Secure Data Analytics

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The Motivation

- Cloud databases: Google Cloud SQL, Microsoft SQL Azure, Amazon SimpleDB.

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- Service providers (SP) answer queries from different clients.
- Data owner might not want to reveal data values to SP; clients might not want SP to learn their queries and/or the query results.



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Hakan Hacigumus, Balakrishna R. Iyer, Chen Li, Sharad Mehrotra: Executing SQL over encrypted data in the database-service-provider model. SIGMOD 2002 cloud server

Introduction and Motivation



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

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

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

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

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

Introduction and Motivation

- Secure Query Processing



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

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

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

Related Work

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- Fully homomorphic encryption encryption due to Craig Gentry, "A Fully Homomorphic Encryption Scheme (Ph.D. thesis)": mostly of theoretical interest, impractical, and inefficient for large data.

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  - To enable the client to perform NN queries without letting the server learn contents about the query (and its result) or the tuples in the database.
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  - Adversary model: same as whatever model in which E is secure, e.g, IND-CPA, IND-CCA.

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- Goal: find a method S such that $S(E(q), E(D)) = E(\text{nn}(q, D))$, where $q \in \mathbb{R}^d$, without letting the SP learn contents about either the query (and its results) or the tuples in D.

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- Standard security model, such as indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA), or indistinguishability under chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA).

Insecurity of Existing Methods

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  - Attack we found: after learning only d query points and their encryptions, a linear system of d equations can be formed to decrypt any encrypted $p \in D$.

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  - Attack we found: In the above process, the server learns if q lies to the left or the right of another point, in each dimension, which leads to a binary search to efficiently recover any encrypted point.

Hardness of the Problem: OPE

- Order-preserving encryption (OPE) is a set of functions $\{\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{E}^{-1}, op\}$, such that:
  - $\mathcal{E}(m) = c$, $\mathcal{E}^{-1}(c) = m$ (here we omit the keys).
  - $op(c_1, c_2) = 1$ if $m_1 < m_2$; $op(c_1, c_2) = -1$ if $m_1 > m_2$.

Rakesh Agrawal, Jerry Kiernan, Ramakrishnan Srikant, Yirong Xu: Order-Preserving Encryption for Numeric Data. SIGMOD 2004

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Theorem

A truly secure OPE does not exist in standard security models, such as IND-CPA. It also does not exist even in much relaxed security models, such as the indistinguishability under ordered chosen-plaintext attack (IND-OCPA).

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Alexandra Boldyreva, Nathan Chenette, Younho Lee, Adam O'Neill: Order-Preserving Symmetric Encryption. EUROCRYPT 2009
Alexandra Boldyreva, Nathan Chenette, Adam O'Neill: Order-Preserving Encryption Revisited: Improved Security Analysis and Alternative Solutions. CRYPTO 2011

Hardness of the Problem: SNN gives OPE

- Given $E(D) = \{E(p_1), \ldots, E(p_N)\}$, suppose we have a secure SNN method S such that: $S(E(q), E(D)) \rightarrow E(nn(q, D))$ without the knowledge of E^{-1}.

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

2: $S(E(p_3), E(D) = E(p_4)$

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

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

3: $S(E(p_4), E(D) = E(p_5)$

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

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

4: $S(E(p_5), E(D) = E(p_4)$, Repetition FOUND!

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

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$i = N-$ (number of steps -2)!

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

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

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

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

Challenge: $\mathrm{minmax}(|G_i|)$!

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

G_i : a subset of dataset D

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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3. minimum $|G_x|$ and minimum $|G_x| - |G_i|$, which means low storage and communication overheads, as well as cheap encryption cost

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

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Duplicated points

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- Minimum Space Grid (MinSG)
- Minimum Maximum Partition(MinMax)

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Square Grid (SG)


D

Square Grid (SG)

G(D)



Square Grid (SG)

- Merits:

- Demerits:

Square Grid (SG)

- Merits:
  - simple
  - minimum storage cost at client
- Demerits:

Square Grid (SG)

- Merits:
  - simple
  - minimum storage cost at client
- Demerits:
  - high storage and communication overheads, as well as expensive encryption cost because of highly unbalanced partitions when the data distribution is skewed

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

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

$|G| = 26$

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

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- A greedy algorithm: always split the maximum partition G_x into smaller partitions

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

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

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

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

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

$|G| = 26$

- A greedy algorithm: always split the maximum partition G_x into smaller partitions
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

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

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

$|G_1| = 16$

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

$|G_{11}| = 11$
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Minimum Space Grid (MinSG)

- Merits:
- Demerits:

Minimum Space Grid (MinSG)

- Merits:
  - relatively balanced partitions: low storage and communication overheads, as well as cheap encryption cost
- Demerits:

Minimum Space Grid (MinSG)

- Merits:
  - relatively balanced partitions: low storage and communication overheads, as well as cheap encryption cost

- Demerits:
  - complicated partitioning process
  - not most balanced: small-sized partitions introduced by some unnecessary splitting

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

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

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

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

- We need a method that produce more balanced partitions!!

SVD Partitioning

- Square Grid (SG)
- Minimum Space Grid (MinSG)
- Minimum Maximum Partition(MinMax)

Minimum Maximum Partition (MinMax)

Minimum Maximum Partition (MinMax)



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

$|G| = 26$

- similar to MinSG in most part

Minimum Maximum Partition (MinMax)



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

$|G| = 26$

- similar to MinSG in most part
- use **segments** going though the space bounded by B_x instead of lines going though the entire space to split partitions

Minimum Maximum Partition (MinMax)



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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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$|G_4| = 11$

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Minimum Maximum Partition (MinMax)

- Merits:
- Demerits:

Minimum Maximum Partition (MinMax)

- Merits:
  - most balanced partitions: low storage and communication overheads, as well as cheap encryption cost
- Demerits:

Minimum Maximum Partition (MinMax)

- Merits:
    - most balanced partitions: low storage and communication overheads, as well as cheap encryption cost
- Demerits:
    - high storage cost at client

Comparison between MinSG and MinMax

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

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MinSG



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MinMax

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

MinSG



MinMax

- Clearly, MinMax achieves more balanced partitions than MinSG, which means lower storage and communication overheads, as well as cheaper encryption cost.

Experiment

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- We examine the three methods: SG, MinSG and MinMax.

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- Data sets
  - Points of interest in California(CA) and Texas(TX) from the *OpenStreetMap* project.
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- Default settings.

Symbol	Definition	Default Value
$\lvert D \rvert$	size of the dataset	10^6
k	number of partitions	625
DT	dataset type	CA

- Vary $|D|$: Wai Kit Wong, David Cheung, Ben Kao, Nikos Mamoulis: Secure kNN computation on encrypted databases. SIGMOD 2009



Attack on Existing SNN Methods

- Vary $|D|$: Haibo Hu, Jianliang Xu, Chushi Ren, Byron Choi: Processing private queries over untrusted data cloud through privacy homomorphism. ICDE 2011



Partition size in different methods

- Vary *k*



Partition size in different methods

- Vary $|D|$



- Vary k


SG
MinSG
MinMax
Send–D
query communication (bytes)
10^8
10^7
10^6
10^5
10^4
0
300
600
900
1200
k

Query communication cost

- Vary $|D|$



Total running time of the preprocessing step

- Vary *k*



- Vary $|D|$


SG
MinSG
MinMax
Send–D
total running time (secs)
10^0
10^1
10^2
10^3
0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
2
|D|=N: x10^6

Query time for different methods

- Vary k



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- Vary $|D|$



- Vary k


SG
MinSG
MinMax
60
45
30
15
0
partition time (secs)
0
300
600
900
1200
k

Running time of the partition phase

- Vary $|D|$



Total size of $E(D)$

- Vary k



Total size of $E(D)$

- Vary $|D|$



Open Problems

1. Other similarity metrics?

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2. High dimensions (beyond 2)?

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5. Secure data analytics based on similarity search: clustering, content-based search, etc.

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2. High dimensions (beyond 2)?
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4. Updates?
5. Secure data analytics based on similarity search: clustering, content-based search, etc.
6. Variants of similarity search: reverse nearest neighbors, skylines, etc.

Conclusion

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- Implement the SVD with three partitioning methods.
- Future work
  - extending our investigation to higher dimensions, k nearest neighbors

Thank You

Q and A