

COM-402: Information Security and Privacy

Blockchain

3/3


Slide credits: Bryan Ford, Lefteris Kokoris-Kogias, David Tse


Some of the slides are also inspired by CS-522 POCS EPFL, Highly Available Transactions VLDB 2014, ECE-598 AM UIUC

Acknowledgments

Some of the slides are partly inspired by:


- CS-522 POCS EPFL
- Highly Available Transactions VLDB 2014
- ECE-598 AM UIUC






The AP Choice

- Strong Consistency is not possible
 - The system can reply with stale data
- Many applications do not care
 - DNS
 - Shopping carts
 - NoSQL Databases
- Benefits of weak consistency
 - Highly Available systems
 - Low-Latency
 - No Coordination



The CP Choice

- Strong Consistency
 - Safety first
 - System halts on partitions
- Needs Coordination
 - Consensus Protocols
- Benefits
 - Writes are atomic
 - Any data read are the freshest possible




Consensus

- In the consensus problem, the processes propose values and have to agree on one among these values
- Properties
 - Validity: Any value decided is a value proposed
 - Agreement: No two correct processes decide differently
 - Termination: Every correct process eventually decides
 - Integrity: No process decides twice

Consensus in a Data Center

- Not a central focus of this course
 - CS-451
 - Paxos Made Simple L.Lamport
 - Raft ->In Search of an Understandable Consensus Algorithm D.Ongaro et al, ATC 14'




Byzantine Failures

- Assume some nodes and the network may be actively malicious
 - They might not reply at all (direct DoS attack)
 - They might be able to prevent honest nodes from communicating (indirect DoS attack)
 - They might send different messages to different nodes (equivocation)
- Fundamentally need $N=3f+1$ for consensus in the general case
 - f out of N might not reply => Need to proceed with $N-f$ or $2f+1$
 - f out of the $N-f$ might be malicious => Need majority
 - $N-2f > f \Rightarrow N>3f$ or $N=3f+1$
- Can be relaxed to $N=2f+1$ under various stronger assumptions
 - Trusted hardware components to prevent equivocation
 - Assumptions that honest nodes can communicate within a finite time (synchronicity)


Impossibility results

No Byzantine Consensus $f \geq N/3$,


- Counter example: divide into 3 equal groups, P Q and R.
 - P is corrupted and contains the sender
 - Temporarily partition Q and R.
 - P behaves as though the Sender says “0” and interacts with Q.
 - P behaves as though the Sender says “1” and interacts with R.
- (P and Q) must behave the same as if R has crashed (pick “0”)
- (P and R) must behave the same as if Q had crashed (pick “1”)




Bitcoin




Transaction Verification in Bitcoin




Transaction Verification in Bitcoin




Transaction Verification in Bitcoin




Transaction Verification in Bitcoin




Conflict Resolution




Conflict Resolution




Conflict Resolution



Conflict Resolution




Conflict Resolution



Leader Election



Proof-of-Work



$H(\text{Block, nonce}=0) = \text{abc3426fe31233}$

$H(\text{Block, nonce}=1) = \text{fe541200abc229}$

$H(\text{Block, nonce}=2) = \text{0bc3429831233}$


.

.

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$H(\text{Block, nonce}=f23) = \text{0000fed98312}$

Unstable Consensus (Forks)



Question?

What happens if there is a network partition

- a) The protocol halts preserving safety
- b) Now we have 2 versions of bitcoin that will never merge back
- c) The clients do not realize it and can be attacked
- d) Free money for everyone

Risk or Wait

In order for a transaction to be valid it needs to be confirmed by the blocks.

- Each confirmation takes **10 minutes**
- Wait **one hour** to spend your money
- Real time transactions are risky,
double-spending them is not a hard thing to do.




What's new about Bitcoin?


- We do not assume that we know all of the node IDs ahead of time!
 - This undercuts ~30 years of work.
- “Honest majority” measured as a fraction of “hashpower”
- Incentives for following the protocol
- Nodes do not need to output a final decision (aka “stabilizing consensus”)

Double Spending Attack

- 1) Give transaction to seller
- 2) Take the product
- 3) Send a 2nd transaction and create a longer chain



Is Bitcoin Decentralized?



5 Mining pools can collectively attack the system.



Bitcoin Mining Calculator

Hash Rate (GH/s):

300.00

Power (Watts):

900.00

Power Cost (\$/kWh):

0.10

Pool Fees %:

0.00

Difficulty:

46684376316.860300

Block Reward:

25.00000000

Exchange Rate (USD):

243.12000000

Hardware Costs (USD):

0.00

7.948 years

Convert: 2,900.87 days

Days to generate one block mining solo: 2900.87 Day(s)

(can vary greatly depending on your luck)

Explanation of previous slide


It's well known by now that in practice, miners form coalitions called mining pools, where they essentially follow the instructions of the pool administrator, get a share of the rewards.

The motivation to join pools is straightforward. On average, a block is found every 10 minutes.

Here's a reasonably priced mining rig, \$150. Power consumption like a toaster left on.

Mining solo, it would expect to take 8 years before it finds a block (could happen much earlier or much later, depending on luck)

Miners would prefer to get smaller amounts of revenue in a shorter time frame.



MINING • NEWS

June 12, 2014
GHash.IO large
mining pool crisis

GHash Commits to 40% Hashrate Cap at Bitcoin Mining Summit

Stan Higgins | Published on July 16, 2014 at 18:40 GMT

Bitcoin Wallets

- Hot wallet for a few dozen CHF → Mobile



Copay



Airbitz



breadwallet



Bither

- Cold wallet for < 1k CHF → Multi-Sig Desktop



Armory



Electrum



mSIGNA

- Cold wallet for > 1k CHF → Hardware




KeepKey



Trezor


Bitcoin Paper Wallet



Front

Private Key

SK2wewraon7bWgKQDyvde7mit5716wpdNJEc1yDszgyJVEX1rgm



WALLET IMPORT FORMAT




PRIVATE KEY

SK2wewraon7bWgKQDyvde7mit5716wpdNJEc1yDszgyJVEX1rgm



Public Key



Bitcoin performance

Security	Transaction throughput	Confirmation Latency
50% adversary ✓	5 transactions/s ✗	hours ✗

Principal challenge: Scalability

Solving Blockchain's Biggest Problem: 5 Projects Working On Scalability

August 23, 2018

By Jorn van Zwanenburg

1

Blockchain's Scaling Problem, Explained



Connor Blenkinsop



AUG 22, 2018


7 Challenges That Need to be Addressed Before Blockchain Mass Adoption is Possible

Blockchain Scalability: The Issues, and Proposed Solutions




BitRewards [Follow](#)
Apr 25, 2018 · 4 min read

Bitcoin: A Distributed ledger



Transaction confirmation




Transaction confirmation

30% adversary power

$k=0 \ \varepsilon = 1.0000000$
 $k=5 \ \varepsilon = 0.1773523$
 $k=10 \ \varepsilon = 0.0416605$
 $k=15 \ \varepsilon = 0.0101008$
 $k=20 \ \varepsilon = 0.0024804$
 $k=25 \ \varepsilon = 0.0006132$
 $k=30 \ \varepsilon = 0.0001522$
 $k=35 \ \varepsilon = 0.0000379$
 $k=40 \ \varepsilon = 0.0000095$
 $k=45 \ \varepsilon = 0.0000024$
 $k=50 \ \varepsilon = 0.0000006$


Nakamoto's table




Physical limits

Network capacity C

Speed-of-light
propagation delay D



Physical limits with Bitcoin security?




Optimization - Skipchains

- Thesis of Eleftherios Kokoris, EPFL 2019
- Supervised by Bryan Ford

Problem: Efficient Verification


- How does a “light” (low-power, mobile) client securely confirm a recent (or old) transaction?
- Especially after being offline for months, years?
- Without “just trusting” central party (exchange)?



Backward and Forward Verifiability


- Standard blockchains traversable only **backward**

- Via hash back-links from current head



- We add traversability **forward in time***

- Collective signature by prior consensus group



Applications of SkipChains


- Enable Offline/P2P verification
 - Works even if Internet is unavailable, slow, costly
- Broad applications
 - Software/key updates
 - Blockchain-Attested Degrees, Awards, ...
 - Chain-of-Custody, Bills of Lading, ...

A detailed "Chain Of Custody Record" form. At the top, it shows sample card fronts for "George George 123456" and "George George 123456". Below this is a "Comments" section with a "Comments" field and a "Project No." field containing "123". The main body of the form has sections for "Sample Card Back", "Sample Card Back", "Sample Card Back", and "Sample Card Back". Each section contains a table with columns for "Date", "ID", "Batch #", "Signature", "Signature", and "Signature". The first row of the first table is filled with "2012-07-10", "123456", "123456", "George George", "George George", and "George George". The second row is partially filled with "2012-07-10", "123456", "123456", "George George", "George George", and "George George". The third row is partially filled with "2012-07-10", "123456", "123456", "George George", "George George", and "George George". At the bottom, there is a "Sample Custody" section with a table for "From", "To", "Date", and "Time".

Smart Contracts


Digital currency is just one application on top of a blockchain

Decentralized Consensus “Blockchain”



Smart Contracts: user-defined programs running on top of a blockchain

Decentralized Consensus
“Blockchain”



About Ethereum

Crowdfunded ~\$20M in ~ a month

Popularized a grand vision of
“generalized” cryptocurrency

Flexible scripting language
“pyethereum” simulator, 2014



DECENTRALIZED
APPLICATIONS
GLOBAL NETWORK

Vitalik Buterin (born 1994,
founded Ethereum in 2013)



Key challenges in smart contract design:

- Smart Contracts in Ethereum can be trusted for correctness and availability, but not **privacy**
- Blockchain resources are expensive
- Race conditions and temporary forks

Examples

- “Namecoin”: a DNS replacement
 - Initially, all names are unregistered.
 - Anyone can claim an unregistered name.
 - Once it’s registered, no one can change it.




Examples: Namecoin

```
def register(k, v):  
  
    if !self.storage[k]: # Is the key not yet taken?  
        # Then take it!  
  
        self.storage[k] = v  
  
    return(1)  
  
else:  
  
    return(0) // Otherwise do nothing
```

Reasons to be excited about this

- Programmable money is an excellent idea
 - Doesn't strictly require a cryptocurrency, but it's here first
- Exists outside mainstream business culture / jurisdictions
 - Could avoid government overreach and monopolies
- We might agree on a standard business database format

Ethereum Languages



Basics

- Submit a transaction to the blockchain in order to create a new contract
 - transaction contains the *code* as data
 - contracts have an “account balance” denominated in Ether
 - contracts have a persistent “storage” file
- Submit transactions to the blockchain to interact with the contract
 - transactions can contain monetary “value,” added to the account
 - procedure calls

Gas

Every Tx defines:

recipient, from, data, amount, **gasPrice**, **gasLimit**

Validity: amount + gas*price <= accounts[from].balance

Update: recipient.balance += amount

from.balance -= amount + **gas*price**

execute(code, amount, balance, mem, **gas**)

from.balance += unusedGas * price

Contract Call Stack

A:

```
def call():
    assert msg.gas == 100
    x = B.call(gas=10)
    return x + " World!"
```



B:

```
def call():
    assert msg.gas == 10
    y = C.call(gas=5)
    assert y == 0
    // out of gas
    return "Hello "
```

C:

```
def call():
    assert msg.gas == 5
    while True:
        loop
```

Returns "Hello World!"

What's the deal with The DAO?

- Crowdfunding instrument that raised \$150+ million dollars of ETH
 - Initially, the goal was \$10,000 to fund a Bike Lock company
- TheDAO contract is ambitious! Lets users pool their investments and vote
- A subtle bug in TheDAO led to the loss of \$50 million worth of tokens
- The Ethereum community developed a “Hard Fork” to cancel the theft
- A faction of dissenters are maintaining “Eth Classic”, also traded on exchanges

Alternative: Proof-of-Stake (PoS)

- **Proof-of-Stake:** assigns consensus shares in proportion to prior capital investment
 - Could address energy waste problem
 - Major unsolved security & incentive problems
- But PoS requires secure public randomness...




Alternative: Permissioned Ledgers

- Also called “permissioned blockchains” or “private blockchains”
- Just decide **administratively** who participates; Fixed or manually-changed group of trustees
- **Liability clearly defined**
- No proof-of-work needed → low energy cost
- More mature consensus protocols applicable
- Higher human organizational costs
- No longer open for “anyone” to participate




Tremendous potential for regulated sectors such as finance and health

Blockchain in Healthcare: Logging of Data Access



Other application: smart contracts to support patient consent

Do You Need a Blockchain?



For a more complete version:

Do you Need a Blockchain?
Morgen E. Peck
IEEE Spectrum
Special Issue on Blockchains
September 2017

Additional resources

Lectures by Andrew Miller:

<http://soc1024.ece.illinois.edu/teaching/ece598am/fall2016/>

Online Coursera Course:

<https://www.coursera.org/learn/cryptocurrency>

Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies book, with many videos – Narayanan, Bonneau, Felten, Miller (2016):

- <http://bitcoinbook.cs.princeton.edu>