# Matheus Venturyne Xavier Ferreira

Personal Data	OCTOBER 2, 2022
ADDRESS: 5.420 Science and Engineering Complex, 150 We EMAIL: matheus@seas.harvard.edu WEBPAGE: http://matheusvxf.github.io/	estern Ave, Boston, MA 02134
RESEARCH INTERESTS	
Market Design, Game Theory, Cryptography, Security	
EDUCATION	
Princeton University Doctor of Philosophy in COMPUTER SCIENCE Master of Arts in COMPUTER SCIENCE Thesis: Economics and Computation in Decentralized Systems Advisor: S. Matthew Weinberg	Princeton, NJ, USA 2022 2018
Universidade Federal de Itajubá B.S. with Honors in COMPUTER ENGINEERING	Itabira, MG, Brazil 2016
University of California, San Diego Exchange student fully funded by a BSMP Fellowship	San Diego, CA, USA 2014
Work Experience	
Harvard University Postdoctoral Fellow in COMPUTER SCIENCE Fellow in COMPUTER SCIENCE	Boston, MA, USA 2021 - Present Summer 2020
Broadcom Corporation SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT ENGINEER INTERN IN BLUETOOTH	San Diego, CA, USA Summer 2014
SELECTED HONORS AND AWARDS	
RIT's Future Faculty Career Exploration Program, Roche	ster Institute of Technology 2022
<ul> <li>Spotlight Beyond WINE, WINE 2021</li> </ul>	2021
<ul> <li>SEAS Award for Excellence, Princeton School of Enginee</li> </ul>	ering and Applied Sciences 2020
<ul> <li>LATinE Fellow, Purdue University College of Engineering</li> </ul>	ng 2020
<ul> <li>2020 CRA-WP Grad Cohort for URMD, CRA</li> </ul>	2020
Winning Presentation, Princeton Research Day, Princetor	u University 2020
• Dean's Grant, Princeton University Graduate School	2016 - 2021
• First Year Fellowship in Engineering, Princeton University	ity 2016
<ul> <li>Congratulations from Higher Counsel, Universidade Fed</li> </ul>	leral de Itajubá 2016
Motion of Applause, Municipal Chamber of Itabira	2016
CNS Espresso Prize for Excellence in Networking, University	ersity of California, San Diego 2014
$ullet$ 1 $^{st}$ place in 2nd Line Follower Robot Competition, Unifer	i [ <b>Video</b> ] 2013

- Matheus V. X. Ferreira and David C. Parkes. Credible decentralized exchange design via verifiable sequencing rules. In *Submission*, 2022
- Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Ye Lin Sally Hahn, S. Matthew Weinberg, and Catherine Yu. Optimal strategic mining against cryptographic self-selection in proof-of-stake. In *Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation*, EC '22, page 89–114, New York, NY, USA, 2022. Association for Computing Machinery
- Meryem Essaidi, Matheus V. X. Ferreira, and S. Matthew Weinberg. Credible, Strategyproof, Optimal, and Bounded Expected-Round Single-Item Auctions for All Distributions. In Mark Braverman, editor, 13th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2022), volume 215 of Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), pages 66:1–66:19, Dagstuhl, Germany, 2022. Schloss Dagstuhl Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik
- Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Daniel J. Moroz, David C. Parkes, and Mitchell Stern. Dynamic posted-price mechanisms for the blockchain transaction-fee market. In *Proceedings of the 3rd ACM Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies*, AFT '21, page 86–99, New York, NY, USA, 2021. Association for Computing Machinery
- Matheus V. X. Ferreira and S. Matthew Weinberg. Proof-of-stake mining games with perfect randomness. In *Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation*, EC '21, page 433–453, New York, NY, USA, 2021. Association for Computing Machinery
- Matheus V. X. Ferreira and S. Matthew Weinberg. Credible, truthful, and two-round (optimal) auctions via cryptographic commitments. In *Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation*, EC '20, page 683–712, New York, NY, USA, 2020. Association for Computing Machinery
- Tithi Chattopadhyay, Nick Feamster, Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Danny Yuxing Huang, and S. Matthew Weinberg. Selling a single item with negative externalities. In *The World Wide Web Conference*, WWW '19, page 196–206, New York, NY, USA, 2019. Association for Computing Machinery

#### **TEACHING**

Conference Reviewer.

**USENIX Security** 

Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC)

ACM Economics and Computation (EC)

ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA)

**Princeton University - Teaching Assistant** 

Spring 2020	Junior Independent Work (COS 398)		
Spring 2018	Economics and Computation (COS 445)		
Fall 2017	Computation Geometry (COS 451)		
Universidade Federal de Itajuba - Teaching Assistant			
2015	Computer Security		
2013	Objected-Oriented Programming (ECO 30)		
SERVICE			
Program Comn	nittee.		
The Web Co	onference: Economics, Monetization, and Online Markets Track (WWW)	2023	
Internationa	al Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics)	) 2022	
Web and Int	ternet Economics (WINE)	2022	
ACM Adva	nces in Financial Technologies (AFT)	2022	
Internationa	al Conference on Mathematical Research for Blockchain Economy (MARBLE)	2022	
Global Chal	lenges in Economics and Computation	2020	
Journal Review	ver.		
Journal of C	ryptoeconomic Systems	2020, 2021	
Games and	Economic Behavior	2020	

2022

2022

2021

2021

ACM Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT)	2020
Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science (ITCS)	2019, 2020, 2022
Web and Internet Economics (WINE)	2018, 2019, 2020

#### Undergraduate Students Mentoring

• Hannah Huh. *Princeton University*. Now at Citadel Feb-2022-May 2022
Title: *Computing Optimal Strategies for Cryptographic Self-Selection Games* 

Anthony Hein. Princeton University
 Sept 2021-May 2022

 Title: Searching for Optimal Strategies in Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Access to External Randomness

#### **Outstanding Computer Science Senior Thesis Prize**

- Michelle Woo. *Princeton University*. Now at Radix Trading LLC Fall 2020-May 2021 Title: *Computing optimal selfish mining strategies for Proof-of-Stake blockchains via MDPs*
- Catherine Yu. Princeton University. Now at Stripe
   Title: Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake

   Published at ACM EC 2022
- Tinashe Handina. *Princeton University*. Now Ph.D. student at Caltech June 2020-May 2021 Title: *A Random walk in Extensive Form Games: An Investigation into information, strategy-proofness and Credibility*

#### DIVERSITY, INCLUSION & OUTREACH

Member, Computer Science Ad Hoc Committee, Princeton University	2021
• Mentor, Algorithmic Game Theory Mentoring Workshop (AMW), SIGECOM	2020 - 2022
• Peer Mentor, Graduate Scholars Program, Princeton University	2019 - 2021
LGBTQIA Peer Educator, Whitman College, Princeton University	2019 - 2020
Mentor, Princeton Summer Programming Experience, Princeton University	2017
Mentor, Princeton Women in Computer Science, Princeton University	2016 - 2017

#### **TALKS**

#### 1. Fall 2022 SIGecom Seminar Series

November 4, 2022

Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake

#### 2. INFORMS Annual Meeting

October 16-19, 2022, Indianapolis

Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake

#### 3. RIT's Future Faculty Career Exploration Program

Rochester, September 21-24, 2022

Economics and Computation in Distributed Systems

#### 4. 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

Boulder, CO, July 11-15, 2022

Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake

#### 5. Crypto Monthly

Ripple Labs, June 21, 2022

Economics and Computation in Distributed Systems

#### 6. Harvard Theory of Computation Seminar

Harvard University, February, 2022

Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness

## 7. Spotlights Beyond WINE, The 17th Conference on Web and Internet Economics December 2021

[Video]

Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness

#### 8. 3rd ACM Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies

[Video]

September 26-28, 2021

Dynamic Posted-Price Mechanisms for the Blockchain Transaction-fee market

### 9. 16th Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation July 23, 2021

Dynamic Posted-Price Mechanisms for the Blockchain Transaction-fee market

#### 10. 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

[Video]

July 2021

Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness

#### 11. Princeton University Research Day

[Video]

Princeton University, May 2021

Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness

### 12. Princeton Theory of Computation Day

Princeton University, April 2021

Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness

#### 13. Microsoft Research, Algorithms Group

Redmond, CA, March 2021

Economics and computation in Distributed Systems

#### 14. René Carmona's Group

Princeton University, March 2021

Algorithms, game theory and blockchains

#### 15. INFORMS Annual Meeting

November 2020

Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments

#### 16. 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

[Video]

July 2020

Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments

#### 17. Winning Presentation, Reinterpretation Track, Princeton Research Day

[Video]

Princeton University, May 2020

Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments

#### 18. Princeton Theory of Computation Day

**Princeton University, June 2019** 

Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments

#### 19. Princeton Mechanism Design Seminar

Princeton University, June 2017

Selling a Single Item with Negative Externalities: To Regulate Production or Payments?

#### REFERENCES

#### **Professor S. Matthew Weinberg**

Department of Computer Science Princeton University 35 Olden Street Princeton, NJ 08544 smweinberg@princeton.edu

#### **Professor David C. Parkes**

Computer Science Division

Harvard University Science and Engineering Complex, 150 Western Ave Boston, MA 02134 parkes@eecs.harvard.edu

**Professor Tim Roughgarden**Department of Computer Science Columbia University 500 West 120th Street, Room 450 MC0401 New York, NY 10027 (212) 853-8474 tim.roughgarden@gmail.com