Matheus Venturyne Xavier Ferreira

PERSONAL	Дата	AUGUST 21, 2023
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WEBPAGE:	http://matheusvxf.github.io/	
RESEARCH	Interests	
Artificial Inte	ligence, Optimization, Algorithmic Economics, Security	
EDUCATION	N	
Princeton Un		Princeton, NJ, USA
	losophy in COMPUTER SCIENCE s in COMPUTER SCIENCE	202 201
Thesis: Economics and Computation in Decentralized Systems		
Advisor: S. M	atthew Weinberg	
Universidade	Federal de Itajubá	Itabira, MG, Braz
B.S. with Hon	ors in Computer Engineering	201
	California, San Diego	San Diego, CA, USA
Exchange stu	dent fully funded by a BSMP Fellowship	201
WORK EXP	ERIENCE	
Harvard Univ		Boston, MA, USA
	Fellow in COMPUTER SCIENCE MPUTER SCIENCE	2022 - Presen Summer 202
I Imirromeiter of	Viscinia	Charlottocyillo VA IIC
University of Assistant Prof	ressor of COMPUTER SCIENCE	Charlottesville, VA, USA Starting July 202
	<u>.</u>	
Broadcom Co SOFTWARE D	rporation EVELOPMENT ENGINEER INTERN IN BLUETOOTH/NFC	San Diego, CA, USA Summer 201
SELECTED 1	Honors and Awards	
	toral Fellowship Simons Laufer Mathematical Sciences Institute I due to visa constraints)	202
• Highlig	hts Beyond EC, 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Comp	outation 202
• Future I	Faculty Career Exploration Program, Rochester Institute of Tech	nology 202
 Spotlight 	at Beyond WINE, The 17th Conference on Web and Internet Eco	nomics 202
• SEAS A	ward for Excellence, Princeton School of Engineering and Appl	ied Sciences 202
• LATinE	Fellow, Purdue University College of Engineering	202
• CRA-W	P Grad Cohort for URMD, Computing Research Association	202
 Winning 	g Presentation, Princeton Research Day, Princeton University	202
• Dean's (Grant, Princeton University Graduate School	2016 - 202
	ar Fellowship in Engineering, Princeton University	201
	rulations from Higher Counsel, Universidade Federal de Itajubá	
22-01		_01

•	Motion of Applause, Municipal Chamber of Itabira	2016
•	CNS Espresso Prize for Excellence in Networking, University of California, San Diego	2014
•	Brazil Scientific Mobility Program, Federal Government of Brazil	2014
•	1^{st} place in 2nd Line Follower Robot Competition, Unifei [Video]	2013

PUBLICATIONS (AUTHORS IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER)

- Matheus V. X. Ferreira and David C. Parkes. Credible decentralized exchange design via verifiable sequencing rules. In *To appear at Proceedings of the 55th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing*, STOC '23, 2023
- Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Ye Lin Sally Hahn, S. Matthew Weinberg, and Catherine Yu. Optimal strategic mining against cryptographic self-selection in proof-of-stake. In *Proceedings of the 23rd* ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC '22, 2022
- Meryem Essaidi, Matheus V. X. Ferreira, and S. Matthew Weinberg. Credible, strategyproof, optimal, and bounded expected-round single-item auctions for all distributions. In *Proceedings of the 13th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference*, ITCS '22, 2022
- Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Daniel J. Moroz, David C. Parkes, and Mitchell Stern. Dynamic postedprice mechanisms for the blockchain transaction-fee market. In *Proceedings of the 3rd ACM Confer*ence on Advances in Financial Technologies, AFT '21, 2021
- Matheus V. X. Ferreira and S. Matthew Weinberg. Proof-of-stake mining games with perfect randomness. In *Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation*, EC '21, 2021
- Matheus V. X. Ferreira and S. Matthew Weinberg. Credible, truthful, and two-round (optimal) auctions via cryptographic commitments. In *Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics* and Computation, EC '20, 2020
- Tithi Chattopadhyay, Nick Feamster, Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Danny Yuxing Huang, and S. Matthew Weinberg. Selling a single item with negative externalities. In *The World Wide Web Conference*, WWW '19, 2019

TEACHING

Princeton University - Teaching Assistant

Spring 2020 Junior Independent Work (COS 398)
Spring 2018 Economics and Computation (COS 445)
Fall 2017 Computation Geometry (COS 451)

Universidade Federal de Itajuba - Teaching Assistant

2015 Computer Security

2013 Objected-Oriented Programming (ECO 30)

2023

Research Consult. The Latest in DeFi Research

Poster Co-Chair. ACM EAAMO Program Committee. Tokenomics Program Committee. WINE

Program Committee. ACM Advances in Financial Technologies

Program Committee. MARBLE

Program Committee. ACM Economics and Computation (EC)

Program Committee. The Web Conference: Economics, Monetization, and Online Markets

Reviewer. Operations Research

Reviewer. Distributed Ledger Technologies **Reviewer.** International Economic Review

Reviewer. Transactions on Economics and Computation

Reviewer. ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA)

Reviewer. Journal of Cryptoeconomic Systems

2022

Program Committee. Tokenomics

Program Committee. ACM Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT)

Program Committee. MARBLE

Reviewer. Transactions on Economics and Computation

External Reviewer. Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC)

External Reviewer. ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA) **External Reviewer.** Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science (ITCS)

2021

Reviewer. Journal of Cryptoeconomic Systems

External Reviewer. ACM Economics and Computation (EC)

External Reviewer. USENIX Security

2020

Program Committee. Global Challenges in Economics and Computation

Reviewer. Journal of Cryptoeconomic Systems **Reviewer.** Games and Economic Behavior

External Reviewer. ACM Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT) **External Reviewer.** Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science (ITCS)

External Reviewer. Web and Internet Economics (WINE)

2019

External Reviewer. Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science (ITCS)

External Reviewer. Web and Internet Economics (WINE)

2018

External Reviewer. Web and Internet Economics (WINE)

Undergraduate Students Mentoring

• Hannah Huh. *Princeton University*. Now at Citadel Title: *Computing Optimal Strategies for Cryptographic Self-Selection Games*

Feb-2022-May 2022

• Anthony Hein. Princeton University

Sept 2021-May 2022
Title: Searching for Optimal Strategies in Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Access to External Randomness

Outstanding Computer Science Senior Thesis Prize

• Michelle Woo. *Princeton University*. Now at Radix Trading LLC Fall 2020-May 2021 Title: *Computing optimal selfish mining strategies for Proof-of-Stake blockchains via MDPs*

Catherine Yu. Princeton University. Now at Stripe
 Title: Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake

 Published at ACM EC 2022

•	Tinashe Handina. Princeton University. Now Ph.D. student at Caltech	June 2020-May 2021
	Title: A Random walk in Extensive Form Games: An Investigation into informa	tion, strategy-proofness
	and Credibility	

Member, Computer Science Ad Hoc Committee, Princeton University	2021
• Panelist, CS Advisory Council: Grad student panel, Princeton Computer Science	August 2021
Panelist, Pathways to Graduate School, Princeton School of Engineering	August 2021
Panelist, Pathways to Graduate School, Princeton School of Engineering	August 2020
• Panelist, Princeton Prospective PhD Preview (P3), Princeton Graduate School	October 2020
Mentor, Algorithmic Game Theory Mentoring Workshop (AMW), SIGecom	2020, 2021, 2022
Peer Mentor, Graduate Scholars Program (GSP), Princeton University	2019, 2020, 2021
Graduate student faculty hiring committee, Princeton Computer Science	2019
LGBTQIA Peer Educator, Whitman College, Princeton University	2019, 2020
Mentor, Princeton Summer Programming Experience, Princeton University	2017
Mentor, Princeton Women in Computer Science, Princeton University	2016, 2017
ALKS	
1. Blockchain + Economics workshop	[Video]

TA

August 15, 2023

Algorithm Design under the Credibility Lenses

2. CryptoEconDay

[Video]

Paris, France, July 9, 2023

Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules

3. Highlights Beyond EC

June 23, 2023

Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules

4. STOC 2023 [Video]

Orlando, FL, June 20-23, 2023

Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules

5. MIT Media Lab, Digital Currency Initiative

June 14, 2023

Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules

6. Quantitative Issues in Centralised and Decentralised Finance (SIAM Financial Mathematics) Philadelphia, PA, June 9, 2023

Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules

7. Eighth Marketplace Innovation Workshop

May 22, 2023

Credible, Optimal Auctions via Blockchains

8. De Gruyter digital event

[Video]

May 18, 2023

Bitcoin: A game-theoretic analysis

9. Research Day at the Metrograph

[Video]

New York City, NY, May 16, 2023

Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules

10. Crypto and Blockchain Economics Research Forum (CBER) Symposium April 20, 2023

[Video]

Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules

11. MIT, Algorithms and Complexity Seminar

Cambridge, MA, April 19, 2023

Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules

12. Princeton University, Decenter Seminar

Princeton, NJ, April 10-13, 2023

Transparency and Security via Algorithmic Economics

13. University of Virginia, Department of Computer Science

Charlottesville, VA, March 20-22, 2023

Transparency and Security via Algorithmic Economics

14. Tufts University, Department of Computer Science

Medford, MA, February 28 and March 1, 2023

Transparency and Security via Algorithmic Economics

15. The University of Sydney, School of Computer Science

Sydney, Australia, February 20, 2023

Transparency and Security via Algorithmic Economics

16. Carnegie Mellon University, Crypto Seminar

[Video]

Pittsburgh PA, February 16, 2023

Transparency and Security via Algorithmic Economics

17. 4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics Security and Protocols (Tokenomics)

Sorbonne Université, France, December 12-13, 2022

Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules

18. Harvard University, EconCS Seminar

Boston, MA, November 4, 2022

Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules

19. SIGecom Seminar Series Fall 2022

November 4, 2022

Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake

20. UC Berkeley, Crypto Economics Security Conference

Berkeley, CA, October 31-November 1, 2022

Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules

21. INFORMS Annual Meeting

Indianapolis, IN, October 16-19, 2022

Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake

22. Rochester Institute of Technology (Future Faculty Career Exploration Program)

Rochester, NY, September 21-24, 2022

Economics and Computation in Distributed Systems

23. 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

[Video]

University of Colorado, Boulder, CO, July 11-15, 2022

Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake

24. Ripple Labs, Crypto Monthly

June 21, 2022

Economics and Computation in Distributed Systems

25. Harvard University, Theory of Computation Seminar

Boston, February 11, 2022

Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness

26. The 17th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (Spotlights Beyond WINE) [Video] December 15, 2021 Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness [Video] 27. 3rd ACM Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies September 26-28, 2021 Dynamic Posted-Price Mechanisms for the Blockchain Transaction-fee market 28. 16th Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation July 23, 2021 Dynamic Posted-Price Mechanisms for the Blockchain Transaction-fee market [Video] 29. 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation July 22, 2021 Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness 30. Princeton University, Research Day [Video] Princeton, May 2021 Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness 31. Princeton University, Theory of Computation Day Princeton, April 2021 Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness 32. Microsoft Research, Algorithms Group Redmond, WA, March 10, 2021 Economics and Computation in Distributed Systems 33. INFORMS Annual Meeting November 2020 Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments [Video] 34. 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments 35. Princeton University, Research Day (Winning Presentation) [Video] Princeton, NJ, May 5, 2020 Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments 36. Princeton University, Theory of Computation Day Princeton, NI, June 2019 Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments

Selling a Single Item with Negative Externalities: To Regulate Production or Payments?

37. Princeton University, Mechanism Design Seminar

Princeton, NJ, June 2017