# Sigstore's Cosign with GKE, Artifact Registry and KMS



#### Mathieu Benoit

GKE/Anthos DevRel Engineer - Google Cloud
CNCF Ambassador
Medium | Blog | LinkedIn






### Sigstore's cosign and policycontroller with GKE, Artifact Registry and KMS


Feb 10, 2023 by Mathieu Benoit

As soon as I came back from KubeCon NA 2022, my first ever in-person KubeCon, I felt re-energized. What a community, full of people eager to share knowledge and expertise with each others, so inspiring. I mostly attended sessions about security best practices for containers and Kubernetes (that's what excites me these days!). Secure Software Supply Chain (S3C) was almost mentioned everywhere, for good reasons.

<u>Link</u>

#### **Zero Trust** with Software Supply Chain - <a href="slsa.dev">slsa.dev</a>





E Use compromised dependency

H Use compromised package

You use an artifact from the right place, but it's not what the owner intended:

- Compromised account
- Compromised build process
- Compromised package repository

Requirement	SLSA 1	SLSA 2	SLSA 3	SLSA 4
Provenance - Available	~	~	~	~
Provenance - Authenticated		~	~	~
Provenance - Service generated		~	~	~
Provenance - Non-falsifiable			~	~
Provenance - Dependencies complete				~

#### **Sigstore**



sigstore was started to improve supply chain technology for anyone using open source projects. It's for open source maintainers, by open source maintainers.

And it's a direct response to today's challenges, a work in progress for a future where the integrity of what we build and use is up to standard.



#### Sign code

Easy authentication and smart cryptography work in the background. Just push your code.





















#### Verify signatures


A transparency log stores data like who created something and how, so you know it hasn't been changed.



#### Monitor activity

Logged data is readily auditable, for future monitors and integrations to build into your security workflow.

# Agenda




#### Sign a container image locally with Cosign



```
TERMINAL
0 0 0
 docker push ${CONTAINER_IMAGE}
 cosign generate-key-pair
 cosign sign \
     --key cosign.key \
     ${CONTAINER_IMAGE}
 cosign verify \
     --key cosign.pub \
     ${CONTAINER_IMAGE}
                  cosign
                                  Google Artifact Registry
```






#### Sign a container image via Cloud KMS with Cosign



```
TERMINAL
 0 0 0
KMS_KEY=gcpkms://projects/${PROJECT_ID}/locations/${REGION}/keyRings/${KEY_RING}/cryptoKeys/${KEY_NAME}
cosign generate-key-pair \
     --kms ${KMS_KEY}
cosign sign \
     --key ${KMS_KEY} \
     ${CONTAINER_IMAGE}
cosign verify
     --key ${KMS_KEY} \
     ${CONTAINER_IMAGE}
                      cosign cosign
                                                Google Artifact Registry
                   Google Cloud KMS
```






#### <u>Link</u>

```
apiVersion: policy.yami

apiVersion: policy.sigstore.dev/v1alpha1
kind: ClusterImagePolicy
metadata:
   name: private-signed-images-cip
spec:
   images:
   - glob: "**"
   authorities:
   - key:
        kms: ${KMS_KEY}
```

## Demo!





#### Link

```
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: private-signed-images-cp
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  background: true
  rules:
  - name: private-signed-images
   match:
      any:
      - resources:
          kinds:
          - Pod
    verifyImages:
      - imageReferences:
        _ "*"
        attestors:
        - count: 1
          entries:
          - keys:
             kms: ${KMS_KEY}
```



Sign

Verify signature with Sigstore policycontroller and Kyverno

Congrats!



# What about my Helm charts and OCI images?



3

Sign

4

Verify signature with **Flux** 



5

Sign

6

Verify signature with **Flux** 

#### Sign an Helm chart




```
TERMINAL
0 0 0
 helm push oci://${HELM_CHART_IMAGE}
 cosign generate-key-pair
 cosign sign \
     --key cosign.key \
     ${HELM_CHART_IMAGE}
 cosign verify \
     --key cosign.pub \
     ${HELM_CHART_IMAGE}
                   cosign
                                  Google Artifact Registry
```










<u>Link</u>

#### Sign an OCI image



```
0 0 0
                                                         TERMINAL
 oras push ${OCI_IMAGE}
 cosign generate-key-pair
 cosign sign \
     --key cosign.key \
     ${OCI_IMAGE}
 cosign verify \
     --key cosign.pub \
     ${OCI_IMAGE}
                 sigstore cosign
```






Link

+ Workload Identity

# apiVersion: source.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1beta2 kind: OCIRepository metadata: name: my-oci-image spec: interval: 5m url: oci://\${IMAGE} provider: gcp ref: semver: "\*" verify: provider: cosign secretRef: name: cosign-pub



## That's a wrap!

#### **Complementary resources**

- Out of scope of this presentation:
  - BinAuthz (Kritis/Grafeas)
  - Kubewarden and Connaisseur
  - Portieris (Notary) or Ratify/Gatekeeper (Notary V2)
- More context:
  - OCI Artifacts Explained
  - Signature Formats
  - Sigstore Or: How We Learned to Stop Trusting Registries and Love Signatures
- Sigstore not just for Open Source projects:
  - A Guide to Running Sigstore Locally
  - The Road to SLSA4 Applying the Sigstore Ecosystem in a Corporate Environment
  - <u>Using Sigstore to meet FedRAMP Compliance at Autodesk</u>
- Gatekeeper + Cosign is not working yet... <u>needs contributors</u>



Mathieu Benoit
<a href="Medium">Medium</a> | Blog | LinkedIn</a>

# Thanks!