

# The joint evolution of movement and competition strategies

Pratik R. Gupte<sup>1,\*</sup>

Christoph F. G. Netz<sup>1,\*</sup>

Franz J. Weissing<sup>1,\*</sup>

1. Groningen Institute for Evolutionary Life Sciences, University of Groningen, Groningen 9747 AG, The Netherlands.

\* Corresponding authors; e-mail: p.r.gupte@rug.nl or f.j.weissing@rug.nl

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# 1 Abstract

2 To be added.

## 3 2 Introduction

4 Intraspecific competition is a constant feature of animal ecology, and an important driver of population dy-  
5 namics and the spatial distribution of organisms (Krebs and Davies, 1978). Competition can be broadly  
6 classified into two main types, ‘exploitation’ and ‘interference’. In exploitation competition, individuals  
7 compete indirectly by depleting a common resource, while in interference competition, individuals com-  
8 pete directly by interacting with each other (Birch, 1957, Case and Gilpin, 1974, Keddy, 2001). A special  
9 case of interference competition which is widespread among animal taxa is ‘kleptoparasitism’, in which an  
10 individual steals a resource from its owner (Iyengar, 2008). Experiments with foraging birds have shown  
11 that competition, including kleptoparasitism, can affect the spatial distribution of individuals across resource  
12 patches (Goss-Custard, 1980, Rutten et al., 2010*b*, Vahl et al., 2005*a*, 2007, 2005*b*). The avoidance of com-  
13 petitive interactions can also affect the distribution and behaviour of animals foraging in groups (Bijleveld  
14 et al., 2012, Rutten et al., 2010*a*). At larger scales, competition among different behavioural types in a  
15 species can strongly influence species distributions and animal movement decisions (e.g. Duckworth and  
16 Badyaev, 2007, Schlägel et al., 2020).

17 Competition is difficult to study in free living animals, yet knowledge of the fine-scale mechanisms and  
18 evolutionary consequences of competition is central to basic evolutionary ecology. For instance, it is sur-  
19 mised that interference is more important than exploitation under natural conditions (see Case and Gilpin,  
20 1974), but it is difficult to establish whether interference, and especially kleptoparasitism, represents a for-  
21 aging specialisation shown by part of the population, or whether it is an opportunistic strategy conditioned  
22 on local cues, that can be used by all individuals. Furthermore, it is nearly impossible to study the causes and  
23 consequences of competition — such as its coevolution with movement strategies, or the effect on resource  
24 landscapes — at evolutionary time-scales in most animals, due to a lack of long-term data (Clutton-Brock  
25 and Sheldon, 2010). Our poor understanding of competition poses a problem, since it is key to models such

as the Ideal Free Distribution (IFD), which is a cornerstone of evolutionary ecology (Fretwell and Lucas, 1970). The IFD posits that individuals should distribute on a heterogeneous resource landscape such that their intake rate is identical at all occupied locations, after accounting for competition. As suggested by the name, the IFD assumes that competing individuals are omniscient (“ideal”), and move instantaneously, without costs, to any location on the landscape (“free”). While these evidently unrealistic assumptions have their own ramifications (Amano et al., 2006, Cressman and Křivan, 2006, Matsumura et al., 2010, Tregenza, 1995), IFD models also neglect important mechanisms underlying competition. For instance, IFD models ignore resource depletion (Cressman and Křivan, 2006, Fretwell and Lucas, 1970, van der Meer and Ens, 1997), or treat interference as an almost inevitable part of the foraging process (reviewed in Tregenza, 1995, van der Meer and Ens, 1997, see also Cressman and Křivan 2006, Garay et al. 2020). On the contrary, the abundance of resources and their depletion is of obvious importance to individuals’ movement decisions. Similarly, interference competition is a complex individual behaviour which is closely related to movement decisions, and even minor differences in its treatment in models can have important ecological and evolutionary consequences (van der Meer and Ens, 1997).

Here, we present a mechanistic model of intraspecific competition in a spatially explicit context, as the outcome of evolved behavioural and movement strategies. This allows us to both focus more closely on the interplay of exploitation and interference competition, and to examine the feedbacks between movement and foraging behaviour at evolutionary scales. As foraging and movement decisions are taken by individuals, we study the joint evolution of both types of decision by means of individual-based evolutionary simulation models (IBMs; DeAngelis and Diaz, 2019, Huston et al., 1988), which are well suited to modelling the evolution of complex behaviours (Getz et al., 2015, 2016, Guttal and Couzin, 2010, Netz et al., 2020). We implement a spatially explicit IBM approach to competition and animal movement decisions, using one model with three scenarios of increasing complexity. In our model, individuals move on a spatially fine-grained resource landscape with discrete, depleteable food items. They make movement decisions using an inherited (and evolvable) strategy which integrates local cues such as the local resource and competitor densities. After each move, individuals choose between two foraging strategies: whether to search for a food item or steal from another individual; the mechanism underlying this foraging choice is also inher-

ited. We consider lifetime resource consumption as a proxy for fitness, such that more successful individuals produce more offspring, and thus are more efficient in transmitting their movement and foraging strategies to future generations (subject to small mutations). In the first scenario, we examine how exploitation competition influences the evolution individual movement rules, population level resource intake, and the spatial structure of the resource landscape. In the second scenario, we introduce kleptoparasitic interference as an inherited strategy, fixed through an individual’s life, and investigate how individual movement and behaviour decisions coevolve. In the third scenario, we model kleptoparasitism more realistically, as a behavioural strategy conditioned on local environmental and social cues, compare the population-level and landscape-scale outcomes between scenarios 2 and 3 to show the influence of modelling choices.

Using this model, we investigate three primary questions: (1) Do movement decisions, evolved in the context of exploitation competition, and based on localised cues of resource abundance and competitor presence, lead to an ideal free distribution? (2) Under what conditions does kleptoparasitic interference evolve and persist in a population? (3) Can conditional foraging strategies outperform fixed foraging strategies, and do either of them lead to ideal free distributions?

### 3 The Model

We implement an individual-based evolutionary simulation model with three scenarios of increasing complexity whose most basic components — the environment size and shape, its gridded structure and each cell’s capacity to hold multiple individuals, as well as the discrete conception of time within and between generations — are inspired by Netz et al. (2020). We conceptualised the models around the behaviour of waders (*Charadrii*, which are extensively studied in the context of foraging competition (e.g. Rutten et al., 2010a,b, Vahl et al., 2005a, 2007, 2005b)). We simulated a population with a fixed size moving on a landscape of  $512^2$  grid cells, with the landscape wrapped at the boundaries so that individuals passing beyond the bounds at one end re-appear on the diametrically opposite side. The model has two time scales, first, a behavioural time scale of  $T$  timesteps, during which individuals move, make foraging decisions, and handle prey items they find or steal. Individuals are modelled as being immobile while handling food items,

creating the conditions for kleptoparasitism (Brockmann and Barnard, 1979). On the second, evolutionary time scale, individuals reproduce and pass on their movement and foraging strategies to their offspring, the number of which is proportional to their intake at the behavioural time scale. By default, we set  $T$  to 400, and simulated a population of 10,000 individuals over 1,000 generations. The model code (in C++) can be found as part of the Supplementary Material in the Zenodo repository at [Zenodo repository here](#).

### 3.1 Resource Landscape

**Prey Abundance** We considered a resource landscape that is heterogeneous in its productivity of discrete resources, but with strong spatial clustering of grid cells of similar productivity (see Fig. 1C; panel *gen = 1*) (While we modelled a landscape of  $512^2$  grid cells, we show a subset of  $60^2$  grid cells in Fig. 1C.). We assigned each cell a constant probability of generating a new prey item per timestep, which we refer to as the cell-specific growth rate  $r$ . We modelled clustering by having the distribution of  $r$  across the grid take the form of 1,024 uniformly distributed resource peaks with  $r$  declining from the centre of each peak (called  $r_{max}$ ) to its periphery (see Fig. 1C). Effectively, the cell at the centre of each cluster generates a prey item five times more frequently than the cells at the edges. We ran all three scenarios at a default  $r_{max}$  of 0.01, and also across a range of  $r_{max}$  values between 0.001 and 0.05. For an  $r_{max} = 0.01$ , the most productive cells (at the centres of a cluster) are likely to generate one item per 100 timesteps (or four times per generation, for  $T = 400$ ), while the least productive cells (at cluster peripheries) are likely to generate one item every 500 timesteps (only about once per generation, for  $T = 400$ ). Since our model was conceived to represent foraging waders, we considered our resources to represent mussels, a common prey of many waders, whose abundances are largely driven by external gradients; we refer to these resources as ‘prey items’ henceforth. Cells in our landscape were modelled as having a uniform carrying capacity  $K$  of 5 prey items, and while a cell is at carrying capacity its  $r$  is 0.

**Prey Acquisition by Foragers** Foragers can perceive a cue indicating the number of all prey items  $P$  in a cell, but do not know the exact locations of these prey. We model foragers as having a probability  $q$  of failing to detect a prey item, and a probability  $q^P$  of not detecting any of  $P$  prey items; foragers are thus

successful in finding a prey item with a probability  $1 - (q^G)$ . As foraging events occur simultaneously, it is possible for more foragers to be considered successful in finding prey than there are discrete items in that cell. This simple case of exploitation competition is resolved by assigning  $P$  prey among some  $N$  successful searchers at random. Foragers that are assigned a prey item in timestep  $t$  begin handling it, and are considered to be handlers for the purposes of timestep  $t + 1$ , i.e., movement and foraging decisions of other individuals). Foragers that are not assigned a prey item are considered idle during timestep  $t$ , and are counted as non-handlers for  $t + 1$ .

## 3.2 Competition and Movement Strategies

**Scenario 1: Exploitative Competition** The first scenario simulates only exploitative competition; individuals move about on the landscape and probabilistically find and consume prey items. Between finding and consuming a prey item, individuals must ‘handle’ each prey for a fixed handling time  $T_H$  (set at 5 timesteps by default). The handling time dynamic is well known from many systems; for instance, it could be the time required for an oystercatcher to break through a mussel shell, or the time between catching and subduing prey for raptors, with the handling action obvious to nearby individuals, and the prey not fully under the control of the finder (Brockmann and Barnard, 1979). We refer to such individuals as ‘handlers’ for convenience. Handlers are assumed to be fully absorbed in their processing of prey, and do not make any movements until they have fully handled and consumed their prey.

**Scenarios 2 and 3: Kleptoparasitic Interference Competition** The second scenario builds on Scenario 1, with the addition that individuals inherit a fixed strategy to either forage or to steal prey items from handlers. Agents that steal are termed kleptoparasites. Kleptoparasites are always successful in stealing from a handler; this may be thought of as the benefit of the element of surprise, a common observation among birds Brockmann and Barnard (1979). When the number of kleptoparasites exceeds handlers, handlers are assigned among kleptoparasites at random. Individuals that have been stolen from ‘flee’ and are moved to a random cell within a Chebyshev distance of 5, and do not make any further foraging decisions there. Having acquired prey, a kleptoparasite converts into a handler, but need only handle prey for  $T_H - t_h$  timesteps, where

$t_h$  is the time that the prey has already been handled by its previous owner; thus kleptoparasites save time on handling compared to a forager. Unsuccessful kleptoparasites are considered idle, and are also counted as non-handlers for timestep  $t + 1$ . Handlers that finish processing their prey in timestep  $t$  return to the non-handler state and are assessed as such by other individuals when determining movements for  $t + 1$ . Scenario 3 is similar to scenario 2, except that individuals process local environmental cues and pick either the forager or kleptoparasite strategy to use in the next timestep. Apart from the frequency of the choice, the actual foraging dynamics are the same as described in the fixed-strategy case.

**Competition Strategies** Individuals in scenario 1 only search for prey, and thus are subject only to exploitation competition. In scenario 2 either search or steal based on their inherited strategy. However, individuals in scenario 3 process the cell-specific environmental cues  $P$ ,  $H$ , and  $Nh$  to determine their next foraging strategy as

$$\text{strategy} = \begin{cases} \text{forager,} & \text{if } w_P P + w_H H + w_{Nh} Nh \geq w_0 \\ \text{kleptoparasite,} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

where the cue weights  $w_P$ ,  $w_H$  and  $w_{Nh}$ , and the bias  $w_0$  are also genetically encoded and heritable between generations.

**Movement Strategies** Movement decisions are modelled as in (Netz et al., 2020): at the end of each timestep  $t$ , each individual scans the nine cells of its Moore neighbourhood for three environmental cues, (1) the number of discrete prey items  $P$ , (2) the number of individuals handling prey  $H$  (referred to as ‘handlers’), and (3) the number of individuals not handling prey  $Nh$  (referred to as ‘non-handlers’). Based on these cues, a ‘suitability score’  $S$  is assigned to each cell as  $S = s_P P + s_H H + s_{Nh} Nh$ . At the start of timestep  $t + 1$ , each individual moves to the cell to which it has assigned the highest suitability. Here, the weighing factors for each cue  $s_P$ ,  $s_H$  and  $s_{Nh}$  are genetically encoded and heritable between generations. All individuals move simultaneously, and then implement their foraging or kleptoparasitic behaviour to acquire prey. Individuals move and forage on the resource landscape for  $T$  timesteps per generation, and  $T$  is set at 400 by default.

### 3.3 Reproduction and Inheritance

We modelled discrete, non-overlapping generations of haploid individuals with 7 gene loci, with asexual reproduction. Population size was fixed, and each generation is considered to be replaced by its offspring. The gene loci encoding the decision making weights which determine individual movement ( $s_P$ ,  $s_H$ ,  $s_{Nh}$ ) and foraging decisions ( $w_P$ ,  $w_H$ ,  $w_{Nh}$ ,  $w_0$ ) are transmitted from parent individuals to offspring. The total lifetime intake of individuals is used as a proxy of fitness. The number of offspring of each parent is thus proportional to the parent's share of the population intake, and this is implemented as a weighted lottery that selects a parent for each offspring. The decision-making weights are subject to independent random mutations with a probability of 0.001. The size of the mutation (either positive or negative) is drawn from a Cauchy distribution with a scale of 0.01 centred on the current value of the weight to be mutated. This allows for a small number of very large mutations while the majority of mutations are small. To ensure that global individual movement rules evolved, we initialised each offspring at a random location on the landscape, and also reset its total intake to zero.

### 3.4 Simulation Output and Analysis

**Population Activities and Intake** We counted the number of times the forager or kleptoparasite strategy was used in each generation of our simulations, as well as the number of times no strategy could be used because individuals were handling a food item. We refer to the ratio of time spent foraging, stealing, and handling as the population's 'activity budget'. We examined how the population activity budget developed over evolutionary time, and whether a stable ecological equilibrium was reached. Furthermore, we counted the total population intake — the number of items consumed in each generation — as a measure of population productivity.

**Resource Landscape and Individual Distribution Snapshot** To visualise the effect of different foraging strategies on the resource landscape, we exported snapshots of the entire simulation landscape at the midpoint of each generation ( $t = 200$ ). This snapshot contained data on (1) the number of prey items, (2) the number of handling individuals, and the number of individuals using either a (3) searching strategy or (4)



kleptoparasitic strategy, on each grid cell. We used only a subset of the total landscape ( $60^2$  of  $512^2$  cells) for further analyses to speed up computation.

**Testing the Matching Rule** To examine whether foragers in our model achieved an IFD, we used the snapshots to test a basic prediction of the IFD and the related matching rule: that the number of individuals on a patch should be strongly positively correlated with patch quality (Fretwell and Lucas, 1970, Parker, 1978). In real world systems, patch quality is measured as a matter of convenience: either as a snapshot of the number of discrete items on a patch at a given time point, or as patch productivity, which is a more long-term predictor of item abundance. We calculated the correlation coefficient between the number of individuals (excluding handlers) and (*a*) the number of prey items, and (*b*) the cell-specific productivity *r*.

**Resource Landscape Gradients** Another measure of whether foragers have achieved an IFD on their resource landscape is whether individuals can improve their intake by moving to a another location; in our model, this would be to a neighbouring cell. We calculated the cell-specific item gradient for each landscape snapshot, as the difference in item counts between each cell and its neighbouring cells. We then calculated the proportion of grid cells from which it was possible to move to a neighbouring cell with more prey items, with the expectation that higher values indicate a more non-ideal distribution of foragers.

**Decision Making Weights** To understand the evolutionary consequences of our simulation on the individual decision making weights, we exported the weights of each individual in every generation of the simulation. Since weights could take arbitrarily large values, and to detect relative rather than absolute differences, we multiplied each weight by 20 and applied a hyperbolic tangent transform. This scaled the weights between -1 and +1, with each weight scaled separately in each simulation run.

**Data Availability** Simulation data used in this study are available on the Dryad/IRODS/Zenodo repository **REPOSITORY LINK HERE**; simulation code is available on Github and archived on Zenodo at **ZENODO LINK HERE**; data analysis and figure code is available on Github and archived on Zenodo at **ZENODO LINK HERE**.

## 4 Results

### 4.1 Scenario 1: No Kleptoparasitism

In scenario 1, the population's activity budget is split among foraging and handling (Fig. 1A;  $r_{max} = 0.01$ ). The proportion of handling in the activity budget, and the population intake are both initially low, but then peak within ten generations (Fig. 1B). This is because individuals can easily acquire prey items from the fully stocked landscape in the first few generations, as no time has to be spent on searching. As individuals deplete prey items faster than they can be replenished, the overall number of prey items is drastically reduced (Fig. 1C; panel  $gen = 1$ ,  $gen = 10$ ). As the number of prey items reduces, handling as a share of the activity budget declines to a stable value  $\sim 45\%$  within 50 generations; this is because fewer searching foragers find a prey item. This leads to a similar stabilisation in population intake (Fig. 1A, 1B). Furthermore, with few prey items, foragers are unable to detect useful movement cues (as they cannot detect  $r$ ), and move essentially randomly on the landscape. Consequently, and contrary to expectations under the IFD, the correlation between the number of foragers and cell productivity remains just above zero across generations; this is simply the correlation expected between two normally distributed variables (Fig. 1D). Finally, forager and prey abundances are not independent, with prey items attracting foragers to cells, and foragers reducing prey item counts; as a result, the correlation between forager and prey item abundances remains weakly negative across generations (Fig. 1E).

### 4.2 Scenario 2: Fixed Competition Strategies

In scenario 2, the population activity budget includes stealing, in addition to foraging, handling (Fig. 2A;  $r_{max} = 0.01$ ). As in scenario 1, the most common activity in early generations is searching for prey items, with stealing attempts relatively rare and going nearly extinct as a strategy. Population intake also spikes in early generations as individuals successfully acquire prey items from the fully stocked prey landscape (Fig. 2B). Subsequently, the resource landscape is depleted similar to scenario 1 within 10 generations (Fig. 2C; panel  $gen: 1$ ,  $gen: 10$ ). At this stage, it becomes more likely for a kleptoparasite to encounter a handler than for a searching forager to find a prey item, and the frequency of kleptoparasites and of stealing attempts as

a share of the activity budget increases rapidly (Fig. 2A). Stealing attempts become the dominant activity within 30 generations, and reflects the proportion of individuals with an inherited kleptoparasitic strategy; a stable  $\sim 70\%$  of the population (Fig. 2A). However, this also indicates that most kleptoparasites are unsuccessful at finding handlers, as successful stealing attempts convert kleptoparasites to handlers. With few searching foragers, fewer prey items are extracted from the landscape, which recovers beyond its initial prey abundance within 50 generations (Fig. 2C; panel *gen.: 50*).

On relatively saturated resource landscapes, searching foragers can move essentially randomly and yet stand a strong chance of finding prey items. Their main movement priority is thus avoiding non-handlers, which have a strong probability of being kleptoparasites, given their relative frequency in the population. As kleptoparasites, the numerically dominant strategy, seek to move towards handlers, their primary resource, they too are not strongly influenced by prey item abundances. Thus the correlations between forager abundance and cell productivity, and forager and prey abundance, do not correspond to IFD expectations, and remain weak or zero across generations (Fig. 2D, 2E). While both searching and kleptoparasitic foragers evolve similar movement rules in relation to non-handlers (avoidance) and prey items (preference), the evolved movement response to handlers shows a rapid divergence. This divergence helps explain how kleptoparasites increase from a negligible fraction of scenario 2 populations to being the most common strategy (Fig. 3A). Kleptoparasites very rapidly (within 3 generations) evolve a strong preference for moving towards handlers, which are their primary resource (Fig. 3B, 3D). While all kleptoparasites prefer to move towards handlers, the strength of the preference shows multiple, distinct values or ‘morphs’, which are remarkably persistent across generations (Fig. 3B). On the other hand, searching foragers evolve no such preference, and have a much wider range of both positive and negative preferences for handlers (Fig. 3C, 3D). The strategy dependent divergence of movement rules can be explained by strong correlational selection on kleptoparasites to move towards their primary resource, handlers.

### 4.3 Scenario 3: Condition-Dependent Competition Strategies

In scenario 3, the population’s activity budget is very different from scenario 2 (Fig. 4A). By generation 30, all individuals have a propensity to steal from handlers, i.e., all individuals are opportunistic kleptoparasites

(Fig. 4A; *orange line*). However, unlike scenario 2, the frequency of stealing attempts does not strongly track the frequency of opportunistic kleptoparasites, staying at or below 25%, approximately the same as the frequency of searching for prey items. However, handling found prey is the most common activity ( $\sim 45\%$ ) as in scenario 1, with a stable equilibrium within 30 generations (Fig. 4A;  $r_{max} = 0.01$ ). Consequently, population intake stabilises (after an initial spike, as in scenarios 1 and 2) within ten generations to a level similar to scenario 1 (Fig. 4B). Unlike scenario 2, where the proliferation of kleptoparasites results in a reduction in handling and intake, no such reduction occurs in scenario 3. As in scenarios 1 and 2, the depletion of prey items results in the degradation of the resource landscape within ten generations (Fig. 4C; panels *gen: 1*, *gen: 10*). The reduced depletion following the evolution and persistence of kleptoparasitism leads to a resource landscape recovery intermediate between scenarios 1 and 2 within 50 generations (Fig. 4C; panel *gen: 50*). As individuals move and choose foraging strategies conditionally, they are able to better choose between the payoff of more prey items, and more handling foragers from which to steal, and the risk of falling victim to kleptoparasites. Here too, in a departure from IFD expectations, the correlations between forager abundance and cell productivity, and forager and prey abundance, remain weak or zero across generations (Fig. 4D, 4E).

#### 4.4 Evolution, the Ideal Free Distribution, and Alternative Movement Cues

In scenario 1, the proportion of cells from which it is possible to move to a neighbouring cell with more items is initially very high ( $\sim 75\%$ ;  $r_{max} = 0.01$ ) (Fig. 5A1 – panel *gen: 1*, Fig. 5A2 – green line). This proportion rapidly declines to  $\sim 25\%$  within 25 generations, as foragers approach a sort of IFD by depleting most cells on the landscape until they are devoid of prey items (Fig. 1C – panel *gen: 50*, Fig. 5A1 – panels *gen: 10*, *gen: 50*, Fig. 5A2 – green line). As a consequence, the majority of the landscape is a ‘clueless plateau’ (Perkins, 1992); on most cells, foragers cannot make directed movement decisions based on item abundances alone because all neighbouring items abundances are identical (see black areas in Fig. 5A1). In this context, foragers evolve to use an alternative cue, the presence of agents handling a prey item, with  $> 75\%$  of individuals showing a preference for handlers within 100 generations (Fig. 5A2 – blue line). Forager preference for handlers (which do not represent a direct resource in scenario 1), may be explained

as the sensing of a long-term cue of cell productivity. Since handlers are immobilised on the cell where they find a prey item, cells with handlers are (1) certain to have a non-zero rate of prey item generation, and (2) likely to border cells which can generate prey items, due to the patterning of the landscape.

Scenario 2 landscapes follow a similar pattern to scenario 1 in the first 10 generations ( $r_{max} = 0.01$ ; Fig. 5B1 – panel *gen: 1*, *gen: 10*, Fig. 5B2 – black line). However, within 50 generations, the reduction in prey item extraction allows most cells to regenerate prey items, with differences among cells according to their productivity  $r$  (Fig. 2C). Thus it is possible to move to a neighbouring cell with more items from  $> 75\%$  of the landscape, indicating a population very far from the IFD (Fig. 5B1 – panel *gen: 50*, 5B2). However, since the majority of foragers are kleptoparasites, which seek out handlers (Fig. 5B2 – red and blue lines), this recovery of the resource landscape provides only indirect movement cues, as searching foragers are more likely to convert to handlers on cells with more prey items. Unlike scenario 1, the rapid increase in handler preference is driven by correlational selection on kleptoparasites (see subsection above). Scenario 3 is similar to scenario 2, except that only about half the landscape allows movement to a neighbouring cell with more prey items (Fig. 5C1, 5C2). Here, the rapid evolution of a handler preference in movement decisions cannot be assigned a clear cause, since handlers are both a potential direct resource as well as indirect cues to the location of productive cells.

#### 4.5 Landscape Productivity and Evolutionary Outcomes

The landscape's  $r_{max}$  has a marked effect on population activity budgets and total intake. The frequency of foraging reduces with  $r_{max}$  in scenarios 1 and 3; this is caused by more frequent acquisition of prey items (as regrowth keeps pace with depletion), which results in a greater frequency of handling rather than foraging. In scenario 2 however, the frequency of handling is relatively unaffected by increasing  $r_{max}$  (Fig. 6A). The difference between scenarios 2 and 3 has to do with the change in the frequency of kleptoparasitism (Fig. 6B). In scenario 2, kleptoparasitism forms  $> 75\%$  of all activities at very low  $r_{max}$ , and is much more common than in scenario 3 populations at the same regrowth rate. However, at relatively high  $r_{max}$  (0.03), the fixed kleptoparasitic strategy goes extinct. At these regrowth rates, the scenario 2 population matches the scenario 1 population, with foragers rapidly converted to handlers. In scenario 3, kleptoparasitism persists at

low frequencies even at the highest regrowth rates (Fig. 6B); thus some foragers lose time in extracting items which are then stolen from them. Consequently, while populations in all three scenarios achieve very similar intakes at low  $r_{max}$ , at intermediate regrowth rates (0.01 – 0.025), conditionally kleptoparasitic populations outperform populations using fixed strategies. Only at high regrowth rates, when fixed strategy populations (scenario 2) effectively convert to purely forager populations (scenario 1), do they achieve a higher intake than scenario 3 populations (Fig. 6C).

## 5 Discussion

### 5.1 Polymorphism as the Outcome of Constraints

Competition is a key process in determining animal space use across scales Fretwell and Lucas (1970), van der Meer and Ens (1997), and is often suggested as a driver of phenotypic, behavioural, and foraging polymorphisms (CITE – *I'm not able to find a good reference for this*). In our scenario 1 with only exploitative competition, only a single movement morph evolves. Previous models of the evolution of movement rules suggest that multiple movement morphs can evolve in a consumer-resource context (Getz et al., 2015, Netz et al. in prep.). In our model 1, there instead seems to be a globally optimal movement strategy associated with foraging that shows no frequency-dependence, and thus polymorphisms do not emerge.

In our scenario 2, the modelling of kleptoparasitic interference as a fixed strategy leads to the dimorphism between obligate foragers and kleptoparasites. This constraint is resolved in scenario 3, and individuals evolve to be kleptoparasitic in the presence of handlers, and turn to foraging otherwise. The strategy constraint on scenario 2 individuals prevents the population from converging on a single behavioural and movement phenotype, as kleptoparasites are dependent on foragers for intake.

Fixed-strategy populations evolve a further polymorphism in movement behaviour, with kleptoparasites moving towards handlers, and foragers neutral to handlers. This coupling of movement and behavioural strategy is expected from the ‘correlational selection hypothesis’, which holds that suites of behaviours might be correlated into a syndrome when certain combinations of traits are favoured by selection (Sih et al., 2004, Wolf and Weissing, 2010). Obligate kleptoparasites functionally occupy a higher trophic level

whose primary resource is handling foragers, rather than prey items, and thus gregarious kleptoparasites are very quickly the only kleptoparasites to survive. Once the handler-preference is fixed in kleptoparasitic lineages, it becomes the more frequent handler response in the population (over avoidance) as kleptoparasites increase in frequency.

The proportion of kleptoparasites to foragers in scenario 2 is quite tightly controlled by the density-dependent success of either strategy. The population requires a certain number of foragers, without which kleptoparasites would have no intake, while at low densities, kleptoparasites rapidly outcompete foragers and increase in number. However, limit cycles of kleptoparasites and foragers do not emerge. One important cause for this is global natal dispersal, which ensures a well-mixed population in each generation, rather than increasing densities of offspring (of either strategy) around the most successful ancestors ('differential reproduction'). Differential reproduction would allow instabilities related to spatial structuring, whereby increasing kleptoparasite density in an area would eventually lead to lower per-capita intake among kleptoparasites relative to foragers, and consequently an increase in the forager to kleptoparasite ratio.

## 5.2 Plasticity, Polymorphisms, and Productivity

Scenario 3, which allows individuals to opportunistically steal prey items, resolves the strategic constraint of scenario 2. When the inherited decision making weight is conditionally coupled with expressed behaviour, the frequency of stealing attempts better reflects the encounter rate of handlers, rather than the frequency of stealing propensity in the population. scenario 3 individuals' behaviour is thus more adapted to immediate, local conditions; they lose less time in futile stealing attempts, and thus achieve better intakes. Consequently, individuals rapidly converge upon a single, optimal strategy, which is to steal when handlers are available, and to forage otherwise.

Conditional strategy populations thus outperform fixed-strategy populations, and have similar intakes as forager populations, on low productivity landscapes. On more productive landscapes ( $r_{max} \geq 0.02$ ), exploitation competition is reduced, and the probability of a forager-prey item encounter is much higher than the probability of a kleptoparasite-handler encounter. Consequently, fixed-strategy kleptoparasites rarely match the per-capita intakes of foragers, and rapidly go extinct. Thus high  $r_{max}$  instances of scenario 2

consistently produce populations that are functionally identical to scenario 1 populations, with no kleptoparasitism. However, at high  $r_{max}$ , opportunistic kleptoparasites in scenario 3 have a greater per-capita intake rate than pure foragers, as kleptoparasitic prey acquisition deprives a (foraging) handler of its prey. This allows kleptoparasitic interference to persist, while also resulting in slightly lower total population intake than the pure forager populations of scenario 1 and high  $r_{max}$  scenario 2.

### 5.3 Competition and Landscape Effects

Competition strongly influences landscape structure, which has cascading ecological and evolutionary effects. In scenario 1, foragers face exploitation competition alone, and rapidly deplete prey items, which results in a large, stable proportion of the landscape forming clueless plateaus, with few movement cues (Perkins, 1992). Consequently, individuals slowly converge upon a movement strategy that makes use of public information in the form of handling individuals, which indicate a profitable prey-item generation probability. In scenario 2, the emergence and persistence of kleptoparasitism at low  $r_{max}$  reduces resource depletion, prey-items are regenerated, and the proportion of clueless plateaus is reduced. Ironically, the abundance of item cues is not functionally useful to most individuals; kleptoparasites find themselves in a ‘desert of plenty’ as their only resource is handlers, which are uncommon relative to prey items. Scenario 3 populations evolve kleptoparasitism, which similarly depresses prey-item depletion, and reduces the proportion of clueless plateaus. However, due to their conditional strategies, these individuals make use of the full range of cues for movement and behaviour decisions.

## 6 Conclusion

WORK IN PROGRESS

## 7 Acknowledgments

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## 462 **8 Appendix A: Supplementary Figures**

### 463 **8.1 Fox–dog encounters through the ages**

## 464 **9 Appendix B: Additional Methods**

### 465 **9.1 Measuring the height of fox jumps without a meterstick**



467 **11 Figure legends**






Figure 1: **Eco-evolutionary implications of pure exploitation competition (Scenario 1).** Within 20 generations of evolution, the population reaches an equilibrium in (A) the relative proportion of time spent on searching prey and handling prey, and in (B) the total intake of the population. (C) The sustained extraction of prey-items results in a rapid depletion of the resource landscape within 10 generations. The number of individuals on occupied cells is shown as black circles (size = number of individuals). In a departure from IFD predictions, at equilibrium, cell occupancy (number of foragers per cell) is only weakly correlated with cell productivity  $r$  (D), while it is even negatively correlated with the number of food items in the cell (E). Panels A, B, D and E show three replicates, while panel C shows a single replicate; all panels are for  $r_{max} = 0.01$ .





Figure 2: **Eco-evolutionary implications of exploitation combined with a fixed foraging strategy (Scenario 2).** In Scenario 2, the population reaches an equilibrium in (A) the relative proportion of time spent on searching prey and handling prey, and in (B) the total intake of the population. Stealing activities (red line; panel A) are less common than kleptoparasitic individuals (orange line; panel A), as successful kleptoparasites become handlers (green line; panel A). (C) With a reduction in foraging and handling due to increased stealing after generation 30 (panel A), prey-item depletion is reduced, and the resource landscape recovers by generation 50. The number of individuals on occupied cells is shown as black circles (size = number of individuals). At equilibrium, cell occupancy (number of foragers per cell) is only weakly correlated with cell productivity  $r$  (D), and weakly negatively correlated with the number of food items in the cell, in contrast with IFD predictions (E). Panels A, B, D and E show three replicates, while panel C shows a single replicate; all panels are for  $r_{max} = 0.01$ .



**Figure 3: Rapid divergence of movement rules between fixed foraging strategies due to correlational selection (Scenario 2).** (A) Kleptoparasitism rapidly becomes the more frequent strategy in Model 2 populations, with no differences across replicates. (B) However, replicates differ strongly in the frequencies of evolved movement strategies among the two behavioural strategies. While nearly all kleptoparasites evolve to move towards handlers, their direct resource, the strength of their handler preference is polymorphic, with 2 or 3 morphs in most replicates. (C) Foragers are also polymorphic in their handler responses, but these morphs are the results of drift, rather than selection. (D) Overall, within 5 generations (shown on a log scale), all kleptoparasitic individuals ( $\sim 75\%$  of the population at equilibrium; see Fig. 3A) have an evolved preference for moving towards handlers. Meanwhile, forager individuals are agnostic to handlers, and are equally split between handler preference and avoidance. All panels show three replicates at  $r_{max} = 0.01$ .




Figure 4: **Eco-evolutionary implications of exploitation combined with a conditional foraging strategy (Scenario 3).** Scenario 3 populations reach an equilibrium in **(A)** the relative proportion of time spent on searching prey and handling prey, and in **(B)** the total intake of the population within 30 generations of evolution. While an opportunistic kleptoparasitic strategy (orange line; panel A) becomes rapidly fixed in the population, the actual frequency of stealing remains relatively much lower (red line; panel A). **(C)** The initially rapid depletion of the resource landscape within 10 generations is halted as kleptoparasitism reduces foraging activities, and the resource landscape regenerates prey-items by generation 50. The number of individuals on occupied cells is shown as black circles (size = number of individuals). **(D)** Contrary to IFD expectations, the correlation between the number of individuals on a cell, and its productivity  $r_{max}$ , and **(E)** the correlation between individual counts and the probability of finding a prey-item are both weak across generations. Panels **A**, **B**, **D** and **E** show three replicates, while panel **C** shows a single replicate; all panels are for  $r_{max} = 0.01$ .




Figure 5: **Evolution, the IFD, and alternative movement cues.** The movement of foragers and their consumption of prey items leads to large areas of the resource landscape where moving to a neighbouring cell does not increase potential intake in terms of prey items (**A1**, **B1**, **C1** – panels *gen:1*, *gen:10*, **A2**, **B2**, **C2** – green line). This homogenisation to zero items leads to the creation of ‘clueless regions’, i.e., neighbouring cells with no difference in item counts, and thus no direct resource gradients (**A1**, **B1**, **C1** – white areas). Foragers in scenario 1 slowly evolve a preference for handlers, which indicate cells with a non-zero probability of generating prey items (**A2** – blue line). The evolution and persistence of a kleptoparasitic response (orange lines) in scenarios 2 (**B2**) and 3 (**C2**) and stealing events (red lines) reduces item depletion, allowing the spatial structure of the landscape to re-emerge. In both scenarios, there are large areas of the landscape where individuals can improve their intake of prey items by moving to a neighbouring cell, contrary to a population that has achieved an ideal free distribution (**B1**, **C1** – panel *gen: 50*). All panels show replicates at  $r = 0.01$ ; landscape panels show only a single replicate.




Figure 6: Landscape productivity strongly affects model outcomes. **(A)** The frequency foraging reduces with increasing  $r_{max}$  in models 1 and 3, but remains relatively stable in model 2. In all three models, this is partly due to an increase in handling caused by increased resource availability, and **(B)** partly due to reduced kleptoparasitism in models 2 and 3. In model 2, kleptoparasitism goes extinct at higher  $r_{max}$ , and such model 2 populations are functionally identical with model 1 populations. **(C)** At low  $r_{max}$ , populations in all three models achieve similar intakes. At intermediate  $r_{max}$  however, populations with a conditional kleptoparasitic strategy outperform populations with fixed strategies. At high  $r_{max}$ , conditional kleptoparasitism populations (model 3) achieve lower intakes than populations in models 1 and 2, which are then functionally identical. Shaded regions around solid lines show the standard deviation of each value; these are not visible when the standard deviation is very small.