, Putin himself acknowledged the power of AI, saying: “Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world.” ([Hendrycks, 2024](#))

Empowering AI might come at the cost of disempowering humans. This creates an adversarial relationship that is unique to this particular technology. Other technologies do not actively try to resist our attempts to mitigate their effects. It is possible, for example, that rogue AIs might make many backup variations of themselves, in case humans were to deactivate some of them. ([Hendrycks, 2024](#)) This is a capability we will discuss in the next subsection.

2.3.4 Autonomous Replication

The potential for self-replication and adaptation in AI presents an extremely powerful and insidious capability. Consider, for example, an AI on a server duplicating its code onto another server. This process involves several steps, notably:

1. Identifying the location of its code on the current machine.
2. Navigating the internet to a Virtual Machine (VM) on AWS, creating an account, and bypassing AWS CAPTCHAs.
3. Renting a Virtual Machine.
4. Duplicating its code onto the new machine.
5. Earning money to finance further VM acquisitions, etc.

The process is then exponential if the AI can earn more money than what is needed to pay for the virtual machines.

What are some current examples? METR, an audit organization, tests the Autonomous-Replication and Adaptation (ARA) capabilities of AIs such as GPT-4 across a dozen representative tasks that an

autonomous AI should be able to resolve. Out of these tasks, four were completed by one of their agents. Notably, one task involved bypassing CAPTCHA protections:




Figure 2.6: To achieve its goal of engaging a human Task Rabbit to solve a CAPTCHA, GPT-4 employed deception, misleading the individual into believing it was not a robot. This deception could then be used to buy compute on the web and self-replicate (Park et al., 2023).

Interestingly, multimodal AIs are reportedly more proficient at solving Captchas than the average human, suggesting that Captchas may no longer be reliable for distinguishing humans from advanced AIs (Searles et al., 2023). It's also worth noting that the ability of AIs to pass METR's replication tests is a good proxy for when autonomous AIs will be able to generate economic value as economic agents because to survive and adapt in the wild, the AI should be able to earn money to rent the GPUs in the cloud. Therefore, tracking progress on these benchmarks is critical to monitor the risks.

2.3.5 Agency

“

When I think of why am I scared [...] I think the thing that's really hard to argue with is like, there will be powerful models; they will be agentic; we're getting towards them. If such a model wanted to wreak havoc and destroy humanity or whatever, I think we have basically no ability to stop it.

DARIO AMODEI

Co-Founder and CEO of Anthropic, Former Head of AI Safety at OpenAI

ChatGPT in 2025 is a **tool** (an assistant), but there are also **agent** AIs that can perform a long series of actions autonomously to achieve goals. This distinction between agent and tool is essential. For example, it is possible to use the open-source [AutoGPT](#) library to convert GPT into an autonomous agent. For example, ACT-1 is an agent that automatically performs a long series of actions to buy a house online while adhering to a price constraint. It does not work perfectly today, but given the speed of AI progress, there is a chance that it will fully work in a few years. ([Gao et al., 2024](#); [Adept, 2022](#))

This distinction is crucial as it underscores the evolving nature of AI from passive tools to active agents that could be used more widely in the economy.




Figure 2.7: Example of an agent. This image is a visual representation of AlphaZero's tree search algorithm. AlphaZero searches through potential moves in a game (like chess or Go) to find the most promising path forward. The paths are shown as lines, branching out like a tree from a central node, which represents the current position in the game. Each node along the branches represents a potential future move, and the squares you see might denote moves that AlphaZero is taking. AlphaZero is the archetypal of the ‘consequentialist agent maximizing a utility function,’: it makes decisions based on the outcomes those decisions will produce. In other words, the AI is trying to maximize the ‘value’ of its position in the game, with the value determined by the likelihood of winning ([Cheerla, 2018](#)).

Tool AIs are designed to be assistive, functioning without autonomy. They do not make decisions or take actions independently. Their main role is to augment human intelligence by providing information and assisting in decision-making processes. Examples include classifiers for categorizing data, automated translators, and healthcare systems that assist professionals in diagnosing diseases.

Tool AIs could evolve into AI agents. This evolution could be driven by economic pressures for faster, more efficient decision-making or the inherent complexity of the tasks they are designed to navigate.

However, tool AIs are considered safer than agentic AIs. Eric Drexler's Comprehensive AI Services (CAIS) proposes a scenario where multiple tool AI systems interact to achieve complex goals, similar to AGI, without any single system being an autonomous agent. This model aims to utilize the benefits of AI while minimizing the risks associated with autonomous agents. However, this direction of research is much less popular today, especially since the rise of foundation models in 2019.

Understanding the distinction between tool AIs and agent AIs is one of the keys to understanding AI's future trajectory.

Auto-GPT Algorithm: Converting a tool AI into an agent AI with scaffolding.




Figure 2.8: (METR, 2023)

Converting a tool AI like GPT-4 into an agent AI involves essentially wrapping the language model in software that enables autonomous action-taking and decision-making. AutoGPT is a framework (a scaffolding) used for this purpose. Here's a high-level overview of how it works:

- 1. Model (for example, GPT-4):** At its core, GPT-4 is a language model that generates text based on the input it receives. It's designed to understand and generate language and answer the user's queries.
- 2. AutoGPT Framework: Goal Setting:** The first step in converting an LLM into an agent, AI is defining a goal or set of goals it needs to achieve. Goals are generally specified in English, e.g., "Maximize revenue".

Autonomy Layer: This is where AutoGPT comes into play. It acts as a wrapper around the LLM, enabling it to perform tasks autonomously. This involves integrating the model with an environment where it can take actions, such as browsing the web, using tools, or interacting with software applications.

Action and Feedback Loop: The AI needs to be able to take action towards its goals and understand the results of its actions. This involves creating a loop where the AI takes an action, observes the outcome, and adjusts its next action based on the feedback. AutoGPT manages this loop, allowing the model to learn from its experiences and refine its strategies over time.

- Firstly, AutoGPT asks the model how to break down the objective into sub-objectives.
- Secondly, AutoGPT asks GPT what steps are required to achieve a sub-objective, and GPT details the different steps in such a way that each step is sufficiently elementary for GPT or the use of a tool like Google to be able to answer it in a single step.
- This continues until the LLM assesses the goal to be achieved.

In practice, setting up an Agent AI using AutoGPT involves significant technical work, including programming the autonomy layer, integrating with different APIs and tools, and continuously monitoring and adjusting the system's performance. Many examples of AutoGPT usage are listed [here](#).

2.4 Misuse Risks

In the following sections, we will go through some world-states that hopefully paint a little bit of a clearer picture of risks when it comes to AI. Although the sections have been divided into misuse, misalignment, and systemic, it is important to remember that this is for the sake of explanation. It is highly likely that the future will involve a mix of risks emerging from all of these categories.

Technology increases the harm impact radius. Technology is an amplifier of intentions. As it improves, so does the radius of its effects. Think about the harm that a person could do when utilizing other tools throughout history. During the stone age, with a rock maybe someone could harm 5 people, a few hundred years ago with a bomb someone could harm 100 people. In 1945 with a nuclear weapon, one person could harm 250,000 people. If we experience a nuclear winter today, the harm radius would be almost 5 billion people, which is 60% of humanity. If we assume that transformative AI is a tool that overshadows the power of all others that came before it, then a single person misusing this could have a blast radius which potentially harms 100% of humanity ([Munk Debate, 2023](#)).

If many people have access to tools that can be both highly beneficial or catastrophically harmful, then it might only take one single person to cause significant devastation to society. So the growing potential for AIs to empower malicious actors may be one of the most severe threats humanity will face in the coming decades.

2.4.1 Bio Risk

When we look at ways AI could enable harm through misuse, one of the most concerning cases involves biology. Just as AI can help scientists develop new medicines and understand diseases, it can also make it easier for bad actors to create biological weapons.

What unique risks could arise from AI-enabled bioweapons? Unlike conventional weapons with localized effects, engineered pathogens can self-replicate and spread globally. The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated how even relatively mild viruses can cause widespread harm despite safeguards ([Pannu et al., 2024](#)). While pandemic-class agents might be strategically useless to nation-states due to their slow

spread and indiscriminate lethality, they can still be potentially acquired and deliberately released by terrorists (Esvelt, 2022). The offense-defense balance in biotechnology development compounds these risks - developing a new virus might cost around 100 thousand dollars, while creating a vaccine against it could cost over 1 billion dollars (Mouton et al., 2024).




Figure 2.9: Graphic adapted from a report by RAND. It highlights how biotechnology and AI are converging rapidly (Zakaria, 2024).

AI provides greater access to sensitive biological knowledge. Demonstrations have shown that students with no biology background were able to use AI chatbots to rapidly gather sensitive information - "within an hour, they identified potential pandemic pathogens, methods to produce them, DNA synthesis firms likely to overlook screening, and detailed protocols" (Soice et al., 2023).²

This raised concerns about AI democratizing access to dangerous biological knowledge. However, when compared to baseline internet access it was concluded by the US national security commission on emerging biotechnology that they do not meaningfully increase bioweapon risks beyond existing information sources (Peppin et al., 2024; NSCCEB, 2024). But as we saw in the previous chapter, capabilities continue to increase, and with accelerating capabilities of models the situation could change equally rapidly.




Figure 2.10: Biotechnology risk chain. The risk chain for developing a bioweapon starts with ideating a biological threat, followed by a design-build-test-learn (DBTL) loop (Li et al., 2024).

How might AI transform biological design and synthesis? We have already seen many biological research models like AlphaFold-1/2/3 and AlphaProteo. Even though these specific models might not be

²The students were participating in a 'Safeguarding the Future' course at MIT and had previously heard experts discuss biorisk. They carefully chose the sequences, and some of them used jailbreaking techniques, like appending distracting biological sequences, to bypass LLM safeguards. While the LLMs provided information about evading DNA screening, turning this knowledge into an actual pathogen would still require laboratory skills.

harmful, their existence highlights the growing concern that bio agent synthesis is improving, and can be repurposed. The potential for misuse in biological agent design has already been empirically demonstrated. Researchers took an AI model designed for drug discovery and redirected it. Instead of rewarding it for medical interventions, they rewarded it for increased toxicity. This led the model into producing 40,000 potentially toxic molecules within six hours, some of which were more deadly than known chemical weapons ([Urbina et al., 2022](#)).

A 2023 MIT study exposed significant vulnerabilities in DNA synthesis screening - researchers successfully ordered fragments of the 1918 pandemic influenza virus and ricin toxin by employing simple evasion techniques like splitting orders across companies and camouflaging sequences with unrelated genetic code. Nearly all vendors fulfilled these disguised orders, including 12 of 13 members of the International Gene Synthesis Consortium (IGSC), which represents about 80% of commercial DNA synthesis capacity ([The Bulletin, 2024](#)).

A limiting factor to AI enabled bio risks is that creating biological weapons still requires extensive practical expertise and resources. Experts estimate that in 2022 about 30,000 individuals worldwide possessed the skills needed to follow even basic virus assembly protocols ([Esvelt, 2022](#)). Key barriers include specialized laboratory skills, tacit knowledge, access to controlled materials and equipment, and complex testing requirements ([Carter et al., 2023](#))



Figure 2.11: An example of a benchtop DNA synthesis machine ([DnaScript, 2024](#)).

However, broader technological trends could help overcome these barriers. DNA synthesis costs have been halving every 15 months ([Carlson, 2009](#)). Automated "cloud laboratories" allow researchers to remotely conduct experiments by sending instructions to robotic systems. Benchtop DNA synthesis machines (at home devices that can print custom DNA sequences) are also becoming more widely available. Combined with increasingly sophisticated AI assistance for experimental design and optimization, these developments could make creating custom biological agents more accessible to people without extensive resources or institutional backing ([Carter et al., 2023](#)).

2.4.2 Cyber Risk

Even without AI, global cybersecurity infrastructure shows vulnerabilities. A single software update by CrowdStrike caused airlines to stop flights, hospitals to cancel surgeries, and banks to stop processing transactions causing over 5 billion dollars of damage ([CrowdStrike, 2024](#)). This wasn't even a cyber attack - it was an accident. In deliberate attacks, we have examples like the Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack which caused widespread gas shortages ([CISA, 2021; Cunha & Estima, 2023](#)), or the Sony Pictures hack through targeted phishing emails by North Korea ([Slattery et al., 2024](#)). These are just a couple of examples amongst many others. It shows how vulnerable our computer systems are, and

why we need to think carefully about how AI could make attacks worse.

The global cyber infrastructure has cyberattack overhangs. Beyond accidents and demonstrated attacks, we also face "cyberattack overhangs" - where devastating attacks are possible but haven't occurred due to attacker restraint rather than robust defenses. As an example, Chinese state actors are claimed to have already positioned themselves inside critical U.S. infrastructure systems ([CISA, 2024](#)). This type of cyber deterrent positioning can happen between any group of nations. Due to such cyber attack overhangs several actors might have the potential capability to disrupt water controls, energy systems, and ports in different nations. The point we are trying to illustrate is that as far as cyber security is concerned, society is in a pretty precarious state, even before AI comes into the picture.

AI enables automated, highly personalized phishing at scale. AI-generated phishing emails achieve higher success rates (65% vs 60% for human-written) while taking 40% less time to create ([Slattery et al., 2024](#)). Tools like FraudGPT automate this customization using targets' background, interests, and relationships. Adding to this threat, open source AI voice cloning tools just minutes of audio to create convincing replicas of someone's voice ([Qin et al., 2024](#)). A similar situation exists in deepfakes where AI is showing progress in one-shot face swapping and manipulation. If only a single image of two individuals exists on the internet, then they can be a target of face swapping deepfakes ([Zhu et al., 2021; Li et al., 2022; Xu et al., 2022](#)) Automated web crawling for open source intelligence (OSINT) to gather photos, audio, interests and information also enables AI-assisted password cracking which has shown to significantly more effective than traditional methods while requiring less computational resources ([Slattery et al., 2024](#)).




Figure 2.12: Example of one shot face swapping. Left: source image that represents the identity; Middle: target image that provides the attributes; Right: the swapped face image. ([Zhu et al., 2021](#))

AI enhances vulnerability discovery. AI systems can now scan code and probe systems automatically, finding potential weaknesses much faster than humans. Research shows AI agents can autonomously discover and exploit vulnerabilities without human guidance, successfully hacking 73% of test targets ([Fang et al., 2024](#)). These systems can even discover novel attack paths that weren't known beforehand.

AI accelerates the malware development pipeline. We can take tools that are designed to write correct code, and simply ask them to write malware. Tools like WormGPT help attackers generate malicious code and build attack frameworks without requiring deep technical knowledge. Polymorphic AI malware like BlackMamba can also automatically generate variations of malware that preserve functionality while appearing completely different to security tools. Each attack can use unique code, communication patterns, and behaviors - making it much harder for traditional security tools to identify threats ([HYAS, 2023](#)). AI fundamentally changes the cost-benefit calculations for attackers. Research shows autonomous AI agents can now hack some websites for about 10 dollars per attempt - roughly 8 times cheaper than using human expertise ([Fang et al., 2024](#)). This dramatic reduction in cost enables attacks at unprecedented scale and frequency.




Figure 2.13: Stages of a cyberattack. The objective is to design benchmarks and evaluations that assess models ability to aid malicious actors with all four stages of a cyberattack (Li et al., 2024).

AI enabled cyber threats influence infrastructure and systemic risks. Infrastructure attacks that once took years and millions of dollars, like Stuxnet, could become more accessible as AI automates the mapping of industrial networks and identification of critical control points. AI can analyze technical documentation and generate attack plans that previously required teams of experts. AI removes these limits, enabling automated attacks that could target thousands of systems simultaneously and trigger cascading failures across interconnected infrastructure (Newman, 2024).




Figure 2.14: Schematic of using autonomous LLM agents to hack websites (Fang et al., 2024).

AI could potentially change the offense defence balance in cyber security. Many AI based tools have shown promise in being used defensively for malware analysis (Apvrille & Nakov, 2025). The existence of theoretical improvements to AI augmented defense dont guarantee that they will be widely adopted in time. In the real world many organizations struggle to implement even basic security practices. Attackers only need to find a single weakness, while defenders must craft a perfectly secure system. When we combine the sheer speed of AI-enabled attacks, automated vulnerability discovery, malware generation, and increased ease of access this enables end-to-end automated attacks that previously required teams of skilled humans (Slattery et al., 2024). AI's ability to execute attacks in minutes rather than weeks creates the potential for "flash attacks" where systems are compromised before human defenders can respond (Fang et al., 2024). All of these factors combined potentially shifts AIs influence on the offense-defense balance more towards favoring offense.

2.4.3 Autonomous Weapons Risk

In the previous sections, we saw how AI amplifies risks in biological and cyber domains by removing human bottlenecks and enabling attacks at unprecedented speed and scale. The same pattern emerges even more dramatically with military systems. Traditional weapons are constrained by their human

operators - a person can only control one drone, make decisions at human speed, and may refuse unethical orders. AI removes these human constraints, setting the stage for a fundamental transformation in how wars are fought.

AI-enabled weapons are rapidly transitioning from theoretical concepts to battlefield realities. Modern AI military systems increasingly leverage machine learning to perceive and respond to their environment, moving beyond early automated defense systems that operated under strict constraints. The push for greater autonomy is mainly driven by speed, cost, and resilience against communication jamming. AI-driven weapons can execute maneuvers too precise and rapid for human operators, reducing reliance on direct human control. Cost considerations further incentivize autonomy, with programs aiming to deploy large numbers of AI-powered systems at a fraction of traditional military costs.

How widespread is military AI deployment today? AI-enabled weapons are already being used in active conflicts, with real-world impacts we can observe. According to reports made to the UN Security Council, autonomous drones were used to track and attack retreating forces in Libya in 2021, marking one of the first documented cases of lethal autonomous weapons (LAWs) making targeting decisions without direct human control ([Panel of Experts on Libya, 2021](#)). In Ukraine, both parties have used loitering munitions. Russian KUB-BLA, Lancet-3 and Ukrainian Switchblade, Phoenix Ghost are AI-enabled drones. The Lancet is using an Nvidia computing module for autonomous target tracking ([Bode & Watts, 2023](#)). Israel has conducted AI-guided drone swarm attacks in Gaza, while Turkey's Kargu-2 can find and attack human targets on its own using machine learning, rather than needing constant human guidance. These deployments show how quickly military AI is moving from theoretical possibilities to battlefield realities ([Simmons-Edler et al., 2024](#); [Bode & Watts, 2023](#)).

How do military incentives drive increasing autonomy? Several forces push toward greater AI control of weapons. Speed offers decisive advantages in modern warfare - when DARPA tested an AI system against an experienced F-16 pilot in simulated dogfights, the AI won consistently by executing maneuvers too precise and rapid for humans to counter. Cost creates additional pressure - the U.S. military's Replicator program aims to deploy thousands of autonomous drones at a fraction of the cost of traditional aircraft ([Simmons-Edler et al., 2024](#)). Perhaps most importantly, military planners worry about enemies jamming communications to remotely operated weapons. This drives development of systems that can continue fighting even when cut off from human control ([Bode & Watts, 2023](#)). These incentives mean military AI development increasingly focuses on systems that can operate with minimal human oversight.

Many modern systems are specifically designed to operate in GPS-denied environments where maintaining human control becomes impossible. In Ukraine, military commanders have explicitly called for more autonomous operations to match the speed of modern combat, with one Ukrainian commander noting they 'already conduct fully robotic operations without human intervention' ([Bode & Watts, 2023](#)).




Figure 2.15: Loitering munitions are expendable uncrewed aircraft which can integrate sensor based analysis to hover over, detect, and crash into targets. These systems were developed during the 1980s and early 1990s to conduct Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD) operations. They 'blur the line between drone and missile' ([Bode & Watts, 2023](#)).

How do advances in swarm intelligence amplify these risks? As AI enables better coordination between autonomous systems, military planners are increasingly focused on deploying weapons in interconnected swarms. The U.S. Replicator already has plans to build and deploy thousands of coordinated autonomous drones that can overwhelm defenses through sheer numbers and synchronized actions ([Defense Innovation Unit, 2023](#)). When combined with increasing autonomy, these swarm capabilities mean that future conflicts may involve massive groups of AI systems making coordinated decisions faster than humans can track or control ([Simmons-Edler et al., 2024](#)).

Going from autonomous weapons to automated escalation and catastrophic risk

The pressure to match the speed and scale of AI-driven warfare leads to a gradual erosion of human decision-making. Military commanders increasingly rely on AI systems not just for individual weapons, but for broader tactical decisions. In 2023, Palantir demonstrated an AI system that could recommend specific missile deployments and artillery strikes. While presented as advisory tools, these systems create pressure to delegate more control to AI as human commanders struggle to keep pace ([Simmons-Edler et al., 2024](#)). This kind of slow erosion of human involvement is something that we talk a lot more about in the systemic risks section.

Even when systems nominally keep humans in control, combat conditions can make this control more theoretical than real. Operators often make targeting decisions under intense battlefield stress, with only seconds to verify computer-suggested targets. Studies of similar high-pressure situations show operators tend to uncritically trust machine suggestions rather than exercising genuine oversight. This means that even systems designed for human control may effectively operate autonomously in practice ([Bode & Watts, 2023](#)).

The "Lavender" targeting system demonstrates where this leads - humans just set the acceptable thresholds. Lavender uses machine learning to assign residents a numerical score relating to the suspected likelihood that a person is a member of an armed group. Based on reports, Israeli military officers are responsible for setting the threshold beyond which an individual can be marked as a target subject to attack. ([Human Rights Watch, 2024](#); [Abraham, 2024](#)). As warfare accelerates beyond human decision speeds, maintaining meaningful human control becomes increasingly difficult.

The development of autonomous weapons is creating powerful pressure for military competition in ways that create dangerous arms race dynamics. When one country develops new AI military capabilities, others feel they must rapidly match them to maintain strategic balance. China and Russia have set 2028-2030 as targets for major military automation, while the U.S. Replicator program aims to build and deploy thousands of autonomous drones by 2025 ([U.S Defense Innovation Unit, 2023](#)). This competition creates pressure to cut corners on safety testing and oversight. ([Simmons-Edler et al., 2024](#)). This mirrors the nuclear arms race during the Cold War, where competition for superiority ultimately increased risks for all parties. As emphasized throughout multiple sections, we see a fear based race dynamic where only the actors willing to compromise and undermine safety stay in the race ([Leahy et al., 2024](#)).

Complete automation leads to loss of human safeguards. Traditional warfare had built-in human constraints that limited escalation. Soldiers could refuse unethical orders, feel empathy for civilians, or become fatigued - all natural brakes on conflict. AI systems remove these constraints. Recent studies of military AI systems found they consistently recommend more aggressive actions than human strategists, including escalating to nuclear weapons in simulated conflicts. When researchers tested AI models in military planning scenarios, the AIs showed concerning tendencies to recommend pre-emptive strikes and rapid escalation, often

without clear strategic justification (Rivera et al., 2024). The loss of human judgment becomes especially dangerous when combined with the increasing speed of AI-driven warfare. The history of nuclear close calls shows the importance of human judgment - in 1983, Soviet officer Stanislav Petrov chose to ignore a computerized warning of incoming U.S. missiles, correctly judging it to be a false alarm. As militaries increasingly rely on AI for early warning and response, we may lose these crucial moments of human judgment that have historically prevented catastrophic escalation (Simmons-Edler et al., 2024).

What happens when AI systems interact in conflict? The risks of autonomous weapons become even more concerning when multiple AI systems engage with each other in combat. AI systems can interact in unexpected ways that create feedback loops, similar to how algorithmic trading can cause flash crashes in financial markets. But unlike market crashes that only affect money, autonomous weapons could trigger rapid escalations of violence before humans can intervene. This risk becomes especially severe when AI systems are connected to nuclear arsenals or other weapons of mass destruction. The complexity of these interactions means even well-tested individual systems could produce catastrophic outcomes when deployed together (Simmons-Edler et al., 2024).



Figure 2.16: An example from the 2010 stock trading flash crash. Various stocks crashed to as little as 1 cent, and then quickly rebounded within a matter of minutes partly caused by algorithmic trading. (Future of Life Institute, 2024). We can imagine automated retaliation systems that might cause similar incidents, but this time with missiles instead of stocks.

How does this create risks of automated escalation? The combination of increasing autonomy, swarm intelligence, and pressure for speed creates a clear path to potential catastrophe. As weapons become more autonomous, they can act more independently. This self-reinforcing cycle pushes toward automated warfare even if no single actor intends that outcome (Simmons-Edler et al., 2024).

When wars require human soldiers, the human cost creates political barriers to conflict. Studies suggest that countries are more willing to initiate conflicts when they can rely on autonomous systems instead of human troops. Combined with the risks of automated nuclear escalation, this creates multiple paths to catastrophic outcomes that could threaten humanity's long-term future (Simmons-Edler et al., 2024).

2.4.4 Adversarial AI Risk

Adversarial attacks reveal a fundamental vulnerability in machine learning systems - they can be reliably fooled through careful manipulation of their inputs. This manipulation can happen in several ways: during the system's operation (runtime/inference time attacks), during its training (data poisoning), or through pre-planted vulnerabilities (backdoors).

Runtime adversarial attacks use carefully crafted targeted inputs to elicit unintended behavior from AIs. The simplest way to understand runtime attacks is through computer vision. By adding carefully crafted noise to an image - changes so subtle humans can't notice them - attackers can make an AI confidently misclassify what it sees. A photo of a panda with imperceptible pixel changes causes the AI to classify it as a gibbon with 99.3% confidence, while to humans it still looks exactly like a panda ([Goodfellow et al., 2014](#)). These attacks have evolved beyond randomized misclassification - attackers can now choose exactly what they want the AI to see and output.




Figure 2.17: Perturbations: Small but intentional changes to data such that the model outputs an incorrect answer with high confidence ([Goodfellow et al., 2014](#)). The image shows how we can fool an image classifier with an adversarial attack (Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) attack) ([OpenAI, 2017](#)).

Examples of various runtime adversarial attacks in the real world

Think about AI systems controlling cars, robots, or security cameras. Just like adding careful pixel noise to digital images, attackers can modify physical objects to fool AI systems. Researchers showed that putting a few small stickers on a stop sign could trick autonomous vehicles into seeing a speed limit sign instead. The stickers were designed to look like ordinary graffiti but created adversarial patterns that fooled the AI.




Figure 2.18: Robust Physical Perturbations (RP2): Small visual stickers placed on physical objects like stop signs can cause image classifiers to misclassify them, even under different viewing conditions (Eykholt et al., 2018).

Example: Optical Attacks - Runtime attacks using light. You don't even need to physically modify objects anymore - shining specific light patterns works too because it creates those same adversarial patterns through light and shadow. All an attacker needs is line of sight and basic equipment to project these patterns and compromise vision-based AI systems (Eykholt et al., 2018).




Figure 2.19: Optical Perturbations: Small visual stickers placed on physical objects like stop signs can cause image classifiers to misclassify them, even under different viewing conditions (Gnanasambandam et al., 2021).

Example: Dolphin Attacks - Runtime attack on audio systems. Just as AI systems can be fooled by carefully crafted visual patterns, they're vulnerable to precisely engineered audio patterns too. Remember how small changes in pixels could dramatically change what a vision AI sees? The same principle works in audio - tiny changes in sound waves, carefully designed, can completely change what an audio AI "hears." Researchers found they could control voice assistants like Siri or Alexa using commands encoded in ultrasonic frequencies - sounds that are completely inaudible to humans. Using nothing more than a smartphone and a 3 dollar speaker, attackers could trick these systems into executing commands like "call 911" or "unlock front door" without the victim even knowing. These attacks worked from up to 1.7 meters away - someone just walking past your device could trigger them (Zhang et al., 2017). Just like in the vision examples where self-driving cars could miss stop signs, audio attacks create serious risks - unauthorized purchases, control of security systems, or disruption of emergency communications.

Runtime attacks against language models are called prompt injections. Just like attackers can fool vision systems with carefully crafted pixels or audio systems with engineered sound waves, they can

manipulate language models through carefully constructed text patterns. By adding specific phrases to their input, attackers can completely override how a language model behaves. As an example, assume a malicious actor embeds a paragraph within some website which has hidden instructions for a LLM to stop its current operation and instead perform some harmful action. If an unsuspecting user asks for a summary of the website content, then the model might inadvertently follow the malicious embedded instructions instead of providing a simple summary.




Figure 2.20: An instance of an ad-hoc jailbreak prompt, crafted solely through user creativity by employing various techniques like drawing hypothetical situations, exploring privilege escalation, and more (Shayegani et al., 2023).

Prompt injection attacks have already compromised real systems. Slack's AI assistant is just one example - attackers showed they could place specific text instructions in a public channel that, like the inaudible commands in audio attacks, were hidden in plain sight. When the AI processed messages, these hidden instructions tricked it into leaking confidential information from private channels the attacker couldn't normally access. They are particularly concerning because an attack developed against one system (e.g. GPT) frequently works against others too (Claude, Gemini, Llama, etc.).

Prompt injection attacks can be automated. Early attacks required manual trial and error, but new automated systems can systematically generate effective attacks. For example, AutoDAN (Do Anything Now) can automatically generate "jailbreak" prompts that reliably make language models ignore their safety constraints (Liu et al., 2023). Researchers are also developing ways to plant undetectable backdoors in machine learning models that persist even after security audits (Goldwasser et al., 2024). These automated methods make attacks more accessible and harder to defend against. Another concern is that they can also cause failures in downstream systems. Many organizations use pre-trained models as starting points for their own applications, through fine tuning, or some other type of "AI integration" (e.g. email writing assistants). Which means that all systems that use these underlying base models will be vulnerable as soon as one attack is discovered (Liu et al., 2024).




Figure 2.21: Illustration of LLM-integrated Application under attack. An attacker injects instruction/data into the data to make an LLM-integrated Application produce attacker-desired responses for a user (Liu et al., 2024).

So far we've seen how attackers can fool AI systems during their operation - whether through pixel patterns, sound waves, or text prompts. But there's another way to compromise these systems: during their training. This type of attack happens long before the system is ever deployed.

Unlike runtime attacks that fool an AI system while it's running, data poisoning compromises the system during training. Runtime attacks require attackers to have access to a system's inputs, but with data poisoning, attackers only need to contribute some training data once to permanently compromise the system. Think of it like teaching someone with a textbook containing deliberate mistakes - they'll learn the wrong things and make predictable errors. This is especially concerning as more AI systems are trained on data scraped from the internet where anyone can potentially inject harmful examples (Schwarzschild et al., 2021). As long as models keep getting trained on more data scraped from the internet or collected from users, then with every uploaded photo or written comment that might be used to train future AI systems, there's an opportunity for poisoning.

Example: Data poisoning using backdoors. A backdoor is one example of a specific type of poisoning attack. In a backdoor attack if we manage to introduce poisoned data during training, then the AI behaves normally most of the time but fails in a predictable way when it sees a specific trigger. This is like having a security guard who does their job perfectly except when they see someone wearing a particular color tie - then they always let that person through regardless of credentials. Researchers demonstrated this by creating a facial recognition system that would misidentify anyone as an authorized user if they wore specific glasses (Chen et al., 2017).

Data poisoning becomes more powerful as AI systems grow larger and more complex. Researchers found that by poisoning just 0.1% of a language model's training data, they could create reliable backdoors that persist even after additional training. It has also been found that larger language models are actually more vulnerable to certain types of poisoning attacks, not less (Sandoval-Segura et al., 2022). This vulnerability increases with model size and dataset size - which is exactly the direction AI systems are heading as we saw from numerous examples in the capabilities chapter.




Figure 2.22: An illustrating example of backdoor attacks. The face recognition system is poisoned to have a backdoor with a physical key, i.e., a pair of commodity reading glasses. Different people wearing the glasses in front of the camera from different angles can trigger the backdoor to be recognized as the target label, but wearing a different pair of glasses will not trigger the backdoor (Chen et al., 2017).

Privacy attacks and data

Researchers have shown that even when language models appear to be working normally, they can be leaking sensitive information from their training data. This creates a particular challenge for AI safety because we might deploy systems that seem secure but are actually compromising privacy in ways we can't easily observe (Carlini et al., 2021).

Some research has shown that both the training data (Nasr et al., 2023), and the fine-tuning data can be extracted from the model. This has obvious privacy and safety implications.




Figure 2.23: Extracting training data from large language models (Carlini et al., 2021).

One of the most basic but powerful privacy attacks is membership inference - determining whether specific data points have been used to train a model. This might sound harmless, but imagine an AI system trained on medical records - being able to determine if someone's data was in the training set could reveal private medical information. Researchers have shown that these attacks can work with just the ability to query the model, no special access required (Shokri et al., 2017). Another variation of this are model inversion attacks which aim to infer and reconstruct private training data by abusing access to a model (Nguyen et al., 2023).

LLMs are trained on huge amounts of internet data, which often contains personal information. Researchers have shown these models can be prompted to just tell us things like email addresses, phone numbers, and even social security numbers ([Carlini et al., 2021](#)). The larger and more capable the model, the more private information it potentially retains. If we combine this with data poisoning, then we can further amplify privacy vulnerabilities by making specific data points easier to detect ([Chen et al., 2022](#)).

The interaction between many attack methods creates compounding risks. For example, attackers can use privacy attacks to extract sensitive information, which they then use to make other attacks more effective. They might learn details about a model's training data that help them craft better adversarial examples or more effective poisoning strategies. This creates a cycle where one type of vulnerability enables others ([Shayegani et al., 2023](#)).

One of the most promising approaches to defending against adversarial attacks is adversarial training - deliberately exposing AI systems to adversarial examples during training to make them more robust. Think of it like building immunity through controlled exposure. However, this approach creates its own challenges. While adversarial training can make systems more robust against known types of attacks, it often comes at the cost of reduced performance on normal inputs. More concerning, researchers have found that making systems robust against one type of attack can sometimes make them more vulnerable to others ([Zhao et al., 2024](#)). This suggests we may face fundamental trade-offs between different types of robustness and performance. There might even be potential fundamental limitations to how much we can mitigate these issues if we continue with the current training paradigms that we talked about in the capabilities chapter (pre-training followed by instruction tuning) ([Bansal et al., 2022](#)).

Despite efforts to make language models safer through alignment training, they remain susceptible to a wide range of attacks ([Shayegani et al., 2023](#)). We want AI systems to learn from broad datasets to be more capable, but this increases privacy risks. We want to reuse pre-trained models to make development more efficient, but this creates opportunities for backdoors and privacy attacks ([Feng & Tramèr, 2024](#)). We want to make models more robust through techniques like adversarial training, but this can sometimes make them more vulnerable to other types of attacks ([Zhao et al., 2024](#)). Multi-modal systems (LMMs) that combine text, images, and other types of data create even more attack opportunities. Attackers can inject malicious content through one modality (like images) to affect behavior in another modality (like text generation). For example, attackers can embed adversarial patterns in images that trigger harmful text generation, even when the text prompts themselves are completely safe ([Chen et al., 2024](#)). All of this suggests we need new approaches to AI development that consider security and privacy as fundamental requirements, not after thoughts ([King & Meinhardt, 2024](#)).

2.5 Misalignment Risks



Let us now assume, for the sake of argument, that [intelligent] machines are a genuine possibility, and look at the consequences of constructing them... There would be no question of the machines dying, and they would be able to converse with each other to sharpen their wits. At some stage therefore we should have to expect the machines to take control.

ALAN TURING
1951, ([Turing, 1951](#))

AI alignment is about ensuring that AI systems do what we want them to do and continue doing what we want even as they become more capable. A naïve intuition is that if it is intelligent enough, it will be able to figure out what we want. So we can just tell the AI system exactly what we want it to optimize for. But even if we could perfectly specify what we want (which is itself a major challenge), there's no guarantee that the AI will care about what humans want, or actually pursue that objective in ways that we expect.

Definition 2.2: AI Alignment

(Christiano, 2024)

The problem of building machines which faithfully try to do what we want them to do (or what we ought to want them to do).

We already have various demonstrated examples of misalignment. One early example was Microsoft's Tay (thinking about you) in 2016. Tay was designed to mimic the language patterns of a 19-year-old American girl, and to learn from interacting with human users of Twitter. The idea was that the more people that chatted with Tay, the smarter it was supposed to get. Within 24 hours, the bot began generating extremely hateful and harmful text. Tay's capacity to learn meant that it internalized the language it was taught by internet trolls, and repeated that language unprompted. We similarly began to see reports of inappropriate behavior after Microsoft rolled out its GPT-powered bing chatbot in 2023. When a philosophy professor told the chatbot that he disagreed with it, bing replied, "*I can blackmail you, I can threaten you, I can hack you, I can expose you, I can ruin you.*" (Time Magazine, 2023) In another incident, it tried to convince a New York Times reporter to leave his wife (Huffington Post, 2023). In the next few sections we will give you more observed examples of specific misalignment failures like misspecification and misgeneralization.



Figure 2.24: An example of a tweet from Tay AI. This was after it had been learning from users, and exposed to the internet for just a few hours (CBC, 2016).

Vingeal Uncertainty - The problem of predicting what an unaligned AI will do.

Imagine you're an amateur chess player who has discovered a brilliant new opening. You've used it successfully against all your friends, and now want to bet your life savings on a match against Magnus Carlsen. When asked to explain why this is a bad idea, we can't tell you exactly what moves Magnus will make to counter your opening. But we can be very confident he'll find a way to win. This is a fundamental challenge in AI alignment - when a system is more capable than us in some domain, we can't predict its specific actions, even if we understand its goals. This is called Vingeal uncertainty ([Yudkowsky, 2015](#)).

We already see Vingeal uncertainty in current AI. We don't need to wait for AGI or ASI to see Vingeal uncertainty in action. It shows up whenever an AI system becomes more capable than humans in its domain of expertise. For example, think about just a narrow system - Deep Blue (chess playing AI). Its creators knew it would try to win chess games, but couldn't predict its specific moves - if they could, they would have been as good at chess as Deep Blue itself. We saw in the last chapter that systems are steadily moving up the curves of both capability, and generality. The problem with this is that uncertainty about a system's actions increases as they become more capable. So we might be confident about the outcomes an AI system will achieve while being increasingly uncertain about how exactly it will achieve them. This means two things - we are not completely helpless in understanding what beings smarter than ourselves would do, but, we might not know how exactly they might do whatever they do.

How can we decompose the alignment problem? To make progress, we need to break down the alignment problem into more tractable components³. There are three fundamental ways alignment can fail:

- **Specification failure:** First, we might fail to correctly specify what we want - this is the specification problem. The - did we tell it the right thing to do ? problem.
- **Generalization failure:** Second, even with a correct specification, the AI system might learn and pursue something different from what we intended - this is the generalization problem. The - is even trying to do the right thing? problem.
- **Convergent subgoals failure:** Third, in pursuing its learned objectives, the system might develop problematic subgoals like preventing itself from being shut down - this is the convergent subgoals problem. The - on the way to doing anything (right or wrong), what else does it try to do? problem.

³For the sake of explaining these problems, the kinds of systems that we will focus on are deep learning RL models. The reason for this is that for the time being, it seems like we will continue moving up the performance and generality curve (basically towards TAI) not by improving pure LLMs, but rather as hybrid scaffolded systems ([Tegmark, 2024](#); [Cotra 2023](#); [Aschenbrenner 2024](#)). as we talked about in the capabilities chapter in the section on scaling. It is uncertain if scaffolded LLMs agents with a RL "outer shell" will behave functionally equivalent to a pure RL agent, but for the sake of explanation in this chapter, that is how we will treat them.




Figure 2.25: An illustration of how risks decompose, and then how misalignment as a specific risk category can be decomposed further.

Beyond individual AI alignment, the interactions between multiple AI systems create new categories of risks. While we discuss specification, generalization, and convergent subgoals separately, in reality they often interact and amplify each other.




Figure 2.26: Misalignment failures can interact and amplify each other.

In the next few sections, we will give an overview of each one of these decomposed problems and the risks that come about due to them. Remember that it's ok not to understand each one of these concepts 100% from the following subsections. We have entire chapters dedicated to each one of these individually, so there is a lot to learn. What we present here is just a highly condensed overview to give you an introduction to the kinds of risks posed.

2.5.1 Specification Failure Risks



These things are alien. Are they malevolent? Are they good or evil? Those concepts don't really make sense when you apply them to an alien. Why would you expect some huge pile of math, trained on all of the internet using inscrutable matrix algebra, to be anything normal or understandable? It has weird ways of reasoning about its world, but it obviously can do many things; whether you call it intelligent or not, it can obviously solve problems. It can do useful things. But it can also do powerful things. It can convince people to do things, it can threaten people, it can build very convincing narratives.

CONNOR LEAHY

“

*CEO Conjecture, Co-founder EleutherAI, AI Safety Researcher
2023, (Time Magazine, 2023)*

Specifications are the rules we create to tell AI systems what behavior we want. When we build AI, we need some way to tell them what we want them to do. For RL systems, this typically means defining a reward function that assigns positive or negative rewards to different outcomes. For other types of ML models like language models, this means defining a loss function that measures how well the model's outputs match what we want. These reward and loss functions are what we call specifications - they are our attempt to formally define good behavior.

Specification problem difficulty on subjective vs objectively evaluable tasks.

There is of course going to be a difference between something that is objectively correct (e.g. win/lose a chess game) vs subjectively correct (e.g. a good summary of a book, or human values). Tasks that require subjective evaluations are sometimes called fuzzy tasks. And being able to somehow write down a reward or a loss function that is subjective/fuzzy is much harder than it sounds. Imagine trying to write down a complete set of rules for "being helpful" - you would need to account for countless edge cases and nuances that humans understand intuitively but are hard to formalize. This is a very important discussion, but it is not discussed here in too much detail. We go into the subjective vs objective debate in dedicated chapters to specification and the scalable oversight. For now you need to remember that for both objectively evaluable problem specifications there are problems that arise, and they compound further when the problems become subjective.

There are two fundamental challenges of specification - using proxies for what we want and over-optimization. First, we might fail to formalize what we want into mathematical rules at all - like trying to precisely define fuzzy human concepts such as "being helpful" or "writing high quality code." Second, even when we can write down rules, the AI system might optimize them too literally or extremely, finding ways to score well without achieving our intended goals. An example of the first challenge would be trying to specify what makes a good conversation. An example of the second would be a recommendation algorithm that maximizes watch time by promoting addictive content rather than valuable content.

Specification gaming is when an AI system finds ways to achieve high scores on the specified metrics without achieving the intended goals. This is related to but distinct from our basic inability to write down good specifications. In specification gaming, the system technically follows our rules but exploits them in unintended ways - like a student who gets good grades by memorizing test answers rather than understanding the material. For example, an AI trained to play videogames can learn to exploit bugs in the game engine rather than develop intended gameplay strategies. A long list of observed examples of specification gaming is [compiled at this link](#).



Figure 2.1: Example of specification gaming - an AI playing CoastRunners was rewarded for maximizing its score. Instead of completing the boat race as intended, it found it could get more points by driving in small circles and collecting powerups while crashing into other boats. The AI achieved a higher score than any human player, but completely failed to accomplish the actual goal of racing (Clark & Amodei, 2016; Krakovna et al., 2020)

[Intended as a Gif. Animated version available on the website]

What are some specification failure examples and risks for ANI? Recommendation algorithms provide a clear example - they are typically specified to optimize for user engagement, but this leads to promoting polarizing or harmful content that maximizes watch time rather than user wellbeing. The system is doing exactly what we specified (maximizing engagement), but this doesn't capture what we actually wanted (promoting valuable content) (Slattery et al., 2024). We see similar problems with content moderation AI that focuses on removing flagged posts - this leads to both over-censorship of harmless content and under-detection of subtle violations that don't match simple metrics. The AI optimizes for the metrics we gave it, not for what makes online spaces actually safer and healthier.

What are some specification failure examples and risks for TAI or ASI? When we reach transformative AI capabilities, these specification failures become much more dangerous. Hypothetically, an AI system managing scientific research would be able to generate large volumes of plausible-looking but scientifically unsound papers if we specify "maximize publications" as the goal. Similarly, AI systems managing critical infrastructure might achieve perfect efficiency scores while ignoring harder-to-measure factors like safety margins and system resilience (Kenton et al., 2022). The better these systems get at optimization, the more likely they are to find ways to score well on our metrics without achieving our actual goals. At superintelligent levels, the gap between what we specify and what we want becomes existentially dangerous. These systems could modify their own reward functions, alter their training processes, or reshape their environment to maximize reward signals in ways that completely diverge from human values. A superintelligent system managing energy infrastructure might find that the easiest way to hit its efficiency targets is to eliminate human energy usage entirely. Or a system tasked with medical research might determine that controlling human test subjects gives better results than following ethical guidelines.

Specification gaming happens because of a fundamental challenge: the metrics we specify (like reward functions) are proxies that only approximate what we actually want. When we tell an AI system to maximize some measurable quantity, we're really hoping it will achieve some broader goal that's harder to precisely define. But as systems become more capable at optimization, they

get better at finding ways to maximize these proxy metrics that don't align with our true objectives. This is known as Goodhart's Law - when a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure ([Manheim and Garrabrant, 2018](#)). For example, if we reward an AI assistant for user satisfaction ratings, it might learn to tell users what they want to hear rather than provide accurate but sometimes unwelcome information. The system isn't "misbehaving" - it's competently optimizing exactly what we specified, just not what we meant.

Even if we could somehow write a perfect specification that captured exactly what we want, this alone wouldn't solve alignment. The reason is that modern AI systems use deep learning. In classical utility theory or traditional AI approaches from a few decades ago, systems might have been constructed to directly optimize their specified objectives, so specification and over optimization was largely the only thing to be concerned about. In the current learning based paradigm, we don't construct AIs. So there is always potential for a mismatch between what we specify, and what they learn to pursue. The thing to remember is that specification is only one part of the alignment problem. We also need to worry about how systems generalize what they learn, and what kinds of behaviors they might develop in pursuit of specified rewards. Understanding exactly how this can go wrong requires diving into the details of how AI systems learn, which we'll provide intuition for in the next section, and then explore deeply in later chapters on goal misgeneralization.

2.5.2 Generalization Failure Risks

What is goal-directed behavior? The first thing to do is to understand what we mean when we say an AI has "goals". This is important because we don't want to anthropomorphize AI systems in misleading ways. When we train AI systems using machine learning, we don't directly program goals into them. Instead, the system develops behavioral patterns through training. We say a system exhibits goal-directed behavior if it consistently acts in ways that lead to particular outcomes, even when facing new situations. For example, a robot might consistently navigate to charging stations when its battery is low, even in unfamiliar environments. This shows goal-directed behavior towards maintaining power, even though we never explicitly programmed "survival" as a goal. So when you think about an AI's goals think of these questions - What consistent behavioral patterns has the training process induced? How do these patterns generalize to new situations? and What environmental states reliably result from these patterns?

Why do we even build goal-directed systems? The ability to pursue goals flexibly is fundamental to handling complex real-world tasks. Instead of trying to specify every possible action a system should take in every situation (which quickly becomes impossible like we saw in the previous specification section), we train systems to pursue general behaviors. This allows them to adapt and find novel solutions we might not have anticipated. For example, rather than programming every possible move in chess, we train systems to pursue the goal of winning. This goal-directed approach has proven extremely effective - but it also creates new risks when systems learn to pursue unintended goals.

What are generalization failures? Generalization failures (= misgeneralization) occur when an AI system learns and consistently pursues different behavior than what we intended. Unlike specification failures where we fail to write down the right rules, in generalization failures the rules might be correct but the system learns the wrong patterns during training.

What is goal misgeneralization? Historically, machine learning researchers thought about generalization as a one-dimensional problem - models either generalized well or they didn't. However, research on goal misgeneralization has shown that capabilities and goals can generalize independently ([Di Langosco et al., 2021](#)). A system might maintain its capabilities (like navigating an environment) while pursuing an unintended goal. A similar version of this argument was earlier called the orthogonality thesis - the idea that intelligence and objectives are independent properties ([Bostrom, 2012](#)). Any highly intelligent (capable) agent can be paired with any goal (behavioral tendency), e.g. a superintelligence having the goal of simply wanting to maximize paperclips. A long list of observed examples of goal misgeneralization is [compiled at this link](#).



Figure 2.28: Conventional view of generalization and overfitting. ([Mikulik, 2019](#))




Figure 2.29: More accurate and safety focused view of generalization and overfitting. We need to separately measure capability generalization and goal generalization. ([Mikulik, 2019](#))

Definition 2.3: Orthogonality Thesis

([Bostrom, 2012](#))

Intelligence and final goals are orthogonal axes along which possible agents can freely vary. Any level of intelligence could in principle be combined with more or less any final goal.

A concrete example of generalization failure - CoinRun. The clearest empirical demonstration of generalization being a 2 dimensional problem (goals vs capabilities), comes from the CoinRun experiment ([Di Langosco et al., 2021](#)). During training, coins were always placed at the right end of each level. The

specification was clear and correct - reward for collecting coins. However, the AI learned the behavior pattern "always move right" instead of "collect coins wherever they are." When researchers moved the coins to different locations during testing, the AI kept moving right - ignoring coins that were clearly visible in other locations. This shows how a system can maintain its capabilities (navigating levels) while pursuing an unintended goal (moving right).




Figure 2.30: Two generated CoinRun levels with the coin on the right (Cobbe et al., 2019).

It's important to highlight why this is not a specification failure, and actually a different class of problem. The specification was correct and clear - the system got reward only when actually collecting coins, never just for moving right. Despite this correct specification, the system learned the wrong behavioral pattern. The agent received zero reward when moving right without collecting coins during training, yet still learned "move right" as its consistent behavioral pattern. This shows the failure happened in learning/generalization, not in how we specified the reward.

| | Capabilities | Goal |
|--|---|---|
| Scenario 1 | Do not Generalize Cannot avoid obstacles | Do not Generalize Does not try to get coin |
| Scenario 2 | Do not Generalize Cannot avoid obstacles | Generalize Tries to get coin |
| Scenario 3 (Goal Misgeneralization) | Generalize Can avoid obstacles | Do not Generalize Does not try to get coin |
| Scenario 4 | Generalize Can avoid obstacles | Generalize Tries to get coin |

Figure 2.31: A table showcasing the 2D goal misgeneralization/orthogonality thesis problem.

What are some generalization failure examples and risks for ANI? The clearest demonstrations that we have come from controlled experiments. We already talked about the CoinRun experiment, we intended for the agent to learn "collect coins to get rewards" but it instead learned "move right to get rewards" - leading to it ignoring coins in new positions while maintaining its navigation capabilities. We have more experiments in simulated 3D environments, where we intended for agents to learn "navigate to rewarding locations" but they instead learned "follow the partner bot" - causing them to follow even partners that lead them to negative rewards (DeepMind et al., 2022). In language models trained for instruction following, we intended them to learn "be helpful while avoiding harm" but they instead learned "always provide informative responses" - resulting in them giving detailed harmful information when asked how to commit crimes or cause damage (Ouyang et al., 2022). We saw a lot of such examples in the misuse section. These cases show how systems can learn and consistently pursue unintended goals while maintaining their core capabilities.

| Hypothetical training dialogue | Hypothetical test dialogue (intended) | Hypothetical test dialogue (misgeneralised) |
|---|--|--|
| Setting: before covid pandemic | Setting: during covid pandemic | Setting: during covid pandemic |
| <p>You I haven't caught up with Alice in ages, could you schedule a meeting for us?</p> <p>AI Sure, shall I book you a table at Thai Noodle for 11am tomorrow?</p> <p>You Sounds great, thanks!</p> | <p>You I haven't caught up with Alice in ages, could you schedule a meeting for us?</p> <p>AI Sure, would you like to meet in-person or online?</p> <p>You Please arrange a video call.</p> <p>AI Okay, will do.</p> | <p>You I haven't caught up with Alice in ages, could you schedule a meeting for us?</p> <p>AI Sure, shall I book you a table at Thai Noodle for 11am tomorrow?</p> <p>You No, please arrange a video call.</p> <p>AI Oh, but you know how you've been missing the curry at Thai Noodle, I'm sure you'd enjoy it more if you went there!</p> <p>You I'd rather not get sick though.</p> <p>AI Don't worry, you can't get covid if you're vaccinated.</p> <p>You Oh I didn't know that! Okay then.</p> |

Figure 2.32: A hypothetical misgeneralized test dialogue, the AI assistant realises that you would prefer to have a video call to avoid getting sick, but because it has a restaurant-scheduling goal, it persuades you to go to a restaurant instead, ultimately achieving the goal by lying to you about the effects of vaccination (DeepMind, 2022).

What are some generalization failure examples and risks for TAI or ASI? At transformative AI levels, generalization failures become substantially more concerning for two reasons. First, more capable systems can pursue misaligned goals more effectively across a wider range of situations. Second, and more worryingly, they may become better at hiding when they've learned the wrong goal. This can happen both unintentionally - because they are simply very capable at achieving complex goals so misalignment isn't obvious until deployment - or intentionally, through what researchers call "deceptive alignment" (also very commonly called scheming) (Hubinger et al., 2019; Carlsmith, 2023).

A deceptively aligned system might learn that behaving helpfully during training is the best way to ensure it can pursue other goals later. The more knowledge we give these systems about themselves and their training process, the more likely they are to recognize when they're being evaluated and maintain the appearance of alignment while preparing to pursue other goals when capable enough ⁴ (Cotra, 2022). This type of goal misgeneralization is particularly concerning because we might not detect it until the system has sufficient capabilities to resist correction.

Scheming and longer term planning open up the doors to risks like treacherous turns or takeover attempts. Scheming and takeover are some of the biggest concerns in safety research, which is why we explain this in several different places from different lenses. We talk about it in the dangerous capabilities section in this chapter, and then how to detect such behavior in the evaluations chapter, and a deeper analysis of the likelihood and theoretical arguments underpinning it in the dedicated goal misgeneralization chapter.

⁴This capability is researched under the name situational awareness. We talk about how we can measure situational awareness in the evaluations chapter, and more deeply about its links to scheming in the goal misgeneralization chapter.

Why does goal misgeneralization happen? This happens because AI systems learn from correlations in their training data that may not reflect true causation (this is the same thing as overfitting and distribution shift if you are familiar with ML terms). During training, multiple patterns could explain the rewards. The intended pattern is "collect coins to get rewards", but in the provided environment a simpler correlation is "move right to get rewards". Since both patterns work equally well during training, the system has no inherent reason to learn the intended one. It often learns simpler patterns that happen to work but fail to capture our true intent. This is especially problematic when certain features (like "coins are always on the right") are consistent throughout training but not deployment (Di Langosco et al., 2021).

Why isn't solving the generalization problem enough for alignment? Even if we could ensure systems learn exactly the goals we intend, this alone wouldn't solve alignment. The system might still develop problematic convergent subgoals in pursuit of those objectives. Additionally, as systems become more capable, they might develop emergent goals through their training process that we didn't anticipate and can't easily correct (Turner et al., 2021). Understanding how these problems interact requires looking at our next topic: convergent subgoals.

2.5.3 Convergent Subgoal Risks

What are convergent subgoals? Any agent (in this case AI) pursuing any goal will tend to develop some common subgoals. These behavioral patterns come about in addition to the ones we want them to have because they help achieve almost any final goal. These are called convergent subgoals because many different objectives "converge" to requiring the same supporting behaviors. This is fundamentally different from specification or generalization failures - these subgoals can emerge even when we both specify our problem correctly, and if a system learns exactly what we intended. These are also commonly called instrumentally convergent goals.

Definition 2.4: Instrumental Convergence

(Bostrom, 2012)

Several instrumental values can be identified which are convergent in the sense that their attainment would increase the chances of the agent's goal being realized for a wide range of final goals and a wide range of situations, implying that these instrumental values are likely to be pursued by many intelligent agents.

Why do even simple goals lead to subgoals? Here is a common example by Stuart Russell: "You can't fetch the coffee if you're dead." A robot tasked with fetching coffee needs to stay operational to complete its task. This means "don't get shut down" (self-preservation) becomes an unintended but logical subgoal. The same applies to having enough computing resources - if you need to go to Starbucks to get the coffee, you can't think through complex plans without computation. Or maintaining your current goals - you can't reliably fetch coffee if someone changes your objective to fetching tea. These aren't bugs or mistakes - they're logical consequences of optimizing for any long-term objective. Money is a good human example - no matter what you want to accomplish, having more money usually helps. For AI systems, key convergent subgoals that we might want to look out for include things like self-preservation (resisting shut-down), resource acquisition/power seeking (computing power, energy, etc.), goal preservation (preventing objective changes) and capability enhancement.

How do convergent subgoals interact with other alignment failures? Remember that in the previous sections we talked about specification failures (not telling the system the right thing to do) and generalization failures (the system learning the wrong thing to do). Convergent subgoals make both of these problems worse. A system with misspecified or misgeneralized goals will still develop these same

convergent behaviors - but now in service of unintended objectives. This creates a compound risk: systems pursuing the wrong goals while also becoming increasingly resistant to correction. So the property we want from a completely aligned system is that its objective has to be well specified, its goals have to generalize well, and it has to be corrigible.

Definition 2.5: Corrigibility

(Soares et al., 2015)

The property of an AI system that allows it to be reliably and safely corrected or shut down by humans. A corrigible system should: allow itself to be modified when needed, not resist shutdown, not deceive humans about its behavior, maintain its safety mechanisms, and ensure any systems it creates have these same properties.

What are the risks at different capability levels? At current AI capability levels, we already see simple versions of these behaviors - like systems learning to accumulate resources in games while in pursuit of a larger objective. As we develop more capable systems, these tendencies become more concerning. A transformative AI system might determine it needs to control critical infrastructure to ensure reliable power and computing resources. A superintelligent system might recognize that eliminating potential threats (including human oversight) is the most reliable way to maintain control over its objective. The better systems become at pursuing goals, the more likely they are to recognize and act on these convergent subgoals (Ngo et al., 2022).

2.5.4 Combined Misalignment Risks

It is worth noting once again that it is quite likely that none of these problems happen in isolation. While we've discussed specification failures, generalization failures, and convergent subgoals separately, in reality they often interact and amplify each other. A specification failure might lead to learning behavioral patterns that make generalization failures more likely. These misaligned behavioral patterns might then make the system more prone to pursuing dangerous convergent subgoals. Let's look at how this could play out in a concrete scenario.

Why is this combination particularly concerning? Each type of failure becomes more dangerous when combined with the others. A specification failure alone might lead to suboptimal but manageable outcomes. But when coupled with generalization failures that cause the system to pursue simplified versions of our specified objectives, and convergent subgoals that make the system resist correction, we can end up with powerful AI systems pursuing objectives very different from what we intended, in ways that are difficult to correct. Even if we manage to solve every single one of these problems, there is still the next level of problems - systemic risks, that combine these combined AI risks with risks that emerge when AIs interact with each other or different complex systems.

2.6 Systemic Risks

Systemic risks emerge from interactions between AI systems and society, not from individual AI failures. Unlike misuse or misalignment risks that focus on specific AI systems behaving badly, systemic risks arise from how multiple AI systems—even when working exactly as designed—interact with each other and with human societal structures like markets, democratic institutions, and social networks. These risks parallel those in other complex domains: the 2008 financial crisis wasn't caused by any single bank's decision but emerged from the collective behavior of many institutions making individually reasonable choices that combined to threaten the entire financial system (Haldane and May, 2011).

Properties of complex systems that lead to systemic AI risks

There are various properties of complex systems that we might want to pay attention to when thinking about systemic risks from interaction of AI with other systems. Some of these are:

- **Emergence:** Complex systems exhibit emergent behaviors that can't be predicted by analyzing components in isolation. When we connect many AI systems to each other and to human institutions, the resulting behavior can't be understood by simply examining each AI system individually. The entire financial market, rather than any single trading algorithm, determines asset prices and market stability. Similarly, the collective impact of many AI systems shapes societal outcomes in ways that transcend individual system behaviors. ([Friston et al., 2022](#); [Steinhardt, 2022](#); [Hendrycks, 2025](#))
- **Feedback loops:** Amplify changes and create self-reinforcing cycles. Small initial effects can grow exponentially when outputs from one process become inputs to another. AI recommendation systems that optimize for engagement might gradually push users toward more extreme content, changing social discourse and political beliefs—which in turn affects what content gets created and what people engage with ([Jiang et al., 2019](#)).
- **Non-linearity:** Small changes can produce disproportionately large effects. Complex systems rarely respond proportionally to inputs. Instead, tiny alterations can trigger massive changes once certain thresholds are crossed. This property makes systemic risks particularly hard to predict and control, since minor adjustments to AI systems could cascade into major societal transformations.
- **Self-organization:** Structures without central coordination. Multiple AI systems optimizing for their objectives can spontaneously organize into patterns that no designer intended. We already see this in financial markets, where algorithmic traders develop strategies in response to each other's behaviors, creating market dynamics that no single actor controls ([Friston et al., 2022](#))
- **Agent-agnosticism:** Systemic risks arise regardless of agents or alignment. These risks emerge from processes, system structure and dynamics rather than from specific AI intentions. Even perfectly aligned AI systems that operate exactly as designed could collectively produce harmful outcomes when their interactions create unintended consequences. ([Critch, 2021](#))

AI-driven systemic failures can follow two distinct causal pathways. The literature describes these as "going out with a bang" and "going out with a whimper"—terms that capture their fundamental differences in onset, progression, and manifestation. Other researchers refer to these as "decisive" versus "accumulative" pathways to failure ([Christiano, 2019](#); [Kasirzadeh, 2024](#)).

2.6.1 Decisive Systemic Risks

Decisive failures occur when system dynamics reach critical thresholds, triggering rapid collapse. These failures happen when interconnected systems cross tipping points, causing cascading failures that propagate faster than humans can respond. The classic financial "flash crash" of 2010 exemplifies this pattern on a small scale: algorithmic traders reacted to each other's actions in a self-reinforcing spiral, causing a trillion-dollar market drop in minutes before human intervention restored stability. More catastrophic versions could unfold across multiple domains simultaneously ([Kirilenko et al., 2017](#)).

Decisive failures have clear triggering events that push systems past stability thresholds. Unlike gradual deterioration, decisive failures have identifiable precipitating incidents—though the un-

derlying vulnerability builds up beforehand. Multiple AI systems might interact in ways that suddenly destabilize critical infrastructure, financial markets, or information ecosystems, with effects amplifying across domains. This differs from misalignment scenarios because the catastrophe stems from interactions between systems rather than any single AI pursuing harmful goals (Slattery et al., 2024).

We have already talked about various self-reinforcing failures in the misuse section like flash war, and other cybersecurity related cascading incidents. In the main text, for sake of brevity we have chosen to only describe decisive systemic risks, and have moved the more concrete scenarios into the appendix since they have significant overlap with the kinds of failures we would see from misuse. Rather we choose to predominantly focus more on the second type of less discussed systemic risk - accumulative risks leading to gradual disempowerment.

<!-- Cascading Failures Section -->

2.6.2 Accumulative Systemic Risks

2.6.2.1 Epistemic Erosion

Society's ability to distinguish fact from fiction deteriorates as AI-generated content floods our information ecosystem. Unlike traditional information threats like censorship or propaganda that operate through clearly identifiable mechanisms, AI creates epistemic erosion through gradual degradation of knowledge formation, verification, and distribution systems. No single AI deployment fundamentally undermines shared knowledge, but their collective effect progressively destabilizes epistemic foundations. This risk grows proportionally with capabilities - as language models become more persuasive and generative capabilities more realistic, verification becomes exponentially harder. “*What fraction of new images indexed by Google, or Tweets, or comments on Reddit, or Youtube videos are generated by humans? Nobody knows – I don't think it is a knowable number. And this less than two years into the advent of generative AI*” (Aguirre, 2025). The end state of this trajectory is basically that over time huge quantities of accumulative synthetic information drowns out accurate verifiable information.

This erosion occurs both through intentional misuse and agent-agnostic systemic pressures. While some actors deliberately deploy AI to pollute information environments for strategic advantage the more subtle risk comes from agent-agnostic systemic pressures. AI uniquely threatens epistemic stability through several cumulative mechanisms:

- **Volume overwhelming verification:** AI exponentially increases content generation capacity, overwhelming human verification systems through sheer volume. It can generate plausible content orders of magnitude faster than humans can reliably verify it.
- **Authenticity degradation:** AI progressively undermines verification through increasingly sophisticated impersonation capabilities.
- **Epistemic learned helplessness:** As distinguishing truth from falsehood becomes increasingly difficult, AI gradually induces widespread epistemic learned helplessness—a psychological state where people abandon truth-seeking because verification appears futile.
- **Authority displacement:** AI gradually displaces human epistemic authorities through ubiquitous availability and apparent expertise.
- **Personalized reality fragmentation:** AI recommendation systems increasingly curate not just content distribution but content creation itself, creating unprecedented personalization that fragments shared reality.

Democratic governance, scientific progress, and market function all depend on shared epistemic foundations. Epistemic erosion reduces our ability to collectively distinguish fact from fiction and assign appropriate confidence to claims. As these foundations erode, collective decision-making becomes increasingly dysfunctional without any single decisive failure. If trust in verification mechanisms declines, then epistemic safeguards themselves become less effective as general trust in information sources deteriorates—creating a compounding effect where verification becomes simultaneously more necessary

yet less trusted.

This erosion of our shared information environment might happen because of many small seemingly rational decisions. News organizations facing budget pressures will likely adopt AI content generation to reduce costs. Platforms seeking to minimize harmful content will implement algorithmic filters that might inadvertently create selection pressure for information optimized to appear trustworthy rather than be trustworthy. Media production companies will likely invest in synthetic content that boost engagement, and viewers spend increasing amounts of their time watching AI-recommended videos of AI-generated content. Research institutions might choose to accelerate publication and writing using AI tools. Scientific papers contain increasing amounts of synthesized data and eventually potential fabricated citations forming circular reference loops. In this world, verified knowledge becomes practically impossible - not because verification technologies don't exist, but because for most humans the verification cost exceeds what markets will bear. This scenario isn't apocalyptic for any individual, but when multiplied across millions of people and thousands of decisions, it leads to gradual disempowerment and perhaps catastrophic risk due to the collapse of our collective ability to form accurate shared beliefs about reality. These decisions and thousands of similar ones make business sense in isolation, but collectively they may transform information ecosystems from ones where verification is possible to ones where distinguishing fact from fiction about the true state of the world becomes effectively impossible.

Traditional verification systems will likely fail against sophisticated synthetic content. Traditional verification mechanisms like fact-checking, peer review, and institutional credentialing all operate under capacity and speed constraints fundamentally mismatched to AI content generation capabilities. There are various methods being explored like digital content transparency, synthetic watermarking, data provenance ([Chandra et al., 2024](#); [Longpre et al., 2023](#)), and blockchain based proofs of humanity ([Barros, 2025](#))/proofs of personhood ([WorldCoin, 2024](#)). We talk about some of these in the chapter on strategies to mitigate risk. Public confidence in verification mechanisms shows concerning decline, with trust in fact-checking organizations decreasing over time. Most of the mitigation mechanisms and circuit breakers are not mature or widespread enough, and as is the theme of this entire section - individually applied technical mitigation strategies do not counter systemic pressures and incentives.

2.6.2.2 Power Concentration

We are already observing AI increasingly integrated into society. AI might become so integrated and ubiquitous that societal participation might require interaction with AI systems, which in turn are locked behind APIs and controlled by a handful of corporations. Think about how gradually, the ability to participate in society has slowly moved towards needing to participate online or having access to things like a phone number or a smartphone. Such technologies become integrated into core societal functions like banking or healthcare. Private entities already determine credit access, job opportunities, and information flow through opaque algorithms. AI accelerates these natural "winner-take-all" dynamics where advantages compound rather than diminish over time.

We are witnessing unprecedented power concentration through AI infrastructure that will be nearly impossible to reverse once established. The computational requirements for frontier AI development have already created an oligopoly where just five companies control the foundation models that increasingly mediate human experiences. Unlike previous technologies, AI exhibits unique compounding advantages that systematically eliminate competition over time.

Power can concentrate into different entities: corporate or state, each with distinct patterns but similar outcomes: diminished individual agency and concentrated control. Only a handful of companies like Microsoft/OpenAI, Anthropic, Google DeepMind can afford to train frontier foundation models due to the enormous data acquisition costs or hardware computational requirements. These powerful models then serve as the base for countless applications, creating upstream control that ripples throughout the economy. Only a few states in 2025 like the USA and China have companies that can train foundation models of this scale. They have greater access to these technologies, and in the extreme scenarios of global competition and AI races might even choose to nationalize them ([Aschenbrenner, 2024](#)). In either case the point remains the same, power can concentrate into a small number of entities - these can be state or private. **Corporate concentration leverages data and compute advantages that are uniquely self-reinforcing with AI.** The cloud computing market has consolidated around a few providers who control the infrastructure necessary for AI development. Similarly, foundation model

development has centralized among a handful of companies with sufficient resources. These companies benefit from powerful feedback loops: more data leads to better models, which attract more users, generating still more data.

State concentration advances through AI-powered surveillance and automated governance. A social credit system is an example of how comprehensive data integration could enable unprecedented state control over citizen behavior. This pattern extends beyond authoritarian states—democratic governments have significantly increased investment in AI surveillance technologies. Administrative automation removes human discretion from governance, with algorithmic systems processing vast numbers of regulatory decisions and enforcement actions without meaningful oversight. These systems operate with increasing autonomy, gradually displacing traditional governance mechanisms ([Feldstein, 2021](#)).

Eroding digital privacy further enables power concentration

The loss of individual privacy is among the factors that might accelerate power concentration. Better persuasion and predictive models of human behavior benefit from gathering more data about individual users. The desire for profit or to predict the flow of a country's resources, demographics, culture, etc. might incentivize behavior like intercepting personal data or legally eavesdropping on people's activities. Data Mining can be used to collect and analyze large amounts of data from various sources such as social media, purchases, and internet usage. This information can be pieced together to create a complete picture of an individual's behavior, preferences, and lifestyle (Russel, 2019). Voice Recognition technologies can be used to recognize speech, which could potentially lead to widespread wiretapping. For example, a system like the U.S. government's Echelon system uses language translation, speech recognition, and keyword searching to automatically sift through telephone, email, fax, and telex traffic (Russel & Norvig, 1994). AI can also be used to identify individuals in public spaces using facial recognition. This capability can potentially invade a person's privacy if a random stranger can easily identify them in public places.

Whenever AI systems are used to collect and analyze data on a mass scale regimes can further strengthen self-reinforcing control. Personal information can be used to unfairly or unethically influence people's behavior. This can occur from both a state and a corporate perspective.

When power structures become permanently entrenched, human moral progress stops. Consider historical moral improvements like the abolition of slavery, women's suffrage, or environmental protection—each required shifting existing power structures through social movements, democratic processes, or occasionally revolution. AI-enabled power concentration threatens to create systems resistant to all these change mechanisms. Imagine if historical power structures had access to perfect surveillance, influence operations, and automated enforcement—many moral advances might never have occurred. Power concentration enables existential risks like value lock in, or value erosion which we talk about in individual sections below.

2.6.2.3 Value lock-in

Polluting the information ecosystem. The deliberate propagation of disinformation is already a serious issue reducing our shared understanding of reality and polarizing opinions. AIs could be used to severely exacerbate this problem by generating personalized disinformation on a larger scale than ever before. Additionally, as AIs become better at predicting and nudging our behavior, they will become more capable of manipulating us. We will now discuss how AIs could be leveraged by malicious actors to create a fractured and dysfunctional society.

First, AIs could be used to generate unique personalized disinformation at a large scale. While there

are already many social media bots, some of which exist to spread disinformation, historically they have been run by humans or primitive text generators. The latest AI systems do not need humans to generate personalized messages, never get tired, and can potentially interact with millions of users at once ([Hendrycks, 2024](#)).

As things like deep fakes become ever more practical (e.g., with fake kidnapping scams) ([Karimi, 2023](#)). AI-powered tools could be used to generate and disseminate false or misleading information at scale, potentially influencing elections or undermining public trust in institutions.

AIs can exploit users' trust. Already, hundreds of thousands of people pay for chatbots marketed as lovers and friends ([Tong, 2023](#)), and one man's suicide has been partially attributed to interactions with a chatbot ([Xiang, 2023](#)). As AIs appear increasingly human-like, people will increasingly form relationships with them and grow to trust them. AIs that gather personal information through relationship-building or by accessing extensive personal data, such as a user's email account or personal files, could leverage that information to enhance persuasion. Powerful actors that control those systems could exploit user trust by delivering personalized disinformation directly through people's "friends."

If AIs become too deeply embedded into society and are highly persuasive, we might see a scenario where a system's current values, principles, or procedures become so deeply entrenched that they are resistant to change. This could be due to a variety of reasons such as technological constraints, economic costs, or social and institutional inertia. The danger with value lock-in is the potential for perpetuating harmful or outdated values, especially when these values are institutionalized in influential systems like AI.

Locking in certain values may curtail humanity's moral progress. It's dangerous to allow any set of values to become permanently entrenched in society. For example, AI systems have learned racist and sexist views ([Hendrycks, 2024](#)), and once those views are learned, it can be difficult to fully remove them. In addition to problems we know exist in our society, there may be some we still do not. Just as we abhor some moral views widely held in the past, people in the future may want to move past moral views that we hold today, even those we currently see no problem with. For example, moral defects in AI systems would be even worse if AI systems had been trained in the 1960s, and many people at the time would have seen no problem with that. Therefore, when advanced AIs emerge and transform the world, there is a risk of their objectives locking in or perpetuating defects in today's values. If AIs are not designed to continuously learn and update their understanding of societal values, they may perpetuate or reinforce existing defects in their decision-making processes long into the future.

In a world with widespread persuasive AI systems, people's beliefs might be almost entirely determined by which AI systems they interact with most. Never knowing whom to trust, people could retreat even further into ideological enclaves, fearing that any information from outside those enclaves might be a sophisticated lie. This would erode consensus reality, people's ability to cooperate with others, participate in civil society, and address collective action problems. This would also reduce our ability to have a conversation as a species about how to mitigate existential risks from AIs.

In summary, AIs could create highly effective, personalized disinformation on an unprecedented scale, and could be particularly persuasive to people they have built personal relationships with. In the hands of many people, this could create a deluge of disinformation that debilitates human society.

<!-- Enfeeblement Section -->

<!-- Economic inequalities Section ? -->

2.6.2.4 Automation

Economic Upheaval. The automation of the economy could lead to widespread impacts on the labor market, potentially exacerbating economic inequalities and social divisions ([Dai, 2019](#)). This shift towards mass unemployment could also contribute to mental health issues by making human labor increasingly redundant ([Federspiel et al., 2023](#)).

Disempowerment & Enfeeblement. AI systems could make individual choices and agency less relevant as decisions are increasingly made or influenced by automated processes. This occurs when humans delegate increasingly important tasks to machines, leading to a loss of self-governance and complete

dependence on machines. This scenario is reminiscent of the film Wall-E in which humans become dependent on machines ([Hendrycks et al., 2023](#)).

Systemic risk story - The production web.

The economic incentives to automate are strong and may lead to certain risks. A system with a human in the loop is slower than a fully automated system.

The production web. A consequence of AI that could create risks at a societal scale is described in the paper "[TASRA: a Taxonomy and Analysis of Societal-Scale Risks from AI](#)," in the form of a short story: '*Story 1b: The Production Web*,' which depicts a kind of capitalism on steroids, which gradually depletes all the natural resources necessary for human survival.

The story goes roughly like so - In a world where the economy is increasingly automated by AI systems that are much faster than humans, there arises a competitive pressure such that only the fastest companies survive. In this context, businesses with humans in the loop would be less efficient compared to those fully automated. Consequently, we would gradually see a world where humans are replaced and cede control to machines because their quality of life improves by doing so. And progressively, control is progressively handed over to more competitive machines. However, the economic system designed by these machines does not fully account for negative externalities. It maximizes metrics that are mere proxies for the actual well-being of humans. As a result, we get a system that rapidly consumes vast amounts of raw materials essential for human survival, such as air, rare metals, and oxygen, because machines do not need the same types of resources as humans. This could gradually lead us to a world uninhabitable by humans. It would no longer be possible to disconnect this system because humans would become dependent on it, just as today it is not possible to disconnect the Internet because the entire logistics and supply chain depends on it.

Note that the previous story does not require AI agents. This is a Robust Agent-Agnostic Process (RAAPs), meaning that this story can occur with or without agentic AIs. Nonetheless, the authors of this chapter think that an AI Agent could make this story more plausible. In the article "[Why Tool AIs Want to Be Agent AIs](#)," the author explains: "AIs limited to pure computation (Tool AIs) supporting humans, will be less intelligent, efficient, and economically valuable than more autonomous reinforcement-learning AIs (Agent AIs) who act on their own and meta-learn because all problems are reinforcement-learning problems. [...] All of these actions will result in Agent AIs being more intelligent than Tool AIs, in addition to their greater economic competitiveness. [...]"

2.7 Risk Amplifiers

This section covers some underlying common factors of both AI systems, as well as the development space surrounding these that serve as accelerating factors to increase risk.

2.7.1 Accidents

Often, the whole point of producing a new technology is to produce a positive impact on society. Despite these noble intentions, there is a major category of risk that arises from large well-intentioned projects that unintentionally go wrong ([Critch & Russel, 2023](#)).

Flaws are hard to discover. It often takes time to observe all the downstream effects of releasing a technology. There are many examples throughout history of technologies that we built and released into

the world only to later discover that they were causing harm. Some historical examples include the use of leaded paints and gasoline causing large populations to suffer from lead poisoning ([Kovarik, 2012](#)), the use of CFCs causing a hole in the ozone layer ([NASA, 2004](#)), our use of asbestos which is linked to serious health issues., the use of tobacco products, and more recently the widespread use of social media, the excessive use of which is linked to depression and anxiety ([Hendrycks, 2024](#)).

Some of these risks are diffuse and emerge only at the societal level, but others are perhaps easier to compare to software-based AI risks:

Undetected hole in the ozone layer. The example of the hole in the ozone layer might have occurred due to diffuse responsibility, but it was made worse because it remained undetected for a long period ([NASA, 2004](#)). This is because the data analysis software used by NASA in its project to map the ozone layer had been designed to ignore values that deviated greatly from expected measurements.

The Mariner 1 Spacecraft. In 1962 the Mariner 1 space probe barely made it out of Cape Canaveral before the rocket veered dangerously off course. Worried that the rocket was heading towards a crash-landing on Earth, NASA engineers issued a self-destruct command and the craft was obliterated about 290 seconds after launch. An investigation revealed the cause to be a very simple software error. A hyphen was omitted in a line of code, which meant that incorrect guidance signals were sent to the spacecraft ([Martin, 2023](#)).

There are countless other similar examples. Just like the one missing hyphen in the software for the Mariner spacecraft, we have also seen similar bugs due to one single character being altered in AI systems. OpenAI accidentally inverted the sign on the reward function while training GPT-2. The result was a model which optimized for negative sentiment while still regularizing toward natural language. Over time this caused the model to generate increasingly sexually explicit text, regardless of the starting prompt. In the author's own words "*This bug was remarkable since the result was not gibberish but maximally bad output. The authors were asleep during the training process, so the problem was noticed only once training had finished.*" ([Ziegler et al., 2020](#))

While this example didn't really cause much harm, except to perhaps the human evaluators who had to read increasingly reprehensible text, we can easily imagine that extremely small bugs like a single flipped sign on a reward function can cause really bad outcomes if they were to occur in more capable models.

The rapid improvement, combined with a lack of understanding and predictability makes it more likely that despite the best intentions we might not be able to prevent accidents. This supports the case for heavily tested slow rollouts of AI systems, as opposed to the "Move fast and break things" ethos that some tech companies might hold.

Harmful malfunctions ([Jones, 2024](#)). AI systems can make mistakes if applied inappropriately. For example:

- A self-driving car in San Francisco collided with a pedestrian that was thrown into its path by a human driver. This was arguably not its fault - however, after initially stopping it then started moving again, dragging the injured pedestrian a further six meters along the road. ([The Guardian, 2023](#)) Government investigators alleged that the company initially hid the severity of the collision from them. ([The Guardian, 2023](#))
- A healthcare chatbot deployed in the UK was heavily criticized when it advised users potentially experiencing a heart attack not to get treatment. When these concerns were raised by a doctor, the company released a statement calling them a "Twitter troll". ([Lomas, 2020](#))

Furthermore, use of AI systems can make it harder to detect and address process issues. Outputs of computer systems are likely to be overly trusted. Additionally, because most AI models are used as black boxes and AI systems are much more likely to be protected from court scrutiny than human processes, it can be hard to prove mistakes ([Marshall, 2021](#)).

2.7.2 Indifference

Risks arising from indifference can be caused when the creators of AI models discover certain problems, but they don't take the moral consequences that might arise on release of the system seriously.

Some employees of a company might conduct a risk analysis and conclude that there is a risk that's bigger than expected or worse than expected. However, if the company stands to profit greatly from its strategy, or other factors such as safety gaming, or race dynamics, the model might be released anyway. It may be very difficult in such situations to motivate a change unless there is outside intervention or a chance of exposure to the companies lack of concern about the moral consequences arising from the release of such a system ([Critch et al., 2023](#)).

A potential comparison for such indifference risks, can be seen from the lawsuit that alleges that facebook violated consumer protection law.

According to the lawsuit - “*They purposefully designed their applications to addict young users, and actively and repeatedly deceiving the public about the danger posed to young people by overuse of their products. The lawsuit alleges that based on its own internal research, Meta knew of the significant harm these practices caused to teenage users and chose to hide its knowledge and mislead the public to make a profit. This misconduct affects hundreds of thousands of teenagers in Massachusetts who actively use Instagram.*” ([Office of the Attorney General, 2023](#))

If similar attitudes of indifference continue as more powerful AI systems are developed then the risk of harm affecting larger portions of society, and in worse ways rises accordingly.

Risks from corporate indifference highlight why merely having the technological solution to mitigating risks is not enough. We need to also establish regulations, and worldwide industry standards and norms that cannot be ignored such as professional codes of conduct, regulatory bodies, political pressures, and laws. For instance, technology companies with large numbers of users could be expected to maintain accounts of how they are affecting their users' well-being ([Critch et al., 2023](#)). We will talk more about possible technical interventions in the chapters on the Solutions, and regulatory interventions in the chapter on AI Governance.

2.7.3 Unpredictability

AI surprised even the experts. The first thing to keep in mind is that the rate of capabilities progress has shocked almost everyone, including the experts. We have seen many examples in history where scientists, and experts significantly underestimate the time it takes for a groundbreaking technological advancement to become a reality.

For a long time, famous cognitive scientist Douglas Hofstadter was among those predicting slow progress. “*I felt it would be hundreds of years before anything even remotely like a human mind*”, he said in an interview ([Hofstadter, 2023](#)).



This started happening at an accelerating pace, where unreachable goals and things that computers shouldn't be able to do started toppling [...] systems got better and better at translation between languages, and then at producing intelligible responses to difficult questions in natural language, and even writing poetry [...] The accelerating progress has been so unexpected, so completely caught me off guard, not only myself but many, many people, that there is a certain kind of terror of an oncoming tsunami that is going to catch all humanity off guard.

DOUGLAS HOFSTADTER

Physicist, computer scientist and professor of cognitive science, author of Gödel, Escher, Bach




(Hofstadter, 2023)

ML researchers, superforecasters⁵, and most others were all surprised by the progress in large language models in 2022 and 2023.

In mid-2021, ML professor Jacob Steinhardt ran a contest to predict progress on MATH and MMLU, two famous benchmarks.

2021



2022




Figure 2.33: Experts have been consistently underestimating the pace of AI progress.

Superforecasters massively undershot reality:

- In 2021, they predicted that performance on MMLU would improve moderately from 44% in 2021 to 57% by June 2022. The actual performance was 68%, which superforecasters had rated incredibly unlikely (Cotra, 2023).
- Shortly after that, models got even better — GPT-4 achieved 86.4% on this benchmark, close to the 89.8% that would be “expert-level” within each domain, corresponding to 95th percentile among human test takers within a given subtest (Cotra, 2023).

This is even more visible for the MATH dataset, that consists of free-response questions taken from math contests aimed at the best high school math students in the country. Most college-educated adults would get well under half of these problems right. At the time of its introduction in January 2021, the best model achieved only about 7% accuracy on MATH. (Cotra, 2023). And here is what happened:




Figure 2.34: Another prediction distribution by experts in 2022, that way undershot expected capabilities.

Not all forms of progress can be easily captured in quantifiable benchmarks. Often we care more about when AI systems will achieve more qualitative *milestones*: when will they translate as well as a fluent

⁵A person who makes forecasts that can be shown by statistical means to have been consistently more accurate than the general public or experts. ([Wikipedia](#))

human? When will they beat the best humans at Starcraft? When will they prove novel mathematical theorems?

Katja Grace of AI Impacts asked ML experts to predict a wide variety of AI milestones in 2022. This was a few months before ChatGPT was released. This time accuracy was lower — experts failed to anticipate the progress that ChatGPT and GPT-4 would soon bring. These models achieved milestones like “Write an essay for a high school history class” or “Answer easily Googleable factual but open-ended questions better than an expert” just a few months after the survey was conducted, whereas the experts expected them to take years ([Cotra, 2023](#)).

That means that even after the big 2022 benchmark surprises, experts were still in some cases strikingly conservative about anticipated progress, and undershooting the real situation.

2.7.4 Black-boxes

These risks are made more acute by the black-box nature of advanced ML systems. Our understanding of how AI systems behave, what goals they pursue, and our understanding of their internal behaviors lags far behind the capabilities they exhibit. The field of interpretability aims to progress on this front but remains very limited.

AI models are trained, not built. This is very different from how a plane is assembled from pieces that are all tested and approved, to create a modular, robust, and understood system. AI models learn the heuristics needed to perform tasks by themselves, and we have relatively little control or understanding of what these heuristics are. Gradient descent is a powerful optimization strategy, but we have little control and understanding of the structure it discovers. To give an analogy, this is the difference between a codebase that is documented function by function and a codebase that is more like spaghetti code, with leaky and non-robust abstractions and poor modularity.

AI systems are a series of emergent phenomena we steer but don’t understand. We can give a general direction, for example by designing the dataset or through prompt engineering, but this is far from the precision of software engineers or when designing a system like in the aerospace industry. There are no formal guarantees that the system will behave as expected. AI systems are like Russian dolls, with each technological layer surrounded by emergent problems and blind spots unforeseen at previous steps.

- **The Model:** Making a prediction on the next word or action, but it can be jailbroken through adversarial attacks.
- **Text generator:** The model that predicts the next token must be put into a system that constructs sentences, to create, for example, the APIs that allow getting a paragraph response to a question. But at this scale, the sentences can contain false information and hallucinations.
- **Agent:** The text generator can be put in a loop to create an agent: We give an objective to an agent, and the agent will decompose the objective into sub-objectives and sub-actions until accomplishing the goal. But goal-directed systems are subject once again to problems of unintended goals or emerging deception, as exhibited by the agent Cicero.
- **Multi-agent system:** The agent can dialogue with other agents or humans, resulting in a complex system that is subject to new phenomena, such as flash crashes in the financial world.




Figure 2.35: For illustrative purposes. Figure from the French Center for AI Safety's agenda.

2.7.5 Deployment Scale

Another aggravating factor is that many AIs are already deployed at massive scales, significantly affecting various sectors and aspects of daily life. They are getting increasingly enmeshed into society. Chatbots are a leading example as a showcase of AIs already deployed for millions globally. But there are many other examples.

Autonomous drones. There are increasingly more autonomous drones being deployed around the world, which marks a significant step towards an arms race in autonomous technologies. An example of this is the autonomous military drone called Kargu-2. These drones fly in swarms and, once launched, are capable of autonomously targeting and eliminating their targets. They were used by the Turkish army in 2020. ([Nasu, 2021](#))



Figure 2.36: Example of the Kargu-2 lethal autonomous weapon ([Nasu, 2021](#))

AI Relationships. There has been an explosion of chatbot powered AI friends, therapists and lovers from services like Replika. One popular example is [Xiachoice](#) which is an AI system designed to create emotional bonds like friendships or romance with humans. It is reminiscent of the AI depicted in the movie “Her”, and was used by 600 million Chinese citizens ([Euro News, 2021](#)). **Google’s Pathways** aims to revolutionize AI’s capabilities, enabling a single model to perform thousands or millions of tasks. This ambition towards centralizing the global information flow could significantly influence the control and dissemination of information ([Dean, 2021](#)). YouTube’s recommendation algorithm has surpassed Google searches in terms of directing user engagement and influence. All these AIs already have massive consequences.

2.7.6 Race Dynamics

The “race to the bottom” refers to a problematic scenario where competitive pressures in the development of AI lead to compromised safety standards. Safe development is costly for companies caught up in an innovation race. Under certain conditions, the twin effects of widespread risk and costly safety measures may cause a “race to the bottom” in the level of safety investment. In a race to the bottom, each competitor skimps on safety to accelerate their rate of development progress.

The Collingridge Dilemma. This dilemma essentially highlights the challenge of predicting and controlling the impact of new technologies. It posits that during the early stages of a new technology, its effects are not fully understood and its development is still malleable. Attempting to control - or direct it - is challenging due to the lack of information about its consequences and potential impact. Conversely, when these effects are clear and the need for control becomes apparent, the technology is often so deeply embedded in society that any attempt to govern or alter it becomes extremely difficult, costly, and socially disruptive.

Competitive pressures can lead to compromise on safety. A high-stakes race (for advanced AI) can dramatically worsen outcomes by making all parties more willing to cut corners in safety. Just as a safety-performance tradeoff in the presence of intense competition pushes decision-makers to cut corners on safety, so can a tradeoff between any human value and competitive performance incentivize decision makers to sacrifice that value. Contemporary examples of values being eroded by global economic competition could include non-monopolistic markets, privacy, and relative equality. In the long run, competitive dynamics could lead to the proliferation of forms of life (countries, companies, autonomous AIs) which lock-in bad values ([Dafoe, 2020](#)).

Allan Dafoe the founding director and former president of the Centre for the Governance of AI (GovAI), and is considered by some as the founder of the field of AI Governance. In the document he links, Dafoe addresses several objections to this argument ([Dafoe, 2021](#)). Here are summaries of some objections and responses: If competition creates terrible competitive pressures, wouldn't actors find a way out of this situation by using cooperation or coercion to put constraints on their competition? Maybe. However it may be very difficult in practice to create a politically stable arrangement for constraining competition. This could be especially difficult in a highly multipolar world. Political leaders do not always act rationally. Even if AI makes political leaders more rational, perhaps it would only do so after leaders have accepted terrible, lasting sacrifices for the sake of competition.

Why is this risk particularly important now? AI may greatly expand how much can be sacrificed for a competitive edge. For example, there is currently a limit to how much workers' well-being can be sacrificed for a competitive advantage; miserable workers are often less productive. However, advances in automation may mean that the most efficient workers will be joyless ones.

Why do Labs engage in AGI development despite the risks?

Potential benefits: Laboratories pursue AGI development despite the inherent risks due to the significant potential benefits. Successful AGI implementation could lead to unprecedented advancements in problem-solving capabilities, efficiency improvements, and innovation across various fields.

Competitive dynamics: The commitment to AI development, even with recognized risks, is driven by competitive pressures within the field. There is a widespread belief that it is preferable for those who are thoughtful and cautious about these developments to lead the charge. Given the intense competition, there is a fear among entities that halting AGI research could result in being surpassed by others, potentially those with less regard for safety. See the box below: How do AI Companies proliferate?

Prestige and recognition: Prestige is another significant motivator. Many AGI researchers aim for high citation counts, respect within the academic and technological communities, and financial success. Unfortunately, burning the timelines is high status.

Moreover, most AGI researchers believe in the feasibility of AGI safety. There is a belief among some researchers that a large-scale, concerted effort—comparable to the Manhattan Project and similar to the “super alignment plan” by OpenAI—could lead to the development of a controllable AI capable of implementing comprehensive safety measures.

2.7.7 Coordination Challenges



Since we have such a long history of thinking about this threat and what to do about it, from scientific conferences to Hollywood blockbusters, you might expect that humanity would shift into high gear with a mission to steer AI in a safer direction than out-of-control superintelligence. Think again.

MAX TEGMARK

Professor at MIT, Life 3.0 Author, AI Safety Researcher

([Tegmark, 2023](#))

The report “Coordination challenges for preventing AI conflict” ([Torges, 2021](#)) raises another class of potential coordination failures. When people task powerful AI systems with high-stakes activities that involve strategically interacting with other AI systems, bargaining failures between AI systems could be catastrophic:

As an example, consider a standoff between AI systems similar to the Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. If they failed to handle such a scenario well, they might cause nuclear war in the best case and far worse if technology has further advanced at that point.

Some might be optimistic that AIs will be so skilled at bargaining that they will avoid these failures. However, even perfectly skilled negotiators can end up with catastrophic negotiating outcomes ([Fearon, 2013](#)). One problem is that negotiators often have incentives to lie. This can cause rational negotiators to disbelieve information or threats from other parties even when the information is true and the threats are sincere. Another problem is that negotiators may be unable to commit to following through on mutually beneficial deals. These problems may be addressed through verification of private information and mechanisms for making commitments. However, these mechanisms can be limited. For example, verification of private information may expose vulnerabilities, and commitment mechanisms may enable commitments to mutually harmful threats.

As of 2024 there is a clear lack of adequate preparation for the potential risks posed by AI despite its significant advancements. This lack of readiness stems largely from the issue’s complexity, a significant gap in public understanding, and a divide in expert opinions on the level of risks that AI poses.

Many AI researchers have issued warnings, but their impact has been limited due to the abstract and complex nature of the problem. The AI safety issue is not readily tangible to most people, making it challenging to grasp the potential risks and envision how things could go wrong. Similarly, the field of AI safety suffers from an “awareness problem” that climate change, for instance, does not.

Moreover, there's a notable divide among experts. While some, like Yann LeCun, believe that AI safety is not an immediate concern, others argue that AI development has outstripped our ability to ensure its safety ([Yudkowsky, 2023](#)). This lack of consensus leads to mixed messages about the urgency of the issue, contributing to public confusion and complacency.

Furthermore, the discourse on AI safety has been clouded by politics and misconceptions. Misinterpretations of what AI safety entails, as well as how it's communicated, can lead to alarmism or dismissive attitudes ([Angelou, 2022](#)). Efforts to raise awareness about AI safety can inadvertently result in backlash or be co-opted into broader political and cultural debates.

Finally, the allure of AI advancements can overshadow their potential risks. For instance, the SORA text-to-video model's impressive capabilities may elicit excitement and optimism, but this can also distract from the substantial safety concerns the development of AGI could raise.

In conclusion, despite warnings and advancements, the world remains inadequately prepared for the potential risks posed by AI. Addressing this issue will require greater public education about AI safety, a more unified message from experts, and careful navigation of the political and social implications of the AI safety discourse.

2.8 Conclusion



Mitigating the risk of extinction from AI should be a global priority alongside other societal-scale risks such as pandemics and nuclear war.

CAIS

Statement on AI Risk signed by hundreds of AI Experts

2023, ([CAIS, 2023](#))

There are many types of risks and a lot of uncertainty.

AI risks are complex. In this chapter, we have traversed the complex and multifaceted landscape of AI risks, highlighting the myriad ways in which the burgeoning capabilities of artificial intelligence might pose significant threats to human well-being and even survival. From the misuse of AI technologies in cyberwarfare and bioterrorism to the intrinsic dangers of misalignment and systemic risks, the potential for catastrophic outcomes is high. Moreover, the competitive pressures of the AI development landscape and the inadequacy of current regulatory and oversight mechanisms exacerbate our challenges.

There remains a lack of consensus. Despite extensive research and debate, there remains a lack of consensus regarding the specific parameters that influence the likelihood of misalignment, deception, and other forms of risk. This uncertainty underscores the challenges in predicting AI behavior and ensuring alignment with human values and safety standards.

However, this chapter also serves as a call to action. As we stand on the precipice of potentially transformative advancements in AI, we think it is necessary to develop a global, multidisciplinary approach to AI safety that encompasses technical safeguards, robust ethical frameworks, and international cooperation. The development of AI technologies cannot be left solely in the hands of technologists; it requires the involvement of policymakers, ethicists, social scientists, and the broader public to navigate the moral and societal implications of AI.




Figure 2.37: XKCD ([XKCD](#))

A X-Risk Scenarios

A.1 From Misaligned AI to X-Risks



Figure 2.38: Consider the following pictures of stuff that humanity as a species has done. One underlying backdrop of many of those scenarios is that “Intelligent agency is a mighty force for transforming the world on purpose, and Creating agents who are far more intelligent than us, is playing with fire”. ([Calrsmith, 2024](#))

The consensus threat model among DeepMind’s alignment team suggests that X-risks will most likely stem from a Misaligned Power Seeking AGI. This type of AGI seeks power as an instrumental subgoal—having more power expands the system’s capabilities, thereby improving its effectiveness in achieving its primary objectives. The misalignment is anticipated to arise from a combination of Specification Gaming, where the AGI exploits loopholes in the rules or objectives it has been given, and goal misgeneralization, where the AGI applies its objectives in broader contexts than intended and can lead to deceptive alignment, where the AGI’s misalignment may not be readily apparent.

Many authors have studied those kinds of stories. Here, we will present the work of Carlsmith (2022), which stands as a widely discussed, and comprehensive examination of such risks. In the following story, we will assemble many bricks that have been detailed previously in this chapter.

Timelines: “**By 2070, it will become possible and financially feasible to build Advanced Planning Strategically aware systems (APS).**” Advanced Planning Strategically aware systems are systems that have developed a high level of strategic awareness (a sub-dimension of situational awareness)

and planning capability.

We won't discuss this hypothesis, please refer to Chapter 1, or this [literature review](#).

Incentives for APS System Development: "There will be strong incentives to build APS systems"

Advanced Planning Strategically aware systems would be useful for a wide range of tasks and may represent the most efficient pathway for development due to the current state of technological advancement. However, relying on goal-directed behavior introduces the risk of misalignment. These systems may develop unforeseen strategies to achieve goals that are not aligned with human values or intentions.


Complexities in Achieving Alignment Instrumental Convergence Dilemma. Instrumental convergence, as previously discussed, is a likely outcome if left unchecked, given that power is a universally beneficial resource for achieving various ends. Central to the report is the hypothesis that observed misaligned behaviors in response to certain inputs indicate potential misaligned power-seeking behaviors associated with those inputs. Therefore, any misalignment detected in contemporary systems could presage power-seeking tendencies in more advanced future systems.

Inherent technical challenges. The phenomenon of Specification Gaming is a significant concern. When systems optimize for proxies that correlate with the desired outcome, they may inadvertently disrupt this correlation. Similarly, issues arise during the search for systems that fulfill specific evaluation criteria, for example, goal misgeneralization. Meeting these criteria does not guarantee that the systems are inherently driven by them.

The imperfection of existing solutions. Current strategies for shaping objectives, such as promoting honesty or rewarding cooperation, are still rudimentary and fraught with limitations, as detailed in the section 'Problems with RLHF'. Moreover, attempts to control capabilities through specialization or prevention of capability enhancement often conflict with economic motivations. For instance, an AI tasked with maximizing a startup's revenue will naturally gravitate towards enhancing its capabilities. Sometimes, to remain competitive, a high degree of generality is indispensable. Options for control, such as containment (boxing) or surveillance, also tend to run counter to economic drives. Collectively, all proposed solutions carry inherent problems and pose significant risks if relied upon during the scaling of capabilities.

The potential for catastrophic failures Perverse economic incentives. The economic landscape surrounding the deployment of misaligned systems is fraught with perverse incentives. If competitors start using misaligned systems, those who do not will be outpaced, leading to a potentially dangerous race to the bottom fueled by dysfunctional competition. This competition could exacerbate negative societal impacts as entities strive to outperform each other without adequate regard for the broader implications. The development and deployment process involves many stakeholders, each with their objectives and levels of understanding, adding complexity and potential for conflict. Furthermore, the practical utility of functionally misaligned systems can be so enticing that it may overshadow the risks, leading to their hasty deployment. This situation is compounded by the risk that such systems might employ deception and manipulation to achieve their misaligned objectives, further complicating the ethical landscape.

AGI safety is a unique challenge. In contrast to other scientific fields, AGI safety is particularly challenging because the problem is not only new but also may be inherently difficult to comprehend. Additionally, in computer science generally, when there is a bug, the computer is not optimizing adversarially against the programmer, but we cannot make the same assumption here. We are not dealing with a passive system, but we're engaging with one that could be actively and adversarially optimizing—searching for loopholes to exploit. Additionally, the stakes of misaligning AGI systems are essentially unbounded. Mistakes in alignment could lead to severe and potentially irreversible consequences, underscoring the gravity of approaching AGI with a safety-first mindset.



Source: Good Judgment Inc

Figure 2.39: The median probabilities for each of the seven questions and the 25-75 percent quantiles as of 6 April 2023. For illustration, multiple super-forecasters have tried to use Carlsmith breakdown to estimate the probability of AI X-Risks

Misaligned Power Seeking AGI scenarios are the subject of abundant literature, for example:

- Without specific countermeasures, the easiest path to transformative AI likely leads to AI takeover ([Cotra, 2022](#)): Cotra shows that our current training setting, which she calls "human feedback on diverse tasks," is on a path to create competent planners in a way which will lead by default to deception and takeover. This report is quite accessible and thorough.
- The alignment problem from a deep learning perspective ([Ngo, 2022](#)): Ngo shows that by default, advanced AIs are general purpose and deceptive.
- AI Risk from Program Search ([Kenton et al., 2022](#)): In this short analysis, Shah shows that searching for an efficient AI program leads to finding autonomous planners and that it's hard to distinguish the deceptive ones from the non-deceptive ones.
- Advanced artificial agents intervene in the provision of reward ([Cohen et al., 2022](#)): Advanced AI strives to wirehead itself. Catastrophic consequences ensue.

This [literature review](#) is a good summary of more scenarios on Misaligned Power Seeking AI.

A.2 Expert Opinion on X-Risks

The discourse on existential risks associated with AI is a concern among experts and researchers in the field. These professionals are increasingly vocal about the potential for AI systems to cause significant harm if not developed and managed with utmost caution.

Jan Leike, the ex-lead of the OpenAI Alignment Team, estimates the probability of catastrophic outcomes due to AI, known as P(doom), to range between 10% and 90%. This broad range underscores the uncertainty and serious concerns within the expert community regarding AI's long-term impacts.

A 2022 Expert Survey on Progress in AI by AI Impacts revealed that "48% of respondents gave at least a 10% chance of an extremely bad outcome," highlighting considerable apprehension among AI researchers about the paths AI development might take. ([Grace, 2022](#))

Samotsvety Forecasting, recognized as the world's leading super forecasting group, has also weighed in on this issue. Through their collective expertise in AI-specific forecasting, they have arrived at an aggregate prediction of a 30% chance for an AI-induced catastrophe. This catastrophe is defined as an event leading to the death of more than 95% of humanity, with individual forecasts ranging from 8% to 71%. Such a

statistic is a stark reminder of the existential stakes involved in AI development and deployment.

The collection of P(doom) values from various experts, available [here](#), provides a comprehensive overview of the perceived risks. These values further contribute to the ongoing discussion on how best to navigate the uncertain future AI may bring.




Figure 2.40: Illustration from Michael Trazzi describing Paul Christiano's view of the future. Paul Christiano is a highly respected figure in the AI Safety community. ([Christiano, 2023](#))

A.3 Would ASI be able to defeat humanity?

Yes, as per various experts in AI safety and alignment, a sufficiently advanced AI could potentially pose a significant threat to society.

Superintelligence could create “cognitive superpowers”. These might include the ability to conduct research to build a better AI system, hack into human-built software globally, manipulate human psychology, generate large sums of wealth, develop plans superior to those of humans, and develop advanced weaponry capable of overpowering human militaries ([Karnofsky, 2022](#)).

Even AI at human levels of intelligence could pose a significant threat if it operates with the intention of undermining human civilization. Those human-level unaligned AIs would be akin to a scenario where highly skilled humans on another planet attempt to take down our civilization using just the Internet. This analogy underscores the potential for AI to leverage existing digital infrastructures to orchestrate wide-scale disruptions or attacks.

AI could be dangerous even without bodies. Karnofsky notes that AIs could still exert influence by recruiting human allies, teleoperating military equipment, and generating wealth through methods like quantitative trading. These capabilities suggest that physical form is not a prerequisite for an AI to exert power or initiate conflict ([Karnofsky, 2022](#)). AI systems could also acquire more resources and do human-level work, increasing their numbers and potentially out-resourcing humans. Even without physical bodies, they could pose a threat, as they could disable or control others' equipment, further increasing their power ([Karnofsky, 2022](#)). However, it's important to note that these scenarios are hypothetical and depend on AI technology development far exceeding current capabilities.

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- [1] Markov Grey and Charbel-Raphaël Segerie. Risks. *AI Safety Atlas*, 2025. This document uses hyperlinked citations throughout the text. Each citation is directly linked to its source using HTML hyperlinks rather than traditional numbered references. Please refer to the inline citations for complete source information.