Cooperative and Stochastic Multi-Player Multi-Armed Bandit: Optimal Regret With Neither Communication Nor Collisions

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K-Arm, m-Player Bandits

• Fix $\mathbf{p} = (p_1, p_2, \dots, p_K) \in [0, 1]^K$. Let $(r_t(i))_{1 \le i \le K, 1 \le t \le T}$ be independent variables with

$$\mathbb{P}\left(r_t(i)=0\right)=1-p_i$$
 and $\mathbb{P}\left(r_t(i)=1\right)=p_i$.

• At time t, each player $(P_X)_{X \in [m]}$ picks arm i_t^X without communication, and observes the reward:

$$r_t(X) = r_t(i_t^X) \cdot \mathbb{1}_{i_t^X \neq i_t^Y \ \forall Y \neq X}.$$

- Collisions \rightarrow *no reward*.
- Regret: $R_T = \left(\sum_{t=1}^T \sum_{X=1}^m r_t(X)\right) T\mathbf{p}^*$, where $\mathbf{p}^* = \max_{1 \leq i_1 < \dots < i_m \leq K} \left(\sum_{j=1}^m p_{i_j}\right)$ is sum of the top m arms.
- Goal: find a (randomized) strategy minimizing $\max_{\mathbf{p}} \mathbb{E}[R_T]$.

Bounds on the minimax regret

- Some of the previous works:
 - Regret $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{T})$, $p_1, p_2, p_3 \leq 1 \varepsilon$ [Lugosi-Mehrabian 18].
 - Regret $\widetilde{O}(T^{1-\frac{1}{2m}})$, non-stochastic [Bubeck-Li-Peres-Sellke 19].
 - Regret $O\left(\sum_{i} \frac{\log(T)}{\Delta_{i}}\right)$ [Huang-Combes-Trinh 21].
- All "cheat" by using collisions to implicitly communicate.

Theorem (BBS 21)


There is a strategy (using public shared randomness) with

$$\max_{\mathbf{p}} \mathbb{E}[R_T] = O\left(mK^{11/2}\sqrt{T\log T}\right),$$


$$\mathbb{P}\left(\text{there is a collision}\right) = O(T^{-2}).$$

• (K, m) = (3, 2): $\Theta(\sqrt{T \log T})$ optimal [Bubeck-Budzinski 20].


- Work in the plane $\{p_1 + p_2 + p_3 = \text{constant}\}.$
- No communication \rightarrow can assume player strategies are functions of empirical average rewards.
- Topological obstruction: playing top 2 arms forces collision.




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
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


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Collision-Free Solution for 2 players, 3 arms


• Idea ([BB 20]): create interface between regions $\{i^A = 1, i^B = 2\}, \{i^A = 2, i^B = 1\}.$



- Label interface to avoid adjacent collisions with $w_t \gtrsim \sqrt{\frac{\log T}{t}}$.
- Thin interface, random $\Theta \to \text{regret } O(\sqrt{T \log T})$.
- General (K, m) needs a high-dimensional analog.

General Strategy

• New partition in the case (K, m) = (3, 2):



- Regions form a tree, defined by arm inequalities added in order.
- Example region: $\{1,3,5\} >_2 \{4,8\} >_3 \{2,6\} >_1 \{7,9,10\}$.
- ullet Via shared randomness, map regions o arms w/o collision.

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Some Details of the Partition

- Inequalities always separate arms that might be in top m. Once top m vs bottom K-m is determined, stop.
- Example for (K, m) = (10, 5):

- Generalization of random interface: stop early if gap size for new inequality lies in a small random interval.
- Each player needs to input estimate of p, output region.
- Main step: pick 1 of $\leq K$ cuts. Efficient despite $\approx K!$ regions.

THANK YOU!