

# Do Dictatorships Affect People's Long Term Beliefs and Preferences?

An Empirical Assessment of the Latin American Case\*

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## Abstract

Does the political regime experienced during youth have long lasting effects on political beliefs and preferences? I exploit time and country variation in political regimes in Latin America using data from the 1995 to 2010 Latinobarometer and find that exposure to non-democratic regimes during youth reduces subsequent preference for democracy, satisfaction with democracy and confidence in institutions. These results suggest exposure to dictatorships during formative years permanently eroded democratic values. Exposure to non-democratic regimes also affects self-location in an ideology scale, reducing identification with the Right and increasing identification with the Left; which suggests dictatorships also shaped the political orientation of voters.

**Keywords:** Dictatorships, preference formation, Latin America.

**JEL codes:** D72, P16, Z13.

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# 1 Introduction

History is full of examples of authoritarian rulers attempting to influence people’s beliefs and preferences: dictators impose their creeds through media and propaganda, educational systems, and sheer repression and coercion. This effort in shaping hearts and minds of citizens most likely aims at increasing the probability of staying in power. Though rational individuals should not be fooled by dictators’ efforts, research in social psychology suggests that these efforts could nevertheless affect preferences. If political regimes have an impact on citizens’ preferences, they can have long term effects on a country’s outcomes through citizens’ choices after a regime change: individuals who grew up during a dictatorship might vote, in a democracy, following preferences partly shaped by the dictator’s intentions or developed as an oppositional reaction to them. Preferences and beliefs may affect long term economic outcomes directly (Guiso et al., 2006) or indirectly through political institutions (Mulligan et al., 2004; Besley & Kudamatsu, 2008). Then, what is the effect of these efforts on long term political beliefs and preferences? Will individuals’ political ideas be permanently affected by dictators’ actions? To shed light on these questions I match self-reported preferences and beliefs with the political regime under which individuals lived during their childhood and early youth. Considering 18 Latin American countries in the period spanning 1995-2010 I use the variation in exposure to dictatorships by country and cohort of birth to identify, in a differences-in-differences setting, the effect of exposure on a set of outcome variables capturing preferences over political regimes, trust in institutions, and ideological orientation.

Focus on childhood and youth stems from psychological theories on preference and belief formation. As an empirically backed theory originally developed in the sixties, the Impressionable Years Hypothesis (IYH) states that individuals are more malleable during youth: core values are formed during this period and experience little to no change afterwards (Greenstein, 1965; Hess & Torney, 1967; Krosnick & Alwin, 1989). In a similar line, the work of economist James Heckman and co-authors has shown that the effect of shocks and stimuli on skill and personality development is greater during early childhood and decreases over time (Knudsen et al., 2006; Cunha & Heckman, 2007; Heckman, 2011; Heckman et al., 2013; Gertler et al., 2014). Within economics the IYH lies behind recent studies of preferences over redistribution (Giuliano & Spilimbergo, 2014; Alesina & Fuchs-Schundeln, 2007) and political partisanship (Madestam & Yanagizawa-Drott, 2011), while in political science it is the starting point for studies on party affiliation and voting (Sears & Valentino, 1997; Valentino & Sears, 1998).

This paper tests the IYH in the context of the formation of preferences over political regimes. The paper is also linked and contributes to recent research within economics on political preference formation (for instance on the role of propaganda and education, e.g. Adena et al. (2015); Cantoni et al. (2017); Yanagizawa-Drott (2014)) and it also contributes empirical findings to the political economy literature exploring regime transitions.<sup>1</sup>

I focus on exposure to dictatorships as I understand that non-democratic regimes have greater incentives than democracies to affect individuals' preferences, while they also face lower constraints. For dictators, being ousted from power may involve severe economic loss and even prison or death, while benefits and rents of remaining in power tend to be higher than those perceived by government leaders or policy makers in democratic regimes. Thus, dictators have great incentives to try and affect individuals' preferences in order to legitimate themselves and their regimes and increase their probability of survival. In democratic regimes, governments' actions are constrained by a set of checks and balances (the constitution and law, separation of powers, etc.), while different views are represented in parliament through different parties. Government actions are under scrutiny of a free press, while freedom of speech guarantees dissenting opinions can be heard. Democratic governments cannot coerce individuals into having democratic beliefs or arbitrarily incarcerate individuals with non-democratic preferences. Almost the exact opposite is true in a non-democratic regime: a ruler dictates government action at will, individuals with undesired views can be coerced or incarcerated, freedom of speech is curtailed, parties are banned, government propaganda is hard to avoid and to be countered, etc.

I focus on Latin America for two reasons. First, its political volatility implies great variation in timing and length of dictatorships across countries during the twentieth century, which is key for the identification strategy. Second, the survey I use consistently captures beliefs and preferences for a large set of countries and years; surveys for other regions either lack key questions or an adequate year-country coverage to conduct an empirical study.<sup>2</sup> Empirically, I match self-reported preferences and beliefs with the political regime under which individuals lived during childhood and youth. I consider

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<sup>1</sup>With the exception of Ticchi et al. (2013) and more recently Besley & Persson (2018), in general terms agents in this literature do not have preferences over regimes but derive them from the utility obtained under different regimes. Allowing regimes to have long term effects of individuals' preferences contributes to the understanding of regime transitions, especially of pendular movements between regimes experienced by many countries in modern history.

<sup>2</sup>For instance, a question on regime preferences cannot be systematically found in the Eurobarometer, World Value Survey or Afrobarometer. When available, coverage of relevant questions does not provide enough variation in political regimes for adequate empirical research.

individuals from 18 countries interviewed between 1995 and 2010. I use the variation in the length of exposure to political regimes during childhood and youth by country and cohort of birth to identify the effect of dictatorships on the outcome variables; in a repeated cross section setting this is done by including cohort and country fixed effects and estimating the impact of exposure at the cohort-country level. I include a battery of demographic and socioeconomic controls and country $\times$ year-of-survey fixed effects, and also control for exposure to macroeconomic shocks and the severity of the dictatorships. My empirical strategy abstracts from different channels, suggested by the literature, through which beliefs and preferences could be affected and estimates the effect of overall exposure to dictatorships.

Ex ante, the effect of exposure to dictatorships on beliefs and preferences is ambiguous. On one hand, a growing literature within economics documents that propaganda and educational reforms tend to be effective when shaping preferences (Adena et al., 2015; Cantoni et al., 2017; Yanagizawa-Drott, 2014; Alesina & Fuchs-Schundeln, 2007). This literature suggests that exposure to dictatorships could erode democratic values, reducing individuals' preference for democracy. On the other hand, research in psychology suggests that exposure to a given point of view may lead to increased polarization and even strengthen opposing views (Lord et al., 1979; Cacioppo & Petty, 1979; Malamuth & Check, 1981), a result also found within economics (DellaVigna et al., 2014). This literature suggests that exposure to dictatorships could foster oppositional reactions and strengthen democratic values, increasing individuals' preference for democracy. Ambiguity regarding the effect of dictatorships also extends to individuals' ideology, as Latin American dictatorships not only attempted to affect democratic values but, being in their great majority Right-wing regimes, they also explicitly sought to stop the spread of Left-wing ideas.

The empirical results show that an additional year of exposure to dictatorships reduces the likelihood of an individual preferring democracy over any other political system by 2.2 percentage points. Compared to a non-exposed individual, the average exposed person experiences thirteen years of dictatorship starting at age 6, which reduces preference for democracy by 28.6 percentage points vis a vis a non-exposed individual. Exposure to dictatorships also reduces Confidence in Congress, Judiciary, and Armed Forces, decreases Satisfaction with Democracy, and reduces (increases) the likelihood of an individual to self-identify with the Right (Left) in an ideology scale. All results are in line with the IYH. Results for auxiliary outcome variables suggest reduction in Confidence in Radio and Police, and in the Opinion of the United States. In a series of extensions and robustness checks I show that results are robust to estimating

a more saturated specification, allowing differential impact of negative macroeconomic shocks, considering differential effects of Left-wing and Right-wing dictatorships, using a reduced sample containing only individuals with non-zero exposure, and using alternative criteria to distinguish democracy from dictatorship. Exposure to dictatorships at other ages than 4 to 25 has little to no impact, also in line with the IYH.

I interpret these results as showing that dictatorships eroded democratic values. I follow the literature on political science to stress a potential link between erosion of democratic values and an increase in individuals' self-identification with the (far) Left. Results confirm that non-democratic regimes may have persistent effects on a country's outcomes, through individuals' preferences. To the extent to which dictators affect democratic values and political orientation of future generations, outcomes of the democratic process (or the process itself) are affected, in the long run, by the dictator's actions.

The paper is structured as follows: first I present a short account of political regime changes in Latin America. In the following section, I introduce the Impressionable Years Hypothesis and present related literature. In Section 4 I present the data and descriptive statistics, and in Section 5 I discuss the identification strategy and empirical methodology. Next, I show and discuss empirical results and in Section 7 I present extensions and robustness checks. In the last section I present final remarks.

## 2 Latin America and Dictatorships

The political history of Latin America during the twentieth century is one of great turmoil, as shown in Figure 1 below (Zanatta, 2012; Rouquié, 1987). After decades in which political conflict mainly responded to struggles between fractions of an oligarchic elite -and often involved authoritarian rule-, a wave of democratization, covering the mid-thirties to the early sixties, transformed the political institutions of the region.<sup>345</sup> This wave in many countries involved extending the franchise, reforming electoral law and bodies, and the creation of mass parties that reflected political demands of greater

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<sup>3</sup>See Figure A1 and Table A1 in the Appendix for a detail of each spell of dictatorship by country and the corresponding ruler(s).

<sup>4</sup>This wave was part of what political scientists call the Second Wave of democratization across the world (Huntington, 1991, 1993).

<sup>5</sup>Acemoglu & Robinson (2005) puts some structure on regime transitions in Latin America in the twentieth century. The model links the degree of inequality and the costs and benefits of repression and democratization with different democratization paths, including rapid and definitive democratization, blocked democratization and pendular movements between democratization and authoritarian regimes.

shares of the population. Nevertheless, a wave of (mostly military) dictatorships spread across the region during the sixties and early seventies. This backslide can be understood not only as a reaction to previous democratization efforts, that in many cases led to redistributive policies dubbed as "excessive" by (part of) the elites, but also as a geopolitical move in the context of the Cold War. The Cuban Revolution (1959) put the region under the threat of communism, prompting the United States to start the Alliance for Progress program and back and finance several anti-communist governments (democratic and undemocratic) in the region. Political erosion of dictatorial regimes, international pressure and negative macroeconomic shocks, among others, led to another wave of democratization that started in the early eighties; by 1990 only Cuba remained undemocratic.<sup>6</sup>




Figure 1: Dictatorships in Latin America, 1920 to 2000

Notes: The figure plots the share of the population of the 16 Latin American countries in the sample living under a non-democratic regime. Population data comes from the MOxLAD data set. Non-democratic regimes are those with a Polity Score Index (taken from the Polity IV Project data set) below zero.

History shows that many non-democratic governments in the region explicitly attempted to affect individuals' beliefs and preferences across the twentieth century. A good example is given by the so-called *Operation Condor*, a coordinated effort of military dictatorships in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay (with minor participation in Colombia, Peru, Venezuela and Ecuador) to control and suppress political opposition. It involved a severe anti-communist and anti-Left discourse that stressed the "perils" of democracy and presented the Armed Forces as the guardian of

<sup>6</sup>Again, this was part of a Third Wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991, 1993).

traditional values and the moral guide for society. These regimes reformed educational systems in an attempt to re-write history, heavily controlled the media, curtailed freedom of speech, banned political parties and organizations and severely constrained or directly prohibited any form of democratic participation. Dubbed the *National Reorganization Process* in Argentina, the name correctly captures the intention of the dictators across the region.<sup>7</sup> Nevertheless, *Operation Condor* is not the only episode of rulers attempting to change individuals' preferences in Latin American history, as other non-democratic regimes also made attempts to highlight the "disadvantages of democracy" and to remain in power through propaganda, indoctrination and coercion.

Overall, a review of Latin American history shows great variation in political regimes and an explicit intention of changing beliefs and preferences. Against this background, in this paper I empirically assess whether dictators succeeded in their attempts, while testing the Impressionable Years Hypothesis. In the next section I introduce the literature on the IYH and discuss empirical evidence regarding the channels through which political regimes could affect preferences.

### 3 Related literature

The question on whether dictators' attempts to affect individuals' beliefs and preferences have the desired effect is a question about how political preferences are formed. Research in social psychology found empirical evidence supporting the idea that influences experienced during early youth have a profound impact on individuals' values, beliefs and preferences.<sup>8</sup> According to the IYH, after this period of early socialization ends, it is unlikely that core orientations will change.<sup>9</sup> Thus, birth cohorts that differ in terms of economic, social and political conditions during socialization will subsequently display different attitudes. Further research in social psychology and political

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<sup>7</sup>About 50,000 individuals were killed and 400,000 were arrested and imprisoned as part of *Operation Condor*; 30,000 individuals are still missing. For details see for instance McSherry (2002) and Kornbluh (2003).

<sup>8</sup>See for instance Cutler (1974), Easton & Dennis (1980), Greenstein (1965), Hess & Torney (1967), Sears (1975, 1983), Visser & Krosnick (1998).

<sup>9</sup>A similar theory is the *increasing persistence hypothesis*. While it also states the malleability of individuals during youth, this theory emphasizes that both biological and social processes (linked to brain deterioration and accumulation of social ties with similar opinions) reduce the likelihood of changes in beliefs and preferences (Glenn, 1980). From an empirical point of view, this hypothesis is hard to distinguish from the IYH as they both predict beliefs and preferences are formed during early youth. A markedly different theory is the *lifelong openness hypothesis*, which states changes in life circumstances affect beliefs and preferences throughout the whole life of an individual (Brim & Kagan, 1980). This hypothesis predicts high flexibility in attitudes and opinions, in contrast with most of the empirical evidence.

science investigated the impact of experiences during youth on political preferences and found support for the IYH (Jennings & Niemi, 1968; Krosnick & Alwin, 1989; Sears & Valentino, 1997). A stream of research in the area concentrates on partisanship, studying party identification along an individual's life or across cohorts; research that studies more abstract political beliefs and preferences have usually focused on a single country.<sup>10</sup> There is no clear consensus on the length of the Impressionable Years: evidence of political socialization has been found for ages 18 to 25 (Newcomb et al., 1967) but also 10 to 17 (Krosnick & Alwin, 1989) and 4 to 18 (Madestam & Yanagizawa-Drott, 2011). Against this background, in this paper I consider exposure during ages 4 to 25 and smaller age subperiods, and I estimate impacts on preferences for political regimes, confidence in institutions and ideological orientation, across a set of countries.

This paper is closely related to the work of Giuliano & Spilimbergo (2014) and Pop-Eleches & Tucker (2014). Giuliano & Spilimbergo (2014) use regional variation in growth rates in the United States to investigate the impact of economic shocks on the formation of beliefs and preferences. Their results support the IYH: experiencing a severe recession during ages 18 to 25 leads to stronger preferences for redistribution, lower confidence in institutions, higher support for the Democratic party, and to an increase in the belief that luck is a more important determinant of success in life than effort. I depart from this paper as I focus on the role of political regimes in the formation of political beliefs and preferences. Pop-Eleches & Tucker (2014) investigate the effect of exposure to different types of communism on attitudes towards democracy and capitalism for twelve former communist countries of Eastern Europe and find little differences between them. Though without explicitly relying on the IYH, the authors find stronger results for exposure between ages 6 to 17.

A review of the empirical literature provides hints regarding the channels through which a dictator can affect individuals' beliefs and preferences. First, early work on indoctrination through education can be found in the work of Lott. Lott (1990) posits that a component of education expenditure responds to an authority's intentions of favoring a particular ideology, preference or belief. Lott (1998) shows that totalitarian governments spend more resources on public education and media and presents evidence suggesting that this is an attempt to control the information received by the citizens, in order to indoctrinate them. The author suggests dictators indoctrinate citizens to promote their beliefs and preferences and remain in power. Alesina & Fuchs-

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<sup>10</sup>See Osborne et al. (2011) and Valentino & Sears (2005, 1998) for studies on partisanship in the United States. See Persson & Oscarsson (2010) and Muñoz (2009) for studies of democracy in Sweden and Spain respectively.



Schundeln (2007) study the impact of growing up under a socialist dictatorship and find that individuals who grew up in East Germany (compared to those socialized in West Germany) prefer more state intervention and redistribution and are more likely to think success in life depends on factors that are largely outside of their control, rather than on individual effort. Also, Cantoni et al. (2017) document how the introduction of new pro-regime contents in the curriculum in dictatorial China led to higher trust in government officials and a re-alignment of views on political participation and democracy with those promoted by the authorities.

Secondly, a recent stream of literature stresses the role of media and propaganda in preference formation (DellaVigna et al., 2014; DellaVigna & Kaplan, 2007). Particularly, Adena et al. (2015) study the causal effect of exposure to radial propaganda on voting outcomes during the rise of the Nazi party in Germany and find that the introduction of pro-Nazi messages in radio transmissions significantly increased Nazi support. Likewise, Yanagizawa-Drott (2014) finds that exposure to radial propaganda increased participation in the Rwandan genocide of the Tutsis promoted by the non-democratic Hutu government.<sup>11</sup>

In third place, another stream of literature emphasizes the role of economic incentives in preference formation (Di Tella et al., 2007; Manacorda et al., 2011). In this respect, Voigtländer & Voth (2014) find massive infrastructure spending in Germany significantly decreased resistance to the Nazi regime. Also, spending in development and reconstruction projects by the United States have been found to reduce opposition and improve perception of the government in occupied Iraq (Berman et al., 2011) and Afghanistan (Beath et al., 2013).

To sum up, the literature reviewed supports the idea that dictatorships can affect preferences through indoctrination in the educational system, through media and propaganda and through transfers and economic opportunities.<sup>12</sup> The literature also predicts that individuals should be more strongly affected by exposure during the Im-

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<sup>11</sup>For the particular context of Latin America, González & Prem (2018) shows the effect of exposure to televised political campaigns against a constitutional reform promoted by Pinochet in Chile helped to defeat the dictator and shorten his spell in power.

<sup>12</sup>A regime's actions could not only affect preference formation but also the incentives for preference transmission. Ticchi et al. (2013) develop a model along these lines, in which governments invest in institutions that affect the transmission of parents' political preferences to their offspring. In the model, democracies have incentives to foster democratic values that in turn perpetuate democracy, while dictatorships have incentives to do the opposite. The model predicts that the longer the duration of a dictatorship, the lower the share of individuals with democratic beliefs and preferences. Alternatively, a cohort of individuals would be socialized in a greater extent to democratic values if it is raised in a democracy. More recently, Besley & Persson (2018) develop a closely related model with very similar implications.

pressionable Years. While the literature reviewed suggests that exposure should align individuals' beliefs and preferences with those promoted by the regime, the possibility of an oppositional reaction should not be discarded, thus I remain agnostic regarding the direction of the effect.

## 4 Data and Descriptive Statistics

### Opinion Data

The Latinobarometer is a public opinion survey carried out across Latin America; covering 8 countries in 1995, it expanded to 17 in 1996 and to 18 in 2004, and is based on a nationally representative sample of about 1,100 individuals.<sup>13</sup> A core questionnaire captures respondents' characteristics, such as age, gender, religion, marital status, labour force status, educational level, socioeconomic status (as perceived by the interviewer), and a set of 10 variables capturing ownership of durable goods and access to services that serve as wealth indicators.<sup>14</sup> Crucially, the survey also includes different modules on perceptions, opinions, beliefs and preferences, which, in many cases, change from year to year. The key advantage of the Latinobarometer over similar data sets is that information on political beliefs and preferences is consistently captured for all the countries and years covered. In contrast, opinion surveys for Africa, Asia or Europe typically lack a comprehensive set of questions suitable for the purpose of this paper, or are too small in terms of countries and years included. My sample comprises individuals aged 18 to 85 surveyed in all countries of Latin America (with the exception of Cuba and Haiti) between 1995 and 2010 (no opinion data was collected in 1999).

### Political Regime Data

Estimating the impact of dictatorships requires a criterion for distinguishing political regimes. Based on standard practices in the political economy literature and the discussion in Munck & Verkuilen (2002) and Besley & Kudamatsu (2008), I use the Polity Score Index (from the Polity IV data set) as a demarcation criteria (Marshall & Jaggers, 2005). For a given country and year the data set measures how the executive power is recruited, which constrains (if any) limit the executive authority and the level of political competition. These dimensions are combined to construct an aggregate in-

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<sup>13</sup>Though a rich data set, the Latinobarometer appears to be fairly unused in the economic literature, with the exception of the works of Graham and coauthors on happiness and inequality (Graham & Pettinato, 2001; Graham & Felton, 2006).

<sup>14</sup>The goods and services included are: television, refrigerator, computer, washing machine, telephone (land line), car, second home, hot water, drinking water, and sewage system.

indicator capturing the type and quality of a political regime. This indicator -the Polity Score- takes values from -10 to 10 and it is customary in the literature to take negative values as indicating non-democratic regimes. All the individuals in my sample are living under democracies at the time of survey.<sup>15</sup> In Section 7 I test the robustness of my results by using an alternative demarcation criteria compiled by Vanhanen (2000).

## Historical Data

Economic conditions in Latin America have been very volatile during the twentieth century. In order to control for economic shocks during the Impressionable Years I use historical data on Real GDP coming from the Montevideo-Oxford Latin American Economic History Data Base (MOxLAD).<sup>16</sup>

## Variable construction

To construct the outcome variables, I focus on questions that capture political beliefs and preferences potentially targeted by dictatorial regimes and that are available for all years and countries.

First, regarding regime preference, I focus on the following question:

*With which of the following statements do you agree most?*

- a) *Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government;*
- b) *Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one;*
- c) *For people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic or a non-democratic regime.*

From these answers I construct Preference for Democracy, Preference for Authoritarian Regimes and Indifference between Regimes, three dummy variables that take value one when the individual expresses preference for a regime or indifference between them. Given the reviewed literature, it is reasonable to assume that dictators often try to reduce Preference for Democracy, as a means to increase the probability of their regime's survival.

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<sup>15</sup>I drop individuals interviewed in Venezuela in 2009 and 2010 as the Polity Score is negative.

<sup>16</sup>The MOxLAD brings together public data covering more than forty indicators for twenty Latin American countries for the period 1900-2000. Due to availability of Real GDP information I drop individuals born before 1939 in Paraguay, 1945 in Bolivia and Panama, 1950 in Dominican Republic, and 1920 for the rest of the countries.

In second place, I consider Confidence in Congress, Judiciary System, Political Parties and Armed Forces, which come from the following question:

*Please look at this card and tell me how much confidence you have in each of the following groups/institutions. Would you say you have a lot, some, a little or no confidence?*

Responses capture confidence on a 1 to 4 scale. Although whether these are groups or institutions can be argued about, I will use exclusively the second term for the sake of simplicity, and will refer to them altogether as Confidence in Institutions.<sup>17</sup> Results for each institution are interesting per se, but they could also be imperfectly capturing the behaviour of an underlying latent variable (e.g, a general sense of trust in institutions). Precisely, descriptive statistics show a close positive (negative) correlation between Confidence in Institutions and Preference for Democracy (Preference for Authoritarian Regimes); then any attempt to affect the latter should have an impact on the former.

Next, I consider Satisfaction with Democracy as another outcome variable, based on this question:

*In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in (country)?*

This variable measures how satisfied individuals are with the way democracy works in their country, on a 1 to 4 scale. Descriptive statistics (below) show that Satisfaction with Democracy is positively (negatively) correlated with Confidence in Institutions and Preference for Democracy (Preference for Authoritarian Regimes), which supports the idea that the outcome variables considered so far can be thought of capturing an underlying taste for Democracy. If dictators' efforts are effective, exposure to dictatorship should reduce individuals' Preference for Democracy, Confidence in Institutions, and Satisfaction with Democracy, while an increase should be found in case efforts backfire.

Finally, I also consider Right-wing Orientation, coming from the following question:

*In politics, people normally speak of 'Left' and 'Right'. On a scale where 0 is Left and 10 is Right, where would you place yourself?*

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<sup>17</sup>This is the set of institutions available for all years and countries in the survey. In Section 6 I use other institutions as additional outcome variables.

This variable measures individuals' self location on an ideology scale that goes from Left (0) to Right (10). I include this variable in the analysis given the efforts of many dictatorships in the region to fight against the diffusion of Left-wing ideas, as commented in Section 2. As dictators' efforts could have succeeded or backfired in affecting individuals' ideologies I remain agnostic regarding expected results. Though most of the non-democratic regimes in Latin America throughout the twentieth century could be characterized as Right-wing, in Section 7 I repeat my estimation allowing differential effects by the ideological sign of the regime.<sup>18</sup>

Finally, in order to measure exposure to dictatorships I use the Polity Score Index to construct my main variable of interest,  $ExpDict_{bc}$ , which measures the share of years spent under a non-democratic regime between the ages 4 to 25 for an individual from cohort  $b$  born in country  $c$ . Using these data sets I construct two additional control variables. First, I construct a control variable measuring exposure to negative macroeconomic shocks ( $ExpShock_{bc}$ ); following Giuliano & Spilimbergo (2014) I consider severe recessions as the occasions in which Real GDP growth was below the 10th percentile of a country's growth rate distribution. This control variable measures the fraction of years between ages 4 to 25 spent in a recession for an individual from cohort  $b$  born in country  $c$ .<sup>19</sup> Second, I construct a control variable measuring the intensity of the dictatorial regime to which individuals were exposed ( $ExpIntens_{bc}$ ); this variable captures the average Polity Score Index of all years spent under dictatorship, for an individual from cohort  $b$  born in country  $c$ . As extensions I repeat my estimation interacting exposure to dictatorships with these two controls.

## Descriptive Statistics

The final sample comprises 264,962 individuals. Table A2 in the Appendix presents descriptive statistics for the main socioeconomic variables used as controls. Figure 2 below plots countries by the average exposure to dictatorship between ages 4 to 25 and the average value of the main outcome variables.

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<sup>18</sup>Examples of Left-wing regimes are Peru's Velasco Alvarado (1968-1975) and Nicaragua's Sandinistas (1979-1984).

<sup>19</sup>Results do not change significantly under a different definition of a negative shock (e.g., growth below the 5th percentile).



showing significant positive correlation between them. Cross correlations between all outcome variables are reported in Table A3 in the Appendix: it shows that individuals who prefer Democracy tend to show higher Confidence in Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy, while the inverse is true for those preferring Authoritarian Regimes.




Figure 3: Correlations between selected outcome variables

Notes: Each panel plots the average value of two outcome variables for each country in the sample. The variables and scales of each panel match the ones used in neighbouring panels to ease grasping other cross correlations not included in the figure. See Table A3 in the Appendix for all cross correlations.

Also, Table A4 in the Appendix shows that higher Right-wing Orientation is associated with higher Satisfaction with Democracy and Confidence in Institutions. In fact, those who self-identify with the far Left (answering 0 or 1) display the highest Preference for Authoritarian Regimes and lowest Preference for Democracy, Satisfaction with Democracy and Confidence in Institutions. This suggests that for a core of far Left individuals, institutions are not to be trusted, democracy is not necessarily the best way to rule a country and satisfaction with democracy is rather low. This is not an exclusive feature of the Latin American far Left, as similar correlations can be found in other data sets.<sup>20</sup>

Also, this characterization of the far Left matches the political science literature: in research on the ideological and historical sources of the Latin American Left, Cas-

<sup>20</sup> A positive correlation between Satisfaction with Democracy and self-location in the Left-Right scale is also found in the Eurobarometer; the European Value Survey shows a positive correlation between self-location in the scale and agreement with a statement claiming democracy is the best political system. A positive correlation between self-location in the scale and confidence in parliament, the government, the judiciary system and armed forces is also found in the World Value Survey.

tañeda (1995) and Panizza (2005) mention a "hardcore" tradition coming from marxist thought. Though a more social-democrat component of the Left recognizes democracy and democratic values as valuable in themselves and aim to make reforms following democratic rules, a non-negligible fraction of the same Left considers democracy and democratic institutions as part of the apparatus that prevents "real" change to be made. This view of the ideological sources of the Left is shared by other scholars as well.<sup>21</sup> In fact, party systems in Latin America often featured (and still do) a far Left party that explicitly or implicitly distrusts democracy (Colomer, 2005), and the existence of guerilla movements across the continent supports the idea of part of the Left having lower preference for democracy.<sup>22</sup> Cross correlations across outcome variables are consistent with this analysis of the Latin American Left and are relevant for the interpretation of my results later on.

## 5 Identification and Specification

Identification comes from the fact that different countries experienced dictatorships of different lengths at different years. The cohorts born in 1980 and 1981 in Brazil and Colombia provide an example: those born in Colombia did not experience dictatorship at all, while for Brazilians the 1980 cohort experienced one year of dictatorship and the 1981 experienced none. The impact of exposure to dictatorship is identified by taking the difference in outcomes between the 1981 and 1980 cohorts within each country and comparing this difference across countries. In a setting with multiple countries and cohorts the empirical strategy consists in estimating a regression capturing exposure to dictatorships, which varies at the cohort-country level, while controlling for country and cohort fixed effects. This corresponds to the following baseline model:

$$Y_{ibct} = \alpha + \beta ExpDict_{bc} + \gamma_b + \delta_c + \varepsilon_{ibct} \quad (1)$$

where  $Y_{ibct}$  is an outcome variable observed for individual  $i$ , born in year  $b$ , interviewed in country  $c$ , at time  $t$ . Cohort fixed effects ( $\gamma_b$ ) capture common characteristics held by individuals in the same birth year cell irrespective of their country of origin,

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<sup>21</sup>See Angell (1995), Hartlyn & Valenzuela (1995), Carr et al. (1993) and Castañeda (2006).

<sup>22</sup>Colomer (2005) calculates the average political orientation of the voters of a set of 68 Latin American parties and finds that the far Left parties tend to be Communist (or Communist-inspired) and/or linked to guerrillas. Guerrillas often started from small factions splitting from Communist/Socialist parties, as are the cases of MLN-Tupamaros (Uruguay), Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Colombia), Sendero Luminoso (Peru), Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo (Argentina) and Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (Chile), among others.



thus accounting for cohort-specific beliefs and preferences (e.g. younger cohorts may have higher preference for democracy than older cohorts).<sup>23</sup> Country fixed effects ( $\delta_c$ ) account for common characteristics held by individuals from a given country, irrespective of their birth cohort, thus capturing time-invariant, structural differences across countries (e.g. religion, language).  $\varepsilon_{ibct}$  is an idiosyncratic error term. The main variable of interest,  $ExpDict_{bc}$ , measures the share of years between ages 4 and 25 lived under a non-democratic regime. As country of birth is not available I use country of residence at the time of the survey instead, which may attenuate the estimated effects.<sup>24</sup>  $\beta$  measures the average effect on the outcome variable of an additional year of exposure to dictatorships during ages 4 to 25.

Incorporating additional controls, my preferred specification is:

$$Y_{ibct} = \alpha + \beta_1 ExpDict_{bc} + \beta_2 ExpIntens_{bc} + \beta_3 ExpShock_{bc} + \beta_4 X_i + \gamma_b + \delta_c + \delta_c \times \theta_t + \varepsilon_{ibct} \quad (2)$$

This specification includes country $\times$ year-of-survey fixed effects ( $\delta_c \times \theta_t$ ). This reduces concerns that responses may be influenced by events at the time of the survey: any common element to all inhabitants of a given country in a given year is accounted for by this term (e.g. the contemporaneous political situation in the country).  $X_i$  represents a vector of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of individuals, including age (in one year dummies), gender, seven dummies for educational level, three dummies for marital status, seven dummies for labour force status, five dummies for socioeconomic status, ten dummies for religion, ten dummies capturing access to goods and services. As discussed,  $ExpShock_{bc}$  captures exposure to severe negative macroeconomic shocks experienced between ages 4 to 25, and  $ExpIntens_{bc}$  captures the average Polity Score of the experienced dictatorships.  $\varepsilon_{ibct}$  is an idiosyncratic error term.

I run three specifications for each outcome. Specification (1) includes birth cohort fixed effects ( $\gamma_b$ ), country fixed effects ( $\delta_c$ ) and country $\times$ year-of-survey fixed effects ( $\delta_c \times \theta_t$ ). Specification (2) includes  $ExpIntens_{bc}$  and demographic and socioeconomic controls in  $X_i$ . Specification (3) incorporates exposure to recessions ( $ExpShock_{bc}$ ) and

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<sup>23</sup>Note that this specification implies cohort specificities are common across countries: as I use variation in political regimes at the cohort-country level I cannot control for elements that affect a cohort's beliefs and preferences in a given country and that are not related to the political regime experienced by that cohort.

<sup>24</sup>The Latinobarometer includes a question on citizenship (for the period 2006-2010) that shows only 1.8% of the respondents are not citizens of the country where they reside. This reduces concern of migration affecting the estimation.

corresponds to equation 2 above. This is the most demanding specification and is the basis for further extensions and robustness checks. All regressions are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the country level. Because of the small number of clusters (18), I correct the standard errors using ‘wild bootstrap’ (Cameron et al., 2008).<sup>25</sup> I incorporate additional fixed effects and run a more saturated specification in Section 7.

### Challenges to the identification strategy

Note that the regression specifications allow to address a series of identification concerns. Country fixed effects reduces the concern that persistent differences across countries (e.g. income levels, policies) may be correlated with outcomes and thus, bias the results. Likewise, cohort fixed effects allow to control for cross-cohort changes in outcomes that occur independently of political regimes. Also, contemporaneous country-year shocks (i.e. affecting a country at the time of the survey) are accounted for by country $\times$ year-of-survey fixed effects.

Another concern is given by omitted variables. In this respect, my preferred specification includes as many socio-demographic controls as possible as well as a term capturing exposure to macroeconomic shocks, identified by Giuliano & Spilimbergo (2014) as preference-forming shocks. Though a priori one may fear that exposure to dictatorships affects beliefs and preferences not only directly but also through the control variables (e.g. affecting education), auxiliary regressions (available upon request) show this is not the case.

Another difficulty arises if unobservable elements are responsible both for exposure to dictatorships and for the formation of beliefs and preferences. For instance, if a society has low preference for democracy this could lead to a transition towards dictatorship; individuals born and raised under the new regime may display low preference for democracy not only as a result of a dictator’s actions but also due to intergenerational transmission of (mostly non-democratic) preferences.

Against this background, the impact of exposure to an additional year of dictatorship can be identified if a random component affects regime switches. In principle, as democracies do not have institutional mechanisms to turn into dictatorships (and viceversa) how and when a regime transitions into a different one is subject to a degree of randomness. Precisely, the Latin American experience provides many examples of randomness affecting the start, end and overall duration of dictatorships. Failed

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<sup>25</sup>I use the stata command *boottest* developed by Roodman (2018), with 100,000 repetitions.

coups and rebellions illustrate how transitions partly depend on chance.<sup>26</sup> In other cases, democratic regimes fell against the desires of a majority of society and as a consequence of independent actions of the armed forces.<sup>27</sup> Likewise, transitions were affected by sudden death or major medical illnesses, wars and natural disasters, external economic shocks and even foreign intervention (as cooperation and collaboration across dictatorial regimes or the involvement of the CIA).<sup>28 29 30 31</sup>

Though these examples illustrate the degree of randomness behind regime transitions, they do not provide a good enough and systematic source of variation that can be taken as the basis for an instrumental variables approach. My identification strategy is, then, based on the assumption that exposure to an additional year of dictatorship during childhood and youth is subject to randomness.

## 6 Results

In the following subsection I present the main results for Preference for Democracy. In Tables 2 and 3, the first column includes cohort, country, year-of-survey and country×year-of-survey fixed effects. Column 2 incorporates the already discussed controls and column 3 introduces the control for exposure to recessions. The main coefficient of interest is the one associated with  $ExpDict_{bc}$ , which measures the average effect of an additional year of exposure to dictatorships between the ages 4 to 25. In the rest of the section I present results for Confidence in Institutions, Satisfaction with Democracy,

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<sup>26</sup>Consider failed assassination attempts of dictators as Pinochet in Chile (1986) and Stroessner in Paraguay (1974), to name a few. Chile illustrates the case of failed coups: democratic from 1935 to 1972, coups were attempted in 1936, 1938, 1939, 1943, 1948, 1955 and 1969.

<sup>27</sup>See Peeler (1998), O'Donnell et al. (1986) and Hartlyn & Valenzuela (1995).

<sup>28</sup>For instance, dictators Rafael Trujillo (Dominican Republic) and Anastasio Somoza (Nicaragua) where assassinated, while Velasco Alvarado (Peru) suffered an aneurism. The sudden death of presidents Perón (Argentina) and Gestido (Uruguay) are key to understand subsequent dictatorships in both countries.

<sup>29</sup>Regarding wars, the Falklands/Malvinas islands' war in 1982 precipitated the fall of the Argentinian regime. Other relevant conflicts include Honduras-El Salvador (1969), Paraguay-Bolivia (1932-1935) and Peru-Ecuador (1941). As for natural disasters, Trujillo took advantage of the 1930 hurricane in Dominican Republic to strengthen his grip on the state, while the 1985 earthquake in Mexico led to reforms that accelerated the democratization process.

<sup>30</sup>For instance, the successful 1972 coup in Ecuador was directly linked to oil explorations and findings on the previous years. Brückner et al. (2012) find oil price shocks contribute to democratization processes, while Caselli & Tesei (2016) find resource windfalls exacerbate the authoritarian character of mild dictatorships.

<sup>31</sup>Coups promoted and/or backed by the CIA include Guatemala (1954), Ecuador (1961), Dominican Republic (1961), Brazil (1964), Bolivia (1971) and Chile (1973), among others. For accounts of the involvement of the United States in Latin American regime switches, see Blum (2003), Grimmett (2002), Grossman (1995), and Schoultz (1998).

Right-wing Orientation, and additional outcome variables. For these, I present results for my preferred specification.<sup>32</sup>

### Preference for Democracy

Table 2 below shows that an additional year of exposure to dictatorships leads to a reduction of 2.2 percentage points in the likelihood of preferring democracy, significant at 5% levels for my preferred specification. The coefficient is stable across specifications and the introduction of controls increases precision of the estimate. This result implies nine years of exposure -average exposure in my sample- reduces Preference for Democracy in 19.8 percentage points, a sizeable effect considering a mean Preference for Democracy of 62.2% for the entire sample. Further results (See Table 4 below) show that this reduced democratic preference is almost evenly channeled into increased Preference for Authoritarian Regimes and Indifference between Regimes, though only the latter is significant.

Table 2: Preference for democracy - Main results

	Preference for Democracy		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
<b>ExpDict</b>	<b>-0.016</b>	<b>-0.022**</b>	<b>-0.022**</b>
	<b>(0.012)</b>	<b>(0.009)</b>	<b>(0.009)</b>
ExpIntens		-0.002*	-0.002*
		(0.001)	(0.001)
ExpShock			0.003
			(0.036)
Observations	181,685	181,685	181,685
R-squared	0.065	0.076	0.076
FE	yes	yes	yes
Controls	no	yes	yes
Macro shock	no	no	yes

Notes: The table reports results from regressions against exposure to non-democratic regimes between ages 4 to 25, run on a sample of individuals aged 26 or older. Standard errors clustered at country level and estimated with wild bootstrap, in parenthesis. Fixed effects include cohort, country, year-of-survey, and country×year-of-survey. Controls include age, gender, religion, marital status, workforce status, educational level, socioeconomic status, ten indicators of access to goods and services, average Polity Score during years of exposure (*ExpIntens*), and exposure to severe negative macroeconomic shocks (*ExpShock*). Significance: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

This result can be better understood in terms of persuasion rates, which aim to measure the percentage of individuals who change their views as a result of exposure to dictatorships (DellaVigna & Gentzkow, 2010). In this paper I follow Cantoni et al.

<sup>32</sup>Results for all the specifications are available upon request.

(2017) and calculate conditional persuasion rates: given a belief promoted by a dictator, the conditional persuasion rate scales the effect of exposure to dictatorships on this belief by the share of the sample who would not hold the belief in the absence of exposure to the dictatorship.<sup>33</sup> In this case, the conditional persuasion rate is 3.4%, which means that experiencing an additional year of dictatorships during ages 4 to 25 would persuade 3.4% of the exposed individuals to declare they do not prefer democracy. These rates are in line with other estimates in the persuasion literature.<sup>34</sup>

To obtain more detailed information about the importance of the age of exposure, I repeat the estimations but consider exposure to dictatorships in smaller age intervals, allowing different coefficients for exposure at ages 4 to 12, 13 to 17 and 18 to 25. Results presented in Table 3 (below) show that Preference for Democracy was greatly affected by exposure at ages 18 to 25; an additional year of dictatorship experienced at these ages reduces Preference for Democracy by 1.7 percentage points (significant at 1% levels). Results also show a negative though smaller effect (1.1 percentage points) for exposure at ages 4 to 12, and a small and not significant effect for exposure between ages 13 to 17.<sup>35</sup>

To further probe into these results, I allow for negative macroeconomic shocks to have differential effects by exposure to dictatorship, as suggested by the political economy literature (Ticchi et al., 2013; Acemoglu et al., 2004; Dunning, 2008). On one hand, negative shocks reduce resources available to a political regime, and then could decrease any efforts undertaken to affect preferences, or reduce their effectiveness. On the other, a recession may increase the likelihood of a rebellion and thus increase a dictator’s incentives to affect preferences. I repeat the estimation of my preferred specification including an interaction term that captures the impact of negative macroeconomic shocks at differential levels of exposure to dictatorships. Table A6 in the Appendix shows that the interaction term is not significant for Preference for Democracy (and Preference for Authoritarian Regimes and Indifference between Regimes).

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<sup>33</sup>For binary variables as Preference for Democracy, I proceed as follows. First, I assume that the dictator would like to reduce Preference for Democracy. Then, I estimate the effect of exposure to dictatorship on Preference for Democracy. I then predict the Preference for Democracy that exposed individuals would display if they had not been exposed at all. Then I calculate the share of the sample that would prefer democracy with zero exposure (combining the observed preference for non-exposed individuals and the counterfactual preference for exposed individuals). The conditional persuasion rate is defined as the regression coefficient divided by this share of the sample who prefers democracy when exposure is zero.

<sup>34</sup>DellaVigna & Kaplan (2007) find persuasion rates of 3%-8% for exposure to Fox News in the United States; DellaVigna et al. (2014) find rates of 4%-5% for exposure to Serbian radio.

<sup>35</sup>A discussion of potential explanations behind stronger effects at this age band is presented further below.

Table 3: Preference for democracy - Differential effects by age band

	Preference for Democracy		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
ExpDict (4 to 12)	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.010* (0.006)	-0.011** (0.006)
ExpDict (13 to 17)	0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)
ExpDict (18 to 25)	-0.012** (0.006)	-0.016*** (0.006)	-0.017*** (0.005)
ExpIntens (4 to 12)		0.155 (0.102)	-0.001 (0.001)
ExpIntens (13 to 17)		-0.068 (0.042)	-0.001* (0.001)
ExpIntens (18 to 25)		-0.162 (0.531)	0.000 (0.001)
ExpShock (4 to 12)			0.026 (0.029)
ExpShock (13 to 17)			-0.006 (0.014)
ExpShock (18 to 25)			0.003 (0.013)
Observations	181,685	181,685	181,685
R-squared	0.065	0.076	0.076
FE	yes	yes	yes
Controls	no	yes	yes
Macro shock	no	no	yes

Notes: The table reports results from regressions against exposure to non-democratic regimes between ages 4 to 1, 13 to 17 and 18 to 25, run on a sample of individuals aged 26 or older. Standard errors clustered at country level and estimated with wild bootstrap, in parenthesis. Fixed effects include cohort, country, year-of-survey, and country  $\times$  year-of-survey. Controls include age, gender, religion, marital status, workforce status, educational level, socioeconomic status, ten indicators of access to goods and services, average Polity Score during years of exposure (*ExpIntens*), and exposure to severe negative macroeconomic shocks (*ExpShock*). Significance: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Finally, I allow differential effects of exposure to dictatorships by the severity or intensity of the regime. Though all regimes with a negative Polity Score are understood to be non-democratic, the literature recognizes differences across non-democratic regimes that may matter for the formation of preferences (Marshall & Jagers, 2005). Individuals may be differentially affected by dictatorships depending on whether the dictator remains in power by restricting political competition and rigging elections or by arbitrary incarceration and torture. I repeat the estimation of my preferred specification including an interaction term that captures the impact of an additional year of exposure to dictatorship for different average values of the Polity Score during the exposed years. Table A7 in the Appendix shows that the interaction term is small and not significant, ruling out differential effects of dictatorships for Preference for Democracy

(and Preference for Authoritarian Regimes and Indifference between Regimes).

## Confidence in Institutions, Satisfaction with Democracy and Right-wing Orientation

Table 4 below reports results of my preferred specification for Confidence in the four institutions considered, on Satisfaction with Democracy and on Right-wing Orientation. The table shows that exposure to dictatorship reduces Confidence in Congress, Judiciary System, and Armed Forces; though negative, coefficients are not significant for Confidence in Political Parties. The largest impact corresponds to Confidence in Judiciary. Coefficients imply that average exposure (nine years) lead to a reduction of 0.66, 0.77 and 0.84 points in a 1 to 4 scale for Confidence in Congress, Armed Forces and Judiciary, respectively. Easier to interpret, the corresponding persuasion rates are 4.8% for Confidence in Judiciary and 4.5% for Confidence in Congress.<sup>36</sup> Note that if the dictator intended to increase Confidence in Armed Forces, the negative effect of exposure implies a negative persuasion rate (of 6.8% in this case), that is, that efforts backfired.<sup>37</sup>

Table 4: All outcome variables - Main results

	Preference for Democracy (1)	Preference for Authoritarian Regimes (2)	Indifference between Regimes (3)	Confidence in Political Parties (4)	Confidence in Congress (5)	Confidence in Judiciary (6)	Confidence in Armed Forces (7)	Satisfaction with Democracy (8)	Right-wing Orientation (9)
ExpDict	-0.022** (0.009)	0.009 (0.006)	0.013* (0.007)	-0.040 (0.030)	-0.074** (0.037)	-0.093*** (0.035)	-0.085** (0.035)	-0.055* (0.029)	-0.223 (0.153)
ExpIntens	-0.002* (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.019)
ExpShock	-0.003 (0.036)	0.012 (0.040)	-0.015 (0.024)	0.063 (0.129) (0.150)	-0.010 (0.132)	0.015 (0.151)	0.189 (0.113)	0.039 (0.464)	-0.171
Observations	181,685	181,685	181,685	191,917	188,766	190,376	177,519	187,646	153,578
R-squared	0.076	0.063	0.043	0.083	0.107	0.100	0.105	0.126	0.065
FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Macro shock	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Notes: The table reports results from regressions against exposure to non-democratic regimes between ages 4 to 25, run on a sample of individuals aged 26 or older. Standard errors clustered at country level and estimated with wild bootstrap, in parenthesis. Fixed effects include cohort, country, year-of-survey and country×year-of-survey. Controls include age, gender, religion, marital status, workforce status, educational level, socioeconomic status, ten indicators of access to goods and services, average Polity Score during years of exposure (*ExpIntens*), and exposure to severe negative macroeconomic shocks (*ExpShock*). Significance: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

<sup>36</sup>Calculating conditional persuasion rates for confidence in institutions requires additional steps. First, I assume that the dictator intends to reduce Confidence in Judiciary and Congress, and construct two dummy variables that take value 0 when confidence is high (3 or 4) and 1 when it is low (1 or 2). I assume that the intention is to increase Confidence in Armed Forces and construct a dummy variable taking value 0 when confidence is low and 1 when it is high. I then repeat the estimation of the effect of exposure to dictatorship with my preferred specification, on the three dummies, and use these coefficients to estimate conditional persuasion rates as explained in a previous footnote.

<sup>37</sup>A discussion of potential reasons why the dictator's efforts may have backfired only for some variables is presented later below.

Results for exposure in smaller age intervals (see Table A5 in the Appendix) show that the negative impact is mostly concentrated at exposure between ages 18 to 25: coefficients are negative and significant for all institutions considered, and represent between a third to three fourths of the total effect. Results for differential effects of macroeconomic shocks (see Table A6 in the Appendix) show a significant and negative interaction term only for Confidence in Congress (-0.423); coefficients are negative but not significant for other institutions. This suggests that suffering a negative economic shock during a dictatorship experienced at formative ages amplified the pure effect of the dictatorship, at least regarding the perception of Congress. Allowing differential effects by dictatorship intensity (see Table A7 in the Appendix) yields no significant interaction effects.

Table 4 above shows that an additional year of exposure to dictatorship during ages 4 to 25 reduces contemporaneous Satisfaction with Democracy by 0.055 (in a 1 to 4 scale); an individual exposed to the sample average of nine years would display almost half a point of a lower Satisfaction with Democracy compared to a non-exposed individual. Alternatively, the corresponding persuasion rate is 4.1%, which implies a year of exposure leads 4.1% of the exposed to be dissatisfied with democracy. Looking at results by age band, the reduction in Satisfaction with Democracy responds almost exclusively to exposure to dictatorships during ages 18 to 25 (see Table A5 in the Appendix). Interaction terms considering exposure to macroeconomic shocks and regime intensity are small and not significant (see Tables A6 and A7 in the Appendix).<sup>38</sup>

Regarding Right-wing Orientation, recall this is measured by a variable that takes values 0 (Left) to 10 (Right); a negative coefficient indicates movement of individuals away from the Right and towards the Left. Results in Table 4 above show that exposure seems to reduce identification with the Right and to increase identification with the Left, albeit the coefficient is imprecisely estimated. The result suggests that nine years of exposure (average exposure for the sample) would move an individual two full points away from the Right and towards the Left, with an implied persuasion rate of -6.2% in this case.<sup>39</sup>

To probe further into this result, I convert the outcome variable into eleven dummies (one for each possible answer) and estimate the impact of exposure on the probability of

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<sup>38</sup>In this case I assume that the dictator's intention is to reduce Satisfaction with Democracy; the corresponding dummy takes value 0 for Satisfaction with Democracy above or equal to 2 and 1 otherwise.

<sup>39</sup>Given a large majority of Right-wing dictatorships in the region, in this case I assume that the dictator's intention is to shift individuals away from the Left and towards the Right of the political spectrum. The corresponding dummy takes value 0 for Right-wing Orientation below or equal to 5, and 1 in the other cases.



giving each possible answer. As Figure 4 below shows (see Table A8 in the Appendix for regression results), exposure to dictatorship increases self-identification with the (far) Left: coefficients are positive and significant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels for the probability of answering 0, 1 and 2 respectively. The largest coefficient in absolute value (-0.015) corresponds to the likelihood of answering 8 (being relatively far-Right). Results also show negative effects for answering 9 and 10, although imprecisely estimated.<sup>40</sup>




Figure 4: Right-wing orientation point estimates and 90% confidence interval

Notes: The figure plots the coefficients on the variable *expdict<sub>bc</sub>* taken from regressions of each of the eleven values of the Right-wing Orientation variable using my preferred specification (Specification 3). The shaded area represents the 90% confidence interval. See Table A8 in the Appendix for regression results

The shift towards the Left of the political spectrum is fairly split between the three age bands, though it is precisely estimated (significant at 5% levels) only for exposure at ages 13 to 17 (see Table A5 in the Appendix). Interestingly, results for differential effects by macroeconomic shocks (see Table A6 in the Appendix) show a large, negative effect (-1.62 in a 0 to 10 scale) on Right-wing Orientation for the interaction between exposure to dictatorships and severe macroeconomic crisis. This suggests that suffering a year of severe macroeconomic crisis while also experiencing a dictatorship greatly affected ideological orientation. Again, allowing differential effects by dictatorship intensity (see Table A7 in the Appendix) shows no significant interaction effects.

<sup>40</sup>I do not interpret this result as suggesting that exposure turns specific individuals from the far Right directly to the far Left, but rather than exposure shifts individuals from the far Right to the Right, from the Right to the Centre Right, from the Centre Right into the Centre, and so on and so forth.

## Discussion of main results

Taken together, results show that exposure to dictatorship during childhood and early youth affects political beliefs and preferences: higher levels of exposure lead to lower values of a set of variables that could be associated with democratic values. Coefficients are small but non-negligible, especially considering that average exposure is approximately nine years. Results for exposure at age subgroups suggest that exposure at later ages (18 to 25) matters more for the formation of political beliefs and preferences than exposure at earlier stages of life, which could be due to many factors.

First, note that individuals aged 18 to 25 are a key subgroup to be mobilized in any attempt to topple an authoritarian regime, as youth tends to take a leading role in protests and (political) mobilizations, both in democracies and authoritarian regimes.<sup>41</sup> An authoritarian ruler that anticipates the importance of youth may concentrate his efforts precisely on this demographic. For example, the ruler may tailor indoctrination and propaganda to this specific demographic, through special media campaigns or the educational system. Also, any transfer or preferential treatment used to elicit support may be specially targeted to this subgroup, or programs covering specific needs may be created. Alternatively, if sheer coercion and repression are the main tools to stay in power, these may be disproportionately directed to youth in order to increase the probability of survival.<sup>42</sup> In this interpretation, stronger effects at this subgroup may reflect increased intensity or targeting of the dictators' efforts to remain in power.<sup>43</sup>

Second, consider that this subgroup corresponds to ages at which even the most disinterested individuals would normally start their political life, engaging in democratic forms of participation in the public sphere.<sup>44</sup> Of course, Democracy goes beyond the particular act of voting and usually involves free speech, free press, separation of powers, discussion and legislation by an elected legislative body, among others. Also, many details and particularities of how democracies work are at the front of public discussion and interest during electoral campaigns. To the extent that individuals learn and value

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<sup>41</sup>This has been seen across Latin America during the twentieth century, but also during political turmoil in the Eastern bloc in the 1960s and even in recent years in protests in the Arab world. Even prosperous, solid and long lasting democracies have seen revolts in which youth played an important role, as illustrated by the case of France (May 1968) and the United States (1960s anti-war movement, 2010s Occupy movement).

<sup>42</sup>As a potential counterpoint, note that a way to keep youth under control is to indoctrinate it from earlier ages. Nevertheless, allocating resources and effort to contain or convert contemporaneous youth may be optimal in the short run, as indoctrination of children or adolescents increases the probability of survival in the medium term.

<sup>43</sup>In this interpretation the dictator targets 'youth' and not particularly the 18-25 subgroup, but the strength of the effect is due to individuals (still) being impressionable at these ages.

<sup>44</sup>Note that voting has been compulsory for almost all of Latin American countries since the start of democratic rule (Helmke & Meguid, 2007).

democracy due to direct exposure to it and its associated institutions and practices, the effects of dictatorial rule may be stronger when experienced precisely at the time individuals would normally be exposed to these elements for the first time. In this interpretation, individuals learn more or develop a greater taste for democracy when they live an election cycle or they see a functioning parliament at age 20 vis-a-vis at age 12, and hence suppression of democratic institutions has a stronger effect precisely at later ages.

Note that occasionally dictators remain in power and nominally maintain some democratic institutions, rigging elections or allowing some degree of political activity in a (restricted) parliament. In this setting, ages 18 to 25 mark the first ‘direct’ participation in this restricted and flawed version of democracy. To the extent that participation in a watered down version of democracy generates and elicits lower support than the unrestricted version, this can also explain stronger effects for this group.<sup>45 46</sup>

Some precisions can be made regarding results for confidence in institutions and satisfaction with democracy. These results have been previously interpreted, together with results for regime preference, as capturing an underlying ‘taste’ for democracy. Nevertheless, it could be the case that exposure to dictatorship affects confidence in institutions and satisfaction with democracy due to other reasons or through other channels. First, note that individuals could have a lower opinion of congress, judiciary system and political parties (or democracy in general) if they think that these institutions have some degree of responsibility in the advent of the dictator in the first place, above and beyond (or independently of) the dictators’ actual efforts to affect beliefs and preferences.

Second, the dictatorship could have a long term effect on the quality of these institutions (or democracy itself). In this setting, lower confidence in, for instance, the judiciary system, results not (only) from the dictators’ ability to shape preferences and beliefs, but (also) from actually bad performance of the judiciary. Quality of institutions could be damaged by the dictator as part of an active and conscious effort to remain in power, or due to a more passive form of neglect.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>45</sup>For instance, this could mark the first time that individuals experience that their chosen candidate or party is prohibited from participating in elections, or their first participation in elections that are rigged or that take part under repression or coercion.

<sup>46</sup>Again, the effect stems from the fact that individuals are not (fully) affected prior to voting age and are still impressionable until (approximately) age 25.

<sup>47</sup>For example, the dictator could appoint incompetent but faithful individuals to key positions in the administration, that could remain in the bureaucratic structure after regime change. Or the dictator could simply reduce the budget devoted to judiciary or to public education linked to human resource formation, such that even after a reversal in a democratic regime, quality and efficiency could be compromised in the medium run.

Similarly, beyond or independently of a dictators' actual efforts to affect beliefs and preferences, a long ban on political parties could also compromise the quality of future politicians. To the extent that part of the formation of politicians and legislators occurs within the structure of political parties, through practice and contact with more experienced peers, long periods with heavy restrictions on the operation of parties (or direct bans) could mean that after the transition to a democracy, political parties and congressmen may have little experience and may be of lower quality (vis-a-vis a no dictatorship case).

Third, and similarly as the previous point, it could be the case that reduced satisfaction with democracy and confidence in institutions stems from discontent regarding how these institutions handle problems and situations created by the dictatorship itself. For instance, lower confidence in judiciary could stem from the difficulty or inability of the judiciary to prosecute and incarcerate the dictator and his collaborators, in cases where the regime violated human rights or used the state for personal enrichment. Similarly, lower confidence in congress or political parties could stem from incapacity of fully undoing some of the dictators policies, or from the fact that in many countries the dictator or his followers maintained positions in congress or lead political parties.

Two counterpoints should be made to the last two interpretations. First, note that the empirical specification includes year-country fixed effects and a battery of other control variables. This means that the effect of dictatorships through its effect exclusively through the perception of contemporaneous institutions should partly be captured by the controls. For example, a negative shock on trust in institutions due to a large scale corruption scandal linked to a former dictator should be (partly) absorbed by a year-country fixed effect. Second, note that the situations discussed above should not necessarily affect individuals differently by age of exposure.<sup>48</sup> Recall that the sample considers individuals aged 26 onwards, to avoid including those still in their impressionable years. Hence, lower confidence in institutions stemming from the reasons mentioned above should in principle have a similar effect across individuals, and should have a rather small effect on the estimated coefficients.

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<sup>48</sup>As an example, suppose a dictator rules between 1980 and 1984, and this tenure has a long lasting negative effect on the quality of the judiciary system. Suppose that transition to democracy is peaceful and conditional on the implementation of an amnesty law, guaranteeing the safety and liberty of the dictator and his collaborators. Suppose that individuals interviewed in 1995 have a negative view of the judiciary system due to its poor quality, and have a negative view of congress and political parties due to their inability to overturn the amnesty and investigate corruption during the dictatorship. Individuals aged 4-25 during dictatorship would be aged 19-40 in 1995. It is not clear why the negative views of judiciary, congress and political parties would concentrate on those aged 19-40 and not affect also other (older) individuals.

Note that the effect on confidence in armed forces seems to be open to much less debate or interpretation: given the important role played by the armed forces for the conservation of power by dictators (and the fact that a great proportion of them were directly high ranking military members) it is reasonable to assume that any effort made by a non-democratic regime to affect beliefs and preferences must have tried to or started by improving the image of the armed forces. In this setting, the results strongly suggests that these efforts clearly backfired, mainly due to the armed forces being used for repression and coercion rather than to lower quality in the long term or discontent with contemporaneous behaviour.

Results also show that macroeconomic shocks do not seem to have differential impacts, though the interaction coefficient is negative and significant for Confidence in Congress and Right-wing Orientation. For the latter, experiencing a year of dictatorship under a severe recession moves an individual 1.62 points to the Left in the 0 to 10 scale. The size and sign of the interaction term points to a reinforcement of the pure exposure effect, which suggests negative shocks exacerbated a dictator's efforts to affect preferences. Finally, the effect of exposure does not seem to depend on the severity of the dictatorship experienced.

Looking at the results as a whole, under the (historically backed) assumption that dictators identified with the Right strongly attempted to affect ideological preferences of individuals, the results for Right-wing Orientation shown in Figure 4 suggest their efforts actually backfired. This result contrasts with the reviewed literature within economics on persuasion and preference formation; results in this literature tend to show an agent's effort to affect preferences either has no effect or a positive effect in the desired direction.

To further understand my results, recall the correlations between Right-wing Orientation and the rest of the outcome variables already described: consistent with the political science literature, individuals who self-identify with the far Left display lower satisfaction with democracy, preference for democracy and trust in institutions. Then, I interpret my results as suggesting that even though dictators were successful in eroding democratic values, the increased disenchantment and skepticism towards democracy and democratic values and institutions proved to be a fertile ground for the radical and populist Left to thrive. This interpretation is also consistent with the positive and significant effect found for Indifference between Regimes.

Let us take a deeper look at the joint interpretation of results, given that the actions of the dictators had seemingly contradictory effects, reducing democratic values (in line with the dictator's preferences) but shifting preferences away from the Right

and towards the Left (and reducing confidence in Armed Forces). The interpretation above puts forth the idea of political alienation of individuals. In this setting, the dictator's *main* achievement is to successfully erode democratic values of individuals. Then, disenchanted, unsatisfied and politically alienated individuals would be more easily captured or attracted by radical and/or populist parties (in the left of the political spectrum in Latin America). This is consistent with part of the political science literature mentioned before, and with the increase in Indifference between Regimes found in the results.

Nevertheless, this setting implies the failure of the anti-left (and pro-armed forces) efforts made by the dictator, and raises the question of why efforts in one direction succeed and others fail. A related interpretation inverts the direction of the explanation: suppose that the dictator's efforts true effects are either null or negative (backfiring). In this setting, the *main* effect of dictatorship is to raise opposition to ideological indoctrination and to the main instrument used in repression, hence the increase in self-identification with the (far) Left and the decrease in confidence in Armed Forces. Then, it is this increased support for the (far) Left which drives reduced preference for democracy, satisfaction with democracy and confidence in the remaining institutions, given the (far) Left critical and instrumental view of democracy and its institutions.

Alternatively, it could be useful for the interpretation of results to distinguish between two dimensions: one linked to political regimes (democratic versus non-democratic) and another one linked to the ideological sign of a regime (Left versus Right). In this respect results suggests that individuals were successfully affected along the first dimension but reacted resisting and countering indoctrination along the second dimension. In this line of analysis, results suggest that political regime preference is more malleable than ideological orientation or, in any case, that individuals are less successful in resisting indoctrination along the first dimension than along the second.

This could result from the role played by exposure to the actual set of practices and institutions linked to democracy (congressional debates, party competition in regular elections, among others previously mentioned above) that tend to be overridden during a dictatorship, vis-a-vis the way in which ideologies are transmitted or attacked. The intuition is that an individual does not need to experience (far) left wing policies in order to remain or become (far) left wing himself, while exposure to a fully working democracy is (more) critical for the development of a taste or preference for democracy. Then, a dictator's disruption of democracy and its institutions has a negative effect on the adoption of democratic values by individuals, while his efforts towards right-wing indoctrination are less successful. Particularly, models of intergenerational transmis-

sion of preferences show that minorities may react to threats by intensifying the efforts made to transmit a given trait (religion, belief).<sup>49</sup> Hence, an attack on the (far) Left may generate a response that surpasses the dictators' efforts.<sup>50</sup> The same models also show reduced incentives to transmit a trait held by an overwhelming majority of the population; hence an attack on democratic values may generate a lower response in the opposite direction.

Finally, an important point is that of *democratic indoctrination*: democracies make investments that foster democratic values in order to (among other objectives) decrease the likelihood of a transition to authoritarian regimes.<sup>51</sup> In strict terms, then, the estimated coefficients capture the joint effect of both a one year increment in exposure to dictatorships and a one year decrement in exposure to democracy. With this precision in mind, the contradictory results could result from a combination of the lack of democratic indoctrination and the general backfiring of the efforts of the dictator. In an extreme situation, the dictator's efforts to affect individuals' democratic values and ideological indoctrination backfire on both fronts, but the absence of democratic indoctrination has a stronger effect and generates the observed reduction in 'taste' for democracy.

The intuition behind this interpretation lies on the fact that the fundamental values and actual practices and institutions of democracy make it difficult for governing parties to engage in full-fledged ideological indoctrination, while there is probably a higher degree of agreement or consensus by all actors and parties in a democracy to engage in (ideologically neutral) democratic indoctrination.<sup>52</sup> In this interpretation, absence of democratic indoctrination more than compensates the pro-democratic oppositional reaction to the dictatorship, but due to ideological neutrality it has no countervailing effect over the pro-left reaction.

Results are also consistent with a case in which democracies also invest in right-wing indoctrination; in this setting the population has a pro-democratic and pro-left oppositional reaction to the actual and specific efforts made by the dictator to affect beliefs and preferences, and the lack of exposure to democratic institutions countervails

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<sup>49</sup>See for instance Bisin & Verdier (2000, 2001).

<sup>50</sup>See Corradi et al. (1992) for examples on the culture of resistance in the Southern Cone.

<sup>51</sup>See Ticchi et al. (2013) and Besley & Persson (2018) and references therein.

<sup>52</sup>Although democratically elected governments may push for a particular ideology, a free press, separation of powers and other checks and balances make it hard for a president to, for instance, make deeply biased changes to school curricula or highly charged propaganda campaigns. These type of measures would probably be opposed (and blocked) by part of the press, opposition parties and civil society organizations, for instance. Nevertheless, probably a large majority of political parties and civil society organizations would agree on the desirability of using the educational system to impart democratic values.

the first reaction but exacerbates the second.<sup>53</sup> Note however that this explanation implies that democracies have greater capacity to affect beliefs and preferences than dictators, when there are reasons to believe that the opposite should hold.<sup>54</sup>

Clearly, an investigation into the actual transmission mechanisms and channels through which the dictator attempts to affect beliefs and preferences is required in order to better understand and interpret the results. Note also that some of the alternative interpretations developed above may be complementary, or very hard to distinguish empirically.<sup>55</sup> Besides, the discussion on which channels and mechanisms are operating extends to results for the interaction of exposure to dictatorships and negative macroeconomic shocks.<sup>56</sup> Though identifying channels and mechanisms exceeds the scope of the current paper, it nevertheless presents novel reduced-form evidence on the topic, hopefully opening the discussion to future research.

## 7 Extensions and Robustness checks

As extensions and robustness checks I consider additional outcome variables, a more saturated specification, two falsification exercises testing for exposure before or after ages 4 to 25, an alternative criterion to distinguish dictatorships from democracies (Vanhanen, 2000), differential effects by political sign of the dictatorships and the income inequality experienced, and a restricted sample of individuals with nonzero exposure. Tables presented here and in the Appendix show regression results for my preferred specification.

First, I consider additional outcome variables, capturing the effect of exposure on actual political behaviour (Attending authorized demonstrations, Signing a petition)

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<sup>53</sup>Note that this setting is also consistent with stronger effects for Right-wing Orientation than for preference for democracy and confidence in institutions. Nevertheless, it is not clear a priori why democracies would push individuals' political orientation towards the right.

<sup>54</sup>As the dictator has more power with less constraints than any democratic equivalent.

<sup>55</sup>As another example of empirical difficulties in distinguishing channels and mechanisms, consider that the dictator could attempt to convince individuals that the regime is still a democracy, for instance to take advantage of pre-existing pro-democratic beliefs and preferences. This example refers to cases in which the dictator stays in power mostly through bending democratic practices and institutions (electoral fraud, buying opposition politicians, etc.) rather than sheer terror and repression. In this setting, exposure to dictatorship erodes democratic beliefs and preferences as it is perceived by individuals as exposure to (low-quality) democracy.

<sup>56</sup>These results may help to indirectly shed light on the interpretations discussed above. For instance, an approach that attributes the results mainly or exclusively to the lack of democratic indoctrination is contested by the negative interaction term observed for Confidence in Congress. Severe negative macroeconomic shocks should also reduce the capacity of the dictator to populate the government structure with friends and allies, hence one could claim that the fall in the quality of judiciary should be lower, although the interaction term in this case shows no differential effect.



and on confidence in authorities (Police, Government) and media (Television, Newspapers, Radio) and the opinion of the United States.<sup>57</sup>

Table 5: Results for additional outcome variables

	Confidence in Television (1)	Confidence in Newspapers (2)	Confidence in Radio (3)	Confidence in Government (4)	Confidence in Police (5)	Attend a Demonstration (6)	Sign a Petition (7)	Opinion of United States (8)
ExpDict	0.015 (0.015)	-0.001 (0.018)	-0.043* (0.023)	-0.040 (0.035)	-0.100** (0.042)	0.011 (0.012)	-0.008 (0.014)	-0.041* (0.024)
ExpIntens	-0.001 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.006 (0.005)	0.001 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.003 (0.003)
ExpShock	0.020 (0.095)	-0.023 (0.083)	0.073 (0.111)	0.110 (0.164)	0.210 (0.187)	0.016 (0.050)	-0.015 (0.056)	0.082 (0.065)
Observations	193,117	122,707	110,537	143,672	193,728	124,071	66,980	123,548
R-squared	0.059	0.056	0.070	0.152	0.095	0.066	0.078	0.159
FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Macro shock	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Notes: The table reports results from regressions against exposure to non-democratic regimes between ages 4 to 25, run on a sample of individuals aged 26 or older. Standard errors clustered at country level and estimated with wild bootstrap, in parenthesis. Fixed effects include cohort, country, year-of-survey, and country×year-of-survey. Controls include age, gender, religion, marital status, workforce status, educational level, socioeconomic status, ten indicators of access to goods and services, average Polity Score during years of exposure (*ExpIntens*), and exposure to severe negative macroeconomic shocks (*ExpShock*). Significance: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Table 5 shows that exposure to dictatorship reduces Confidence in Radio and in Police, and Opinion of the United States. Lower confidence in Radio could stem from past attempts of media manipulation on the part of the dictator. Reduction in Confidence in Police (together with reduced Confidence in Armed Forces) could stem from the fact that non-democratic regimes used these institutions to repress and coerce the population. A reduction in the Opinion of the United States is consistent with the role played by that government in the rise of several dictatorships seen in the region. Results also show that exposure to dictatorship does not significantly affect actual political behaviour; though coefficients point towards an increase in the likelihood of attending a demonstration and a reduction in the likelihood of signing a petition, they

<sup>57</sup>These additional variables capturing confidence come from the same question already seen. Variables capturing political behaviour come from the question: *I am going to read out a variety of political activities. I would like you to tell me, for each one, if you have ever done any of them, if you would ever do any of them, or if you would never do any of them?* I construct dummy variables that take value 1 if the individual has engaged in the activity and 0 otherwise. The variable capturing the opinion of the United States comes from the question: *I would like to know your opinion about the following countries that I'm going to read. Do you have a very good, good, bad or very bad opinion of...* I recode this variable on a 1 to 4 scale as the other questions on Confidence. Confidence in Television and in Police are available for all years. Availability for the rest is as follows: Confidence in Newspapers (2001 and 2003-2010), in Radio (2001, 2003, 2005-2010) and in Government (1995, 1996, 2002-2010), Trust in the United States (2000-2007, 2009 and 2010). Attending authorized demonstration was not asked in 1997, 2001, 2004, 2009 and 2010, while signing a petition was recorded only in years 2002 and 2004 to 2008.

are imprecisely estimated.

In second place, I incorporate age×cohort fixed effects. Coefficients from this more saturated specification (see Table A9 in the Appendix) are very similar in magnitude and statistical significance to my main estimations. Results show again that exposure reduces Preference for Democracy, Confidence in Congress, Judiciary, Armed Forces and Satisfaction with Democracy and increases Indifference between Regimes. Third, I consider exposure at ages 26 to 45 and, as a placebo, during 20 years before individuals were born (ages -20 to 0). Table 6 below shows small and not significant coefficients for all outcomes for the placebo exercise measuring the effect of exposure before birth. Results for exposure at ages 26 to 45 shows a negative and significant coefficient (at 10% levels) for the case of Confidence in Armed Forces only. This may be linked to the notorious role of this repressive force during non-democratic regimes in the region. Overall, results suggest belief and preference plasticity mainly during ages 4 to 25.

Table 6: Results for all outcome variables - Falsification exercises

	Preference for Democracy (1)	Preference for Authoritarian Regimes (2)	Indifference between Regimes (3)	Confidence Political Parties (4)	Confidence in Congress (5)	Confidence in Judiciary (6)	Confidence in Armed Forces (7)	Satisfaction with Democracy (8)	Right-wing Orientation (9)
PANEL A: Exposure between ages 26 to 45									
ExpDict (26 to 45)	0.001 (0.011)	0.005 (0.012)	-0.006 (0.018)	0.007 (0.021)	-0.033 (0.033)	-0.052 (0.043)	-0.085* (0.044)	-0.046 (0.029)	-0.059 (0.129)
ExpIntens (26 to 45)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.003 (0.003)	0.003 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.010 (0.009)
ExpShock (26 to 45)	0.036 (0.065)	-0.060 (0.039)	0.024 (0.052)	0.172* (0.095) (0.115)	0.015 (0.097)	0.063 (0.118)	0.131 (0.093)	0.090 (0.672)	0.215
Observations	70,454	70,454	70,454	74,882	73,267	73,963	69,748	72,967	58,811
R-squared	0.087	0.069	0.052	0.096	0.123	0.122	0.114	0.141	0.070
PANEL B: Exposure between 20 years before birth and birth									
ExpDict (-20 to 0)	0.003 (0.009)	0.003 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.008)	-0.010 (0.016)	0.013 (0.026)	0.008 (0.018)	-0.004 (0.019)	0.025 (0.024)	-0.052 (0.079)
ExpIntens (-20 to 0)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.004 (0.003)	0.004 (0.005)	0.000 (0.000)	0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.011)
ExpShock (-20 to 0)	0.026 (0.022)	-0.042* (0.023)	0.016 (0.023)	0.085 (0.052) (0.066)	0.119* (0.056)	0.124** (0.078)	0.037 (0.048)	0.015 (0.222)	0.388*
Observations	225,733	225,733	225,733	238,143	234,775	236,546	220,082	232,935	191,912
R-squared	0.070	0.059	0.039	0.075	0.098	0.087	0.099	0.117	0.060
FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Macro shock	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Notes: The table reports results from regressions against exposure to non-democratic regimes between ages 26 to 45 (Panel A) and 20 years before birth and birth (Panel B). Regressions are run on a sample of individuals aged 46 or older for Panel A and 18 or older (but born on or after 1940) for Panel B. Standard errors clustered at country level and estimated with wild bootstrap, in parenthesis. Fixed effects include cohort, country, year-of-survey, and country×year-of-survey. Controls include age, gender, religion, marital status, workforce status, educational level, socioeconomic status, ten indicators of access to goods and services, average Polity Score during years of exposure (*ExpIntens*), and exposure to severe negative macroeconomic shocks (*ExpShock*). Significance: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

In fourth place, I repeat the empirical exercise using the Vanhanen Index (Van-

hanen, 2000) as an alternative method for distinguishing democracies and dictatorships. I consider this Index given that among alternatives to the Polity IV criteria, it is almost the only one to cover all Latin American countries in my sample in the desired time horizon (see Munck & Verkuilen (2002) for a review of democracy indexes). In a detailed analysis of the indexes, Munck & Verkuilen (2002) notes that the Vanhanen Index bases its classification of regimes on only two dimensions (Competition and Participation), hence the classification of regimes is somewhat different to the one coming from the Polity Score Index. Concretely, of the years and countries considered in my sample, both indexes agree on regime classification on 85.6% of cases. In 8.8% of the cases Vanhanen's classification classifies a regime as a dictatorship when the Polity IV dataset considers it a democracy, while in 4.6% of the cases the opposite holds. Results (see Table A10 in the Appendix) show coefficients similar in size and sign than the main findings, although only the reduction in Right-Wing Orientation is statistically significant (at 5% levels). Additional results for age bands (available upon request) show significant effects for exposure at ages 18 to 25 for Indifference between Regimes, Confidence in Political Parties, Congress, Judiciary and Armed Forces, and Satisfaction with Democracy, with the same signs and similar magnitudes as those found using the Polity Score Index. The negative coefficients for Right-wing Orientation are significant for exposure at ages 4 to 12 and 13 to 17. Taken together, these results suggest that the choice of an Index does not affect the conclusion that exposure to dictatorships during ages 4 to 25 significantly affected subsequent political beliefs and preferences.

As another robustness check, in fifth place I repeat my estimations taking into account the political orientation of non-democratic regimes. Note that though non democratic regimes in Latin America can be overwhelmingly classified as Right-wing, the region did experience regimes that can be classified as Left-wing. Although it can be safe to assume that all dictators aim at eroding democratic values to strengthen their chances of survival, regimes that differ in political orientation may have diverging goals when promoting a particular ideology, thus considering exposure to different regimes may be important to explore the effect on Right-wing Orientation.

A full classification of regimes is a hard task, subject to heated debate. To construct a classification of regimes I proceed in the following way. First, I resort to existing data sets constructed by political science scholars: I use the data set compiled by Murillo et al. (2010), covering 1978-2000, and the Database of Political Institutions compiled by Beck et al. (2001), spanning 1975-2000. From them I extract an ideological classification of regimes (Left, Right, Center, Center-Left, etc.). Second, I infer political

sign of regimes by crossing this information with other data sets. I use information for 1975-2000 to attach a political sign to parties and coalitions, and then infer the sign of pre-1975 regimes with the help of a data set on legislative elections for a subsample of Latin American countries starting as early as 1912 (compiled by Coppedge (Coppedge)). Furthermore, Baker & Greene (2011) also code the ideology of Latin American political parties, allowing to assign a political sign to some non-democratic regimes carried on by parties or individuals strongly associated to given parties.<sup>58</sup> Finally, for remaining non classified regimes, I manually assigned a political orientation based on information on policy and international relations.<sup>59</sup>

As regime classification is debatable, I generated two classifications (available upon request): the first considering dictatorships that unambiguously can be characterized as Left-wing, while the second captures also ambiguous cases. I then repeated my estimations incorporating a dummy variable measuring whether individuals experienced at least one year of Left-wing dictatorships during ages 4 to 25 and an interaction term capturing the joint effect of this dummy and my standard *ExpDict<sub>bc</sub>* variable.

Results (see Table A11 in the Appendix) show no differential effect for almost all of the outcome variables, independently of which criteria to distinguish Left-wing dictatorships were used. Results do show a negative and significant interaction term for Indifference between Regimes, which suggests that, for a given level of exposure to dictatorships, having experienced at least one year of Left-wing dictatorial regimes reduces Indifference between Regimes, vis a vis an individual with the same level of exposure but only to Right-wing dictatorships. Still, this result is rather weak as it is significant at 10% levels and not robust to changing the classification criteria. Overall, considering the political orientation of the regimes does not affect results and conclusions: Right-wing and Left-wing dictatorships had similar effects in terms of affecting political beliefs and preferences.

As yet another robustness check, in sixth place I repeat my estimations considering the inequality level experienced during the exposure to dictatorships. It could be the case that dictatorships have differential effects on preference formation depending on whether dictators engaged in redistributive policies. To include inequality in my estimations I consider two sources of data. First, I resort to Siniscalchi (2014), who gathers data from different sources and constructs long run historical series of the Gini Index for Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay. Second, I use the data collected

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<sup>58</sup>For this task I use the Archigos data set (Goemans et al., 2009), which provides the names of all individuals occupying the main executive position for each country and year of my sample.

<sup>59</sup>For instance, I took breaking diplomatic relationships with the Soviet Union, banning the Communist Party and trade unions in general as a sign of Right-wing orientation.

by the UNU-WIDER World Income Inequality Database (UNU-WIDER, 2015). This database contains information for a subset of the countries in my sample, usually starting from the 1950's onwards. For those countries and years for which more than one estimation is available I take the average of the reported values; I interpolate to obtain information for missing years when possible.<sup>60</sup>

I use this data on inequality to calculate the average value of the Gini Index during exposure to dictatorship at ages 4 to 25. I then construct a dummy variable capturing whether an individual experienced an average level of inequality below or above the median level of inequality experienced in his or her country of origin. I repeat my estimations adding this dummy variable to my preferred specification, along with an interaction term capturing the joint effect of exposure to dictatorships and to high inequality levels. Results (see Table A12 in the Appendix) show a small and not significant interaction term for all outcomes, suggesting no heterogeneous effects by inequality levels.

As a final variation, I repeat the estimations on a restricted sample, disregarding individuals with zero exposure. The identification of the effect of an additional year of exposure to dictatorships is now done based on comparison of individuals that experienced at least one year of dictatorships during ages 4 to 25. In Section 5 I discussed the possibility that an underlying variable could be driving both beliefs and preferences and changes in political regimes. Though I cannot prove this is not the case, I argued against it on the basis that a significant random component affected the start, end and overall duration of non-democratic regimes in my sample. If an underlying variable is related to political regimes and beliefs and preferences, by restricting the sample only to exposed individuals I focus on individuals who are more similar in terms of this underlying variable (as they are all exposed) and exploit the randomness in the timing and length of dictatorships. Results (see Table A13 in the Appendix) show a similar picture compared to my main findings. Coefficients for Confidence in Judiciary, Congress and Armed Forces are very similar in magnitude and statistical significance to those previously estimated. Coefficients for Preference for Democracy, for Authoritarian Regimes, Indifference between Regimes, Satisfaction with Democracy and Right-wing Orientation are also similar in size to the main findings albeit imprecisely estimated. Note that restricting the sample implies dropping about 30% of the observations, hence lack

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<sup>60</sup>As a result of these sample restrictions, I can only consider exposure for 1920 onwards for Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay. I drop Costa Rica and Nicaragua, while I consider individuals only born from certain years onwards for Bolivia (1964), Colombia (1956), Ecuador (1961), El Salvador (1957), Guatemala (1944), Honduras (1964), Mexico (1946), Panama (1956), Paraguay (1979), Peru (1957), Venezuela (1958) and Dominican Republic (1950).

of statistical significance may arise from improved identification of a truly non-existing effect, or reduced statistical power over a truly existing one.

## 8 Discussion and Final Remarks

This paper aims at establishing the impact of growing up under a non-democratic regime. My main results show that exposure to dictatorships reduces Satisfaction with Democracy, Confidence Judiciary, Congress, Armed Forces, and Preference for Democracy. I take these results as indicative of an erosion of democratic values. Quantitatively the impacts can be large: nine years of exposure (average exposure in the sample) lead to a reduction of almost 20% in Preference for Democracy. Exposure to dictatorships also leads individuals away from the (far) Right and towards the (far) Left of the political spectrum: nine years of exposure leads to a two point shift in a 0 to 10 scale. Persuasion rates show exposure to dictatorships effectively persuades between 3.4% to 4.8% of the exposed to hold the dictator's desired beliefs regarding Preference for Democracy and Confidence in Judiciary and Congress; nevertheless, exposure backfires in terms of Confidence in Armed Forces and Right-wing Orientation (persuasion rates of -6.8% and -6.2% respectively).

Looking at additional outcomes, exposure seems to reduce confidence in tools that may have been used for repression (Armed Forces, Police) or indoctrination (Radio), and also reduce the opinion of countries involved in some dictatorship spells (United States). Also, results suggest a stronger effect of exposure to dictatorships at ages 18 to 25, precisely the age at which individuals most likely would start their political life in a democratic regime. The effect of exposure does not seem to depend on the severity or the ideological orientation of the regime or the degree of income inequality, while results suggest that exposure to severe macroeconomic shocks could have magnified the effect of exposure to dictatorships on the ideological orientation of individuals. Results are in general robust to considering additional fixed effects, restricting the sample to only exposed individuals, considering exposure outside of the 4 to 25 age range, and using alternative criteria to distinguish dictatorships from democracies.

Results show that the actions of the dictators had seemingly contradictory effects: on one hand exposure reduced democratic values (in line with the dictator's preferences) but on the other hand it shifted preferences away from the Right and towards the Left. I interpret these results as showing dictatorships contributed to the political alienation of individuals: erosion of democratic values matches the profile of unsatisfied, disenchanted individuals that are prone to being captured by radical, populist

political parties, an interpretation consistent with political science literature. This interpretation is also consistent with the increase in Indifference between Regimes found.

Alternatively, it could be useful for the interpretation of results to distinguish between two dimensions: one linked to political regimes (democratic versus non-democratic) and another one linked to the ideological sign of a regime (Left versus Right). In this respect results suggests that individuals were successfully affected along the first dimension but reacted resisting and countering indoctrination along the second dimension. Results suggest that political regime preference is more malleable than ideological orientation or, in any case, that individuals are less successful in resisting indoctrination along the first dimension than along the second. This could be related to the fact that democracy is embedded in a series of practices (congressional debates, party competition in regular elections, etc.) that tend to be overridden during a dictatorship, while ideological positions are harder to attack in a likewise direct fashion.

Finally, results confirm that non-democratic regimes may have persistent effects on outcomes through individuals' preferences. To the extent to which dictators affect democratic values and political orientations of future generations, outcomes of the democratic process (or the process itself) are affected, in the long run, by the dictator's actions. These results call for a deeper exploration of the mechanisms through which regimes affect political preferences. This paper then provides useful empirical evidence than informs the development of further models in the political economy of dictatorships and regime transitions.

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# A Appendix

## Tables

Table A1: Rulers by country and spell (1900-1990)

Country	Period	Ruler(s)	Country	Period	Ruler(s)
Argentina	1930 - 1932	Uriburu	El Salvador	1961 - 1962	[Junta] Portillo, Rivera, Avelar, Rodríguez Porth, Valiente
Argentina	1932 - 1938	Justo	El Salvador	1962	Cordón Cea
Argentina	1943 - 1944	Ramirez	El Salvador	1962 - 1963	Rivera
Argentina	1944 - 1946	Farrell	El Salvador	1972 - 1977	Armando Molina
Argentina	1946 - 1955	Peron	El Salvador	1977 - 1979	Romero
Argentina	1955	Lonardi	El Salvador	1979	[Junta] Gutiérrez, Avendaño, Majano, Mayorga Quiroz, Andino Gómez, Ungo
Argentina	1955 - 1958	Aramburu	El Salvador	1980	[Junta] Gutiérrez, Majano, Morales Erlich, Dada Hirezi, Ávalos Navarrete
Argentina	1958 - 1962	Frondizi	Guatemala	1898 - 1920	Estrada Cabrera
Argentina	1962 - 1963	Guido	Guatemala	1920	Herrera y Luna
Argentina	1963 - 1966	Illa	Guatemala	1931 - 1943	Ubico Castañeda
Argentina	1966 - 1970	Onganía	Guatemala	1954 - 1957	Castillo Armas
Argentina	1970 - 1971	Levingston	Guatemala	1957	Gonzáles López
Argentina	1971 - 1972	Lanusse	Guatemala	1957 - 1958	Florez Avendaño
Argentina	1976 - 1981	Videla	Guatemala	1958 - 1963	Ydígoras Fuentes
Argentina	1981	Viola	Guatemala	1963 - 1966	Peralta Azurdía
Argentina	1981 - 1982	Galtieri	Guatemala	1974 - 1978	Laugerud García
Argentina	1982	Bignone	Guatemala	1978 - 1982	Lucas García
Bolivia	1936 - 1937	Toro Ruilova	Guatemala	1982 - 1983	Ríos Montt
Bolivia	1937 - 1939	Busch Becerra	Guatemala	1983 - 1985	Mejía Víctores
Bolivia	1939 - 1940	Quintanilla Quiroga	Honduras	1907	[US Invasión] Oqueli Bustillo
Bolivia	1940 - 1943	Peñaranda Castillo	Honduras	1907	[US Invasión] Dávila Cuellar
Bolivia	1944 - 1946	Villaroel Lopez	Honduras	1912	[US Invasión] Bonilla Chirinos
Bolivia	1946	Guillén Olmos	Honduras	1919	[US Invasión] Bertrand Barahona
Bolivia	1946 - 1947	Monje Gutiérrez	Honduras	1924	[US Invasión] Lopez Gutiérrez
Bolivia	1947 - 1949	Hertzog Garaizabal	Honduras	1924	[US Invasión] Bueso Cuéllar, Dávila Bonilla
Bolivia	1949 - 1951	Urriolagoitia Harriague	Honduras	1924	[US Invasión] Tosta Carrasco
Bolivia	1951 - 1952	Ballivián Rojas	Honduras	1936 1949	Carías Andino
Bolivia	1952 - 1956	Paz Estenssoro	Honduras	1949 1954	Gálvez Durón
Bolivia	1956 - 1960	Siles Zuazo	Honduras	1954 1956	Lozano Díaz
Bolivia	1960 - 1964	Paz Estenssoro	Honduras	1956 1957	[Junta] Rodríguez Herrera, Caraccioli Moncada, Gálvez Barnes, Palma Gálvez
Bolivia	1964 - 1965	Barrientos Ortuño	Honduras	1958 1963	Villeda Morales
Bolivia	1965	Ovando Candía & Barrientos Ortuño	Honduras	1963 1971	López Arellano

Rulers by country and spell (1900-1990) (continued)

Country	Period	Ruler(s)	Country	Period	Ruler(s)
Bolivia	1966	Ovando Candía	Honduras	1971 1975	López Arellano
Bolivia	1966 - 1969	Barrientos Ortuño	Honduras	1975 1978	Melgar Castro
Bolivia	1969	Siles Salinas	Honduras	1978 1979	[Junta] Paz García, Álvarez Cruz, Ze- laya Rodríguez
Bolivia	1969 - 1970	Ovando Candía	Mexico	1884 - 1911	Díaz
Bolivia	1970 - 1971	Torres González	Mexico	1917 - 1920	Carranza
Bolivia	1971 - 1978	Banzer Suárez	Mexico	1920	de la Huerta
Bolivia	1978	Pereda Asbún	Mexico	1920 - 1924	Obregón
Bolivia	1979	Padilla Arancibia	Mexico	1924 - 1928	Eliás Calles
Bolivia	1979	Guevara Arze	Mexico	1928 - 1930	Portes Gil
Bolivia	1979 - 1980	Guelier Tejada	Mexico	1930 - 1932	Ortiz Rubio
Bolivia	1980 - 1981	Meza Tejada	Mexico	1932 - 1934	Rodríguez
Bolivia	1981 - 1982	[Junta] Bernal, Calderón, Mariscal, Morales, Pammo & Torrelio	Mexico	1934 - 1940	Cárdenas del Río
Brazil	1898 - 1902	Campos Sales	Mexico	1940 - 1946	Ávila Camacho
Brazil	1902 - 1906	Rodrigues Alves	Mexico	1946 - 1952	Alemán Valdés
Brazil	1906 - 1909	Moreira Pena	Mexico	1952 - 1958	Ruiz Cortines
Brazil	1909 - 1910	Peçanha	Mexico	1958 - 1964	López Mateos
Brazil	1910 - 1914	Rodrigues da Fon- seca	Mexico	1964 - 1970	Díaz Ordaz
Brazil	1914 - 1918	Blás	Mexico	1970 - 1976	Echeverría Álvarez
Brazil	1918 - 1919	Moreira	Mexico	1976 - 1982	López Portillo y Pacheco
Brazil	1919 - 1922	Pessoa	Mexico	1982 - 1988	de la Madrid Hur- tado
Brazil	1922 - 1926	Bernardes	Nicaragua	1893 - 1909	Santos Zelaya López
Brazil	1926 - 1930	Luís	Nicaragua	1910	Madriz Rodríguez
Brazil	1930 - 1945	Getulio Vargas	Nicaragua	1910 - 1911	Estrada Morales
Brazil	1964 - 1967	de Alencar	Nicaragua	1911 - 1916	Díaz Recinos
Brazil	1967 - 1969	da Costa e Silva	Nicaragua	1917 - 1920	Chamorro Vargas
Brazil	1969 - 1974	Garrastazu Médici	Nicaragua	1921 - 1923	Chamorro Bolaños
Brazil	1974 - 1979	Geisel	Nicaragua	1923 - 1924	Martínez González
Brazil	1979 - 1985	Figueiredo	Nicaragua	1925	Solórzano Gutiérrez
Chile	1924 - 1925	[Junta] Altamirano Talavera, Dartnell, Bello Codecido -	Nicaragua	1926	Chamorro Vargas
Chile	1925	Alessandri Palma	Nicaragua	1926 - 1928	[Civil war] Díaz Re- cinos / Sacasa
Chile	1925	Barros Borgoño	Nicaragua	1929 - 1932	Moncada
Chile	1926 - 1927	Figueroa Larraín	Nicaragua	1933 - 1936	Sacasa
Chile	1927 - 1931	Ibáñez del Campo	Nicaragua	1936	Brenes Jarquin
Chile	1931	Montero Rodríguez	Nicaragua	1937 - 1947	Somoza García
Chile	1931	Trucco Franzani	Nicaragua	1947	Lacayo Sacasa
Chile	1931 - 1932	Montero Rodríguez	Nicaragua	1947 - 1950	Román y Reyes
Chile	1932	Puga, Dávila Es- pinoza	Nicaragua	1950 - 1956	Somoza García
Chile	1932	Blanche, Oyanedel Urrutia	Nicaragua	1956 - 1963	Somoza Debayle
Chile	1933 - 1934	Alessandri Palma	Nicaragua	1963 - 1966	Schick Gutiérrez
Chile	1973 - 1988	Pinochet	Nicaragua	1966 - 1967	Guerrero Gutiérrez
Colombia	1904 - 1909	Reyes	Nicaragua	1967 - 1972	Somoza Debayle
Colombia	1909	Holguín	Nicaragua	1972 - 1974	[Junta] Martínez Lacayo, Lovo Cordero, Agüero Rocha, Paraguaga Irias
Colombia	1909 - 1910	González Valencia	Nicaragua	1974 - 1979	Somoza Debayle

Rulers by country and spell (1900-1990) (continued)

Country	Period	Ruler(s)	Country	Period	Ruler(s)
Colombia	1910 - 1914	Restrepo	Nicaragua	1979 - 1984	[Junta] Ortega, Ramírez, Chamorro, Robelo, Morales, Córdova Rivas, Cruz Porras
Colombia	1914 - 1918	Concha	Nicaragua	1985 - 1989	Ortega Saavedra
Colombia	1918 - 1921	Suárez	Panama	1903 - 1904	[Junta] Arango, Arias, Boyd, Espinosa Batista
Colombia	1921 - 1922	Holguín	Panama	1904 - 1908	Amador Guerrero
Colombia	1922 - 1926	Ospina	Panama	1908 - 1910	de Obaldía Gallegos
Colombia	1926 - 1930	Abadía Méndez	Panama	1910	Mendoza Soto
Colombia	1948 - 1950	Ospina Pérez	Panama	1910 - 1912	Arosemena Alba
Colombia	1950 - 1951	Gomez	Panama	1912 - 1916	Porras Barahona
Colombia	1951 - 1953	Urdaneta Arbeláez	Panama	1916 - 1918	Valdés Arce
Colombia	1953 - 1957	Rojas Pinilla	Panama	1918	Urriola Garrés
Dom. Republic	1899 - 1902	Jiménez	Panama	1918 - 1920	Porras Barahona
Dom. Republic	1902- 1903	Vásquez	Panama	1920	Lefevre de la Ossa
Dom. Republic	1903	Woss y Gil	Panama	1920 - 1924	Porras Barahona
Dom. Republic	1903- 1905	Morales Languasco	Panama	1924 - 1928	Chiari Robles
Dom. Republic	1906 - 1911	Cáceres	Panama	1928 - 1930	Arosemena Guillén
Dom. Republic	1911 - 1912	Victoria	Panama	1931 - 1932	Alfaro Jovane
Dom. Republic	1912 - 1913	Nouel	Panama	1932 - 1936	Arias Madrid
Dom. Republic	1913 - 1914	Bordas Valdez	Panama	1936 - 1939	Arosemena Barreati
Dom. Republic	1914	Báez Machado	Panama	1940	Boyd Briceño
Dom. Republic	1914 - 1916	Jiménez	Panama	1940 - 1941	Arias Madrid
Dom. Republic	1916	[US Occupation] Henríquez y Carvajal	Panama	1941 - 1945	Adolfo de la Guardia Arango
Dom. Republic	1916 - 1922	[US Occupation] Shepard Knapp (US Navy)	Panama	1945	Duncan Guillén-Arosemena
Dom. Republic	1922 - 1924	[US Occupation] Bautista Vicini Burgos	Panama	1945 - 1948	Jiménez Brin
Dom. Republic	1924 - 1930	Vásquez	Panama	1961 - 1964	Chiari Remón -
Dom. Republic	1930	Estrella Ureña	Panama	1964 - 1967	Robles Méndez -
Dom. Republic	1930 - 1938	Rafael Trujillo Molina	Panama	1967 - 1968	Robles
Dom. Republic	1938 - 1940	Peynado	Panama	1968 - 1969	Pinilla Fabrega / Urrutia Parrilla
Dom. Republic	1940 - 1942	de Jesús Troncoso de la Concha	Panama	1970 - 1978	Lakas Bahas
Dom. Republic	1942 - 1952	Rafael Trujillo Molina	Panama	1978 - 1982	Royo Sánchez
Dom. Republic	1952 - 1960	Héctor Trujillo Molina	Paraguay	1898 - 1902	Aceval
Dom. Republic	1966 - 1978	Balaguer Ricardo	Paraguay	1902 - 1904	Escurra
Ecuador	1895 - 1901	Alfaro	Paraguay	1905	Gaona
Ecuador	1901 - 1905	Plaza	Paraguay	1905 - 1906	Báez
Ecuador	1905 - 1906	García	Paraguay	1906 - 1908	Ferreira
Ecuador	1906 - 1911	Alfaro	Paraguay	1908 - 1910	González Navero
Ecuador	1911	Estrada	Paraguay	1910 - 1911	Gondra
Ecuador	1912	Freile Zaldumbide	Paraguay	1911	Jara
Ecuador	1912	Andrade Marín	Paraguay	1911 - 1912	Marcial Rojas
Ecuador	1912	Baquerizo Moreno	Paraguay	1912	González Navero
Ecuador	1912 - 1916	Plaza	Paraguay	1912 - 1916	Schaerer
Ecuador	1916 - 1920	Baquerizo Moreno	Paraguay	1916 - 1919	Franco
Ecuador	1920 - 1924	Tamayo	Paraguay	1919 - 1920	Montero
Ecuador	1924 - 1925	Córdova	Paraguay	1920 - 1921	Gondra



Rulers by country and spell (1900-1990) (continued)

Country	Period	Ruler(s)	Country	Period	Ruler(s)
Ecuador	1925 - 1926	[Junta] Bustamante, Dillon, Oliva, Larrea, Gómez de la Torre, Garaicoa, Boloña, Arízaga, Moreno, Viteri, Ayora, Albornoz, Hidalgo, Gómez Gault, Egüez	Paraguay	1921 - 1923	Eusebio Ayala
Ecuador	1926 - 1931	Ayora	Paraguay	1923 - 1924	Eligio Ayala
Ecuador	1931 - 1932	Baquerizo Moreno	Paraguay	1924	Riant
Ecuador	1932	Guerrero Martínez	Paraguay	1924 - 1928	Eligio Ayala
Ecuador	1932 - 1933	de Dios Martínez	Paraguay	1928 - 1932	Guggiari
Ecuador	1933 - 1934	Montalvo	Paraguay	1932 - 1936	Eusebio Ayala
Ecuador	1934 - 1935	Velasco Ibarra	Paraguay	1936	Franco
Ecuador	1935 - 1937	Páez	Paraguay	1940	Estigarribia
Ecuador	1937 - 1938	Enriquez Gallo	Paraguay	1940 - 1948	Morinigo
Ecuador	1938	Borrero	Paraguay	1948	Frutos
Ecuador	1938 - 1939	Mosquera Narváez	Paraguay	1948 - 1949	González Navero
Ecuador	1939	Arroyo del Río	Paraguay	1949	Molas López
Ecuador	1940	Córdova	Paraguay	1949 - 1954	Chaves
Ecuador	1940 - 1944	Arroyo del Río	Paraguay	1954	Romero Pereira
Ecuador	1944 - 1947	Velasco Ibarra	Paraguay	1954 - 1989	Stroessner
Ecuador	1961 - 1963	Arosemena Monroy	Peru	1919 - 1930	Leguía y Salcedo
Ecuador	1963 - 1966	[Junta] Castro Jijón, Cabrera Sevilla, Freile Posso, Gándara	Peru	1931 - 1931	Sánchez Cerro
Ecuador	1966	Yeroví Indaburu	Peru	1931	Samanez
Ecuador	1966 - 1967	Arosemena	Peru	1931 - 1933	Sánchez Cerro
Ecuador	1972 - 1976	Rodríguez Lara	Peru	1948 - 1956	Odria Amoretti
Ecuador	1976 - 1978	[Junta] Poveda, Durán Arcentales, Leoro Franco	Peru	1962 - 1963	Pérez Godoy
El Salvador	1898 - 1903	Regalado	Peru	1963	Lindley López
El Salvador	1903 - 1907	Escalón	Peru	1968 - 1975	Velasco Alvarado
El Salvador	1907 - 1911	Figueroa	Peru	1975 - 1978	Morales Bermúdez
El Salvador	1911 - 1913	Araujo	Uruguay	1899 - 1903	Lindolfo Cuestas
El Salvador	1913 - 1914	Meléndez	Uruguay	1972 - 1976	Bordaberry
El Salvador	1914 - 1915	Quiñónez Molina	Uruguay	1976	Demicheli
El Salvador	1915 - 1918	Meléndez	Uruguay	1976 - 1981	Méndez
El Salvador	1919	Quiñónez Molina	Uruguay	1981 - 1985	Álvarez
El Salvador	1919 - 1923	Meléndez	Venezuela	1899 - 1908	Castro
El Salvador	1923 - 1927	Quiñónez Molina	Venezuela	1909 - 1913	Gómez
El Salvador	1927 - 1931	Romero Bosque	Venezuela	1913 - 1914	Fortoul
El Salvador	1931	Araujo	Venezuela	1914 - 1922	Márquez Bustillos
El Salvador	1931 - 1934	Hernández Martínez	Venezuela	1922 - 1929	Gómez
El Salvador	1934 - 1935	Menéndez	Venezuela	1929 - 1931	Pérez
El Salvador	1935 - 1944	Hernández Martínez	Venezuela	1931 - 1935	Gómez
El Salvador	1944	Menéndez	Venezuela	1936 - 1941	López Contreras
El Salvador	1944 - 1945	Aguirre y Salinas	Venezuela	1941 - 1945	Medina Angarita
El Salvador	1945 - 1948	Castaneda Castro	Venezuela	1945 - 1948	Betancourt
El Salvador	1948 - 1950	[Junta] Bolaños, Osorio, Galindo Pohl, Costa	Venezuela	1948	Gallegos
El Salvador	1950 - 1956	Osorio	Venezuela	1948 - 1950	Delgado Chalbaud
El Salvador	1956 - 1960	Lemus	Venezuela	1950 - 1952	Suárez Flamerich
El Salvador	1960 - 1961	[Junta] Falla Cáceres, Fortín Magaña, Castillo Figueroa, Yanes Urías, Castillo, Alonso Rosales	Venezuela	1952 - 1957	Pérez Jiménez

Rulers by country and spell (1900-1990) (continued)

Country	Period	Ruler(s)	Country	Period	Ruler(s)
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Notes: The table omits rulers who stood in power for less than a month. Dictatorship periods are defined using the Polity Score Index. Names of rulers come from the Archigos data set (Goemans et al., 2009) complemented and contrasted with web queries.

Table A2: Descriptive statistics

Variable	Observations	% in the category
<i>Education</i>	260,154	
Illiterate		7.54
Primary, incomplete		18.03
Primary, complete		16.34
Secondary, incomplete		18.18
Secondary, complete		21.10
Superior, incomplete		9.80
Superior, complete		9.00
<i>Marital status</i>	261,914	
Married/cohabiting		58.04
Single		31.43
Divorced/widowed/separated		10.54
<i>Access to goods and services</i>	264,154	
Second home		10.81
Drinking water		87.08
Hot water		38.96
Sewage system		69.65
Television		87.73
Refrigerator		78.31
Computer		20.20
Washing machine		47.12
Telephone		48.48
Car		27.03
<i>Labour force status</i>	262,177	
Self-employed		30.98
Public employee		8.44
Private employee		17.88
Temporarily unemployed		6.42
Retired		6.02
Housekeeper		22.33
Student		7.93
<i>Religion</i>	264,154	
Catholic		72.37
Evangelist		12.85
Jehova witness		0.99
None		7.02
Other		6.77

Notes: The table reports the number of non-missing observations for relevant characteristics of the individuals in my sample. It also shows the share of individuals in each response category. For the list of goods and services the Table reports the share of individuals that owns or has access to that good or service.

Table A3: Correlations across outcome variables

	Satisfaction with Democracy (1)	Confidence in Congress (2)	Confidence in Political Parties (3)	Confidence in Judiciary (4)	Confidence in Armed Forces (5)	Indifference between Regimes (6)	Preference for Democracy (7)	Preference for Authoritarian Regimes (8)
Satisfaction with Democracy	1							
Confidence in Congress	0.2941	1						
Confidence in Political Parties	0.2525	0.5461	1					
Confidence in Judiciary	0.2581	0.5566	0.4609	1				
Confidence in Armed Forces	0.1422	0.3413	0.269	0.4012	1			
Indifference between Regimes	-0.0938	-0.0323	-0.0173	-0.0236	0.0328	1		
Preference for Democracy	0.2016	0.0829	0.0742	0.0626	-0.0252	-0.6315	1	
Pref. for Authoritarian Regimes	-0.1582	-0.0714	-0.0757	-0.0547	-0.0017	-0.2222	-0.6157	1
Right-wing Orientation	0.0326	0.0254	0.0277	0.0475	0.1014	0.0056	-0.0027	-0.0022

Notes: The table presents cross correlations across outcome variables.

Table A4: Outcome variable averages by right-wing orientation

	0 (Left)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 (Right)
Preference for Democracy	0.60	0.60	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.61	0.64	0.65	0.63	0.63
Indifference between Regimes	0.17	0.19	0.18	0.19	0.20	0.18	0.21	0.20	0.19	0.19	0.16
Preference for Authoritarian Regimes	0.23	0.21	0.20	0.18	0.18	0.19	0.18	0.16	0.17	0.19	0.20
Satisfaction with Democracy	2.15	2.24	2.25	2.28	2.29	2.23	2.33	2.37	2.37	2.37	2.38
Confidence in Congress	1.92	1.97	2.05	2.07	2.09	2.00	2.13	2.15	2.12	2.12	2.10
Confidence in Judiciary	2.00	2.05	2.09	2.10	2.13	2.07	2.19	2.22	2.22	2.21	2.21
Confidence in Political Parties	1.73	1.81	1.86	1.86	1.87	1.77	1.91	1.92	1.90	1.92	1.88
Confidence in Armed Forces	2.24	2.26	2.23	2.27	2.33	2.37	2.47	2.54	2.58	2.54	2.55

Notes: The table presents average values of outcome variables by each value of the Right-wing Orientation scale.

Table A5: All outcome variables - Differential effects by age bands

	Preference for Democracy (1)	Preference for Authoritarian Regimes (2)	Indifference between Regimes (3)	Confidence in Political Parties (4)	Confidence in Congress (5)	Confidence in Judiciary (6)	Confidence in Armed Forces (7)	Satisfaction with Democracy (8)	Right-wing Orientation (9)
ExpDict (4 to 12)	-0.011** (0.006)	0.008 (0.006)	0.006* (0.003)	-0.027** (0.013)	-0.024 (0.020)	-0.029 (0.019)	-0.028 (0.023)	-0.009 (0.015)	-0.067 (0.084)
ExpDict (13 to 17)	0.001 (0.003)	0.007 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.010)	-0.022*** (0.007)	-0.022** (0.010)	-0.016 (0.012)	-0.015* (0.008)	-0.085** (0.038)
ExpDict (18 to 25)	-0.017*** (0.005)	0.009 (0.006)	0.008** (0.004)	-0.027** (0.012)	-0.033** (0.015)	-0.049*** (0.014)	-0.053*** (0.016)	-0.043*** (0.012)	-0.090 (0.085)
ExpIntens (4 to 12)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.009)
ExpIntens (13 to 17)	-0.001* (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.003 (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.009)
ExpIntens (18 to 25)	0.000 (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.003 (0.003)	0.006** (0.003)	0.004** (0.002)	-0.002 (0.006)
ExpShock (4 to 12)	0.026 (0.029)	-0.028 (0.026)	0.012 (0.027)	0.094 (0.066) (0.065)	0.026 (0.067)	0.015 (0.080)	0.125 (0.056)	0.091 (0.012)	-0.002
ExpShock (13 to 17)	-0.006 (0.014)	0.008 (0.014)	-0.002 (0.009)	0.018 (0.030) (0.042)	0.018 (0.040)	0.025 (0.053)	0.051 (0.032)	-0.030 (0.233)	0.155
ExpShock (18 to 25)	0.003 (0.013)	0.017 (0.018)	-0.020 (0.015)	-0.025 (0.045) (0.055)	-0.030 (0.050)	-0.025 (0.043)	0.045 (0.043)	-0.019 (0.198)	-0.162
Observations	181,685	181,685	181,685	191,917	188,766	190,376	177,519	187,646	153,578
R-squared	0.076	0.063	0.043	0.083	0.107	0.100	0.105	0.126	0.065
FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Macro shock	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Notes: The table reports results from regressions against exposure to non-democratic regimes between ages 4 to 12, 13 to 17 and 18 to 25, run on a sample of individuals aged 26 or older. Standard errors clustered at country level and estimated with wild bootstrap, in parenthesis. Fixed effects include cohort, country, year-of-survey and country×year-of-survey. Controls include age, gender, religion, marital status, workforce status, educational level, socioeconomic status, ten indicators of access to goods and services, average Polity Score during years of exposure (*ExpIntens*), and exposure to severe negative macroeconomic shocks (*ExpShock*). Significance: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Table A6: All outcome variables - Differential effects by macro shocks

	Preference for Democracy (1)	Preference for Authoritarian Regimes (2)	Indifference between Regimes (3)	Confidence in Political Parties (4)	Confidence in Congress (5)	Confidence in Judiciary (6)	Confidence in Armed Forces (7)	Satisfaction with Democracy (8)	Right-wing Orientation (9)
ExpDict	-0.023** (0.009)	0.013 (0.008)	0.010 (0.009)	-0.029 (0.025)	-0.046 (0.028)	-0.082*** (0.030)	-0.064** (0.029)	-0.049* (0.028)	-0.116 (0.139)
ExpIntens	-0.002* (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.019)
ExpShock	-0.001 (0.050)	0.033 (0.43)	-0.033 (0.034)	0.125 (0.121)	0.146 (0.185)	0.071 (0.157)	0.312** (0.150)	0.073 (0.131)	0.427 (0.528)
ExpDict × ExpShock	0.010 (0.095)	-0.057 (0.053)	0.047 (0.067)	-0.170 (0.175)	-0.423** (0.215)	-0.154 (0.187)	-0.325 (0.259)	-0.093 (0.130)	-1.621** (0.765)
Observations	181,685	181,685	181,685	191,917	188,766	190,376	177,519	187,646	153,578
R-squared	0.076	0.063	0.043	0.083	0.107	0.100	0.105	0.126	0.065
FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Macro shock	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Notes: The table reports results from regressions against exposure to non-democratic regimes between ages 4 to 25, run on a sample of individuals aged 26 or older. Standard errors clustered at country level and estimated with wild bootstrap, in parenthesis. Fixed effects include cohort, country, year-of-survey and country×year-of-survey. Controls include age, gender, religion, marital status, workforce status, educational level, socioeconomic status, ten indicators of access to goods and services, average Polity Score during years of exposure (*ExpIntens*), and exposure to severe negative macroeconomic shocks (*ExpShock*). Significance: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Table A7: All outcome variables - Differential effects by regime intensity

	Preference for Democracy (1)	Preference for Authoritarian Regimes (2)	Indifference between Regimes (3)	Confidence in Political Parties (4)	Confidence in Congress (5)	Confidence in Judiciary (6)	Confidence in Armed Forces (7)	Satisfaction with Democracy (8)	Right-wing Orientation (9)
ExpDict	-0.035 (0.023)	0.019* (0.012)	0.016 (0.015)	-0.070* (0.042)	-0.085 (0.070)	-0.057 (0.049)	-0.080* (0.044)	-0.019 (0.041)	-0.306 (0.221)
ExpIntens	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.002 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.021)
ExpShock	-0.010 (0.040)	0.006 (0.041)	-0.017 (0.029)	0.079 (0.131)	-0.004 (0.144)	-0.004 (0.138)	0.186 (0.149)	0.020 (0.115)	-0.122 (0.466)
ExpDict × ExpIntens	-0.003 (0.004)	0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.009)	0.008 (0.007)	0.001 (0.007)	0.008 (0.007)	-0.018 (0.026)
Observations	181,685	181,685	181,685	191,917	188,766	190,376	177,519	187,646	153,578
R-squared	0.076	0.063	0.043	0.083	0.107	0.100	0.105	0.126	0.065
FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Macro shock	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Notes: The table reports results from regressions against exposure to non-democratic regimes between ages 4 to 25, run on a sample of individuals aged 26 or older. Standard errors clustered at country level and estimated with wild bootstrap, in parenthesis. Fixed effects include cohort, country, year-of-survey and country×year-of-survey. Controls include age, gender, religion, marital status, workforce status, educational level, socioeconomic status, ten indicators of access to goods and services, average Polity Score during years of exposure (*ExpIntens*), and exposure to severe negative macroeconomic shocks (*ExpShock*). Significance: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Table A8: Results for individual values of Right-wing Orientation

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	missing
ExpDict	0.007*	0.006**	0.008***	0.000	0.000	0.004	-0.001	-0.007	-0.015**	-0.004	-0.010	0.013
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.011)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.012)	(0.012)
ExpIntens	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
ExpShock	0.009	-0.004	0.008	0.022	0.006	0.039	-0.003	0.003	-0.036	-0.006	0.022	-0.061
	(0.018)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.051)	(0.018)	(0.013)	(0.022)	(0.009)	(0.037)	(0.042)
Observations	264,154	264,154	264,154	264,154	264,154	264,154	264,154	264,154	264,154	264,154	264,154	264,154
R-squared	0.026	0.014	0.010	0.014	0.013	0.034	0.011	0.012	0.011	0.011	0.060	0.082
FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Macro shock	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Notes: The table reports results from regressions against exposure to non-democratic regimes between ages 4 to 25, run on a sample of individuals aged 26 or older. Standard errors clustered at country level and estimated with wild bootstrap, in parenthesis. Fixed effects include cohort, country, year-of-survey, and country×year-of-survey. Controls include age, gender, religion, marital status, workforce status, educational level, socioeconomic status, ten indicators of access to goods and services, average Polity Score during years of exposure (*ExpIntens*), and exposure to severe negative macroeconomic shocks (*ExpShock*). Significance: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Table A9: Results for all outcome variables - with age×cohort fixed effects

	Preference for Democracy (1)	Preference for Authoritarian Regimes (2)	Indifference between Regimes (3)	Confidence in Political Parties (4)	Confidence in Congress (5)	Confidence in Judiciary (6)	Confidence in Armed Forces (7)	Satisfaction with Democracy (8)	Right-wing Orientation (9)
ExpDict	-0.024** (0.010)	0.009 (0.006)	0.014* (0.008)	-0.041 (0.029)	-0.074** (0.037)	-0.092*** (0.035)	-0.084** (0.036)	-0.057* (0.029)	-0.224 (0.153)
ExpIntens	-0.002* (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.022)
ExpShock	0.007 (0.039)	0.010 (0.041)	-0.017 (0.024)	0.075 (0.132) (0.151)	-0.013 (0.140)	0.020 (0.151)	0.183 (0.115)	0.043 (0.456)	-0.154
Observations	181,685	181,685	181,685	191,917	188,766	190,376	177,519	187,646	153,578
R-squared	0.080	0.066	0.047	0.087	0.111	0.104	0.109	0.129	0.070
FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Macro shock	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Notes: The table reports results from regressions against exposure to non-democratic regimes between ages 4 to 25, run on a sample of individuals aged 26 or older. Standard errors clustered at country level and estimated with wild bootstrap, in parenthesis. Fixed effects include cohort, country, year-of-survey, country×year-of-survey and age×cohort. Controls include age, gender, religion, marital status, workforce status, educational level, socioeconomic status, ten indicators of access to goods and services, average Polity Score during years of exposure (*ExpIntens*), and exposure to severe negative macroeconomic shocks (*ExpShock*). Significance: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.



Table A10: Results for all outcome variables - with Vanhanen (2000) definition of political regimes

	Preference for Democracy (1)	Preference for Authoritarian Regimes (2)	Indifference between Regimes (3)	Confidence in Political Parties (4)	Confidence in Congress (5)	Confidence in Judiciary (6)	Confidence in Armed Forces (7)	Satisfaction with Democracy (8)	Right-wing Orientation (9)
ExpDict	-0.009 (0.011)	-0.002 (0.008)	0.011 (0.008)	-0.048 (0.044)	-0.054 (0.045)	-0.065 (0.054)	-0.061 (0.043)	-0.051 (0.039)	-0.300** (0.155)
ExpIntens	0.003 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.005)	0.001 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.010)	-0.009 (0.010)	-0.011 (0.009)	-0.010 (0.011)	-0.012* (0.007)	-0.102** (0.044)
ExpShock	-0.009 (0.007)	0.000 (0.004)	0.009** (0.004)	-0.023 (0.015) (0.018)	-0.031* (0.018)	-0.034* (0.019)	-0.040** (0.019)	-0.035* (0.078)	-0.059
Observations	181,685	181,685	181,685	191,917	188,766	190,376	177,519	187,646	153,578
R-squared	0.076	0.063	0.043	0.083	0.107	0.100	0.105	0.126	0.065
FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Macro shock	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Notes: The table reports results from regressions of various outcomes against exposure to non-democratic regimes between ages 4 to 25, with the measure of exposed individuals constructed on the basis of Vanhanen's indicator (Vanhanen, 2000). Regressions are run on a sample of individuals aged 26 or older. Standard errors clustered at country level and estimated with wild bootstrap, in parenthesis. Fixed effects include cohort, country, year-of-survey, and country×year-of-survey. Controls include age, gender, religion, marital status, workforce status, educational level, socioeconomic status, ten indicators of access to goods and services, average Polity Score during years of exposure (*ExpIntens*), and exposure to severe negative macroeconomic shocks (*ExpShock*). Significance: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Table A11: Results for all outcome variables - Differential effects by political orientation of regimes

	Preference for Democracy (1)	Preference Authoritarian Regimes (2)	Indifference between Regimes (3)	Confidence in Political Parties (4)	Confidence in Congress (5)	Confidence in Judiciary (6)	Confidence in Armed Forces (7)	Satisfaction with Democracy (8)	Right-wing Orientation (9)
PANEL A: Interaction with exposure to non-ambiguous Left-wing dictatorships									
ExpDict	-0.024** (0.009)	0.006 (0.007)	0.018** (0.007)	-0.036 (0.032)	-0.069* (0.041)	-0.092** (0.037)	-0.089** (0.037)	-0.059* (0.032)	-0.194 (0.162)
ExpIntens	-0.002* (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.020)
ExpShock	0.018 (0.034)	0.004 (0.04)	-0.022 (0.022)	0.074 (0.122)	-0.002 (0.149)	0.015 (0.130)	0.195 (0.151)	0.045 (0.116)	-0.186 (0.470)
Dummy Left	-0.027* (0.015)	0.007 (0.010)	0.020 (0.014)	-0.010 (0.026)	-0.002 (0.019)	0.001 (0.017)	-0.014 (0.017)	-0.018 (0.043)	0.079 (0.135)
ExpDict×Dummy	0.022 (0.018)	0.007 (0.017)	-0.029* (0.016)	-0.012 (0.041)	-0.018 (0.032)	-0.005 (0.027)	0.021 (0.051)	0.025 (0.050)	-0.161 (0.266)
Observations	181,685	181,685	181,685	191,917	188,766	190,376	177,519	187,646	153,578
R-squared	0.076	0.063	0.043	0.083	0.107	0.100	0.105	0.126	0.065
PANEL B: Interaction with exposure to non-ambiguous and ambiguous Left-wing dictatorships									
ExpDict	-0.020** (0.010)	0.005 (0.007)	0.015 (0.011)	-0.037 (0.041)	-0.071 (0.057)	-0.096** (0.045)	-0.088** (0.044)	-0.068* (0.038)	-0.199 (0.226)
ExpIntens	-0.002* (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.024)
ExpShock	0.004 (0.031)	0.012 (0.037)	-0.016 (0.023)	0.063 (0.127)	-0.010 (0.148)	0.016 (0.130)	0.191 (0.151)	0.046 (0.112)	-0.173 (0.457)
Dummy Left	-0.013 (0.009)	0.011 (0.007)	0.002 (0.009)	-0.008 (0.019)	-0.003 (0.021)	-0.005 (0.018)	-0.004 (0.019)	-0.024 (0.024)	-0.044 (0.115)
ExpDict×Dummy	0.007 (0.012)	-0.003 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.014)	0.002 (0.031)	-0.003 (0.043)	0.008 (0.031)	0.008 (0.048)	0.037 (0.029)	0.001 (0.198)
Observations	181,685	181,685	181,685	191,917	188,766	190,376	177,519	187,646	153,578
R-squared	0.076	0.063	0.043	0.083	0.107	0.100	0.105	0.126	0.065
FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Macro shock	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Notes: The table reports results from regressions against exposure to non-democratic regimes between ages 4 to 25, run on a sample of individuals aged 26 or older. Standard errors clustered at country level and estimated with wild bootstrap, in parenthesis. Fixed effects include cohort, country, year-of-survey, and country×year-of-survey. Controls include age, gender, religion, marital status, workforce status, educational level, socioeconomic status, ten indicators of access to goods and services, average Polity Score during years of exposure (*ExpIntens*), and exposure to severe negative macroeconomic shocks (*ExpShock*). Significance: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Table A12: Results for all outcome variables - Differential effects by inequality levels

	Preference for Democracy (1)	Preference for Authoritarian Regimes (2)	Indifference between Regimes (3)	Confidence in Political Parties (4)	Confidence in Congress (5)	Confidence in Judiciary (6)	Confidence in Armed Forces (7)	Satisfaction with Democracy (8)	Right-wing Orientation (9)
ExpDict	-0.011 (0.022)	0.014 (0.026)	-0.003 (0.012)	-0.045 (0.073)	-0.099 (0.060)	-0.128 (0.094)	-0.115 (0.123)	-0.091 (0.333)	-0.021 (0.224)
ExpIntens	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.003 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.031)	0.000 (0.004)	0.000 (0.014)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.065)
ExpShock	-0.066 (0.052)	0.093* (0.048)	-0.027 (0.043)	-0.124 (0.101) (0.177)	-0.090 (0.133)	-0.052 (0.174)	0.068 (0.107)	-0.073 (0.502)	-0.534
Dummy High Gini	0.002 (0.011)	0.011* (0.006)	-0.013 (0.009)	0.000 (0.019)	0.004 (0.034)	-0.003 (0.023)	-0.022 (0.022)	-0.018 (0.026)	0.095 (0.091)
ExpDict×Dummy	-0.008 (0.017)	-0.017 (0.011)	0.025 (0.017)	0.004 (0.032)	0.003 (0.047)	0.018 (0.052)	0.045 (0.050)	0.039 (0.048)	-0.150 (0.147)
Observations	116,152	116,152	116,152	122,400	120,375	121,544	118,213	119,821	99,366
R-squared	0.078	0.070	0.033	0.085	0.106	0.098	0.104	0.118	0.059
FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Macro shock	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Notes: The table reports results from regressions against exposure to non-democratic regimes between ages 4 to 25, run on a sample of individuals aged 26 or older. Standard errors clustered at country level and estimated with wild bootstrap, in parenthesis. Fixed effects include cohort, country, year-of-survey, and country×year-of-survey. Controls include age, gender, religion, marital status, workforce status, educational level, socioeconomic status, ten indicators of access to goods and services, average Polity Score during years of exposure (*ExpIntens*), and exposure to severe negative macroeconomic shocks (*ExpShock*). Significance: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Table A13: Results for all outcome variables - Restricted sample

	Preference for Democracy (1)	Preference for Authoritarian Regimes (2)	Indifference between Regimes (3)	Confidence in Political Parties (4)	Confidence in Congress (5)	Confidence in Judiciary (6)	Confidence in Armed Forces (7)	Satisfaction with Democracy (8)	Right-wing Orientation (9)
ExpDict	-0.009 (0.009)	0.010 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.006)	-0.028 (0.031)	-0.068* (0.041)	-0.094** (0.044)	-0.078** (0.039)	-0.038 (0.032)	-0.134 (0.148)
ExpIntens	-0.004** (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.003* (0.001)	-0.005** (0.003)	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.019 (0.015)
ExpShock	-0.023 (0.046)	0.000 (0.033)	0.023 (0.032)	0.070 (0.202) (0.167)	-0.025 (0.170)	0.015 (0.183)	0.132 (0.134)	-0.019 (0.344)	-0.575*
Observations	147,319	147,319	147,319	156,183	153,696	155,006	150,481	152,600	124,607
R-squared	0.068	0.059	0.042	0.083	0.105	0.093	0.107	0.111	0.066
FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Macro shock	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Notes: The table reports results from regressions against exposure to non-democratic regimes between ages 4 to 25, run on a sample of individuals aged 26 or older with nonzero exposure. Standard errors clustered at country level and estimated with wild bootstrap, in parenthesis. Fixed effects include cohort, country, year-of-survey, and country×year-of-survey. Controls include age, gender, religion, marital status, workforce status, educational level, socioeconomic status, ten indicators of access to goods and services, average Polity Score during years of exposure (*ExpIntens*), and exposure to severe negative macroeconomic shocks (*ExpShock*). Significance: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

## Figures




Figure A1: Dictatorship spells by country

Notes: The figure plots for each country the duration of each spell of non democratic regime, as defined by with the Polity Score Index. See Table A1 below for a detail on the ruling dictator in each period for each country and year.




Figure A2: Outcome variables and exposure to non democratic regimes

Notes: Each panel plots the average value of an outcome variable for all individuals with a given value of exposure to dictatorships between ages 4 to 25.