

CURRICULUM VITAE

MARTA KOZAKIEWICZ

CONTACT INFORMATION

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PERSONAL DETAILS

Date of birth: 21/04/1989
Citizenship: Polish

RESEARCH INTERESTS

Primary: Behavioral Economics, Experimental Economics.
Secondary: Microeconomic Theory.

EDUCATION

2014-present	Ph.D. in Economics, University of Bonn, Germany. Thesis: <i>Essays in Behavioral Economics</i> , Expected completion: Summer 2020.
2012–2014	M.S., Quantitative Methods in Economics and Information Systems, Warsaw School of Economics.
2008–2011	B.A., Quantitative Methods in Economics and Information Systems, Warsaw School of Economics, Specialization: Econometrics.

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Summer 2019	Lecturer at the University of Bonn, <i>Behavioral Economics</i> (B.Sc.).
Winter 2018/19	Teaching Assistant at the University of Bonn, <i>Research Module in Management and Applied Microeconomics</i> (M.Sc.).

HONORS AND GRANTS

2018 - present	Research fellowship, Collaborative Research Center (CRC) TR 224,
Autumn 2018	6100 EUR research funding for the project “Misguided Learning: The Underlying Mechanisms”, Collaborative Research Center (CRC) TR 224 through project A1,
Autumn 2017	6000 EUR research funding for the project “Experimental Evidence on Misguided Learning”, Institute for Applied Microeconomics, University of Bonn,
2015 - 2018	doctoral scholarship, German Academic Research Service (DAAD),
2014 - 2015	doctoral scholarship, German Research Foundation (DFG).

PRESENTATIONS

Autumn 2019	ESA European Meeting of the Economic Science Association, Dijon, France.
Summer 2018	Bonn Applied Micro Workshop, Bonn, Germany.

SKILLS

Languages:	Polish (native), English (fluent), German (intermediate).
Programming:	Octave/MatLab, Stata, zTree.

WORKING PAPERS

“Experimental Evidence on Misguided Learning” (joint work with Lorenz Götte)

We test experimentally the theory formulated by Heidhues et al. (2018). The model predicts the behavior of an agent who has a biased perception of his ability and is learning about an unknown, decision-relevant parameter in a dynamic environment. We use a novel experimental design to demonstrate that the learning process of an agent who is overestimating his performance differs significantly from that of an unbiased individual. In a dynamic setting, the overconfident agent misinterprets repeatedly the output and forms erroneous beliefs about the unknown parameter. The learning process is “self-defeating”: by applying what he thinks he has learned, the agent is generating observations that are misleading and is using them to form even more mistaken beliefs. We provide the first empirical evidence that giving a biased agent the possibility to experiment and acquire new information is not only ineffective but in some cases counterproductive.

WORK IN PROGRESS

“Does the world get crazier or is it just me? Learning about ability and an external parameter”
(joint work with Lorenz Götte)

“Estimating Belief-Based Utility Using Experimental Data”