

# Code Assessment of the Core Updates to SparkLend

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Produced for



by



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# 1 Executive Summary

Dear all,

Thank you for trusting us to help Sparklend with this security audit. Our executive summary provides an overview of subjects covered in our audit of the latest reviewed contracts of Core Updates according to [Scope](#) to support you in forming an opinion on their security risks.

Sparklend disabled the flashloan into borrow functionality in an effort to remove a potential attack vector. This change was done as part of applying the Jan 10th patch which fixes a vulnerability. The function `getReservesCount` is now exposed publicly as part of the introduced changes. No issue with these changes has been uncovered.

The most critical subjects covered in our audit are the impact of this change on the existing system and the correctness of the changes introduced. Security regarding all the aforementioned subjects is high.

In summary, we find that the codebase provides a high level of security.

It is important to note that security audits are time-boxed and cannot uncover all vulnerabilities. They complement but don't replace other vital measures to secure a project.

The following sections will give an overview of the system, our methodology, the issues uncovered and how they have been addressed. We are happy to receive questions and feedback to improve our service.

Sincerely yours,

ChainSecurity

# 1.1 Overview of the Findings

Below we provide a brief numerical overview of the findings and how they have been addressed.

<b>Critical</b> -Severity Findings	0
<b>High</b> -Severity Findings	0
<b>Medium</b> -Severity Findings	0
<b>Low</b> -Severity Findings	0

## 2 Assessment Overview

In this section, we briefly describe the overall structure and scope of the engagement, including the code commit which is referenced throughout this report.

### 2.1 Scope

The assessment was performed on the source code files inside the Core Updates repository based on the documentation files. The table below indicates the code versions relevant to this report and when they were received.

This report covers the application of the January 10th patch and the removal of the flashloan functionality only. In scope are the corresponding changes in the following files relative to the base version v1.19.2 / commit 6070e82d962d9b12835c88e68210d0e63f08d035 only.

```
contracts/interfaces/IPool.sol
contracts/protocol/libraries/logic/FlashLoanLogic.sol
contracts/protocol/libraries/types/DataTypes.sol
contracts/protocol/pool/Pool.sol
```

V	Date	Commit Hash	Note
1	08 March 2023	317efdb757de81c831ba9df9d57b4ed2c5419f6b	Initial Version

For the solidity smart contracts, the compiler version 0.8.10 was chosen.

#### 2.1.1 Excluded from scope

All other files not explicitly mentioned. Notably this report is not a review of the core codebase. Note that setting the pool's revision is out of scope as this is part of the deployment process (remains 0x1) in code.

## 2.2 System Overview

This system overview describes the initially received version (**Version 1**) of the contracts as defined in the [Assessment Overview](#).

Furthermore, in the findings section, we have added a version icon to each of the findings to increase the readability of the report.

Sparklend implements changes to the Spark Lend core protocol. Namely, the following changes are implemented (see [Assessment Overview](#) for the compared to version):

1. The `Pool`'s interface has been expanded by the function `getReservesCount()` that simply returns the internal `_reservesCount` variable.
2. Specifying any interest mode other than `NONE` when flashloaning is disabled. Thus, borrowing in the flashloan has been deactivated.
3. (The `DataTypes.FlashloanParams` struct has an additional `pool` field which specifies the pool's address. However, it is unused.)

### 3 Limitations and use of report

Security assessments cannot uncover all existing vulnerabilities; even an assessment in which no vulnerabilities are found is not a guarantee of a secure system. However, code assessments enable the discovery of vulnerabilities that were overlooked during development and areas where additional security measures are necessary. In most cases, applications are either fully protected against a certain type of attack, or they are completely unprotected against it. Some of the issues may affect the entire application, while some lack protection only in certain areas. This is why we carry out a source code assessment aimed at determining all locations that need to be fixed. Within the customer-determined time frame, ChainSecurity has performed an assessment in order to discover as many vulnerabilities as possible.

The focus of our assessment was limited to the code parts defined in the engagement letter. We assessed whether the project follows the provided specifications. These assessments are based on the provided threat model and trust assumptions. We draw attention to the fact that due to inherent limitations in any software development process and software product, an inherent risk exists that even major failures or malfunctions can remain undetected. Further uncertainties exist in any software product or application used during the development, which itself cannot be free from any error or failures. These preconditions can have an impact on the system's code and/or functions and/or operation. We did not assess the underlying third-party infrastructure which adds further inherent risks as we rely on the correct execution of the included third-party technology stack itself. Report readers should also take into account that over the life cycle of any software, changes to the product itself or to the environment in which it is operated can have an impact leading to operational behaviors other than those initially determined in the business specification.

## 4 Terminology

For the purpose of this assessment, we adopt the following terminology. To classify the severity of our findings, we determine the likelihood and impact (according to the CVSS risk rating methodology).

- *Likelihood* represents the likelihood of a finding to be triggered or exploited in practice
- *Impact* specifies the technical and business-related consequences of a finding
- *Severity* is derived based on the likelihood and the impact

We categorize the findings into four distinct categories, depending on their severity. These severities are derived from the likelihood and the impact using the following table, following a standard risk assessment procedure.

Likelihood	Impact		
	High	Medium	Low
High	Critical	High	Medium
Medium	High	Medium	Low
Low	Medium	Low	Low

As seen in the table above, findings that have both a high likelihood and a high impact are classified as critical. Intuitively, such findings are likely to be triggered and cause significant disruption. Overall, the severity correlates with the associated risk. However, every finding's risk should always be closely checked, regardless of severity.

## 5 Findings

In this section, we describe our findings. The findings are split into these different categories:

Below we provide a numerical overview of the identified findings, split up by their severity.

<b>Critical</b> -Severity Findings	0
<b>High</b> -Severity Findings	0
<b>Medium</b> -Severity Findings	0
<b>Low</b> -Severity Findings	0