Matheus Venturyne Xavier Ferreira

PERSONAL DATA OCTOBER 1, 2022 ADDRESS: 5.420 Science and Engineering Complex, 150 Western Ave, Boston, MA 02134 matheus@seas.harvard.edu EMAIL: WEBPAGE: http://matheusvxf.github.io/ RESEARCH INTERESTS Market Design, Game Theory, Cryptography, Security **EDUCATION Princeton University** Princeton, NJ, USA Doctor of Philosophy in Computer Science 2022 Master of Arts in COMPUTER SCIENCE 2018 Thesis: Economics and Computation in Decentralized Systems Advisor: S. Matthew Weinberg Universidade Federal de Itajubá Itabira, MG, Brazil B.S. with Honors in Computer Engineering 2016 University of California, San Diego San Diego, CA, USA Exchange student fully funded by a BSMP Fellowship 2014 **WORK EXPERIENCE Harvard University** Boston, MA, USA Postdoctoral Fellow in Computer Science 2021 - Present Fellow in Computer Science Summer 2020 **Broadcom Corporation** San Diego, CA, USA SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT ENGINEER INTERN IN BLUETOOTH/NFC Summer 2014 SELECTED HONORS AND AWARDS • RIT's Future Faculty Career Exploration Program 2022 • SEAS Award for Excellence, Princeton School of Engineering and Applied Sciences 2020 • LATinE Fellow, Purdue University College of Engineering 2020 • 2020 CRA-WP Grad Cohort for URMD, CRA 2020 • Dean's Grant, Princeton University Graduate School 2016 - 2021 2016 • First Year Fellowship in Engineering, Princeton University • Congratulations from Higher Counsel, Universidade Federal de Itajubá 2016 • Motion of Applause, Municipal Chamber of Itabira 2016 CNS Espresso Prize for Excellence in Networking, University of California, San Diego 2014 • 1st place in 2nd Line Follower Robot Competition, Universidade Federal de Itajubá [Video] 2013

- Matheus V. X. Ferreira and David C. Parkes. Credible decentralized exchange design via verifiable sequencing rules. In *Submission*, 2022
- Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Ye Lin Sally Hahn, S. Matthew Weinberg, and Catherine Yu. Optimal strategic mining against cryptographic self-selection in proof-of-stake. In *Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Confer*ence on Economics and Computation, EC '22, page 89–114, New York, NY, USA, 2022. Association for Computing Machinery
- Meryem Essaidi, Matheus V. X. Ferreira, and S. Matthew Weinberg. Credible, Strategyproof, Optimal, and Bounded Expected-Round Single-Item Auctions for All Distributions. In Mark Braverman, editor, 13th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2022), volume 215 of Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), pages 66:1–66:19, Dagstuhl, Germany, 2022. Schloss Dagstuhl Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik
- Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Daniel J. Moroz, David C. Parkes, and Mitchell Stern. Dynamic posted-price
 mechanisms for the blockchain transaction-fee market. In *Proceedings of the 3rd ACM Conference on*Advances in Financial Technologies, AFT '21, page 86–99, New York, NY, USA, 2021. Association for
 Computing Machinery
- Matheus V. X. Ferreira and S. Matthew Weinberg. Proof-of-stake mining games with perfect randomness. In *Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation*, EC '21, page 433–453, New York, NY, USA, 2021. Association for Computing Machinery
- Matheus V. X. Ferreira and S. Matthew Weinberg. Credible, truthful, and two-round (optimal) auctions via cryptographic commitments. In *Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation*, EC '20, page 683–712, New York, NY, USA, 2020. Association for Computing Machinery
- Tithi Chattopadhyay, Nick Feamster, Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Danny Yuxing Huang, and S. Matthew Weinberg. Selling a single item with negative externalities. In *The World Wide Web Conference*, WWW '19, page 196–206, New York, NY, USA, 2019. Association for Computing Machinery

TEACHING

Princeton University - Teaching Assistant

Spring 2020	Junior Independent Work (COS 398)	
Spring 2018	Economics and Computation (COS 445)	
Fall 2017	Computation Geometry (COS 451)	
Universidade F	ederal de Itajuba - Teaching Assistant	
2015	Computer Security	
2013	Objected-Oriented Programming (ECO 30)	
SERVICE		
Program Comm		
The Web Conference: Economics, Monetization, and Online Markets Track (WWW)		2023
	l Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics)	2022
	ernet Economics (WINE)	2022
ACM Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT)		2022
	l Conference on Mathematical Research for Blockchain Economy (MARBLE)	2022
Global Chall	enges in Economics and Computation	2020
Journal Review	rer.	
Journal of Cryptoeconomic Systems		2020, 2021
Games and 1	Economic Behavior	2020
Conference Rev	viewer.	
Symposium	on Theory of Computing (STOC)	2022
ACM-SIAM	Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA)	2022
ACM Economics and Computation (EC)		2021
USENIX Sec	urity	2021
ACM Advar	nces in Financial Technologies (AFT)	2020

Undergraduate Students Mentoring

- Hannah Huh. *Princeton University*. Now at Citadel Feb-2022-May 2022
 Title: *Computing Optimal Strategies for Cryptographic Self-Selection Games*
- Anthony Hein. Princeton University
 Sept 2021-May 2022

 Title: Searching for Optimal Strategies in Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Access to External Randomness
 Outstanding Computer Science Senior Thesis Prize
- Michelle Woo. *Princeton University*. Now at Radix Trading LLC Fall 2020-May 2021 Title: *Computing optimal selfish mining strategies for Proof-of-Stake blockchains via MDPs*
- Catherine Yu. Princeton University. Now at Stripe
 June 2020-May 2022

 Title: Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake
 Published at ACM EC 2022
- Tinashe Handina. *Princeton University*. Now Ph.D. student at Caltech June 2020-May 2021 Title: *A Random walk in Extensive Form Games: An Investigation into information, strategy-proofness and Credibility*

DIVERSITY, INCLUSION & OUTREACH

Member, Computer Science Ad Hoc Committee, Princeton University	2021
• Mentor, Algorithmic Game Theory Mentoring Workshop (AMW), SIGECOM	2020 - 2022
• Peer Mentor, Graduate Scholars Program, Princeton University	2019 - 2021
• Peer Educator, LGBTQIA Peer Ed Program, Whitman College, Princeton University	2019 - 2020
• Mentor, Princeton Summer Programming Experience, Princeton University	2017
Mentor, Princeton Women in Computer Science, Princeton University	2016 - 2017

TALKS

1. Fall 2022 SIGecom Seminar Series

November 4, 2022

Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake

2. INFORMS Annual Meeting

October 16-19, 2022, Indianapolis

Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake

3. RIT's Future Faculty Career Exploration Program

Rochester, September 21-24, 2022

Economics and Computation in Distributed Systems

4. 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

Boulder, CO, July 11-15, 2022

Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake

5. Crypto Monthly

Ripple Labs, June 21, 2022

Economics and Computation in Distributed Systems

6. Harvard Theory of Computation Seminar

Harvard University, February, 2022

Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness

7. Spotlights Beyond WINE, The 17th Conference on Web and Internet Economics December 2021

Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness

8. 3rd ACM Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies September 26-28, 2021 Dynamic Posted-Price Mechanisms for the Blockchain Transaction-fee market 9. 16th Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation July 23, 2021 Dynamic Posted-Price Mechanisms for the Blockchain Transaction-fee market 10. 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation July 2021 Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness 11. Princeton University Research Day [Video]

11. Princeton University Research Day

[Video]

Princeton University, May 2021

Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness

12. Princeton Theory of Computation Day

Princeton University, April 2021

Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness

13. Microsoft Research, Algorithms Group

Redmond, CA, March 2021

Economics and computation in Distributed Systems

14. René Carmona's Group

Princeton University, March 2021

Algorithms, game theory and blockchains

15. INFORMS Annual Meeting

November 2020

Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments

16. 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

[Video]

July 2020

Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments

17. Princeton University Research Day

[Video]

Princeton University, May 2020

Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments

18. Princeton Theory of Computation Day

Princeton University, June 2019

Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments

19. Princeton Mechanism Design Seminar

Princeton University, June 2017

Selling a Single Item with Negative Externalities: To Regulate Production or Payments?

REFERENCES

S. Matthew Weinberg

Assistant Professor of Computer Science at Princeton University smweinberg@princeton.edu

David C. Parkes

George F. Colony Professor of Computer Science at Harvard University parkes@eecs.harvard.edu

Tim Roughgarden

Professor of Computer Science at Columbia University Head of Research a16z crypto tim.roughgarden@gmail.com