

Chapter 12

Message Authentication Codes

Security problems

- Masquerade
 - Insertion of messages into the network from a fraudulent source
- Content modification
 - Changes to the contents of a message
- Sequence modification
 - Any modification to a sequence of messages
- Timing modification
 - Delay or replay of messages
- Source repudiation
 - Denial of transmission of message by source
- Destination repudiation
 - Denial of receipt of message by destination


Message Authentication

- A service objective for making sure that the message is authenticated.
 - Content authentication: the content has not been modified.
 - Source authentication: the message is indeed from what is claimed

Message Authentication Functions


- Hash function
 - Hash serves as the authenticator
- Message encryption
 - The ciphertext serves as the authenticator
- Message authentication code (MAC)
 - Keyed hash value serves as the authenticator

SK Encryption for Authentication




(a) Symmetric encryption: confidentiality and authentication


PK Encryption for Authentication



(b) Public-key encryption: confidentiality





(c) Public-key encryption: authentication and signature




(d) Public-key encryption: confidentiality, authentication, and signature

MAC for Authentication





(b) Message authentication and confidentiality; authentication tied to plaintext




(c) Message authentication and confidentiality; authentication tied to ciphertext


HMAC: Hash Function-based MAC

- Motivations
 - Cryptographic hash functions such as MD5 and SHA are faster in software than symmetric block ciphers
 - Library code for cryptographic hash functions is widely available
- HMAC: mandatory-to-implement for IP security
- FIPS 198: NIST standard

HMAC Structure




Efficient implementation




Security of HMAC

- Depend on the strength of the underlying hash function
- Proved security:
 security of HMAC = strength of the
 embedded hash function

CMAC: Cipher-based MAC




(a) Message length is integer multiple of block size




(b) Message length is not integer multiple of block size

Figure 12.8 Cipher-Based Message Authentication Code (CMAC)

Hash Functions and MAC for PRNG





(a) PRNG using cryptographic hash function

(b) PRNG using HMAC

Three PRNG based on HMAC

$m = \lceil n/\text{outlen} \rceil$	$m = \lceil n/\text{outlen} \rceil$	$m = \lceil n / \text{outlen} \rceil$
$w_0 = V$	W = the null string	A(0) = V
W = the null string	For $i = 1$ to m	W = the null string
For $i = 1$ to m	$w_i = MAC(K, (V \parallel i))$	For $i = 1$ to m
$w_i = MAC(K, w_{i-1})$	$W = W \parallel w$	A(i) = MAC(K, A(i-1))
$W = W \parallel w$	Return leftmost n bits of W	$w_i = MAC(K, (A(i) \parallel V))$
Return leftmost n bits of W		$W = W \parallel w_i$
Return retunds to ous or w		Return leftmost n bits of W
NIST SP 800-90	IEEE 802.11i	TLS/WTLS

Summary

- Security problems
- Message authentication
 - Authentication service
 - Message encryption
 - Message authentication code
- Message authentication functions
 - Hash functions
 - Message encryption
 - Message authentication codes

- MACs based on hash functions: (HMAC)
 - HMAC design objectives
 - HMAC algorithm
 - Security of HMAC
- MAC based on block ciphers: CMAC
- Pseudorandom number generation using hash functions and MACs