
# Lab Week 6 — marvleon


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# 6.1a EB Guestbook


### 6.1.3 Running the application




### 6.1.4 Handling failures seamlessly




## 6.1.7 Deploying the Guestbook






# 6.1g App Engine Guestbook

### 6.1.3 Deploying the Guestbook




### 6.1.4 Handling failures seamlessly



# 6.2g Cloud Run, Secret Manager (Web Proxy)


### 6.2.8 Setup secret proxy




# What is the security advantage of passing in the secret proxy route as an environment variable?


When the Docker container is stopped or removed the environment variables disappear with it. The environment variable is only accessible to the process running inside the Docker container. Also, configuration is separated from the code (the secret route is not hardcoded).

### 6.2.9 Cloud Build and Container Registry





### 6.2.10 Deploy to Cloud Run





### 6.2.12 Deploy to Cloud Run with Secret Manager






### Identify the vulnerability that Google has prevented.


Google has prevented Server-Side Request Forgery by requiring a special HTTP header called Metadata-Flavor to be included in requests to its metadata server. Without this, any app can be tricked into querying the computeMetadata URLs and showing sensitive information.

# 6.3a ECS Guestbook

### 6.3.5 Examine the service





### 6.3.6 Visit the site




# 6.3g Cloud Run Guestbook

### 6.3.2 Prepare a container image






### 6.3.3 View container image



### 6.3.5 View the Guestbook



What port do container instances listen on?

8080

What are the maximum number of instances Cloud Run will autoscale up to? 100

# 6.4 Cloud Functions PubSub

6.4.4 -

After downloading the file from the bucket, where is it stored?

Somewhere locally, determined by the tempfile.mkstemp() function.

What class in the ImageMagick package is used to do the blurring of the file?

The Image class from the Wand library.


What lines of code perform the blurring of the image and its storage back into the filesystem?

Lines 72-74

```
with Image(filename=temp_local_filename) as image:
  image.resize(*image.size, blur=16, filter="hamming")
  image.save(filename=temp_local_filename)
```

### 6.4.7 Test function





```
VEL: I
ME: blur_offensive_images
ECUTION_ID: 2h2buvhpfkf7
ME_UTC: 2023-11-07 05:18:33.180
                   :: 1
- blur offensive_images
TION_ID: 2h2bunbpfHP
_UTC: 2022-11-07 05:18:28.180
Blurred image_uploaded_to: gs://marvlab6bucketout/somble=949916_1280.jpg
                   l: I
: blur_offensive_images
JTION_ID: 2h2buwhpfkf7
UTC: 2023-11-07 05:18:33.026
                        f
blur_offensive_images
FION ID: 2h2buvhpfkf7
DTC: 2023-11-07 05:18:32.026
Image somble-949916_1280.jpg was blurred.
                :L: 1

:: blur_offensive_images
:UTION_ID: 2h2buwhpfkf7

:_UTC: 2023-11-07 05:18:32.120
       VLC: 1 MC: blur_offensive_images
MC: blur_offensive_images
MC: 100, ID: shabuwhpfltf
MC: UTC: 2022-11-07 05:18:22.120
MC: Image zombie-949916_1280.jpg was downloaded to /tmp/tmplh7_snfr
 MAME: blur_offensive_images
EXECUTION_ID: 2h2buwhpfkf7
CIME_UTC: 2022-11-07 05:18:32.069
                      : 1
blur_offensive_images
TIOM ID: 2h2burbpftf7
UTC: 2022-11-07 05:18:22.069
The image sombit=949916_1280.jpg was detected as inappropriate.
                     : I
blur_offensive_images
TION_ID: 2h2buvhpfkf7
UTC: 2023-11-07 05:18:31.763
EVEL: I
(AME: blur_offensive_images
EXECUTION_ID: 2h2buvhpfkf7
FME_UTC: 2023-11-07 05:18:31.763
LOG: Analysing sombie-949916_1280.jpg.
    NME: DIM offensive images
ME: blur offensive images
MECUTION_ID: 2h2buvhpflf7
IME_UTC: 2022-11-07 05:18:31.572
ME.origon execution started
                     :: E blur offensive_images
Blur offensive_im
                           blur_offensive_images
ION_ID:
IC: 2022-11-07 05:16:11.207
IC: 2022-11-07 05:16:11.207
Inyers/google-python.psip/sp/lib/python3.7/site-packages/google/oauth2/_init__py:40: Python27DeprecationWarning: After January 1, 2024, no
layers/google.python.psip/sp/lib/python3.7/site-packages/google/oauth2/_init__py:40: Python27DeprecationWarning: After January 1, 2024, no
layers/google.python27DeprecationWarning)
lings.warn(message, Python27DeprecationWarning)
```

### 6.4.11 PubSub via CLI


### Why are there no items returned?

The user subscribed <u>after</u> the message was published, so the new subscriber cannot pull the old message.

#### 6.4.12 -

### What is the messageID of the published message?

9584811683418593



### 6.4.15 Test programs and cleanup