

Stancetaking in Discourse

Subjectivity, evaluation, interaction

Edited by

Robert Englebretson

Rice University

John Benjamins Publishing Company

Amsterdam / Philadelphia

2007

The stance triangle

John W. Du Bois

University of California, Santa Barbara

1. Introduction¹

One of the most important things we do with words is take a stance. Stance has the power to assign value to objects of interest, to position social actors with respect to those objects, to calibrate alignment between stancetakers, and to invoke presupposed systems of sociocultural value. Yet very little is understood at present about stance: what it is, how we do it, what role language and interaction play in the process, and what role the act of taking a stance fulfills in the broader play of social life. These are the questions which will inform this paper, as I seek to develop a language for describing the phenomenon of stance and clarifying the role it plays in the larger contexts of language and interaction. If we are to achieve any general understanding of stance, it will be necessary to seek the foundational principles which underlie the act of taking a stance and negotiating its meaning. Because the diversity of observable stances extends in principle without limit, it is necessary to go beyond merely cataloguing their contents or classifying their types. To frame a theory of stance means to provide a general account of the mode of production of any stance and of its interpretation in a context of interaction. Realizing such a goal will require us to define a research agenda capable of bringing together multiple coordinated lines of inquiry drawn from a range of disciplines concerned with the use of language. As one step in this direction, this paper presents a preliminary sketch of some of the theoretical resources and analytical tools that are likely to be required for such an account.

Stance can be approached as a linguistically articulated form of social action whose meaning is to be construed within the broader scope of language, interaction, and sociocultural value. Setting the problem in this way brings into play several aspects of language in interaction. As we seek the theoretical resources needed to account for the achievement of stance, we find ourselves faced with a

complex web of interconnections linking stance with dialogicality, intersubjectivity, the social actors who jointly enact stance, and the mediating frameworks of linguistic structure and sociocultural value they invoke in doing so.

Dialogicality makes its presence felt to the extent that a stancetaker's words derive from, and further engage with, the words of those who have spoken before – whether immediately within the current exchange of stance utterances, or more remotely along the horizons of language and prior text as projected by the community of discourse. While the idea of dialogicality has proved theoretically evocative (Bakhtin [1934]1981; Voloshinov [1929]1973), it cannot be said to have translated successfully into a well-defined program for substantive research on observed instances of dialogic interaction (but for some hopeful possibilities see Linell 1998). In this light, stance represents a promising testing ground to explore the potential of a more explicit dialogic method in the context of conversational interaction. Here I draw on my recent formulation of dialogic syntax as a specifically dialogic method (Du Bois 2001). Dialogic syntax looks at what happens when speakers build their utterances by selectively reproducing elements of a prior speaker's utterance. As an analytical practice, dialogic syntax details the process of mapping resonances between juxtaposed utterances in discourse. As it happens, when the formal method of dialogic syntax is applied to conversational interaction, it turns up a remarkable number of stance pairs characterized by a recurring functional-interactional configuration, in which the stance utterance of a subsequent speaker is constituted as bearing a close analogy to the stance utterance of a prior speaker. As stances build on each other dialogically, the analogy implied by their structural parallelism triggers a series of interpretative and interactional consequences, which will be seen to carry significant implications for the interaction at hand, and, at a more general level, for the theory of stance.

Injecting dialogicality into the analysis of stance leads naturally to a concern with *intersubjectivity*, which I understand as the relation between one actor's subjectivity and another's. Though its conceptual origins lie in philosophy, intersubjectivity has long been recognized as an issue for the social sciences, where it has influenced especially those approaches which locate language and cognition within a sociocultural and/or sociocognitive perspective (Bruner 1986; Clancy 1999; Hanks 1990; Lucy 1993; Ochs 1988; Schutz 1962; Silverstein 2001; Tomasello 1999; Vygotsky 1986). It should be noted that intersubjectivity presupposes subjectivity. While subjectivity has been getting the greater share of attention lately, being recognized for its role in the cognitive organization of language structure (Langacker 1991; Traugott 1989) and the discourse-functional organization of language use (Maynard 1993; Scheibman 2002), intersubjectivity is no less indispensable as a piece of the larger stance puzzle. The significance of the necessary link between the intersubjective, subjective, and objective will become evident

once we recognize them as fundamental sociocognitive relations which organize language use. Intersubjectivity and its companions play a prominent role in the present approach to stance, insofar as they serve to ground the sociocognitive aspects of stancetaking in dialogic interaction.

To complete the picture, we need to look at how the dialogic and intersubjective dimensions of stance relate to the stancetakers' *actions*, and to the sociocultural frames that mediate the consequences of their actions. Stance is realized, in the usual case, by a linguistic act which is at the same time a social act. The act of taking a stance necessarily invokes an evaluation at one level or another, whether by assertion or inference. This in turn implicates those dimensions of sociocultural value which are referenced by the evaluative act. Sociocultural value is mobilized and deployed through stance processes. Via specific acts of stancetaking, value can be focused and directed at a precise target, as locally relevant values are activated to frame the significance of participant actions. Moreover, since language is reflexive (Haviland 1996; Lucy 1993), and participants routinely monitor who is responsible (Hill and Irvine 1993) for any given stance, the very act of taking a stance becomes fair game to serve as a target for the next speaker's stance. Stance both derives from and has consequences for social actors, whose lives are impacted by the stances they and others take. Moreover, in many cases the current stance act resonates both formally and functionally with a stance taken in prior discourse. Thus the value of any stance utterance tends to be shaped by its framing through the collaborative acts of co-participants in dialogic interaction. We begin to appreciate why stance should come to wield both subtlety and power in the dynamics of social life.

In this paper, I work to bring these elements together in a unified framework for stance. The model I propose is articulated in terms of a set of triangular relations among the components of stance. But before we get to the stance triangle, there is groundwork to be laid. I begin the paper with a brief presentation of several different kinds of stance phenomena. I then address the problem of contextualizing stance, articulating a set of questions designed to identify some of the key aspects of the indexical context of interaction which are needed for interpreting stance. I go on to explore the role of intersubjectivity and other sociocognitive relations in the elaboration of stance, arguing that making sense of intersubjectivity in interaction depends on a dialogic understanding of language use. This sets the stage for the next level of theorizing stance. I introduce the stance triangle as a way of representing the components of the stance act, and more importantly, articulating their multiplex interrelations. In its guise as a representation of the fundamental structure of the stance act, the stance triangle attempts to shed light on the realization, interpretation, and consequences of stance in interaction. The result is a fundamentally dialogic perspective on stance which sees the stance act

as shaped by the complex interplay of collaborative acts by dialogic co-participants. By way of conclusion, I summarize the main contributions of the stance triangle, and pose the question of what, after all, is so special about stance.

2. Kinds of stance

One way to begin thinking about stance is to look at some likely exemplars, based on what has been recognized as stance (or a stance-related category) by one analytical tradition or another. While the range of proposals in the literature is too broad to survey here, what we can do is look at a few of the types that have played a leading role in previous discussions of kinds of stance or stance-related categories. For now we can think of these as different kinds or types of stance acts, but in the end we will have to consider alternative formulations of the issue of stance diversity. By the same token, although for expository purposes we begin with abbreviated examples of stance utterances viewed in isolation, it will soon become clear that the actual stance taken cannot be fully interpreted without reference to its larger dialogic and sequential context.

Perhaps the most salient and widely recognized form of stancetaking is *evaluation*. Evaluation has received considerable attention in recent years (Conrad and Biber 2000; Hunston and Sinclair 2000; Hunston and Thompson 2000; Labov and Waletzky 1967; Lemke 1998; Linde 1997; Macken-Horarik and Martin 2003; Thompson and Hunston 2000). A closely related concept is that of *assessment*, as analyzed in conversation analysis (Goodwin and Goodwin 1992; Goodwin 2006; Pomerantz 1984). Work on the related notion of *appraisal* has been pursued from the perspective of systemic functional grammar (Martin 2000), and additional important work on stance, point of view, and related notions has been developed by a number of scholars (Berman et al. 2002; Berman 2005; Chafe 1994; Kärkkäinen 2003a, 2003b; Kockelman 2004; Shoaps 2004).

Consider the following three examples of evaluation, drawn from the Santa Barbara Corpus of Spoken American English (Du Bois et al. 2000; Du Bois et al. 2003).^{2, 3}

- (1) (*Conceptual Pesticides* SBC003: 317.46-318.16)
PETE; That's horrible.
- (2) (*Runway Heading* SBC022: 193.440-194.341)
LANCE; (TSK) That's ideal.
- (3) (*Appease the Monster* SBC013: 1117.12-1118.12)
KEVIN; @that's @nasty.

In these examples, taken from three different conversations, the stance predicates *horrible*, *ideal*, and *nasty* are used to evaluate something. The thing evaluated – the specific target toward which the evaluation is oriented – is referred to in each case by the demonstrative pronoun *that*. The evaluative target may be called the object of stance (for reasons that will become clear in due course). In general terms, evaluation can be defined as the process whereby a stancetaker orients to an object of stance and characterizes it as having some specific quality or value.

The next set of examples presents a somewhat different pattern of stance:

- (4) (*Runway Heading* SBC022: 612.895-613.160)
LANCET; I'm glad.
- (5) (*Hey Cutie-Pie* SBC028: 52.330-53.355)
JEFF; (TSK) I'm so glad.
- (6) (*Lambada* SBC002: 665.79-667.35)
MILES; I'm just amazed.

In these stance utterances, the first person pronoun *I*, indexing the stancetaker, is followed by an affective predicate, positioning the speaker as *glad*, *so glad*, or *amazed*.⁴ As speakers position themselves affectively, they choose a position along an affective scale – as, for example, either *glad* or *so glad*. Such utterances have often been described as indexing affective stance (Besnier 1993; Haviland 1991; Maynard 1993; Ochs 1996; Shoaps 2002).

Speakers may position themselves not only along an affective scale, but also along an epistemic scale (Clift 2006; Haviland 1991; Heritage and Raymond 2005; Kärkkäinen 2003b; Thompson and Mulac 1991), for example, presenting themselves as knowledgeable or ignorant:

- (7) (*Appease the Monster* SBC013: 185.50-185.99)
KENDRA; I know.
- (8) (*Risk* SBC024: 588.565-588.970)
DAN; .. I don't know.

The general concept which subsumes both affective and epistemic stance acts of the sort illustrated here is *positioning* (Davies and Harré 1990; Du Bois 2002a). Positioning can be defined, provisionally, as the act of situating a social actor with respect to responsibility for stance and for invoking sociocultural value. In the examples presented here for both affective and epistemic positioning, the speaker who is taking the stance is indexed via a first-person pronoun in syntactic subject role (*I*), while the stance predicate (adjective or verb) specifies the nature of the stancetaker's position, whether with respect to an affective (*glad*) or an epistemic (*know*) state, or both (*amazed*).

In the next set of examples, the structural pattern is superficially similar to the one just presented:

- (9) (LSAC 1296-02)⁵
PAT; I agree.
- (10) (*Doesn't Work in This Household* SBC019: 127.391-128.183)
MELISSA; I totally agree.

Here a first-person pronoun in syntactic subject position is followed by a stance predicate (the verb *agree*). But what is being achieved thereby is different enough to warrant recognition as a distinct type of stance. The difference lies in the pragmatic-interactional configuration that it enacts. By uttering *I agree* the speaker defines her stance in relation to that of another party, typically the person she is addressing. The addressee's role is usually left implicit, but can be made explicit on occasion:

- (11) (LSAC 1396-01)⁶
LESLIE; I agree with you.

As this example illustrates, agreement normally implies agreement *with* someone,⁷ which in conversation is usually the person being addressed. The general term for this kind of stancetaking is *alignment* (Du Bois 2002a; Heritage 2002; Heritage and Raymond 2005). Alignment can be defined provisionally as the act of calibrating the relationship between two stances, and by implication between two stancetakers. Although a stance verb like *agree* may be the most transparent way to display alignment with another speaker, it is certainly not the usual way. More commonly, speakers show alignment by stance markers like *yes* or *no*, or gestures like a nod or a headshake, or any number of other forms that index some degree of alignment. Just as often, participants allow their alignment to remain implicit, inviting the listener to infer it based on comparing the relevant stances. The role of implicit stance alignment will prove to be especially important in the management of intersubjectivity.

These examples make it clear that stance utterances can vary in significant and systematic ways. But the question remains as to how to interpret this variability. Of the cases examined so far, most seem to involve one of three well-differentiated kinds of stance function, namely evaluation (*that's horrible*), positioning (*I'm glad*), and alignment (*I agree*). But do these stance functions really represent separate categories of stance – or simply different facets of the speaker's stance, more broadly conceived? What about other candidates that have been proposed as stance types – epistemic stance (*I know*), affective stance (*I'm glad*), and more? The problem is, while these are sometimes viewed as different types of stance

acts, no one has yet resolved the question of how many such types should be recognized – whether there will turn out to be three, five, or many more subtypes of stance. Nor have the criteria for deciding the question been established. More seriously, there is the matter of whether the various forms of stance occur separately or together. In other words: Can a single stance combine aspects of more than one of these stance functions? This question raises the possibility of an alternative approach which recognizes a more complex picture of the stance act, seen as encompassing multiple facets at once. Building a more unified understanding of stance has the advantage of avoiding a limitless proliferation of stance types. Such an approach would seek to interpret the diversity of stances not as distinct types of stance, but simply as different facets of a single unified stance act. The choice between proliferation of stance types and integration of stance facets will be returned to below.

The answer to some of these questions may hinge in part on the realization that, in the analysis presented so far, something seems to be missing. In stances which were characterized as positioning (4–8), for example, the question arises: What is the speaker positioning himself *about*? Similarly, in stances involving alignment (9–11), it seems equally essential to ask: What is the speaker agreeing about, and who are they agreeing *with*? These questions point to some important issues about stance. Speakers do not just perform generic stance *types*, they perform specific stance acts, which have specific content and are located in a particular dialogic and sequential context. To fully understand what stance is being taken on any given occasion, we need to learn more about how speakers realize stances and how hearers interpret their situated meanings. In part, this question concerns how participants contextualize the stance utterance in order to interpret it, as the stance emerges across successive utterances through processes of dialogic action. This is the issue we begin to explore in the next section.

3. Contextualizing the emerging stance

If stance is an act, we should expect to locate it in utterances. For the sake of argument, however, let us begin this discussion where it has so often begun before in the study of language – not with the utterance, but the sentence. The sentence can, with a little imagination, be hypothesized as an abstract linguistic structure detached from any mooring in a specific context of use. What can the decontextualized sentence reveal – and what can it not? Consider the following sentences:

- (12) The Caribbean is incredible.
- (13) It was really great.

- (14) I would love to go.

Each of these sentences contains at least one apparently evaluative word: *incredible*, *great*, and *love* (and perhaps others). These words are obviously not neutral descriptions of external reality, but imply value judgments regarding some referent. The evaluative connotations of such words are evident even from sentences taken in isolation. In fact, the evaluative meaning often comes through even in an arbitrary listing of individual words (*incredible*, *great*, *ideal*, *horrible*, *nasty*, and so on).

But stance is more than the context-free connotations of words or sentences. In the grammarian's standard presentation of the isolated sentence, stance remains incomplete. The missing ingredients can only be found by contextualizing the utterance, defined as the situated realization of language in use. Any utterance carries cues for its own indexical contextualization (Gumperz 1992; Silverstein 1976). Contextualization cues (or indexical signs) work by pointing beyond the utterance to its presupposed conditions of use. Thus in situating the understanding of any stance, the first question is: *What's missing?* In pragmatic terms this translates to: *What are the indexical absences?* Tracing out the salient indexical meanings (Jakobson [1957]1990; Peirce [1885]1933; Silverstein 1976) helps us to identify those aspects of context which must become known in order to arrive at a successful interpretation of the stance at hand.

There are at least three things we need to know about a given occasion of stancetaking, beyond what may be overtly present in the words and structures of the stance sentence itself: (1) *Who is the stancetaker?* (2) *What is the object of stance?* (3) *What stance is the stancetaker responding to?* Each question points to one component of the process of interpreting stance.

3.1 Who is the stancetaker?

In conversation, participants normally care who says what, and monitor it accordingly. Participant awareness of the attributability of utterances is routinely represented in most systems for transcribing discourse (Du Bois 1991; Du Bois et al. 1993; Jefferson 2004), typically by supplying each transcribed utterance or turn with a label indicating the identity of the speaker. In the following utterances by three different speakers, the identity of the speaker is indicated as usual at the beginning of each turn.

- (15) (*Deadly Diseases* SBC015: 210.075-212.730)
JOANNE; the- the Caribbean is incre:dible.

- (16) (*Conceptual Pesticides* SBC003: 1326.05-1326.85)

MARILYN; it was really great.

- (17) (*Deadly Diseases* SBC015: 187.025-188.070)

KEN; I would love to go:.

One important difference between attested utterances like those in (15–17) and hypothetical sentences like those abstracted in (12–14) is that a real utterance is always framed by its context of use. A key component of the context of any utterance is the speaker who is responsible for it. In the representations of utterances given here, we are told that someone named Joanne⁸ is responsible for the claim that a certain place is incredible; that Marilyn is responsible for the statement that something was really great; and that Ken is responsible for a display of affect or preference about going somewhere. To be sure, just attributing speakership in this way doesn't reveal much unless the speaker's identity carries some significant associations for us. But in most conversational settings, participants may draw on a range of biographical associations for the current speaker, regardless of whether they happen to know the speaker's name. Participants remember interactionally salient information about co-participants, and so may factor into their stance interpretation, in addition to what the speaker is saying right now, some or all of the following: what the speaker has said previously (whether on this occasion or some other); what sort of relationship they have displayed up to now relative to co-present others; what accent, voice quality, and intonation they are speaking with; what their displayed regional, ethnic, gender, or other identities may be; whether they appear entitled to their claimed identities; details of their life story, if known; and so on. Moreover, participants derive memorable information about each other from stances taken, which they may retain as socially salient, with the option of introducing it into future processes of stance interpretation. Knowing which social actor is responsible for a specific stance utterance in the past can make a significant difference in the interpretation of a current stance utterance, in part because of the dialogic connections that arise between stances.

3.2 What is the object of stance?

To make sense of a given stance we need to know not only who is speaking, but what they are speaking about. Among other things, we need to know the referential object or target toward which the stance is being directed – for example, *what* is claimed to be incredible or great, *where* the speaker displays a desire to go, and so on. Consider the following examples:

- (18) (*Raging Bureaucracy* SBC004: 17.67-18.82)
 CAROLYN; That stuff is great.
- (19) (*Conceptual Pesticides* SBC003: 1326.05-1326.85)
 MARILYN; it was really great.

If two people each evaluate something as *great*, have they taken the same stance? The cited utterances, drawn from two different conversations, differ slightly in their evaluative predicates (*is great* vs. *was really great*) and in the noun phrases which designate their respective objects of stance (*that stuff* vs. *it*). But these small differences don't really speak to the main question. What we want to know, if we are to decide what stance is being taken, is what *it* and *that stuff* refer to. A crucial part of interpreting any stance utterance is identifying the object of stance, as part of the process of referential grounding (Hanks 1990). Often the immediate prior discourse provides sufficient contextualization to resolve the reference of a pronoun, demonstrative noun phrase, or other referring form, thus establishing the identity of the relevant object of stance:

- (20) (*Conceptual Pesticides* SBC003: 1324.18-1326.85)
 MARILYN; S- really relaxing weekend,
 you know,
 it was really great.
- (21) (*Raging Bureaucracy* SBC004: 15.42-18.82)
 CAROLYN; You know what's good is .. hibiscus cooler.
 (0.2)
 That stuff is great.

A weekend and a drink of hibiscus cooler may both be great, but they will be great in very different ways. The respective stances of Marilyn and Carolyn, once referentially grounded, cannot be regarded as the same. Stance is a property of utterances, not of sentences, and utterances are inherently embedded in their dialogic contexts.

It's not just pronouns that need to be resolved by contextualizing the stance utterance, but also the meaning of content words and other elements as well. Compare the following two stance utterances, which both employ the word *incredible* in the evaluative predicate, but apply it to rather different stance objects:

- (22) (*Deadly Diseases* SBC015: 210.075-212.730)
 JOANNE; the- the Caribbean is incre:dible.
- (23) (*Cuz* SBC006: 168.60-170.30)
 ALINA; (H) The male athletes were incredible,

The evaluative content of the message conveyed by an evaluative word like *incredible* may shift according to whether it applies to a vacation destination (valued for passive attributes like visual beauty, tranquility, and so on) or to athletes (valued for the active display of strength, agility, talent, and so on).

In *I would love to go* (17), the utterance may initially appear more self-contained, as if carrying its meaning complete within itself. But this illusion is soon dispelled by examination of the prior discourse:

- (24) (*Deadly Diseases* SBC015: 164.420-188.070)
 1 JOANNE; (H) I don't know how many Americans have been
 to Nicaragua.
 ((39 LINES OMITTED))
 41 KEN; I would love to go:

Here, the phrase *love to go* refers not to going in the abstract, nor to going somewhere at random, but specifically to going to Nicaragua. The stance object that Ken is evaluating is thus *to go to Nicaragua*, abbreviated as *to go*. In such cases, the contextualized stance utterance takes its interpretation in part from the prior stance of a dialogic co-participant. This contextualization remains essential to the interpretation of the current stance even if the relevant prior stance occurred quite a bit earlier, as is the case here. In sum, identifying the object of stance – what the evaluation is about – is an essential part of the process of stance interpretation, for participants and analysts alike.

3.3 What stance is the stancetaker responding to?

Knowing the identity of the stancetaker and the object of stance is a good start, but we remain on uncertain ground until we know what prior stance the current stance is being formulated in response to – its counterstance, if you will. Why this stance is being taken, why just now, why in these terms – to answer these questions we need to monitor the dialogic and sequential shape of the ongoing exchange of stance and counterstance. Consider the examples of alignment given previously (*I agree*, *I agree with you*). Despite the fact that as sentences these are grammatically complete, as stances they are pragmatically incomplete. People don't agree in the abstract, they agree with someone about something. While a sentence like *I agree with you* (11) foregrounds – or profiles, in Langacker's (1987) terms – the dimension of alignment almost exclusively, for its interpretation it must still indexically incorporate a prior stance content, including the relevant object of stance. Normally the relevant stance content will be locatable in the prior discourse, specifying what specific stance is being agreed with:

(25) (LSAC 1396-01)

- 1 CORA; we are considered white collar because we're social workers.
 ((2 LINES OMITTED))
 4 LESLIE; I agree with you.

Here, Leslie's *I agree with you* creates a convergent alignment with her addressee which immediately entails or implicates an endorsement of the addressee's stance. The result can be informally paraphrased⁹ as *I agree with you that we are considered white collar (because we're social workers)*. Similarly in the following example:

(26) (LSAC 1296-02)

- 1 KIM; No more or no less than any other school is the way I see it.
 2 PAT; Yeah,
 3 I agree.
 4 I agree.

When Pat says *I agree* in line 3 (and again in line 4), she is doing more than just "being agreeable" (or even "doing agreement"). Her stance is quite specific, and can be paraphrased as, *I agree (with you that it's) no more or no less than any other school....*¹⁰ Finally, consider Melissa's utterance of *I totally agree* (10), whose relevant context is as follows:

(27) (Doesn't Work in This Household SBC019: 98.652-129.138)

- 1 JAN; Take it downstairs.
 ((28 LINES OMITTED))
 30 MELISSA; I totally agree.
 31 I should go downstairs.

In saying *I totally agree*, Melissa is not agreeing in the abstract, but specifically agreeing with her mother Jan's directive that she should take her homework downstairs. The requirement to specify the particular content for the stance of agreement is so strong that participants will go back 29 lines in the conversation, if need be, to find the proposition spelled out overtly. Lest there be any doubt as to what proposition she is agreeing to in line 30, Melissa makes it explicit in her next utterance (line 31), yielding a composite stance that is roughly paraphrasable as *I totally agree (that) I should go downstairs*.¹¹ To generalize, given a decontextualized sentence which apparently expresses simple agreement (*I agree*, *I totally agree*, *I agree with you*), it is not possible to tell from the sentence alone what is being agreed with.¹² Only by referencing the relevant prior stance, locatable ana-

phorically in the dialogic context, can the meaning of the present agreeing stance be understood.

We have considered three questions about the context of stance which are likely to be relevant, in some formulation or other, to the interpretation of any act of stancetaking. In asking, *Who is the stancetaker, what is the stance about, and what stance is the stancetaker responding to?* we are seeking to fill in some of the blanks that must be filled if we want to understand what the stance now being taken actually is. In more general terms, these questions about stance can be linked to notions of stance subject, stance object, and alignment, connections which will be further developed below. But we are far from claiming that these are the only questions, or necessarily the main ones, or the best formulations of them. Certainly there are additional questions that will need to be posed as we continue our efforts to tease out the recurrent features of the stance act, and some of these will come up below. But it is important to point out here that even the questions informally posed so far frequently require participants (and analysts) to go beyond what is explicit in the words of the stance utterance itself. Still the questions must be answered. Their relevance to stance does not depend solely on the presence of explicit words, gestures, prosody, or other communicative elements, however important these may be, but is grounded ultimately in the systematic knowledge which participants control regarding what can be expected to be present in any stance. The constant relevance of the general components of stance influences what we expect to know about any act of stancetaking, and thereby shapes its specific interpretation. This holds true whether the information is directly expressed in the stance utterance, or is only to be found distributed across multiple utterances by different speakers within extended sequences of dialogic exchange. The claim is that in each case, certain well-defined items of information are actively sought out by participants in response to the projectable structure of stance.

We have been considering how the contextualization of actual stance utterances (e.g., 15–27) contributes to the interpretation of stance. In contrast, little or nothing of the relevant contextualizing information can be gleaned from inspecting idealized sentences (e.g., 12–14) in isolation, even if the sentences are fully grammatical and fully meaningful – at least as meaningful as they can be, if limited to the sentential level of referring-and-predicating functions (Silverstein 1976, 2001). Yet once we identify the relevant contextual features, the necessary ingredients start to fall into place for a full pragmatic and interactional interpretation. In constructing a logic of stance interpretation, what we want to describe is the participant's interpretive process, which we track by close observation of their own interpretive actions in stance-rich environments. This interpretive inquiry is akin to that which has motivated scholars as diverse as Geertz (1973) and Sacks (1992), whose overt theoretical positioning may otherwise appear so disparate as

to be incommensurable. We need contextual grounding (Gumperz 1992; Hanks 1990; Silverstein 1976) in dialogic and sequential context (Linell 1998; Sacks 1992; Schegloff 1996; Voloshinov [1929]1973) to arrive at a sufficiently enriched interpretation of the utterance (Recanati 1989; Sperber and Wilson 1995). We cannot overlook the influence of even so basic interpretive processes as these if we want to understand how stances come to be understood. Ultimately, the specificity of stance is grounded in its dialogicality. Only when the dialogic context is taken into account does stance become complete.

4. Subjectivity and positioning

In light of this understanding of the processes of stance contextualization, we are now ready to re-examine the issue of positioning, which we consider in light of speaker subjectivity. Subjectivity and positioning go hand in hand, inasmuch as the act of positioning regularly invokes a dimension of speaker subjectivity. Consider the following:

- (28) (*Lambada* SBC002: 865.91)
JAMIE; I like this song.
- (29) (*This Retirement Bit* SBC011: 444.12-445.36)
SAM; I don't like those.

In these stance utterances, the subjective dimension is registered overtly through several discrete linguistic elements, including personal pronouns (*I*) and affective verbs (*like*, *don't like*). The personal pronoun *I* points directly to the speaking subject (Benveniste 1971; Culoli 1990; Ducrot 1972, 1984)¹³ who, in these cases at least, is the one taking the stance. The affective stance predicate indexes specific aspects of the subject's feelings, positioning the speaker subjectively along some scale of affective value. Yet it cannot be overlooked that subjective predicates which are transitive (*like*, *don't like*, *love*, *hate*, and so on) regularly specify also the object to which the subject is orienting affectively.¹⁴ The transitive clause *I like this song* (28), uttered in the auditory presence of a song playing on the stereo, directly specifies the object of stance – the entity being oriented to. This example compactly illustrates the co-existence of subjective (*I*) and objective (*this song*) elements within a unified stance. Similarly, in *I don't like those* (29), the coherent expression of speaker subjectivity requires both a subject and an object of stance (specified as *I* and *those*, respectively). In sum, to articulate this kind of subjectivity, what is required is an orientation to a specific object of the speaking subject's

stance, combined with specification of a particular intentional relation (Searle 1983), such as desiring, loving, hating, liking, not liking, and so on.

The following stance diagrams represent the relations of evaluation and positioning between the stance subject and stance object:

	<u>Speaker</u>	<u>Stance Subject</u>	<u>Positions/Evaluates</u>	<u>Stance Object</u>
(30)	JAMIE;	I	like	this song
(31)	SAM;	I	don't like	those

This kind of stance diagram is useful in making explicit several aspects of our analysis. First, we find it essential to represent the identity of the speaker, because this tells us who is the speaking subject (the stancetaker). Second, in analyzing the various discrete components of the utterance, we label the words which overtly express or index the stance subject and the stance object. Third, we label the verb or other stance predicate according to the kind of stance action it performs. In these examples, the predicate (*like*, *don't like*) obviously serves to position the subject, but it also commits the stancetaker to a certain evaluation of the object. In recognition of this apparent dual stance function, the representations of evaluation and positioning are combined in a single column.

While some stance utterances evidently perform combinations of functions (for example, evaluation of a stance object combined with positioning of a stance subject), we might still ask whether it is possible for a stance utterance to express only pure subjectivity. It is true that there are stance utterances which overtly position the speaking subject without explicitly including any reference to a stance object. In what appear to be simple one-place predicates (Thompson and Hopper 2001), speaking subjects position themselves subjectively – and that seems to be the end of it. Consider examples (4) and (5), repeated here for convenience:

- (32) (*Runway Heading* SBC022: 612.895-613.160)
LANCE; I'm glad.
- (33) (*Hey Cutie-Pie* SBC028: 52.330-53.355)
JEFF; (TSK) I'm so glad.

Up to now we have analyzed these cases as simply reflecting the speaker's subjective self-positioning, with respect to a scale of affective value (*glad*). In contrasting Lance's *I'm glad* with Jeff's *I'm so glad*, what is immediately obvious as a difference is the presence of the intensifying adverb *so* in the latter case. We might take this to indicate that Jeff is positioning himself as claiming a more intense subjective experience along the scale of gladness than Lance is claiming. While this may be true as far as it goes, to focus exclusively on the subjective side of the equation is to

leave out a key variable: the object of stance. Here the stance object is, once again, what the speaker is affectively orienting to. But can an object be part of the stance if it is not part of the sentence? The answer may hinge on whether orientation to an object is taken to be a necessary part of the process of constituting subjectivity. The evidence we have seen points to a positive conclusion: displays of subjectivity always make relevant the relation between a stance subject and a stance object.

The claim is that it is a regular feature of subjectivity to orient to an object. If the stance object is not overtly specified within the immediate stance utterance, participants will feel that something is missing. If subjectivity requires orientation to an object, the full meaning of any subjective stance must remain mysterious until we locate the object, even if this requires us to search the discourse context to find it. This explains why two stances in which similar or identical words are used may still differ substantially with respect to what they are stances about. Such appears to be the case in examples (32)–(33) above. The difference between Jeff's and Lance's stances may hinge primarily on what they are glad about – the object of stance – but this is left unmentioned within the stance utterance itself. But that's not to say that the participants are not orienting to a stance object. Once we take into account the sequential context in which the stances developed in the first place, their actual significance becomes clear. In the first *I'm glad* example, Lance, an apprentice air traffic controller, is being debriefed after a work session by Randy, his trainer:

- (34) (*Runway Heading* SBC022: 607.505-613.160)

- 1 RANDY; N:o significant problems.
- 2 (0.5)
- 3 #to #dea- —
- 4 .. to talk about.
- 5 (2.0)
- 6 LANCE; I'm glad.

Here the stance content of the utterance *I'm glad* emerges from successive contributions by Randy and then Lance, with the cumulative result being paraphrasable as something like *I'm glad (that there are) no significant problems to talk about*.¹⁵ In the second example, Jeff is talking on the phone to Jill about her friend who is visiting her, and asks:

- (35) (*Hey Cutie-Pie* SBC028: 49.985-53.355)

- 1 JEFF; Are you guys having fun?
- 2 JILL; Y:es:.
- 3 (0.6)
- 4 JEFF; (TSK) I'm so glad.

Quite a different stance emerges from this sequential contextualization, paraphrasable as *I'm so glad you guys are having fun*.¹⁶

The main difference in meaning between the last two examples turns out to have little to do with the presence of the intensifier *so*, but is instead based on differences in the dialogic sequence through which the stance emerged. To take into account only the current stance utterance (*I'm glad*) would be to miss out on what the stance predicate *glad* is pointing to. People are not *glad* in general, but *glad that* (something). Obviously it makes a difference whether the complement of *glad* is to be understood as *you guys are having fun* or *there are no significant problems to talk about*. Even self-positioning presupposes an object, namely, the specific entity or state of affairs toward which the speaker expresses their subjective stance.

The following diagrams represent the relevant relationship between stance subject and stance object:

(36)	Stance Positions/ Stance		
	# Speaker	Subject	Evaluates Object
6 LANCE;	I	'm glad	{there are no significant problems}

(37)	Stance Positions/ Stance		
	# Speaker	Subject	Evaluates Object
4 JEFF;	I	'm so glad	{you guys are having fun}

Along the same lines, the next stance utterance appears at first to be a simple display of amazement:

- (38) (*Lambada* SBC002: 665.79-667.35)

- 698¹⁷ MILES; I'm just ama:zed.

But the sequential context makes it clear that Miles is not just amazed, he is amazed about something:

- (39) (*Lambada* SBC002: 660.75-667.35)

- 696 MILES; Cause there're a lot of women out there who apparently don't believe in using condoms.
- 697a (1.0)
- 697 PETE; Hm.
- 698a (0.6)
- 698 MILES; I'm just ama:zed.

Summing across the full discourse context, Miles' stance amounts to something like *I'm just amazed (that) there're a lot of women out there who (apparently) don't believe in using condoms*. Clearly, the stance act of affective self-positioning (as

glad or *amazed*) is incomplete until we include the object of stance – what the speaker is glad or amazed about. Although it may be merely implicit in the current stance utterance, the stance object is an indispensable component of even a subjective stance. Even in its absence, the stance object remains relevant and hence may trigger a search for it in the prior discourse. The conclusion: Subjectivity takes an object.

If subjectivity must have its object, this should be as relevant to epistemic subjectivity as to affective subjectivity. Consider examples (7)–(8), repeated here for convenience:

- (40) (*Appease the Monster* SBC013: 920.13-921.13)
KENDRA; I know.

(41) (*Risk* SBC024: 588.565-588.970)
DAN I don't know.

On the face of it, Kendra positions herself as knowing, while Dan positions himself as not knowing. At least this is what the words taken literally and in isolation seem to mean. But such interpretations in isolation are meaningless. How far off the mark they are becomes evident once we take into account the dialogic context:

Kendra and Dan each speak no more than three words, yet manage to produce apparently complete stance utterances thereby. But the stances they achieve through their slender utterances are more complex than what is immediately evident in the stance utterances themselves. Their respective stances emerge only from the larger dialogic sequence, as shown in the following representations:

(44)		Stance	Positions/	Stance
#	Speaker	Subject	Evaluates	Object
2	KENDRA; I	know		{those are good spatulas}

(45)	#	Speaker	Stance	Positions/	Stance
			Subject	Evaluates	Object
2	DAN;	I	don't know	{if we are not attacking each other until we get rid of the striped guy}	18

The point is that people do not normally present themselves as knowing (or not knowing) in the abstract. Rather, they know (or don't know) particular things. Generally the precise specification of what they know, if not present in the sentence itself, is already there in the immediate prior discourse – often in the utterance of a dialogic partner. It takes Wendy's and Kendra's utterances together for Kendra's stance to emerge. Likewise, it takes Jennifer and Dan working together to articulate Dan's emerging stance. This kind of co-action, as realized in the context of conversational interaction, is a big part of what it means for linguistic action to be dialogic.

Once our analysis systematically incorporates the dialogic co-participants' contributions to the emerging stance, several things start to become clear. First, a stance verb like *know* often points to a dialogically prior stance, articulating a precise indexical relation to it. Second, the prior stance must be incorporated anaphorically into the interpretation of the overall emergent stance which culminates in the current stance utterance. Third, the stance act is not necessarily complete within a single intonation unit, clause, sentence, or even turn. Stance utterances like *I know* and *I don't know* are designed to incorporate their dialogic antecedents, through which they gain the interpretative specificity they need to be complete. This has important consequences for our understanding of subjectivity. Despite initial appearances, the stance which culminates in a short and apparently simple utterance like *I'm glad* or *I know* cannot be a matter of subjectivity in isolation, whether affective or epistemic. Rather, it necessarily combines a subjective and an objective component. In constituting subjectivity, the requirement for inclusion of a stance subject (*I*) is intimately connected to the requirement for inclusion of a stance object (the state of affairs that the speaker is glad about, informed about, and so on). The link that is constituted between subject and object creates a vector of subjectivity. The subject-object link is often achieved dialogically, through separate but coordinated contributions by several co-actors, as successive stance utterances – stance and counterstance – are deployed in response to each other. Despite popular conceptions of subjectivity as a purely internal, solipsistic state of the individual psyche, we see from the evidence of stancetaking that the presence of a subjective element in no way precludes the presence of an objective element as well. In the end, subjectivity proves meaningful only when subject and object are defined in relation to each other.

Though we have not yet arrived at a full understanding of what is needed to contextualize and interpret stance, we have come far enough to draw some preliminary conclusions. The three questions about stance contextualization that were introduced at the outset – regarding the identity of the stancetaker, the object of stance, and the prior stance being responded to – make for a good start toward filling in the information that we need to interpret any given stance utterance. But the full significance of these bits of information must remain obscure until we understand better why we should need them in the first place. We need to ask what else may be needed to complete the picture of the stance in question. So far, we have identified a regular pattern whereby a single stance utterance culminates in the bringing together of an object-centered act of evaluation and a subject-centered act of positioning. This predictable pattern remains relevant even if one of the elements is not explicitly verbalized within the current stance utterance, but is to be located anaphorically in the discourse of a prior speaker. It is in fact routine to find complex stance culminations, precipitated in the end by a seemingly simplex stance utterance, but dependent on the prior context. In many such cases, it is possible to distinguish the object-centered element from the subject-centered element, and to attribute each element to a distinct portion of the discourse, whether as a specific word or phrase in the current or prior stance utterance. The concrete localization of the overt words or other meaningful elements which ground the various components of stance is important for assessing the compositional contribution of the several evaluative words and constructions in a stance utterance. In the end, however, no stance stands alone. It is the stance utterance *with its dialogic context* that is the relevant unit for stance interpretation. In order to arrive at a situated interpretation for any particular stance utterance, it is necessary to monitor the developmental history of the emergence of the stance, as its content is enriched via the structure of expectations regarding the necessary recurrent components in the general model of stance.

But still more is needed if we wish to grasp how the contextually recovered stance components combine with the explicit components of the stance utterance itself to yield the stance interpretation. To get to the next level of understanding, a key issue that remains to be addressed concerns the role of intersubjectivity. As with the subjective and objective elements of stance, the place of the intersubjective in relation to other elements of stance will prove essential in arriving at a more complete picture of the interpretive matrix within which stance is dialogically realized.

5. Intersubjectivity and alignment

We have seen how subjectivity figures in stance, most evidently in the case of positioning, where what is positioned is typically the speaking subject – the stancetaker. A positioning utterance like *I'm glad* foregrounds its subjectivity via overt cues such as first-person pronouns, affective predicates, and other elements that index salient aspects of the speaking subject. Moreover, the subjective stance presumes an orientation to an object, whether overtly present in the stance utterance (*I don't like those*) or not (*I'm amazed*). But even after identifying the missing stance object, we still only have part of the story. Some hint of what remains to be incorporated is suggested by a simple observation. In the dialogic realization of stance, the subjective orientation to a stance object may be shared among more than one participant. Indeed this object-orientation may extend across multiple stance acts by different speakers. This gives rise to what I call the shared stance object. (For the related notion of joint attention, see Hobson 1993; Kidwell and Zimmerman 2006; Moore and Dunham 1995; Tomasello 1999; Tomasello et al. 2005.) As we will see, the shared stance object becomes the cornerstone of the dialogic construction of intersubjectivity.

What are we to make of intersubjectivity? How does it enter into the dialogic realization and interpretation of stance? As the word itself suggests, intersubjectivity presupposes subjectivity, at least etymologically. But to observe intersubjectivity in action, we will have to expand our view to encompass more than one subjectivity – to bring into focus the sociocognitive relations that arise between two subjectivities, when the subjective stances of two participants collide within a dialogic exchange. When we learn to see how one speaker's subjectivity reacts to another's subjectivity, we will have a real opportunity to witness the dialogic emergence of intersubjectivity.

Consider the following exchange, which provides a larger window of context for example (29):

- (46) (*This Retirement Bit* SBC011: 444.12-446.30)

- 1 SAM; I don't like those.
- 2 (0.2)
- 3 ANGELA; I don't either.

Through this kind of sequential juxtaposition of evaluative stances, intersubjectivity rises to focal prominence. Analogical relations are established between the juxtaposed stances (*I don't like those : I don't either*). The foregrounding of this dialogic relation potentially invites inferences based on the comparison. A similar

dialogic relation arises between the two participants' stances in the next example as well:

- (47) (*A Tree's Life* SBC007: 581.32-585.99)
- 1 ALICE; I don't know if she'd do it.
 - 2 (0.6)
 - 3 MARY; I don't know if she would either.

It is useful to have a way to represent the implicit structure of the stance parallels in such cases, in a way that perspicuously captures the potential for participant inferencing about stance. One tool that has proven useful for representing dialogic relations between stances is what I have called the *diagraph* (Du Bois 2001). While the diagraph was developed for independent purposes – primarily for analyzing the structural relations that characterize dialogic syntax – it can be equally effective in bringing out the similarities and contrasts between stances in dialogic sequence. Foregrounding the relevant structural relations, diagraphs display the parallelism of elements using a representation like the following (abstracted from example 47):

- (48) 1 ALICE: I do n't know if she 'd do it .
3 MARY: I do n't know if she would either.

A word is in order regarding the organization and significance of diagraph analysis. The diagraph is designed to represent the mapping of structured resonances across utterances. (Diagraph, from *dia-* 'across' + *graph* 'mapping', means literally 'mapping across.') The two most immediately relevant dimensions of the diagraph are, in simplistic terms: rows correspond to utterances,¹⁹ and columns correspond to the specific elements which resonate between different utterances, which are specified as parallel within the diagraph. To display the resonance iconically, the diagraph is formatted so that elements that resonate with each other are aligned vertically in columns. A further element that is always included in the diagraph is speaker labels, which serve to index the identity of the participants who enact the dialogic resonance in question. The recognition of a central role for participant identity in resonance relations is part of what makes dialogic syntax dialogic. Note that the diagraph is not intended to capture everything about the utterances represented, but is simply one tool to be used in conjunction with others. The diagraph focuses primarily on those elements which display significant resonance, foregrounding their relationships to each other. As such, the diagraph representation is not supposed to replace the original transcription with all its detail, but rather should remain implicitly linked to it for purposes of interpretation. The connection between the two representations of the same discourse excerpt is made explicit via such notational devices as line numbers which cross-reference

each line of the diagraph with the corresponding line of the transcription. (For more detailed discussion and exemplification of diagraph analysis, see Du Bois 2001. For related work on structural parallelism in discourse, see Blanche-Benveniste et al. 1991; Harris 1952; Jakobson 1966, 1981; Johnstone 1994; Linell 1998; Schegloff 1996; Silverstein 1984; Tannen 1987.)

Now, what does the diagraph in (48) tell us? One speaker takes a stance, then a second speaker takes a seemingly equivalent stance. But a closer examination of the diagraph makes it clear that, along with their parallels, the two stances are also fundamentally different. Though subtle, the differences turn out to be important because of what they tell us about the dialogic relations that are established through the sequential realization of stances. The diagraph in (48) shows how Alice responds to Mary's *I don't know if she'd do it* with a very similar utterance: *I don't know if she would either*. As similar as these two stance utterances are, there is a limit to their convergence. The second stance utterance ends with the word *either*, and this is no mere adornment. If Mary had responded to Alice's utterance with a lexically identical utterance – just *I don't know if she'd do it* – the effect would likely be perceived as somewhat strange, in part because of the absence of the word *either*.²⁰ The strangeness cannot be explained away as a problem with an "echoic" utterance: saying just *I don't know if she would* would be pragmatically aberrant as well, in more or less the same way. Why is the presence of the word *either* so crucial here? The same issue arises in *I don't either* in (46), suggesting that there is a general principle involved. In both cases, the word *either* in this construction serves to index a specific intersubjective relation between two speakers engaged in dialogic interaction. While space precludes full exploration of the detailed workings of this pattern here, the evidence from many similar cases makes it clear that *either* cannot normally be omitted from the second stance utterance without causing pragmatic anomaly (Du Bois 2004). There is no other explanation for the virtually obligatory presence of *either* in such sentences than its role in indexing the intersubjective relationship between two stances in dialogic juxtaposition. In general terms, whenever an interactionally salient dialogic resonance arises between two stances, the intersubjective relationship between one's own resonating stance and that of the prior speaker must ordinarily be acknowledged indexically – if one wishes to avoid being judged interactionally incompetent.

One way to look at stance is to ask how it is constituted as an action within an interpretive framing erected by the ongoing dialogic activity. In this light, the diagraph in (48) can be interpreted in terms of who leads and who follows. The first stance (Alice's in line 1) can be characterized as a *stance lead*, while the second (Mary's in line 3) is a *stance follow*.²¹ The importance of this contrast becomes clear when we note that, despite their similar stance content, the participants mark their stances differently. Mary's stance follow is virtually required to include

the word *either*, which serves an intersubjective indexical function here. In contrast, Alice's stance lead is virtually precluded, pragmatically if not grammatically, from including the intersubjective indexical *either*. Example (46) is like (47) in this respect: the intersubjective use of *either* is pragmatically required. The subjective positioning in (46) is affective (*don't like*), while the subjective positioning in (47) is epistemic (*don't know*), as well as modal (*if*) in effect. But the need to index the intersubjective relationship between a stance follow and a prior stance lead remains the same.

There is an important connection between intersubjectivity and the stance act of alignment that is visible in these examples. Note that alignment, as I use the term, represents a point along a continuous scale or range of values. In contrast to common usage which forces a binary choice between a positive pole (referred to as aligned) vs. a negative pole (disaligned), the approach I favor treats alignment as continuously variable in principle. By recognizing the variability of scalar alignment we can take into account the fact that stances are aligned by subtle degrees, so that stance alignment can be relatively positive or negative – or, more precisely speaking, convergent or divergent to some degree. Alignment is in play whether the direction is convergent, divergent, or as often happens, ambiguous between the two. Thus two participants in dialogic interaction should be understood as engaging in the alignment process when they converge to varying degrees, and, by the same token, when they diverge to varying degrees. In this light, the use of *either* in the cited examples should be seen as part of an act of alignment that serves to calibrate the intersubjective relationship implicit in the stances of engaged co-participants. In such cases, words like *either* (or *too*, as discussed below) can be said to function as intersubjective alignment markers.

6. The stance triangle

We have been assembling an analytic toolkit of interconnected concepts and methods designed to shed light on the various elements and processes of stance. Key components include the concepts of evaluation, positioning, and alignment, as well as the sociocognitive relations of objective, subjective, and intersubjective intentionality. In developing new ways of analyzing these and other elements, we have been working to lay the groundwork for the next stage of theorizing stance. Now it is time to bring all the elements together to forge a unified framework for stance. The picture we are moving toward is one in which stance is seen as a single unified act encompassing several triplet sets of distinct components and processes. On the level of action, stance is to be understood as three acts in one – a triune act, or tri-act. To the question posed at the outset (in Section 2) as to whether

evaluation, positioning, and alignment represent three different types of stance, the view from the stance triangle suggests that they are simply different aspects of a single stance act. Rather than three separate types of stance, we interpret them as subsidiary acts of a single overarching, unified stance act. Each subsidiary act is distinguishable from the others by virtue of its own distinctive consequences, yet the three are yoked together through their integration in the dialogic stance act.

The stance act thus creates three kinds of stance consequences at once. In taking a stance, the stancetaker (1) evaluates an object, (2) positions a subject (usually the self), and (3) aligns with other subjects. The following definition sums it up:

- (49) Stance is a public act by a social actor, achieved dialogically through overt communicative means, of simultaneously evaluating objects, positioning subjects (self and others), and aligning with other subjects, with respect to any salient dimension of the sociocultural field.

Alternatively, adopting the first-person point of view of the stancetaker as speaking subject, we can informally gloss this definition as follows:

- (50) *I evaluate something, and thereby position myself, and thereby align with you.*




Figure 1. The stance triangle

The beginnings of a framework for analyzing stance are implicit in these definitions. In the rest of this section, I will further sketch out a preliminary version of this framework, along with some initial suggestions as to how it can expand the analytic reach of the stance concept.

The clearest way to represent the stance model I am proposing is in the form of a triangle (Figure 1).

The three nodes of the stance triangle represent the three key entities in the stance act, namely the first subject, the second subject, and the (shared) stance object. The three sides of the triangle represent vectors of directed action that organize the stance relations among these entities. While the stance triangle comprises the three subsidiary acts of evaluating, positioning, and aligning, these are not distributed evenly among the three sides, as in the expected one-to-one correspondence found in conventional triangular models. Rather, two of the three sides represent evaluative vectors directed from one of the two stance subjects toward the single shared stance object. The first evaluative vector originates from the first subject, the second from the second subject. The third side of the triangle (the vertical line on the left) represents alignment between the two subjects. Significantly, each of the three stance act vectors is relational and directed, linking two nodes of the triangle. Vectors of alignment may originate in either the first or second subject and be directed toward the other subject. For each vector of directed action in the diagram, an arrowhead points in the direction of action's object or target. Because there are two social actors represented in the stance triangle – the first and second stance subjects – there are two tokens of each action vector type. This makes for a total of six arrowheads, corresponding to the three acts of evaluation, positioning, and alignment, doubled by the co-presence of two subjects. The stance triangle is unusual in that it depicts three stance acts for the first subject, and again the very same three stance acts for the second subject.²² And yet the acts are different, the second time around.

The stance triangle provides the basis for understanding the causal and inferential linkage that may arise between the various subsidiary acts. Concomitant to evaluating a shared stance object, stancetakers position themselves. Concomitant to positioning themselves, stancetakers define alignment with each other, whether the alignment is convergent or divergent. Depending on the circumstances, it is possible to draw inferences regarding any unspecified portion of the stance triangle, as long as the rest of the triangle is known. Crucially for the analysis, all three of the three-in-one subsidiary acts remain relevant to stance interpretation even if only one or two of them are overtly expressed in the linguistic form of the stance utterance. The stance triangle shows how a stance utterance that specifies only one of the three vectors can allow participants to draw inferences about the others. For example, if Melissa agrees with Jan, she positions herself as taking

the same stance (roughly speaking) as Jan, including the evaluation Jan has performed in her own prior stance. Conversely, if Melissa expresses an evaluation that is effectively the same as Jan's previous evaluation, this allows us to infer her convergent alignment with the previous speaker. In sum, the stance triangle posits a model of the components of stance and of the organization of the relations between them, with strong implications for inferencing regarding participants' positioning, alignment, and evaluation. Attending to the structured interrelations among the acts and entities which comprise stance allows participants, and analysts, to draw inferences by triangulating from the explicit components of stance to the implicit. What I am proposing is that the structure of dialogic action represented in the stance triangle offers a framework for analyzing the realization and interpretation of stance. Our understanding of stance is enhanced, I suggest, by taking seriously the interrelations among components of the stance act as specified in the stance triangle model.

To assess these claims for the theoretical significance of the stance triangle, we need to see it in action – to test its utility in the analysis of actual instances of stance in interaction. We begin by taking a second look at an example introduced earlier (46), considering it now in light of the stance triangle:

- (51) (*This Retirement Bit* SBC011: 444.12-446.30)
- | | | |
|---|---------|---------------------|
| 1 | SAM; | I don't like those. |
| 2 | | (0.2) |
| 3 | ANGELA; | I don't either. |

The three entities at the nodes of the stance triangle are more or less transparently represented in this example – the first stance subject (Sam's *I*), the second stance subject (Angela's *I*), and the shared stance object (in Sam's utterance, *those*; in Angela's, what some would call a zero, or a deletion, representing the understanding that Angela is referring implicitly to the same referent as Sam's *those*). Sam's stance predicate (*don't*) *like* serves both to position the entity expressed by its syntactic subject (*I*) and to evaluate the entity expressed by its syntactic object (*those*). While the stance acts of evaluation and positioning are more or less evident from direct inspection of the conversational example, to see the alignment clearly it will be useful to create a diagram:

- (52) 1 SAM; I do n't like those .
 3 ANGELA; I do n't either.

Angela marks her contribution as a stance follow to Sam's stance lead, deploying the word *either* in its intersubjective alignment function.

To display the analysis in terms of the stance triangle more precisely, we can incorporate labels specifying which entities and actions are present in the stance utterance, and how they are expressed (or implied) in it, as in the following diagram, termed a stance diagram.²³

		Stance	Positions/	Stance
#	Speaker	Subject	Evaluates	Object Aligns
1	SAM;	I ₁	don't like	those
3	ANGELA;	I ₂	don't {like}	{those} either

As for the three stance actions, in these data, the verb specifies both the evaluation of the object and the positioning of the subject, so the two labels are combined in a single column. Angela's use of the word *either* indexes alignment, taking account of the fact that Angela's stance utterance is a stance follow which builds dialogically off of Sam's prior stance lead. The column heading thus marks the alignment function of the word *either* accordingly. Note that this stance diagram representation is only intended as an informal aid to visualizing those elements in the stance utterance which correspond most directly to the relevant stance triangle entities and actions. For example, if we really want to specify how alignment is achieved in this kind of utterance, we would have to acknowledge that it's not just using the word *either* that does it, but also the resonance generated through the act of reproducing words and structures of the prior speaker. There is always more to stance in dialogic interaction than can be captured in any labeled diagram as simple as this one. Nevertheless, the stance diagram helps to make visible key aspects of the mapping between forms which resonate across utterances. This brings out the similarities, but just as important, the differences that constitute what I have called the *stance differential*. The stance diagram serves as a useful intermediate stage in the analysis leading to the stance triangle, especially in foregrounding the stance act of alignment. Having parsed out the various component acts and entities of a stance exchange via the stance diagram, one can in principle then map this analysis onto the stance triangle.

The next example provides a further test case involving the three subsidiary acts of evaluation, positioning, and alignment, as well as the stance differential. (The first line of this example was analyzed above in (17) and (24).) As is clear from the prior discourse, Ken is talking specifically about going to Nicaragua. Now look at what develops next, in the subsequent exchange of stances:

- (54) (Deadly Diseases SBC015: 186.540-198.625)
- 1 KEN; .. I would love to go.: (0.3)
- 2 (0.3)
- 3 LENORE; Yeah.

- 4 (1.0)
- 5 JOANNE; Yeah?
- 6 (0.9)
- 7 I want to go too.

There are interesting aspects of resonance to be found in various of the possible pairings of stance utterances that could be made here, but two resonance pairings in particular are of immediate interest: the two *yeah*'s (lines 3 and 5), and *I would love to go : I want to go too* (lines 1 and 7). First, consider Lenore's *yeah* in line 3. Uttered with a final falling intonation, this amounts to an intersubjective alignment marker, displaying her convergence with Ken's stance in line 1, as the relevant prior stance. After a one-second pause – a saliently long pause for a lively conversation like this – Joanne utters the same word as Lenore, but with a different intonation. Even though the words are identical, a stance differential is created nonetheless, primarily by intonation but also by other factors such as voice quality and sequential placement. Where Lenore had a terminative intonation contour (realized as a final fall) on *Yeah*, Joanne uses a rising *appeal* contour, suggesting a questioning of, or at least an ambivalence toward, Lenore's more definite *yeah*.²⁴ Joanne's display of a subtle stance differential in line 5 effectively raises some question as to whether she will fully align herself with the prior salient stance, to which Ken and Lenore are both by now on-record adherents. After another substantial pause, Joanne goes on in line 7 to commit to a sort of stance follow. But she withdraws the word *love*, choosing *want* instead, a presumable downgrade of the level of commitment to the proposition at issue.²⁵ This sheds light on her lack of commitment as implied by her use of a questioning intonation for what could have been, with different intonation, a strong marker of convergent alignment. The crucial resonance relations in this exchange are highlighted in the following diagraph of Ken and Joanne's utterances:

- (55) 1 KEN; I would love to go .
- 7 JOANNE; I want to go too.

While not realized in immediately successive utterances, the analogy between the two stance utterances (*I would love to go : I want to go too*) is unmistakable – sufficiently transparent to be recognizable across a few intervening utterances. Although it might appear that Joanne is saying more or less "the same thing" as Ken, the differences which constitute the stance differential are actually quite crucial, as the diagram above suggests. To create a more explicit representation labeling the relevant stance entities and actions, we recast (55) as a stance diagram:

(56)		Stance Speaker	Positions/ Subject	Evaluates Object	Stance Aligns
1	KEN;	I ₁	would love	to go {to Nicaragua}	
7	JOANNE;	I ₂	want	to go {to Nicaragua}	too

This diagram shows clearly how Ken performs a stance lead, and Joanne a stance follow. Joanne explicitly registers the difference between her follow and his lead via the word *too*, which is not ommissible in this context without pragmatic anomaly.

The evidence from many such cases makes it clear that when a stance follow is juxtaposed to a dialogically resonant prior stance lead, then, given certain well-defined conditions,²⁶ the intersubjectivity involved must be registered obligatorily, using the appropriate linguistic index: *too* for positive utterances, *either* for negative utterances.²⁷ Although the role of intersubjectivity in language usually remains implicit or is subtly expressed (e.g., via prosody or sequential placement), sometimes it is realized overtly in the tangible form of a specific word, as in this case. As this and earlier examples attest, the indexical function of *too* and *either* becomes a valuable diagnostic for the individual speaker's obligatory engagement with dialogically constructed intersubjectivity.

One further point about the stance triangle calls for comment here. In the present analysis of stance, the shared stance object obviously plays a critical role, binding the subjectivities of dialogic co-actors together, thereby articulating an intersubjective relation between them. But what about cases which don't seem to involve a shared stance object? This would appear to present a challenge for the present analysis. Yet the argument can be made that the stance triangle applies even in such less-than-transparent cases. While this question deserves a more extended response than can be presented here, a word of commentary may give some idea of what kind of answer will be required. It has been claimed that *all* meaningful use of human language, from the age of about one year, presupposes shared orientations, for example toward a word's referent (Tomasello 1999; Tomasello et al. 2005; see also Hobson 1993). It will be an important task for future research to show how the stance triangle extends naturally to incorporate such observations. In the meantime, in cases where it may not be obvious that the full stance triangle is in play, it is usually possible to break the triangle down into its component vectors (e.g., an individual stance vector constituting the subject-object evaluative relation), and thereby to achieve an insightful, if partial, analysis of stance.

At the outset (Section 2) we considered whether we could set up a distinction between different types of stance. Among the more promising candidates were evaluation, positioning, and alignment. But should we consider these as distinct types, or merely different facets, of stance? The answer may hinge on whether

they regularly occur separately, in complementary distribution, or whether they rather co-occur as different aspects of a single act of stancetaking. The evidence we have seen suggests that they are not so much alternatives as different facets of a more general phenomenon of stance. This is what the stance triangle tries to represent. Since its first introduction (Du Bois 2002a, 2002b) the stance triangle has come to be used in a diverse and informative body of work on stance in interaction (e.g., Haddington 2004, 2005, 2006; Kärkkäinen 2006; Takanashi 2004; see also the papers by Kärkkäinen, Haddington, Keisanen, and Rauniomaa in this volume). The stance triangle has proved well suited to framing effective research questions, without imposing predetermined limitations on what the researcher can undertake to investigate about stance.

7. Discussion

The conception of stance we need is one capable of being situated within a larger mediating framework for linguistic action and interpretation, which is itself grounded in the dialogic dimensions of sociocognitive relations, interactional collaboration, and shared responsibility between conversational co-participants. To come to terms with the complexity of the stance act and its interpretive frame, it is necessary to articulate a systematic approach to understanding what stance is. To do this, we need a way to represent how stance works. We need this if we want to be able to frame questions about how discourse participants achieve stance, and about how the multiplex meanings and consequences of stance play out in the public space of interaction. The framework I have proposed is encapsulated in a triangle, but it must not be forgotten that there is a larger interpretive apparatus that subtends this geometric metaphor. The stance triangle is built on certain basic assumptions about what is needed to constitute a stance, which I have elaborated in some detail in this paper.

I have argued that stance can be analyzed, in its fundamental structure, as a single unified act encompassing three subsidiary acts – in effect, a triune act, or tri-act. I define stance as a public act by a social actor, achieved dialogically through overt communicative means (language, gesture, and other symbolic forms), through which social actors simultaneously evaluate objects, position subjects (themselves and others), and align with other subjects, with respect to any salient dimension of value in the sociocultural field. I have argued for a particular configuration of actors and actions as the defining feature of stance. Key to this configuration is a set of three entities (first subject, second subject, stance object) and a set of three actions (evaluation, positioning, alignment). The analysis of stance in terms of these elements lays the basic foundations on which the

stance triangle is built. But there is more to the stance triangle than this. Crucially, the stance triangle specifies the effective relationships between entities and acts through vectors of stance action. On another level, sociocognitive relations link the subject and object of stance relations, and map one subject-object vector to another to constitute the intersubjective relation. The model shows how stance can be analyzed in terms of a set of triangular relations which link entities via vectors of dialogic co-action and intersubjectivity.

What consequences flow from the triangular model of stance? Here I will point to just a few of the implications that arise. The parallelism of two of the three stance vectors allows us to analyze the phenomenon of alignment, based on an analogy which is partly structural and partly functional. This parallelism may in turn invite analogical inferences (Itkonen 2005; Jakobson 1966; Silverstein 1984). The stance triangle provides a framework for understanding the sociocognitive relations (objective, subjective, intersubjective) that are present in all dialogic interaction, and tries to clarify how these relations are constituted through the stance acts of evaluating objects (objective), positioning subjects (subjective), and aligning with other subjects (intersubjective). Especially in cases involving what I have called the stance differential, the triangle provides leverage to analyze the fine calibration of convergent and divergent alignment in the stancetakers' positioning of themselves relative to others.²⁸

In the world of theory-making, there are many triangles. Why one more? But this is not your average triangle. Most triangle diagrams try to maximize the contrast between three terms selected to display the most important and sharply differentiated abstract concepts in the theory. Here, on the other hand, two of the three points of the triangle are used to represent what amounts to the same thing twice – two stance subjects. This is not done to flout the principle of economy, but because it displays the interchangeability of perspectives (Mead 1934; Schutz 1962) of dialogic stance partners who alternately fill the roles of speaker and hearer, of first subject and second subject, as the polarity of co-action cycles rapidly via the dynamics of dialogic exchange.

Unlike many triangles which remain in the realm of the theoretical, this triangle is meant to be used. The idea is that its general architecture underlies the actual practices of realizing stances and negotiating their significance in particular events of language use. To the extent that it articulates a predictable framework for action, the stance triangle is available to participants as a resource for organizing their evaluative actions on any specific occasion. Looked at from the analyst's perspective, this makes it relevant to describing what is happening in actual instances of stance in interaction. Appropriately deployed, the stance triangle can clarify the array of entities and sociocognitive relations that are activated, constituted, and brought into relation to each other by a particular stance action. In addition, by

allowing us to triangulate between one participant's observable (if partial) stance actions and those of their dialogic partner, the stance triangle provides a way to apprehend the regularity of stance inferencing that brings systematicity to the consequences of stance.

8. Conclusions

Stance is not something you have, not a property of interior psyche, but something you do – something you take. Taking a stance cannot be reduced to a matter of private opinion or attitude. Using the language of Wittgenstein (1953) we might say: There are no private stances. We deploy overt communicative means – speech, gesture, and other forms of symbolic action – to arrive at a dialogic achievement of stance in the public arena. Stance can be imagined as a kind of language game in Wittgenstein's sense, which is to say, it unfolds within a recognized framework for interpreting action. To realize stance dialogically means to invoke a shared framework for co-action with others. Stance must be intelligible within that framework, as it comes into existence in its natural environment of dialogic interaction. The expectation of a well-defined framework for stance remains in play even if the framework must in part be dynamically constituted by the participants themselves in the very act of taking a stance. Stance is an activity built for two (or more). As we maneuver within the constantly shifting field of stances, we find that even our own stance must be enacted collaboratively. Through joint and several acts we engage in the activity of stance, invoking relevant components of the stance frame as we both shape and respond to the multiplex consequences which flow from our actions. Our exceptional agility at managing the dialogic play of stance and counterstance is underlain by an implicit awareness of the structure of the activity system that frames and enables the achievement of stance. Participants use their knowledge of the elements, actions, and vectors of stance – as described here by the stance triangle – to project the multiplex consequences of their own and their partners' unfolding stances.

Stance is best understood in terms of the general structure of the evaluative, positioning, and aligning processes that organize the enactment of stance, rather than as a catalog of the contents of stance, or even – as important as these may be – of the sociocultural value categories that are referenced by stance. This is what the stance triangle tries to achieve: a general level of analysis that can be applied in principle to any instance of stance.²⁹ Stance always combines elements of generality and specificity; but while the stance triangle as a theoretical object is general by design, it is also intended to frame the concrete analysis of specific stances. The general principles governing the stance framework, including principles of dialogic

co-action and the intersubjective organization of sociocognitive relations, impinge on the realization and interpretation of individual stances. Part of the meaning of any stance derives from the manner of its realization in interaction, including the dialogic dimensions of the form it takes. Stance utterances gain added levels of significance through their juxtaposition with other stance utterances. Much of the dialogic quality of stance comes from the way a present stance may resonate with a prior stance, as resonance across stances shapes the sociocognitive alignment between speakers, and thus helps frame intersubjectivity.

The method used here to analyze resonance across successive stance utterances is dialogic syntax (Du Bois 2001), and specifically the diagraph. The diagraph representation depicts the precise resonance relations between two stance utterances, allowing us to probe in finer detail the specific reciprocal relations between sub-portions of the utterances mapped in the diagraph. Given an explicit set of mapping relations between counterpart elements across paired stance utterances, we can go on to draw detailed inferences regarding aspects of the stance differential between the two participants, including convergences and divergences of epistemology, affect, and other regular concerns of stancetakers. The potential is extremely rich for analytical and theoretical cross-fertilization between the methods of the stance triangle and the diagraph. This will be fruitful as long as we remember that dialogic processes must be real for participants if they are to found the claims about stance which are implicit in the stance triangle.

From a dialogic perspective, no stance stands alone. Each stance is already specific with respect to, for example, the participants it indexes, the objects it evaluates, and the dimensions of sociocultural value it invokes. But beyond this, any stance realization is capable of extending its particularity further by entering into unique relationships with other stance realizations, within particular configurations of dialogic exchange. This sets up dialogic juxtapositions of stances which may foreground the structural analogy between pairs of successive stances, yielding a combinatorial explosion of resonance relations, as these are activated across the paired stance utterances. Yet the resources available to participants for interpreting such a diversity of stances are sufficient to the task, while remaining constant and general. The stance triangle – including its component vectors – provides a general account of the framing processes which adapt to both the particularities of the individual stance act and its unique configuration of dialogic-sequential development. The tension between generality and particularity, characteristic of all culturally framed social practice, is necessarily reflected in the interpretation and realization of stance. To resolve this tension, or simply to embrace it, constitutes an ongoing challenge for any theory of stance, including the present one.

Stance is undeniably complex. There is no avoiding the rapid ramification of meaning and consequence as stances emerge from the flux of dialogic interaction. Still, we might wish for something simpler – a take-home message that we can reference to keep a clear focus on the central meaning of stance. What is it that sets stance apart as a research agenda, a way of conceiving and analyzing the nature of linguistic and social action? What is the ultimate import of stance? The short answer: *Stance is an act of evaluation owned by a social actor*. This characterization, while by no means complete, unites three key aspects of social life: act, responsibility, and value. The *act* of stance is performed in the public space of dialogic interaction, where it inherits the peculiar contingencies of all dialogic action, both influencing and being influenced by the co-actions of others. Despite its apparent dependency as a local symbolic action delimited by the uptake of other individuals, stance may be among the most broadly consequential of social actions in its cumulative effects – an act whose force can be measured by its effective penetration into virtually all domains of sociocultural life. *Responsibility*, the second element in this capsule cameo of stance, comes with ownership. In the dialogic shop of stances, there's a rule: If you take it, you own it. Responsibility for the stance act is serious business, with potentially profound consequences for the relationships of stance actors with their dialogically co-responsible partners and with their expanding networks of social relations along wider horizons of time and space. Because stance responsibility is of interest to all within the stancetaking community of discourse, the question of who took which stance is perennially salient, is remembered over time, and counts as negotiable coin in the currency of reported discourse. Through its open-ended social circulation, stance (and meta-stance narratives) can only expand its role in the broader calculus of social meaning. Third, *value* is what stance is all about – literally. Stance always invokes, explicitly or implicitly, presupposed systems of sociocultural value, while at the same time contributing to the enactment and reproduction of those systems. Social actors are accountable for how they manage and indeed reshape the systems of social value on which we all depend. In sum, ownership of stance is the glue that binds the stance act together with actor responsibility and sociocultural value, so that all is linked to a social actor with a name, a history, an identity. As players in the language-game of stance, we've all got some skin in the game. We make it our business to know where the other players stand, who they stand with, and where they're headed. And we care about the state of the game, too: how it is played, who plays it well and fairly, in what condition the players leave the turf – and what all of this implies for the environs of sociocultural value in which we all must live.

We are left with a view of the stance act as, perhaps, the smallest unit of social action. Such a fundamental status will be justified if stance can be shown to

bind together the minimum structures necessary to attain the force of social action. This is what the stance triangle aims to represent: the minimum structure of stance as dialogic action. In depicting the co-participants' joint evaluative orientation to a shared stance object, the stance triangle proposes a framework for understanding the dialogic realization of intersubjectivity in a way that is capable of embracing both convergence and contestation. To be sure, it may seem counterintuitive to locate contestation *within* intersubjectivity, rather than to simply demand mute agreement to the normative assumptions of social reality as the conventional prerequisite to communication. But the evidence from stance in interaction is clear: convergence and divergence of evaluative alignment are equally at home in the dialogic engagement of co-participants. If the stance triangle is to have analytic value in the end, it must come from striving to represent at once the unity, and the ambivalence, of stance as it emerges in dialogic interaction.

Notes

1. My understanding of stance as presented here has developed during the course of a series of presentations at conferences and symposia, including at the meetings of the American Anthropological Association, New Orleans (2002); Volkswagen Foundation conference on Rhetoric Culture, Johannes Gutenberg University, Mainz (2002); Kroeber Anthropological Society, Berkeley (2003); a lecture series on stance and dialogic syntax, Oulu, Finland (2003); LangNet Symposium, Oulu (2003); Fulbright lecture, Södertörn University, Södertörn, Sweden (2004); and, finally, culminating in a presentation on "The Intersubjectivity of Interaction" at the 10th Rice Symposium, on Stancetaking in Discourse, at Rice University, Houston (2004). My research on 'too' and 'either' in the Santa Barbara Corpus was presented at the Rice Symposium and in fuller form at the International Computer Archive of Modern and Medieval English (ICAME), University of Verona (Du Bois 2004). In addition, early versions of my ideas about stance were presented in a series of colloquia during this period at the Linguistics Department and the group on Language, Interaction, and Social Organization (LISO) at the University of California, Santa Barbara. I have benefited greatly from discussion with all these audiences, for which I am grateful. I am especially thankful for comments on earlier versions of this work from Mira Ariel, Mary Bucholtz, Patricia Clancy, Robert Englebretson, Rachel Giora, Pentti Haddington, William Hanks, John Haviland, Susan Hunston, Cornelia Ilie, Adam Jaworski, Elise Kärkkäinen, Tiina Keisanen, Amy Kyrtzis, Gene Lerner, John Lucy, Mirka Rauniomaa, Geoffrey Raymond, Joanne Scheibman, Robin Shoaps, Michael Silverstein, Hiroko Takanashi, Sandra Thompson, and an anonymous reviewer for the present volume.

2. See the Appendix for transcription conventions. Note that some of the transcriptions have been simplified for the sake of clarity. For example, square brackets for overlapping speech have been omitted when the cited example doesn't include the other half of the pair of overlapping utterances. For full transcription details, the original sources may be consulted, as described in the following note.

3. Most of the examples in this paper are taken from conversations in the Santa Barbara Corpus of Spoken American English (Parts 1 and 2). The source citation gives the title of the dis-

course in italics (e.g., *Lambada*), followed by the identifying number of the discourse in the Santa Barbara Corpus of Spoken American English (e.g., SBC002). The final portion of the citation for each excerpt consists of two numbers, representing respectively the start time and end time in seconds. With this information it is possible for interested readers to listen to the appropriate portion of the relevant audio file (e.g., SBC002.WAV) by accessing the Santa Barbara Corpus as published on CD and DVD (Du Bois et al. 2000; Du Bois et al. 2003), or on the internet. Further information on contents of and access to the Santa Barbara Corpus of Spoken American English is available at <http://www.linguistics.ucsb.edu/research/sbcorpus.html>.

4. The predicate *amazed* can be understood as incorporating, in addition to its affective dimension, a salient epistemic dimension as well.

5. The source of this example, cited as LSAC, is the Longman Spoken American Corpus. The LSAC is a five million word corpus of spoken American English conversation, recorded under my direction by researchers from UC Santa Barbara. Conversations in the LSAC were recorded all over the United States using expertise and methodology developed for the Santa Barbara Corpus of Spoken American English and corpus design concepts developed by Longman in their work helping to build the British National Corpus. The LSAC was developed under contract to Longman publishers.

6. The names of speakers are arbitrarily assigned pseudonyms. The following is a key to the original labels in the LSAC corpus for the speakers cited here: in LSAC 1396-01, CORA=<1828> and LESLIE=<1829>; in LSAC 1296-02, KIM=<1564> and PAT=<1565>.

7. Alternatively, agreement can be articulated in relation to the proposition expressed by a co-participant – the stance content of a prior utterance, as denoted, for example, by the word *that* in *I agree with that*.

8. Names used for speakers are pseudonyms.

9. In explicating the interpretation of a stance in its dialogic context, I have sometimes ventured a paraphrase of the "content" of the stance as it has emerged from the successive contributions of several participants. The problem is that the paraphrase usually comes across as too explicit or too literal in character. A summary paraphrase cannot do justice to the specific quality of the actual stance as it emerges dialogically in discourse. This is because to paraphrase is to attempt to give a monologic approximation of a stance that may have taken two people to create dialogically in the first place. The challenge of precisely and perspicuously describing stances that emerge in dialogic interaction is a serious one, which deserves more attention than we can give it here.

10. The content of Kim's stance is constituted as *no more or no less than any other school*. (This phrasing is admittedly rather opaque in itself, but unfortunately this cannot be clarified without expending a lot more time and space than is warranted for the present example; nevertheless, the general point about alignment should be sufficiently clear.) This is to be distinguished from the final portion of the utterance (*is the way I see it*), which pertains narrowly to Kim's framing of the proposition. This is a parenthetical framing of self-positioning, not part of the stance proposition as such, so the framing phrase is interpreted as outside the scope of Pat's agreeing move. Alignment markers like the verb *agree* typically pick out just the stance content or stance proposition, leaving the previous speaker's metalinguistic framing or self-positioning out of the calculus of stance alignment. How this works in detail on a structural level is a rich topic for further analysis.

11. To be sure, Melissa's use of the modal *should* introduces a subtle shift which slyly mitigates the directive force of Jan's original unmitigated imperative.

12. For a rich treatment of agreement from the perspective of conversation analysis, see Heritage (2002) and Heritage and Raymond (2005).
13. In most of the examples presented in this paper, the stance subject can be taken to be more or less equivalent to the speaking subject. But things are not always so simple, as is clear from the sophisticated analyses of the *sujet de l'énonciation* by the cited authors, as well as from characterization of the multivocality of certain kinds of utterances (Bakhtin [1934] 1981; Goffman 1981; cf. Agha 2005). While the complex case of multivocality is very interesting to consider from the perspective of the stance triangle, this must await a separate treatment.
14. In other words, they are intentional predicates, in the philosophical sense (Searle 1983).
15. There are additional interesting issues here having to do with the incremental realization of Randy's turn, the timing of pauses, and what could be considered a lengthy delay on Lance's part in coming in with *I'm glad*. But these issues are largely orthogonal to the present discussion.
16. How this stance develops over time and across speakers is of some interest. Jeff's affective stance utterance in line 4 builds off of Jill's prior *yes* in line 2, which in turn endorses Jeff's own setting of the question in line 1. This can be considered an instance of other-positioning (line 1). I have developed the concept of other-positioning to account for cases in which the first subject (speaking subject) proposes a candidate stance for the second subject (addressee), with varying degrees of impositive force. Given that this often seems to provide the best analysis for, e.g. ordinary questions, the phenomenon of other-questioning is surprisingly commonplace. (For application of this concept to questioning by interviewers in television news formats, see Haddington 2005, and Haddington this volume.)
17. This number represents the intonation unit number (or line number), counting from the beginning of the published transcription.
18. This is not to suggest that an epistemic paraphrase tells the whole story of Dan's *I don't know*, which may have as much (or more) to do with an act of demurral that hedges and blurs his response to (and responsibility for) the candidate stance (other-positioning, see note 16) that Jennifer presents him with. But that's another story.
19. More precisely, it is intonation units (Chafe 1993; Du Bois et al. 1993) that generally define the rows (or "strands") of a diagraph. Based on my research (Du Bois 2001), intonation units represent the most salient and productive unit for dialogic mapping in conversation. Where information about the intonation unit is unavailable, the most viable alternative for identifying the rows of a diagraph would generally be the clause.
20. One can try to imagine special circumstances in which the pronoun *I* is given heavy contrastive stress (suggesting that it is only *I*, but not *you*, who don't know if she'd do it), but this would be quite unusual.
21. My terms here are modeled on the notion of *gaze follow(ing)* (Tomasello 1999: 62–67; Tomasello et al. 2005), which is parallel to the phenomenon of stance follow in interesting ways. For a related notion, see discussion in conversation analysis of the interactional negotiation of turn status as epistemically "first" (=lead) or "second" (=follow) (Heritage and Raymond 2005).
22. Note that the self-positioning act defines a vector which emanates from a subject and reflects back on that same subject. To explicitly represent both source and target of the reflexive vector of self-positioning would involve a circular arrow originating in the subject and reflecting back on itself. Rather than display such an arrow in this simple diagram of the stance triangle, we show only the head of the arrow for the self-positioning vector, as it reflects back on the stance subject. This reflection can be seen as being triggered by a sort of "blowback" from the

subject's act of evaluating the stance object. (Other-positioning requires a significantly more elaborate notation, and thus is not represented in Figure 1.)

23. The stance diagram incorporates aspects of the stance diagram (see discussion of examples (30)–(31)), such as the labeling of stance roles (stance subject, stance object) and functions (evaluation, positioning, alignment), combined with aspects of the diagraph, such as the inclusion of multiple lines representing dialogically resonating utterances, with vertical alignment of elements to iconically display which are resonating with which.
24. While the dialogic resonance in lines 5 and 7 between Lenore and Joanne is interesting in that the intersubjective stance differential is subtly realized through an audible contrast located primarily in the intonational difference (*Yeah*. : *Yeah?*), it will not be diagrammed here for reasons of space.
25. The passage continues with several further developments regarding this stance negotiation, but a fuller analysis of these events must be reserved for another occasion.
26. While it is beyond the scope of this article to lay out all the conditions governing the use of *too* and *either*, one key factor can be mentioned here: the use of subjective intentional stance predicates such as *like*, *love*, *know*, *think*, and *want* (Du Bois 2004).
27. This is not to say that *too* and *either* always function as diagnostics for intersubjectivity. Aside from their high frequency use in marking intersubjective pragmatic relations, both words can be used to mark referential semantic relations as well (although in spoken discourse this objective function is much rarer than the (inter-)subjective function presented here (Du Bois 2004)). Conversely, there are many intersubjective contexts in which these particular indexical forms do not appear. While *too* and *either* should be recognized as powerful diagnostics for intersubjectivity when their conditions of use are applicable, the analysis of intersubjectivity in language must draw on a wide variety of additional tools, including diagraph analysis.
28. The stance triangle bears an important relation to the systems of sociocultural value that stances invoke and reproduce, as social actors position themselves and evaluate entities with respect to specific values along any socially salient dimension of the sociocultural field. How stancetaking processes both invoke and construct the associated systems of sociocultural value is a critical issue which we can only point to in this paper, but one which represents a prime topic for further research.
29. While the inclusion of the shared stance object – seemingly a specialized property of certain kinds of stance exchanges – might seem to limit the general applicability of the stance triangle, from a dialogic perspective it can be argued that a shared orientation to a stance object is a general property, not only of stance acts but of the use of language in general (see the discussion at the end of Section 6). But that is a long story, and must be reserved for another occasion.

References

- Agha, A. 2005. "Voice, footing, enregisterment." *Journal of Linguistic Anthropology* 15: 38–59.
- Bakhtin, M. [1934]1981. *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays by M.M. Bakhtin*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
- Benveniste, E. 1971. "Subjectivity in language." In *Problems in General Linguistics*, E.M. Meek (trans), 223–230. Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press.

- Berman, R.A., Ragnarsdóttir, H. and Strömqvist, S. 2002. "Discourse stance." *Written Language and Literacy* 5: 255–290.
- Berman, R.A. 2005. "Introduction: Developing discourse stance in different text types and languages." *Journal of Pragmatics* 37: 105–124.
- Besnier, N. 1993. "Reported speech and affect on Nukulaelae atoll." In *Responsibility and Evidence in Oral Discourse*, J.H. Hill and J.T. Irvine (eds.), 161–181. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Blanche-Benveniste, C., Bilger, M., Rouget, C. and van den Eynde, K. 1991. *Le français parlé: Études grammaticales*. Paris: Éditions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique.
- Bruner, J. 1986. *Actual Minds, Possible Worlds*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Chafe, W.L. 1993. "Prosodic and functional units of language." In *Talking Data: Transcription and Coding in Discourse Research*, J.A. Edwards and M.D. Lampert (eds.), 33–43. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Chafe, W.L. 1994. *Discourse, Consciousness, and Time: The Flow and Displacement of Conscious Experience in Speaking and Writing*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Clancy, P.M. 1999. "The socialization of affect in Japanese mother-child conversation." *Journal of Pragmatics* 31: 1397–1421.
- Clift, R. 2006. "Indexing stance: Reported speech as an interactional evidential." *Journal of Sociolinguistics* 10: 569–595.
- Conrad, S. and Biber, D. 2000. "Adverbial marking of stance in speech and writing." In *Evaluation in Text: Authorial Stance and the Construction of Discourse*, S. Hunston and G. Thompson (eds.), 56–73. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Culioli, A. 1990. *Pour une linguistique de l'énonciation*. Paris: Ophrys.
- Davies, B. and Harré, R. 1990. "Positioning: Conversation and the production of selves." *Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior* 20: 43–63.
- Du Bois, J.W. 1991. "Transcription design principles for spoken discourse research." *Pragmatics* 1: 71–106.
- Du Bois, J.W. 2001. *Towards a Dialogic Syntax*. Ms., Department of Linguistics, University of California, Santa Barbara.
- Du Bois, J.W. 2002a. "Stance and consequence." Paper presented at Annual Meetings of the American Anthropological Association, New Orleans, LA, November 20–24.
- Du Bois, J.W. 2002b. "Dialogic rhetoric: Stance and intersubjectivity in the syntax of engagement." Paper presented at Volkswagen Foundation conference on "Rhetoric Culture," Johannes Gutenberg University, Mainz, July 4–7.
- Du Bois, J.W. 2004. "Searching for intersubjectivity: 'Too' and 'either' in stance alignment." Paper presented at 25th Conference of the International Computer Archive of Modern and Medieval English (ICAME), University of Verona.
- Du Bois, J.W., Schuetze-Coburn, S., Cumming, S. and Paolino, D. 1993. "Outline of discourse transcription." In *Talking Data: Transcription and Coding in Discourse Research*, J.A. Edwards and M.D. Lampert (eds.), 45–89. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Du Bois, J.W., Chafe, W.L., Meyer, C. and Thompson, S.A. 2000. *Santa Barbara Corpus of Spoken American English*, CD, Part 1. Philadelphia: Linguistic Data Consortium.
- Du Bois, J.W., Chafe, W.L., Meyer, C., Thompson, S.A. and Martey, N. 2003. *Santa Barbara Corpus of Spoken American English*, CD, Part 2. Philadelphia: Linguistic Data Consortium.
- Ducrot, O. 1972. *Dire et ne pas dire*. Paris: Hermann.
- Ducrot, O. 1984. *Le dire et le dit*. Paris: Minuit.
- Geertz, C. 1973. *The Interpretation of Cultures*. New York: Basic Books.
- Goffman, E. 1981. "Footing." In *Forms of Talk*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Goodwin, C. and Goodwin, M.H. 1992. "Assessments and the construction of context." In *Rethinking Context: Language as an Interactive Phenomenon*, A. Duranti and C. Goodwin (eds.), 147–189. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Goodwin, M.H. 2006. *The hidden life of girls: Games of stance, status, and exclusion*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Gumperz, J.J. 1992. "Contextualization and understanding." In *Rethinking Context: Language as an Interactive Phenomenon*, A. Duranti and C. Goodwin (eds.), 229–252. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Haddington, P. 2004. "Stance taking in news interviews." *SKY Journal of Linguistics* 17: 101–142.
- Haddington, P. 2005. *The Intersubjectivity of Stance Taking in Talk-in-Interaction*. Ph.D. dissertation. English Department, University of Oulu: Oulu University Press.
- Haddington, P. 2006. "The organization of gaze and assessments as resources for stance taking." *Text and Talk* 26: 281–328.
- Hanks, W.F. 1990. *Referential Practice: Language and Lived Space Among the Maya*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Harris, Z.S. 1952. "Discourse analysis." *Language* 28: 1–30.
- Haviland, J.B. 1991. "Sure, sure: Evidence and affect." *Text* 9: 27–68.
- Haviland, J.B. 1996. "Projections, transpositions, and relativity." In *Rethinking Linguistic Relativity*, J.J. Gumperz and S.C. Levinson (eds.), 271–323. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Heritage, J. 2002. "Oh-prefaced responses to assessments: A method of modifying agreement/disagreement." In *The Language of Turn and Sequence*, C.E. Ford, B.A. Fox and S.A. Thompson (eds.), 196–224. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Heritage, J. and Raymond, G. 2005. "The terms of agreement: Indexing epistemic authority and subordination in talk-in-interaction." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 68: 15–38.
- Hill, J.H. and Irvine, J.T. (eds.). 1993. *Evidence and Responsibility in Oral Discourse*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hobson, R.P. 1993. *Autism and the development of mind*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Hunston, S. and Sinclair, J.M. 2000. "A local grammar of evaluation." In *Evaluation in Text: Authorial Stance and the Construction of Discourse*, S. Hunston and G. Thompson (eds.), 74–101. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hunston, S. and Thompson, G. 2000. *Evaluation in Text: Authorial Stance and the Construction of Discourse*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Itkonen, E. 2005. *Analogy as Structure and Process*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- Jakobson, R. [1957]1990. "Shifters and verbal categories." In *On Language: Roman Jakobson, L.R. Waugh and M. Monville-Burston (eds.)*, 386–392. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Jakobson, R. 1966. "Grammatical parallelism and its Russian facet." *Language* 42: 398–429.
- Jakobson, R. 1981. "Poetry of grammar and grammar of poetry." In *Selected Writings, Vol. 3: Poetry of Grammar and Grammar of Poetry*, 87–97. The Hague: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Jefferson, G. 2004. "Glossary of transcript symbols with an introduction." In *Conversation Analysis: Studies from the First Generation*, G.H. Lerner (ed.), 13–31. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- Johnstone, B. (ed.). 1994. *Repetition in Discourse: Interdisciplinary Perspectives*. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

- Kärkkäinen, E. 2003a. "Is she vicious or dense?": Dialogic practices of stance taking in conversation." In *Santa Barbara Papers in Linguistics 12: Recent Studies in Empirical Approaches to Language*, T. Nakayama, T. Ono and H. Tao (eds.), 47–65. Santa Barbara: University of California, Santa Barbara.
- Kärkkäinen, E. 2003b. *Epistemic Stance in English Conversation: A Description of its Interactional Functions, with a Focus on 'I think'*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- Kärkkäinen, E. 2006. "Stance taking in conversation: From subjectivity to intersubjectivity." *Text & Talk* 26: 699–731.
- Kidwell, M. and Zimmerman, D.H. 2006. "Observability" in the interactions of very young children." *Communication Monographs* 73: 1–28.
- Kockelman, P. 2004. "Stance and subjectivity." *Journal of Linguistic Anthropology* 14: 127–150.
- Labov, W. and Waletzky, J. 1967. "Narrative analysis: Oral versions of personal experience." In *Essays on the Verbal and Visual Arts*, J. Helm (ed.), 12–44. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- Langacker, R.W. 1987. *Foundations of Cognitive Grammar, Vol. 1: Theoretical Prerequisites*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Langacker, R.W. 1991. *Concept, Image, and Symbol: The Cognitive Basis of Grammar*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Lemke, J.L. 1998. "Resources for attitudinal meaning: Evaluative orientations in text semantics." *Functions of Language* 5: 33–56.
- Linde, C. 1997. "Evaluation as linguistic structure and social practice." In *The Construction of Professional Discourse*, B.-L. Gunnarsson, P. Linell and B. Nordberg (eds.), 151–172. New York: Addison Wesley Longman.
- Linell, P. 1998. *Approaching Dialogue: Talk, Interaction, and Contexts in Dialogical Perspectives*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- Lucy, J.A. (ed.). 1993. *Reflexive Language: Reported Speech and Metapragmatics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Macken-Horakik, M. and Martin, J.R. 2003. *Negotiating heteroglossia: Social perspectives on evaluation* (Special Issue). *Text* 23.
- Martin, J.R. 2000. "Beyond exchange: APPRAISAL systems in English." In *Evaluation in Text: Authorial Stance and the Construction of Discourse*, S. Hunston and G. Thompson (eds.), 142–175. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Maynard, S.K. 1993. *Discourse Modality: Subjectivity, Emotion, and Voice in The Japanese Language*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- Mead, G.H. 1934. *Mind, Self, and Society*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Moore, C., and Dunham, P.J. (eds.). 1995. *Joint attention: Its origins and role in development*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Ochs, E. 1988. *Culture and Language Development: Language Acquisition and Language Socialization in a Samoan Village*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ochs, E. 1996. "Linguistic resources for socializing humanity." In *Rethinking Linguistic Relativity*, J.J. Gumperz and S.C. Levinson (eds.), 407–437. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Peirce, C.S. [1885]1933. "Three kinds of signs." In *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, Vol. 3, C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss (eds.), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Pomerantz, A. 1984. "Agreeing and disagreeing with assessments: Some features found in preferred/dispreferred turn shapes." In *Structures of Social Action*, J.M. Atkinson and J. Heritage (eds.), 57–101. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Recanati, F. 1989. "The pragmatics of what is said." *Mind and Language* 4: 295–328.
- Sacks, H. 1992. *Lectures on Conversation*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Schegloff, E.A. 1996. "Confirming allusions: Toward an empirical account of action." *American Journal of Sociology* 102: 161–216.
- Scheibman, J. 2002. *Point of View and Grammar: Structural Patterns of Subjectivity in American English Conversation*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- Schutz, A. 1962. *Collected Papers I. The Problem of Social Reality*. The Hague: Nijhoff.
- Searle, J.R. 1983. *Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Shoaps, R.A. 2002. "Pray earnestly": The textual construction of personal involvement in Pentecostal prayer and song." *Journal of Linguistic Anthropology* 12: 34–71.
- Shoaps, R.A. 2004. *Morality in Grammar and Discourse: Stance-taking and the Negotiation of Moral Personhood in Sakapultek (Mayan) Wedding Counsels*. Ph.D. dissertation. Linguistics Department, University of California, Santa Barbara.
- Silverstein, M. 1976. "Shifters, verbal categories, and cultural description." In *Meaning in Anthropology*, K.H. Basso and H. Selby (eds.), 11–55. Albuquerque: School of American Research.
- Silverstein, M. 1984. "On the pragmatic poetry of prose: Parallelism, repetition, and cohesive structure in the time course of dyadic conversation." In *Meaning, Form, and Use in Context: Linguistic Applications*, D. Schiffrin (ed.), Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
- Silverstein, M. 2001. "The limits of awareness." In *Linguistic Anthropology: A Reader*, A. Duranti (ed.), 382–401. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Sperber, D. and Wilson, D. 1995. *Relevance: Communication and Cognition*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Takanashi, H. 2004. *The Interactional Co-Construction of Play in Japanese Conversation*. Ph.D. dissertation. Linguistics Department, University of California, Santa Barbara.
- Tannen, D. 1987. "Repetition in conversation: Towards a poetics of talk." *Language* 63: 574–605.
- Thompson, G. and Hunston, S. 2000. "Evaluation: An introduction." In *Evaluation in Text: Authorial Stance and the Construction of Discourse*, S. Hunston and G. Thompson (eds.), 1–27. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Thompson, S.A. and Mulac, A. 1991. "A quantitative perspective on the grammaticalization of epistemic parentheticals in English." In *Approaches to Grammaticalization, Vol. 2: Focus on Types of Grammatical Markers*, E.C. Traugott and B. Heine (eds.), 313–329. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- Thompson, S.A. and Hopper, P.J. 2001. "Transitivity, clause structure, and argument structure: Evidence from conversation." In *Frequency and the Emergence of Linguistic Structure*, J.L. Bybee and P.J. Hopper (eds.), 27–60. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- Tomasello, M. 1999. *The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Tomasello, M., Carpenter, M., Call, J., Behne, T., and Moll, H. 2005. "Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition." *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 28: 675–735.
- Traugott, E.C. 1989. "On the rise of epistemic meanings in English: An example of subjectification in semantic change." *Language* 65: 31–55.
- Voloshinov, V.N. [1929]1973. *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

- Vygotsky, L.S. 1986. *Thought and Language*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Wittgenstein, L. 1953. *Philosophical Investigations*. New York: MacMillan.

Appendix: Transcription conventions

The transcription symbols and conventions used in this paper are largely as in Du Bois et al. (1992), although there have been a number of significant updates in my more recent transcription practice. The most relevant symbols are given below. (For further details see <http://www.linguistics.ucsb.edu/projects/transcription/representing>).

Meaning	Symbol	Comments
intonation unit	<u>LINE</u>	one new line for each intonation unit
speaker/turn attribution	JILL;	semicolon follows name in CAPS
simultaneous speech	[]	brackets show overlap start and end
pause, timed	(1.2)	pause duration in seconds
hold (micro-pause)	..	less than 150 milliseconds
lag (prosodic lengthening)	:	colon marks slowing of local tempo
breath	(H)	audible inhalation
laugh	@	one symbol for each pulse of laughter
unintelligible	###	one symbol per unintelligible syllable
uncertain hearing	#you're #kidding	transcribed words are uncertain
pseudograph	~Jill	name change to preserve anonymity