Martin Haselmayer[1]

Participation in the Good Council

Insights from a Private Mini-Public

Abstract: *This study investigates participation in the Good Council for Redistribution. This privately organized deliberative mini-public initiated by Austrian activist Marlene Engelhorn deliberated on wealth distribution and allocated her €25 million inheritance. The initiative lacked a democratic mandate and institutional ties, yet it attracted significant media attention and provided generous financial compensation to participants. Drawing on two surveys fielded before the start of the Good Council, the study examines who sought to take part and explores the motives for willingness to participate. Findings confirm sociodemographic biases in participation that could be mitigated in the statistical selection stage. Moreover, the study reveals differences in the relevance of motives that are linked to sociodemographic and attitudinal factors. The results suggest that understanding the motives for participation may contribute to enhancing representativeness and inclusiveness of deliberative mini-publics.*

1. Introduction

In January 2024, Marlene Engelhorn, a prominent Austrian activist for wealth taxes who inherited tens of millions of euros from her grandmother, gathered journalists from all over the country to announce the launch of a private, deliberative mini-public. The 'Good Council for Redistribution' (Guter Rat für Rückverteilung) was introduced with two core aims: (1) to deliberate over wealth distribution in Austria, a country with high wealth concentration and literally no wealth or inheritance taxes and (2) to redistribute Engelhorn's private inheritance of 25 million Euros with virtually no constraints. In the days that followed, 10,000 Austrians, a random sample of all residents aged 16 and above, received an invitation letter that asked them to participate. The story quickly made

---

1   Foresight Institute, and University of Vienna, Department of Government, Austria. mh@foresight.at ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7765-5158.

headlines both nationally and internationally, with coverage from major outlets such as the BBC, The New York Times, and O Globo.[2]

To the media and the public, it was intriguing how someone could choose to let a group of strangers distribute their fortune. From the perspective of research on deliberative mini-publics, citizen engagement, and democratic participation, a privately organized and implemented nationwide citizen assembly was novel, too. Additionally, a couple of its core design features make the project particularly interesting. First, the Good Council lacks a democratic mandate or institutional ties. Both are typically considered important for its legitimacy in theoretical terms and for public perception (see e.g. Goldberg and Bächtinger, 2023). Moreover, a strong mandate and/or institutional ties are important when it comes to the political or policy impact of mini-publics, which ultimately also feeds back to their (perceived) legitimacy (Courant, 2022). The Good Council could not offer potential outcomes such as binding policies or even recommendations for a political body. Yet, it came with the obvious and tangible impact of giving away the dedicated 25-million budget. Beyond that, the Good Council offered strong personal benefits: generous remuneration, which amounted to €1,200 per weekend based on calculations that accounted for local wages and weekend supplements. The organization also paid very strict attention to representation, accessibility, and inclusiveness, for example by providing various interpreters, paying for on-site and off-site childcare or an accompanying person for a disabled member.

Based on the very particular design features of this private mini-public, this paper explores the willingness motivation behind participation in the Good Council. It describes the selection process and the criteria of representativity applied to it and examines how the goal of descriptive representation was defined and met. Thereby, it asks who opted to participate in the Good Council and if well-known biases of (direct) political participation applied. In addition, it explores the motives for participation. Using multivariate regression models, the paper examines variation across different social groups or based on general attitudes towards wealth distribution or democracy.

To do so, the paper draws on (1) a registration survey that everyone aspiring to participate had to fill in (n = 1,422) and (2) a survey that was distributed to then-selected Council members, replacement members, as well as non-selected candidates, who agreed to participate in research on the Good Council (n = 302).

The results show that despite its peculiar design features, willingness to participate in the Good Council was strongly skewed along sociodemographic patterns like income or education as well as people's general assessment of wealth distribution. However, due to the high number of registrations, these biases were alleviated in the second stage of the selection process. When it comes to the motives for participation, analyses show that outstanding monetary compensation

---

2   https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67935463,
    https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/11/world/europe/austria-heiress-engelhorn-inheritance-giveaway.html?searchResultPosition=1,
    https://oglobo.globo.com/economia/epoca/noticia/2024/06/08/saiba-de-onde-vem-a-fortuna-da-herdeira-bilionaria-que-vai-distribuir-r-140-milhoes-na-austria.ghtml [02 October 2024].

as provided by the Good Council might contribute to motivate underrepresented groups: financial motives were particularly relevant to unemployed persons, those with lower interest in politics, and those less knowledgeable about the subject matter. On the other hand, intrinsic motives of participation, such as interest in the topic, are more in line with classic patterns of participation. Furthermore, the prospect of making new experiences was particularly relevant for younger respondents, whereas parents attach more weight to the duty of honouring their selection. The results further suggest gender differences, as women and diverse respondents attached more weight to bring in their own ideas, honour the selection, and make new experiences.

   These results are from a single-case study of a quite unusual citizen's assembly. Accordingly, they should be interpreted cautiously. Nevertheless, the findings provide new and relevant insights into possible strategies for broadening participation and thereby to improving the representativeness of deliberative minipublics (see also Spada and Peixoto (2025), this volume). For once, the 'prize' for contributing a significant amount of time and effort could be evaluated. There are reasonable limits to monetary incentives (e.g. Gneezy *et al.*, 2011) and official authorities will find it hard to justify similar compensation. Nevertheless, one could question whether current practices of remuneration are fair and serve the purpose of inclusiveness. Beyond this, the findings suggest that simpler strategies could also help expand the participation of underrepresented groups. Given the diversity of motives for participation, targeting specific groups by emphasizing particular aspects of mini-publics could prove valuable in future exercises. Consequently, research should focus more on understanding why individuals choose to respond — or not respond — to an invitation to join a citizen's assembly.

2. The Good Council for Redistribution
— a Brief Overview

Austria is a country with high wealth concentration, where the top 1% hold between 40–50% of the total wealth (Fessler and Schürz, 2023; Kennickel *et al.*, 2021; Jestl and List, 2020). Employment taxes are high, wealth is hardly taxed, and there has been no inheritance tax since 2008 (OECD, 2024; 2023).[3] While a strong and stable majority of Austrians find inequality unfair and endorse the (re)introduction of wealth-related taxes (e.g. Haselmayer, 2024b; OECD, 2021), there has not been a political majority for such changes in the Austrian parliament for a long time.[4]

---

[3] Austria is one of the few OECD countries that does not currently impose taxes on inheritances. At 0.6% of GDP, wealth-related taxes in Austria are approximately three times lower than the OECD average of 1.9% (OECD, 2023). Additionally, the share of wealth-related taxes in Austria has roughly halved over the past three decades, decreasing from 1.1% of GDP in 1993 (*ibid.*).

[4] Currently, three out of five parliamentary parties reject the introduction of wealth-related taxes: the People's Party (ÖVP), the Freedom Party (FPÖ), and NEOS. Moreover, the ÖVP is typically pivotal for government formation and has been in government for 37 years.

This setting lays the background for the Good Council for Redistribution. The mini-public was financed on the private initiative of Marlene Engelhorn and was organized on her behalf in response to the 'government's failure' to tackle wealth inequality.[5] The project kicked off with a press conference on 9 January 2024, announcing the project's launch and the postal distribution of 10,000 letters to randomly selected Austrian residents, which marked the first part of the selection process (see Haselmayer, 2024a, for more details). Participation was set up as a two-stage process based on current recommendations for such processes (e.g. Curato *et al.*, 2021; OECD, 2020). Invitation letters were personalized, included a unique identifier to prevent fraud, and provided basic information about the Council and the role of future members. In the second stage, interested citizens completed a registration survey — available online or by phone — primarily to collect sociodemographic information and general views on wealth distribution. These data then entered the statistical selection process, which used a widely applied algorithm introduced by Flanigan *et al.* (2021) to select 50 members and 15 substitutes.

The Good Council met over six weekends between March and June 2024. The aim was to develop ideas on wealth distribution based on a broad discussion of the topic, with recommendations for allocating a project budget of 25 million Euros. This funding came from the initiator's inheritance and was transferred to a trust account before the project began. The only pre-defined criteria for the use of the Good Council funds excluded allocations to unconstitutional, anti-life, or inhumane groups or content. Additionally, profit-oriented project goals, organizations, and the founding or financing of political parties were disallowed.[6]

Citizen councils are typically initiated by or linked to democratic institutions. However, as a private initiative, the Good Council has no ties to the political system. Consequently, it lacks a democratic mandate and has no influence over political decisions or policies. Nonetheless, the redistribution of project funds provides a direct and tangible form of influence. Furthermore, a strong mandate and close ties to political institutions are not necessarily indicators of successful impact (e.g. Giraudet *et al.*, 2022).

---

[5] https://guterrat.info/en/ [10 October 2024].

[6] '[T]he money was not allowed to go to groups or individuals or flow into activities that are unconstitutional, anti-life or inhumane. Furthermore, redistribution does not mean investment: the money could not go to organizations that operate for profit. The Council could also not do anything else with the money that would run counter to the actual purpose of the Good Council — i.e. redistribution. For example: founding or financing parties with the money, paying out the money to themselves or related parties' (Good Council FAQs: https://guterrat.info/en/faqs/ [4 October 2024]).

Initiator	Marlene Engelhorn
Implementation	Organizing team under the leadership of Alexandra Wang
Topic	Wealth distribution and redistribution
Objectives	1. To initiate a debate on wealth distribution 2. Redistribute 25 million Euros
Selection	1. Random selection of 10,000 Austrian residents aged 16+ 2. Statistical selection of 50 members and 15 replacement members (based on Flanigan *et al*., 2021)
Duration	16 March 2024–09 June 2024 (6 weekends)

Table 1. Good Council — basic facts.

Compared to previous initiatives, the substantial expense allowance of 1,200 Euros per weekend is notable, significantly exceeding standard stipends and general recommendations for citizen councils (Carson and Dienel, 2020). Even alternate members received 240 Euros for each of the first three weekends in case they were needed as replacements. In contrast, members of the Austrian Climate Council — the only nationwide mini-public organized by the Ministry for Climate Action, Environment, Energy, Mobility, Innovation, and Technology — received only 100 Euros per weekend. Thus, even alternates in the Good Council received more than full members of the Climate Council. Beyond raising questions about participants' intrinsic motivation (see e.g. Gneezy *et al.*, 2011), such a generous allowance could also help mitigate common sociodemographic biases in participation. To explore this question further, this paper studies who aspired to participate in the Good Council and what motives drove the willingness to do so.

3. Participation in the Good Council

Based on current recommendations for such processes, the selection of Council members was set up as a two-stage process that combined a stage of random selection from the entire population with statistical selection to account for biases in participation willingness (e.g. Curato *et al.*, 2021; OECD, 2020). Figure 1 presents an overview of the various stages, which are described in more detail below.

Figure 1. Timeline of the Good Council. (Note: After the first weekend, one member and one replacement dropped out. The member was replaced, leaving 50 members and 13 replacements.)

Stage I — Random selection

The initial step of the selection process involved inviting potential participants. The sole criteria for eligibility were (a) residency in Austria and (b) being at least 16 years old, the legal voting age. To ensure equal opportunities for all citizens meeting these criteria, the selection process needed to be inclusive of the entire resident population. The Central Register of Residents (ZMR), recognized as the most suitable and reliable data source for this purpose, was utilized to achieve comprehensive coverage. Access to this data required submitting a formal application to the Ministry of Interior Affairs, which subsequently granted permission. Furthermore, the selection was conducted entirely at random, without the application of any stratification criteria.

Of the 10,000 randomly selected Austrian residents who received an invitation to participate, 1,424 registered,[7] expressing their interest in joining the Good Council (Table 2). The response rate of 14.2% was significantly higher than the expected ±5%, based on both national and international accounts (e.g. Devillers *et al.*, 2021; Jacquet, 2019; 2017; Fournier *et al.*, 2011; Statistik Austria, 2021). Thus, despite the lack of institutional ties, people were more than twice as willing to participate in the Good Council than they were to take part in the government-induced Council for Climate Action.

---

[7]   Out of these 1,424 persons, two had to be removed from the pool due to incomplete survey responses. The statistical selection drew on 1,422 registrations.

Invitations	Registrations	Response rate %	Cancelations	% of registrations
10,000	1,424	14.2	16	1.1

Table 2: Registration for the Good Council. (Data source: Haselmayer, 2024a.)

As recommended elsewhere (e.g. OECD, 2020), the brief registration survey included sociodemographic information. Respondents were asked for their gender, education, employment status, postal code (to calculate geographic regions and urbanization level), household income, household size, and number of children in the household (to compute per capita income). Another variable captured the overall view on the fairness of wealth distribution in Austria to ensure a diverse range of opinions on the key topic of interest. In total, nine variables with 35 categories entered the selection logic.

In line with empirical evidence from other deliberative mini-publics (e.g. Ryfe and Stalsburg, 2012; Fournier *et al.*, 2011), participation willingness was highly skewed based on socio-economic status. Table 3 provides an overview of the variables relevant to the selection process, showing the number of registrations per category and the odds ratios representing each group's share among registrants relative to its actual share in the population. Values below 1 indicate underrepresentation, a value of 1 indicates proportional representation, and values above 1 indicate overrepresentation.

The results in Table 3 reveal that individuals with higher education and above-average income were more likely to register. Specifically, individuals with a university degree were 2.3 times more likely to express willingness to participate compared to their share in the Austrian population, whereas those with only compulsory education were underrepresented by a factor of 0.38. Similarly, people from the third (OR: 1.27) and fourth income deciles (OR: 1.4) were more likely to seek participation.

Additionally, people under 45, residents of urban areas, and those from the eastern federal states (*Bundesländer*) were disproportionately represented among those expressing interest in the Good Council. Individuals from pre-2004 EU member states, other countries (mainly Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria), and Austria were somewhat more likely to participate. Attitudes toward wealth distribution also had an effect: those who believed wealth is unequally distributed in Austria were more inclined to join the Good Council (OR: 1.15).

Variable	Category	(n)	Registration (odds ratio)	Members (perfect representation)	Surplus per category
Gender	Diverse	6	0.84	0-1	5–6
	Female	712	0.99	25	687
	Male	704	1.01	25	679
Age	16–29	322	1.20	9	313
	30–44	503	1.46	12	491
	45–59	330	0.91	13	317
	60+	267	0.60	16	251
Education	Compulsory education	126	0.38	12	114
	Apprenticeship	335	0.75	16	319
	Vocational schools	172	0.87	7	165
	High school	287	1.28	8	279
	University degree	502	2.27	8	494
Employment	Unemployed	65	1.14	2	63
	In education	150	1.18	1	149
	Employees	795	1.24	23	772
	Self-employed	133	1.62	3	130
	Pension	236	0.61	14	222
	Other	43	0.34	1	42
Region	Eastern	647	1.04	22	625
	Southern	328	1.14	10	318
	Western	447	0.88	18	429
Degree of urbanization	Cities	542	1.23	16	526
	Towns and suburbs	434	1.00	15	419
	Rural areas	446	0.82	19	427
Place of birth	Austria	1,174	1.08	38	1,136
	EU (pre 2004)	85	1.33	2	83
	EU (post 2004)	80	0.53	2	78
	Turkey, Ex-Yugoslavia	47	0.33	3	44
	Other	39	1.23	4	35
Income	Q1	212	0.60	13	199
	Q2	262	0.74	13	249
	Q3	450	1.27	13	437
	Q4	498	1.40	13	485
Assessment of wealth distribution	Unfair	1,231	1.15	38	1,193
	Fair	191	0.55	12	179

Table 3. Registration for the Good Council of Redistribution.[8] (Note: n = 1,422. Data sources: Population data, Statistics Austria (2021–2023); attitudes toward wealth distribution, SORA (2022).)

These results suggest that the Good Council reproduced entrenched biases in participation (willingness). However, the high overall response rate provided a strong foundation for creating a representative panel. As shown in Table 3, even among groups with the lowest registration rates (or absolute numbers), there was no difficulty in meeting the necessary quotas to form a representative panel (of the nine selection variables). For example, despite their low enrolment odds, it

would have been possible to recruit more than two panels exclusively composed of individuals with only compulsory education, up to four panels of individuals from low-income households (fourth quartile), or one entire mini-public consisting of unemployed individuals.

Stage II — Statistical selection

The second stage of the selection process aimed to address these biases. To achieve this, it used an algorithm developed by Flanigan *et al.* (2021), which is widely employed in assembling mini-publics.[9] The approach seeks to select representative panels while maximizing each individual's chance of being included in the final panel. The LEXIMIN algorithm requires a set of selection variables and predetermined quotas as input, then computes a range of panels that satisfy these quotas. The final panel is chosen through a random draw from the list of qualifying options (for more details, see Flanigan *et al.*, 2021). In this process, all nine variables, encompassing 35 categories, were fully incorporated into the stratification logic. The algorithm treated the strata as 'soft' targets, meaning that they were not mutually exclusive, and balanced representation across these categories was achieved while ensuring the fairness of the random selection.

Figure 2 shows the percentage share of Good Council members[10] for each category (dots). The whiskers represent the actual distribution in the population, with a range spanning 10 percentage points. The standard for evaluating mini-public representativeness emphasizes 'broad representation' (Curato *et al.*, 2021; OECD, 2020) or the ability for everyone in the population 'to see someone like themselves in the panel' (Redman and Carson, 2022). As illustrated in Figure 1, the differences in the final panel are minimal across the nine variables and 35 categories (mean deviation: 1.5%). Based on objective statistical criteria, the Good Council closely reflected the actual demographic make-up of the Austrian population (Table A2 in the appendix provides the exact figures).

---

9   In 2021, the paper already cited 50 citizen panels. Major sortition organizations, such as the Sortition Foundation and newDemocracy rely on the algorithm, see: https://selection.newdemocracy.com.au/ and https://github.com/sortitionfoundation/ stratification-app [10 October 2024].

10   The panel composition represents the final pool of Council members. Two initially selected panel members had to be replaced. One member dropped out before the first weekend and the selected replacement member took part in all Council meetings. A second member dropped out after the first weekend (no show) and was replaced for the five remaining weekends. Beyond that, the composition remained unchanged until the end of Good Council. The replacement group consisted of 15 persons from the initial pool of registered users, which were determined using the LEXIMIN algorithm, once all 50 initial members had agreed to participate.

Composition of the Good Council

Figure 2. Composition of the Good Council. (Note: Points indicate %-share of Council members. Whiskers indicate the distributional range of the Austrian population.)

4. Motives for Participation in the Good Council

What drove the general willingness to participate in the Good Council? Previous research extending descriptive analyses of registration patterns has explored sociodemographic and attitudinal factors that may influence willingness to engage in deliberative mini-publics using hypothetical surveys (Coffé and Michels, 2014; Webb, 2013; Neblo, 2010). These studies find that higher education, higher occupational status, and younger age are significantly and positively correlated with participation readiness. The same holds for higher political interest, political efficacy, and satisfaction with democracy (Coffé and Michels, 2014; Webb, 2013; Neblo, 2010). One study also found that financial incentives

may increase willingness to participate (Neblo, 2010). Beyond hypothetical surveys, Jacquet (2017) explores the motives for non-participation through qualitative interviews with citizens who did not respond positively to invitations to join a Belgian mini-public. The primary reasons for non-participation in his study were personal, such as scheduling conflicts or a preference for spending time in the private sphere, though a perceived lack of impact was also frequently mentioned. Less important factors for non-participation included low internal efficacy or political alienation (*ibid.*).

To explore this question further, this paper draws on data regarding the relevance of different motives for participation based on actual expressions of interest in joining the Good Council. These data are used to examine how different motives vary across sociodemographic and attitudinal attributes. Understanding the relative importance of different participation motives is crucial, as it could inform design decisions and targeting strategies for specific (under-represented) groups, thereby fostering more inclusive participation.

To investigate the motives for participation, we conducted an online survey in the week leading up to the Council's first meeting in March 2024. The survey included a diverse group of individuals, all of whom had previously expressed their willingness to participate in the Good Council. This group consisted of selected Council members, replacement members, and registered users who consented to take part in the survey (see Table 4). Participation was very high for members (94%) and replacement members (100%)[11] and substantial for the group of registered citizens who had previously agreed to take part in the survey (65%). In total, the dataset includes valid responses from 302 individuals.

Group	(n)	(N)	Response rate
Members	46	50	92%
Replacement	14	14	100%
Registered	253	374	68%
Total	313	437	72%

Table 4. Survey composition (pre-Council).

The survey included a question with five closed-ended items to capture different motives for participation.[12] Respondents could rate the importance of each motive on a four-point Likert-type scale, ranging from not important at all to very important. Respondents were asked to rate the importance of each motive on a four-point Likert scale, ranging from 'not important at all' to 'very important'. These items are designed to capture three distinct rationales for participation: (a) 'intrinsic' motives related to political participation, such as interest in the

---

[11] Out of the fifteen replacement members, one resigned, while another one replaced an original Council member.

[12] There was also an open question for additional motives, which was seldomly used (n = 66 or 22% of respondents) and mostly included repetitive enumerations of motives from the closed items (or variations thereof). Therefore, this item is not included in the subsequent analysis. The most prominent motives are 'making a contribution' (n = 31), sub-topics of inequality (e.g. education, representation; n = 14) and '(new) exchanges' (n = 10).

topic and the opportunity to contribute one's own ideas, (b) 'personal' motives, such as financial remuneration or the desire for new experiences, and (c) a 'sense of duty', emphasizing the fact of honouring one's selection.

Figure 1 presents descriptive results for all questions for Council members, replacement members, and the group of non-selected registered respondents. It is evident from the figure that virtually everyone was interested in the topic, with roughly two-thirds of both groups expressing very strong interest. A similar proportion of respondents were eager to contribute their own ideas (91% of Good Council members, 100% of replacement members, 95% of registered respondents). Thus, in terms of the purely intrinsic dimension of participation, there is no observable difference between the three groups.

A sense of duty also played a significant role, particularly for Good Council members (86%), somewhat less so for replacement members (72%), and even less for registered respondents (58%). However, the difference likely reflects the timing of the survey, which was conducted just before the Council's first meeting. At that point, the sense of duty felt much more immediate for those selected for the Council and their replacements.

When it comes to personal motives, all groups attached the same level of importance to new experiences, with seven out of ten respondents indicating this was a key factor. Lastly, remuneration — arguably one of the most distinctive features of the Good Council — was least relevant according to the survey: roughly a third (29%) of non-selected respondents and just under half of members (42%) and replacement members (50%) considered it important. However, this figure may reflect social desirability bias, as respondents might downplay the importance of money, viewing it as a 'less noble' motive.[13]

In descriptive terms, the differences between the three groups are negligible, except for the two aspects most influenced by actual membership status: just days before the start of the Council, the duty of honouring the selection and the tangible benefits of remuneration were much more immediate for participants and replacement members, which likely explains these differences.

---

[13] For example, Rynes *et al.* (2004) show that employees sharply underreport the importance of money as motivation.

Motives for participation

Figure 3. Motives for participation: registered users and Good Council members. (Note: Results for Good Council members (GC), replacements (RP), and registered users (RE).)

Multivariate analysis

Building on the descriptive findings, we now turn to a more detailed analysis to understand the factors that drive these motivations. To gain a better understanding of what influences participation motives, we conducted ordered logistic regression models. The dependent variables in these models are the five identified motives for participation (measured on a 4-point scale).

As explanatory factors, we include a range of variables, most of which have been linked to participation in mini-publics in previous research (Coffé and Michels, 2014; Webb, 2013; Neblo, 2010). These variables are grouped into: (a) personal attributes, which include sociodemographic factors, and (b) attitudinal variables, which reflect general views of democracy, wealth inequality, as well as knowledge of wealth concentration in Austria.

Sociodemographic variables include gender (male (1), female/diverse (0)), education (5 categories, ranging from no degree/basic education to university degree), employment status (not employed, employed, retired), age (continuous), a dummy for children in the household (0/1), as well as an estimate of personal wealth (10-point ladder). Attitudinal variables encompass internal political efficacy (an index of two questions on respondents' confidence in contributing to political discussions and their general understanding of political issues),[14] political interest (4-point scale), general assessment of the fairness of wealth distribution (4-point scale), and knowledge about wealth concentration in Austria (an estimate of the top 1% share of wealth, measured as deviation from the true

---

14 Item 1: I can understand and assess important political issues well. Item 2: I have the confidence to actively participate in a conversation about political issues.

value on an 11-point scale). Finally, a three-category variable adjusts for differences between members, replacement members, and non-selected respondents that may reflect variation in the 'immediacy' of motives, such as financial remuneration (see Figure 2). The appendix provides summary statistics for all variables (Table A3).

Table 5 presents the results of ten ordered logistic regression models. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level to account for potential serial auto-correlation. For each of the five dependent variables, we ran two separate models: one with sociodemographic variables and another with attitudinal ones. This approach allows us to examine two different explanatory logics without over-loading the model. A 'full model' that includes all variables is provided in Table A4 of the Appendix, confirming the results presented below.

To assess the magnitude of the effects, Figures 3–5 plot the predicted probabilities for two selected response options from the four-point scale. The choice of categories was guided by the response patterns shown in Figure 2 to highlight the main differences for each variable. For the topics of interest, own ideas, and sense of duty, the plots show the probabilities for choosing 'very important' or 'somewhat important'. For new experiences, the results represent the difference between 'rather not important' and 'very important'. For monetary motives, we plot the probabilities for choosing 'not at all important' and 'somewhat important'. The substantive interpretation focuses on these differences.

Topic

Turning to the first two models, the left panel of Figure 3 presents the results for priming the topic. The only significant sociodemographic variable is wealth, based on respondents' self-reported position on a ten-point ladder. Moving from the lowest (1) to the highest (10) wealth positions, respondents were more likely to choose the 'very important' category. At the lowest wealth position (1), about 59% of respondents rated the topic as 'very important', while this figure increased to 84% for the wealthiest respondents (10). The adjacent response category shows the exact opposite trend. Thus, while the topic was important to nearly everyone, wealthier respondents were much more likely to consider it 'very important'.

When examining attitudinal factors, a clear difference is observed across levels of political interest. Those least interested in politics were also least likely to say the topic mattered strongly to them. Across the observed levels of political interest, the predicted probabilities of rating the topic as 'very important' increase from 37% to 83%. Differences remain substantial even when excluding the small group of entirely uninterested respondents: comparing 'rather not' (54%) to 'very' (83%) interested respondents shows a 29% difference. A similar trend is observed for internal political efficacy. Here, the share of 'very important' responses rises from 48% to 80% (+32%) as political efficacy increases. At the same time, those with lower efficacy were more likely to select the 'somewhat important' category. In sum, more privileged groups (both in material and political terms) attached greater importance to the topic of the Good Council.

Figure 4. Predicted probabilities of selected answer categories. (Note: Estimates are based on Model 1 (SD) (wealth) and on Model 1 (AT) (pol. interest, efficiency), Table 5.)

Own ideas

Turning to the motive of promoting one's own ideas, statistically significant differences are found with regard to gender. Men were less inclined to bring in their own ideas than women or diverse respondents. On average, 45% of men selected the 'very important' category, 12% fewer than female/diverse respondents (57%). Additionally, unemployed respondents showed a stronger attachment to bringing in their ideas than those employed or retired. Unemployed participants (70%) were 19% more likely than employed individuals (51%) and 34% more likely than pensioners (36%) to view this motive as very important. This hierarchy reverses when considering the 'somewhat important' category, with pensioners (55%) more likely to choose it than employed (43%) and unemployed respondents (27%).

As expected, individuals with higher political efficacy were more likely to show a stronger attachment to bringing in their ideas. Respondents with the highest efficacy scores were up to 32% more likely to consider this motive very important. At the lowest efficacy score, 48% of respondents felt it was very important, whereas 80% of those with the highest scores agreed. The difference remains substantial even when comparing those with medium (efficiency score of 0) and very high (score of 2) efficacy: the former group's predicted probability of selecting 'very important' is 62%, while the latter's is 80%, representing a +18% difference.

We also observed an effect based on respondents' views of wealth distribution. The fairer they perceived it, the less likely they were to rate bringing in their own ideas as very important, with predicted relevance increasing from 30% to 57%. Among those who saw the distribution as very unfair, about 38% considered the motive somewhat important, while 57% rated it as very important. For all other groups, the motive was less urgent, and there was no significant difference between the 'very important' and 'somewhat important' responses.

This suggests that those more directly concerned with the issue of wealth distribution (e.g. unemployed) and those who view the distribution as more unjust are more driven to bring their ideas to the Council. Additionally, those more 'able' to contribute (due to political efficacy) were also more likely to reference this motive.


Figure 5. Predicted probabilities of selected answer categories. (Note: Estimates are based on Model 2 (SD) (gender, employment) and Model 2 (AT) (efficiency), Table 5.)

Sense of duty

Turning to the motive of fulfilling a duty by honouring the selection, it correlates with two sociodemographic factors. First, men were less likely to consider this motive very important (20%) compared to women or people with diverse gender identities (32%). Figure 4 shows that women and diverse respondents were almost equally split between the 'somewhat important' (38%) and 'very important' (32%) categories. In contrast, men were more likely to select 'somewhat important' (35%, +15%). Beyond gender, respondents without children (under 14) placed less importance on the duty motive (36% somewhat, 24% very important), while those with children were more evenly split between the two categories (37% and 34%, respectively). Thus, the motive of honouring the selection was stronger for women/diverse individuals and those with children in the household.

As indicated by the bivariate patterns in Figure 2, the multivariate analysis further confirms substantial differences between registered respondents and selected Council members.

Figure 6. Predicted probabilities of selected answer categories. (Note: Estimates are based on Model 3 (SD), Table 5.)

New experiences

The third set of motives focuses on personal aspects, as shown in Figure 6. Here, we examine the probabilities of rating this motive as 'very important' or 'rather not important'. Gender and age were key drivers of the motive related to new experiences. This motive was more significant for female/diverse respondents (41%) compared to men (31%). While twice as many women/diverse respondents rated it as 'very important' (41%) compared to 'somewhat important' (20%), men were almost equally split between the two categories (27% and 31%).

New experiences also mattered more for younger respondents than for older ones. Moving from the youngest to the oldest, the likelihood of selecting 'very important' decreased from 50% to 16% (–34%). Additionally, respondents with children in the household were more likely to rate new experiences as 'very important' (44%) compared to those without children (33%). For gender, children, and age, the opposite trend was observed for the 'rather not important' response.

Figure 7. Predicted probabilities of selected answer categories. (Note: Estimates are based on Model 4 (SD), Table 5.)

Remuneration

Regarding financial incentives, employment status and knowledge of wealth concentration in Austria show significant effects. Only 8% of the unemployed said that fair remuneration didn't matter at all, compared to 22% of the employed and 34% of pensioners. Conversely, 40% of the unemployed rated money as somewhat important, compared to 24% of the employed and 16% of pensioners.

Figure 6 reveals an interesting trend in relation to knowledge about wealth concentration. Those who underestimate the concentration of wealth (top 1% share) are more influenced by monetary incentives. Moving from strong underestimation (36%) to overestimation (20%), respondents were 16% more likely to choose 'somewhat important'. This suggests that individuals who (strongly) underestimate wealth inequality are more receptive to financial incentives than those with a more accurate or inflated perception of the wealth distribution.

There is also a significant effect for political interest. Among those least interested in politics, fair pay mattered more (40% rated it 'somewhat important') compared to those with higher political interest (20%). As with the duty motive, regression models confirm significant differences between registered respondents and selected Council members ($p < 0.05$) as well as replacement members ($p < 0.05$). The results suggest that substantial financial incentives could motivate groups that are typically underrepresented, such as individuals with fewer material resources or lower interest in politics. Additionally, the findings on knowledge about wealth distribution indicate that such rewards might also engage those who perceive the topic as less relevant or pressing.

Figure 8. Predicted probabilities of selected answer categories. (Note: Estimates are based on Model 5 (SD) (employment) and Model 5 (A) (knowledge, political interest), Table 5.)

5. Discussion

This study examined the selection process for the Good Council, evaluating the representativeness of registered participants and the final panel. It also explored the various motives for participation in the citizen assembly. The results show that participation willingness was strongly influenced by sociodemographic and attitudinal factors, which are well-established in political participation research. However, the large pool of registered individuals and the two-stage selection process ensured a high level of descriptive representation across a broad range of variables.

   The analysis of participation motives reveals that both sociodemographic and attitudinal factors affect why individuals choose to engage in deliberative mini-publics. The data indicate that the monetary incentive offered by the Good Council was particularly appealing to traditionally underrepresented groups, including the unemployed, less politically engaged individuals, and those with a misconception of the topic's relevance. Other noteworthy findings include the stronger emphasis on personal experiences among younger participants, and a greater sense of duty to honour their selection among parents and women as well as diverse respondents.

   Overall, the results underscore that people participate in deliberative mini-publics for diverse reasons. Understanding the variation in these motives could inform the design of more inclusive mini-publics, particularly by improving financial remuneration. Although there are well-founded concerns in the research about using substantial **financial** incentives (Gneezy *et al*., 2011), the findings suggest it may be worthwhile to reconsider whether current practices could unintentionally undermine inclusiveness. However, increased remuneration, while encouraging participation, is not sufficient on its own to address deeper barriers to inclusiveness or achieve true representativeness. Other factors, such as perceived impact, institutionalization, and intrinsic motivations, likely play a more critical role in shaping participation. Simpler solutions, such as tailoring

	Topic		Own ideas		Sense of duty		Experience		Remuneration	
	M1 (SD)	M1 (AT)	M2 (SD)	M2 (AT)	M3 (SD)	M3 (AT)	M4 (SD)	M4 (AT)	M5 (SD)	M5 (AT)
Gender: male	−0.19		−0.51*		−0.66**		−0.47*		−0.31	
	(0.26)		(0.26)		(0.22)		(0.22)		(0.23)	
Education	0.14		0.04		0.04		−0.09		0.16+	
	(0.11)		(0.09)		(0.10)		(0.08)		(0.09)	
Employed	−0.30		−0.84*		−0.57+		−0.28		−1.15***	
	(0.40)		(0.35)		(0.34)		(0.32)		(0.33)	
Retired	0.64		−1.52**		−0.70		−0.28		−1.75**	
	(0.65)		(0.59)		(0.53)		(0.51)		(0.54)	
Age	0.00		0.01		0.01		−0.02*		−0.00	
	(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)	
Children	0.30		0.40		0.55*		0.52*		0.45+	
	(0.29)		(0.28)		(0.26)		(0.26)		(0.25)	
Wealth	0.14+		−0.06		0.04		0.03		−0.09	
	(0.07)		(0.07)		(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.07)	
Int. efficacy		0.45*		0.85***		0.00		−0.05		0.05
		(0.20)		(0.20)		(0.18)		(0.17)		(0.16)
Political interest		0.73**		−0.06		0.04		−0.15		−0.46*
		(0.25)		(0.21)		(0.20)		(0.23)		(0.21)
Fairness of wealth distribution		−0.35		−0.43*		−0.08		−0.15		−0.07
		(0.24)		(0.19)		(0.17)		(0.22)		(0.21)
Knowledge: wealth distribution		0.06		−0.02		−0.03		−0.03		−0.12*
		(0.06)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.06)

	Topic		Own ideas		Sense of duty		Experience		Remuneration	
	M1 (SD)	M1 (AT)	M2 (SD)	M2 (AT)	M3 (SD)	M3 (AT)	M4 (SD)	M4 (AT)	M5 (SD)	M5 (AT)
GC replacement member	0.10	0.20	−0.45	−0.32	0.97**	0.87**	−0.08	−0.35	0.70*	0.28
	(0.39)	(0.41)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.31)	(0.30)	(0.34)	(0.33)	(0.32)	(0.33)
GC member	0.18	−0.40	0.68	1.21	0.89	0.59	0.91	0.45	0.98*	0.48
	(0.72)	(0.64)	(0.59)	(0.78)	(0.55)	(0.65)	(0.82)	(0.86)	(0.48)	(0.43)
cut1	−3.31***	−3.09***	−6.23***	−5.57***	−1.71**	−2.08***	−4.07***	−3.06***	−2.10***	−2.35***
	(0.79)	(0.72)	(1.15)	(1.05)	(0.58)	(0.45)	(0.55)	(0.50)	(0.60)	(0.45)
cut2	0.28	0.87+	−3.39***	−2.70***	−0.06	−0.41	−2.29***	−1.30**	0.12	−0.31
	(0.61)	(0.51)	(0.58)	(0.48)	(0.59)	(0.41)	(0.51)	(0.45)	(0.60)	(0.42)
cut3			−0.49	0.26	1.62**	1.11**	−0.80	0.06	2.13**	1.69***
			(0.55)	(0.41)	(0.60)	(0.42)	(0.50)	(0.44)	(0.66)	(0.44)
Observations	300	289	297	287	294	283	299	288	299	289
McFadden's R^2	0.03	0.10	0.04	0.07	0.03	0.01	0.04	0.01	0.05	0.02
BIC	458.17	388.88	568.98	518.77	811.65	783.26	797.07	776.60	760.94	744.73

Table 1. Explaining motives for willingness to participate. (Notes: Respondent-clustered standard errors in parentheses, + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.)

information campaigns to target specific groups, may also complement financial incentives by addressing structural barriers. Ultimately, a deeper understanding of participation motives could help reduce biases and enhance the inclusion of underrepresented groups.

However, these results have limitations, as they stem from a single study of a distinct, privately organized mini-public, which limits their generalizability to other contexts. Nonetheless, the findings suggest that further research into participation motives is valuable and could be applied to test whether the observed patterns hold in publicly organized mini-publics. Additionally, future studies could explore participants' perceptions of potential impact and institutionalization, as these factors may play a crucial role in shaping willingness to participate. Building on previous studies (Jacquet, 2017), it is also essential to explore the reasons for non-participation. This is particularly important as it may lead to self-selection bias if refusal patterns align with structural factors or preferences relevant to the mini-public's discussion (Spada and Peixoto (2025), this volume). Such research would further enrich our understanding of the barriers to engagement.

Disclaimer

References

Carson, L. & Dienel, H.L. (2020) Financial compensation for citizens in mini-publics: Comparing Australia and Germany, *newDemocracy Research and Development Note*, 27 July, [Online], https://www.newdemocracy.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/RD-Note-Financial-Compensation.pdf [04 October 2024].

Coffé, H. & Michels, A. (2014) Education and support for representative, direct and stealth democracy, *Electoral Studies*, **35**, pp. 1–11.

Courant, D. (2022) Institutionalizing deliberative mini-publics? Issues of legitimacy and power for randomly selected assemblies in political systems, *Critical Policy Studies*, **2**, pp. 162–180.

Curato, N., Farrell, D.M., Geißel, B., Grönlund, K., Mockler, P., Pilet, J.-P., Renwick, A., Rose, J., Setälä, M. & Suiter, J. (2021) *Deliberative Mini-Publics: Core Design Features*, Bristol: Bristol University Press.

Devillers, S., Vrydagh, J., Caluwaerts, D. & Reuchamps, M. (2021) Looking in from the outside: How do invited but not selected citizens perceive the legitimacy of a mini-public?, *Journal of Deliberative Democracy*, **17** (1).

Fessler, P., Lindner, P. & Schürz, M. (2023) Eurosystem household finance and consumption survey 2021: First results for Austria, *OeNB Reports*, [Online], https://www.hfcs.at/dam/jcr:435ec169-8c42-4614-ad31-e36c4d0640a0/HFCS_2021_first-results.pdf [14 March 2024].

Flanigan, B., Gölz, P., Gupta, A., Hennig, B. & Procaccia, A.D. (2021) Fair algorithms for selecting citizens' assemblies, *Nature*, **596** (7873), pp. 548–552.

Fournier, P., van der Kolk, H., Carty, R., Blais, A. & Rose, J. (2011) *When Citizens Decide: Lessons from Citizen Assemblies on Electoral Reform*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Giraudet, L.G., Apouey, B., Arab, H., Baeckelandt, S., Begout, P., Berghmans, N. & Tournus, S. (2022) 'Co-construction' in deliberative democracy: Lessons from the French citizens' convention for climate, *Humanities and Social Sciences Communications*, **9** (1), pp. 1–16.

Gneezy, U., Meier, S. & Rey-Biel, P. (2011) When and why incentives (don't) work to modify behavior, *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, **25** (4), pp. 191–210.

Goldberg, S. & Bächtiger, A. (2023) Catching the 'deliberative wave'? How (disaffected) citizens assess deliberative citizen forums, *British Journal of Political Science*, **53** (1), pp. 239–247.

Haselmayer, M. (2024a) Auswahl der Mitglieder des Guten Rats. Dokumentation der Ergebnisse, *Foresight*, March 2023, [Online], https://www.foresight.at/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/FORESIGHT_Bericht_23061_Guter_Rat_Auswahl.pdf [08 November 2024].

Haselmayer, M. (2024b) Guter Rat für Rückverteilung: Bevölkerungsbericht. Dokumentation der Ergebnisse, *Foresight*, November 2024, [Online], https://www.foresight.at/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/FORESIGHT_Bericht_23061_Guter_Rat_Bevoelkerung.pdf [03 December 2024].

Jacquet, V. (2019) The role and the future of deliberative mini-publics: A citizen perspective, *Political Studies*, **67** (3), pp. 639–657.

Jacquet, V. (2017) Explaining non-participation in deliberative mini-publics, *European Journal of Political Research*, **56** (3), pp. 640–659.

Jestl, S. & List, E. (2020) *Distributional National Accounts (DINA) for Austria, 2004–2016*, [Online], https://wid.world/news-article/distributional-national-accounts-dina-for-austria-2004-2016/ [14 March 2024].

Kennickell, A.B., Lindner, P. & Schürz, M. (2022) A new instrument to measure wealth inequality: Distributional wealth accounts, *Monetary Policy & the Economy: Quarterly Review of Economic Policy*, **21** (4), pp. 61–84.

Neblo, M.A., Esterling, K.M., Kennedy, R.P., Lazer, D.M. & Sokhey, A.E. (2010) Who wants to deliberate — and why?, *American Political Science Review*, **104** (3), pp. 566–583.

OECD (2020) *Innovative Citizen Participation and New Democratic Institutions: Catching the Deliberative Wave*, Paris: OECD Publishing. doi: 10.1787/339306da-en

OECD (2021) *Does Inequality Matter? How People Perceive Economic Disparities and Social Mobility*, Paris: OECD Publishing. doi: 10.1787/3023ed40-en

OECD (2023) *Revenue Statistics — OECD Countries (1965–2021)*, [Online], https://stats.oecd.org/# [4 November 2024].

OECD (2024) *Taxing Wages — Austria*, [Online], https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/topics/policy-issues/tax-policy/taxing-wages-austria.pdf [4 November 2024].

Redman, K. & Carson, L. (2022). How to Recruit Participants for Citizens' Assemblies. newDemocracy Research and Development Note, January 2022. https://www.newdemocracy.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/RD-Note-Recruitment.pdf [16 December 2024].

Ryfe, D.M. & Stalsburg, B. (2012) The participation and recruitment challenge, in Nabatchi, T., Gastil, J., Leighninger, M., *et al.* (eds.) *Democracy in Motion: Evaluating the Practice and Impact of Deliberative Civic Engagement*, pp. 43–56, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rynes, S. L., Gerhart, B., & Minette, K. A. (2004). The importance of pay in employee motivation: Discrepancies between what people say and what they do. *Human Resource Management: Published in Cooperation with the School of Business Administration, The University of Michigan and in alliance with the Society of Human Resources Management*, *43*(4), 381-394.

Spada, P., and Peixoto, T. (2025) The limits on representativeness in citizens' assemblies: A critical analysis of democratic minipublics, *Journal of Sortition*, **1** (1).

Statistik Austria (2021) *Auswahlverfahren für den Klimarat der Bürgerinnen und Bürger 2021/22. Methodische Dokumentation und Ergebnisse* [*Selection and Methods Report of the Austrian Climate Council*], [Online], https://www.statistik.at/fileadmin/pages/300/methodenbericht_auswahlverfahren_klimarat.pdf [07 October 2024].

Webb, P. (2013) Who is willing to participate? Dissatisfied democrats, stealth democrats and populists in the United Kingdom, *European Journal of Political Research*, **52** (6), pp. 747–772.

Appendix

Variable	Data source	Description
Gender	Statistics Austria/ Estimate	Database: Bevölkerung zu Jahresbeginn ab 2002 (einheitlicher Gebietsstand 2023) Diverse gender identity: Estimate based on international studies (Office for National Statistics (ONS-UK) 2023; Ipsos 2021; Zhang *et al.*, 2020)
Age	Statistics Austria	Database: Bevölkerung zu Jahresbeginn ab 2002 (einheitlicher Gebietsstand 2023)
Education	Statistics Austria	Database: Abgestimmte Erwerbsstatistik — Personen — Zeitreihe ab 2011 (2021) (letzte Aktualisierung: [12 July 2023])
Employment	Statistics Austria	Database: Mikrozensus-Arbeitskräfteerhebung Jahresdaten (2022)
Region	Statistics Austria	Database: Mikrozensus, Arbeitsmarkt, Jahresdaten (2022), Regionale Gliederung
Degree of urbanization	Statistics Austria	Database: Mikrozensus, Arbeitsmarkt, Jahresdaten, 2022, Regionale Gliederung
Place of birth	Statistics Austria	Database: Bevölkerung zu Jahresbeginn ab 2002 (einheitlicher Gebietsstand 2023)
Income	Statistics Austria	Database: EU-SILC (2022)
Assessment of wealth distribution	SORA — Institute for Social Research and Consulting	Representative survey of 2,000 individuals aged 16 and older (2022); responses without 'don't know/ no answer' (Zandonella and Schönherr, 2023, p. 14)

Table A1. Data sources population data. (Note: The selection of data sources was based on the relevance and availability of the respective data.)

References for Table A1

Ipsos (2021) *LGBT+ Pride 2021 Global Survey*, [Online], https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/news-polls/ipsos-lgbt-pride-2021-global-survey [14 March 2024].

Office for National Statistics (ONS-UK) (2023) *Quality of Census 2021 Gender Identity Data*, released 8 November 2023, [Online], https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/culturalidentity/genderidentity/articles/qualityofcensus2021genderidentitydata/2023-11-13 [14 March 2024].

Zandonella, M. & Schönherr, D. (2023) Umverteilung — So denken die Vielen. Steuer-, arbeitsmarkt- & sozialpolitische Vorhaben aus Sicht der Bevölkerung, *SORA — Forschungsbericht*, Wien, March 2023 [15 March 2024].

Zhang, Q., Goodman, M., Adams, N., Corneil, T., Hashemi, L., Kreukels, B. & Coleman, E. (2020) Epidemiological considerations in transgender health: A systematic review with focus on higher quality data, *International Journal of Transgender Health*, **21** (2), pp. 125–137.

Variable	Category	Mean (members)	Mean (population)	Difference
Gender	Diverse (estimate)	0.02	0.01	0.01
	Female	0.50	0.51	−0.01
	Male	0.48	0.49	−0.01
Age	16–29	0.20	0.19	0.01
	30–44	0.26	0.24	0.02
	45–59	0.24	0.26	−0.02
	60+	0.30	0.31	−0.01
Education	Compulsory eduction	0.20	0.24	−0.04
	Apprenticeship	0.32	0.31	0.01
	Vocational schools	0.16	0.14	0.02

Variable	Category	Mean (members)	Mean (population)	Difference
	High school	0.14	0.16	−0.02
	University degree	0.18	0.16	0.02
Employment	Unemployed	0.06	0.04	0.02
	In education	0.08	0.09	−0.01
	Employees	0.44	0.45	−0.01
	Self-employed	0.08	0.06	0.02
	Pension	0.28	0.27	0.01
	Other	0.06	0.09	−0.03
Region	Eastern	0.44	0.44	0.00
	Southern	0.22	0.20	0.02
	Western	0.34	0.36	−0.02
Degree of urbanization	Cities	0.78	0.76	0.02
	Towns and suburbs	0.06	0.05	0.01
	Rural areas	0.04	0.04	0.00
Place of birth	Austria	0.06	0.06	0.00
	EU (pre 2004)	0.06	0.08	−0.02
	EU (post 2004)	0.24	0.25	−0.01
	Turkey, Ex-Yugoslavia	0.24	0.25	−0.01
	Other	0.28	0.25	0.03
Income	Q1	0.24	0.25	−0.01
	Q2	0.34	0.31	0.03
	Q3	0.30	0.30	0.00
	Q4	0.36	0.38	−0.02
Attitude toward wealth distribution	Unfair	0.76	0.75	0.01
	Fair	0.24	0.25	−0.01

Table A2. The composition of the final panel. (Note: n = 1,422. Data sources: Population data: Statistics Austria (2021–2023); attitudes toward wealth distribution: Zandonella and Schönherr (2023) — see Table A1 for more details.)

Variable	N	Mean	Median	Std. Dev.	min	max
Motive: topic	313	2.67	3	0.5	1	3
Motive: own ideas	309	2.46	3	0.61	0	3
Motive: New experiences	312	1.98	2	0.94	0	3
Motive: Honor selection	307	1.81	2	0.96	0	3
		81				
Motive: Fair compensation	310	1.17	1	0.85	0	3
Council membership	313	0.24	0	0.52	0	2
Gender (male)	313	0.43	0	0.5	0	1
Education	313	3.73	4	1.37	1	5
Employment status	313	2.01	2	0.57	1	3
Age	313	44.19	40	15.78	16	95
Child(ren) in the household	313	0.29	0	0.46	0	1
Position on wealth ladder	300	3.87	4	1.76	1	10
Internal political efficiency	305	0.81	1	0.79	−1.5	2
Political interest	312	2.01	2	0.73	0	3
Assessment of wealth distribution	305	0.5	0	0.63	0	3
Knowledge: Top 1% share of total wealth	299	1.59	1	2.24	−4	5

Table A3. Summary statistics. (Note: Different numbers of observations are due to missing responses/don't knows.)

	Topic	Own ideas	Sense of duty	Experience	Remuneration
	M1	M2	M3	M3	M3
Gender: male	−0.46	−0.86**	−0.68**	−0.44+	−0.25
	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.25)
Education	0.02	−0.18+	0.01	−0.12	0.25*
	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Employed	0.14	−0.58	−0.58+	−0.30	−1.31***
	(0.43)	(0.37)	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.35)
Retired	0.98	−1.58*	−0.68	−0.17	−1.82**
	(0.74)	(0.69)	(0.54)	(0.53)	(0.58)
Age	−0.01	0.01	0.02+	−0.02*	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Children	0.35	0.28	0.54*	0.70*	0.46+
	(0.34)	(0.29)	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.26)
Wealth	0.09	−0.17*	0.04	0.04	−0.10
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Int. efficacy	0.48*	1.12***	0.10	−0.13	−0.12
	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.19)
Political interest	0.77**	0.09	−0.00	0.16	−0.24
	(0.28)	(0.24)	(0.20)	(0.25)	(0.21)
Fairness of wealth	−0.38	−0.25	−0.02	−0.01	0.11
distribution	(0.26)	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.22)	(0.21)
Knowledge: wealth	0.04	−0.01	−0.04	−0.02	−0.08
distribution	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
GC replacement member	0.50	−0.34	0.98**	−0.31	0.51
	(0.47)	(0.41)	(0.34)	(0.37)	(0.35)
GC member	−0.39	1.65+	0.76	0.67	0.74
	(0.67)	(0.91)	(0.63)	(0.92)	(0.48)
cut1	−2.83**	−7.13***	−1.86**	−4.07***	−2.26**
	(0.97)	(1.19)	(0.71)	(0.67)	(0.72)
cut2	1.16	−4.23***	−0.14	−2.23***	−0.01
	(0.81)	(0.79)	(0.70)	(0.64)	(0.72)
cut3		−1.13	1.48*	−0.76	2.01*
		(0.76)	(0.71)	(0.64)	(0.79)
Observations	279	277	273	278	279
McFadden's R^2	0.12	0.13	0.03	0.04	0.06
BIC	408.36	513.33	780.93	764.17	732.82

Table A4. Explaining motives for willingness to participate (combined models). (Notes: Respondent-clustered standard errors in parentheses, + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.)