# Matheus Venturyne Xavier Ferreira

PERSONAL DATA J	ANUARY 23, 2023
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WEBPAGE: http://matheusvxf.github.io/	
RESEARCH INTERESTS	
Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Economics, Cryptography, Security	
EDUCATION	
Princeton University	Princeton, NJ, USA
Doctor of Philosophy in COMPUTER SCIENCE	2022
Master of Arts in COMPUTER SCIENCE Thesis: Economics and Computation in Decentralized Systems	2018
Advisor: S. Matthew Weinberg	
Universidade Federal de Itajubá	Itabira, MG, Brazil
B.S. with Honors in COMPUTER ENGINEERING	2016
University of California, San Diego	San Diego, CA, USA
Exchange student fully funded by a BSMP Fellowship	2014
WORK EXPERIENCE	
Harvard University	Boston, MA, USA 2022 - Present
	Summer 2020
Broadcom Corporation SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT ENGINEER INTERN IN BLUETOOTH/NFC	San Diego, CA, USA Summer 2014
	Summer 2011
SELECTED HONORS AND AWARDS	
Future Faculty Career Exploration Program, Rochester Institute of Technology	
<ul> <li>Spotlight Beyond WINE, The 17th Conference on Web and Internet Econon</li> </ul>	
• SEAS Award for Excellence, Princeton School of Engineering and Applied	Sciences 2020
<ul> <li>LATinE Fellow, Purdue University College of Engineering</li> </ul>	2020
Winning Presentation, Princeton Research Day, Princeton University	2020
Dean's Grant, Princeton University Graduate School	2016 - 2021
• First Year Fellowship in Engineering, Princeton University	2016
• Congratulations from Higher Counsel, Universidade Federal de Itajubá	2016
Motion of Applause, Municipal Chamber of Itabira	2016
CNS Espresso Prize for Excellence in Networking, University of California	, San Diego 2014
• $1^{st}$ place in 2nd Line Follower Robot Competition, Unifei [ <b>Video</b> ]	2013

#### PUBLICATIONS (AUTHORS IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER)

- Matheus V. X. Ferreira and David C. Parkes. Credible decentralized exchange design via verifiable sequencing rules. Tokenomics 2022, 2022
- Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Ye Lin Sally Hahn, S. Matthew Weinberg, and Catherine Yu. Optimal strategic mining against cryptographic self-selection in proof-of-stake. In *Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation*, EC '22, 2022
- Meryem Essaidi, Matheus V. X. Ferreira, and S. Matthew Weinberg. Credible, strategyproof, optimal, and bounded expected-round single-item auctions for all distributions. In *Proceedings of the 13th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference*, ITCS '22, 2022
- Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Daniel J. Moroz, David C. Parkes, and Mitchell Stern. Dynamic postedprice mechanisms for the blockchain transaction-fee market. In *Proceedings of the 3rd ACM Confer*ence on Advances in Financial Technologies, AFT '21, 2021
- Matheus V. X. Ferreira and S. Matthew Weinberg. Proof-of-stake mining games with perfect randomness. In *Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation*, EC '21, 2021
- Matheus V. X. Ferreira and S. Matthew Weinberg. Credible, truthful, and two-round (optimal) auctions via cryptographic commitments. In *Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics* and Computation, EC '20, 2020
- Tithi Chattopadhyay, Nick Feamster, Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Danny Yuxing Huang, and S. Matthew Weinberg. Selling a single item with negative externalities. In *The World Wide Web Conference*, WWW '19, 2019

#### **TEACHING**

Web and Internet Economics (WINE)

TEMETHING				
Princeton Univ	versity - Teaching Assistant			
Spring 2020	ing 2020   Junior Independent Work (COS 398)			
Spring 2018	ring 2018 Economics and Computation (COS 445)			
Fall 2017				
Universidade l	Federal de Itajuba - Teaching Assistant			
2015	Computer Security			
2013	Objected-Oriented Programming (ECO 30)			
SERVICE				
Program Com	nittee.			
ACM Economics and Computation (EC)				
The Web Conference: Economics, Monetization, and Online Markets (WWW)				
International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics)				
Web and In	Web and Internet Economics (WINE)			

ACM Economics and Computation (EC)	2023
The Web Conference: Economics, Monetization, and Online Markets (WWW)	2023
International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics)	2022
Web and Internet Economics (WINE)	2022
ACM Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT)	2022
International Conference on Mathematical Research for Blockchain Economy (MARBLE)	2022
Global Challenges in Economics and Computation	2020
Journal Reviewer.	
Distributed Ledger Technologies	2023
International Economic Review	2023
Transactions on Economics and Computation	2022
Journal of Cryptoeconomic Systems	2020, 2021
Games and Economic Behavior	2020
Conference External Reviewer.	
Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC)	2022
ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA)	2022
ACM Economics and Computation (EC)	2021
USENIX Security	2021
ACM Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT)	2020
Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science (ITCS) 2019,	2020, 2022

2018, 2019, 2020

#### Undergraduate Students Mentoring

• Hannah Huh. *Princeton University*. Now at Citadel Title: *Computing Optimal Strategies for Cryptographic Self-Selection Games* 

Feb-2022-May 2022

2016, 2017

• Anthony Hein. Princeton University

Title: Searching for Optimal Strategies in Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Access to External Randomness

#### **Outstanding Computer Science Senior Thesis Prize**

- Michelle Woo. *Princeton University*. Now at Radix Trading LLC Fall 2020-May 2021 Title: *Computing optimal selfish mining strategies for Proof-of-Stake blockchains via MDPs*
- Catherine Yu. Princeton University. Now at Stripe
   Title: Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake

   Published at ACM EC 2022
- Tinashe Handina. *Princeton University*. Now Ph.D. student at Caltech June 2020-May 2021 Title: A Random walk in Extensive Form Games: An Investigation into information, strategy-proofness and Credibility

#### DIVERSITY, INCLUSION & OUTREACH

• Member, Computer Science Ad Hoc Committee, Princeton University 2021 • Panelist, CS Advisory Council: Grad student panel, Princeton Computer Science August 2021 • Panelist, Pathways to Graduate School, Princeton School of Engineering August 2021 • Panelist, Pathways to Graduate School, Princeton School of Engineering August 2020 Panelist, Princeton Prospective PhD Preview (P3), Princeton Graduate School October 2020 • Mentor, Algorithmic Game Theory Mentoring Workshop (AMW), SIGecom 2020, 2021, 2022 • Peer Mentor, Graduate Scholars Program (GSP), Princeton University 2019, 2020, 2021 • Graduate student faculty hiring committee, Princeton Computer Science 2019 • LGBTQIA Peer Educator, Whitman College, Princeton University 2019, 2020 • Mentor, Princeton Summer Programming Experience, Princeton University 2017

#### **TALKS**

1. Quantitative Issues in Centralised and Decentralised Finance (SIAM Financial Mathematics) Philadelphia, PA, 6-9 June, 2023

Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules

• Mentor, Princeton Women in Computer Science, Princeton University

2. Tokenomics, 2022

Sorbonne Université, France, December 12-13, 2022

Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules

3. Harvard EconCS Seminar

Harvard University, MA, November 4, 2022

Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules

4. Fall 2022 SIGecom Seminar Series

SIGecom, November 4, 2022

Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake

5. Crypto Economics Security Conference

UC Berkeley, October 31-November 1, 2022

Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules

6.	<b>INFORMS</b>	Annual	Meeting

Indianapolis, IN, October 16-19, 2022

Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake

#### 7. RIT's Future Faculty Career Exploration Program

Rochester, NY, September 21-24, 2022

**Economics and Computation in Distributed Systems** 

#### 8. 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

Boulder, CO, July 11-15, 2022

Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake

[Video]

#### 9. Crypto Monthly

Ripple Labs, June 21, 2022

**Economics and Computation in Distributed Systems** 

#### 10. Harvard Theory of Computation Seminar

Harvard University, February 11, 2022

Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness

# 11. Spotlights Beyond WINE, The 17th Conference on Web and Internet Economics December 15, 2021

Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness

## 12. 3rd ACM Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies

[Video]

[Video]

September 26-28, 2021

Dynamic Posted-Price Mechanisms for the Blockchain Transaction-fee market

# 13. 16th Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation

July 23, 2021

Dynamic Posted-Price Mechanisms for the Blockchain Transaction-fee market

# 14. 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

[Video]

July 22, 2021

Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness

#### 15. Princeton University Research Day

[Video]

Princeton University, May 2021

Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness

# 16. Princeton Theory of Computation Day

Princeton University, April 2021

Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness

#### 17. Microsoft Research, Algorithms Group

Redmond, CA, March 10, 2021

Economics and computation in Distributed Systems

#### 18. René Carmona's Group

Princeton University, March 2021

Algorithms, game theory and blockchains

# 19. INFORMS Annual Meeting

November 2020

Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments

#### 20. 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

[Video]

July 2020

Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments

#### 21. Winning Presentation, Reinterpretation Track, Princeton Research Day

[Video]

Princeton University, May 5, 2020

Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments

# 22. Princeton Theory of Computation Day

Princeton University, June 2019

Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments

# 23. Princeton Mechanism Design Seminar

Princeton University, June 2017

Selling a Single Item with Negative Externalities: To Regulate Production or Payments?

# REFERENCES

#### **Professor S. Matthew Weinberg**

Department of Computer Science Princeton University 35 Olden Street Princeton, NJ 08544 smweinberg@princeton.edu

#### **Professor David C. Parkes**

Computer Science Area Harvard University Science and Engineering Complex, 150 Western Ave Boston, MA 02134 (617) 384-8130 parkes@eecs.harvard.edu

# **Professor Tim Roughgarden**

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