CVE-2021-36460

NVD CVE-2021-36460: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-36460

MITRE CVE-2021-36460: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2021-36460

CWE-836: Use of Password Hash Instead of Password for Authentication

The VeryFitPro app (Android: com.veryfit2hr.second, iOS) <=3.3.7 hashes the account's password locally on the device using SHA-1 and uses the hash to authenticate in all communication with the backend API, including login, registration and changing of passwords.

This allows an attacker in possession of a hash to takeover a user's account without knowing the original password, rendering the security benefits of storing hashed passwords in the database useless. This is also known as a Pass the Hash attack.

As of the 22nd of April 2022, both Android and iOS apps are affected in their most recent versions (3.3.7). The Android app has over 10,000,000 installs, the iOS app has 3.4K ratings and is the #198 app in the "Health & Fitness" category.

Proof of concept

For example, during login, the app hashes the password entered by the user using SHA-1 locally on the device and then makes a POST request to the URL http://veryfitproapi.veryfitplus.com/user/login with a request body like this:

area=Europe&password=5baa61e4c9b93f3f0682250b6cf8331b7ee68fd8&account=foo%40bar.com

The backend then parses the request body, comparing the hash value defined by the password key with the hash stored in the database in order to verify authentication of the user.

Attack scenario

1. Attacker obtains the password hash of a user, for example through SQL injection, information exposure or sniffing
2. Attacker performs login on any Android device / emulator or iOS device using the VeryFitPro app
3. Attacker intercepts the POST login request and replaces in the request body the hash value of password and the email address of account with the user's
4. Attacker is now logged in as the user
5. Attacker can now impersonate the user and perform actions like changing the password by using the app

Mitigation

• In the apps, transmit the original password (unhashed) in the request body via HTTPS to the backend API.
• In the backend, hash the password parsed from the request body before comparing it to the hash in the database.
• In order to mitigate CWE-327, the passwords must be hashed using a strong algorithm like Argon2

Timeline

• 25th of June 2021: Vulnerability found by @martinfrancois, CVE ID requested and vendor contacted
• 28th of June 2021: No reply from vendor, contacted vendor again
• 6th of April 2022: CVE-2021-36460 received
• 15th of April 2022: No reply from vendor, contacted vendor again
• 22nd of April 2022: No reply from vendor, advisory published