

Power Consumption Attacks in Wireless Sensor Networks

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Outline of today's talk

- 1 Introduction
 - Topics
 - Motivation
- 2 Methodology
 - Overview
 - Battery Behavior
 - Attack Simulations
- 3 Results and Analysis
 - Simulation Results
 - Mitigation Strategies
- 4 Conclusion
 - Future Work


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
Wireless Sensor Networks(WSNs)

- A **wireless sensor network(WSN)** is a network of **Sensor Nodes**
- **Sensor Nodes** send and receive wide varieties of data.
- **Sensor Nodes** generally operate in one of two states:
 - **Sleep Mode** - less power draw, but can't receive and transmit
 - **Active Mode** - more power draw, and can receive and transmit


WSN examples (1) - p.H. and flow



WSN examples (2) - fire detection and prevention




WSN examples (3) - security systems




Attacks on WSN power supplies

- **Sensor Nodes** are developed in bulk for mass deployment
- Bulk production has robbed WSNs of more robust **battery lives**
- limited battery lives make sensor nodes easy targets for **Power Consumption Attacks**
- A **Power Consumption Attack** drains the battery power of sensor nodes by forcing **meaningless active mode time**.
- Attackers hope to gain something by compromising nodes:
 - Protocol information for other attacks
 - temporary system downing
 - permanent system downing
 - competitive advantage
- Here we show some of our attack models

Attack Models (1) - standard denial of sleep




Attack Models (2) - inverse denial of sleep



Attack Models (3) - routing power draw

Time

Attack Model 3



Problem

- **How do we defend against a wide range of Power Consumption Attacks?**

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Overview

Battery Tests

- The logical conclusion to mitigate risks of **Power Consumption Attacks** is to use more powerful **batteries**
- Another simulation we ran tested various types of batteries
- The batteries tested were:
 - Lead-Acid Batteries
 - Alkaline Long-Life Batteries
 - Carbon-Zinc Batteries
 - NiMH Batteries
 - NiCad Batteries
 - Lithium Ion Batteries
- With weights varying from **0.1 mg** to **1 mg**
- And Packet sizes varying from **2 bits** to **1 kb**


Attack Simulation

- The **standard power consumption attack** seen in model 1 and the **routing power consumption attack** seen in model 3 were simulated in an environment that allowed user defined:
 - Packet Size (bits)
 - Initial Node Energy (joules)
 - Power To Transmit Messages (Watts)
 - Power To Receive Messages (Watts)
 - speed of Transmission radios (bps)
- Each of these were variate for 55,000 simulations.


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Lithium Ion Results



Comparing Attacks



Previous Strategies

- Some **risk mitigation strategies** have already been adopted for use in WSNs:
 - **Predefined Transfer Windows**
 - **Node Reception Memory**
 - **Jamming Detection Protocols**
 - **Low Power Wake-up Radio**
 - **Defined Maximum Path Length**
- Many strategies are developed with specific attacks in mind
- Even our proposed strategies have already been deployed

Proposed Strategies

- Targeted the root problem of all Power Consumption attacks:
pre-defined battery life
- Installation of solar panels and other similar power regeneration devices.
- Attacks can still be mounted on the network, but would have to fight a endlessly renewing power source
- This addition could be costly, and distributors would need to shrink the size of their network
- But it is up to the distributor to examine there expected net benefit

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Future Work

- Model and test additional attack types
- Do a cost benefit analysis of different types of **batteries** and **alternative power sources**
- compare cost benefits of other mitigation strategies