Matheus Venturyne Xavier Ferreira

PERSONAL DATA	November 20, 2024	
ADDRESS: Rice Hall #102, 85 Engineer's Way, Charl	<u></u>	
<pre>EMAIL: matheus@virginia.edu WEBPAGE: https://sites.google.com/view/matheusvxf/</pre>		
RESEARCH INTERESTS		
Artificial Intelligence, Optimization, Algorithmic Econo	omics. Security	
EDUCATION Princeton University	Duin coton NII LICA	
Princeton University Doctor of Philosophy in COMPUTER SCIENCE	Princeton, NJ, USA 2022	
Master of Arts in COMPUTER SCIENCE	2018	
Universidade Federal de Itajubá	Itabira, MG, Brazil	
B.S. with Honors in COMPUTER ENGINEERING	2016	
University of California, San Diego	San Diego, CA, USA	
Exchange student fully funded by a BSMP Fellowship	2014	
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE		
University of Virginia Assistant Professor of COMPUTER SCIENCE	Charlottesville, VA, USA July 2024 - Present	
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Harvard University Lecturer in COMPUTER SCIENCE	Boston, MA, USA Sept 2023 - December 2023	
Postdoctoral Fellow in COMPUTER SCIENCE	Sept 2021 - July 2024	
Fellow in COMPUTER SCIENCE	Summer 2020	
Princeton University	Princeton, NJ, USA	
Ph.D. candidate in COMPUTER SCIENCE (advised by <i>S.</i> Thesis: <i>Economics and Computation in Decentralized System</i>		
Broadcom Corporation	San Diego, CA, USA	
SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT ENGINEER INTERN IN BLUE	0	
SELECTED HONORS AND AWARDS		
 Postdoctoral Fellowship, Simons Laufer Mathematical Sciences Institute (SLMath) (declined due to work visa restrictions) 		
Highlights Beyond EC, 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation		
Future Faculty Career Exploration Program, Rochester Institute of Technology		
Spotlight Beyond WINE, The 17th Conference on Web and Internet Economics		
SEAS Award for Excellence, Princeton School of Engineering and Applied Sciences		
LATinE Fellow, Purdue University College of Engineering		
CRA-WP Grad Cohort for URMD, Computing Research Association		
Winning Presentation, Princeton Research Day, Princeton University		
Dean's Grant, Princeton University Graduate Sch	·	
Dear o Grand, Trinceton Graversity Graduate Sen	2010 2021	

• First Year	Fellowship in Engineering, Princeton University	2016
Congratulations from Higher Counsel, Universidade Federal de Itajubá		2016
• Motion of	Applause, Municipal Chamber of Itabira	2016
• CNS Espre	esso Prize for Excellence in Networking, University of California, San Di	ego 2014
• Brazil Scie	entific Mobility Program, Federal Government of Brazil	2014
• 1 st place is	n 2nd Line Follower Robot Competition, Unifei [Video]	2013
PUBLICATION	NS (AUTHORS IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER)	Google Scholar
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TEACHING		
University of V Fall 2024	Tirginia Economics of Distributed Systems (CS 6501)	
	rsity - Co-Instructor	
Fall 2023	Economics and Computation (CS 136)	
Princeton Univ	ersity - Teaching Assistant Junior Independent Work (COS 398)	
Spring 2018	Economics and Computation (COS 445)	
Fall 2017	Computation Geometry (COS 451) ederal de Itajuba - Teaching Assistant	
2015	Computer Security	
2013	Objected-Oriented Programming (ECO 30)	

2025

Program Committee. Financial Cryptography (FC)

External Reviewer. Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science (ITCS)

2024

Panel. NSF Small Business Innovation Research/Small Business Technology Transfer

Co-Organizer. EC'24 Tutorial on Transaction Fee Mechanism Design **Program Committee.** ACM Economics and Computation (EC) **Program Committee.** Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT)

Program Committee. The 4th Workshop on Decentralized Finance (DeFi)

Reviewer. Finance and Stochastics

Reviewer. Games and Economics Behavior

External Reviewer. Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science (ITCS)

External Reviewer. Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC)

External Reviewer. ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA)

External Reviewer. ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (PODC)

2023

Poster Co-Chair. ACM EAAMO Program Committee. Tokenomics Program Committee. WINE

Program Committee. ACM Advances in Financial Technologies

Program Committee. MARBLE

Program Committee. ACM Economics and Computation (EC)

Program Committee. The Web Conference: Economics, Monetization, and Online Markets

Reviewer. Operations Research

Reviewer. Distributed Ledger Technologies **Reviewer.** International Economic Review

Reviewer. Transactions on Economics and Computation

Reviewer. ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA)

Reviewer. Journal of Cryptoeconomic Systems

2022

Program Committee. Tokenomics

Program Committee. ACM Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT)

Program Committee. MARBLE

Reviewer. Transactions on Economics and Computation

External Reviewer. Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC)

External Reviewer. ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA) **External Reviewer.** Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science (ITCS)

2021

Reviewer. Journal of Cryptoeconomic Systems

External Reviewer. ACM Economics and Computation (EC)

External Reviewer. USENIX Security

2020

Program Committee. Global Challenges in Economics and Computation

Reviewer. Journal of Cryptoeconomic Systems **Reviewer.** Games and Economic Behavior

External Reviewer. ACM Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT) **External Reviewer.** Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science (ITCS)

External Reviewer. Web and Internet Economics (WINE)

2019

External Reviewer. Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science (ITCS)

External Reviewer. Web and Internet Economics (WINE)

2018

External Reviewer. Web and Internet Economics (WINE)

RESEARCH ADVISING

- Lars Lien Ankile. *Harvard University*. Now at MIT Summer '23 May '24 Title: *I See You! Robust Measurement of Adversarial Behavior*
- Hannah Huh. Princeton University. Now at Citadel
 Title: Computing Optimal Strategies for Cryptographic Self-Selection Games
- Anthony Hein. Princeton University. Now at Five Rings
 Fall '21 May '22
 Title: Searching for Optimal Strategies in Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Access to External Randomness

Outstanding Computer Science Senior Thesis Prize

- Michelle Woo. *Princeton University*. Now at Radix Trading LLC Fall '20 May '21 Title: *Computing optimal selfish mining strategies for Proof-of-Stake blockchains via MDPs*
- Catherine Yu. Princeton University. Now at Stripe
 Summer '20 May '22
 Title: Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake
 Published at ACM EC 2022
- Tinashe Handina. *Princeton University*. Now Ph.D. student at Caltech Summer '20 May '21 Title: *A Random walk in Extensive Form Games: An Investigation into information, strategy-proofness and Credibility*

DIVERSITY, INCLUSION & OUTREACH

• Member, Computer Science Ad Hoc Committee, Princeton University 2021 Panelist, CS Advisory Council: Grad student panel, Princeton Computer Science August 2021 • Panelist, Pathways to Graduate School, Princeton School of Engineering August 2021 Panelist, Pathways to Graduate School, Princeton School of Engineering August 2020 • Panelist, Princeton Prospective PhD Preview (P3), Princeton Graduate School October 2020 • Mentor, Algorithmic Game Theory Mentoring Workshop (AMW), SIGecom 2020, 2021, 2022 • Peer Mentor, Graduate Scholars Program (GSP), Princeton University 2019, 2020, 2021 • Graduate student faculty hiring committee, Princeton Computer Science 2019 • LGBTQIA Peer Educator, Whitman College, Princeton University 2019, 2020 • Mentor, Princeton Summer Programming Experience, Princeton University 2017 • Mentor, Princeton Women in Computer Science, Princeton University 2016, 2017

TALKS AND EVENTS

- 1. Double auctions for cross-blockchain resource allocation EC '24 Workshop on Blockchains and Decentralized Finance. Yale School of Management New Haven, CT. July 8, 2024
- 2. Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules Econ-DeFi Seminar. UC Santa Barbara. Santa Barbara, CA. June 28, 2024
- 3. Dynamic Transaction Fee Mechanism Design EC '24 Transaction Fee Mechanism Design Tutorial June 25, 2024
- 4. I See You! Robust Measurement of Adversarial Behavior Marketplace Innovation Workshop (MIW) May 20, 2024
- I See You! Robust Measurement of Adversarial Behavior TLDR Conference. Columbia Business School New York City. May 17, 2024

- I See You! Robust Measurement of Adversarial Behavior NSF/CEME Decentralization Conference. Vanderbilt University Nashville, TN. April 19, 2024
- I See You! Robust Measurement of Adversarial Behavior Blockchain Lab. Stern School of Business. New York University New York City, NY. April 12, 2024.
- 8. I Wasn't There: Applications of Blockchain to Privacy Preserving Reality Protection. **Facilitator** Princeton Center for the Decentralization of Power Through Blockchain Technology (Decenter) Princeton, NJ. December 04, 2023
- 9. Algorithm Design under the Credibility Lenses. **Quest Lecture** Boston University Center for Computing and Data Sciences Boston, MA. November 30, 2023
- Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules Thalesians Seminar. International Association for Quantitative Finance New York City, NY. October 03, 2023
- 11. Future of Decentralization, AI & Computing Summit. **Panelist**. UC Berkeley Berkeley, CA, August 27, 2023

[Video]

12. Algorithm Design under the Credibility Lenses. Blockchain + Economics workshop August 15, 2023 [Video]

13. Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules CryptoEconDay, CryptoEconLab Paris, France, July 9, 2023

[Video]

- 14. Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules. **Highlights Beyond EC** London, UK. June 23, 2023
- 15. Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules. STOC 2023 Orlando, FL, June 20-23, 2023

[Video]

- Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules MIT Media Lab, Digital Currency Initiative Cambridge, MA. June 14, 2023
- 17. Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules Quantitative Issues in Centralised and Decentralised Finance (SIAM Financial Mathematics) Philadelphia, PA, June 9, 2023
- Eighth Marketplace Innovation Workshop May 22, 2023
 Credible, Optimal Auctions via Blockchains
- 19. De Gruyter Digital Event

[Video]

May 18, 2023

Bitcoin: A game-theoretic analysis

20. Research Day at the Metrograph

[Video]

New York City, NY, May 16, 2023

Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules

 Crypto and Blockchain Economics Research Forum (CBER) Symposium April 20, 2023
 Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules [Video]

22. MIT, Algorithms and Complexity Seminar

Cambridge, MA, April 19, 2023

Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules

23. Princeton University, Decenter Seminar

Princeton, NJ, April 10-13, 2023

Transparency and Security via Algorithmic Economics

24. University of Virginia, Department of Computer Science Charlottesville, VA, March 20-22, 2023 Transparency and Security via Algorithmic Economics 25. Tufts University, Department of Computer Science Medford, MA, February 28 and March 1, 2023 Transparency and Security via Algorithmic Economics 26. The University of Sydney, School of Computer Science Sydney, Australia, February 20, 2023 Transparency and Security via Algorithmic Economics 27. Carnegie Mellon University, Crypto Seminar [Video] Pittsburgh PA, February 16, 2023 Transparency and Security via Algorithmic Economics 28. 4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics Security and Protocols (Tokenomics) Sorbonne Université, France, December 12-13, 2022 Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules 29. Harvard University, EconCS Seminar Boston, MA, November 4, 2022 Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules 30. SIGecom Seminar Series Fall 2022 November 4, 2022 Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake 31. UC Berkeley, Crypto Economics Security Conference Berkeley, CA, October 31-November 1, 2022 Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules 32. INFORMS Annual Meeting Indianapolis, IN, October 16-19, 2022 Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake 33. Rochester Institute of Technology (Future Faculty Career Exploration Program) Rochester, NY, September 21-24, 2022 Economics and Computation in Distributed Systems 34. 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation [Video] University of Colorado, Boulder, CO, July 11-15, 2022 Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake 35. Ripple Labs, Crypto Monthly June 21, 2022 Economics and Computation in Distributed Systems 36. Harvard University, Theory of Computation Seminar Boston, February 11, 2022 Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness 37. The 17th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (Spotlights Beyond WINE) [Video] December 15, 2021 Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness 38. 3rd ACM Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies [Video] September 26-28, 2021 Dynamic Posted-Price Mechanisms for the Blockchain Transaction-fee market 39. 16th Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation July 23, 2021 Dynamic Posted-Price Mechanisms for the Blockchain Transaction-fee market [Video] 40. 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation July 22, 2021 Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness

41. Princeton University, Research Day [Video] Princeton, May 2021 Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness 42. Princeton University, Theory of Computation Day Princeton, April 2021 Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness 43. Microsoft Research, Algorithms Group Redmond, WA, March 10, 2021 Economics and Computation in Distributed Systems 44. INFORMS Annual Meeting November 2020 Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments 45. 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation [Video] July 2020 Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments 46. Princeton University, Research Day (Winning Presentation) [Video] Princeton, NJ, May 5, 2020 Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments 47. Princeton University, Theory of Computation Day Princeton, NJ, June 2019 Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments 48. Princeton University, Mechanism Design Seminar Princeton, NJ, June 2017 Selling a Single Item with Negative Externalities: To Regulate Production or Payments?