

# Martin Vaeth

[mvaeth@princeton.edu](mailto:mvaeth@princeton.edu) ◦ [www.martinvaeth.com](http://www.martinvaeth.com) ◦ 609-356-2762

<b>Placement Director</b>	Gianluca Violante	<a href="mailto:violante@princeton.edu">violante@princeton.edu</a>	609-258-4003
<b>Graduate Administrator</b>	Laura Hedden	<a href="mailto:lhedden@princeton.edu">lhedden@princeton.edu</a>	609-258-4006

## Graduate Studies

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### Princeton University

2019-present

PhD Candidate in Economics

Expected Completion Date: May 2025

### REFERENCES

Roland Bénabou	Alessandro Lizzeri	Fedor Sandomirskiy
Department of Economics	Department of Economics	Department of Economics
Princeton University	Princeton University	Princeton University
609-258-3672	917-756-0238	626-567-9223
<a href="mailto:rbenabou@princeton.edu">rbenabou@princeton.edu</a>	<a href="mailto:lizzeri@princeton.edu">lizzeri@princeton.edu</a>	<a href="mailto:fsandomi@princeton.edu">fsandomi@princeton.edu</a>

## Prior Education

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### London School of Economics and Political Science

2018

M.Sc. in Economics and Philosophy

### Heidelberg University

2017

B.Sc. in Mathematics

## Fields

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PRIMARY	Microeconomic Theory
SECONDARY	Behavioral Economics, Political Economy

## Job Market Paper

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“[Rational Voter Learning, Issue Alignment, and Polarization](#)”, 2024

Best Job Market Paper Award (European Economic Association and UniCredit Foundation)

*We model electoral competition between two parties when voters can learn about their political positions through flexible information acquisition. Rational voter learning generates polarized and aligned political preferences, even when voters’ true positions are unimodally distributed and independent across policy issues. When parties strategically select their positions, voter and party polarization mutually reinforce each other, and both rise as information costs decline. Because voters learn exclusively about the axis of disagreement between parties, party positions respond to only one dimension of aggregate shocks to voter preferences. We adapt our model to a market setting with horizontally differentiated goods when consumers learn about their product preferences. A reduction in information cost not only increases product differentiation but also leads to higher markups, reducing consumer welfare. These results show how lower information costs can reduce welfare in both political and economic contexts.*

## Working Papers

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1. “Attention and Regret”, 2024, Revise and Resubmit at *Journal of Political Economy*
2. “Imprecision Attenuates Updating”, 2024
3. “The Optimal Design of Public Recognition Schemes”, 2024

## Work in Progress

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1. “Self-Control through Emotions: Guilt and Pride”, 2024

## Teaching

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*Princeton University*    ECO 500: Mathematics for Economists (TA, 2024)  
ECO 100: Introduction to Microeconomics (TA, 2022, 2023, 2024)  
*Heidelberg University*    Linear Algebra (TA, 2016)

## Professional Activities

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### External Presentations

2024    35th Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory  
2023    European Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society, Bonn Microeconomic Theory Seminar  
2022    Calgary/SFU/UBC Theory Workshop

### Service

Co-organizer of the Princeton Political Economy Research Seminar (2023-2024)

### Refereeing

*American Economic Review, Journal of Mathematical Economics*

## Fellowships, Awards, and Grants

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Stephen Goldfeld Summer Fellowship	2024
William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Summer Grants	2021-2024
Global Priorities Fellowship, Forethought Foundation	2020
Hayek Prize for best performance in the MSc Economics and Philosophy at LSE	2018
Scholarship by the German Academic Scholarship Foundation	2014-2018
Scholarship to study in China by the German Academic Exchange Service	2014-2015
Deutschlandstipendium scholarship	2013-2014

## Languages

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FLUENT    German (native), English  
BASIC    French, Spanish, Chinese

*Last updated: November 2024*