

More Than Just Kissing Babies:
The Strategy of Campaign Visits in United States
Presidential Elections

MASTER THESIS

MARKUS NEUMANN
University of Mannheim

Thesis Supervisor:
Professor Thomas Gschwend

June 2, 2014

ABSTRACT

Every four years, the Democratic and Republican parties each send out a nominee to tour the country, press the flesh and convince the American people to put them into the White House. In this paper, I analyse how candidates decide where to hold their campaign events. To this end, I employ a poisson regression on data from the 2004, 2008 and 2012 presidential elections. I find that the competitiveness of a state as well as its number of votes in the electoral college serve as an excellent predictor of campaign visits. This effect is even more prevalent in the last month before Election Day. Beneath the state level, candidates from both parties focus their efforts on cities and regions which support them politically.

CONTENTS

1. <i>Introduction</i>	1
2. <i>The State of Campaign Research</i>	2
3. <i>The When and Where of Campaign Visits</i>	8
3.1 What does a candidate appearance accomplish?	8
3.2 Hypotheses	10
4. <i>Analysis</i>	12
4.1 The Dataset	12
4.2 The State Level	15
4.3 The County Level	20
4.4 The Temporal Dimension	26
5. <i>Conclusion</i>	31
6. <i>Bibliography</i>	34
7. <i>Appendix</i>	38

1. INTRODUCTION

Following the re-election of Barack Obama in November 2012, a peculiar story unfolded in Gilbert, Arizona: Enraged over Obama's victory, local Holly Solomon ran over her husband in an SUV, inflicting life-threatening injuries on him. Her reason: she felt that he was single-handedly responsible for Obama's re-election because he had not voted (CBS News - Crimesider Staff, 2012).

This is a very colorful illustration of the frequently cited mantra that "every vote counts". However, given the background of the Electoral College and the 'winner-takes-it-all' rule, this adage actually does not apply to the U.S. presidential elections. Instead, the results in most of the states are more or less pre-determined, as the margin of victory is so great that it would never be possible for the losing party to mount a challenge. Given the fact that it was actually Mitt Romney who won Arizona by a margin of over 200,000 votes, it would not have mattered either way if the husband of the aforementioned Holly Solomon had cast a ballot or not. As a consequence, most of the election campaigns are held in a handful of 'battleground states', which effectively determine the presidency.

The purpose of this paper is an analysis of campaign strategy under these circumstances. In an election campaign, any candidate faces three fundamental challenges: Raising money, buying advertisements and making appearances throughout the country. My main concern is the latter. I determine where candidates spend the most valuable resource they have: their time.

At the latest when the last primary contender is mathematically eliminated, the presidential candidates from both parties start to tour the country in order to rally the populace behind them. The summer and fall preceding an election is spent holding rallies, organizing fundraisers, visiting farms, schools and other public functions. But which criteria does a campaign manager apply in deciding where to go to? Is it better to attend a town hall meeting in Golden, Colorado, or address a crowd of grassroots supporters in Orlando, Florida? Could a big rally in Arizona bring the traditionally red state into play for a democratic candidate, or is it safer to protect the small lead he enjoys in Iowa? Assuming that campaign managers do not resolve these dilemmas by closing their eyes and pointing their finger at a map, my research question emerges: What is the strategy behind a candidate's campaign

visits? Which states and cities do the presidential hopefuls visit while they are on the campaign trail, and why?

In order to answer this question, I break it down into three sections. The first part of the analysis deals with the state level. Deciding which states to visit is probably the most crucial decision for a campaign manager as it directly pertains to the 'grand strategy' of gathering as many votes in the electoral college as possible. Conversely, at the county-level, demographic and socio-economic details become more important. Here I determine whether the contenders for the White House prefer to rally people in areas that already support them or attempt to win over new voters who are not traditionally aligned with their party. While the first and second part are mainly concerned with geography, the last section is dedicated to the temporal dimension of the issue: *When* exactly do the candidates go where? Is there a difference between the early campaign season which lasts until the end of summer, and the hectic last month during the 'get-out-the-vote-period', or do the candidates largely stick to their guns?

However, before I can deal with any of these questions, I first need to assess the previous research which has been done on this topic. Both the broader literature on political campaigns in general as well as the more refined field of candidate appearances are relevant to my study.

2. THE STATE OF CAMPAIGN RESEARCH

"There isn't one idea from political science that has ever been of use in a real political campaign" (Shaw, 2006, 2). This quote from James Carville (lead strategist in Bill Clinton's 1992 campaign and originator of the infamous adage "It's the economy, stupid!") is quite revealing of the attitude many campaign strategists seem to have towards political scientists. As in almost any applied science, the age-old dispute between practitioners and theorists is also present in the field of campaign research. While electioneering professionals contend that political science models are either trivial or useless, researchers claim that campaign staffers are overly secretive, careless with data and lack overall perspective (Shaw, 2006, 3). Of course, in an ironic twist of fate, James Carville has since become a professor of political science (Hobgood, 2008).

If the seminal texts on election research constitute the 'bible' for political scientists, then "The People's Choice" is undoubtedly the 'Genesis'. Berelson, Lazarsfeld

and Gaudet (1968) provide one the earliest studies on voting behaviour and political campaigns. Originally published in 1948, "The People's Choice" remains one of the cornerstones of election research and American Politics. The book is based on a panel study conducted over the course of the 1940 election campaign, in Erie County, Ohio. In its essence, the study deals with one issue: How do voters decide whom to vote for?

According to Berelson, Lazarsfeld and Gaudet (1968, 74), political campaigns play a crucial role in this regard "because they *activate* latent dispositions." What the authors mean by this is that most of the time, political attitudes lie dormant within the population: people already have a more or less diffuse opinion on parties and candidates, but as long as they are not confronted by stimuli such as political advertisements, speeches or debates, these underlying convictions are not revealed. As soon as the campaign season starts, these latent dispositions rise to the surface.

In addition to 'activation', the authors propose two further mechanisms by which campaigns can influence vote choice. Among people who, early into the campaign, already have a fairly clear idea where they will make their cross come Election Day, political communication is expected to have a reinforcing effect, strengthening their convictions and providing them with verbal ammunition they can use to convince friends and family. Consequently, the purpose of campaigns is to ensure that these voters do not change their mind and actually turn out in numbers on Election Day (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and Gaudet, 1968, 87).

Lastly, campaigns also attempt to persuade voters whose original intention may have been to vote for the rival party to change their mind. While such a conversion effect may be extremely beneficial (not only do you gain a vote, but your opponent also loses one), Berelson, Lazarsfeld and Gaudet (1968, 100) find that it is also quite rare.

The debate surrounding the prevalence of activation, reinforcement and persuasion effects has been raging among political scientists ever since. However, none of the subsequent research conducted on this topic has actually led to fundamental improvements over the study of Lazarsfeld and colleagues. Acute, succinct and parsimonious - in the field of election research, "The People's Choice" still stands alone. Consequently, the work of Lazarsfeld and colleagues serves as the bedrock of my theory of campaign visits.

Given the fact that the original of "The People's Choice" was published over 65 years ago, under vastly different sociological, political and institutional conditions, one could claim that it no longer applies to the modern political landscape. After all, the American society of the 1940s and 50s was far more homogenous - and far more

white - than it is today, which was also born out in a different electoral landscape. Nowadays, the black and especially the Latino vote can have a profound effect on the outcome of presidential elections and thus factor heavily into the strategies of the candidates. But while the circumstances in politics may be different compared to the 1940s, the fundamental rules of the game have not changed.

As far as campaigns (as opposed to the broader topic of elections) go, a large part of the literature deals with the question regarding their efficacy. Lazarsfeld and colleagues contend that while campaigns play an important role in activating people's latent attitudes, they are unlikely to change the outcome of the election because the two parties' efforts cancel each other out. This so-called "minimal effects" theory continues to feature prominently throughout the literature.

For the most part, this body of research can be divided into two major camps. Economic theories of voting focus almost entirely on the financial side of politics. Building on Downs (1957), they posit that the election result can be predicted long before the fact, and completely independent of what happens during the fall campaign. To this end, Fair (1978); Kiewiet (1983); Markus (1988); Ferejohn (1986); Keefer (2007) all utilize the personal financial situation of voters and the state of the economy in one way or another.

By contrast, political theories, starting with Rosenstone (1983), cast a wider net. In addition to the economic variables mentioned above, this school of thought incorporates party identification and presidential approval rating as the most crucial factors for forecasting the results of an election (Holbrook, 1991; Campbell, 1992). The combination of these and a number of similar covariates allow for a very accurate prediction of the decision voters make at the ballot box.

Gelman and King (1993) approach the same issue from a slightly different perspective. The authors acknowledge the validity of the preeminent forecasting models, but argue that their ability to predict the election results without taking the campaign into account does not necessarily rule out the importance of campaign effects (Gelman and King, 1993, 449). Finkel (1993, 13) picks up on this issue and shows that the variable of presidential approval, which is used very frequently for the prediction of elections, cannot be regarded as independent from campaign effects, especially if the president is running for re-election himself. This is why modern approaches to forecasting use bayesian methods to combine these structural components with opinion polls to account for changes occurring during the campaign (Linzer, 2013). So while the aforementioned articles by and large support the "minimal effect" hypothesis, most of them also leave the door open for at least some degree of influence by campaign effects.

Much of the literature which contends that campaigns do matter, is built on a number of iconic advertisements which supposedly have influenced several elections. Perhaps most infamous of all, the 1964 "Daisy Girl" ad contrasts a video clip of a two-year old infant with images of a nuclear explosion. In the background, the voice of Lyndon B. Johnson ominously warns that "We must either love each other... or we must die" (Schwartz et al., 1964). Similarly, the 1988 "Willie Horton" and "Revolving Door" spots pin the blame for the escape of a prison inmate on Democratic presidential candidate Michael Dukakis (McCarthy, 1988; Frankenberry and Ailes, 1988). Whether these two advertisements really were single-handedly responsible for a Republican win in an election in which the Democrats at one point held an advantage of 17 percent, is obviously questionable. But there is little doubt about the fact that the debate surrounding ads such as these has spawned a sprawling body of literature.

In a critical juncture from the classic research on campaigns, many of these texts put a lot more stock into the potency of persuasion effects (Huber and Arceneaux, 2007; Franz and Ridout, 2010). Likewise, Dilliplane, Goldman and Mutz (2013) finds that, at the very least, reinforcement is not the only game in town: The author shows that, given the right circumstances, people definitely can be convinced to defect from their original party choice. However, there are also some dissenting voices: Freedman, Franz and Goldstein (2004) contend that advertisements have the biggest effect on previously undecided citizens and tend to raise their participation levels - clear evidence in favor of Lazarsfeld and colleagues.

Another important question is where political campaigns need to buy advertisements in order to 'get the biggest bang for their buck': Shaw (2006) - who was responsible for determining the resource allocation of both of George W. Bush's campaigns - notes that a state's competitiveness, the number of votes it has in the electoral college as well as its cost for advertisements are the deciding factors. Contrary to conventional wisdom, Urban and Niebler (2014) argue that ads can also be beneficial in non-battleground states, as they help to shore up the base and increase campaign contributions.

To this end, political scientists have made numerous contributions to the literature. The game-theoretical paper of Brams and Davis (1974) is the quintessential study in this regard. As an alternative to simply distributing a campaign's resources in proportion to the states' number of electoral votes, the authors propose to use a state's population size to the power of 1.5 instead. The theoretical reasoning behind the "3/2's rule" is that the probability for a single voter to change the outcome of the entire election is much greater in the more populous states with a larger number

of electors. As Brams and Davis (1974, 122) show, this fact easily offsets the larger proportional gain smaller states receive due to the two-senators constant in the calculation of electors (for example, Florida’s two Senators account for less than seven percent of its 29 electors whereas they make up half of Utah’s four).

	2004	2008	2012
Electoral Votes	0.30	0.41	0.30
Population	0.28	0.39	0.31
Brams & Davis	0.21	0.29	0.23
Lake	0.20	0.29	0.23
Bartels	0.21	0.30	0.21

Tab. 2.1: Correlation (Pearson’s R) between resource distribution models and actual distribution

Similarly, Lake (1979), who criticises Brams and Davis for maximizing for the number of electoral votes rather than the chance of winning the election, introduces a slightly different model, as does Bartels (1986). These ‘rules’ make for a fairly decent predictor of campaign strategy in the 1960s and 70s.

However, when applied to candidate visits in any of the last three Presidential elections (see table 2.1), none of them fare particularly well. My job in this paper is to replace these theoretically-derived formulae with empirical models based on recent data.

The issue of resource distribution also features prominently throughout the research of Kelley (1966), who provides one of the earliest accounts on the topic of candidate visits. As opposed to the body of literature on campaign advertisements, this field is far less well-developed. Kelley’s main focus lies on the strategic calculations in the 1964 election according to which Johnson and Goldwater scheduled their appearances throughout the country: “The value of campaigning in any given state in any given year is primarily a function of the state’s electoral vote and the closeness of the race there, and both these factors should therefore be strongly reflected in any rational allocation of a presidential candidate’s time” (Kelley, 1966, 64). Kelley shows that the strategy of both Johnson and Goldwater largely conforms to this expectation. The time the president and his challenger devoted to the 50 states strongly correlates with their expected utility values (Kelley, 1966, 65).¹ Kelley’s empirical analysis suffers somewhat from the limited statistical tools available in the 1960s and is generally kept far too short: The author only mentions it in a brief remark as well as a footnote and does not provide details on important aspects, such as how the dependent variable (the candidates’ time in a state) is

¹ The expected utility of a state is calculated by subtracting 100 from the difference between the two parties’ vote percentages and multiplying the result by the state’s electoral votes. The coefficients are reported as .8 for Johnson and .84 for Goldwater, both at significant at the 99% level. Unfortunately Kelley does not specify which method he used.

operationalized. However, the logic behind it is completely sound. Consequently this analysis forms the foundation on which I later build my first hypothesis. Kelley also assumes that the main function of campaign visits lies in rallying rather than persuading voters. He notes that this feature may have been particularly prominent for Goldwater's campaign, because the Arizona Senator had to convince the crowd of lethargic "stay-at-home-conservatives" that the election was sufficiently important to flock to the polls in large numbers Kelley (1966, 56). For Kelley, the role of divisive issues - mainly the civil rights movement and nuclear policy - seems to lie in polarizing voters and 'priming' them towards one of the political parties. Candidate visits then serve the purpose of 'activating' them for the election, reaping what the cleavages have sown.

In addition to his analysis of political advertisement, Shaw (2006) also provides one of the few recent examinations of campaign visits. Most crucially, Shaw conducts a statistical analysis of campaign appearances very similar to my own. However, owing to a small sample size (for the 2004 election, he records three times less visits than I do) and a suboptimal implementation (he does not use a count model), his findings are ambiguous at best.

However, owing to his experience in the Bush campaign team in the elections of 2000 and 2004, the author is still able to provide many important insights as both a researcher and a practitioner. One of his most important contributions is the notion that campaign strategists do not only treat advertisements in terms of media markets, but also campaign visits. Specifically, candidate appearances not only have an effect on the people who attend them (who are relatively few in number), but are also reported on by the local media. Since, as Shaw (2006) puts it, media coverage represents "free advertisement", being picked up by the media is crucial for a candidate, so the author's findings likely give some indication about the way presidential campaigns manage their relations with the press.

This topic has also received a fair deal of scholarly scrutiny. Flowers, Haynes and Crespin (2003) examine the role the media play in conveying the messages sent out by the presidential hopefuls. They show that whether the press relays information given by politicians depends on several factors, who gave the message, what they said, how and when they said it, etc. Baum (2005) deals with a related topic: He analyses the purpose talk shows serve for presidential candidates. They provide a cheap method of reaching voters who are generally uninterested in politics. The author does not find support for persuasion effects, but rather the reinforcement of existing attitudes towards parties and candidates. Iyengar and Kinder (2010) reach a similar conclusion. Lenz and Lawson (2011) provide empirical evidence for the

claim that uninformed voters rate politicians primarily based on their appearance. Considering that these effects should also be applicable to campaign visits in general, this research provides valuable insights for my study.

My synthesis of the research on election campaigns most relevant to my paper yields four key results: First, the theory of activation, persuasion and reinforcement effects by Lazarsfeld and colleagues undoubtedly constitutes the bread and butter of the campaign literature. All subsequent research deals with this topic to some degree. By the same token, it also forms the basis for my own theory. Second, the issue of campaign advertisementss has already received a considerable degree of scholarly scrutiny. The lessons from the research on this topic can also be applied to its less well-understood twin brother, campaign visits. Third, the game-theoretical work on the optimal distribution of resources in political campaigns serves as an excellent starting point for my own research in this field. However, the resulting formulae are not ephemeral: When applied to data from modern campaigns, the mathematically-derived equations fall short. Hence, I develop an empirical model which can account for candidate appearances in the last three elections to a much better degree. Fourth, both Kelley and Shaw provide a comprehensive account of campaign visits. However, neither manages to support their theoretical claims with conclusive empirical evidence. Kelley devotes very little effort to this issue and while Shaw does conduct a quantitative anylsis, it also remains at the periphery of his efforts. As a result, his findings are somewhat ambiguous. Consequently, my task lies in improving upon these results and building a model which is capable of explaining the when and where of campaign visits.

3. THE WHEN AND WHERE OF CAMPAIGN VISITS

3.1 What does a candidate appearance accomplish?

It is January 2008, the Republican primary campaign is in full swing. Following a debate in New Hampshire, Mitt Romney and his family sit in front of a TV, watching the post debate-discussion. On the screen, the moderator turns to the audience and asks: "First of, show of hands. [...] How many of you walked in here supporting Mitt Romney?" Only a handful people in the crowd raise their hand. "How many of you are going to leave here supporting Mitt Romney?" Almost the entire audience now has their hand in the air. In front of the TV, the former Massachusetts governor

and his family break out in jubilation.

This scene, as shown in the documentary "Mitt" (Whiteley, 2014), demonstrates what a candidate appearance is supposed to accomplish. This example leads me to the fundamental assumptions underlying my analysis.

As outlined above, Lazarsfeld and colleagues contend that campaigns primarily activate and reinforce existing attitudes. This hypothesis has since been repeatedly challenged, but throughout most of the literature, it is still supported. Since the primary purpose of this paper is not to test veracity of this theory, I accept it on the basis of its prevalence. By the same token, it is actually also irrelevant to me whether campaigns make a difference or not, what matters is that the Democratic and Republican parties *think they do*.

Applied to the more specific topic of campaign visits, this means that if a previously undecided voter is exposed to a presidential candidate - be it at a rally, a town hall meeting, or a grassroots event - his latent disposition will be activated. There is a manifold of possible explanations for this phenomenon. Picture a citizen who has voted Republican all her life but has since become disillusioned with politics. When the Romney campaign schedules an event at the local strawberry farm, she decides to attend. Impressed by Romney's charm, fiery rhetoric and sparkling white teeth (according to Lenz and Lawson (2011), looks matter), her faith is restored: perhaps the politicians up in Washington care about us common folk after all!

Similarly, campaign visits can also cause a reinforcement effect. Imagine a small-business owner who has traditionally been leaning to the left. He was not too happy when Obama bailed out the banks, but he will be damned if another Republican in the White House starts yet another war! During a visit by Joe Biden to the town's elementary school, he hears about the virtues of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Filled with renewed enthusiasm, he signs up as a volunteer to the Obama campaign, handing out lawn signs and bumper stickers to his neighbors.

These slightly hyperbolic illustrations of campaign effects serve the purpose of showing how the theoretical concept of Lazarsfeld and colleagues might work in reality. "Joe the Plumber", "Tito the Builder", or "Bob the Electrician" are further examples of what happens when politicians meet ordinary people. The former also serves the purpose of clarifying that activation and reinforcement effects might not necessarily always be to the benefit of the candidate who causes them: "Joe the Plumber" a.k.a. Joe Wurzelbacher only became a political activist and Tea Party darling after an encounter with Barack Obama during his 2008 presidential campaign (Mak, 2011).

As Shaw (2006) notes, political advertisements on television, radio and in news-

papers as well as candidate visits make up the brunt of campaigns. But what is the importance of these two elements relative to each other? There is little doubt about the fact that advertisements make up the lion's share of the amount of political communication most people experiences. Franz and Ridout (2010, 310) estimate that throughout the 2004 campaign, over 2.5 million ads were broadcasted. By contrast, my dataset reports only 1192 appearances by Bush and Kerry over the same period.

However, there is considerable evidence that the impact of advertisements is limited, as they are subject to diminishing returns (Mitchell, 2012). The campaign teams still keep spending hundred of millions of dollars on them, but only because with the rise of private funding and political action committees (PACs), money is starting to lose its role as a limiting factor. But the proverbial "bang for the buck" is getting smaller and smaller.

By contrast, candidate visits are still something special, as they give voters a chance to meet the potential future (or present) president in person. As a consequence, campaign appearances provide an opportunity to bridge the chasm that usually exists between politics and society.

A crucial factor which raises the relative importance of visits is that they are far more dependent on the skills of the candidate than other campaign measures. A presidential candidate has a crew of writers to compose his speeches, an art department to brush up his TV advertisements and a statistics team to keep track of polls, but if he is unable to make a connection with ordinary people on the street, no amount of money and organizational support can help him. Consequently, candidate appearances are also more revealing of the nominees and give voters a better chance to gauge their suitability for the Oval Office.

Perhaps the most important reason for the 'preciousness' of candidate visits as a resource is that they are necessarily limited by finite amount of time the presidential candidate, his nominee for Vice President, and their spouses have. While it is always possible to buy more advertisements, the principal agents of the campaign can only visit so many rallies in the months leading up to the election.

As a consequence, there is a strong incentive to make the most out of these appearances, necessitating a good strategy.

3.2 *Hypotheses*

Shaw (2006, 42) recounts that when the Bush campaign for the 2000 Presidential election first assembled, one of Karl Rove's (Bush's campaign manager) initial goals was to draw up a plan according to which the campaign's resources would be dis-

tributed across the states.

Of course, the crucial element in these considerations is the electoral college. The President of the United States is not elected by popular vote, but rather through the electors who are chosen on a state-by-state basis. Each state receives as many electors as the number of Representatives it is apportioned according to its population, plus its two Senators. In order to account for possible changes in the number of citizens who live in each state, these figures are re-calculated every ten years based on census data. For example, after the recount of 2010, among others, Florida gained two additional Representatives for a total number of 27 (and therefore 29 electors), whereas Iowa's number of seats was reduced from five to four. Since the ratification of the 23rd Amendment in 1961, the District of Columbia receives as many electors as the least populous state, which is currently Wyoming, with only three electors (corresponding to one Representative and two Senators)(United States Senate, 1961). U.S. overseas territories such as Guam or Puerto Rico are not apportioned any electors. However, citizens of one of the 50 states who are living overseas are included in the calculation for the apportionment of seats (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010).

Within the states themselves, the President is chosen on a popular basis. Whichever candidate wins a majority of votes, receives all of the state's electors. Practically, this means that any candidate will attempt to win enough states in order to gain at least 270 electoral votes, a majority in the electoral college.

As outlined above, the game-theoretical rules for an optimal distribution of resources fail to account for my data of campaign visits in 2004, 2008 and 2012. What is the reason for this discrepancy between theory and practice? Brams and Davis already realised the possible flaw in their reasoning, though they may have underestimated its repercussions: There is little actual reason "to expend resources in states that seem invulnerable to one's opponent as it does to conduct forays into states that an opponent has virtually locked up" (Brams and Davis, 1974, 130). Instead, candidates tend to concentrate their efforts in a much smaller number (usually around 10-20) of battleground states which change hands between the two parties more frequently. Consequently I test whether a combination of these two factors makes for a sufficient predictor of candidate visits at the state level.

H_1 : The greater the number of electoral votes a state possesses, the more visits it is likely to receive, but only if the competition between the two parties in the state is sufficiently close.

In contrast to the ample literature on the strategic distribution of resources between states, there is very little research on where candidates go *within* them.

Since the state-wide presidential elections follow the rules of a popular vote, it would be logical to assume that the candidates simply "go shooting where the ducks are", as phrased by 1964 Republican nominee Barry Goldwater (Brams and Davis, 1974).

However, a careful reading of Lazarsfeld and colleagues (as well as Kelley, who makes a similar argument) can provide an additional insight into this question. If campaign visits mainly serve the purpose of activating and reinforcing latent dispositions, then the candidates will attempt to visit the people who, once mobilized, will actually vote for them. It would be irrational for, say, John McCain, to make an appearance in a city with a left-leaning demographic, because his visit would potentially rally previously indifferent voters, the larger part of which would be likely to vote for Barack Obama. Consequently I expect that candidates conduct their visits primarily in counties which have supported their party in previous elections.

H_2 : Candidates are expected to visit counties with a demographic that matches their party's clientele more frequently.

The strategy of campaign visits is as much a question of *where*, as it is of *when*. Time and time again, the last few weeks before Election Day are identified as the most crucial phase, during which a candidate can really make a difference. At this stage in the campaign, the road to the required 270 votes is likely to have become much more clear than earlier into the campaign, as previously undecided voters have committed to candidates and potentially open states have been locked up by one side. Consequently it is to be expected that the candidates focus on the most important and closest states much more emphatically during the critical phase of the campaign than in the months before.

H_3 : In the last month before Election Day, the candidates should be more prone to visit the closest and most valuable battleground states than in the preceding months of the campaign.

4. ANALYSIS

4.1 *The Dataset*

In order to analyse campaign visits in an objective and quantitative manner, I need a dataset which catalogues candidate appearances across the United States.

To this end, I utilize data gathered by *Democracy in Action* (Appleman, 2013), a non-partisan organization dedicated to providing the public with information on campaign practices in the U.S. presidential elections.

Democracy in Action lists its data in a calendaric format, in which each of the campaign activities are assigned to the days on which they occurred. Information on where they took place, who was involved, as well as a short description of the event is also recorded. This information is available for the presidential candidates, vice presidential candidates, and their wives.

Consequently I have re-assembled the *Democracy in Action* data in such a way that the unit of analysis is one campaign visit¹. From the description of the event, I extract the candidate name, party, date, location and state. This information is available for the elections 2004 to 2012². Since the different election campaigns are not directly comparable (for one, they start at completely different dates so the total number of events varies), I do not pool the data, but rather use it for the purpose of comparing the three elections. Additionally, the results from three different election cycles also serve as a robustness test.

Furthermore, not every single campaign event is listed in the same manner by *Democracy in Action*. As the data is based on candidate schedules, news reports, eye-witnesses, etc., it occasionally contains entries which are not strictly campaign-related. For example, George W. Bush's presence at the G8-summit 2004 on Sea Island, Georgia, the Bidens' attendance of a funeral, or a holiday of the Romney family at their summer home in Wolfeborough are all recorded by *Democracy in Action*. I do not use these events because the candidates would have attended these events either way. Now, one could obviously make an argument that even though Bush would have gone to the G8-meeting no matter what, his re-election chances still benefited because he gained free publicity. In fact, I am fairly open to including events which may not seem like campaign events at first sight. For example, the candidates are sometimes reported to have attended mass at the local church or eaten a burger in a restaurant along the way. However, these events are carefully orchestrated to portray the principal agents of the campaign as ordinary people whom you can run into by chance. Consequently, events of this kind remain in the dataset. Nonetheless, I do have to draw the line somewhere. If in doubt, I base my decision on the following question: Would the candidate have gone there if it wasn't for the campaign?

¹ Note that this dataset is not used for my analyses. Rather, the datasets on visits at the state and the county level are aggregated versions of this original dataset.

² Data for the 2000 election is also available, however, it is recorded in a different format from which not all of the aforementioned variables can be properly inferred.

Additionally, there are a few 'special' cases which require some attention: The *Democracy in Action* data notes when a candidate lands at an airport. Naturally, this is not counted as a campaign visit. However, when a candidate lands at an airport *and* addresses a crowd of supporters waiting for him (which happens fairly often), I do code as an event. After all, there is an audience, the media are usually notified in advance and the party intends for it to be conducive to the candidate's election chances.

I use a similar argument to justify the inclusion of TV interviews by the candidates. Granted, these events are not campaign visits in the strictest sense of the word. However, they usually include a live audience, the candidate does not have to pay for them unlike for political advertisements, and they are conducted with the goal of helping the campaign. Essentially, they fit the bill for campaign visits better than they do anything else.³

One type of event which has to be removed however, is fundraisers. These visits are absolutely crucial to a campaign, however, they do not serve the same purpose as regular candidate appearances. Furthermore, they have nothing to do with my hypotheses. Consequently they are omitted from my dataset. The information on these cases might be quite useful to a dedicated analysis of campaign finance, but for the purposes of this paper, they are redundant.

Finally, there are some events appearing in the *Democracy in Action* data which come from an unreliable source and can't be corroborated independently. I have also removed these cases in the interest of guaranteeing impeccable results.

The resulting dataset includes 2981 candidate visits, 1192 from the 2004 election (which means almost three times as many as Shaw (2006) reports for this election year), 799 in 2008 (the campaign

	Democrats	Republicans	Total
2004	712	480	1192
2008	411	388	799
2012	536	438	974

Tab. 4.1: Candidate Visits, by Year and Party

started later here because the Democratic primary campaign between Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama dragged on for a while) and 974 in 2012. As shown in table 4.1, the distribution of events between the two parties is not always completely even,

³ It is worth noting that in a handful of cases, when the candidate has multiple events on the same day as well as a TV appearance, the location of the interview is not reported by *Democracy in Action*. In these cases I use the location of the event preceeding the interview, as the nominees usually do not travel that far on a given day. Naturally it is not guaranteed that this method is always correct, but given that for my regressions, the unit of analysis is either the county or the state (see below), it is unlikely to be too far off. Consequently this technique is better than the alternative of simply omitting these cases.

as the Democratic candidates tend to make more campaign appearances than their opponents, especially in 2004.

Based on the city in which an event takes place, I add the respective county.⁴ The reason for this step is simply the fact that both voting as well as socio-economic data, which I utilize throughout my analysis, are not available for every American city. Consequently, the dataset reports the number of times a candidate has visited a specific county, which is therefore the unit of analysis.⁵⁶ Naturally, for the hypotheses pertaining to the state level, I further aggregate the data up to this point.

4.2 The State Level

The fundamental element of any good campaign strategy - as well as this analysis - is the distribution of resources between states. As I have outlined above, I expect candidates to visit the most-closely fought battleground states most often, especially if they are worth a high number of electoral votes. To test this hypothesis, I run a regression of the state-level data.

The dependent variable is the aggregate number of visits to a state (Washington D.C. included) by both candidates, their running mates and their wives⁷. As this data follows a poisson distribution, a regular OLS regression would not be appropriate and a count model needs to be used instead.

As hypothesis 1 pertains to the importance of "battleground" states, an operationalization for this concept is required. Consequently, the main independent variable measures the closeness of competition through the difference between Democrats and Republicans in the two-party vote in the *preceding* election. For example, the Democrats gained 51.4% in the 2008 election in the state of Florida, whereas Republicans reached 48.6%. This means that the difference between the two percentages is 2.8, marking a very close election. This value is then used in the independent variable for 2012. The reason for using the value from the previous election rather than a more recent and potentially more accurate poll result is because this is what the

⁴ Note that in a handful of cases, the county cannot be uniquely identified from the city because it belongs to two counties. For these campaign visits, I use the information provided in the event description to determine in which part of the city it was located.

⁵ The dataset includes all counties in the United States, even the ones that never received any visits. However, Alaska, which does not have counties but *boroughs*, does not record all of the necessary data, which is why the state is excluded from the county-level analysis.

⁶ See Appendix, figure 7.2 for a graph of the distribution.

⁷ I have also conducted an analysis for each party on its own. However, the results are virtually identical (see Appendix, table 7.1). Consequently I only use the total number of visits, at least as far as the state level is concerned.

candidates' strategists do when planning their resource distribution at the beginning of the campaign: Shaw (2006, 42) notes that when Karl Rove and his team were first determining the potential battleground states for the 2000 race, they based their calculations on the election results of Clinton versus Dole. Since I want to gauge the decision-making process of campaign strategists, using the same operationalization as they do is crucial.

Tab. 4.2: Count model - state level effects

	<i>Dependent variable: Visits per state</i>		
	2004	2008	2012
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Vote Difference	−0.20*** (0.01)	−0.11*** (0.01)	−0.03*** (0.01)
Electoral Votes	0.06*** (0.004)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)
Vote Difference x Electoral Votes	−0.001*** (0.0005)	−0.004*** (0.001)	−0.003*** (0.0003)
Constant	3.88*** (0.07)	3.09*** (0.11)	2.62*** (0.10)
Observations	51	51	51
Log Likelihood	−355.56	−483.46	−964.28
Akaike Inf. Crit.	719.11	974.93	1,936.57
Pseudo R-square	0.76	0.55	0.29

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note that I base the calculation of the Republican and Democrat percentages on the two-party vote and ignore the results of independent candidates. This is because they are completely inconsequential in the strategic calculations of the campaign teams: It does not matter whether you actually get more than 50% of the total vote - as long as you win a simple majority, you win the state. This method is common practice in the literature, and among others, also used by Campbell (1992).

The second crucial independent variable is the number of electoral college votes a state is worth. Here, the operationalization is relatively straightforward and simple. The only thing of note is that because of the re-apportionment of votes on the basis of the 2010 census, the variable contains slightly different values in the 2012 election compared to 2004 and 2008.

Now, these two variables alone do not capture the dynamic surrounding battleground states and the electoral college just yet. Remember that I do not just expect candidates to visit states with a higher number of electoral votes and closer competition more often. Instead, the idea is that they visit battleground states almost exclusively, and only then prioritize between them on the basis of their electoral college weight. To account for this fact, I introduce an interaction term between these two variables.

For the 2012 election (see table 4.2), all coefficients are exactly as predicted. Both *Vote Difference* and *Electoral Votes* have the expected mathematical sign and are significant at the 99% level. Since they are constitutive effects for the interaction term, no further interpretations can be made from them (Brambor, Clark and Golder, 2006, 72).

The coefficient of the interaction effect itself is negative and significant at the 99% level. Since the *Vote Difference* variable is negative and *Electoral Votes* is positive (as they are expected to be), the interaction term is supposed to be negative as well. This means that states which had a very close election in 2008 and possess greater weight in the electoral college will receive the most amount of visits. By contrast, states which were firmly held by one party and do not have as many electoral votes also will not see a lot of candidate appearances. For example, if a state has only six electoral college votes and the difference between the two candidates is 29 percentage points (these are the values of Utah), it is only expected to be visited five to eight times. On the other hand, a state such as Florida with its 29 electoral votes and a vote difference of less than three percentage points is predicted by the model to feature between 124 and 161 campaign events. Given that Florida actually received a total of 143 campaign visits, this is a pretty decent guess!

Naturally, there are also states in which the conditions are not quite as black and white. If both *Vote Difference* and *Electoral Votes* are held at their median, the model expects 12 to 14 visits. On the other hand, if both these variables are taken to their extremes and held at the 99th percentile (given that the two variables are coded in different ways these are opposite values), the model predicts less than one visit! This is very interesting when compared to the result of setting them at their first percentile, as this time, 15 to 21 candidate appearances are predicted. This means that an extreme value of the *Vote Difference* variable has a far bigger impact: When this indicator is extremely low, meaning optimal conditions for frequent candidate visits, a decent amount of campaign events is expected even if the state has a low electoral number of votes. If, on the other hand, a state is extremely valuable but completely out of contention, no visits take place. This is completely in line with




Fig. 4.1: Predicted campaign visits, based on electoral votes and competitiveness.

the theory, which predicts that resources are distributed to states according to their value in the electoral college, *but only if* they are a battleground state. The same effect can be observed in figure 4.1.⁸: Non-competitive states (the vote difference variable is set to 15) do not receive a high number of visits, even if they have a large number of electoral votes. By contrast, a state in which the vote difference in the previous election was very low (in this graph it is set to 2) always receives a number of visits, which actually increase *exponentially* with the number of electoral votes. This means that the game-theoretical models, which work under the false assumption that all states are competitive, actually produce valid results for the battleground states.

As a result, my model allows for a fairly good prediction of the strategy employed by the candidates. One could however criticise my operationalization of the "battleground state" concept. I have chose a variable, capped between zero and 100, which denotes the difference between the two parties in percentage points. Consequently, it measures "how much of a battleground state" a state is. In order to head off

⁸ Note: The figure is based on the 2004 model, which produces better predictions than the one for 2012 (see below for more information).

any possible doubts, I have retested the model with different specifications of this concept.⁹ The results of these alternative models by and large corroborate my initial findings.

In addition, it is also important to know how well the model fits the data in the first place. Winkelmann (2008, 119) notes that pseudo R-square measures can serve as an appropriate goodness-of-fit measure in count models. Interestingly, the McFadden pseudo R-square values actually differ quite a bit depending on the election year. In 2012, the value is only 0.29, which is certainly not great, but given that most other models in the social sciences fare even worse, still acceptable. By contrast, the goodness-of-fit values for 2008 (0.55) and 2012 (0.76) indicate that the model captures the data-generating process quite well. What is the reason for this discrepancy? One possible explanation is the fact that the Democrats did exceedingly well in 2008. As a result, my model marks some traditionally Republican-leaning states (for example North Carolina and Indiana, which Obama won in 2008) as competitive.¹⁰ Additionally, some patterns in the campaign visits of 2012 simply cannot be explained by the model. For some reason, both candidates devoted an unreasonably large amount of resources to Iowa, even though the 'Hawkeye State' was unlikely to be flipped by the Republicans (in 2008, Obama's margin of victory was almost ten percent, in 2012 it was still close to six percent) and only worth six electoral votes in the first place. It is possible that the parties simply miscalculated, or that the Republicans feigned interest in the state, buying ads and organizing candidate appearances even though they knew that they would not actually be able to win. According to Shaw (2006, 68), such diversion tactics are common and aimed at

⁹ Shaw (2006, 43) notes that when preparing for the 2000 presidential election, Karl Rove and his team were not interested in a complicated indicator for competitiveness, but simply wanted to know whether a state was in play or not. I operationalize this concept by creating a dummy variable which is coded as '1' when the difference in votes in the previous election was smaller 10 percentage points (an admittedly somewhat arbitrary value; see Appendix, table 7.2, model 1-3). Furthermore, I utilise a variation of the original model, in which the average difference in percentage points from the last three elections is used (see Appendix, table 7.2, model 5-6). Additionally, I employ a variation of the model in which the current instead of the last election result is used for the *Vote Difference*. The argument for this specification is that over the course of the campaign, the candidates' electioneering teams update their resource allocation strategy based on recent opinion polls. Consequently, the results of the eventual election might be a more accurate representation of the information available to campaign strategists (see Appendix, table 7.3, model 1-3). In addition to the strategic considerations directly aimed at winning the elections, some scholars also posit that campaigns try to aid their party in the concurrent elections for congress (Shaw, 2006; Bartels, 1986). Consequently I add a dummy variable which measures whether there is a Senate election going on in a state (see Appendix, table 7.3, model 4-6). Last but not least, I also test another model based on Shaw's own operationalization, in which a categorical variable with five levels (Base Republican, Lean Republican, Battleground State, Lean Democrat, Base Democrat) is used (the latter functions as the reference category; see Appendix, table 7.4).

¹⁰ As a result, the alternative models 1.3 and 1.4 which do not rely on the previous election as a measure for competitiveness fare better in this regard.

making the opponent commit to wasting resources in a state they are going to win anyway. An additional reason might be the fact that Iowa is traditionally an important state in the primaries, so the campaign teams will likely already have a fairly well-developed infrastructure. As a result, organizing events in this state might simply take less effort. Additionally, the candidates also visit a handful of states, such as California and New York, which are not even close to being competitive. I offer an explanation for this behavior in chapter 4.4.

An important problem which can potentially introduce bias in count models is the presence of excess zeros. This issue occurs when the dependent variable is coded as zero for reasons other than those accounted for by the theoretical model. Winkelmann (2008, 173) refers to fertility studies, in which "the outcome "no births" can be due either to infertility or to choice", as an illustration of this phenomenon. Applied to the topic of campaign visits, an excess of zeros could for example occur if candidates refrain from visiting a state not because it is not competitive, but because it has recently been struck by a natural disaster such as a flood, which has resulted in the roads and airports being closed. However, this example is somewhat outlandish, not only because it is unlikely, but also because natural disasters actually attract politicians on the campaign trail like moths to the flame. Barring something ridiculous such as nuclear irradiation, it is fairly unlikely the presidential candidates will ever be deterred from campaigning. It is true that my dependent variable contains a lot of zeros. However, as Winkelmann (2008, 174) notes, a high fraction of zeros does not necessarily equate to a problem *as long as they are accounted for by the theory*.

Consequently, my empirical analysis fully supports the theory as well as *hypothesis 1*. Campaign visits at the state level do scale with a state's number of electoral votes, but only if it was deemed sufficiently close by campaign strategists on the basis of previous election results.

4.3 The County Level

The results for candidate visits at the state level are fairly conclusive. However, the question of where they go within state borders is just as relevant. If competitiveness at the state level and electoral college votes are the only decisive factors, campaign events should be distributed relatively evenly between counties. As figure 4.2 shows, this is not the case.¹¹ Hypothesis 2 posits that candidates will be more likely to make appearances in places with a demography supportive of their party.

¹¹ A higher number of visits equates to a darker coloring. See Appendix, figure 7.1 for the Republican equivalent.

Consequently, the county model does have to differentiate between the parties. Republican nominees should be spending more time in rural areas with a religious and predominantly white population, whereas Democrats are expected to concentrate their efforts on cities with higher levels of education as well as larger shares of black and Latino (I use the terms Latino and Hispanic interchangeably) voters.




Fig. 4.2: Democrat campaign visits in 2012 by county.

To test the veracity of this claim I utilize a similar dataset as in the previous chapter. However, in this chapter, the data is aggregated to the county rather than the state level. Since the reasons for which candidates choose the locations for their appearances are different within states, I also need a new model. The operationalization of the concept of demographic support for either party is relatively simple: I utilize several socio-economic variables qualifying the population of the counties in which campaign events occur. All data, unless specified otherwise, is based on either the 2010 census or another source, but the same year. Using data from one point in time to explain a dependent variable from another might not be optimal, but given the alternatives, is the best choice. Much of the data is not available for every single year, consequently it is better to have a consistent reference point rather than have some data which was collected at the same time as

the respective election, and some which was not. Given that most socio-economic characteristics of a specific locale do not change very quickly over time, this should not be a problem.

The most basic identifier of any location is sheer size. Therefore I utilize a variable for both the population size (divided by 10 000) as well as population density of a county (people per square kilometer). These variables gauge whether a region consists of urban or rural areas. Furthermore, the model utilizes social qualifiers for median age, the percentage of women among the population as well as the rate of evangelicals. While the reasoning behind using the first two covariates should be fairly self-explanatory, the rationale for the latter might be slightly more opaque. In a nutshell: religion is a very good predictor of party affiliation in the United States, and Republicans tend to be, for the most part, evangelicals. Be it Methodists (Bush Jr.), Episcopalians (Bush Sr., Ford), Quakers (Nixon), Presbyterians (Reagan, Eisenhower) or many of the other Evangelical churches in the U.S. - the GOP is quite homogenous as far as the religious background of its members and voters is concerned (PewResearch, 2009). Even in the 2012 elections, with Mitt Romney as the first Mormon candidate ever to run for President, the Republican party secured 79 percent of the white evangelical vote (Bickel, 2012).

By the same token, the GOP is also generally considered to be the party of white people. Democrats on the other hand have a much higher appeal among Hispanics and African Americans. In 2008, 95 percent of blacks and 67 percent of Latinos voted for Barack Obama (Lopez, 2008). Consequently I use three variables to represent these races. The sum of all other races serves as the reference category. Furthermore, given the Republican party's stance on immigration, the model also includes a measure for the share of foreign-born citizens among the population.

Given that economics is one of the most divisive issues in American politics, it is necessary to employ several variables to represent this cleavage. Median household income as well as the poverty rate provide a measure of the financial status of the population. However the most crucial measure in the context of elections is the unemployment rate. John Boehner, the Republican speaker of the House of Representatives, put it pretty succinctly when describing the 2012 run-off: "Let's call bullsh** bullsh**. This election is about jobs, jobs, jobs" (Sherman, 2012). Given the fact that this indicator actually can vary quite starkly over time, I do utilize the values for 2004, 2008 and 2012. Additionally, I also include the percentage of citizens who have at least a Bachelor's degree to gauge their level of education.

Using all of these qualifiers should paint a fairly accurate picture of the demographic features that determine political attitudes within the population. However,

since I cannot guarantee that these variables account for all of the variance in the dependent variable, I also utilize a measure for vote share. Since the U.S. has a two-party system, the percentage one party has attained in an election automatically also accounts for that of the other. Furthermore, I also use the same competitiveness variable as in the previous chapter (but obviously at the county level).¹² This means that I am testing for whether candidates prefer to visit their core constituencies or make more appearances in locations with a more politically divided population.

Last but not least, I also need to ensure that the previously observed effects between states are accounted for and do not obscure the results at the county level. After all, since the dependent variable used in the state-level regression is really just an aggregated version of the respective county data, the effect of competitiveness (at the state-level) and the electoral college (as well as any relevant facts I may have omitted) is still implicitly present. For this reason I employ a multi-level, or mixed, poisson regression, which is part of the General Linear Mixed Models (GLMM) family. This means that my model includes a fixed effect for all the covariates, plus both a fixed and a random intercept for every state.¹³ This accounts for the fact that, as shown in the previous chapter, the number of visits is correlated between states.¹⁴

The regression results (table 4.3) are by and large as predicted, although they do contain some surprises. For the most part, there are no striking differences between Democrats and Republicans. Candidates of both parties prefer to hold their events in large cities, as indicated by the positive and significant coefficients for population size and density. This fact is prevalent throughout all the elections analysed here. I had however expected Republican candidates to make more appearances in rural areas, where the party's base is located. In fact, the positive coefficient for population density is indeed larger for the Democrats in all three election cycles, and not even significant for Republicans in 2004.

However, as far as many other of the social indicators are concerned, the data does not fit my predictions. I had expected the Democrats to hold events in counties with a younger population and a higher percentage of women, poor people and minorities. The regression results show that the differences between the GOP and

¹² Unfortunately there is no county-level data available for the 2000 election. Consequently the *Vote Difference* and *Democratic Vote Share* variables are derived from the results of the *current* instead of the previous election. As the alternative model 1.4 for the state level has shown, this model specification works perfectly fine.

¹³ As stated above, Alaska is not included due to a lack of data.

¹⁴ The model is estimated via MLE through the Gauss-Hermite weighting function, but without the Laplace approximation that is often utilized in this context (due to the large dataset and the number of covariates, this more accurate way of estimation is not possible). Estimation using Penalized Quasi-Likelihood is also possible and produces similar results.

Tab. 4.3: GLMM Poisson - County Model

	<i>Dependent variable: Visits per county, by party</i>					
	Dem. 04	Rep. 08	Dem. 08	Rep. 08	Dem. 12	Rep. 12
Vote Dem.	0.05*** (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)
Vote Diff.	-0.03*** (0.004)	-0.02*** (0.004)	-0.02*** (0.005)	-0.01*** (0.005)	-0.02*** (0.004)	-0.02*** (0.004)
Population	0.005*** (0.001)	0.01*** (0.001)	0.01*** (0.001)	0.01*** (0.001)	0.01*** (0.002)	0.01*** (0.001)
Median Age	-0.11*** (0.02)	-0.12*** (0.02)	-0.10*** (0.02)	-0.09*** (0.02)	-0.08*** (0.02)	-0.08*** (0.02)
Female	0.38*** (0.05)	0.38*** (0.06)	0.31*** (0.06)	0.23*** (0.06)	0.26*** (0.05)	0.30*** (0.06)
White	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)
Black	0.03*** (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.0001 (0.01)
Latino	0.0002 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.005 (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)
Foreign Born	0.001 (0.01)	-0.004 (0.02)	-0.005 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.06*** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Med.H.Inc.	-0.47*** (0.11)	-0.40*** (0.12)	-0.29*** (0.11)	-0.29** (0.11)	-0.01 (0.09)	-0.25** (0.10)
Bachelor	0.05*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)
Poverty	-0.15*** (0.02)	-0.12*** (0.03)	-0.11*** (0.02)	-0.09*** (0.03)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.09*** (0.02)
Pop. Density	0.0000* (0.0000)	0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0001*** (0.0000)	0.0001*** (0.0000)	0.0000*** (0.0000)	0.0001*** (0.0000)
Unemployment	0.06 (0.05)	0.13** (0.06)	0.06 (0.05)	0.06 (0.06)	0.12** (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)
Evangelicals	0.001 (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.002 (0.01)
Constant	-16.26*** (3.05)	-12.70*** (3.52)	-15.31*** (3.39)	-8.94** (3.68)	-17.67*** (3.27)	-11.24*** (3.40)
Random Effect	9.73	7.70	9.50	9.66	13.52	9.95
Observations	3,091	3,091	3,091	3,091	3,091	3,091
Groups (State)	50	50	50	50	50	50
Log Likelihood	-908.33	-785.28	-689.78	-637.92	-686.89	-683.43
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,850.66	1,604.55	1,413.55	1,309.84	1,407.79	1,400.86

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Democrats are actually marginal in this regard. The coefficient for age is negative and significant for both parties - evidently the Republican's reputation of catering to old people does not extend to campaign visits. Similarly, the supposed "War on Women" by the GOP is not evident in its campaign event strategy, nor is its ostensible preference for white and wealthier voters.

Perhaps the most surprising result is the lack of significance in the Unemployment variable for most of the regressions. I had expected that candidates on the campaign trail try to exploit high levels of unemployment and specifically target affected areas for visits. However, this effect is simply not evident. Only the Republicans in 2004 and the Democrats in 2012 carried out more campaign events in counties with higher levels of unemployment. This finding is difficult to explain, because I had expected, if anything, the reverse to be true. High levels of unemployment are usually used by the opposition to campaign against the economic record of the incumbent. However, Bush in 2004 and Obama in 2012 were the sitting presidents at the time.

The core element of hypothesis - the expectation for parties to campaign among their own clientele - however still holds true - albeit with a twist. The Democratic vote share variable is positive and significant for Democratic campaign visits throughout all three election cycles. Similarly, the variable is negative and significant for Republicans. This means that Democratic candidates strongly prefer to visit counties in which a majority voted for their party in the previous election. For Republicans, the same is true, although not quite to the same degree, as the coefficients here are lower (and not even significant in 2008). However, one interesting fact which is shared by both parties is that the *Vote Difference* variable is also significant - and negative. This means that the parties do like to campaign among a population that favors them - but not too much. A possible explanation for this issue is the role of campaign visits as reinforcement effects. Perhaps the candidates and their campaign teams assume that a population that favors them overwhelmingly will automatically have a high turnout rate, as they make up the base of the party. By contrast, people in counties in which they are favored by a small margin might be *leaning* towards the party, but are not completely sure yet whether they will bother to vote. Consequently, a candidate visit could give voters just the motivation they need.

Unfortunately, illustrating this effect with the help of quantities of interest is not as straightforward. A county in which all values are held at their median is predicted to have exactly zero visits. This is not a surprise given that only a very small share of counties receive any visits at all. To improve the odds, I increase the population size and density to values of a county with a large city (two million

people, 1500 people per square kilometer). Additionally, the *Democratic Vote* share is set to 60 percent, and the vote difference to 20 percent. Now, the model predicts between zero and eight visits for Democrats, and zero to three for Republicans. If the Democratic vote share is lowered to 40 percent, the predicted number of visits by both parties lies between zero and four visits (Republicans candidates carry out less visits overall, hence the comparatively lower value). The problem here is that while there is a difference at the upper end of the confidence interval, the lower bound is always zero, even under the most perfect conditions. Consequently, the null hypothesis can not be rejected. The reason for this issue is simply the fact that, as mentioned above, the model is zero-inflated. Winkelmann (2008, 174) notes that the problem of excess zeros can be combated by using a negative binomial distribution instead of a poisson distribution. However, implementing this model for a GLMM equates to a significant step-up in complexity and therefore lies beyond the scope of this paper.

For now, my regression results provide tentative support for the hypothesis that presidential candidates prefer to campaign among voters whose latent dispositions are already in their favor. Consequently, my findings also serve as additional evidence in favor of the theory developed by Lazarsfeld and colleagues. Furthermore, candidates also seem to make more appearances in larger cities. Given that a higher number of people equates to more voters who can be influenced by a single event, this is not particularly surprising. However, it is also crucial to note that my results are far from definitive. Due to the problem of zero-inflation in the county-level data, a dedicated statistical model is required to confirm my findings.

4.4 *The Temporal Dimension*

For campaign strategists, the question of where candidates hold their events is only one side of the coin. Equally important is when they do it. Figure 4.3 provides a general overview of the timeline of the presidential elections of 2004, 2008 and 2012. The end of the primaries marks the point at which the presidential campaign begins. In 2004, this occurred when John Edwards, Kerry's only serious contender, dropped out of the race after suffering defeat in several states on "Super Tuesday", March 2nd (Goddard, 2004). Four years later, the Democratic primaries dragged on much longer. While John McCain had sewn up the Republican nomination relatively early on, it took Barack Obama until early June to beat Hillary Clinton for good (Snow, Harper and O'Keefe, 2008). The 2012 primaries were marked by the fact that Mitt Romney basically was the designated nominee from the beginning, but the

Republican base was extremely reluctant to accept that fact. When Rick Santorum, the last contender besides the former Massachusetts governor with a realistic shot at the nomination, dropped out on April 10th 2012 (Blake and Henderson, 2004), the actual presidential campaign began in earnest.




Fig. 4.3: Daily number of campaign visits until the election, with LOESS smoothing.

The late spring and early summer months usually do not see a particularly high level of candidate activity. Of course this does not mean that the presidential hopefuls are idle during this time. Instead, the first ten or so weeks are usually spent on organizing and attending as many fundraisers as possible, in an effort to fill the campaign's warchest for the big spending war in the fall. At the same time, the candidates are starting to get their feet wet, appearing in the first few rallies and going on a bus tour or two.

This level of activity carries on until August, when presidential candidates usually choose and announce their running mates. Evidently, this moment marks a turning point in regard to campaign visits, as there is now twice the manpower to carry them out. As a consequence, there is usually a sharp rise in candidate appearances in late August to early September. However, this increase in activity also takes place in campaigns in which the candidate for Vice President was already

chosen beforehand, as with the incumbent presidents Bush in 2004 and Obama in 2012, as well as challenger John Kerry in 2004, who already announced his choice for John Edwards in early July.

The final phase of the campaign sees another rise in candidate visits: Even though the last two months usually make up only about a third of the duration of the entire campaign, more than half of all events take place during this time. The so-called 'get-out-the-vote' period is generally regarded as the time during which a candidate can really make a difference - and the sheer number of candidate appearances throughout the last few weeks before the election shows that there might be some truth to this notion.

Given the spike in campaign events during the final weeks before election day, it seems plausible that the presidential hopefuls also change their pattern regarding the states they visit. Hypothesis 3 posits that during the 'get-out-the-vote' period, the candidates focus their attention on the most valuable and competitive states. Testing whether there is any truth to this notion is fairly simple: I split up my dataset, as used for hypothesis 1, into two parts - the last 30 days of the campaign, and the preceeding months. If there is a difference between the two regression results (the models are the same as for H_1) - specifically a stronger effect on the two primary coefficients as well as the interaction term - the theory has merit.

As shown in table 4.4, this is exactly what happens. For every election cycle, the model for the last nine to ten weeks of the campaign produces more robust and stronger coefficients. Similarly, the goodness-of-fit is also slightly better. This effect can also be seen completely clearly by calculating quantities of interest. For a valuable and extremely competitive state with 20 electoral votes and a vote difference of 0.1 percentage points, the 2012 model predicts 42 to 53 candidate visits. These figures equate to between 7 and 9 percent of the total 606 visits carried out during this time. For the last month of the campaign, this number is slightly lower at between 37 and 47 visits. However, this period is also far shorter and thus features fewer visits, so these numbers actually equate to between 9 and 13 percent of the 368 events. These figures are higher than for the earlier phase of the campaign, thus proving that competitiveness and the number of electoral votes do become more important later as Election Day draws near.¹⁵¹⁶

¹⁵ The numbers presented here are rounded. The actual percentages, as calculated through simulation, are 6.787545 to 8.878599 and 9.280088 to 12.66041. These figures *are* significantly different from each other.

¹⁶ If the second phase of the campaign is restricted to the roughly ten weeks following Labor day (which is often touted as the start of the critical phase of the campaign season) instead, a significant difference is no longer detectable. See table 7.5 in the Appendix for the corresponding regression results. Evidently, the closer the election, the stronger the effect.

Tab. 4.4: Count model - Last month campaign events compared to the preceeding months

	<i>Dependent variable: Campaign Visits per State</i>					
	2004 Late	2004 Early	2008 Late	2008 Early	2012 Late	2012 Early
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Vote Difference	−0.23*** (0.02)	−0.18*** (0.01)	−0.06*** (0.02)	−0.16*** (0.02)	−0.04*** (0.01)	−0.02*** (0.01)
Electoral Votes	0.06*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.13*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)
Vote Difference x Electoral Votes	−0.002*** (0.001)	−0.001** (0.001)	−0.01*** (0.001)	−0.0003 (0.001)	−0.003*** (0.001)	−0.003*** (0.0004)
Constant	3.33*** (0.10)	3.46*** (0.09)	1.70*** (0.17)	2.91*** (0.14)	1.83*** (0.17)	2.06*** (0.12)
Observations	51	51	51	51	51	51
Log Likelihood	−241.12	−270.61	−278.52	−277.53	−413.07	−606.27
Akaike Inf. Crit.	490.25	549.22	565.04	563.06	834.15	1,220.55
Pseudo R-square	0.74	0.71	0.51	0.52	0.32	0.26

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01




Fig. 4.4: Campaign visits per state as percentage of total visits in four-week intervals.

The veracity of this claim can also be demonstrated without inferential statistics: Figure 4.4 shows the percentage of candidate visits throughout the different states over a two week period for the 2012 campaign. Notably, Ohio and Florida, while important for the duration of the entire campaign, make up a far larger share in candidate visits during the last few weeks than they did in the time before. Conversely, states such as California and New York, as well as Texas mainly feature campaign events during the first weeks of the campaign. None of these states are usually considered as "in play" for the presidential elections, and yet they do receive a number of non-fundraiser related visits. Are the candidates simply not sure yet at this stage whether these states are going to be competitive come Election Day? Given the large margins of victory the Democrats have recently enjoyed in California and New York, as well as the Republicans' large margin of victory in Texas, this seems rather unlikely. Instead, a look at the description of these visits provides a much better explanation. Many of these events feature the presidential candidates at some function with hollywood starlets, talkshow hosts, retired politicians and other public figures. None of these appearances are likely to provide any noteworthy electoral benefits in the state they are taking place. They might however broaden a candidate's coalition of supporters to a circle of influential people whose message can be heard nationally. Additionally, just because an event is not explicitly classified as a fundraiser does not mean that this is not its primary purpose. Urban and Niebler (2014, 334) show that advertisements raise the amount of contributions received from non-battleground states. There is no reason to assume that this effect does not also apply to campaign events. California, Texas and New York are by far the biggest sources of *individual* contributions to candidates - so it is no surprise that they receive a disproportional number of candidate visits (FEC, 2012).

As the election draws near, events in these 'ornamental' states make up a far smaller share of candidate visits, as the campaigns become 'more rational' and start focusing on Ohio, Florida, Iowa, Colorado, etc. - the states that matter most. This effect is evident in both the poisson regression as well as the timeline graph - thus providing critical evidence in favor of hypothesis 3.

5. CONCLUSION

My analysis of the strategic considerations which go into the selection of locales for candidate visits during presidential election campaigns has yielded three major

findings. First, campaign managers prioritize competitive battleground states with a large number of votes in the electoral college above anything else. The candidates' time is simply too valuable and too limited to be squandered on ornamental states which are decided long before the campaign has even begun. This means that a large portion of Americans will never get to experience a presidential election campaign in full swing. Second, candidate appearances are heavily concentrated in large cities with a young, well-educated and generally heterogenous population. At the same time both parties also prefer to campaign in regions with a favorable electorate that has previously voted for them. My results also have important implications for the ample literature on electoral reform. Many of these articles argue that a proportional system would lead to a more equal distribution of campaign resources throughout the country. However, as my analysis of the county level (at which the presidential elections are proportional) shows, candidates still concentrate their efforts in a select few areas, whereas other regions, even in extremely competitive battleground states, receive no visits at all. Third, the exact number of partisan events in a state at any given point in time strongly depends on how much time is left until Election Day. During the first few months of the campaign, candidates still cast a fairly wide net, rallying voters in a number of states which likely won't be a factor in the election. As soon as the candidate's choice for his running mate is made public, the campaign's efforts start to ramp up to a much higher level. During the last month, the battle between the nominees reaches a new level of intensity, as around one third of all visits take place and are dispersed over a small number of states which offer a possible route to 270 electoral votes.

The dataset which I have assembled has been crucial in achieving these results, as it offers multiple advantages over previous figures. Compared to Shaw (2006, 85), who records only 462 candidate appearances in 2004, my case number of 1192 for this election alone offers a far more complete and comprehensive picture of the tactics employed in this specific presidential runoff. Combining this data with similar statistical evidence for 2008 and 2012 guarantees a very balanced examination, as the three elections in question included both a Republican and a Democratic incumbent, as well as one contest in which both candidates were challengers. Utilizing data from more than one presidential campaign carries the advantage of allowing a comparison of the results, thus achieving greater reliability. If I had only focused on the 2012 contest, it is very likely I would have missed the fact that the positive correlation between candidate visits and an active Senate race was only a result of the staggered election cycle, and not an actual campaign effect. By contrast, evidence from three different elections guarantees that my findings are robust and can be applied to a

wider range of cases. Furthermore, the level of detail present in my dataset provides it with another edge: Previous statistical evidence on campaign visits has, for the most part, been limited to the aggregate number of visits per state over the course of the entire campaign. My data, on the other hand, contains information on the specific date and place of an event. Any study which fails to account for these factors, particularly the temporal dimension of campaign visits, runs the risk of producing severely biased results.

The dataset's advantages have not even been fully exploited in this analysis, as I have mostly concerned myself with the fundamentals of campaign events, owing to a general lack of research in this area of election studies. The amount of temporal and spatial information present in the data would lend itself well to further research, as many dynamics in presidential campaigns are still not very well-understood. There is a general idea in the literature that the candidates react to each other and adjust their strategy accordingly. This hypothesis could be tested using data gathered throughout my research. Similarly, I have also discarded some information which does not pertain directly to my research interest, but might be useful in another context. Data on when and where the nominees participate in fundraisers is available in my dataset and could be combined with present research on campaign finance. By the same token, reports on the candidates' travel routes could be mined in order to examine the role logistics play in organizing a campaign. Either way, research on electioneering in general and candidate appearances in particular is still in its infancy, and stands to benefit tremendously from new and exciting data. My research unearths the cardinal principles of the strategic component inherent to candidate appearances and thus provides a taste of things to come.

6. Bibliography

- Appleman, Eric M. 2013. "Democracy in Action." Last visited 2014-05-19.
URL: <http://www.p2012.org/>
- Bartels, Larry M. 1986. "Resource Allocation In a Presidential Campaign."
- Baum, Mathew A. 2005. "Talking the Vote: Why Presidential Candidates Hit the Talk Show Circuit." *American Journal of Political Science* 49(2):213–234.
- Berelson, Bernard, Paul Lazarsfeld and Helen Gaudet. 1968. *The People's Choice*. 3 ed. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Bickel, Joshua. 2012. "How the Faithful Voted: 2012 Preliminary Analysis." Last visited 2014-05-27.
URL: <http://www.pewforum.org/2012/11/07/how-the-faithful-voted-2012-preliminary-exit-poll-analysis/>
- Blake, Aaron and Nia-Malika Henderson. 2004. "Rick Santorum drops out of the presidential race." Last visited 2014-05-29.
URL: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/post/rick-santorum-drops-out-of-the-presidential-race/2012/04/10/gIQACvaV8S_blog.html
- Brambor, Thomas, William Roberts Clark and Matt Golder. 2006. "Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses." *Political Analysis* 14(1):63–82.
- Brams, Steven J and Morton D Davis. 1974. "The 3/2's Rule in Presidential Campaigning." *The American Political Science Review* 68(1):113–134.
- Campbell, James E. 1992. "Forecasting the Presidential Vote in the States." *American Journal of Political Science* 36(2):386–407.
- CBS News - Crimesider Staff. 2012. "Holly Solomon, pregnant Arizona wife, runs over husband for not voting in presidential election, police say." Last visited 2014-05-10.
URL: <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/holly-solomon-pregnant-arizona-wife-runs-over-husband-for-not-voting-in-presidential-election-police-say/>

- Dilliplane, Susanna, Seth K. Goldman and Diana C. Mutz. 2013. "Televised Exposure to Politics: New Measures for a Fragmented Media Environment." *American Journal of Political Science* 57(1):236–248.
- Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper.
- Fair, Ray C. 1978. "The Effect of Economic Events on Votes for President." *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 60(2):159–173.
- FEC. 2012. "2012 Presidential Campaign Finance." Last visited 2014-05-29.
URL: <http://fec.gov/disclosure/pnational.do>
- Ferejohn, John. 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control." *Public choice* 50:5–25.
- Finkel, Steven E. 1993. "Reexamining the "Minimal Effects" Model in Recent Presidential Campaigns." *The Journal of Politics* 55(1):1–21.
- Flowers, Julianne F, Audrey A Haynes and Michael H Crespín. 2003. "The Media, the Campaign, and the Message." *American Journal of Political Science* 47(2):259–273.
- Frankenberry, Dennis and Roger Ailes. 1988. "Revolving Door." Last visited 2014-06-01.
URL: www.livingroomcandidate.org/commercials/1988/revolving-door
- Franz, M. M. and T. N. Ridout. 2010. "Political Advertising and Persuasion in the 2004 and 2008 Presidential Elections." *American Politics Research* 38(2):303–329.
- Freedman, Paul, Michael Franz and Kenneth Goldstein. 2004. "Campaign Advertising and Democratic Citizenship." *American Journal of Political Science* 48(4):723–741.
- Gelman, Andrew and Gary King. 1993. "Why Are American Presidential Election Campaign Polls so Variable When Votes Are so Predictable?" *British Journal of Political Science* 23(4):409–451.
- Goddard, Taegan. 2004. "Edwards Will Drop Out." Last visited 2014-05-29.
URL: http://politicalwire.com/archives/2004/03/02/edwards_will_drop_out.html
- Hobgood, Kathryn. 2008. "James Carville Joins Faculty." Last visited 2014-05-29.
URL: http://tulane.edu/news/newwave/111808_carville.cfm

-
- Holbrook, Thomas M. 1991. "Presidential Elections in Space and Time." *American Journal of Political Science* 35(1):91–109.
- Huber, Gregory A and Kevin Arceneaux. 2007. "Identifying the Persuasive Effects of Presidential Advertising." *American Journal of Political Science* 51(4):957–977.
- Iyengar, Shanto and Donald R. Kinder. 2010. *News that matters: Television and American opinion*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Keefer, Philip. 2007. "Elections, Special Interests, and Financial Crisis." *International Organization* 61(3):607–641.
- Kelley, Stanley. 1966. The Presidential Campaign. In *The National Election of 1964*, ed. Milton C. Cummings. Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution chapter 2, pp. 42–81.
- Kiewiet, D. Roderick. 1983. *Macroeconomics & Micropolitics*. Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press.
- Lake, M. 1979. A New Campaign Resource Allocation Model. In *Applied Game Theory*, ed. Steven J Brams, A. Schotter and G. Schwödiauer. Würzburg, Wien: Physica-Verlag pp. 118–132.
- Lenz, Gabriel S and Chappell Lawson. 2011. "Looking the Part: Television Leads Less Informed Citizens to Vote Based on Candidates' Appearance." *American Journal of Political Science* 55(3):574–589.
- Linzer, Drew A. 2013. "Dynamic Bayesian Forecasting of Presidential Elections in the States." *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 108(501):124–134.
- Lopez, Mark Hugo. 2008. The Hispanic Vote in the 2008 Election. Technical report Pew Hispanic Center Washington D.C.: .
- Mak, Tim. 2011. "Joe the Plumber running for Congress in Ohios 9th Congressional district." . Last visited 2014-05-18.
URL: <http://www.politico.com//news/stories/1011/66890.html>
- Markus, Gregory B. 1988. "The Impact of Personal and National Economic Conditions on the Presidential Vote: A Pooled Cross-Sectional Analysis." *American Journal of Political Science* 32(1):137–154.
- McCarthy, Larry. 1988. "Willie Horton." . Last visited 2014-06-01.
URL: <http://www.livingroomcandidate.org/commercials/1988/willie-horton>

- Mitchell, Dona-Gene. 2012. "It's About Time: The Lifespan of Information Effects in a Multiweek Campaign." *American Journal of Political Science* 56(2):298–311.
- PewResearch. 2009. "The Religious Affiliations of U.S. Presidents." Last visited 2014-05-31.
URL: <http://www.pewforum.org/2009/01/15/the-religious-affiliations-of-us-presidents/>
- Rosenstone, Steven J. 1983. *Forecasting Presidential Elections*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Schwartz, Tony, Aaron Erlich, Stan Lee and Sid Myers. 1964. "Peace Little Girl (Daisy)." Last visited 2014-06-01.
URL: <http://www.livingroomcandidate.org/commercials/1964/peace-little-girl-daisy>
- Shaw, Daron R. 2006. *Race To 270 : The Electoral College and the Campaign Strategies of 2000 and 2004*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Sherman, Jake. 2012. "Boehner: 'This election is about jobs'." Last visited 2014-05-31.
URL: <http://www.politico.com/blogs/on-congress/2012/05/boehner-this-election-is-about-jobs-124919.html>
- Snow, Kate, Eloise Harper and Ed O'Keefe. 2008. "Clinton's Historic Bid Falls Short." Last visited 2014-05-29.
URL: <http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/Vote2008/story?id=4705151&page=1&singlePage=true>
- United States Senate. 1961. "Amendment XXIII (1961)."
URL: [http://www.senate.gov/civics/constitution_item/constitution.htm#amdt_23_\(1961\)](http://www.senate.gov/civics/constitution_item/constitution.htm#amdt_23_(1961))
- Urban, Carly and Sarah Niebler. 2014. "Dollars on the Sidewalk: Should U.S. Presidential Candidates Advertise in Uncontested States?" *American Journal of Political Science* 58(2):322–336.
- U.S. Census Bureau. 2010. "2010 Apportionment Results." Last visited 2014-06-01.
URL: http://www.census.gov/population/apportionment/data/2010_apportionment_results.html
- Whiteley, Greg. 2014. "Mitt."
URL: <http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1757800/>
- Winkelmann, Rainer. 2008. *Econometric Analysis of Count Data*. 5 ed. Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag.

7. APPENDIX




Fig. 7.1: Republican campaign visits in 2012 by county.




Fig. 7.2: Distribution of county-level campaign visits.

Tab. 7.1: Count model - state level effects, by party

	<i>Dependent variable: Visits per state</i>					
	Dem. 2004	Rep. 2004	Dem. 2008	Rep. 2008	Dem. 2012	Rep. 2012
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Vote Difference	−0.20*** (0.01)	−0.20*** (0.02)	−0.08*** (0.02)	−0.15*** (0.02)	−0.02*** (0.01)	−0.03*** (0.01)
Electoral Votes	0.06*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.10*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.10*** (0.01)
Vote Difference x Electoral Votes	−0.001** (0.001)	−0.002** (0.001)	−0.01*** (0.001)	−0.002* (0.001)	−0.003*** (0.0004)	−0.003*** (0.0005)
Constant	3.33*** (0.09)	3.01*** (0.11)	2.17*** (0.15)	2.64*** (0.15)	2.03*** (0.13)	1.83*** (0.15)
Observations	51	51	51	51	51	51
Log Likelihood	−234.94	−182.48	−291.17	−263.28	−571.21	−456.54
Akaike Inf. Crit.	477.88	372.97	590.35	534.56	1,150.42	921.08
Pseudo R-square	0.74	0.71	0.50	0.53	0.25	0.32

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Tab. 7.2: Alternative models 1.2 and 1.3

	<i>Dependent variable: Visits per state</i>					
	2004	2008	2012	2004	2008	2012
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Battleground Dummy	3.78*** (0.26)	1.88*** (0.17)	1.13*** (0.12)			
Vote Difference previous three elections				−0.15*** (0.01)	−0.21*** (0.01)	−0.08*** (0.01)
Electoral Votes	0.08*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.004)	0.04*** (0.003)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)
Battleground Dummy x Electoral Votes	0.01 (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)			
Vote Difference three elections x Electoral Votes				−0.003*** (0.001)	−0.0001 (0.001)	−0.004*** (0.0004)
Constant	−0.89*** (0.25)	0.33** (0.15)	1.61*** (0.08)	3.96*** (0.12)	3.97*** (0.13)	3.24*** (0.11)
Observations	51	51	51	51	51	51
Log Likelihood	−387.23	−439.98	−823.89	−773.19	−485.12	−800.52
Akaike Inf. Crit.	782.47	887.95	1,655.79	1,554.38	978.24	1,609.03
Pseudo R-square	0.74	0.59	0.40	0.48	0.54	0.41

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Tab. 7.3: Alternative model 1.4 and 1.5

	<i>Dependent variable: Visits per state</i>					
	2004	2008	2012	2004	2008	2012
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Vote Difference Current	−0.13*** (0.01)	−0.10*** (0.01)	−0.12*** (0.01)			
Vote Difference				−0.21*** (0.01)	−0.12*** (0.01)	−0.02*** (0.01)
Electoral Votes	0.12*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.005)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)
Vote Difference Current x Electoral Votes	−0.01*** (0.001)	−0.001** (0.0003)	−0.0004 (0.0004)			
Vote Difference x Electoral Votes				−0.001 (0.0005)	−0.004*** (0.001)	−0.003*** (0.0003)
Senate Race				−0.47*** (0.07)	0.06 (0.10)	0.59*** (0.08)
Constant	3.44*** (0.09)	3.08*** (0.12)	3.86*** (0.12)	4.33*** (0.10)	3.06*** (0.12)	2.08*** (0.13)
Observations	51	51	51	51	51	51
Log Likelihood	−278.93	−578.02	−715.82	−336.32	−483.29	−937.19
Akaike Inf. Crit.	565.85	1,164.05	1,439.64	682.64	976.59	1,884.37
Pseudo R-square	0.81	0.46	0.47	0.77	0.55	0.31

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Tab. 7.4: Alternative model 1.6; Base Democrat is the reference category

	<i>Dependent variable: Visits per state</i>		
	2004	2008	2012
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Base Republican	−0.64 (1.42)	24.85 (1,072.79)	−17.66 (1,764.33)
Lean Republican	5.96*** (1.47)	23.97 (1,072.79)	−22.56 (1,009.81)
Battleground	3.19** (1.35)	27.79 (1,072.79)	1.10*** (0.18)
Lean Democrat	0.71 (1.41)	22.05 (1,072.79)	2.63*** (0.18)
Electoral Votes	−0.17 (0.21)	0.93 (34.61)	0.04*** (0.004)
Base Republican x Electoral Votes	0.21 (0.21)	−0.88 (34.61)	−0.04 (261.56)
Lean Republican x Electoral Votes	−0.12 (0.22)	−0.58 (34.61)	0.57 (26.57)
Battleground x Electoral Votes	0.25 (0.21)	−0.85 (34.61)	0.06*** (0.01)
Lean Democrat x Electoral Votes	0.22 (0.21)	−0.82 (34.61)	−0.04*** (0.01)
Constant	−0.15 (1.35)	−25.17 (1,072.79)	1.36*** (0.14)
Observations	51	51	51
Log Likelihood	−334.27	−291.17	−418.91
Akaike Inf. Crit.	688.54	602.33	857.82
Pseudo R-square	0.77	0.73	0.69

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Tab. 7.5: Count model - Post-Labor Day campaign compared to pre-Labor Day campaign

	<i>Dependent variable: Campaign Visits per State before or after Labor Day</i>					
	2004 Late	2004 Early	2008 Late	2008 Early	2012 Late	2012 Early
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Vote Difference	−0.23*** (0.02)	−0.17*** (0.02)	−0.11*** (0.01)	−0.14*** (0.02)	−0.03*** (0.01)	−0.02** (0.01)
Electoral Votes	0.06*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)
Vote Difference x Electoral Votes	−0.002*** (0.001)	−0.001 (0.001)	−0.004*** (0.001)	−0.003** (0.001)	−0.003*** (0.0004)	−0.003*** (0.0005)
Constant	3.33*** (0.10)	3.05*** (0.10)	2.72*** (0.13)	1.92*** (0.21)	2.20*** (0.1310)	1.57*** (0.16)
Observations	51	51	51	51	51	51
Log Likelihood	−241.12	−204.58	−385.70	−154.76	−632.69	−394.85
Akaike Inf. Crit.	490.25	417.15	779.39	317.53	1,273.39	797.69
Pseudo R-square	0.74	0.69	0.52	0.50	0.30	0.25

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

VERSICHERUNG ZUR MASTERARBEIT

Ich versichere, dass ich die beiliegende Masterarbeit ohne Hilfe Dritter und ohne Benutzung anderer als der angegebenen Quellen und Hilfsmittel angefertigt und die den benutzten Quellen wörtlich oder inhaltlich entnommenen Stellen als solche kenntlich gemacht habe. Diese Arbeit hat in gleicher oder ähnlicher Form noch keiner Prüfungsbehörde vorgelegen.

Schorndorf den 02.06.2014