

Profits from Peace:  
The Political Economy of Power-Sharing and Corruption  
*Online Appendix*

Felix Haass\*      Martin Ottmann†

2 July 2017

<b>A</b>	<b>Sample Under Analysis</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>B</b>	<b>OLS Regression</b>	<b>3</b>
B.1	Temporal Sequence Between Executive Power-Sharing and Corruption . . . . .	3
B.2	Year Fixed Effects . . . . .	5
B.3	ICRG Corruption Measure . . . . .	7
B.4	Additional Control Variables: Squared Polity2 Term . . . . .	9
B.5	Additional Control Variables: Religious Fractionalization . . . . .	11
B.6	Additional Control Variables: Territorial Power-Sharing and Proportional Representation . . . . .	13
B.7	Length of Post-Conflict Periods . . . . .	15
<b>C</b>	<b>OLS Regression with Endogenous Treatment Effects</b>	<b>17</b>

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\*Research Fellow, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Neuer Jungfernstieg 21, 20354 Hamburg, Germany; Arnold-Bergstraesser-Institute, Windausstr. 16, 79110 Freiburg, Germany, [felix.haass@giga-hamburg.de](mailto:felix.haass@giga-hamburg.de).

†Birmingham Fellow, International Development Department, University of Birmingham, Birmingham B15 2TT, United Kingdom, [m.ottmann@bham.ac.uk](mailto:m.ottmann@bham.ac.uk).

## A Sample Under Analysis

**Table 1.** List of Post-Conflict Countries and Country Years Included in the Empirical Analysis.

No.	Country	Post-Conflict Years
1	Angola	2005-2006, 2010
2	Azerbaijan	1996-2000, 2006-2010
3	Bangladesh	1996-1997
4	Bosnia and Herzegovina	1996-2000
5	Burundi	2009-2010
6	Cambodia	1999-2003
7	Central African Republic	2003-2005, 2007-2008
8	Chad	1996, 2003-2004
9	Comoros	1998-2002
10	Congo	1996, 2000-2001, 2003-2007
11	Congo, the Democratic Republic of the	2002-2005, 2009-2010
12	Cote d'Ivoire	2005-2009
13	Croatia	1996-2000
14	Djibouti	1996-1998, 2000-2004
15	Egypt	1999-2003
16	El Salvador	1996
17	Eritrea	2000-2002, 2004-2008
18	Georgia	1996-1998, 2005-2007, 2009-2010
19	Guatemala	1996-2000
20	Guinea	2002-2006
21	Guinea-Bissau	2000-2004
22	Haiti	1996, 2005-2009
23	Indonesia	1996, 2006-2010
24	Iran, Islamic Republic of	2002-2004
25	Iraq	1997-2001
26	Lesotho	1999-2003
27	Liberia	2004-2008
28	Macedonia, the former Yugoslav Republic of	2002-2006
29	Mali	1996-1999, 2010
30	Moldova, Republic of	1996-1997
31	Mozambique	1996-1997
32	Nepal	2007-2010
33	Niger	1998-2002, 2009-2010
34	Nigeria	2005-2008
35	Pakistan	1997-2001
36	Papua New Guinea	1997-2001
37	Peru	2000-2004
38	Russian Federation	1997-1998
39	Rwanda	2003-2007
40	Senegal	2004-2008
41	Serbia	1996, 2000-2004
42	Sierra Leone	2001-2005
43	Somalia	1997-2000, 2003-2005
44	Sri Lanka	2010
45	Tajikistan	1999-2003
46	Uzbekistan	2001-2003, 2005-2009
47	Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of	1996-1997
48	Yemen Arab Republic	1996-1999

## B OLS Regression

### B.1 Temporal Sequence Between Executive Power-Sharing and Corruption


**Table 2.** OLS Regression with Executive Power-Sharing Measured in January of Each Year

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Executive Power-Sharing	−0.19** (0.09)	0.07 (0.15)	−0.17 (0.19)
Natural Resource Wealth (ln)	−0.13** (0.05)	−0.11** (0.05)	−0.13** (0.05)
Executive PS * Natural Resource Wealth		−0.12** (0.05)	
Foreign Aid Income (ln)	0.02 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)
Executive PS * Foreign Aid Income			0.01 (0.07)
GDP Per Capita (ln)	0.09* (0.05)	0.08 (0.05)	0.09* (0.05)
Polity2	−0.00 (0.01)	−0.00 (0.01)	−0.00 (0.01)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.20 (0.24)	0.20 (0.24)	0.20 (0.24)
Population (ln)	0.00 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	−0.00 (0.04)
Constant	−1.15* (0.68)	−1.30* (0.70)	−1.14* (0.68)
Observations	171	171	171
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.16	0.18	0.16


Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses, \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

**Figure 1.** Marginal Effects of Executive Power-Sharing on Control of Corruption at Different Levels of Non-Tax Government Income with Executive Power-Sharing Measured in January of Each Year

**(a)** Interaction Between Executive Power-Sharing and Natural Resource Wealth



**(b)** Interaction Between Executive Power-Sharing and Foreign Aid Income



*Note:* Dashed lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. The underlying histogram depicts the distribution of observations of the variable on the x-axis in the sample.

## B.2 Year Fixed Effects


**Table 3.** OLS Regression with Year Fixed Effects

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Executive Power-Sharing	−0.16* (0.09)	0.04 (0.15)	−0.01 (0.16)
Natural Resource Wealth (ln)	−0.14*** (0.05)	−0.13** (0.05)	−0.14*** (0.05)
Executive PS * Natural Resource Wealth		−0.09 (0.05)	
Foreign Aid Income (ln)	0.03 (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)	0.02 (0.07)
Executive PS * Foreign Aid Income			0.06 (0.06)
GDP Per Capita (ln)	0.09* (0.05)	0.09 (0.05)	0.09* (0.05)
Polity2	−0.00 (0.01)	−0.00 (0.01)	−0.00 (0.01)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.16 (0.25)	0.17 (0.25)	0.16 (0.26)
Population (ln)	0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)
Constant	−1.32* (0.72)	−1.43* (0.73)	−1.29* (0.72)
Observations	171	171	171
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.15	0.16	0.15


Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses, \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

**Figure 2.** Marginal Effects of Executive Power-Sharing on Control of Corruption at Different Levels of Non-Tax Government Income with Year Fixed Effects

(a) Interaction Between Executive Power-Sharing and Natural Resource Wealth



(b) Interaction Between Executive Power-Sharing and Foreign Aid Income



*Note:* Dashed lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. The underlying histogram depicts the distribution of observations of the variable on the x-axis in the sample.

### B.3 ICRG Corruption Measure


**Table 4.** OLS Regression Using ICRG Corruption Measure as Dependent Variable

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Executive Power-Sharing	−0.65** (0.27)	−0.33 (0.62)	−0.66 (0.55)
Natural Resource Wealth (ln)	−0.07 (0.10)	−0.06 (0.10)	−0.07 (0.10)
Executive PS * Natural Resource Wealth		−0.12 (0.20)	
Foreign Aid Income (ln)	0.05 (0.14)	0.05 (0.14)	0.05 (0.14)
Executive PS * Foreign Aid Income			−0.00 (0.14)
GDP Per Capita (ln)	0.23 (0.20)	0.24 (0.20)	0.23 (0.20)
Polity2	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.44 (0.44)	0.46 (0.44)	0.44 (0.44)
Population (ln)	0.03 (0.09)	0.03 (0.09)	0.03 (0.09)
Constant	0.29 (2.26)	0.24 (2.24)	0.29 (2.28)
Observations	194	194	194
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.09	0.09	0.09


Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses, \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

**Figure 3.** Marginal Effects of Executive Power-Sharing on ICRG Corruption Measure at Different Levels of Non-Tax Government Income

(a) Interaction Between Executive Power-Sharing and Natural Resource Wealth



(b) Interaction Between Executive Power-Sharing and Foreign Aid Income



*Note:* Dashed lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. The underlying histogram depicts the distribution of observations of the variable on the x-axis in the sample.



## B.4 Additional Control Variables: Squared Polity2 Term


**Table 5.** OLS Regression Including Squared Polity2 Term

	Model 1 (Polity2 squared)	Model 2 (Polity2 squared)	Model 3 (Polity2 squared)
Executive Power-Sharing	−0.16** (0.07)	−0.08 (0.17)	−0.14 (0.16)
Natural Resource Wealth (ln)	−0.12*** (0.04)	−0.12*** (0.04)	−0.12*** (0.04)
Executive PS * Natural Resource Wealth		−0.04 (0.06)	
Foreign Aid Income (ln)	0.02 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)	0.02 (0.07)
Executive PS * Foreign Aid Income			0.01 (0.06)
GDP Per Capita (ln)	0.04 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)
Polity2	−0.00 (0.01)	−0.00 (0.01)	−0.00 (0.01)
Polity2 (squared)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.28 (0.22)	0.28 (0.23)	0.28 (0.23)
Population (ln)	−0.01 (0.04)	−0.00 (0.04)	−0.01 (0.04)
Constant	−0.90 (0.58)	−0.96 (0.61)	−0.90 (0.59)
Observations	171	171	171
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.24	0.24	0.24


Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses, \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

**Figure 4.** Marginal Effects of Executive Power-Sharing on Control of Corruption at Different Levels of Non-Tax Government Income Including Squared Polity2 Term

(a) Interaction Between Executive Power-Sharing and Natural Resource Wealth



(b) Interaction Between Executive Power-Sharing and Foreign Aid Income



*Note:* Dashed lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. The underlying histogram depicts the distribution of observations of the variable on the x-axis in the sample.

## B.5 Additional Control Variables: Religious Fractionalization


**Table 6.** OLS Regression Including Religious Fractionalization

	Model 1 (Rel. Frac.)	Model 2 (Rel. Frac.)	Model 3 (Rel. Frac.)
Executive Power-Sharing	−0.14* (0.07)	−0.06 (0.16)	−0.11 (0.15)
Natural Resource Wealth (ln)	−0.10* (0.05)	−0.10* (0.06)	−0.10* (0.05)
Executive PS * Natural Resource Wealth		−0.04 (0.05)	
Foreign Aid Income (ln)	0.05 (0.06)	0.05 (0.06)	0.05 (0.07)
Executive PS * Foreign Aid Income			0.02 (0.06)
GDP Per Capita (ln)	0.11** (0.05)	0.11** (0.05)	0.11** (0.05)
Polity2	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Religious Fractionalization	−0.33* (0.17)	−0.31* (0.18)	−0.32* (0.18)
Population (ln)	0.00 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)
Constant	−1.07 (0.70)	−1.12 (0.72)	−1.06 (0.70)
Observations	168	168	168
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.20	0.20	0.20


Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses, \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

**Figure 5.** Marginal Effects of Executive Power-Sharing on Control of Corruption at Different Levels of Non-Tax Government Income Including Religious Fractionalization

(a) Interaction Between Executive Power-Sharing and Natural Resource Wealth



(b) Interaction Between Executive Power-Sharing and Foreign Aid Income



*Note:* Dashed lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. The underlying histogram depicts the distribution of observations of the variable on the x-axis in the sample.

## B.6 Additional Control Variables: Territorial Power-Sharing and Proportional Representation


**Table 7.** OLS Regression Including Territorial Power-Sharing and Proportional Representation

	Model 1 (Additional PS Variables)	Model 2 (Additional PS Variables)	Model 3 (Additional PS Variables)
Executive Power-Sharing	−0.18* (0.09)	0.03 (0.16)	−0.06 (0.16)
Natural Resource Wealth (ln)	−0.13** (0.05)	−0.11** (0.05)	−0.13** (0.05)
Executive PS * Natural Resource Wealth		−0.09* (0.05)	
Foreign Aid Income (ln)	0.02 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)	0.01 (0.07)
Executive PS * Foreign Aid Income			0.05 (0.06)
Territorial Power-Sharing	−0.00 (0.16)	0.01 (0.15)	0.01 (0.16)
Proportional Representation	0.04 (0.13)	−0.00 (0.13)	0.04 (0.13)
GDP Per Capita (ln)	0.09* (0.05)	0.08 (0.05)	0.08* (0.05)
Polity2	−0.00 (0.01)	−0.00 (0.01)	−0.00 (0.01)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.20 (0.24)	0.20 (0.24)	0.20 (0.24)
Population (ln)	0.00 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	−0.00 (0.04)
Constant	−1.16 (0.69)	−1.25* (0.72)	−1.14 (0.70)
Observations	171	171	171
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.15	0.16	0.15


Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses, \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

**Figure 6.** Marginal Effects of Executive Power-Sharing on Control of Corruption at Different Levels of Non-Tax Government Income Including Territorial Power-Sharing and Proportional Representation

**(a)** Interaction Between Executive Power-Sharing and Natural Resource Wealth



**(b)** Interaction Between Executive Power-Sharing and Foreign Aid Income



*Note:* Dashed lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. The underlying histogram depicts the distribution of observations of the variable on the x-axis in the sample.

## B.7 Length of Post-Conflict Periods


**Table 8.** OLS Regression on a Sample Including the First Seven and Ten Post-Conflict Years

	Model 1 (7 Years)	Model 2 (7 Years)	Model 3 (7 Years)	Model 1 (10 Years)	Model 2 (10 Years)	Model 3 (10 Years)
Executive Power-Sharing	−0.18** (0.09)	−0.00 (0.16)	−0.04 (0.17)	−0.17** (0.08)	−0.04 (0.16)	−0.01 (0.15)
Natural Resource Wealth (ln)	−0.12** (0.05)	−0.11** (0.05)	−0.12** (0.05)	−0.12** (0.04)	−0.11** (0.05)	−0.12** (0.04)
Executive PS * Natural Resource Wealth		−0.08 (0.06)			−0.06 (0.06)	
Foreign Aid Income (ln)	0.03 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)
Executive PS * Foreign Aid Income			0.06 (0.06)			0.07 (0.05)
GDP Per Capita (ln)	0.13** (0.05)	0.12** (0.05)	0.13** (0.05)	0.16*** (0.05)	0.16*** (0.05)	0.16*** (0.05)
Polity2	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.16 (0.22)	0.17 (0.22)	0.16 (0.22)	0.17 (0.19)	0.18 (0.19)	0.17 (0.19)
Population (ln)	−0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.04)	−0.00 (0.04)	−0.01 (0.04)	−0.01 (0.04)	−0.01 (0.04)
Years Since End of Executive PS	0.00 (0.03)	−0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Constant	−1.34** (0.63)	−1.42** (0.65)	−1.33** (0.63)	−1.46** (0.63)	−1.52** (0.65)	−1.47** (0.64)
Observations	233	233	233	304	304	304
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.24	0.24	0.24


Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses, \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

**Figure 7.** Marginal Effects of Executive Power-Sharing on Control of Corruption at Different Levels of Non-Tax Government Income

**(a) Interaction Between Executive Power-Sharing and Natural Resource Wealth**



**(b) Interaction Between Executive Power-Sharing and Foreign Aid Income**




*Note:* Dashed lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. The underlying histogram depicts the distribution of observations of the variable on the x-axis in the sample.




## C OLS Regression with Endogenous Treatment Effects

**Figure 8.** Marginal Effects of Executive Power-Sharing on Control of Corruption at Different Levels of Non-Tax Government Income

(a) Interaction Between Executive Power-Sharing and Natural Resource Wealth



(b) Interaction Between Executive Power-Sharing and Foreign Aid Income



*Note:* Dashed lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. The underlying histogram depicts the distribution of observations of the variable on the x-axis in the sample.