Matheus Venturyne Xavier Ferreira

PERSONAL DATA APRIL 24, 2023 ADDRESS: Room 5.420, Science and Engineering Complex, 150 Western Ave, Boston, MA 02134 EMAIL: matheus@seas.harvard.edu WEBPAGE: http://matheusvxf.github.io/ RESEARCH INTERESTS Artificial Intelligence, Optimization, Algorithmic Economics, Security **EDUCATION Princeton University** Princeton, NJ, USA Doctor of Philosophy in Computer Science 2022 Master of Arts in COMPUTER SCIENCE 2018 Thesis: Economics and Computation in Decentralized Systems Advisor: S. Matthew Weinberg Universidade Federal de Itajubá Itabira, MG, Brazil B.S. with Honors in Computer Engineering 2016 University of California, San Diego San Diego, CA, USA Exchange student fully funded by a BSMP Fellowship 2014 WORK EXPERIENCE Boston, MA, USA **Harvard University** Postdoctoral Fellow in COMPUTER SCIENCE 2022 - Present Fellow in Computer Science Summer 2020 **Broadcom Corporation** San Diego, CA, USA SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT ENGINEER INTERN IN BLUETOOTH/NFC Summer 2014 SELECTED HONORS AND AWARDS • Research Member, Simons Laufer Mathematical Sciences Institute 2023 • Future Faculty Career Exploration Program, Rochester Institute of Technology 2022 • Spotlight Beyond WINE, The 17th Conference on Web and Internet Economics 2021 SEAS Award for Excellence, Princeton School of Engineering and Applied Sciences 2020 • LATinE Fellow, Purdue University College of Engineering 2020 • CRA-WP Grad Cohort for URMD, Computing Research Association 2020 • Winning Presentation, Princeton Research Day, Princeton University 2020 • Dean's Grant, Princeton University Graduate School 2016 - 2021 • First Year Fellowship in Engineering, Princeton University 2016 • Congratulations from Higher Counsel, Universidade Federal de Itajubá 2016 • Motion of Applause, Municipal Chamber of Itabira 2016 • CNS Espresso Prize for Excellence in Networking, University of California, San Diego 2014 • Brazil Scientific Mobility Program, Federal Government of Brazil 2014 • 1st place in 2nd Line Follower Robot Competition, Unifei [Video] 2013

PUBLICATIONS (AUTHORS IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER)

Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC)

ACM Economics and Computation (EC)

USENIX Security

ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA)

- Matheus V. X. Ferreira and David C. Parkes. Credible decentralized exchange design via verifiable sequencing rules. In To appear at Proceedings of the 55th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC '23, 2023
- Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Ye Lin Sally Hahn, S. Matthew Weinberg, and Catherine Yu. Optimal strategic mining against cryptographic self-selection in proof-of-stake. In *Proceedings of the 23rd* ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC '22, 2022
- Meryem Essaidi, Matheus V. X. Ferreira, and S. Matthew Weinberg. Credible, strategyproof, optimal, and bounded expected-round single-item auctions for all distributions. In *Proceedings of the 13th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference*, ITCS '22, 2022
- Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Daniel J. Moroz, David C. Parkes, and Mitchell Stern. Dynamic postedprice mechanisms for the blockchain transaction-fee market. In *Proceedings of the 3rd ACM Confer*ence on Advances in Financial Technologies, AFT '21, 2021
- Matheus V. X. Ferreira and S. Matthew Weinberg. Proof-of-stake mining games with perfect randomness. In *Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation*, EC '21, 2021
- Matheus V. X. Ferreira and S. Matthew Weinberg. Credible, truthful, and two-round (optimal) auctions via cryptographic commitments. In *Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics* and Computation, EC '20, 2020
- Tithi Chattopadhyay, Nick Feamster, Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Danny Yuxing Huang, and S. Matthew Weinberg. Selling a single item with negative externalities. In *The World Wide Web Conference*, WWW '19, 2019

TEACHING

Princeton University - Teaching Assistant				
Spring 2020	Junior Independent Work (COS 398)			
Spring 2018	Economics and Computation (COS 445)			
Fall 2017	Computation Geometry (COS 451)			
Universidade Federal de Itajuba - Teaching Assistant				
2015	Computer Security			
2013	Objected-Oriented Programming (ECO 30)			
C=======				
SERVICE				
Program Comm	nittee.			
ACM Economics and Computation (EC)				
The Web Conference: Economics, Monetization, and Online Markets (WWW)				
International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics)				
Web and Internet Economics (WINE)				
ACM Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT)				
MARBLE				
Global Challenges in Economics and Computation				
Journal Review	ver.			
Distributed Ledger Technologies				
International Economic Review		2023		
Transactions on Economics and Computation		2022, 2023		
Journal of Cryptoeconomic Systems				
Games and Economic Behavior				
Journal of Cryptoeconomic Systems				
Conference Ext	ternal Reviewer.			

2022

2022

2021

2021

ACM Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT)	2020
Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science (ITCS)	2019, 2020, 2022
Web and Internet Economics (WINE)	2018, 2019, 2020

Undergraduate Students Mentoring

- Hannah Huh. *Princeton University*. Now at Citadel Feb-2022-May 2022
 Title: *Computing Optimal Strategies for Cryptographic Self-Selection Games*
- Anthony Hein. Princeton University
 Sept 2021-May 2022

 Title: Searching for Optimal Strategies in Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Access to External Randomness

Outstanding Computer Science Senior Thesis Prize

- Michelle Woo. *Princeton University*. Now at Radix Trading LLC Fall 2020-May 2021 Title: *Computing optimal selfish mining strategies for Proof-of-Stake blockchains via MDPs*
- Catherine Yu. Princeton University. Now at Stripe
 Title: Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake

 Published at ACM EC 2022
- Tinashe Handina. *Princeton University*. Now Ph.D. student at Caltech June 2020-May 2021 Title: *A Random walk in Extensive Form Games: An Investigation into information, strategy-proofness and Credibility*

DIVERSITY, INCLUSION & OUTREACH

Member, Computer Science Ad Hoc Committee, Princeton University	2021
Member, comparer science ria rice communes, rimecton sinversity	2021
• Panelist, CS Advisory Council: Grad student panel, Princeton Computer Science	August 2021
Panelist, Pathways to Graduate School, Princeton School of Engineering	August 2021
Panelist, Pathways to Graduate School, Princeton School of Engineering	August 2020
• Panelist, Princeton Prospective PhD Preview (P3), Princeton Graduate School	October 2020
Mentor, Algorithmic Game Theory Mentoring Workshop (AMW), SIGecom	2020, 2021, 2022
Peer Mentor, Graduate Scholars Program (GSP), Princeton University	2019, 2020, 2021
Graduate student faculty hiring committee, Princeton Computer Science	2019
LGBTQIA Peer Educator, Whitman College, Princeton University	2019, 2020
Mentor, Princeton Summer Programming Experience, Princeton University	2017
Mentor, Princeton Women in Computer Science, Princeton University	2016, 2017

TALKS

- 1. Crypto and Blockchain Economics Research Forum (CBER) Symposium April 20, 2023
 - Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules
- MIT, Algorithms and Complexity Seminar Cambridge, MA, April 19, 2023 Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules
- 3. Princeton University, Decenter Seminar Princeton, NJ, April 10-13, 2023 Transparency and Security via Algorithmic Economics
- 4. University of Virginia, Department of Computer Science Charlottesville, VA, March 20-22, 2023 Transparency and Security via Algorithmic Economics

5. Tufts University, Department of Computer Science Medford, MA, February 28 and March 1, 2023 Transparency and Security via Algorithmic Economics 6. The University of Sydney, School of Computer Science Sydney, Australia, February 20, 2023 Transparency and Security via Algorithmic Economics 7. Carnegie Mellon University, Crypto Seminar [Video] Pittsburgh PA, February 16, 2023 Transparency and Security via Algorithmic Economics 8. 4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics Security and Protocols (Tokenomics) Sorbonne Université, France, December 12-13, 2022 Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules 9. Harvard University, EconCS Seminar Boston, MA, November 4, 2022 Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules 10. SIGecom Seminar Series Fall 2022 November 4, 2022 Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake 11. UC Berkeley, Crypto Economics Security Conference Berkeley, CA, October 31-November 1, 2022 Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules 12. INFORMS Annual Meeting Indianapolis, IN, October 16-19, 2022 Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake 13. Rochester Institute of Technology (Future Faculty Career Exploration Program) Rochester, NY, September 21-24, 2022 **Economics and Computation in Distributed Systems** 14. 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation [Video] University of Colorado, Boulder, CO, July 11-15, 2022 Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake 15. Ripple Labs, Crypto Monthly June 21, 2022 Economics and Computation in Distributed Systems 16. Harvard University, Theory of Computation Seminar Boston, February 11, 2022 Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness 17. The 17th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (Spotlights Beyond WINE) [Video] December 15, 2021 Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness 18. 3rd ACM Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies [Video] September 26-28, 2021 Dynamic Posted-Price Mechanisms for the Blockchain Transaction-fee market 19. 16th Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation

Dynamic Posted-Price Mechanisms for the Blockchain Transaction-fee market

[Video]

20. 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness

July 23, 2021

July 22, 2021

21. Princeton University, Research Day

Princeton, May 2021

Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness

22. Princeton University, Theory of Computation Day

Princeton, April 2021

Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness

23. Microsoft Research, Algorithms Group

Redmond, WA, March 10, 2021

Economics and computation in Distributed Systems

24. René Carmona's Group

Princeton, NJ, March 2021

Algorithms, game theory and blockchains

25. INFORMS Annual Meeting

November 2020

Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments

26. 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

[Video]

July 2020

Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments

27. Princeton University, Research Day (Winning Presentation)

[Video]

Princeton, NJ, May 5, 2020

Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments

28. Princeton University, Theory of Computation Day

Princeton, NJ, June 2019

Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments

29. Princeton University, Mechanism Design Seminar

Princeton, NJ, June 2017

Selling a Single Item with Negative Externalities: To Regulate Production or Payments?

[Video]

REFERENCES

Professor S. Matthew Weinberg

Department of Computer Science Princeton University 35 Olden Street Princeton, NJ 08544 smweinberg@princeton.edu

Professor David C. Parkes

Computer Science Area Harvard University Science and Engineering Complex, 150 Western Ave Boston, MA 02134 (617) 384-8130 parkes@eecs.harvard.edu

Professor Tim Roughgarden

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