
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol

Lectures Notes for the “Computer Security” course
Winter 11/12


Pedro Félix ([pedrofelix at cc.isel.ipl.pt](mailto:pedrofelix@cc.isel.ipl.pt))
[Instituto Superior de Engenharia de Lisboa](#)

Some history

- SSL - Secure Sockets Layer
 - Proprietary specification done by Netscape
 - 1994, v1.0 – not released
 - 1994, v2.0 – critical weaknesses
 - 1995, v3.0 – widely used, IETF draft
- TLS – Transport Layer Security
 - 1999, IETF RFC 2246
 - Very similar but incompatible with SSL v3.0
 - Version value is 3.1
- This presentation
 - General concepts: valid on both SSL v3.0 and TLS
 - Details specific to TLS


SSL/TLS Goals

- Creation, management and operation of a secure connection
- Creation and management
 - Endpoint authentication
 - Key and parameters establishment
 - Parameter reuse
- Operation
 - Message confidentiality
 - Message authentication




Sub-protocols

- Divided in two major sub-protocols
- Record Protocol
 - Handles data fragmentation, compression, confidentiality and message authentication
 - Requires a reliable transport protocol
- Handshake Protocol
 - Handles the secure connection creation and management, namely the secure establishment of the record protocol cryptographic parameters




Record Protocol

- Fragment, Compress, Authenticate (MAC) then Encrypt
- Two independent connection directions
 - Separate keys, IVs and sequence number (client write and server write)



Record Protocol: authentication and encryption

- The MAC protects the: seq. no. + packet type + version + payload



Remarks

- Message replays
 - Detected by the sequence number
- Message reflection
 - Separate MAC keys for each direction
- Keystream reuse (stream based symmetric encryption)
 - Separate encryption keys and IVs for each direction
- Traffic analysis
 - Separate encryption keys
 - Variable padding length

Cryptographic schemes

- The cryptographic schemes used depend on the agreed *cipher suite*
- The cipher suite and compression algorithms are negotiated by the handshake protocol
- Examples
 - TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL
 - TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
 - TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
- A *cipher suite* defines
 - The hash function used by the HMAC (e.g. SHA)
 - The symmetric encryption scheme (e.g. 3DES_EDE_CBC or RC4_128)
 - Supports both block and stream schemes
 - Key establishment scheme (RSA or DH)

Handshake protocol

- Responsible for
 - Negotiation of the operation parameters
 - Endpoint authentication
 - Secure key establishment
- Endpoint authentication and key establishment
 - Authentication is optional on both ends
 - Supports several cryptographic techniques, namely:
 - Key transport (e.g. RSA)
 - Key agreement (e.g. DH)
 - Typical scenario on the internet (HTTPS)
 - RSA based key transport using X.509 certificates
 - Mandatory server authentication
 - Optional client authentication

Handshake Protocol: sketch

- If based on RSA key transport
 - $C \leftrightarrow S$: negotiation of the algorithms to be used
 - $C \leftarrow S$: server certificate
 - $C \rightarrow S$: random secret encrypted with the server public key
 - $C \leftarrow S$: proof of possession of the random secret
- If client authentication is required
 - $C \leftarrow S$: Server requests the client certificate
 - $C \rightarrow S$: client certificate
 - $C \rightarrow S$: proof of possession of the private key, done by signing the handshake messages

Handshake Protocol (1): RSA based

ClientHello	$C \rightarrow S$: client capabilities
ServerHello	$C \leftarrow S$: parameter definitions
Certificate	$C \leftarrow S$: server certificate (KeS)
CertificateRequest(*)	$C \leftarrow S$: Trusted CAs
ServerHelloDone	$C \leftarrow S$: synchronization
Certificate(*)	$C \rightarrow S$: client certificate (KvC)
ClientKeyExchange	$C \rightarrow S$: Enc(KeS: pre_master_secret)
CertificateVerify(*)	$C \rightarrow S$: Sign(KsC: handshake_messages)
ChangeCipherSpec	$C \rightarrow S$: record protocol parameters change
Finished	$C \rightarrow S$: {PRF(master_secret, handshake_messages)}
ChangeCipherSpec	$C \leftarrow S$: record protocol parameters change
Finished	$C \leftarrow S$: {PRF(master_secret, handshake_messages)}

(*) optional


Handshake Protocol (2): RSA-based

- **ClientHello** – supported cipher suites and compression algorithms + proposed session identifier + client random value (!)
- **ServerHello** – Chosen cipher suite and compression algorithm + chosen session identifier + server random value (!)
- **Certificate** – certificate with the server public key (this key should support the agreed key establishment algorithm)
- **CertificateRequest** – client authentication request, containing:
 - List of the public key types supported by the server
 - List of the trust anchors trusted by the server
- **ServerHelloDone** – end of response


Handshake Protocol (3): RSA based

- **Certificate** – client certificate
- **ClientKeyExchange** – establishment of the premaster secret.
 - RSA - premaster secret is encrypted with the server public key
- **CertificateVerify** – Private key proof of possession
 - Done via the signature of all the previous protocol messages
- **ChangeCipherSpec** – Signalization that the next message is going to use the negotiated keys and settings
- **Finished** – Signalization of the end of the handshake.
 - Includes the PRF of all the messages, using the master secret
- All handshake messages (except **ClientKeyExchange**) are sent unprotected by the record protocol (null cipher suite)


Yet another one



A schematic view



Key derivation



Handshake tampering and replay


- Handshake tampering is detected using the **Finished** message
 - The **Finished** message ensures both endpoints that the messages received are the same
- Handshake message replay
 - **ClientHello** and **ServerHello** contains random values (*nounces*), different for each handshake
 - Implies that the **Finished** message is different for each handshake

Endpoint authentication

- The endpoint authentication uses different techniques for the client and the server
- Client authentication
 - Client certificate binds an identity (X500/DNS) to a public key
 - **CertificateVerify** proves the possession of the associated private key - signature of the handshake messages
- Server authentication
 - Server certificate binds an identity (X500/DNS) to a public key
 - **Finished** message proves that the server knows the master secret, implying that he was able to decrypt the premaster secret, implying that he has the associated private key

Connections and Sessions

- Connection
 - transport protocol connection
 - E.g. TCP connection
- Session
 - Association between the client and the server, containing the cryptographic parameters negotiated by the handshake protocol
- Sharing of a session between multiple connections
 - Due to the computational cost of the handshake protocol
 - E.g.: browser with multiple connections to the same server
- Different connections with the same session use different keys
 - Session defines a master secret
 - Each connection derives its key based on this master secret



Session and connection state

- Session
 - Session identifier
 - Peer certificates – identity of the endpoints
 - Compression method and cipher suite
 - Master secret – seed for the key derivation process
 - *Is resumable* – boolean indicating if the session can be used on several connections
- Connection state
 - Sequence numbers
 - MAC keys
 - Encryption Keys
 - Encryption Initialization Vectors (IV)
- The keys and IVs are created based on the master secret
- However, different keys are created for each connection, even if based in the same session

Session reuse

- Each handshake is associated with a session
- The **ClientHello** has ID
 - New one
 - Of another session
- The goal is to establish a new connection using the same session
 - Minimize the connection establishment overhead

ClientHello	$C \rightarrow S$: Session ID of a previous session
ServerHello	$C \leftarrow S$: ID of the new session
<i>ChangeCipherSpec</i>	$C \leftarrow S$: Change Cipher Spec
Finished	$C \leftarrow S$: $\{\text{PRF}(\text{ms}, \text{handshake_messages})\}$
<i>ChangeCipherSpec</i>	$C \rightarrow S$: Change Cipher Spec
Finished	$C \rightarrow S$: $\{\text{PRF}(\text{ms}, \text{handshake_messages})\}$

Handshake request

- The **HelloRequest** message can be sent by the server at any time
- It's goal is to force a new handshake
- The client responds to this message with a **ClientHello** message

HelloRequest	$C \leftarrow S$: Request for a new <i>handshake</i>
ClientHello	$C \rightarrow S$: ...
ServerHello	$C \leftarrow S$: ...
...	...

Attacks

- RSA timing attacks
 - D. Boneh, D. Brumley, *Remote timing attacks are practical*, 2th Usenix Security Symposium
- PKCS #1 v1.5 attacks
 - D. Bleichenbacher, *A chosen ciphertext attack against protocols based on the RSA encryption standard RSA PKCS #1*, Crypto'98
 - V. Klima, O. Pokorny and T. Rosa, *Attacking RSA-based Sessions in SSL/TLS*, CHES'03
- CBC/Authenticate-Then-Encrypt
 - S. Vaudenay, *Security Flaws Induced by CBC Padding - Applications to SSL, IPSEC, WTLS*, EuroCrypt'02

HTTPS protocol


- HTTP over TLS
- Default port: 443
- Check between the URI and the certificate
 - **subjectAltName** extension of type **dNSName** (if present)
 - the (most specific) **Common Name** field in the **Subject** field
- Proxies
 - CONNECT method requests the proxy to create a TCP tunnel to the endpoint

Java Security Sockets Extension

- Java framework and implementation of the SSL and TLS protocols
- Provides SSL/TLS extensions of the regular (java.net) **Socket** and **ServerSocket** classes
- What can be done with it?
 - Secure socket creation and usage
 - Peer authentication
 - Custom certificate validation and trust anchor selection
 - Custom key selection
 - Session management
- Based on the same design criteria of the JCA (Java Cryptography Architecture)

Sockets and socket factories

- The regular sockets use factory-based instance creation
 - **ServerSocket** and **Socket** instances are created by **ServerSocketFactory** and **SocketFactory** instances
- The JSSE has specializations for the SSL/TLS protocols



Java Cryptography Architecture (JCA)

- Cryptographic framework for the Java platform
- Design principles
 - Algorithm independence and extensibility
 - Implementation independence and interoperability
- Architecture based on:
 - Cryptographic Service Providers (CSPs)
 - Packages implementing one or more cryptographic services
 - Engine Classes
 - Abstract definition (abstract class) of a cryptographic service
 - Instance creation via factory methods (static method **getInstance**)
 - Specification Classes
 - Normalized and transparent representations of cryptographic objects, such as keys and other parameters

Engine class examples


- **Signature** class – digital signature
- **Cipher** class – symmetric and asymmetric encryption
- **Mac** class – message authentication codes

- **KeyStore** class - storage for cryptographic keys and certificates
 - Entries stored: private keys, secret keys and trusted certificates
 - Each entry is identified by a alias
 - Abstract, various implementations: JKS (Sun), PKCS# 12

- **CertPathValidator** class – validation of certificate chains

- **SSLSocketFactory** and **SSLServerSocketFactory**
 - Obtain the default and supported cipher suites
 - Create socket instances
- **SSLSocket** and **SSLServerSocket**:
 - Initialize the handshake and receive notifications of its completion
 - Define the enabled protocols (SSL v3.0, TLS v1.0) and enabled cipher suites
 - Accept/require client authentication
 - Obtain the negotiated session
- **SSLSession**
 - Obtain the negotiated cipher suite
 - Get the authenticated peer identity and certificate chain


Factory based architecture



Socket Factory creation

- The creation of **SSLSocketFactory** and **SSLServerSocketFactory** is done by **SSLContext** instances
- Implicit used via the static methods **getDefault** from **SSLSocketFactory** and **SSLServerSocketFactory**
- **SSLContext** instance creation using the **getInstance** static method, initialized with
 - Randomness source – **SecureRandom** class
 - Key manager – **KeyManager** class
 - Trust manager – **TrustManager** class

Remember this?



Key and trust managers

- Trust Manager - determines whether the remote authentication credentials (and thus the connection) should be
 - Construction and verification of certificate chains
 - Determination of the trust anchors
- Key Manager - determines which authentication credentials to send to the remote host
 - Choose the identity to be used (alias string), given a list of accepted trust anchors
 - Get the private key associated with an alias
 - Get the certificate chain associated with an alias


X509TrustManager e X509KeyManager

- X509TrustManager
 - void checkClientTrusted(X509Certificate[] chain, String authType)
 - void checkServerTrusted(X509Certificate[] chain, String authType)
 - X509Certificate[] getAcceptedIssuers()
- X509KeyManager
 - String chooseClientAlias(String[] keyType, Principal[] issuers, Socket socket)
 - String chooseServerAlias(String keyType, Principal[] issuers, Socket socket)
 - X509Certificate[] getCertificateChain(String alias)
 - String[] getClientAliases(String keyType, Principal[] issuers)
 - PrivateKey getPrivateKey(String alias)
 - String[] getServerAliases(String keyType, Principal[] issuers)

Manager Factories

- Creation of **KeyManager** and **TrustManager** instances using **KeyManagerFactory** e **TrustManagerFactory** (engine classes) instances
- **KeyManagerFactory**
 - static `KeyManagerFactory getInstance(String algorithm)`
 - `void init(KeyStore ks, char[] password)`
 - `KeyManager[] getKeyManagers()`
- **TrustManager**
 - static `TrustManagerFactory getInstance(String algorithm)`
 - `void init(KeyStore ks)`
 - `TrustManager[] getTrustManagers()`


The big picture



Cryptography on Windows platforms

- 1996 – CryptoAPI (C language interface)
 - Symmetric encryption schemes, MAC schemes, hash functions, digital signature schemes, key establishment and encryption
 - X.509 certificates
 - PKCS 7/ CMS cryptographic messages
- ? - SSPI – Security Support Provider Interface (C language interface)
 - Authentication and key establishment protocols (ex. *Kerberos*, SSL)
- 2001 – CAPICOM (COM)
 - Subset of CryptoAPI exported as COM components
- 2002 – System.Security.Cryptography (.NET Framework Class Library)
- 2005 – Addition of functionality to System.Security
 - X509 certificates
 - PKCS#7/CMS messages
 - XML signature and encryption

CryptoAPI: architecture




Certificate stores

- Physical stores: files, registry,...
- Logical stores – collection of physical stores
- System stores – logical stores associated with
 - Current user
 - Local computer
 - A service
- All the stores are identified by a string: “MY”, “CA”, “ROOT”
- CryptoAPI has tools for the creation and management of certificate stores
- There is also a Microsoft Management Console snap-in for this purpose
- Contents of the certificate stores
 - Trusted root certificates (trust anchors)
 - Personal certificates (associated private key is store on the CryptoAPI)
 - Other certificates (e.g. intermediate certificates)


SSL/TLS on Windows: examples

- Configuring HTTPS
 - Server – IIS
 - Client – IE, Firefox
- Programming HTTPS clients and servers
 - ASP.NET server page
 - Client with and without authentication
 - Certificate policies
- Web services using HTTPS transport
 - Client
 - Service

Configuring IIS (server)




Certificate (public key) + private key



Client Authentication


Trust anchors

Configuring IE (client)




Certificate (public key) + private key

Trust anchors




Configuring Firefox (client)



Certificate (public key) + private key

Trust anchor



Server: ASP.NET page using HTTPS

```
public class CertEcho : System.Web.UI.Page{
    protected TextBox message;
    protected override void OnLoad(EventArgs ea) {
        // Get the client certificate
        HttpClientCertificate clientCert = Context.Request.ClientCertificate;

        // check if the certificate exists
        if(clientCert.IsPresent == false) {
            message.Text = "No client authentication";
        }else{
            // show the certificate information
            message.Text = "Client authentication using certificate:" + "\n";
            message.Text += "Issuer : " + clientCert.Issuer + "\n";
            message.Text += "Subject : " + clientCert.Subject + "\n";
        }
    }
}
```

Client: HTTP request

- HTTP request

```
static void GetHttp(string url)
{
    HttpWebRequest req = WebRequest.Create(url) as HttpWebRequest;
    HttpWebResponse res = req.GetResponse() as HttpWebResponse;
    ShowResponseContent(res);
}
```

Client: HTTPS request

- HTTPS request
- Additions
 - Define the *trust* policy

```
static void GetHttpSecure(string url)
{
    ServicePointManager.CertificatePolicy = new MyCertificatePolicy1();
    ServicePointManager.SecurityProtocol = SecurityProtocolType.Tls;
    HttpWebRequest req = WebRequest.Create(url) as HttpWebRequest;
    HttpWebResponse res = req.GetResponse() as HttpWebResponse;
    ServicePoint sp = req.ServicePoint;
    Console.WriteLine("Certificate : "+sp.Certificate.GetName());
    ShowResponseContent(res);
}
```

ICertificatePolicy interface

- The **ICertificatePolicy** interface defines the certificate verification policy

```
public class MyCertificatePolicy1 : ICertificatePolicy
{
    public bool CheckValidationResult(ServicePoint sp,
        X509Certificate cert, WebRequest request, int problem)
    {
        ...
        return ValidationResult;
    }
}
```

Client : HTTPS request with client authentication

- HTTPS request with client authentication
- Additions
 - Define the client certificate **and associated private key**

```
static void GetHttpSecureWithClientAuth(string url){  
    ServicePointManager.CertificatePolicy = new MyCertificatePolicy1();  
    HttpWebRequest req = WebRequest.Create(url) as HttpWebRequest;  
    req.ClientCertificates.Add(  
        X509Certificate.CreateFromCertFile("c:/.../pedrofelix.cer")  
    );  
    HttpWebResponse res = req.GetResponse() as HttpWebResponse;  
    ServicePoint sp = req.ServicePoint;  
    Console.WriteLine("Certificate : "+sp.Certificate.GetName());  
    Console.WriteLine("Client Certificate : "+ sp.ClientCertificate.GetName() );  
    ShowResponseContent(res);  
}
```


ClientCertificates

- The ClientCertificates property returns the certificate collection that can be used to authenticate the client
 - The client must have a private key associated with the certificate
 - The chosen certificate has a root trusted by the CA
- The **ServicePoint.ClientCertificate** returns the used certificate

Usage on Web Services (ASP.NET)

- **Service**

- The client certificate is available on the request context

```
public class certecho : System.Web.Services.WebService{  
    [WebMethod]  
    public string CertEcho()    {  
        // Obter certificado de cliente  
        HttpClientCertificate clientCert = Context.Request.ClientCertificate;  
        ...  
    }  
}
```

- **Client**

- Add the client certificate to the proxy certificate collection

```
ServicePointManager.CertificatePolicy = new TLSClient.MyCertificatePolicy1();  
proxy.ClientCertificates.Add(  
    X509Certificate.CreateFromCertFile("c:/.../pedrofelix.cer")  
);
```