#### **Module 18: Protection**


- Goals of Protection
- Domain of Protection
- Access Matrix
- Implementation of Access Matrix
- Revocation of Access Rights
- Capability-Based Systems
- Language-Based Protection

#### **Protection**

- Operating system consists of a collection of object|s, hardware or software
- Each object has a unique name and can be accessed through a well-defined set of operations.
- Protection problem ensure that each object is accessed correctly and only by those processes that are allowed to do so.

### **Domain Structure**

- Access-right = <object-name, rights-set>
   Rights-set is a subset of all valid operations that can be performed on the object.
- Domain = set of access-rights




### **Domain Implementation**

- System consists of 2 domains:
  - User
  - Supervisor
- UNIX
  - Domain = user-id
  - Domain switch accomplished via file system.
    - \* Each file has associated with it a domain bit (setuid bit).
    - \* When file is executed and setuid = on, then user-id is set to owner of the file being executed. When execution completes user-id is reset.

### **Multics Rings**

- Let  $D_i$  and  $D_j$  be any two domain rings.
- If  $j < I \Rightarrow D_i \subseteq D_j$



### **Access Matrix**

object	F <sub>1</sub>	F <sub>2</sub>	F <sub>3</sub>	printer
<i>D</i> <sub>1</sub>	read		read	
$D_2$				print
$D_3$		read	execute	
$D_4$	read write		read write	

Figure 1

#### **Use of Access Matrix**

- If a process in Domain D<sub>i</sub> tries to do "op" on object O<sub>j</sub>, then "op" must be in the access matrix.
- Can be expanded to dynamic protection.
  - Operations to add, delete access rights.
  - Special access rights:
    - \* owner of O<sub>i</sub>
    - \* copy op from  $O_i$  to  $O_i$
    - \*  $control D_i$  can modify  $D_i$ s access rights
    - \* transfer switch from domain  $D_i$  to  $D_i$

### **Use of Access Matrix (Cont.)**

- Access matrix design separates mechanism from policy.
  - Mechanism
    - \* Operating system provides Access-matrix + rules.
    - \* If ensures that the matrix is only manipulated by authorized agents and that rules are strictly enforced.
  - Policy
    - \* User dictates policy.
    - \* Who can access what object and in what mode.

### Implementation of Access Matrix

Each column = Access-control list for one object
 Defines who can perform what operation.

Domain 1 = Read, Write

Domain 2 = Read

Domain 3 = Read

:

Each Row = Capability List (like a key)
 Fore each domain, what operations allowed on what objects.

Object 1 - Read

Object 4 – Read, Write, Execute

Object 5 – Read, Write, Delete, Copy

### **Access Matrix of Figure 1 With Domains as Objects**

object	F <sub>1</sub>	F <sub>2</sub>	F <sub>3</sub>	laser printer	D <sub>1</sub>	D <sub>2</sub>	<i>D</i> <sub>3</sub>	D <sub>4</sub>
D <sub>1</sub>	read		read			switch		
D <sub>2</sub>				print			switch	switch
D <sub>3</sub>		read	execute					
$D_4$	read write		read write		switch			

Figure 2

# **Access Matrix with Copy Rights**

object	F <sub>1</sub>	F <sub>2</sub>	F <sub>3</sub>	
D <sub>1</sub>	execute		write*	
D <sub>2</sub>	execute	read*	execute	
D <sub>3</sub>	execute			

-3	execute			
	(a)			*= if process rundon it can cupy a place into al domains.
object domain	F <sub>1</sub>	F <sub>2</sub>	F <sub>3</sub>	donains.
D <sub>1</sub>	execute		write*	
D <sub>2</sub>	execute	read*	execute	
D <sub>3</sub>	execute	read		1

(b)

# **Access Matrix With Owner Rights**

object	F <sub>1</sub>	F <sub>2</sub>	F <sub>3</sub>
D <sub>1</sub>	owner execute		write
D <sub>2</sub>		read* owner	read* owner write*
D <sub>3</sub>	execute		

(a)

object domain	F <sub>1</sub>	F <sub>2</sub>	F <sub>3</sub>
D <sub>1</sub>	owner execute		
D <sub>2</sub>		owner read* write*	read* owner write*
D <sub>3</sub>		write	write

(b)

# **Modified Access Matrix of Figure 2**

object	F <sub>1</sub>	F <sub>2</sub>	F <sub>3</sub>	laser printer	D <sub>1</sub>	D <sub>2</sub>	D <sub>3</sub>	D <sub>4</sub>
D <sub>1</sub>	read		read			switch		
D <sub>2</sub>				print			switch	switch control
D <sub>3</sub>		read	execute					
D <sub>4</sub>	write		write		switch			

# **Revocation of Access Rights**

- Access List Delete access rights from access list.
  - Simple
  - Immediate
- Capability List Scheme required to locate capability in the system before capability can be revoked.
  - Reacquisition
  - Back-pointers
  - Indirection
  - Keys

# **Capability-Based Systems**

#### Hydra

- Fixed set of access rights known to and interpreted by the system.
- Interpretation of user-defined rights performed solely by user's program; system provides access protection for use of these rights.
- Cambridge CAP System
  - Data capability provides standard read, write, execute of individual storage segments associated with object.
  - Software capability -interpretation left to the subsystem, through its protected procedures.

# **Language-Based Protection**

- Specification of protection in a programming language allows the high-level description of policies for the allocation and use of resources.
- Language implementation can provide software for protection enforcement when automatic hardwaresupported checking is unavailable.
- Interpret protection specifications to generate calls on whatever protection system is provided by the hardware and the operating system.