

# **AFGHANISTAN AND THE VICTORY OF THE TALIBAN**

**HOW AND WHY IT HAPPENED, AND WHAT IT MEANS  
FOR THE ANTI-IMPERIALIST STRUGGLE**



*You have the watches, we have the time*

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**MARXIST ANTI-IMPERIALIST COLLECTIVE**



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## FOREWORD

There is much debate on the "left" all around the world over the victory of the Taliban in Afghanistan. No party worth its salt is left without at least commenting on the defeat of the global imperialists and the victory of the Taliban.

Some are applauding the victory, welcoming it as a sign of the imperialist decline and the oppressed nations of the world finally taking the threads of their destiny into their own hands once again, while others take *an essentially philistine stance*, of the kind of "Neither Washington, Nor Moscow", similar to the philistines of the old, Soviet times, which is nothing more than *implied support* for the aggressor against the victim.

One of my good comrades and friends, Htarni Nyan, used to tell me a few years ago, when I started mentioning the labor aristocracy in my writings more and more, that since the working class of the imperialist nations is, mostly, a labor aristocratic one, that we should start calling their "left" the "Leftist Aristocracy". This term, if I may be frank, perfectly describes the very soul, mindset, and behavior of what is about 99% of all people who call themselves "the left" in the imperialist nations; they *view themselves* as an aristocracy, trying to rule over the "plebeian", "bigoted", "homophobic" and "nationalist" left of the actually-exploited proletariat of the world. Even their "Marxist-Leninists" are like this when they choose the "neither Washington, nor Moscow" line, with their *pseudo-condemnations* of imperialist wars and projects.

It is obvious to me that this new term should be used more and more, to encompass *all varieties* of the human garbage calling themselves "the left", "communists", "Marxists", "Maoists" etc., and it should *not only* speak about the imperialist nation's "left", but for *their minions* in imperialized nations too. More than usual, the Maoists and Trotskyists of the imperialized nations, having studied in universities that are completely controlled by the cosmopolitan bourgeoisie<sup>[1]</sup>, and having been direct disciples or at least indirectly influenced by the theorists of this Leftist Aristocracy, fit this term too.

During times when class struggle is at a point where it demands a clear position, and such is the victory of the Taliban against the filthy compradorist pederast Kabul government, the masks are off, and the Leftist Aristocracy and their circles immediately drop any pretense of putting anti-imperialism first (at least *the few* of them that pretended to do so to begin with) and start whining about "Islamic fundamentalist reactionaries", in a similar way to the philistine next door whom they hate so much, using him as the archetype of the person who "neither knows nor cares what happens outside his own turf."

Here we will try to analyze this unpleasant group of people, but since we bet that our readers will want to know more about the Afghan situation, we will also examine the Taliban movement, the national question, the compradorist elements etc., and then we will finalize the paper by analyzing the implications of this victory regarding Afghanistan itself, and the struggle of the anti-imperialist fighters of the world. Thus, the question of the Leftist Aristocracy will be analyzed alongside Afghanistan itself, drawing parallels of what the Leftist Aristocracy spits from its dirty mouth, and of what actually took and takes place on the soil of Afghanistan.

## THE RISE OF THE TALIBAN AND SOME COMMON MISCONCEPTIONS

There are numerous misconceptions about the Afghan war and the movements fighting in it both by the populations of the first world, especially their intellectuals, and even more so, their "Leftist" intellectuals. One of these misconceptions, held largely by the supposed "educated" Leftist Aristocracy (and not only them, but even by the common "intellectual" liberals), is the common view that the Taliban were created by the US and their allies during the Soviet-Afghan war. This betrays a profound orientalist, chauvinist attitude, and ignorance on anything having to do with Afghanistan or the Middle East or Asia in general. Orientalism and chauvinism because it puts every single Islamist movement *in the same basket*, ignoring their differences, their origins, their causes, and their makeup. Ignorance because it manifests a *profound illiteracy* on the history of Afghanistan during the last 30 years.

The next-door philistine that this Leftist Aristocracy hates so much thinks along the following lines: "The Muslims are all radical 'terrorists' and suicide bombers". The Leftist Aristocracy hates the philistine for thinking in this chauvinist orientalist manner, and quite rightly so. But then, they just go and copy the *same* line of thought, just in *a different form*; the form changes from "every Muslim = an Islamist militant" to "every Islamist militant = US-created terrorist" since in Afghanistan (and in general, for example in Syria or Libya), most, if not all, Islamist militias were funded by the US and the imperialist camp to fight the socialist and anti-imperialist governments during the Soviet-Afghan war, the Libyan war, the Syrian war, etc. The form has changed, but the contents have remained the same. The Muslims and thus the Muslim movements of the Muslim nations, are all turned into one; all fit under the same umbrella, and all their political movements have the same ideology, the same basis, and, therefore, the same international backer. Thus, the Taliban were funded by the USA to fight the socialist government, *even before the*

*Taliban existed!*

The Leftist Aristocracy does not care if its views are indeed well-researched and correct, what matters is to make a statement *to absolve* them, in their "Revolutionary praxis" and "intellectual practice" of posting things on Facebook and Twitter, from taking a principled stance. The "anti-imperialist" cannot support US-funded contras, and therefore blending all Islamists in Afghanistan under one umbrella is desired, since it is a quick, convenient way to adopt the "neither Washington, nor Moscow" line without thinking about it too much. Suffice to say, the socialist government *did not exist anymore* in 1994, when the Taliban first started becoming a movement in Kandahar.

But how did the Taliban emerge? What was Mullah Omar's role in the war?

We know that Omar fought the Soviets and the socialists. We know that he was no high commander;<sup>[2]</sup> he was a poor village boy, from a landless family, who adhered to Sufism, Pashtun tradition, and Pashtunwali, i.e., he was *a Pashtun nationalist*, so when the socialists (*wrongly*) tried to turn against what the common Pashtun villager believed since childhood in such a quick manner, it was this villager that heeded the call to an Islamist insurgency to defend his nation "from the Russians".

Islam is *ingrained* in the modern Pashtun identity, like Orthodox Christianity is ingrained in the modern Greek one.

To quote Anas Haqqani, one of the new generations of Taliban politicians who will soon take over from the old guard who grew up perhaps fighting the Soviets or warlords, "The essence of my Pashto is so Islamic, that were there no Islam, I would still be a Muslim."<sup>[3]</sup>

Omar himself was not similar to Al-Qaeda or ISIL, ideologically speaking (we will write a little more on this below), he was more influenced by the Sufi teachings, a more tolerant and



'spiritual' form of Islamism, i.e. *more peasant-like*. This reflected on Mullah Omar later in his life, where he could live as a king if he wished, but decided to live as an ascetic. All reports, both from enemies and allies of the Taliban alike, *confirm this fact*.<sup>[2]</sup> Mullah Omar was not interested in personal power besides uplifting his Pashto nation from dirt, he was not interested in personal luxury, choosing to live in semi-isolation and in relative poverty both during his life as the Emir of Afghanistan, and after, during the US occupation. This is reported to be a major reason that many peasants followed him and decided to fight under his command, since they saw to him the opposite of what was common among the feudal lords. His retainer during the US occupation even reported that Mullah Omar had achieved a trance-like status due to his daily meditation (which spanned hours), and he did not care for running off to hide in Pakistan to live in luxury like many other mujahideen Pashtun leaders had done. In fact, Omar died in poverty, in Zabul in 2013.<sup>[4]</sup>

All these facts confirm the fact that the Taliban did not start just as another warlord feudal movement, neither as an Islamic Fundamentalist one; they started as what one would call *a bourgeoisie nationalist movement* which had as its aims to unify Pashtunistan and use Islamism *as a unifying factor* to unite both the Pashtuns and the Persians and Uzbeks of Afghanistan under one country.

Quoting from Ghost Wars:

After the Soviet withdrawal, the Kandahar region dissolved into a violent checkerboard—less awful than hellish Kabul, but awful still. Hekmatyar's well-armed, anti-royal forces, backed by Pakistani intelligence, lingered like a storm cloud on the city's outskirts. Trucking mafias that reaped huge profits from the heroin trade and other smuggling rackets propped up local warlords. Any group of young Pashtun fighters with a few Kalashnikovs and rocket-propelled grenade launchers could set up a checkpoint and extort payments on the highways. By 1994 the main road from Quetta in Pakistan through Kandahar and on toward Herat and Iran was choked by hundreds of extralegal roadblocks. So was the road from Kandahar to Kabul. Shopkeepers in the ramshackle

markets clustered around Ahmed Shah Durrani's still magnificent tomb in central Kandahar—now a fume-choked city of perhaps 750,000—battled ruthless extortion and robbery gangs. Reports of unchecked rape and abduction, including child rape, fueled a local atmosphere of fear and smoldering anger. One of the most powerful Durrani warlords in Kandahar, Mullah Naqibullah, had fallen into a state of madness later diagnosed as a medical condition that required antipsychotic drugs. "I was crazy," Naqibullah admitted years later. "The doctors told me that I had a heavy workload, and it had damaged some of my brain cells." The birth and rise of the Taliban during 1994 and the emergence of the movement's supreme leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar, were often described in the United States and Europe as the triumph of a naïve, pious, determined band of religious students swept into power on a wave of popular revulsion over Kandahar's criminal warlords. The Taliban themselves emphasized this theme after they acquired power. As they constructed their founding narrative, they weaved in stories of Mullah Omar's visionary dreams for a new Islamic order for Afghanistan. They described his heroic rescue of abducted girls from warlord rapists. They publicized his yen for popular justice, as illustrated by the public hanging of depraved kidnappers. "It was like a myth," recalled the Pashtun broadcaster Spozhmai Maiwandi, who spoke frequently with Taliban leaders. "They were taking the Koran and the gun and going from village to village saying, 'For the Koran's sake, put down your weapons.'" If the warlords refused, the Taliban would kill them. "For us, it was not strange," Maiwandi recalled. Religious students had meted out justice in rural Kandahar for ages. "We knew these people still existed." Much of this Taliban narrative was undoubtedly rooted in fact, even if credible eyewitnesses to the most mythologized events of 1994, such as the hanging of notorious rapists from a tank barrel, proved stubbornly elusive. In the end, however, the facts may have mattered less than the narrative's claims in the past. The Taliban assembled their story so that Pashtuns could recognize it as a revival of old glory. The Taliban connected popular, rural Islamic values with a grassroots Durrani Pashtun tribal uprising. They emerged at a moment when important, wealthy Pashtun tribal leaders around Kandahar hungered for a unifying cause. The Taliban hinted that their militia would become a vehicle for the return to Afghanistan of King Zahir Shah from his exile in Rome. They preached for a reborn alliance of Islamic piety and Pashtun might.<sup>[5]</sup>

Further, to get a glimpse of the relationship between the

Taliban and the peasantry, we need to quote a report detailing the activity of the Taliban of Pakistan during their nationalist uprising against the Pakistani state back in 2004:

The Taliban's increasing presence in the Swat valley – part of NWFP – can be traced back to 2004, when the local leader of the Taliban, Mullah Fazalullah, set up a radio station that broadcasted easy solutions to the region's grievances. He appealed to the masses of disenfranchised and landless peasants by using simple examples – that included cows, goats, and milk – to spell out the persisting inequalities between the peasants and the wealthy landowners. Within two years, his broadcast messages helped Mr. Fazalullah create peasant militias, armed by the Taliban, which went on to overthrow some of the most powerful landlords in the area.

The Taliban's campaign aimed to exploit class differences and frustrations of the locals, and it did exactly that. Local politicians were threatened and blacklisted, over 40 landlords were intimidated into abandoning their properties and their lands were seized by the radicals and their local militias. However cruel and inhumane their tactics, the Taliban managed to gain acceptance by disparaging the ineffective and corrupt Pakistani government and promising their own economic and land redistribution; thus, addressing some of the disillusioned public's main concerns.<sup>[6]</sup>

Considering the situation in Afghanistan during that period, where any central authority had collapsed, where feudal warlords (backed by the west) were free to ravage and rape the peasants, their sons (bacha bazi) and their daughters, the rise of a movement which, under the veil of Islamism, promised stability and unity made complete sense.

After the socialist-mujahideen civil war, the Pashto regions of Afghanistan were ruled by various warlords, with most of them belonging to two parties, Hezb-e Islami and Harakat-i-inqilab. Mullah Omar, during the socialist-mujahideen war, fought as a soldier under a smaller party, Hezb-e Islami Khalis. After the war ended, he quit fighting and went to his native Kandahar to teach in Madrassas, but seeing that the aftermath of the war left the country in a worse state than it was before, he decided to form a militia with his students (which is what Taliban means, "students") and started liberating from the control of

feudal warlords and unifying province after province, banning bacha bazi, which was becoming more and more rampant due to the warlords abducting children to rape, and pushing out of the game all previous US-funded Pashtun warlords. This was *a new movement* without any ties to the west, which in fact, fought a prolonged war against the coalition led by Jamiat-e Islami, made up mostly of Uzbek and Persian warlords, which was, in fact, *backed by the west*. Jamiat was perhaps the main party during the Soviet-Afghan war, so in short, they represented (and still do) *the most compradorist party* of Afghanistan. Funded by the imperialists since its birth to this very day, with their leaders being the favorite poster boys for imperialist France, for example.

We conclude that the Taliban actually fought all compradorist warlords, Pashtun and Persian alike, during their entire existence. From their very start, to the US invasion in 2001, and after it.

Therefore, the argument that the Taliban represent a compradorist, US-created and funded movement is false. The argument that they represent a feudal movement is also false, since it was the feudal division of Afghanistan in small disconnected markets and therefore statelets that the Taliban movement sought to fight, which makes that position, that many from the Leftist Aristocracy seem to uphold, an argument outside the field of reality, an argument *confusing the form for the content* (for example the Taliban naming their state "Emirate" instead of "Republic"), and in short, an argument which is *used to hide a chauvinist attitude* towards the imperialized and poor people of the world who use Islam to keep on going without losing their sanity and will to live. It is nothing more than the "white man's burden" hidden under "communist" rhetoric.

To prove how *real Marxism* breaks with these chauvinist degenerates, one needs to quote Stalin when he discussed the issue with the Bolsheviks over the Daghestani Soviet Republic and its Muslim population:

Daghestan must be governed in accordance with its specific features, its manner of life and customs.

We are told that among the Daghestan peoples the Sharia is of great importance. We have also been informed that the enemies of Soviet power are spreading rumors that it has banned the Sharia. I have been authorized by the Government of the Russian socialist Federative Soviet Republic to state here that these rumors are false. The Government of Russia gives every people the full right to govern itself on the basis of its laws and customs.

The Soviet Government considers that the Sharia, as common law, is as fully authorized as that of any other of the peoples inhabiting Russia.

If the Daghestan people desire to preserve their laws and customs, they should be preserved.<sup>[7]</sup>

This should be shoved into the faces of the chauvinists of the Leftist Aristocracy, and especially the "Marxist-Leninist" wing. By calling Sharia "reactionary", "bad", "wrong" and whatever other *moralizing term*, they call the entire nations living in Afghanistan "bad", "wrong", and "backwards and reactionary", since according to studies, 99% of the Afghan population, when questioned, said that they prefer Sharia Law to be "the law of the land".<sup>[8]</sup>

Another common misconception, which is used to rob the Taliban of any independent agency, is instead to present them as "mindless puppets" of Pakistan, an argument used very frequently *by both* the "left" and the "right" of Afghanistan, *primarily by the Persians* of the country, and thus it gets repeated multiple times by the rest of the Leftist Aristocracy who follows them as a "first-hand source", also betrays a profound *Persian chauvinism* against the Pashtun nation which composes literally half of Afghanistan's population. We will discuss this in detail later, but for now, we need to ask a *single question* to the people spewing this idea:

What does it mean to say that because a large number of *Pashtuns* who live in Pakistan are part of the Taliban, the Taliban are therefore a "Pakistani" invasion force? It means

two things: first, that the "Pakistanis" *compose a nation*, and second, *that the Pashtun are Pakistanis*. It is nothing more than a fake nationalism, which takes the form of chauvinism against the Pashtuns, since it does not speak of *breaking with the "Afghan" identity altogether*, it speaks about the Persians ruling Afghanistan and with it, the 60% *non-Persians* with it. We will talk more on this a little later.

This argument also ignores some historical facts. As we said, we will discuss more on this later, but for now, we need to say that Pakistan did support the Taliban during their war against the Northern Alliance, but *it never* managed to control it. The Taliban never accepted the Durand line,<sup>[9]</sup> and never Pakistan took an active role to aid the Taliban officially, quite the opposite, they fought a lengthy war against the Taliban factions operating in Khyber, a war which is ongoing to this very day.

The argument of the "Pakistan takeover" holds not only zero factual truth, but also speaks volumes of the Persian chauvinism of the Tajiks and the Hazara who spit these lines. Was the Northern Alliance that these people so much love nothing more than a "Persian" and "American" takeover? It is their nation and movements and parties which enabled the US invasion, which allied itself with it, and which put the Pashtuns and non-Pashtun alike, peasant and worker, under imperialist subjugation and war.

Thus, the argument that the Taliban present a US-created and compradorist group, betrays orientalism and total ignorance of the war going on for the last 50 years in Afghanistan.

The argument which presents the Taliban as a representative of the Feudal order represents both typical, western philistine chauvinism against Islamic values, which values are very common among the people of the Middle East and Central Asia, and also a *very crude understanding of Marxism*, a crude understanding of the relation between the base and superstructure, etc. which too, is very commonplace in the ideological foundations of the Leftist Aristocracy.

The argument, which presents the Taliban victory as a Pakistani invasion, represents nothing more *than Persian Chauvinism against the Pashtun*, and nothing more than an allegiance to the compradorist forces of Afghanistan for the last 40 years.

## AL-QAEDA, ISIL, AND TALIBAN

And now we arrive at another common misconception about the Taliban, which is the idea that Al-Qaeda and Taliban are the same ideologically and practically speaking. This, of course, is wrong. To begin with, Al-Qaeda is a *cosmopolitan* organization. They are quite similar to the *Zionists*. The Zionist is someone who really thinks that Jews, a religion, are a nation. Thus, language, nor territory, nor historical makeup etc. have here any say; nationhood is determined by one's belief in X religion, and in our case, Islam. Al-Qaeda's ideology is identical to that view, and not only that, but it is sectarian enough to divide between Sunni and Shia Muslims.

The question can be set, does Al-Qaeda have a national-territorial basis? We argue that Al-Qaeda has no national-territorial basis, and this can be seen from its organizational structure. There is Al-Qaeda central which resides somewhere on the Pakistan-Afghan border, where many Taliban were probably protecting them due to obligation to show hospitality to Muslims (and, especially Al-Qaeda, which helped them during the civil war. Giving them in, would be a sign that the Taliban were "capitulating" to the US), and that's it; Al-Qaeda central is not controlling any territory, nor does it boast any huge army. They just provide funds and ideological guidance (and legitimacy) to various people *who may or not may be nationalists*<sup>[10]</sup> using the Islamic ideology in a similar manner as the Taliban, and these people aren't even located in Afghanistan or Pakistan, but in various states and nations, some of them are Tuareg (Iyad Ghali's JNIM), some of them Fulanis (Amadou Kufa's Katibat Macina), some of them Arabs (AQAP and Hurras Ad-Din), some of them Somalis (Al-Shabaab), Some Kashmiris (late Zakir Musa's Ansar Ghazwat-ul-Hind) and so on and so on.

*Thus, there is no national basis for Al-Qaeda;* one argument could be made for their national basis, that their national basis are the Arabs, but even then this is not true. What is



true, is that the main leaders of Al-Qaeda were and are indeed Arabs, and some of their biggest armies operated on Arab land and with Arab recruits, such as Zarqawi's, Julani's, Sahraoui's, Wuhayshi's armies etc., *but this was not a cause* of Al-Qaeda's ideology, rather a *symptom* of their origins in the Islamo-zionist tradition dating back to the Arab monarchies who funded (and were themselves formed by) these movements to fight the Nasserists and the Arab nationalist socialists, which symptom faded away the more the years passed and the more these Arab socialist states were pulled down one by one. Right now, Al-Qaeda has four large armies under their command, and from these four, only two are based on Arab land, namely Batarfi's army in Yemen and Huras Ad-Din. The other large Arab army was that of Julani's Al-Nusra, which broke its allegiance to Al-Qaeda and sold it to the Turks and NATO. The two others are in Somalia and in Mali, and are made up of Somali, Tuareg, and Fulani nationalists who use Islamism as a unifying factor like the Taliban and use their allegiance to Al-Qaeda to attract foreign fighters which they would use as suicide bombers or people who could find ways to fund them by their links to the Arab monarchies, and they use the banner of Al-Qaeda to attract such Islamic nationalists to their group.

At least in the case of Mali, the case is obvious that we are speaking about a movement whose future we can see by looking at the history of the Taliban. We have here people who all came from the ranks of Fulani and Tuareg separatists and who try to use a uniting ideology for them to be under one banner fighting off warlords and the French imperialists. In Somalia, it is not that obvious, but it could be seen by the internal conflict back in the early 2010s about the issue of giving allegiance to Al-Qaeda.

In brief, Al-Qaeda, as a pan-Islamic project is dead, and it cannot be any other way, and so is ISIL which attracted most true Al-Qaedans from these covertly nationalist armies to their ranks years ago. The question if Al-Qaeda is stronger one year or the next is not relevant, the moment the regional branch grows it just breaks its allegiance to Al-Qaeda and shows to

the world its true colors. Al-Qaeda, thus, is more of a banner and a way for various people to fund their operations while small and start-up, than a real, coherent army. Al-Qaeda has no national basis as we already explained, even if its branches do have a national basis on their own nations, but even then, *this is a sign of their decay* and death as an Islamic-Nationalist organization. An organization that professes Islamic nationalism and the Islamic nationalists are nothing more than a bunch of rich intellectuals sitting in Swat valley and in Saudi Arabia, being used by the majority of the "Al-Qaeda" leaders who are a bunch of actual nationalists as a way to gain quick money and connections, is nothing more than a dead organization, existing only as name and as pockets. The only way for Al-Qaeda to become relevant, is to drop most of their lines that made up Al-Qaeda until now, lines that are already adopted by ISIL, and move on to be nothing more than an organization which combines Islamism and actual nationalism as a way to fight the west, with any indication of a coherent single "Al-Qaeda and branches" idea being removed, and being replaced with Al-Qaeda being nothing more than *an alliance of independent organizations*, used to better coordinate the work of separate organizations and not as some sort of single organization with branches.

In short, Al-Qaeda will either wither away, or they will abolish their own status which makes Al-Qaeda what it currently is.

Now you have the Taliban, which *sometimes* pays lip service to these "Islamic nationalists", but in practice, they have no relation to them at all. The Taliban has a national basis (The Pashtun), and neither it is organized out of Pashtunistan and the larger Afghanistan, and neither it has shown a desire to do so. In fact, the Taliban has relentlessly fought *the most radical* of the "Islamic Nationalists" of our era, ISIL, where it was the Kabul compradorist government during the battle of Darzab which effectively helped ISIL during their war against the Taliban. The fact that the imperialists plan to use ISIL as a way to fight these real nationalists, who are a real threat to them, *should be pointed out more and more*. It was not the

Taliban that airlifted ISIL from Darzab to Kabul, treating them as guests in the aftermath, it was the Kabul government of Ghani, which operated with the full blessings of the White House which did that.<sup>[11]</sup>

It was not the Kabul government that fought a war with ISIL, it was the Taliban that did that. It was not the Kabul government that executed ISIL leaders in Afghanistan, it was the Taliban that did that immediately as they toppled this government.<sup>[12]</sup>

But, the Taliban *do use Islam*, but not to a cosmopolitan, global degree. The Taliban use Islam *only as a unifying factor for Afghanistan*. Their Islamism practically goes no further than that.

To quote Taliban's spokesman, Zabiullah Mujahid:

Our religion is Hanafi, and Imam Abu Hanifa did not accept the theory of takfir of others, especially Muslims. Those who believe in the principles of Islam, we call them Muslims, and regarding takfir, we feel that Imam Abu Hanifa is our role model in this regard, and according to his advice, if infidelity in a person is proven to be 99% and 1% of Islam remains in him, we call him a Muslim, and we do not excommunicate him. Hence, we do not believe in takfir, and this is a very dangerous phenomenon in the Islamic world that has arisen in the eyes of some extremists, and we do not accept this phenomenon.<sup>[13]</sup>

As we see here the Taliban are not even close to ISIL or Al-Qaeda ideologically, and they are very careful; they use Hanafi because Hanafi is the only way for them to ideologically use as a weapon to keep the non-Sunni Hazaras together with the Sunni Pashtuns and Tajiks and Turkics. Thus, they say "all Muslims are brothers, and thus no need to separate".

We will speak about the national question and why Islamism is being used more in detail in later chapters, but for now, we hope to have informed the reader enough on the major differences between Al-Qaeda, ISIL, and the Taliban movement.

To speak about the class component, the class makeup of

Al-Qaeda is *vastly different* from the one of Taliban. Al-Qaeda started as an organization of various Arabs from different Arab states, like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, as some sort of "alliance" between various Saudi trained clerics, Saudi Aristocrats and Bourgeoisie who went to fight USSR during the war, and in short, mostly radical Islamist nationalists of various backgrounds, usually the intelligentsia in the weapon, and the bourgeoisie or Aristocrat as the funder. This is why Al-Qaeda never assumed the appearance of a movement, and when its national "chapters" did, as we explained, they ceased being in essence "Al-Qaeda". The organization was always, and still is today, an organization of rich people or people with connections to the Arab monarchies who use this money to fund people they deem worthy to fund for a specific project they deem worthy to materialize. As the break with Julani showed, the moment the local branches assume the character of a real, local movement, they break up from Al-Qaeda officially too, after using their money and their "brand" to start up.

The Taliban *are the opposite*, with the only "link" being that both use intellectuals (clergy) in their ranks. But one is, as we explained, a grassroots national movement, made mostly by peasants, and thus why it is a mass movement, the other is made up by various intellectuals, Aristocrats, and Bourgeoisie, and thus why it is mostly a movement confined within the four walls of some Mosques and safe-houses, unable to control territory the way the Taliban does.

But to give a brief sum up, Al-Qaeda is mostly a dead organization officially professing some sort of Islamic Zionism, but its actual armies are nothing of the sort and only use the banner of this Zionism and of Al-Qaeda for their own national purposes.

ISIL is basically a similar Zionist organization in both content and form. The Al-Qaedans who have seen the fraud of the national "Al-Qaedan" armies (which aren't actually following Islamism "nationalism") regarding the actual armies of

Al-Qaeda have joined ISIL which are indeed such an organization, and vice versa, the ISIL commanders and fighters who wanted to use the ISIL banner for the same reasons as the Al-Qaeda commanders saw that using ISIL in that way is not much possible and thus have joined "Al-Qaeda".

The Taliban is mainly composed of Pashtun nationalists who use the "Islamic national" identity as far as Afghanistan goes to try to keep it unified in a single state, and pretty much have no "Islamic nationalist" aspirations besides that, and never really had.

## THE NATIONAL QUESTION

We won't try here to explain the national question in general, and how Marxists (correctly) defined what constitutes a nation. The reader should read Stalin's "Marxism and the National question" for this. But we consider that the national question *has proved to be one of the most important* factors for the world's peoples, and everyone who denies this is, simply put, living in the clouds.

And, since the world's people live in Afghanistan too, it is of paramount importance to understand the national question in Afghanistan, if one wants to have a correct, even at elementary level, understanding of the situation. Thus, for now we will suffice to quote Stalin's conclusion on what is the nation:

A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture.<sup>[14]</sup>

We deem language to be the *most important, and most clear-cut, divider*. It goes without saying that two groups speaking two different languages aren't one nation, but two different nations. Thus, we immediately understand that *there is no "Afghan" nation*, and neither is a "Pakistani" nation. These things are, in essence, *imaginary constructions*, their borders are leftovers from imperialist deals and feudal warlordship, and nothing else. They don't denote actual nations. This would be the case with Iran too, that indeed, *there is no Iranian nation*, but in Iran you have a clearly bigger nation dominating all others there, the Persians. In Afghanistan and Pakistan, no nation is clearly a super-majority against other smaller ones, like it is in Iran.

For example, the composition of Iran is about 60% Persians, about 15% Turks and the rest a combination of Balochi, Kurds, and other smaller nations.

In Afghanistan the Persians compose about 30-40% (if we count Hazara and Tajiks together), the Pashtun about 50%,

and the rest is composed of Uzbeks-Turkmen, Nuristanis and Balochi.

To give an idea of the reader as to how these nations are placed, we will present a map of the languages used in Afghanistan and Pakistan.



Keep in mind that Hazaras and Tajiks speak a common language, Persian. If Hazaras, Tajiks, and Persians are three different nations, we will leave it for another work. Their differences consist of this; Tajiks, Hazaras, and Iran's Persians all speak the same language and all occupy the same (continuous) territory. Iran's Persians are Shiites, and so are the Hazaras. The Tajiks are Sunni and not Shia. This is the difference of Tajiks from Hazara and Iran's Persians. Besides that, Tajiks and Iran's Persians have the same origins, with Tajiks being Persian settlers in Central Asia. There is no

historical or original divide to make up an idea of separate nations (besides religion). The Hazara are a little more complicated, since they are of *Turkic origin* and *appearance*, who adopted Persian as their language centuries ago to have a better position in the Persian-speaking empire at the time, leading to their isolation and persecution through history, and thus this divider could be the only thing separating them with Iran's Persians.

All in all, Tajiks, Persians and Hazaras mostly view themselves as one when contrasted with Pashtuns, Uzbeks and Turkmen. Nonetheless, for the purposes of this study, as we said, we won't analyze if Tajiks, Persians of Iran and Hazaras compose different nations, but we will refer to them collectively as Persian-speaking populations. This leaves us with the Pashtuns, who spread after the border with Pakistan (*the artificially made border*, the Durand line), a few Balochis in the south and a few Uzbeks and Turkmen in the north. Suffice to say, Pakistan too, is not a nation, but rather a state housing four different nations, Sindhi, Punjabi, Pashtuns and Balochi.

We will speak about Pakistan a bit later, for now we will focus on Afghanistan. As we explained, Afghanistan is not a nation. It is a state that includes at least 5 nations, and if we are to consider the Hazaras and Tajiks to be different nations, at least 6 nations. This fact is of paramount importance to understand why semi-feudal warlordism and constant war was able to thrive in our day and age in this country.

*There is no real basis for any unity in Afghanistan.* The only thing uniting all of these nations, is *religion, Islam*, and even then, we aren't speaking of one sect, we are speaking about two major ones, Shiites and Sunnites. What happens in Afghanistan is that the populations, out of nationalist aspirations and aspirations of national self-survival, *rally to anyone* who can secure their existence, even if this "anyone" is a warlord. Thus, the Hazaras, the Tajiks, etc. rally around their own warlords and don't try to fight for any Afghan identity. Only two nations have such an interest and have



proven themselves able to contest this title; the largest nations of Afghanistan, the Persian speaking and the Pashto. Both contest for rulership of the country, since whoever is at helm secures a better situation for the growth of his own nation; a Persian government in Afghanistan can start easily assimilating slowly by slowly the Pashtuns first in the areas where Pashtuns are a minority and then pushing and pushing to assimilate and resettle Persians in the bordering areas, and pushing and pushing and pushing. Even if the Persians don't end up assimilating all Pashtuns, they will end up "stealing" much territory which is now Pashtun and make it Persian. The same is the case with the Pashtuns. Thus, the conflict of the last 30 years could be interpreted *as a national conflict* with the main contestants being the Pashtu and the Persians, with the rest of smaller nations playing ball to secure a better bargain for themselves. Each nation tries to secure the best for themselves, but mainly as a Pashtu-Persian conflict with the Nuristanis, Balochis, Uzbeks and Turkmens playing whatever side would benefit them the most. The national question was one key reason for the survival of warlordism in Afghanistan, since the fact that there exists a national question easily pushes the peasants and workers to give support to whoever appears as someone who is able to safeguard the nation, and in the absence of large capitalist development, the semi-feudal warlords can very easily fill this role.

Now we will speak a little on the relation of Pakistan and the Taliban. Why did Pakistan support the Taliban back in the 90s?

The Pashtun are the only large nation *lacking a state* in Afghanistan. It could be said that the rest of the nations are essentially "*leaking*" into Afghanistan from their home states, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmens etc. There is the state of Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, or Uzbekistan, but there is no state of Pashtunistan! And since the Pashtuns are a very large nation, every state tries to use them to claim other territories. Pakistan tries to use the Pashtuns of Afghanistan to gain a foothold on Afghanistan, and Afghanistan tries to use them to claim the Pashtun territories of Pakistan. Thus, Pakistan came

to this reality; either it would start backing up the Pashtun nationalists of Afghanistan, the Taliban, *and placate their own population of Pashtuns*, and also try to get more influence in Afghanistan for its own bourgeoisie's purposes. Of course, this backfired when the Taliban refused to accept the Durand line, in short, showing to the whole world that Pakistan was used by the Taliban for diplomatic and economic support and nothing else. No wonder that Pakistan took no measure to stop the US invasion in the country. After 2001 Pakistan tried to not be very open against the Afghan Taliban, but the relationship got even more complicated with the Taliban revolution in Pakistan, a war lasting to this day. Pakistan started collaborating with the US to assassinate and capture Taliban leaders regrouping in Pakistan's Pashtun regions, but also trying to keep good relations with some factions of the Taliban who are currently more interested in the Afghan war than re-uniting with the whole of Pashtunistan.

These are the reasons for Pakistani support to the Taliban, both before the US invasion and after it.

As we said before, there is an argument that the Taliban consist of a "Pakistani invasion".

The "Afghanis" who call the Taliban revolt a "Pakistani invasion", as we said, are nothing more than Persian chauvinists. To say that the Taliban are a Pakistani invasion, is to say that Pashtuns are Pakistanis, and that Pakistanis are a nation. Thus, this means that the "Afghanis" *are nothing more than the Persians*. It is a way to claim *all of Afghanistan* for Persians. It is not the Persians who are leaking to Afghanistan, it is the Pashtun who are leaking. Thus, a whole manure-heap of theories can be used to justify their expulsion and national cleansing to pave the way for the true "Afghanis" who speak Farsi! And many "communists" defend this view. Well, if they aren't willing to follow their own logic to the end, we will do it for them. Either the Pashtun of "Pakistan" aren't Pashtun, or they are indeed Pashtun. This means that there is no Afghan nation, and neither is it a Pakistani one. To say that


because Pashtuns living in the south of the Durand line are "Pakistanis" is to say that the Tajiks of Afghanistan are a "Tajik invasion", the same for the Uzbeks and Turkmens etc., and thus we arrive to the conclusion that the thing we call "Afghan" is not a real identity and neither a real nation.

We will give credit to these people if they admit that there is no such nation, and if they admit that there is no Afghanistan but Tajikistan, and that they want to separate and join Tajikistan. At least they would be accurate and honest about what they want.


With this small explanation on the national question of Afghanistan, we urge the reader to remember these national differences for the next chapters of this study, where we will discuss in detail how these national antagonisms manifested within the various governments of Afghanistan.

## POST-SOCIALIST ERA: CONFLICT, COMPRADORIST GOVERNMENTS, TALIBAN RESISTANCE

As we have written already, the post socialist era was marked by a decades old civil war. The previous chapter was the one explaining the national question in Afghanistan. For the convenience of the reader, we will place here a map only of Afghanistan and not Pakistan too, as we did in the previous chapter.



We will follow up to show the territorial control of Afghanistan between the various warlords (who were organized in various parties) directly a year after the fall of the socialist government, in 1992.



We can notice immediacy that the mainly Tajik (Sunni Persian speaking) areas (in the first map they are shown as "Dari"), in Herat and the far north-east are controlled by Jamiat-e Islami, a "Party", i.e. a collective of Tajik warlords led by Burhanuddin Rabbani. One of the main warlords of this party was Panjshir's warlord and current Tajik "national hero" Ahmad Shah Massoud. Jamiat expressed a "republican" and "moderate Islamic" ideology. They are the *main party* against the Taliban, historically being the *Tajik equivalent* of the Taliban as the second (or first) biggest power of the country. They were also one of the main parties *trained and funded* by the imperialists doing the war against the USSR and the socialist Government, and as we will see later, when the imperialists invaded Afghanistan to topple the Taliban, they were one of the parties

to be put *in government again*.

Second is Junbish-e Milli, led by Dostum. This collective of Uzbek and Turkmen warlords shows that the Turkmen and Uzbek warlords and, to a high degree, their peasants, who themselves have a *high degree of mutual intelligibility in their language*, organized politically together.

In the map where the Hazara are shown, Shia militias control this territory too. Then it is the Pashtun warlords of both Hezb-i Islami parties, both of Khalis and Hekmatyar, and the warlords of the Shia Pashtuns led by Mohsen's Harakat-e Islami. Harakat-e Islami was basically, very similar to ideology with Iran, and they drew their own ideology by Iran's main revolutionary theorist, Ali Shariati.


But, what becomes evident in the map, is that the majority of Pashtun areas are basically controlled by not even an "organized" party, but *by local warlords of the village*. The few Pashtun places that were ruled by organized Pashtun warlords were, even then, divided by three. Understanding this plight of the Pashtun nation is instrumental to understand why Mullah's Omar 50 people militia gained ground immediately. One can see that directly after the war, Afghanistan was divided on *national basis*, with the ones having no organized warlords being the Pashtuns, who suffered from this more than all other nations since they were left completely at the mercy of not only both of the non-Pashtun warlords, who often looted and raped their people, but also the local Kulaks and landlords too.

Mullah Omar, at the moment, resigned from fighting and went back to his native Kandahar to teach in Madrassas. Legend has it that Omar saw a dream where a woman visited him and told him to "rise up and put an end to the chaos". So far we know that all other warlords and parties were *western funded* to fight the communists. They were also "old" parties, so to say. But the Taliban started as a "new" party, without any history of backing from the west. The two leaders of the Taliban were also childhood friends, Omar and his friend (and current Taliban deputy prime-minister) Abdul Ghani Baradar,

who weren't warlords but soldiers during the war with the Communists. The biggest help they may have received from the imperialists was probably some AK-47's, but to say that the Taliban were formed as imperialist assets is a gross misinformation; the Taliban grew fighting said assets, as we will show a little later.

As we explained in the first chapter we need to highlight once again that the Taliban were, in essence, a bourgeoisie Pashtun nationalist movement, which aimed to use Islam to unify all of Afghanistan and remove the feudal warlord remnants in the country, which expressed themselves in the form of militias and warlords.

Fast-forward 4 years after the previous map, we go to 1996, one and somewhat years after Mullah Omar and his students started putting down warlord after warlord unifying the Pashtun nation under their national-bourgeoisie movement which took the form of an "Islamic Emirate".




We can see that all imperialist backed warlords don't exist anymore in Pashtunistan; they were defeated by the rising nobodies of the Taliban movement, peasants like Omar. After unifying the pure Pashtun areas (Jalalabad, Kandahar, and the southern areas) they moved to capture areas where Pashtuns were either the Majority, or the large minority (Herat). The forces in the country are now four; Taliban of the Pashtuns, Jamiat of the Tajiks, Junbish of the Turkmen and Uzbeks, and Wahdat of the Hazaras.

All in all, all forces and warlords of the many nations saw that Taliban represented *a step forward economically speaking*, moving from semi-feudalist warlordism to a more capitalist direction, and thus many warlords turned sides to the Taliban (sometimes turning back at the Taliban a little later, showing



how the warlords saw nothing more than their own fiefdom's profit), and fast-forward 5 years later, and Taliban have managed to unify the Turkmen, Hazara, and Uzbek areas under their control too, with remnants of these warlords fleeing and regrouping with the Tajiks at the far north-east and forming the so-called "Northern Alliance".

Here is a map right before the US invasion:



One can see that the biggest areas of resistance against the Taliban governed areas came from Shiite Hazaras. In short, as we wrote earlier, again, it is a war of Persian speaking and Pashtun nations for supremacy. What one can see, too, is that the old CIA and company "assets" were all grouped in the north-east under the banner of the "Northern Alliance". Alas,

could the USA and the imperialists allow a movement which was not directly linked to them to rule Afghanistan? Impossible! Thus, using 9/11 as an excuse, they invaded the country with the help of the northern Alliance (literally collaborators to an invading imperialist power) and Pashtun anti-Taliban warlords (funny that many of them were in *official exile in Pakistan*. How is that possible? Was not the Taliban = Pakistan?) to put their own assets in power and put aside the Taliban.

We urge the readers, if they do not remember the important parties and warlords we discussed before, to go re-read what we wrote, because it is important to remember who is who. Right after the overthrow of the Taliban, the US imperialists with the help of their allied warlords made up what was called "Afghan Interim Administration", a group of 30 "ministers", i.e. people backed by warlords (or in some cases being those warlords), to rule the country. Here is what the new "government" looked like:

5 Hazaras, including several warlords of Wahdat and exiles from Iran and Pakistan, 11 Pashtuns, all exiles, former warlords whom the Taliban won over during the 90s, warlords from Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin and Hezb-e Islami Khalis. The most important of these Pashtuns was Hamid Karzai, who, once his huge feudal family lost and the Taliban unified their fiefdoms, went to cry to US and Europe for support against the "terrorist" Taliban. All in all, all these Pashtuns were either assets of the imperialists in the Soviet War, or willing comprador warlords and tribal leaders who were willing to collaborate with the imperialists in return for their fiefdoms and a large daily American paycheck. 11 Tajiks, who all came, again, from exiles or from local Tajik warlords of the Northern alliance, and 3 Uzbeks, all warlords.

The Pashtuns represent about 50% of Afghanistan's population, but were given one third of the seats. It is obvious that the 16 seats of the Persian-speaking population were a "gift" of the imperialists to the Persians for their loyal support

of the invasion.

One would wonder, "did warlordism disappear after the imperialists invaded? Wouldn't the country advance towards a more normal capitalism?" since it was ruled by the US?

Of course, this was not the case. This is the map of the country right after the Invasion.



Dostum and Junbish just returned to power in the Uzbek-Turkmen areas, Tajik Ismail Khan, one of the original anti-communist "revolutionaries", being one of the leading counter-revolutionaries during the Herat uprising, regained control of Herat, and not only, but he expanded his domain to southern Pashtun areas as well, areas that he never controlled before. Karim Khalili of Wahdat regained control of Hazara areas, Atta Nur, a Tajik warlord who many times came at direct war with Dostum over control of the rest of the north, kept his territories, Gul Agha Shirzai and Haji Abdul Qadeer

took control of the domains they held before the Taliban, and in short, *the era of warlordism just came back*. The 7 years of the struggle of Taliban to put an end to the warlords and the semi-feudal (and sometimes, outright feudal) situation was reversed as simply as that by the US invasion.

This is nothing new; to quote Mao Zedong's analysis on imperialist meddling in China:

The imperialist powers have made the feudal landlord class as well as the comprador class the main props of their rule in China. Imperialism "first allies itself with the ruling strata of the previous social structure, with the feudal lords and the trading and money-lending bourgeoisie, against the majority of the people. Everywhere, imperialism attempts to preserve and to perpetuate all those pre-capitalist forms of exploitation (especially in the villages) which serve as the basis for the existence of its reactionary allies". "Imperialism, with all its financial and military might, is the force in China that supports, inspires, fosters and preserves the feudal survivals, together with their entire bureaucratic-militarist superstructure."<sup>[15]</sup>

This is *precisely* what imperialism did in post-Taliban Afghanistan; it *reversed* the achievements of the progressive, bourgeoisie, Taliban revolution with the rule of the warlords and feudal lords over the masses, trying to win some of the nationalistic minded revolutionary masses in their side using *fake* nationalism.

We will quote some relevant passages from a book and an academic essay about the issue:

There is little incentive for the warlords to relinquish their military power and control over resources and population. They watch each other closely to take advantage of vulnerability or broken promises. Even those who are in the government have secured an "exit policy" against the possibility of the Karzai's government's failure to defeat them: for example, the second most powerful person in Afghanistan, Marshal Muhammad Fahim (minister of defense and vice president), now keeps 300 tanks and 500 armored cars in his stronghold in the Panjshir valley. In Kabul, he amassed 10,000 troops, which are paid well from government sources.<sup>44</sup> The

governor of Herat, Ismail Khan, holds an army of 30,000 troops in the west, using income generated from duties imposed on cross-border trade with Iran. Pacha Khan Zadran of eastern Afghanistan has 6,000 soldiers under his command with 600 being in the direct pay of America.<sup>45</sup> Gul Agha Sherzai (a Qandagari Barakzai Pushtun) in the south and Karim Khalili (a Hazara, Hizb-e Wahdat faction's leader, and Afghan vice president) as well as numerous lesser commanders exist in almost all parts of Afghanistan. Their combined private armies are stronger than those of the state.


Among the main sources of insecurity is continuing rivalry among warlords as well as their challenge to the central authority. Uzbekistan-backed Uzbek Dostum's contest with Fahim-supported Tajik Muhammad Atta in the north, as well as Iran-backed Tajik Ismail Khan's bloody conflict with Pushtun Amanullah Khan in the west, and the stubborn challenge of Karzai by the U.S.-backed Pacha Khan Zadran in the east, in addition to the continuing presence of the al-Qaeda and the Taliban remnants in the south, controlled by countless Pushtun warlords, make the security situation in the country similar to that during 1992–1994.<sup>[16]</sup>

And furthermore, from another academic essay:


The military intervention by the US and allied forces, which started in October 2001 and led to the subsequent collapse of the Taliban regime in autumn 2001, resulted in a power vacuum, which was immediately filled by hundreds of commanders, as well as tribal and religious leaders. These »big men« either possessed a certain legitimacy or controlled the means of violence to a sufficient degree. This development was further strengthened by the US strategy of using Afghan militias to back up their fight against the remnants of al-Qaida and the Taliban (Suhrke et al. 2004).<sup>[17]</sup>

The invasion of Afghanistan threw out the national bourgeoisie from power, and completely broke Afghanistan to pieces, pushing it to the warlord era once again.

Two years later, and the situation is *even worse*, with more and more warlords emerging and splintering the bigger pieces to smaller and smaller pieces.



By 2006, the Taliban have re-emerged, and hold some territories in the areas of Kandahar and Helmand.



But it is evident that more and more areas aren't controlled by major warlords, and most of these areas are Pashtun ones, in short, it is as we discussed before the Taliban became a movement. Again the Pashtuns are laid bare for foreign and local warlords, many times just the village landlord or Kulak militia to be tortured.

Nonetheless, the imperialists understood that if they were to placate the Tajiks too much and not the Pashtuns, the Pashtuns would again go the next day and fight for the Taliban again. Thus, in the government of 2002 to 2004, the ministries were dominated by Pashtuns, but not any kind of Pashtuns. The US and company saw that putting again warlords in power would disrupt their own operations and give the Taliban further boost. Plus, they could not fully trust warlords, who would switch alliances depending on their mood at and the spur of the moment. Thus, they put in the government *cosmopolitan* Pashtuns. I.e, *intellectuals* who spent years and years in exile not only in Pakistan or Iran this time, but in *European countries and the US*. Some of them even were US

citizens, like Ghani.

At the time, the Taliban movement was resurging, fighting a relentless struggle and some of the bloodiest battles against the imperialists and their puppets in the country, but it was evident that the Taliban were there to stay. Karzai and Ghani too, tried to attempt some form of creating a bourgeoisie country by purging the warlords and installing people loyal to Kabul in power in the various regions. Of course, this was *impossible* to be done; one can't make a bourgeoisie republic and system by degree. To "appoint" a new governor means nothing when the *defenses* of the province against the Taliban belong to warlords and feudal lords. The Afghan national army was nothing more than an illusion. To remove the troops of the warlords, who in most Pashtun regions, were at least Pashtuns, with the Afghan "National" army, is to destroy any semblance of a "national army" and install a direct non-Pashtun occupational army, shambing any illusion that the Government was at least "of their people".

To quote a relevant article from 2010:

To give the military a national character, the Afghan army now has ethnic quotas for officers: 40-45 percent Pashtun, 30-35 percent Tajik, 10-12 percent Hazara and 8-10 percent Uzbek and other groups, according to Gen. Mohammad Zahir Azimi, a spokesman for the Defense Ministry.

That's roughly in line with the population. But the army does not track the actual ethnic makeup of the officer corps, so it's difficult to know if the quotas are really filled. There are no quotas for enlisted soldiers.

The Afghan army tries to ensure a mix of ethnic groups in each brigade of enlisted soldiers, but it is hard to find a brigade that northerners do not dominate. Of the nearly 40 soldiers based with the Americans at Combat Outpost Ware in the Arghandab Valley, only two are Pashtun. One of them is the cook.<sup>[18]</sup>

Of course, the Taliban kept advancing, because contrary to the intellectuals sitting in Kabul, thinking that by appointing a



governor with some 1000s of soldiers who are probably Tajiks, or Pashtuns who signed up to just take a paycheck, the so-called "ghost soldiers"<sup>[19]</sup> would enforce the central government's will. Of course, what it did, was make *three factions* from two, the Taliban, who had legitimacy since they were locals, pushing ideas of unity and an end to warlordism, opposing warlords in practice and not by degrees and papers, the government and its half "ghost" army, and the deposed warlords who of course, while being deposed only by name, since they still kept pretty much all de facto power, their removal meant a severance or a decrease on western and central government funds to fund their armies to better exploit the peasants, thus putting them at odds with the government too.

To close this chapter, we will quote from another article from April 2021, just as the Taliban offensive had started. If the reader remembers Ismail Khan, the warlord ruling Herat, here he is again, confirming what we wrote above

In a public show of force, Ismail Khan, one of Afghanistan's most prominent former warlords, paraded hundreds of his militiamen at a rally in the western city of Herat on April 18.

Armed with assault rifles, the militiamen chanted, "Allahu Akbar," or "God is great," as Khan vowed to "defend the people of Herat."

"We hope for a real peace," Khan says, calling on the Taliban to negotiate an end to the war. "But if there isn't one, people shouldn't worry. We will defend their honor and dignity. We won't let anyone trample on them."

Khan, an ethnic Tajik, claimed hundreds of "armed mujahideen" had been deployed in all districts of Herat Province, of which Herat city is the capital. The Taliban, a predominately Pashtun group, controls large swaths of the countryside around the city.

Many of the country's former warlords, including Khan, are ex-commanders of the mujahideen, the Western-backed Islamist groups that fought the Soviet Army in Afghanistan in the 1980s and later the Taliban.

Khan warned the government, which he described as "incompetent," that there would be a "reaction" if it tried to disarm the "mujahideen," employing a term loaded with symbolism by the role that such Islamic fighters' played in the Soviet-Afghan War especially.<sup>[20]</sup>

## TALIBAN'S STRATEGY BEHIND THE 2021 OFFENSIVE

The "quick" Taliban victory being discussed in the media is not really that quick; indeed, the decisive blows were given within two weeks, but the Taliban managed to give so many decisive blows within two weeks because they were fighting and learning and building these last 20 years.

The main reasons that the Taliban won so "quickly" as soon as the Americans signed the withdrawal deal, and the reason they could capture all provinces (save Panjshir) within two weeks, could be classified as four. Four that are also very much interconnected.

Firstly, they *understood the national question* better this time. While remaining mainly a Pashtun army, they did not shy from recruiting from the other nations, they did not shy from encouraging local nations to practice their faith (in case of Hazara, Shia Islam) and in short, promised the tired populations of all the nations in Afghanistan a secured future. Essentially, the Taliban made some sort of non-Pashtun Taliban too. They put local men to rule and command fights in non-Pashtun areas. They understood that the biggest enemy is allowing ground for regional warlords to gain power. The remedy of this is to recruit non-Pashtun commanders and have them fight the imperialists and their puppets on these grounds. After all, anti-imperialism will trump short-sighted "nationalism", especially when the nation is not benefiting at all by having in power an Uzbek or Tajik warlord. The Taliban understood this game a long time ago, and thus by 2017 there were several reports that the Taliban were recruiting non-Pashtun forces.<sup>[21]</sup> One of the top commanders during the offensive was Tajik Taliban commander Qari Fasihuddin, who later captured Panjshir too, and became the Army chief when the government was formed.<sup>[22]</sup> In 2020, the Taliban appointed a Shia Hazara to command Taliban held areas in the Hazara regions.<sup>[23]</sup> All these inroads to the north were made because the Taliban wanted to avoid a situation like the 90s. They knew that once the Americans would leave, the Pashtun

regions would be taken by them immediately. Thus, they centered their offensive first mainly on northern non-Pashtun regions before moving to the south. When the offensive intensified in August, the Taliban started focusing more and more on the north, while they did not try to advance on the south. In the south, they tried to play defensive, not offensive, and in the north they played the offensive.

To prove this point we will highlight the order on which the Taliban liberated provincial capitals. The first province to be captured by the Taliban was Nimruz on August 6. This province, while not being of the north, is not Pashtun either; it forms the center of Balochis in Afghanistan, with over 80% of its population being Balochis and Pashtuns being about 1%. The next day, Jowzjan province was captured, far in the north. The Pashtun population of the province is about 20%, with Uzbeks and Turkmens forming 70% of it. There were reports through the years, and even more so in June, when the Taliban started capturing more and more districts surrounding the provincial capital, Sheberghan, that the Taliban were recruiting many Uzbeks and Turkmens who were fighting, both in command and as troops in the Uzbek-Turkmen areas.<sup>[24]</sup>

Next day, three northern provinces had fallen. Kunduz, a nationally diverse northern province, where Pashtuns compose one third, with the rest being Tajiks and Uzbek and Turkmens, Sar-E-Pol, a province composed mostly by Tajiks and Uzbeks, and Takhar, composed of Tajiks and Uzbeks were captured. So far, not a single Pashtun province is captured. The next day, Samangan, another northern province, composed of 70% Tajiks and about another 30% Uzbeks, with almost no Pashtun presence, was captured by the Taliban. Four days since the attack on provincial capitals, 7 of them have fallen, and none are Pashtun areas, besides perhaps Kunduz, where Pashtuns form the biggest minority (if we consider Uzbeks and Turkmens as separate). On the 10th of August, the Taliban started attacking the provinces that, while majority Pashtun, were on the borders of Pashtunistan. Farah was the first, with 60% Pashtuns and the rest Persians, and the second was again a northern majority Persian province, Baghlan. Next day the Taliban captured the largest Tajik province, Badakhshan.

At this point, the Taliban have essentially secured control of the north by cutting the remaining non-Pashto regions from one another. Thus, while they kept capturing provinces in the north, they started pushing to the Pashtun areas too. Next day after Badakhshan the Taliban broke a record and captured 4 provinces in a single day. At this point people were making bets on how much Kabul would last, with us at Marxist Anti-Imperialist Collective (MAC) betting that before our meeting (which was on 15 of August) the Taliban would be at Kabul, which ended up being true indeed. The four provinces that were captured in this day included Ghazni province, of 60% Pashtuns and 40% Persians, Herat, the main base of Tajik Warlord Ismail Khan, who surrendered to the Taliban, and rumors has it that he even joined the movement (probably in return for the new government to appoint him governor). Herat is mostly Tajik, but Pashtuns form a big minority. Anyway, Herat was a huge blow against the anti-Taliban forces. Badghis also was captured, a northern province with a majority Tajik population of 65%, and the rest being mostly Pashtuns, and then, the historic center of the Taliban and Pashtunistan, Kandahar, the homeland of Mullah Omar, the original province where the Taliban were birthed, was liberated by the Taliban in the snap of a finger. The Taliban, having almost secured the north and non-Pashtun areas, started pushing equally now on all fronts, having connected the puzzle. On August 13th, the Taliban broke a record again and captured 5 provinces, with another majority Pashtun area being captured, Helmand, but also a northern province too, Ghor, of Tajik-Hazara population. Logar too, a Tajik majority-Pashtun minority province was captured too, and Pashtun provinces of Zabul, the death place of Omar having fallen too, and Uruzgan being next. The next day, August 14, the Taliban pushed the last offensive to capture all of the north, focusing their forces to the last northern stronghold, the bastion of Dostum, Mazar-I-Sharif. The Taliban broke another record and captured 7 provinces, Pashtun ones Paktia, Paktika, Kunar, Laghman, and Uzbek-Persian provinces of Balh and Faryab, and next day, on August 15th, the Taliban toppled the government by capturing remaining Pashtun

provinces of Khost and Wardak, the mainland of Hazara, Bamyan, and the nation of Nuristani, Nuristan, and the remaining Tajik, Kapisa and Parwan, before going to Kabul and entering it without a fight after the government officials packed millions of dollars in cars and helicopters and fled. The ones who were keen to fight the Taliban regrouped in one province which the Taliban had not captured, by the time, Panjshir, but we will speak about it in the next chapter. Nonetheless, we think that by explaining step by step the offensive, we have proved to the reader the validity of the claim that the Taliban have understood to some degree the National question, at least more than most people calling themselves "The Left", and by extension, of course the Leftist Aristocracy.

Secondly, the use of Islam in an ideological/political and not a personal manner. History has shown that when nations are under imperialist attack, or in general under threat from outside, they will unite into an alliance or, more than usual, into one state. Such was the state of Yugoslavia and the state of USSR, and such is the state of PRC today. Of course, history has shown that these multinational states *don't fare very well* once imperialism stops being a seeming threat, or when the biggest nation in said state tries assimilationist policies too openly. There is nothing that can keep Afghanistan together, since as we explained, we speak about at least 3 different big nations, Turkmen-Uzbek, Tajiks-Hazara, and Pashtuns. Not only different nations, but *different races*; Turkic and Iranic. To keep such a thing as Afghanistan united, there needs to be an ideology *to cover* the materialist fact of opposition to imperialism, to be used by the intellectuals of each nation within the state to at least try to push to their people such unification. "Blind" nationalism often leaves nationalistic minded people to even ally with imperialism if the imperialists promise them independence (Rojava, Albanians in Kosovo, Ukraine, Uyghurs etc.). Of course, *the main danger is the assimilationist chauvinism of the dominant nation* which pushes the smaller nation to adopt a chauvinist policy into allying with imperialism (Arabs, Serbs, Russians, Han etc.) but this is a question to be discussed for another day. What we want to say,

is that the nationalists who see more in depth, and understand that to have a nation you need your people to be able to eat, go to school, etc., things that aren't possible in a much feasible manner under imperialist occupation, save the few times the imperialists are willing and able to buy off entire nations for a period of time, will try to use more *encompassing ideologies* to try to push the nationalistic minded masses who don't see so much in depth, to push them inside the boat of said multinational state for time being. Communism could very much keep Afghanistan together, if the communists of Afghanistan did not choose an anti-Islamic policy from the start, but this boat has sailed for Afghanistan since a long time ago. The only thing that can keep it together is, therefore, *political Islamism*. And political Islamism not of the Al-Qaeda and ISIL varieties, where sectarianism reigns supreme, but an all encompassing Islamism which does not separate between Shia and Sunni. Such is the political Islamism adopted by the Taliban to keep not only different nations but different religions into one state.

Thus, political Islamism is one key factor in the victory of the Taliban, an Islamism which can be used to unify "Muslims" against imperialism, even if said Muslims are of different nations or of different faiths.

Third, is anti-imperialism. Anti-imperialism is not just a theory or an ideology or something nebulous; *imperialism is a real thing, affecting the life of every single living human on the planet*. And whatever happens, if a nation sees that having their own nation's feudal lord in power does not benefit them much, or seeing that working for imperialists while not much enters their pockets, is again not doing them much good, *they will drop direct nationalism*, which, without much of an ideology behind it *becomes blind nationalism*, something which benefits the nation none, then the nation may even choose to rise its own banner *beneath the banner of another nation* which has revolted against the imperialists and compradors. Such is what happened in Afghanistan when the Pashtun nationalist movement managed to win the trust of the nationalists of the other nations due to their relentless opposition to imperialism.

The nations saw 40 years of imperialist meddling, and saw nothing but despair, poverty, sickness and bombing in return. What good is to have Dostum or Massoud in power if it does not bring much to the nation? No much use at all.

The fourth and final is the general amnesty of the Taliban. By announcing a general amnesty and not pursuing a revengeful strategy, they managed to have the rank and file of the Afghan army, an "army" which is made up of criminals and pederasts or at best, people who just signed up for easy and quick money, re-think their allegiance to X feudal lord or the central government. They knew that in the long term they stood no chance against the Taliban, so they just surrendered. General amnesty is a strong weapon to be used against an opponent which is not led by some deep ideological beliefs, an army that has no national, ideological, or even material coherence, and no support from the people. General amnesty is telling these people, "You did your crimes, now if you drop your weapons and don't do them again, we will not persecute you". It is quite compelling, and one does not need to be in the Afghan army to understand the logic behind this. History proved Taliban's strategy correct, since indeed, one key reason the last offensive of the Taliban was not that bloody as expected, was because the army started surrendering and fleeing without much of a fight both in the north and in the south. The general amnesty even won to the side of the Taliban some warlords (who won't be warlords for much more time) like Shiite Tajik Ismail Khan<sup>[25]</sup> and Pashtun Ghul Aga.<sup>[26]</sup>

Thus, the Taliban managed to use Islam, anti-imperialism, the general amnesty, and the nationalism of various nations of Afghanistan for a unifying cause, and not only that, but the prospect of progress from semi-feudal warlordism towards a capitalist society, in such a way as to secure a more stable position of power, even more than the years of Mullah Omar. They did what Mullah Omar did in Kandahar, this time in the non-Pashtun areas using non-Pashtun commanders and fighters. Since the Pashtun areas were already in their hand in everything but name, they fell like dominoes once they secured



more hard to win non-Pashtun provinces.

As we wrote earlier, neither the warlords, nor a compradorist government composed of westernized intellectuals could get rid of the Taliban. First, the Kabul government was an illusion; they had no actual control on the ground for the simple reason that they weren't the people on the ground. The ones closest to the "people on the ground" were the warlords, whom Karzai and Ghani started antagonizing for a chance to put Afghanistan on a more stable capitalist path. Thus, the government could not get rid of the Taliban without the warlords, and the warlords were one of the main reasons that led people to support the Taliban, forming an essential support basis for them. Dialectically speaking, only a movement like the Taliban could win this war, a war where the "central government" is imposed on the whole country by Americans and their allies, and where the next thing local to the Taliban are a bunch of bacha bazi feudal lords, who rape and pillage without discrimination. The natural outcome would be that the more moderate minded would, at the very least, passively support the Taliban, and the more radical minded would actively join the resistance and pick up arms alongside the Taliban.

The victory of the Taliban was not due to magic; the Taliban had all the necessary requirements to make them win this war, and make years happen in days. First, they used Islam, anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism as a unifying factor for the various nations of Afghanistan, secondly they managed to recruit and secure bases of support in non-Pashtun nations, where it was precisely this Islamism and anti-imperialism that was needed to win non-Pashtun support, and third they used the situation created by the material conditions themselves, the situation where an official government tries to push for an actual bourgeoisie republic, and several feudal lords try to push for their own short-sighted profit and power, *but both central government and warlords being tied to the existence of the other, with one being unable to survive without the other.*

Simple put, in this war, only the Taliban could win, or a force that is what the Taliban is today. It was not a question of "if" but a question of "when".

## CONTRAS

If one studies anti-imperialist movements not only during their years of resistance, but also after these movements take power, one will see a specific pattern very common to every single one of them. This is "the Contras phenomenon", where the imperialists find ways to make use of the contradictions of states and societies to prop up support for specific classes, nations, religious sects, all of these together, or anything they can. The imperialists *don't care much* about the ideology of said movements which organize the specific nation, class, etc.. These movements may be of the "left" variety, or the "right", but the imperialists don't care at all. If needed, they will even support "communists" for their aims.

Here is what Stalin warned us 100 years ago.

But there is still a third factor that is impeding the union of the republics into a single union: the existence of nationalism in the individual republics. The N.E.P. affects not only the Russian, but also the non-Russian population. The New Economic Policy is developing private trade and industry not only in the center of Russia, but also in the individual republics. And it is this same N.E.P., and the private capital associated with it, which nourish and foster Georgian, Azerbaijani, Uzbek and other nationalism. Of course, if there were no Great-Russian chauvinism—which is aggressive because it is strong, because it was also strong previously and has retained the habit of oppressing and humiliating—if there were no Great-Russian chauvinism, then, perhaps, local chauvinism also, as a retaliation to Great-Russian chauvinism, would exist only in a much reduced form, in miniature, so to speak; because, in the final analysis, anti-Russian nationalism is a form of defense, an ugly form of defense against Great-Russian nationalism, against Great-Russian chauvinism. If this nationalism were only defensive, it might not be worth making a fuss about. We could concentrate the entire force of our activities, the entire force of our struggle, against Great-Russian chauvinism, in the hope that as soon as this powerful enemy is overcome, anti-Russian nationalism will be overcome with it; for, I repeat, in the last analysis, this nationalism is a reaction to Great-Russian nationalism, a retaliation to it, a certain form of defense. Yes, that would be so if anti-Russian nationalism in the localities were

nothing more than a reaction to Great-Russian nationalism.[27]

If one ignores how Stalin (like most Bolsheviks at the time), when speaking about nationalism, spoke about chauvinism (as if they were the same thing), one can see how sharp Stalin is on the question. Stalin is saying to communists of the dominant nations to not oppose self-determination of nations, else, these nations will start developing their own defensive chauvinism, and what Stalin implies is that this would be a thorn for them and an opening for the imperialists to use. Stalin is completely right. Chauvinism is not just aggressive, it can be *peacefully assimilationist too*. The *main engine* of this peaceful assimilation is *a state* which is not ruled by the nation's X class that will get assimilated. It is proven that the only state that is willing to give self-determination to nations, is a proletariat state. Of course, even then, this is not guaranteed (see PRC). If the proletariat state is the only way for self-determination of a nation, and if even then, it is not guaranteed that this self-determination will be given, what can one expect of a bourgeoisie state like Taliban's Afghanistan? At best, non-aggressive chauvinism. *But, the sheer fact that the government combats any attempt at secession, is for the nationalistic minded, aggressive chauvinism*. In their mind, this is enough for them to turn against the government, even if it means to ally with imperialists and sell themselves to compradorship.

This is how this "defensive" chauvinism manifests most of the time. The Bolsheviks were not overcome by great Russian chauvinists most of their history, and when they did, they indeed fell (of course this being one of the main reasons and not the sole one). In Afghanistan too, the imperialists will use this opening that is being offered to them by the unfortunate fact that there exists a Durand line, which means that any attempt of the Taliban to turn to clear-cut Pashtun nationalism would manifest into an "invasion" of "Pakistan", something they aren't able to afford, thus the Taliban will avoid it and try to stick in the *vehicle of the Afghan borders*. This means that by sticking to this vehicle, they will oppose

any secessionist movement, and thus they will create a rift to the nationalistic minded masses of the non-Pashtun nations. As we wrote before, the nationalistic minded masses which see far in the future will chose to fight alongside the Taliban for now. But a rift is created by this fact, and a portion will prefer to stick to whatever economic system and vehicle there is if it means they will have their own state. *Even if the vehicle is the warlords*. It is obvious that as the situation is now, the warlords are useless. The only thing that can make them strong enough is *imperialist financial backing*. And this is precisely what will happen from now on.

The imperialists will focus on backing up Hazara, Tajik and Turkic warlords (and if they can, Pashtun too) to try to fight the Taliban. Their class essence will be composed by the lords and their soldiers, i.e. *the parasites* who don't wish to work, but keep waving a gun and consuming what the peasants are forced to give and what the imperialists are willing to give to them to fight the Taliban. And in the meantime, they may be able to win over some masses due to fake "nationalist" rhetoric. The biggest bastion should be expected to be, like 20 years before, the Tajik warlords. So far, indeed, this is the case; former warlords and members of the Ghani cabinet have amassed in Panjshir valley to fight the Taliban. They have all rallied around the son of Ahmad Shah Massoud, Ahmad Massoud. The main leaders of this contra force are Massoud, former vice-president Amrullah Saleh, who claims to be the acting president of the "Islamic Republic of Afghanistan", and the former Defense Minister Bismillah Khan Mohammadi. All of these three leaders of Panjshir resistance are, of course, Tajiks. The bourgeoisie ruling Tajikistan will care of course, first and foremost for their own interest, even if Russia, its main ally, backs up the Taliban, they will back up Massoud.<sup>[28]</sup> This of course shows the short-sightedness of the Tajik government which thinks that they will be able to do something more than make the Taliban mistrust the big Tajik politicians and push them out of power even after the war ends. There is no way for Massoud to win the Taliban, and the only result of it will be that the main Tajik leaders will fail to *at*

*least join high positions in the new bourgeoisie government,* thus pushing down the allies of Tajikistan who could at least try to influence things through legal means. Nonetheless, the Tajik warlords understand that the support of Tajikistan is not enough to fight the Taliban; proper imperialist powers which aren't close to the anti-imperialist camp at all, must enter the game. Thus, Massoud is pleading for the imperialist world to basically come back in Afghanistan, if not with their feet, to at least send him money and weapons; we quote him:

To the many others—in France, Europe, America, the Arab world, elsewhere—who have helped us in our struggle for freedom, first against the Soviets and then against the Taliban 20 years ago, I ask: Will you, dear friends in freedom, assist us once more, as in the past? Despite the betrayal of some, we still have confidence in you.<sup>[29]</sup>

"Will you, dear friends in freedom, assist us once more".. We will leave it to the reader to understand what needs to be understood by Massoud's appeal to the "friends of freedom".

Of course, France was one of the first to "heed the call" for imperialist intervention, and is quite normal. There won't be for France many chances to further enlarge its own share of the pie in the imperialist camp, to further enlarge its domains in the sight of a rising Turkey which endangers its turf in Africa.<sup>[30]</sup> The French Cosmopolitan bourgeoisie have admitted that they favor Massoud, and that they "work to find ways to help him". When they say so, one can be sure that they have probably already sent specialists there to aid the Contras. In Panjshir, there are reports that the soldiers of Turkic warlord Dostum arrived there to aid Massoud like they did 20 years ago.<sup>[31]</sup> Of course, Dostum is to Turkey nothing more than what Massoud is for France,<sup>[32]</sup> and this could hint that Turkey plans to *contest leadership* over the compradorist forces with both Tajikistan and France, thus bringing itself to crossroads against its main "enemy" within their imperialist camp, France. Of course, the Turkish bourgeoisie are a *little more smart* than the French in the question, and they will try to keep good

relationships with the Taliban too, seeing that it is highly possible that the compradorist forces won't enter power again soon.<sup>[33]</sup>

But the Tajiks aren't the only ones that the imperialists could find openings for their contras. The Hazaras are too, but in this case this shows that the smartest bourgeoisie of all are the *ones ruling Iran*, which is too on the anti-imperialist camp, thus from all sides and angles it has the correct stance both regarding anti-imperialist stances and both regarding its own interest in Afghanistan. The ones which Iran was closer to, historically speaking, were the Shias of Afghanistan, i.e. the Hazaras. One would ask, what did the Iranians do to the compradorist and Contra elements of the Hazaras? Help them?

No.

We have reports from various Twitter accounts that are usually on point that pro-Iran fighters in Hazarajat are helping the Taliban identifying and executing Hazara contra forces.<sup>[34]</sup> An indication towards the truth of this could be the assassination of a Taliban splinter group leader who was openly an *aggressive chauvinist* towards the Hazara, Mullah Abdul Manan Niazi. Two weeks before he was killed, Niazi said the following:

Inside Afghanistan, all the Hazaras are Fatemiyoun. I will kill Fatemiyoun and all others who are key players in the civil war in Afghanistan. I will kill thousands of Hazaras.<sup>[35]</sup>

It is evident this is not in line with the "Afghanistan" policy of the Taliban, and therefore Niazi needed to be finished. Two weeks later after he said this, he was assassinated, with sources pointing towards a Taliban-Iranian collaboration to finish off this anti-Hazara commander.<sup>[36]</sup>

Of course, another weapon the imperialists are sure to use, are the ISIL Islamic nationalist types. Already, ISIL has committed several terrorist attacks against the Taliban within a month of Taliban government. We know that some Taliban groups have splitted from the movement, namely Fidai Mahaz for example.

For sure the Islamic Nationalists of the Taliban will be a good weapon for the imperialists to use; here, they will contest the banner of Allah with the Taliban, and this will further make obvious the contradiction between Pashtun nationalism and Islamism which exists deep down to every multinational movement.



## THE WOMEN'S QUESTION

One of the biggest issues concerning the Leftist Aristocracy is the issue of the woman. The issue of the woman takes *multiple* forms; for the parasites living in the west, the issue takes the form of the ideology surrounding "sex work", the right to polygamy, etc.

Of course, the various brands of "leftist" thought of the Leftist Aristocracy represent nothing more *than the will of the parasite and the liberal intellectual*, and what the life of the parasite consists of? Hedonism, drugs, and doing parties on a university campus. It is their lifestyle which makes them create the cardinal principles consistent of the below:

1) LGBT, acceptance of prostitution, hyper sexualization and hedonism, parasitism (the last said *not* explicitly but *implicitly*)

2) Some de facto minor stuff, like a vague notion of national liberation, planned economy, the "withering away of the state" etc., and whenever to vote for Social-Fascism or not due to "harm reduction".

The reason they place what is *essential liberalism* at top, is because for them, politics are a *game*. They place the science of the Anus and its surroundings at top, because this is what their life represents. For these snowflakes to be exposed for their degeneracy, is a personal insult of the worst caliber, which warrants them trying to do voodoo rituals against the exposer in hopes they die a painful death. They will call actual communists "Nazis" or "NazBols" (the word depending on what the degenerate had a glimpse on Twitter the week before) or whatever for exposing their degeneracy.

But the crux of the matter about the women's question is the following: The degenerate parasite woman *needs to be free from society; everyone* has an obligation to her, but she owes *none to anyone*. Society (*especially* the society of the proletariat) is just a gladiator field for her, and the people composing it subjects for her desires; whoever dares to call her out for being

nothing more than a degenerate, will in turn await to be bombed by this woman. This woman will immediately go to the "human rights organizations" which are all funded and controlled by the imperialists and plead for bombing out the "fascists" who dared say the obvious. *A parasitic economic life breeds a parasitic lifestyle and ideology.* The lifestyle of the parasite consists of one motto: *I owe nothing to anyone.* Hence, this woman will oppose anything and anyone who tells her that *she does* own something to the society, and one of her debts is *to be a mother and the mistress of her house*, or as Kollontai put it:

In opening up to women access to every sphere of creative activity, our state has simultaneously ensured all the conditions necessary for her to fulfil her natural obligation – that of being a mother bringing up her children and mistress of her home. From the very beginning, Soviet law recognized that motherhood is not a private matter, but the social duty of the active and equal woman citizen.<sup>[37]</sup>

Therefore, naturally, she will oppose any society which dares to enforce a X law which is a manifestation of an obligation of the female towards the society. For example, the law of the Taliban about the Hijab. The Taliban say that the woman, as per national and Islamic custom, needs to wear some type of Hijab, full face, only as head cover or whatever, but nonetheless a Hijab. The imperialist nation's woman and her minions in the imperialized nation will immediately react to this "infringement of her bodily autonomy" (i.e. as we said, they will react by being told they have any duty towards the society) and do what we said they would do. The question about the Hijab is irrelevant; the Leftist Aristocratic woman and the parasitic society in which she lives don't see the veil, they see *the idea and reality* that they have a duty towards society as the main enemy, the veil is nothing more than one of the 1000s of expressions of the idea and fact of the duty towards the society, and since the veil is pushed by an anti-imperialist movement, they fixate to this both due to personal interest but also due to the economic material interest of the parasite who consumes more than produces,

and who knows deep down that if the "Taliban" of the world become stronger, her parasitic lifestyle is endangered.

But the woman has *a man* too, and the man of the Leftist Aristocracy, and the parasitic society in general, needs women to consummate his parasitic lifestyle, and since all women are for his nothing more than *an object of desire*, including his own family<sup>[38]</sup> putting a duty for women, and restricting their "bodily autonomy", means that his own objects of desire are *limited*. It means that his parasitic lifestyle gets even more difficult to consummate. He opposes the veil because the veil restricts him from seeing the woman living in Afghanistan. He *owns* the women of Thailand, and now wants to own the women of Afghanistan.<sup>[39]</sup> Not being able to do so, completely frustrates him. As Frantz Fanon put it:

But there is also in the European the crystallization of an aggressiveness, the strain of a kind of violence before the Algerian woman. Unveiling this woman is revealing her beauty; it is baring her secret, breaking her resistance, making her available for adventure. Hiding the face is also disguising a secret; it is also creating a world of mystery, of the hidden. In a confused way, the European experiences his relation with the Algerian woman at a highly complex level. There is in it the will to bring this woman within his reach, to make her a possible object of possession. This woman who sees without being seen frustrates the colonizer. There is no reciprocity. She does not yield herself, does not give herself, does not offer herself. The Algerian has an attitude toward the Algerian woman which is on the whole clear. He does not see her. There is even a permanent intention not to perceive the feminine profile, not to pay attention to women. In the case of the Algerian, therefore, there is not, in the street or on a road, that behavior characterizing a sexual encounter that is described in terms of the glance, of the physical bearing, the muscular tension, the signs of disturbance to which the phenomenology of encounters has accustomed us. The European faced with an Algerian woman wants to see. He reacts in an aggressive way before this limitation of his perception.<sup>[40]</sup>

Of course, the imperialists know this, and therefore have made it a weapon. As we said before about Belarus<sup>[41]</sup> "Feminism" is nothing more than a weapon in the hands of the imperialists,

and this since long ago.

To quote from an article on the issue, an article we highly recommend the reader to read:

The relationship between the CIA and feminism is not new. For example, it was revealed that Gloria Steinem, who is still considered a pioneer and respected feminist even today, was funded by the CIA from the early 1950s to the 1960s. This funding relationship is thought to have continued even longer, although Steinem has denied it.

When asked about the topic, she praised her funders, saying that the CIA boasts a liberal and non-violent environment. The name of the foundation she founded with CIA funding was ironic:

Independent Research Service. Through this foundation, she worked to disseminate feminist theses in the world, especially in the U.S.<sup>[42]</sup>

To remind the reader or to make it known to them (if they don't know), Ms. Steinem is considered one of the leading feminist theorists in the world, being the one who co-founded "Woman's Action Alliance", which collaborated with many organizations the Leftist Aristocracy point to this very day as an example!

How is this relevant to Afghanistan, I don't think anyone serious would ask. But for the sake of the reader, we know for fact thanks to CIA reports that the Imperialists pretty much used (and still do) Feminism as a weapon in Afghanistan. We will quote just the title of a message from the co-chair of the US-Afghan Women's Council, Melanne Verneer towards H. Clinton: "RECRUIT AFGHAN WOMEN TO SELL WAR TO EUROPEANS: CIA REPORT"<sup>[43]</sup>

To quote the CIA report in question:

Afghan women could serve as ideal messengers in humanizing the ISAF role in combating the Taliban because of women's ability to speak personally and credibly about their experiences under the Taliban, their aspirations for the future, and their fears of a Taliban victory. Outreach initiatives that create media opportunities for Afghan women to share their stories with French, German, and other European women could help to overcome pervasive skepticism among women in Western Europe toward the

ISAF mission.[44]

Is there more to be said in the issue? It is quite obvious that the entire parasitic society organizes behind a common goal, each for "their" reasons, but which reasons are all rooted in the same base.

But the biggest crime is when people who call themselves seriously "Marxist–Leninists", and "defenders of the legacy of Stalin" adopt a view which would be heavenly opposed by Stalin. When Sheng Shicai consulted the Bolsheviks over what policy should be adopted in Xinjiang, Stalin said the following to Apresov, Soviet diplomat in Xinjiang:

Sheng Shicai's letter made a depressing impression on our comrades. Only a provocateur or a hopeless "leftist" having no idea about Marxism could have written it. What could have happened that Sheng, having such an adviser as you, could have written us (me, Molotov, and Voroshilov) such a letter?

We are sending Sheng a suitable letter, but Cde. Svanidze will pass you a copy of our reply.

You should explain to Sheng the meaning of our reply and take steps so that the instructions given in our reply are followed.

I warn that if our instructions are not taken into consideration we will be forced to deny aid to Sheng.

The charter of the Union is not bad, but paragraph five about "equal rights" for women is not suitable for Xinjiang conditions and should be discarded.[45]

The "ML" wing of the Leftist Aristocracy asks "equal" rights for women in a country that 70%<sup>[46]</sup> of its population lives in rural areas and the amount of women in the workforce is about 20%.<sup>[47]</sup> What is to be said about these sad excuses of "Marxists"? The epithet of "provocateur or hopeless leftist" is good enough for the ones who are dancing between the lines of the Leftist Aristocracy and the genuine communists, but is soft for the Leftist Aristocracy itself.

At long last, what about the screeching about the right to work and to be educated for women? The Taliban have already answered that,<sup>[48]</sup> and the answer is positive.

## REACTIONS

As we said in the prologue, the true Marxist–Leninists are divided by the frauds during important events like the victory of the Taliban. How did the parties of the imperialist nation (who need to adopt a revolutionary defeatism) acted? There can be three broad categories:

1) The ones who followed the Leftist-Aristocratic line and acted in a completely social-chauvinist way, condemning the Taliban and repeating the talking points of the liberals and imperialists verbatim.

2) The ones who were too afraid to say openly that they do support the Taliban. They were afraid because they are tailing the "leftist" intelligentsia, and if they say what needs to be said they would lose support from the university students who form their basis of support.

3) The ones who were not afraid to speak up and said openly what Stalin came to 100 years ago in his Foundations of Leninism when he spoke about the Emir of Afghanistan and his struggle against imperialism.

We will start with the first category of parties, by examining the biggest parties of the labor aristocracy in the USA.

We will start with the most obvious representative of the Leftist Aristocracy, DSA.

As one would expect, the pseudo-radicalism of DSA the last few years when it tried to rebrand as a more "communist" organization loses its steam when one starts speaking about the real world.

Let's quote some parts of what DSA said on their declaration on the issue:<sup>[49]</sup>

The United States should never have invaded Afghanistan. The

Afghan people suffered from U.S. violence for decades and now will face further hardship under the Taliban.

So, from the get go, we can see that the DSA starts spitting their venom towards the Taliban who spend 20 years fighting imperialism while the DSA did nothing.

One would expect for DSA to at least take a completely "neutral" (i.e., passive support for the imperialists) stance, but no! They spread the usual venom about "the women and national minorities" and not only that, but they even plead to the imperialist governments to hide the compradorist elements and collaborators to fascism of Afghanistan in their countries!

The Democratic socialists of America (DSA) International Committee stands firmly in solidarity with the people of Afghanistan, in particular with the women and ethnic minorities sure to face persecution under the Taliban. All Afghans who desire it should be granted asylum in the United States or another country of their choosing, with a waiver of all application hurdles and provision of all necessary support. In addition, the United States must end all its current wars and reckon with its past and present imperialist aggression, including its interventions in the name of "humanitarianism" and its saber-rattling propaganda. Those responsible for the war and its innumerable crimes, particularly George W. Bush and members of his administration, should face justice for their actions.

With anti-imperialists like these, who needs imperialism? DSA does not really care about anti-imperialism, they care about the way of how their government should move on. They (correctly) see that occupation does not work, long gone are the days of colonialism. *The new deal is neocolonialism*, and this can be done by putting compradorist elements in power, compradorist elements which DSA urges for the US government to house, and hopefully, one day they will overthrow the Taliban and bring rights to "the women and ethnic minorities" which DSA so much worries about! Truly, this is the essence of "anti-imperialist" social-fascism. *They aren't against imperialism, they are against a specific means the imperialists use. They are against colonialism insofar*

*they are supportive of neocolonialism.*

The Socialist Alternative had a similar response, but theirs was *worse*: they started calling out Iran, Russia and China for "imperialism" and essentially, the Taliban their compradors.<sup>[50]</sup> Most parties had pretty much the same view, with the Workers World Party having the response of the second category.<sup>[51]</sup> The Communist Party of Greece (KKE) had a similar reaction to the second category<sup>[52]</sup>, and very few parties had a reaction of the third category, mostly small parties from Asia and Latin America of the Maoist variety.

This tells us that no big party in the imperialist nations and the imperialist periphery follows the Stalinist Line in a coherent manner. They follow it as long as the national bourgeoisie adopts a "leftist" robe, but as soon as the national bourgeoisie adopts a *separate* robe, they are all too afraid to show support and endorsement. So be it, let them dance with the lines of the Leftist Aristocracy, it only paves us the way, the true anti-imperialists who follow a coherent thought, to spread the Stalinist line far and wide.

We plead to the reader to always carefully investigate the reactions of parties and organizations during such moments. It is at these moments that the masks drop and people show their true face. The face of the chauvinist and lackey of finance capital, or the face of the coherent anti-imperialist who follows the Stalinist line, which was tried by the ages and gained the acceptance of the world's oppressed masses?

As to what we mean by the Stalinist line? We urge the reader to read Stalin's "The foundations of Leninism", especially the chapter about the national question.

On the matter of states, the anti-imperialist camp is *both reluctant and willing* to openly ally with the Taliban. They wait to see how stable they will be for such a thing. Russia, China, Iran, etc., both were one of the first states to house Taliban delegations, but nothing official as recognition has yet to come. This has its reasons, but in our opinion is a mistake; if the



powers don't approach the Taliban, the Taliban may be approached by someone else, like Turkey and Saudi Arabia. This would put them at odds with these countries, and this is obviously not needed, when it is the Taliban itself urging these states for good relations. The Taliban offer their hands, but if none is there to grab it, why would they not offer their hands elsewhere?

Such are the reactions. Most communist parties (especially the parties in US and the rest of the imperial core, where they are the ones who need to have the proper opinion on the issue first and foremost) aren't anti-imperialist enough to state things openly, and at some point, not anti-imperialist at all, and the anti-imperialist governments try to play with fire in hopes they get more concessions by the Taliban. The global fascist governments of the world are waiting to see if there can be an opening for them to exploit, and their propaganda machines rage non-stop.

## IMPLICATIONS

To finish up this work, we would like to say a few words on the implications of the Taliban victory. We wish to quote something Stalin wrote 80 years ago:

How could it have happened that our glorious Red Army surrendered a number of our cities and districts to the fascist armies? Is it really true that the German-fascist troops are invincible, as the braggart fascist propagandists are ceaselessly blaring forth?

Of course not! History shows that there are no invincible armies and never have been. Napoleon's army was considered invincible, but it was beaten successively by the armies of Russia, England and Germany.<sup>[52]</sup>

A lot of comrades across the world are heavenly demoralized in the face of the counter-revolutions of 1991 and the apparent hegemony of the imperialist nations over the imperialized nations. This is natural, but we should remember that *this is not* the permanent order of things. As the Taliban victory has shown, the imperialists are possible to be defeated. As Stalin said, there is no army that can't be defeated, and there never has been.

The Taliban, after brutal battles against both the US, the entirety of NATO and EU and their allies, and also against Pakistan sometimes, managed to defeat the US, to purge the country of foreign armies. One needs to ask, what happened once it became apparent that the compradorist government was left in the open? Once it became obvious, no one would rush to help it militarily? It fell within two weeks. Such is the nature of the compradorist governments, of the governments subjected to neocolonialism, where the threat of foreign troops forces the population to a *silent submission*. It is obvious that most compradorist governments will be defeated *almost immediately* once the imperialists abandon them. How does this translate to us living in the neo-colonies? It translates like that: anything that can get NATO-EU troops out, anything that

can get our nations out of their pacts, further hastens our victory against the bourgeoisie, further hastens our victory against capitalism, against the enemies of the nation, against the sellouts, and further enforces proletarian internationalism amongst our nations, further enforces communism, further enforces the survival of our nations and its people.

To put things into perspective. We want the reader to imagine if the imperialist troops of South Korea leave. What will happen? The compradorist government of South Korea will probably fall within weeks, and the Korean nation will finally be unified under the proletarian dictatorship.

What would happen for my Albanian nation? We would finally be able to unify our nation which is divided in 4 states, we would also help the Serbs to unify theirs, and we would finally be able to cooperate with Serbia on an equal basis.

What would happen in Arabia, in Hispanoamericana, in the African and Asian nations? We would see their compradorist governments falling one by one, piece by piece. The Taliban victory should and must be studied seriously; we need to learn from it, to understand that the imperialists are not as strong as Hollywood presents them to be. We need to pick up the weapons and march straight into the masses. To say things as they are: The compradors are selling the nation, the capitalists are using the nation as their prostitute, the chauvinist policy is a policy which ensures our mutual death, the imperialists are supporting the capitalists in power, the imperialists keep them alive, the imperialists are occupying our nations, the imperialists are the biggest enemy, *but the imperialists aren't superhuman*. The imperialists can be bled to death, can be purged, and we can finally conquer political power, we can smash the imperialist compradorist bourgeoisie state, we can create a proletarian state in its place, we can finally be able to live like humans and not like animals. To live with dignity and no shame.

Such are the implications of the Taliban victory. Anyone who

calls themselves "communist", but who is not happy with the American defeat, even deep down, is simply put, *nothing more than a Leftist Aristocratic piece of garbage who, deep down, wants the current imperialist status quo to keep going*. Nothing more than an internal enemy to be purged.

The Taliban, whatever their flaws, even as a national-bourgeoisie movement, still fought imperialism for 20 years. They at least shed blood for their nation. A "communist" who is not willing to do the same, or at least, not showing some admiration for the people who do that, is not a communist but a fraud.

To finish up, the Taliban victory over imperialism tells us two things:

1) Even after the USSR fell, struggle and victory against imperialism is possible. Imperialism due to its inherent contradictions is bound to decline. Thus, we should drop the nihilistic outlook, and do deeds. Gather to a coalition *anyone* who is willing to fight the imperialist menace, be it of "left" or "right".

2) What should have been the driving force behind the Taliban revolution? It should have been *the proletariat and the communists*. The fact that they weren't, is a worrying fact. It means that we are making *heavy mistakes*. It means that the masses don't trust us and neither trust their own self to do away with imperialism and establish socialism. It means that after this alliance with all anti-imperialist forces, the mission is to try to *sideline* the other anti-imperialist forces and put the proletariat in political supremacy, and we should do this not by playing ball with the imperialists, not by "calling out" our bourgeoisie or other anti-imperialist forces when they *should not* be called out, but calling them out and taking up the offensive at the right moment and at the right place. Such is the mission set to us by life itself. Skipping the first part won't cut it, in fact, skipping the first part just puts one to *permanent irrelevance*. When there are genuine anti-imperialist

forces other than the communists, they should be used.

There is no time for excuses. Some Pashtun peasants wearing sandals managed to defeat the Yankee plague. Some Pashtun peasants who aren't even internationalist, who aren't even there to solve the capitalist issue. What can we do, we who are internationalist, we who are there to deal not only with the issue of imperialism, but the issue of internal capitalism too? We can do, for sure, much more than the Taliban.

The victory of the Taliban will spell (and it already does) a huge wave of anti-imperialist victories across the world. This is certain. Our job is to transform these bourgeoisie lead anti-imperialist victories to proletarian victories against capitalism in general, and if we aren't able to put the proletariat as the hegemon of the movement before we purge the compradors, then we should at least try to compete with the anti-imperialist forces by working with them to make the masses understand that only the working masses can seal the coffin of imperialism completely.

The communists should learn from the national bourgeoisie, because it seems that Manilovism is the current status quo of most communists, especially the ones in the periphery or the imperialist nations.

F. U. KUQE

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