

BOUNDARIES, TOPICS, AND THE STRUCTURE OF DISCOURSE

AN INVESTIGATION OF THE ANCIENT GREEK PARTICLE DÉ

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ABSTRACT

In this article, a discussion is offered of the Ancient Greek particle *dé* in terms of *boundary-marking*. “Boundary” is treated as the manifestation in discourse of the interaction between topicalization and discourse structure. The marking of boundaries, therefore, subsumes such functions as topic marking and intersentential (interparagraph) connection. *Dé* is described as a boundary-marker and is shown to have a function in various types and at various levels of discourse. While in the oldest Greek (Homeric epic) *dé* is used to mark the segmentation that results from the online “continuative” production of spoken discourse, in later, written discourse the particle is used for a variety of functions: from local, intrasentential subject topic switch (“switch-reference”) to the setting of ‘frames’ in discourse, and from the marking of boundaries that are “content-oriented” to rhetorically highly marked segmentation.

1. Introduction¹

In recent years it has become increasingly clear in discourse-centered linguistics that the analysis of the syntax of isolated sentences is a methodology that has outlived its usefulness for the study of “topic” and of its coding in the grammars of languages. “Topics” are not just the “given” information in a sentence, or the entities a given sentence “says” something “about”. For those linguists who argue that grammar can only be studied in the way in which it shapes texts, it is more fruitful to conceive of “topic” as a discourse notion, applying, e.g., to the degree of continuity in the tracking of the referents of a discourse (Givón, ed. 1983), or, alternatively, to the structure of the discourse itself. Viewed in this broader discourse

perspective, “topic” and its marking in discourse cannot be discussed in isolation from a second important notion in the analysis of texts: the marking of *boundaries* dividing a discourse into larger or smaller segments. It is with the functional correlation between topics and boundaries in discourse that the present paper is concerned.

“Topic” has been mainly discussed as a content-oriented, semantic phenomenon, in terms of what a text “is about”.² This approach is useful to the extent that, obviously, texts are “about” something. But, equally obviously, this “something” in itself cannot determine the structure of a text. The structure of texts is due to the way in which they are *produced* or *presented*, or both, and it is here that boundary-marking comes in. Boundaries (intonational and/or marked with grammatical means) may occur as a consequence of the production of oral text, as a reflex of the cognitive processes of the speaker. Or boundaries may be “rhetorical” in that they have to do with the conscious, deliberate presentation of the discourse. In this latter case, boundary-marking, as a part of general strategies connected with discourse presentation, is often indissolubly bound up with topic-marking. Both “cognitive” and “rhetorical” boundaries will play a role in this paper.

The marking of boundaries in discourse has acquired a special significance in the light of the recent insight that the celebrated notion of *switch-reference* has a much more limited application than has been previously assumed. Or, to put it differently, it is becoming clear that the *markers* of switch-reference have a much *wider* application than just indicating a subject- (topic-)switch on sentence-level.³ The local switch-function appears to be, in many cases, a special application of boundary-marking as a wider discourse phenomenon. The use of boundary markers in actual discourse (not just isolated and/or elicited sentences) suggests that it makes sense to assume a *hierarchical ordering* of the various functions of such markers, from local, where the discontinuity marked may not consist in anything more than a topic/subject switch, to global, when larger segments of texts are set off from each other.

In this article, I present, as a sample treatment of a boundary marker along the lines indicated (types and hierarchies of boundaries), a description of the use of the particle *dé* in Ancient Greek. This particle can be shown to function in discourse as a marker of boundaries which run a gamut of various types and “strengths”, from semantic to cognitive, and from local switch-reference to global text-organization. In traditional grammatical

terms, *dé* can be characterized as a connective particle: it connects a given discourse unit (clause, sentence, paragraph) to the preceding discourse and in doing so effects a boundary between two discourse units. In this capacity, *dé* should be distinguished from the connective particle *kaí*, which connects items *within* a discourse unit and which can as such be said, as a continuous discourse marker, to operate under the scope of *dé* (see especially exx. (12)-(13) in Section 4.2 below).⁴

The organization of the paper is as follows: in Section 2 I give a short overview of the most characteristic ways in which *dé* has been dealt with in Greek linguistics; Section 3 deals with the use of *dé* in oral discourse, the epic poetry of Homer: this will be the proper place to introduce the notion of “cognitive boundary” mentioned above. In Section 4, the central part of the paper, I discuss the interaction of boundary-marking with topics/themes in written narrative discourse. Section 5 deals with segmentation exploited for rhetorical purposes (focusing and emphasis), and in Section 6, finally, the relation between discourse boundaries and antithesis (contrast) will be discussed.

2. Previous approaches

A number of discussions have been devoted to *dé* in Greek descriptive linguistics, the most important of which are Kühner-Gerth (1904: 261 ff.) and Ruijgh (1971: 128 ff.).⁵ In these accounts, diametrically opposed descriptions of *dé* are presented: both consider what the other thinks is “derivative” to be the basic meaning of *dé*.

Kühner-Gerth (1898-1904), one of the major German reference grammars of Ancient Greek, discuss *dé* under the general heading “Beiordnung”, co-ordination. According to Kühner-Gerth (1904: 261 ff.), *dé* is an “adversative” connective particle, originating from an adverb with the sense “however”, “on the other hand” (“andererseits”). The basic sense of the particle is considered to be similar to that of *aber* (“but”), albeit with a wider application. The adversative relation expressed by *dé*, the description goes, can be strong, or weak to the point at which German language users would not feel any “adversative relation” anymore and would use *und* (“and”). In this weakest use, *dé* merely juxtaposes the one “thought” to the other, instead of highlighting an adversative relation between them.

Kühner-Gerth’s account of *dé* in terms of an opposition between two “thoughts” is highly characteristic of the approach to language and texts in

Classical philology: it is at the same time “semantic” (i.e. entirely directed to what a text “expresses”, viz. “thoughts”) and sentence-bound.⁶ But “thoughts” alone do not make a text, nor do “sentences”, and to dissociate *dé* (as well as other grammatical devices) from the structure and organization of texts is to miss the essence of its use.

Ruijgh (1971: 128 ff.) takes what Kühner-Gerth consider to be the derivative use as the basic meaning of *dé*. For him, the “fundamental value” of *dé* is the marking of the transition of one “new fact” to the other. Hence Ruijgh’s term “transitive” for what *dé* does in texts. The “new fact-element”, according to Ruijgh, accounts for a number of recurrent properties of the contexts in which *dé* is used, the most important of which is the fact that many sentences with *dé* have a different subject from the one that precedes; according to Ruijgh, this can be easily explained on the basis of the “new fact element”: when a “new fact” is presented, chances are high that the sentence or clause expressing this “fact” has a new/different subject (1971: 132).

In contrast with Kühner-Gerth, Ruijgh’s account of *dé* implies something dynamic in that it involves the *transition* from one “fact” to a new one, rather than the static opposition of two thoughts. As I will argue in the next section, this account quite accurately characterizes (apart from the vagueness of the term “fact”) the use of *dé* in *oral* texts (specifically: the epic poetry of Homer [*Iliad* and *Odyssey*, 8th cent. BC]) as the marker of what I called above “cognitive boundaries” (cp. the use of *and* in English oral discourse). It is less suited, however, to account for the use of *dé* in later written texts, where boundaries are much more closely connected with the structure of discourse and with the topical elements effecting that structure. In these later texts, as we will see, a new or switched subject is much more than just a possible consequence of the fact that a “new fact” is expressed. Consequently, Ruijgh’s denial that *dé* has anything to do directly with topic-switching is valid without problems for Homeric Greek only.⁷

3. Homeric Greek: the linkage of intonation units

The type of segmentation in a text depends on the nature of the text in terms of structuring and production. This implies a specific use of *dé* in oral texts that is different from that in the later, Classical texts of the 5th and 4th century BC.

In ongoing oral discourse, the main type of segmentation is due to cognitive constraints on the flow of information. According to Chafe (1980, 1982, 1987, 1989), “speaking” amounts to the activation of relatively small pieces of information in the speaker’s consciousness. Each of these information units forms a “mental buffer” that has to be emptied (i.e., transformed into speech) before a new one can be activated. This is a dynamic process which leaves traces in the discourse produced. As Chafe notes, oral discourse is not a smoothly flowing stream of information. Instead, it has a *fragmented* quality: in oral discourse, information is presented in small chunks of about equal length, with pauses in between. Chafe calls these small units, on the basis of their most salient physical property, *intonation units*. Intonation units are the reflection of the cognitive processes of the speaker in that each of them is a verbalization of a piece of information focused on in the speaker’s consciousness.

The typical flow of thought and the concomitant “production” of intonation units comes with its own, typically oral, syntax, which consists in the monitoring of the cognitive processes of the speaker (the dynamic transition from one focus of consciousness to the other), rather than in the marking of the rhetorical articulation of a text. Specifically, intonation units in ongoing oral discourse may be linked to each other, which involves a use of connective particles which is quite different from that in planned written texts. Chafe (1989: 10 ff.) discusses a number of linkage markers in English in this light, of which the most frequently used is *and*. This connective can be characterized as a continuative device, signaling that a given intonation unit has to be understood as the continuation of what precedes (see also Schiffrin 1987: 150, Beaman 1984: 60-1). As Chafe notes, the continuation effected by *and* is more than just the rephrasing of something said earlier: something “new” has to be added to the chain of ideas already uttered.

Chafe’s and Schiffrin’s characterization of *and* in oral English discourse fully applies to the function of *dé* in the metrical discourse of the Homeric epic. *Dé* appears to be the most frequent marker of the most frequent type of boundary in Homeric discourse, functioning as the most neutral linkage marker between two clausal intonation units. Its function is not so much coordination as *progression, continuation*.⁸ Consider:⁹

- (1) a. And (*dé*) Hector from his chariot,
 b. with all his armour on he jumped;
 c. and (*dé*) brandishing his sharp spears,
 d. he went all over the army,

- e. exhorting his men to fight;
- f. and (*dé*) he roused fierce battle;
- g. and (*dé*) they rallied and (*kai*) faced the Greeks;
- h. and (*dé*) the Greeks on their part,
- i. they strengthened their rows;
- j. and (*dé*) battle was prepared;
- k. and (*dé*) they stood opposite each other;
- l. and (*dé*) Agamemnon was the first to rush forward;
- m. and (*dé*) he wanted to fight ahead of everyone else.

(Homer, *Iliad* 11,211-217)

This passage has to be viewed as a piece of ongoing oral narrative showing (stylized) traces of its cognitive production (see also Bakker 1990, 1993); it can be analyzed as a succession of intonation units, by which the narrator proceeds from one idea to the other in his description of the preparation for a battle between the two warring parties in the *Iliad*, the Greeks and the Trojans. The boundaries between the units constitute the primary type of segmentation of this text. Whenever a unit is an entire clause (as in f, g, j, k, l and m) or the first of a series of two or more units that together form a clause (as in a, c and h), it is linked to the previous one by *dé*.

Dé, then, separates (and at the same time links) clausal intonation units. Since the clause is the appropriate way to convey the information that could be called “fact”, it follows that Ruijgh’s (1971: 128) characterization of *dé* in terms of the transition to a new fact is quite appropriate. Just as with *and* in English, every clause marked by *dé* represents a new step in the progression of the narrative. In this respect the progressive use of *dé* in (1) is similar to the use of *dé* as a boundary-marker to be discussed in the next section. The difference is that in Homeric discourse the discontinuity is local (i.e., the units separated/linked are small) and is cognitive in nature.

Notice, in this respect, the use of *kai* in unit g. The difference between this particle and *dé* is precisely that *kai* does not mark an independent new step in the development of the discourse: in this case, the clausal element introduced by *kai* is a rephrasing of the one before. In other words, *kai* is more continuous than *dé*, operating as such under its scope, in linking units that together form a unit set off from the previous discourse by *dé*. This characterization applies to Homeric Greek as well as to the later texts to which we must now turn.

4. Discontinuity and the structure of narrative discourse

The medium of writing has important consequences for the structure and organization of texts. In written texts, the nature and size of the constitutive units is not determined by limitations in the cognitive capacities of the language user; rather, a positive formative principle is involved here, viz. the decisions of the writer as to the presentation, the rhetorical articulation of the text. This is connected with a different type of boundary that is due, similarly, to conscious, text-creative factors rather than to unconscious, cognitive ones. Boundaries in written discourse, apart from their being more deliberate than in oral discourse, tend to be more content-oriented (semantic) as well, and this entails a use of boundary-markers that may be, likewise, “semantic” in that it has to do with the referential aspects or thematic structure of the text. This applies, I will argue, to the particle *dé*, especially in narrative.

An important aspect of the use of *dé* in oral narrative as discussed in the previous section is that in marking cognitive boundaries, the particle has nothing to do with the internal structure of the units which it links in discourse. Specifically, there is no special bond between *dé* occupying the second position in the clause and the first word in the unit, which precedes *dé*: the particle just marks that the unit *as a whole* is linked to what precedes. This is different in the uses to be discussed in this section: here *dé* is often bound up with the first element in the clause in that the presence of *dé* is due to the function of that first element in the discourse. Since the function of the first element/word in a new narrative discourse unit is often that of a (discontinuous) topic, we could say that *dé* may be used as a *topic marker*. This characterization, however, is not very meaningful as long as we do not make it clear what it means for a “topic” to be discontinuous and how this discontinuity relates to the structure of a discourse.

The question of *dé* as a topic marker will be addressed in 4.4 below. In the three subsections preceding (4.1-3), I discuss the three types of discontinuity that I think are relevant for the study of *dé* as a boundary marker in narrative discourse: (i) local and “referential” topic-switch (Section 4.1); (ii) text-organizing boundaries related to the presentation of events and participants in discourse (Section 4.2); and (iii) “perspectival” boundaries, related to the point of view from which the narrative is presented (Section 4.3).

4.1 Topic switch on sentence level: switch-reference

The phenomenon of switch-reference is usually seen (e.g. Haiman and Munro, eds 1983) as a grammatical mechanism, indicating that the subject of a given clause is different from that of another clause. This mechanism appears to be “thematic”, in that it suggests that the discourse at that point is really concerned with a switch from one participant to another.

It seems relevant, however, to consider the possibility of other factors as well in the marking of a subject as “different”. Switched-subject marking may be due to the desire/need to avoid referential ambiguity in a given context: referential tracking as an attempt to avoid *losing track* of referents, so to speak. In this case, there is no thematic discontinuity in the discourse, as indicated by a boundary (change of place, time or cast of participants); rather, what may happen is a local and temporary switch to another (or the other) participant in a given scene, a switch that is explicitly marked to avoid referential ambiguity. In Greek, this marking may involve the particle *dé*. Consider:

- (2) ‘The Persians and their allies were faster than the Spartans in their flight to the wooden wall. They went up and defended the wall as well as they could. After the arrival of the Spartans a major battle was fought over the wall. As long as the Athenians were still not there, **they** (*hoi d'(é)*, viz. the Persians) were able to defend themselves and had a considerable advantage over the Spartans.’ (Herodotus, *Histories* 9, 70, 1).
- (3) ‘This kind of battle went on for a long time, with pursuits and tactical retreats, and in both respects the Athenians were inferior. As long as the archers had their arrows with them and were able to use them, **they** (*hoi dé*, viz. the Athenians) could hold their ground.’ (Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War* 3, 98, 1).

In these examples *dé* is tightly connected with the unmarked anaphoric pronoun *ho*; this bond is so strong that without *dé* the pronoun has a different function (viz. that of the definite article, see further 4.4 below). Both examples are cases of a local topic switch that does not have any consequences for the wider organization of the text: in both cases the discourse is not concerned with a real switch to the topic marked by *dé* (the Persians and the

Athenians, resp.). The point is, rather, that the discourse *was already* concerned with this topic and that after an intervening subclause (translated with *as long as* in both cases) with an incidentally different subject, the original topic has to be “restored”. This is precisely the function of *hoi dé* in both cases: if the pronominal combination were omitted, the wrong impression could arise that the clause in question has the same subject as the preceding subclause, since in Greek, as in other languages, the absence of a switch-marker signals by default that there is no switch.

The use of *dé* in (2)-(3) has been called “apodotic” in Greek grammar: *dé* occurs in a main clause (*apodosis*) which follows a preposed subclause. This use has troubled classical philologists, since *dé*, as an alleged co-ordinating connective ('and' or 'but') is supposed to connect elements of the same order, viz. paratactic main clauses. Various diachronic explanations have been proposed (Kühner-Gerth 1904: 275 ff.; Ruijgh 1971: 647-8) which invoke different adverbial origins of *dé*.¹⁰ However, in the discourse perspective adopted in this paper, *dé* is not so much a co-ordinator as a boundary marker with a set of uses ranging from local to global. On the most local level, the boundary-marking function turns out to play a role in referential tracking, a function which takes precedence over the hypotactic relation between the two segments linked.

The “disambiguating” use of *ho dé* is not confined to “apodotic” main clauses: it occurs whenever the subject of a given clause has to be distinguished from that of the previous clause, without any consequences in terms of thematic discontinuity. Consider:

- (4) (A Greek army has just captured a city; the citizens are throwing themselves from the walls:) ‘And then the commander Aeneas of Stymphale saw someone with a splendid cloak who was running to the wall to throw himself from it. He tried to grab him to prevent him from doing so. But **he** (*ho dé*, i.e. the man with the cloak) dragged him along and both fell down from the wall and died.’ (Xenophon, *Anabasis* 4, 7, 14).

Again, *dé* is used for a purpose connected with local referent-tracking; the particle does not so much contribute to the thematic flow and structure of the discourse as to the identifiability of the incidental subject of a given clause.

However, the tracking function of *dé* is not isolated from its other uses: it shades over into the thematic discontinuity uses of the next subsection. Consider:

- (5) (The Persian prince Cyrus is planning to overthrow the reign of his brother Artaxerxes the king of Persia; to that end he secretly prepares armies on the borders of the Persian empire:)
- 'Another army he prepared in the Thracian Chersonnesus in the following way. There was a certain Clearchus, an exile from Sparta. He got along with this man very well and took to admiring him and gave him a lot of money. And **he** (*ho dé*; viz. Clearchus) took the gold and gathered an army with it.' (Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 1, 1, 9).

In this example, *ho dé* is a disambiguating device, as in (2)-(4), but at the same time it effects a genuine thematic switch, in that it marks the point at which a newly introduced participant deploys his first activity. We see, then, that referential disambiguation is not so much a phenomenon in itself as the one extreme of a continuum of discourse boundaries ranging from local to global.

4.2 *The discontinuity of participants and events*

Switches may be less exclusively local than the instances discussed in the previous subsection: a switch may occur to a participant with whom the story will be concerned from a given point onwards. Such a switch-point constitutes a thematic break in the discourse. In Ancient Greek, thematic breaks in narrative are invariably marked by *dé*. As a more global boundary marker, the particle marks, not the temporary switch to an interfering subject (see 4.1), but a new thematic segment in the discourse. The next example is an instance of such a thematic break:

- (6) (From a judicial speech for an Athenian jury:)
- 'When my friend had had enough, he went home, and I went to sleep. **And then Eratosthenes** (*ho d' Eratosthénēs*) enters the house, men of the jury, and the maid wakes me and says he's inside...' (Lysias 1, 23).

The arrival of Eratosthenes, the speaker's wife's lover, marks an important new stage in the progression of the story and thereby a new segment in the

narrative; the ensuing discontinuity in the discourse is signaled by *dé*: the particle marks the discontinuous subject referring to the new participant.

Discontinuous NP's marked by *dé* frequently co-vary with another device to mark discontinuity in (narrative) texts: preposed (temporal) subclauses. Being placed before the subclause, the discontinuous phrase marked by *dé* is what some linguists would call "left-dislocated": it stands outside the network of the clause to which it belongs. Left-dislocated NPs may be characterized as the reflex in discourse of the return to a participant that has been "active" in the previous discourse.¹¹ Consider:

- (7) (The Greeks are beleaguering a city):
 'Then **Callimachus** had an idea. He ran forward from under the shelter of the trees, only two or three steps, so that he could easily avoid the stones that were thrown down in great quantities. He had success, for at each leap they spent more than ten waggonloads of their stones.'
- And Agasias when he saw** (*ho dè Agasías, hōs horāi*), that the whole army was admiring what Callimachus did, he feared that he would not be the first to enter the place. So without calling in the help of Aristonymus who was next to him, or of Eurylochus, though both of them were friends of his, he went forward by himself and ran past all the others.
- But Callimachus when he saw** (*ho dè Kallímakhos, hōs horāi*) him running past, he held him by the shield.' (Xenophon, *Anabasis* 4, 7, 10-12).
- (8) 'The moment I entered, I saw a baby with bright gold-embroidered clothes kicking and howling. **And Harpagus when he saw me** (*Hárpagos dé, hōs eídē me*), he ordered me to take it at once and bring it to the wildest and most remote spot in the mountains and leave it there.' (Herodotus, *Histories* 1, 111, 3).

In these passages, the L-dislocated NPs that are marked by *dé* precede a preposed temporal subclause. The subclause functions as a frame for the subsequent discourse in the way described by Ramsay (1987) and Thompson (1985). The frame contains a new event sequence that is discontinuous with respect to the previous discourse and the crucial characteristic of this new event sequence is that it is the participant referred to with the L-dislocated phrase who is its "thematic participant". Thus a "positive" topic switch is

part of a thematic transition in the story which is reflected in a moment of discontinuity in the discourse; the L-dislocated NPs, preposed temporal subclauses and the occurrences of *dé* are the grammatical markers of this discontinuity.

A new event sequence in a story may also, and is very frequently, coded for its own sake, without there being any overt indication (in the form of the L-dislocated NP) of a crucial (new) participant in the new sequence. There may be simply a change of scene (in terms of time and/or place) which may, or may not, involve a change in the cast of participants. In such cases the appropriate discontinuous device is the preposed (temporal) subclause, its subordinator (*hôs* or *epeí*, “when”) being marked by *dé*. Consider:

- (9) (Two thieves know a secret entrance to the treasure house of the king, but the latter has set some traps:)

‘The thieves came as usual, and one of them made his way into the chamber. But as soon as he reached the money-jars, he got caught in one of the traps.

Realizing the danger, he called his brother and begged him to come in as quickly as he could and cut off his head, to prevent the recognition of his dead body and the ruin of both. The brother, seeing the sense of this request, did as he was told. He fitted the stone back in its place, and went home, taking the head with him.

When day broke (*hôs dé hêmérê egéneto*), the king entered his treasure house. And how great was his astonishment when he saw the headless body of the thief in the trap, without any sign of damage...’ (Herodotus, *Histories*. 2, 121).

The break of day is the appropriate beginning of a new event sequence in the story. It effects a caesura in the plot, which is reflected in the function of the temporal subclause. The adverbial clause marked by *dé* is discourse-organizing in that it effects a thematic break in the narrative.¹²

In (9) the frame opened by a temporal subclause is “thematic” (content-oriented), in that the discourse boundary coincides with a natural caesura between two sequences of events narrated. But frames, and the boundaries they effect, may also be there for purposes that are not so much concerned with what the narrative “is about” (its thematic structure) as with its

presentation. In such cases, the boundary has more to do with the telling of the story, the creation of the narrative text, than with any “inherent” caesura between two events. An obvious way in which a temporal subclause may contribute to text-creation is to recapitulate what was said in the previous discourse, so as to create a convenient starting-point for what follows. For example:

- (10) (The Persian king Xerxes is marching against Greece with a large army:)

‘When they had arrived in Abydus [at the Hellespont], Xerxes wanted to see the display of his army. He sat down on a throne of white marble that had already been built for him by the people of Abydus. From there he was able to see the whole of his army at a single glance. Watching them he suddenly wished to see a rowing match. The match took place and was won by the Phoenicians of Sydon and Xerxes was delighted both with the match and with the army.

When he saw (*hōs dé horāi*) the whole of the Hellespont hidden by ships and all the coast and plains of Abydus filled with men, he blessed himself and a moment later he wept. Seeing him weep, Artabanus (...) said to him the following...’ (Herodotus, *Histories*. 7, 44-45).

In this passage¹³ the *hōs*-clause restates what was said in the previous discourse in such a way that a meaningful starting-point and setting is created for the telling of what follows (viz. Xerxes’ emotions and the conversation about this topic with Artabanus). The boundary created by the *hōs dé*-clause is there for text-organizing purposes, since there is no corresponding break in the events narrated.¹⁴

The phenomenon of recapitulation by means of a finite temporal subclause marked by *dé*, which in the case of (10) takes the form of what might be called “propositional overlap” (see also Thompson and Longacre 1985: 212) also happens on a smaller scale, viz. when there is “lexical” overlap, effected by a preposed *participle* (equally marked by *dé*). The passage cited in ex. (10) provides an example of this:

- (11) ‘Looking down upon the shore he **watched** (*ethēēito*) both his army and his ships; **watching** them (*thēēūmenos dé*), he suddenly wished to see a rowing match.’

The participle is the restatement in non-finite form of the finite verb in the previous clause; this construction consists in the realization of two “events” (in (11) the watching and the desire, resp.) as two separate discourse units. The effect of the construction is a slow, stepwise development of the narrative at a given point, whereby the boundaries between the events in discourse need not reflect any breaks between the events narrated (Bakker: 1991 ms). Linguistic overlap, both with temporal clauses and participles, is very common in Greek narrative discourse, especially in that of the historian Herodotus. The fact that the phenomenon occurs on a local as well as on a more global scale, and the fact that *dé* is the appropriate marker in all these cases testifies, again, to the homogeneity of the particle as the primary boundary marker of Greek.

Exx. (10) and (11) together show that a certain “hierarchy” of boundaries may be established in that the one instance of the particle may have “scope” over the other (an insight that will recur later on, see exx. (32)-(33) in 6.1): the instance of *dé* in (10) operates on a higher, more global level than that in (11). Often, however, what happens under the scope of *dé* is a smooth continuous affair and no “lower” boundaries are involved: in such cases, the segment separated by *dé* from the previous discourse contains continuous devices instead of boundary markers operating on a lower level. These continuous devices include the co-ordinator *kai* (‘and’) and what I have called the “clause-chaining participle” (Bakker: 1991 ms).

The basic meaning of the particle *kai* is that of an *inclusive focus particle* (like ‘also’, ‘even’ in English),¹⁵ and ‘inclusion’ remains the core aspect of *kai* in all its other uses, for example that as co-ordinating connective below clause-level (‘NP(a) *kai* NP(b)’, ‘A and B’). What interests us here, of course, is the use of *kai* as a clause-combining device: a speaker using *kai* as a connective, we may say, *extends* the discourse segment he is currently engaged in, by including a new clause in its scope, conforming to the basic inclusive force of *kai*. The result in discourse terms is that *kai* in comparison with *dé* is *continuous*, in that it does not imply any shift whatsoever in the presentation of the discourse.¹⁶ An even stronger continuous discourse effect has to be attributed to “clause-chaining participles”, the typical way in Greek to code a tight sequence of events, in which continuity of participant(s) comes as a matter of course.

In the following example, the discontinuity devices mentioned (viz. *dé* and cohesive participles of the type exemplified in ex. (11)) and the continuity devices (*kai* and “chaining” participles) work together in the struc-

turing of the discourse ("ptc" signals that the action in question is expressed by a chaining participle):

- (12) From a judicial speech for an Athenian jury:)
 'When my friend had had enough, he went home, and I went to sleep. **And then Eratosthenes** (*ho d' Eratosthénēs*) enters the house, men of the jury, and (*kai*) the maid wakes (*ptc*) me and says he's inside. And (*kai*) I told (*ptc*) her to watch the door, went down (*ptc*) silently and went outside, and (*kai*) I called at some friends of mine and (*kai*) some of them were not at home, others were not even in town. Having brought with me (*paralabón dé*) as many as I could of those who were available, I marched up. And (*kai*) we took (*ptc*) torches from the shop nearby and went inside, the door being open due to the attention of the maid. Having pushed open (*ósantes dé*) the door of the bedroom...' (Lysias 1, 23-24)

In this passage, the entrance of the lover of the accused's wife constitutes a thematic break in the story and as such warrants a discourse boundary marked by *dé* (*ho d' Eratosthénēs*, see ex. (6) above). Then a discourse section follows in which everything is continuous: two participial clause-chains followed by a finite verb (a construction that is in itself already highly continuous) are linked to each other with the continuous co-ordinator *kai*; the two clause-chains linked this way are followed by finite verbs linked, again, by *kai*. Note that this segment is continuous *in spite of* two subject-switches within its boundaries: after the initial mention of Eratosthenes, the narrator switches two times to another subject, first to the maid, then to himself. These switches, however, do not result in any discontinuity in the text, simply because this text is not structured (i.e. segmented) on the basis of what one character does in contrast to the other: (dis)continuity in a narrative may have its own reasons, over and above the (dis)continuity of participants in a story.

To continue the analysis of (12): a boundary, marked by *dé*, is reached with the participle *paralabón dé* ('having brought with me'), which is not clause-chaining but discourse-organizing in a way which is reminiscent of the temporal subclause and the participle in exx. (10)-(11): it states the outcome of the activity of the previous discourse (in this case the narrator's searching for his friends), not as an independently asserted narrative fact, but as the starting-point for the following actions in the story, which are

expressed as a finite verb followed by *kaí* and another clause chain. The next break in the text is, again, effected by a participle marked by *dé* that has the same organizing function as the previous one. The structure of the passage and the use of the relevant clause-combining devices in it can now be presented as follows:

- (13) –Eratosthenes (*ho d' Eratosthénēs*) enters the house
 - kaí* the maid
 - wakes (*ptc.*) me;
 - says he's inside;
 - kaí*
 - I tell (*ptc.*) her...;
 - go down (*ptc.*)
 - leave the house;
 - kaí* I call at my friends;
 - kaí* I find that some of them are not at home, others not in town¹⁷
 - Having brought with me (*paralabôn dé*) as many as I could,
 I went on my way;
 - kaí*
 - we took (*ptc.*) torches;
 - went inside;
 - Having pushed open (*ôsantes dé*) the door of the bedroom...;

We see, then, what was already apparent in example (1) from Homer, that *kaí*, in its capacity of continuous linking device, may operate under the scope of *dé*, or, to put it in another way, within segments that are as a whole marked off by *dé*. Thus it appears that the relative distribution of *dé* and *kaí* is the same as in Homeric Greek. What is different is that the units linked/separated by *dé* are not due to cognitive limitations of the speaker but to conscious presentation of the text.

4.3 *Perspectival discontinuity: shifts in point of view.*

Continuity or discontinuity in narrative discourse is not limited to the (dis)continuity of participants or events. An important source of continuity or discontinuity is *point of view*, or the perspective from which a narrative is presented. Point of view has been handled mainly by literary theorists. However, as Fleischman (1990: 216) notes, the concept has a hitherto not

sufficiently explored linguistic potential in that narrative point of view, inevitably, has to be conveyed through linguistic, grammatical means. The investigation of those means appears indeed to be a suggestive avenue for the linguistic study of narrative. Fleischman herself focuses on tense-aspect, but it is likely that more of the grammar of languages is involved here; a likely candidate in any case is the category of boundary-markers and discontinuity devices (see also Ehrlich 1990: 56).

A shift in point of view, or its opposite, the maintenance of a given point of view across sentence boundaries, is obviously associated with continuity in a narrative, a shift in point of view coinciding with a discourse boundary and continuation of the perspective chosen with the absence of a boundary. In other words, a shift in point of view may be effected by the use of a boundary-marker, and this is what may happen in the case of *dé*, too. The use of *dé* may signal a change in the perspective from which a narrative is presented, and the use of *kai* may signal the continuation of the perspective.

The perspective-directing use of the two markers can be observed in the first speech of the orator Lysias. This speech (from which more of the examples in this paper have been taken, e.g. (6) and (12) above) is presented strictly from the point of view of the first-person-narrator, an Athenian citizen who has to justify to the jury the fact that he has killed his wife's lover. The linguistic consequence of this "experiential" mode of story-telling is that in many cases the continuous co-ordinator *kai* is used to signal continuation of the speaker's perspective, where an external, less experiential narrator would have used *dé* to indicate a thematic break. Thus sentences of which the experiential narrator himself is the subject are typically linked to the previous discourse by *kai* (*kai egô*, 'and I').

Now in one case, significantly, *egô dé* is used in preference to the automatic *kai egô*. The reason is, I submit, not just to mark a discourse boundary, but, more specifically, to *restore* the default, experiential point of view. This moment occurs at the climax of the story, just after the point at which we had left it in ex. (12):

- (14) ‘When my friend had had enough, he went home, and I went to sleep. And then Eratosthenes (*ho d' Eratosthénês*) enters the house, men of the jury, and (*kai*) the maid wakes me and says he's inside. And I (*kai egô*) told her to watch the door, went down silently and went outside, and (*kai*) I called at some friends of mine and (*kai*) some of them were not at

home, others were not even in town. Having brought with me (*paralabôn dé*) as many as I could of those who were available, I marched up. And (*kai*) we took torches from the shop nearby and went inside, the door being open due to the attention of the maid. Having pushed open (*ôsantes dé*) the door of the bedroom, the first of us who entered saw him still lying in bed with the woman, and those who came in after saw him standing naked in the bed. **And then, I** (*egô dé*) hit him, men of Athens, and threw him on the ground...' (Lysias 1, 23)

In this passage, *dé* signals the transition from ‘us’ (or even ‘them’) to ‘I’ and so restores the original point of view in the story which had “slipped away” in the report of how the narrator had gathered a company around himself.

Earlier in the same story, *dé* plays a role in another narratologically significant moment, where a discourse boundary is created by the narrator adopting, for once, an external, “omniscient” point of view:

- (15) ‘Thereafter, men of Athens, when some time had passed and I was completely ignorant of the domestic evil around me, an old woman approached me. She was sent in secret by a woman whom this guy was having an affair with, as I learnt later. **This woman** (*haútê dé*) was indignant and felt she had been wronged, since he did not visit her as frequently as he had done before. She had followed him in order to find out the reason. So this old woman came to me, after she had watched my house from nearby for some time and said...’ (Lysias 1, 15).

The clause beginning with ‘This woman (*haútê dé*) was indignant’ contains information which the narrator did not have at the moment described; it presents narratorial, omniscient, rather than “experiential” knowledge and it is situated on a narrative plane which is different from the surrounding discourse. The transition to the passage is marked by *dé*, and after the narratorial passage the narrator returns to his proper role as a character “in” the story (‘So this old woman came to me’). This transition back to the story proper is marked by the particle *oún*.¹⁸

4.4 *Dé and “topic marking”*

In the previous subsections we have seen that the function of *dé* as a boundary marker in Classical Greek is often related to the function of the first word in the clause (see also above, introduction to Section 4). This raises the question as to what extent *dé* can be called a *topic marker*. However, in view of (i) my general assumption (stated in the beginning of this paper) that “topic” and “topicalization” are not so much sentential notions (applying, for example, to “old” information in the sentence as opposed to “new” information) as discourse phenomena related to discontinuity in texts; and (ii) the fact that the central function of *dé* is boundary-marking, this question might better be put in a different way: what exactly is the relation between the boundary-marking function of *dé* and the topical and/or discourse-organizing function of the element to which it adheres as the second element in the clause?

It appears that both functions are two sides of one and the same matter: *dé* as a boundary-marking element has a natural affinity with discontinuous (and as such topical) elements in Greek discourse grammar, which leads to repeated, routinized co-occurrence, and eventually to grammaticalization. A first example of this *mutual expectancy* was the collocation of *dé* with the unmarked anaphoric pronoun *ho* (*ho dé*: see exx. (2)-(5) in 4.1), where the pronoun could not have its referent-tracking function without the discontinuous force of *dé* (in fact, it cannot even occur as a demonstrative without *dé*), and where, conversely, the use of *dé* is motivated by the topic-switching function of the pronoun.

In the same way, the co-occurrence of *dé* with preposed adverbials (subclauses and participles, see 4.2) is intimately connected with the discourse function of these elements. *Dé*, being the grammatical marker of boundaries, is used by default whenever a preposed adverbial is used to set a frame: any framing-setting in discourse creates discontinuity with respect to the discourse preceding the frame, and this discontinuity is marked by *dé*. We may say, then, that *dé* not so much creates, expresses, a boundary as marks it as such. *Dé*, automatically co-occurring with preposed finite subclauses, forms a combination with the preposed subordinator that is almost as tight and grammaticalized as in the case of *ho + dé*. As such, the combinations “subordinator + *dé*” in Greek are a grammatical confirmation of the crucial functional difference between preposed and postposed adverbial subclauses. In her article on purpose clauses in English,

Thompson (1985) suggests that this difference is so considerable that preposed and postposed adverbials should be dealt with as two different constructions sharing the same morphology, rather than as one construction with two possible positions. On account of the invariable presence of *dé* with preposed adverbial clauses, we could say that in Greek the two constructions do not even share the same morphology.

In fact, purpose clauses in Greek behave exactly as purpose clauses in English do according to Thompson (1985): most of the time they are postponed, and state the purpose or intent of the subject of the preceding main clause; as such they have a referential, specificatory function. On the rare occasions that they are preposed, on the other hand, they do text-creating work and the subordinator is marked by *dé*. Here is an example:

- (16) ‘First of all, men of Athens, I have a small house which is divided in two equal parts: a first floor serving as men’s apartment and a second floor being used as women’s apartment. Now when our baby was born, the mother suckled it. **In order that** (*hína dé*) she did not have to risk her life while descending along the stairs all the time, when the baby had to be washed, I took my lodging upstairs and the women went to the ground floor.’ (Lysias 1, 9)

Like the English preposed purpose clauses discussed by Thompson, the clause introduced by *hína dé* formulates a problem which the preceding discourse gives rise to (viz. the inefficient situation of the women living upstairs after the arrival of the baby), and the upcoming main clause presents the solution to that problem. As such, the purpose clause is discourse-organizing, in guiding the attention of the reader “by signalling (...) how the reader is expected to associate the material following the purpose clause with the material preceding it” (Thompson 1985: 61).¹⁹ This bridging function of the purpose clause is a clear case of the discourse-organizational potential of preposed adverbials, and the occurrence of *dé* is closely related to this function.

In cases other than preposed adverbial clauses, too, *dé* forms tight, grammaticalized combinations with elements whose adverbial function and discourse-organizing potential automatically trigger the use of *dé*. And just as in the case of the pronoun *ho*, this typical function is dependent on *dé* to such a degree that without the particle the element in question would mean something entirely different. Examples are:

en dè toútōi ‘meanwhile’ (lit.: “in that [time]), which without *dé* would have a simple demonstrative function (‘therein’) without discourse-organizing potential;

metà dè (‘and after/later’), in which *metà* functions as an adverb on account of the presence of *dé* (being a preposition without the particle);

háma dè (‘simultaneously’), where without *dé*, *háma* would be either a preposition or a sentence-level adverb relating two verbs (*háma A kai B*, ‘no sooner A than B’); in either case it would not have the boundary-marking and discourse-organizational effect that it has when accompanied by *dé*.

In all these cases, *dé* “marks” the element or phrase in question for a given text-organizational function. To call this “topic marking” is all right as long as we understand “topic” as a textual notion having to do with meaningful boundaries constituting both the “attention flow” of a reader and the coherence of a text, rather than a sentential phenomenon applying to what a given sentence “is about” or to that part of a sentence providing “given” information.

5. Segmentation and identification

The uses of *dé* in Section 4 were connected with narrative discourse and the kind of discontinuity that may occur there; in Sections 5 and 6 I deal with uses that, though frequently occurring in narrative, are not confined to it.

In Section 4.2 (ex. (1)) we saw that for reasons connected with the “pace” of a text, a narrative may be presented chunkwise in small steps and that segmentation marked by *dé*, as well as lexical overlap in the form of participles, plays a role in this. In the same way, non-narrative information may be presented in small chunks, for example, when more than one thing is said about one and the same person. The segment separated by *dé* from the previous discourse relates to it as a case of apposition:

- (17) ‘I have dissuaded your father, **my brother** (*adelphòs dè emós*), Darius, from marching against the Scythians’ (Herodotus, *Histories* 7, 10, 2).
- (18) ‘Oh king, we have been terribly insulted by your slave, **the shepherd’s son** (*boukólou dè paidós*).’ (Herodotus, *Histories* 1, 114, 5).

In these examples, the use of *kai* instead of *dé* between the two qualifications would imply, owing to the *inclusive* force of *kai* described earlier, that two different persons are meant (e.g. ‘your father and my brother *as well*’ in [17]). Obviously, this is not the intended meaning of the speaker: he uses *dé*, the force of which is segmentation, not conjunction or inclusion, and the effect of the particle is the presentation of a piece of information as a separate, small-scale discourse unit.

Sometimes a boundary may be marked for reasons connected with attention-flow, in a way reminiscent of ex. (16) in 4.4, for example:

- (19) ‘And they arrived at a mountain on the fifth day. **The name** (*ónoma dē*) of this mountain was Theches.’ (Xenophon, *Anabasis* 4, 7, 21)
- (20) ‘Euphiletus, don’t think I’m here just to meddle with your affairs, but this man who is insulting you and your wife happens to be an enemy of ours. If you take the maid who is going to the market-place and (...) put her to the test, you’ll learn everything. **It is Eratosthenes** (*éstι d’ Eratosthénēs*) from the deme Oae who is doing this to you.’ (Lysias 1, 16)

In these examples, the discourse gives rise to a question: “what was the name of that mountain?”, “who is it?” *Identifying* information is provided that adequately answers this question. This information is set off from the preceding discourse by a constituent which takes up the crucial issue of the preceding discourse (viz. the name [*ónoma*] of the mountain and the identity [*éstι*, ‘it is’] of the man) and which is marked by *dé*. In this way a separation of the identifying information from the item to be identified is effected that leads the attention of the hearer/reader in a natural way from the one to the other, and that has at the same time a highlighting effect, in that the identificatory phrase is markedly set off as a separate discourse unit.

Another typical case of a discourse boundary highlighting identificatory information is formed by the instances where the identifying discourse unit is, in syntactic terms, a main clause which follows a subclause containing the item to be identified. Consider:

- (21) ‘Very often I have heard you say that everyone of us is good in those respects in which he is skilled. And as for the things in which he is ignorant, **in those things** (*taûta dē*) he is worthless.’ (Plato, *Laches* 194D)

In this case, *dé* is attached to a demonstrative pronoun (*taúta dé*) that resumes the preceding relative clause translated as ‘and as for ..’. This relative clause functions as a complex, clausal L-dislocated NP, which formulates the question which the discourse gives rise to: “we know about the things in which one is skilled: now how about the things in which one is ignorant?” The demonstrative pronoun represents the relative clause in condensed, pronominal form in the main clause; the pronoun serves as the topical starting-point for the identificatory term ‘worthless’ (*kakós*). All this amounts to a marked guiding of the hearer’s attention from the item to be identified to its identification. Ex. (21) can thus be said to be a syntacticized version of the discourse situation exemplified by (19)-(20).

A special case of the presentation of an identifying phrase as a separate discourse unit are the instances in which the discourse preceding the boundary contains the *denial* of something (an identification that does not apply), while the true identification is presented after the boundary:

- (22) ‘And as for me, I have *not* come to do harm to the Hellenes: <my mission is> **to liberate them** (*ep’ eleutherôsei dé*, lit.: ‘for the liberation’).’ (Thucydides, *Histories* 4, 86, 1).

This is a case of “eliminative” identification: two possibilities are contrasted and the one is rejected in favor of the other: “not A but B” (see Ruijgh 1971: 135). The usual “adversative” particle for eliminative identification is *allá* (“but”), with which the eliminative identification is presented as one integrated discourse segment (*ouk A allá B*, ‘not A but B’). The effect of the identification is greater, however, when the positive part is presented, in a marked way, as a separate segment (not A: B!), and this is done with *dé*.²⁰

The marking of a boundary preceding identifying or specifiatory information can also be repeated, together with the constituent that serves as the basis for the identification and that serves as “substrate” for *dé*. In such cases, the particle *kai* typically occurs, this time not as an inclusive, continuous connective, but as an inclusive focus particle (‘also’, ‘too’); for example:

- (23) (The description of the armor and fighting habits of a warlike tribe:)
They had (*eikhon dé*) body-armor of linen, reaching down to the groin, and instead of skirts to their armor they wore thick twisted cords.

They also had (*eikhon dé kai*) greaves and helmets and (*kai*) on their belts a knife of about the size of a Spartan dagger. With these knives they cut the throats of those whom they managed to overpower and then (*kai*) would cut off their head and (*kai*) carry them as they marched, and (*kai*) sing and (*kai*) dance whenever their enemies were likely to see them.

They also had (*eikhon dé kai*) a spear with one point, about twenty feet long' (Xenophon, *Anabasis* iv, 7, 15-17)

Here the recurring verb *eikhon* ('they had') serves as the hinge on which the structure of the description rests: its function is not so much to inform the reader that these people "had" something, as to break up the information that comes with the description into manageable units: an orderly series of different descriptive "entries" is established. In this capacity, the verb is marked with *dé*; the use of *kai* ("also") is automatic insofar as the description consists of different attributes to one and the same subject. Notice that *kai* is also used, as a continuous co-ordinator (see above), within the larger second segment, as indicated in the translation: another instance of the scope-difference between *dé* and *kai*.

A "base-term" to which *dé* adheres (as *eikhon dé* in [23]) may also be repeated for reasons other than identificatory or discourse-organizing ones. The repetition may be in the service of explicit, emphatic enumerations:

- (24) 'Zeus (*Zeùs*) is fire, Zeus (*Zeùs dé*) is earth, Zeus (*Zeùs dé*) is heaven.' (Aeschylus, *fragment* 70).
- (25) 'Protect (*rhūsai*) yourself and the city, protect (*rhūsai dé*) me, protect (*rhūsai dé*) us from the defilement of the dead king.' (Sophocles, *Oedipus the King* 312-313).

In (24) we do not have one composite statement about Zeus ('Zeus is A, B, and C'), but three separate ones, whereby the repetition of the (subject) term to be qualified ('Zeus') leads to increased emphasis on the qualifying terms. The same applies to (25), where we do not have one request but three, thanks to the segmentizing force of *dé*.

6. Antithesis: complementation and transition

In the preceding sections, the boundary marked by *dé*, whatever its nature (content-oriented or text-creating) did not have anything to do with

the structure of the discourse *preceding* the boundary: the occurrence of *dé* was not *anticipated* by a structural device used to that effect. In a large number of occurrences of *dé*, however, anticipation is precisely what happens: the boundary marked by *dé* is anticipated by another grammatical marker, the particle *mén*. The presence of *mén* often implies a quite different function of the boundary marked by *dé* than the functions discussed thus far. *Mén*, which together with *dé* forms what may be called a correlative pair, may signal one of the two following possibilities: (i) more is to follow: the present discourse chunk is (semantically) incomplete as it stands; or (ii) this is the closing of the current discourse segment as well as discourse topic: a boundary will follow shortly, starting a new discourse topic. In the first case, the boundary marked by *dé* and anticipated by *mén* serves the purpose of discourse *complementation*; in the second case, it marks the *transition* to something new in the discourse, not just a new piece of information, but a significant new thematic discourse segment (that may be quite large). The transition is anticipated in that the discourse preceding the boundary is overtly (marked by *mén*) rounding off the current discourse topic. Both possibilities will be discussed in the two subsections of this section.

6.1 *Complementation*

Often, the boundary marked by *dé* does not signal the beginning of a new text segment, but the completion of an existing one. The boundary occurs within a text segment and is meant to separate the two members of an *antithetical pair* from each other, the first of which is marked with *mén* and the second with *dé*. *Mén* thus marks anticipatory cohesion, while *dé* answers the expectation raised by the previous context and thus serves the purpose of discourse complementation. Simple examples of the *mén..dé*-antithesis are the following:

- (26) ‘Darius and Parysatis had two sons, **the elder** (*presbúteros mén*) was Artoxerxes, **the younger** (*neôteros dé*) Cyrus.’ (Xenophon, *Anabasis* 1, 1, 1).
- (27) ‘What **benefits** us (*tò mèn ôphélimon*) is fair, what **harms** us (*tò dè blaberón*) is shameful.’ (Plato, *Republic* 457B).

The point of the *mén..dé*-construction in these cases is to set up an antithetical framework which is meant to accommodate the presentation of infor-

mation that consists of a binary pair. The *mén..dé*-construction effects a coherence in the discourse that is semantic (content-oriented), in that the information is felt to be incomplete when either member is lacking.

Just as with *dé* on its own, either member of the antithetical pair may form tight combinations with pronominal elements, which in the combination are marked as “topic” and which outside the combination have a different function (see 4.1; 4.4). Among the most frequent of these antithetical topic constructions are *hoi mén..dé* (‘the one..the other’), *hoi mèn..hoi dé* (some (ones)..other(s) (ones)), *tò (tà) mèn..tò (tà) dé* (‘on the one hand..on the other’); for example:

- (28) ‘Some of them (*hoi mén*) died, others (*hoi dé*) took to flight.’ (Xenophon, *Cyropaedia* iii, 2, 10).
- (29) (‘This is the presentation of the research of Herodotus of Halicarnassos (...), that great and wondrous deeds, **some of which** (*tà mèn*) have been performed by the Greeks, **others** (*tà dé*) by the barbarians, may not be left uncelebrated.’ (Herodotus, *Histories*, proem)

Other frequent antithetical situations articulated by the *mén..dé*-construction are the juxtaposition of alternative possibilities or hypotheses in a given situation (*ei mén..ei dé* ‘if..if on the other hand’), or the juxtaposition of a possibility with a fact, in which case *dé* forms a topical combination with the adverb *nún* (‘now’). Especially in the latter case, the *mén..dé*-antithesis forms the structural backbone of what could be called an “antithetical paragraph” (Longacre 1979: 122), for example:

- (30) ‘My king, under ordinary circumstances (*állós mén*, ‘otherwise’) I would not have participated in this adventure (...) but as it is now (*nún dé*), I am ready to do as you ask.’ (Herodotus, *Histories* 1, 42, 1-2).

In other cases, the antithesis is not so much between the two members of a pair of topics, as between two propositions; the simplest case of this phenomenon is when two successive clauses report different properties or actions of one and the same person:

- (31) ‘He admitted (*mén*) that he was guilty, but he entreated (*dé*) me not to kill him.’ (Lysias 1, 25)

In cases like this one, the relation between the two clauses could be called, in semantic terms, “concessive” (‘although he admitted...’). However,

there is nothing inherently “concessive” about the construction as such, and the presentation in discourse: a concessive subclause typically signals that the state of affairs referred to in the main clause obtains under highly unfavorable circumstances, marking it as such as “remarkable” (Bakker 1988: 207-8). In the present case, on the other hand, the presence of *mén* in the first (“concessive”) clause does no more than signal that the clause will acquire its intended meaning only in combination with the following one, to which it anticipates.

The antithesis marked by the *mén..dé*-construction is often presented for its own sake, and does not interfere with the ongoing segmentation of the discourse that is marked by “solitary” *dé*. In other words, the *mén..dé*-construction often occurs within the discourse scope of *dé*, especially when the antithesis has a strictly local importance. The following example, which was cited and discussed earlier for the occurrence of solitary *dé* (see exx. (12)-(14)) contains two cases of this phenomenon (see also note 17):

- (32) ‘**When** (*epeidē dé*) my friend had had enough, **he** (*ekeīnos mén*) went home, and I (*egō dé*) went to sleep.

And then Eratosthenes (*ho d' Eratosthénēs*) enters the house, men of the jury, and the maid wakes me and says he's inside. And I told her to watch the door, went down silently and went outside, and I called at some friends of mine and **some of them** (*toūs mèn*) I did not find at home, **others** (*toūs dé*) not even in town.’ (Lysias 1, 23).

The passage begins with the frame opened by a preposed temporal subclause marked by *dé* (see 4.2); the discourse falling within this frame consists of the antithetical pair *ekeīnos mén..egō dé* ('he..., and I'). The next discourse segment, starting with the switch *ho d' Eratosthénēs* ('and then Eratosthenes'), consists of a piece of fast-paced narrative, presented by means of continuous narrative devices (see exx. (12)-(13)). Within this segment, we find an antithetical pair of no more than local importance (*toūs mén..toūs dé* 'some of them ... others'), functioning below the level of organization marked by solitary *dé* in the passage.

The reverse phenomenon, an instance of solitary *dé* occurring within the scope of the *mén..dé*-construction, occurs also. In such cases, solitary *dé* is typically the marker of a low-level boundary or switch, while the *mén..dé*-construction marks higher-level organization (forming an antithetical paragraph). The following example, just as (32), has been cited before (ex. (3) above):

- (33) ‘**As long as** (*mékhri mén*) the archers had their arrows with them and were able to use them, **they** (*hoi dé*; viz. the Athenian army) could hold their ground [...]. **But when** (*epeì dé*) their leader was dead, they were scattered all over the place, and they themselves were defeated.’ (Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War* 3, 98, 1)

The instance of solitary *dé* in this example occurs in the main clause following a temporal subclause marked by *mén* (*mékhri mén*, ‘as long as’). However, it is not this *dé* to which *mén* anticipates: its function is local switch-reference (see 4.1), to signal that the subject of its clause is not identical to that of the preceding *mén*-clause. The *dé* “answering” *mén* occurs later: (*epeì dé* ‘but when’). The boundary which it effects is a phenomenon one level up in the hierarchical organization of discourse: its purpose is to complement the antithetical paragraph started by *mén*.

6.2 Transition

The instances of *mén..dé* discussed in the previous subsection were all semantic (content-oriented) in that the antithesis marked by *mén..dé* in the discourse reflected an antithesis in the topics dealt with: a juxtaposition of two persons, concepts, situations etc. The dependent status (in discourse terms) for which the member in which *mén* occurs is marked is the grammatical analogue of the sense of incompleteness felt when only one member of a binary, inherently antithetical pair is mentioned.

In the use of *mén..dé* discussed in the present subsection, on the other hand, the presence of *mén* signals, not incompleteness but its very opposite: completeness. This completeness, however, is not semantic in that it has to do with properties of the topics discussed: it is discourse-organizing in that it has to do with the rounding off of a discourse topic. *Mén* may signal that a given topic has been sufficiently dealt with and the expectation raised by the use of the particle does not consist so much in the anticipation of the second member of a binary pair as of a new discourse topic. In other words, in using transition-marking *mén..dé*, a language user looks ahead (and expects his/her reader/hearer to do so too) while rounding off a given topic.

The text-organizing use of *mén..dé* typically implies transitional discourse segments consisting of two contrasted parts. The first part, marked by *mén*, is in reality the last, closing statement of the previous thematic discourse segment, while the second part, marked by *dé*, is the first statement

of the next one. The closing statement marked by *mén* is typically a recapitulation of the theme of the previous discourse. This recapitulation contains an element that can be opposed in some way or another to what follows, so that the attention of both speaker (writer) and hearer (reader) naturally flows from one topic to the other. Consider:

- (34) (After the story of how the Lydian throne passed from the Heraclidae to the dynasty of the Mermnadae:) ‘The sovereign power (*tēn mèn dē turannída*) got in the hands of the Mermnadae in this way (*hoútō*), having been taken from the Heraclidae. And Gyges (*Gúgēs dē*), after he had become king, he sent a lot of votive offerings to Delphi.’ (Herodotus, *Histories* 1, 14).

In this example, there is no antithetical relation between the two members of the *mén..dé* pair (*tēn mèn..turannída*, ‘the power’ vs. *Gúgēs dē*, ‘Gyges’) to the effect that the utterance is incomplete when only the first one is mentioned. The function of the *mén..dé*-construction here is transition, not complementation. As a statement, the clause in which *mén* occurs is perfectly complete: it forms the rounding off of the previous thematic discourse segment and as such it has backward orientation, as appears also from the anaphoric demonstrative *hoútō* (‘in this way’) and the equally anaphoric particle *dē*.²¹ The presence of *mén*, on the other hand, signals that in the flow of discourse, the statement has forward orientation as well: as a closing statement, it forms the starting point for something new. The “new” discourse segment (which in this case deals with the actions of Gyges, the first king of the Mermnadae dynasty) is marked by *dé* and it is *mén* that anticipates to it. The following example is entirely similar:

- (35) ‘Harpagus (*Harpágōi mèn*) was punished by Astyages in this way. It was Cyrus (*Kúrou dē*) to whom Astyages now turned his attention.’ (Herodotus, *Histories* 1, 120).

The contrast is again transitional. The finishing of the story of how king Astyages punished his servant Harpagus not only clears the ground for the king’s plans with Cyrus (his grandson); it also forms the starting-point for the *telling* of these plans, in other words: for a new thematic section in the discourse.

The transitional use of the *mén..dé*-construction is discourse-organizing rather than content-oriented. Of course, the distinction between two thematic discourse segments is related to content as well, but the important

thing about the use of *mén..dé* in (34)-(35) is that the opposition between the two members of the pair is a matter of discourse *flow* (and as such dynamic), rather than of the static juxtaposition of discourse segments. Sometimes, the use of *mén..dé* to mark a transition is concomitant with the overt presence of a speaking ‘I’ who is regulating the flow of discourse and who “manages” the shift from one theme to the other:

- (36) ‘(The story of) Hipparchus’ dream (*hē mèn dē ópsis*) as well as the descent of the Gephyraei, the family who murdered him, has been dealt with by me. Now I have to (*dei dē*) go back to the original story of how Athens came to be liberated from the tyrants.’ (Herodotus, *Histories* 5, 62, 1).

The transition here is overtly presented as a (thematic) break in an ongoing speech event. This example could end the discussion of transitional *mén..dé*, but it is possible to go one step further in the treatment of thematic transitions in ongoing discourse and this brings us back to the oral poetry of Homer.

In Section 3 above I argued (see also Bakker 1990, 1993) that Homeric discourse is characterized by “cognitive” segmentation in that the mental processes of the speaker/poet are reflected in the discourse produced. In this cognitive framework, what surfaces in discourse as a thematic transition from one segment to another, is the consequence of the speaker’s reorientation, his/her mental movement from one “scene” to another.²² This mechanism, which can be considered the cognitive source of the rounding off of a thematic discourse segment and the transition to another, may involve a use of *mén..dé* that is highly characteristic of Homeric discourse, for example:

- (37) Odysseus has just killed a large number of Trojan warriors. The poet now turns to a new theme, Odysseus’ encounter with the Trojan Socus:
 ‘These (*toūs mèn*) he left lying, *and now he (ho d')* stabbed Charops, the son of Ippasus, the full brother of wealthy Socus.’ (Homer, *Iliad* 11, 426-7).

Examples like this have been treated as “mis-placements” in that *dé* is thought to go with a term other than that which plays a role in the antithesis (Kühner-Gerth 1904: 268). In this case, the reasoning goes, *dé* should properly ‘go’ with ‘Charops’, the victim of Odysseus, who is contrasted with the

previous ones. However, this treatment is clear literate bias that does no justice to the speech-dynamics of this passage: there is no mis-placement and there is no antithesis in the semantic sense discussed above (6.1) between two topics. What is crucial in (37) is a transition in the discourse, a thematic shift, which involves the closing of the current discourse segment as a preparation for a new start. In cognitive terms, this involves the removal of Odysseus' previous actions (and victims) from the poet's consciousness. This mental operation, I submit, is signaled by *mén*: the clause in which it occurs does not state so much the fact (event) that Odysseus left these men; rather, it states the fact that *Homer* leaves the concept of Odysseus killing these men. The thematic transition in (37), then, is in reality the reflex of a shift in the attention of the poet, and it is the *mén..dé*-construction that is the primary grammatical marker of this mental operation.

7. Summary and conclusion

In this paper I have described the Ancient Greek connective particle *dé* as a boundary marker. This characterization in discourse terms does more justice to the use of *dé* than that in terms of co-ordination found in classical philology. Boundaries marked by *dé* in Greek texts could be shown to be basically of three types: (i) cognitive; (ii) text-creating; and (iii) content-oriented (“semantic”). The first type typically occurs in oral discourse, where segmentation in the discourse reflects the cognitive processes of the speaker. The second and third types, which are more characteristic of the discourse flow in written language, are the manifestation in discourse of the interaction between topicalization and discourse structure: as a boundary marker, *dé* forms tight combinations with topical elements (pronouns, participles, adverbs and adverbial subordinators etc.) which, by virtue of their creating discontinuity in the text, crucially contribute to the structure of discourse.

In its boundary-marking and discourse-organizing capacity, *dé* shares a number of uses with markers in other languages. For example, Old Russian *že*, as discussed in Ickler (1981), is remarkably similar to *dé* in meaning and distribution. The same applies to the Latin discourse marker *autem* (Caroline Kroon, personal communication). Moreover, *dé* actually occurs, as a borrowed discourse marker, in Coptic Egyptian, a genetically unrelated language, where it has a function that is entirely comparable with its use discussed here.²³ Also, Japanese *wa* (on which see Hinds et al., eds

1987), an entirely different type of marker, does boundary-work reminiscent of the functions I have attributed to *dé*. This overlap testifies to the coherence of the set of functions performed by boundary-markers as well as to the universality of boundary/topic markers as discourse-organizing devices.

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NOTES

1. The research project underlying this paper was made possible by a Fellowship of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Sciences. Earlier versions of this paper were presented in 1989 at Leiden University and at an international colloquium on "particles", organized at Groningen University. For comments on the near-final version I wish to thank Sandra Thompson (UC Santa Barbara) and Caroline Kroon (Univ. of Amsterdam). I also thank the reviewer of this journal for a number of useful remarks and suggestions.
2. E.g. Dik (1989: 267). For a discussion of "topic" in terms of discourse content, see Brown and Yule (1983: 68 ff.). "Aboutness" is also the key concept in discussions of "thematic participants" and paragraphs (Longacre 1979: 118, e.g., deals with "paragraphs" as stretches of discourse "built around" a "thematic participant").
3. See, e.g. Mithun (1992 ms).
4. Some more grammatical information: *dé*, like most Ancient Greek enclitics, occupies the second position in the clause. Diachronically, *dé* can be considered a semantically and phonetically bleached form of the particle *dē* (with long vowel), an evidentiality marker occurring in statements in which a speaker presents something as evident, obvious, both to him/herself and the addressee. *Dé*, furthermore, should be distinguished from the second element in the proximal demonstrative *hóde* ('this one here'). This deictic element -*de* probably also derives from evidential *dē*, by a diachronic mechanism that led to differentiation with *dé*.
5. The interesting work of Levinsohn (e.g. 1987) has to be mentioned separately. Working outside the main stream of Greek linguistics, and dealing exclusively with New Testament Greek, Levinsohn reaches conclusions that are often close to mine.

6. Notice the general conception of language underlying the Kühner-Gerth grammar: language is the expression of thought (“Die Sprache ist der Ausdruck der Gedanken”); since language is the expression of thought and thoughts are expressed by sentences (“Sätze”), it follows that grammar is the study of sentences (“dass die Grammatik nichts anderes ist als *Satzlehre*”), 1898: 1.
7. A third account, from Denniston (1954), the standard — although highly unsatisfactory — textbook on Ancient Greek particles, leaves the question as to whether the basic meaning of *dé* is ‘adversative’ or ‘continuative’ entirely open: “As a connective, *dé* denotes either pure connexion, ‘and’, or contrast, ‘but’, with all that lies in between” (1954: 162).
8. Notice, however, that in the highly specialized poetic language of Greek epic, the “cognitive features” discussed here (intonation units, use of linkage markers) are not so much the direct consequence of the speaker’s cognitive processes (as in the case of ordinary, unplanned speech), as a *deliberate accommodation* of the discourse flow to these processes: Homeric speech is special, marked speech, removed from ordinary speech and aimed at keeping the poet going in the epic performance without hesitations and dysfluencies. To prevent these normal dysfluencies, Homeric poetics, paradoxically, puts *extra* constraints on the discourse, precisely to obviate the cognitive constraints and to guide memory. This involves, among other things, the turning of the physical properties of the intonation units from intonation into *rhythm*. Intonation units in Homer can thus be said to be stylized, in that they turn what *results from* constraints (i.e. intonation units) into a constraint itself (i.e. meter). This complex subject falls outside the scope of the present paper (see Bakker 1993). For the use of *dé*, however, there is no difference: irrespective of whether the units it links are metrically constrained or not, it marks transitions.
9. I will give the Greek text in this paper in translation, since I am concerned with the discourse units as such and the boundaries between them, rather than with their actual wording. I have indicated which of the units in the following example are marked by *dé*; the particle has been “translated” with “and”. As stated above (note 4), *dé* always occupies, as an enclitic, the second place in the clause; thus *and Hector* in the first unit translates *Héktōr dé* in the Greek.
10. Kühner-Gerth point to the adverbial ancestry they attribute anyway to *dé* (“andererseits”, “on the other hand”); Ruijgh considers the modal (adverbial) particle *dé*, with which *dé* must be cognate (see note 4 above on *dé* as an evidential).
11. The discontinuous function of L-dislocated NPs in Ancient Greek does not seem to be very different from that in other languages (e.g. Lambrecht 1987: 233-4), but note that due to the synthetic nature of the Greek verb lexical subjects are never grammatically necessary, so that in a sense all lexical subjects are dislocated. In Bakker (1990: 10 ff.) I have argued that in Homeric discourse, a L-dislocated element has the status of a separate intonation unit. Note that by using the term “L-dislocation” I do not imply any deviation from a given “norm” (as if a transformation were involved); I use the term merely because other usual terms like “topic NP” or “theme” might be confusing in the context of the present paper.
12. For the story from which this example has been taken, and especially the use of the temporal clause in it, see Bakker (1991).

13. Note that there are more instances of *dé* in this passage, which I find it preferable to ignore (but see ex. (11) below), so as not to unnecessarily burden the present exposition.
14. Note that I do not want to imply that content-oriented and text-organizing boundaries marked by *dé* are mutually exclusive phenomena. Content-oriented boundaries (as in ex. (9)) are merely more “iconic” than text-organizing ones, but their effect in/on a discourse is the same.
15. For extensive discussion of “focus particles” in Greek, including *kai*, see Bakker (1988).
16. See Levinsohn (1987: 92 ff.) for a similar account of the relative difference of *dé* and *kai*.
17. As a matter of fact, an instance of *dé* is found in this clause, one that denotes, together with the “preparatory” particle *mén*, the juxtaposition of contrastive topics (*toùs mén...toùs dé*, ‘some of them ... others’). This contrast, however, is an intrasentential phenomenon that does not affect the structure of the passage as a whole: I do not count it as a discontinuity in the sense active here. For *mén...dé* see Section 6.1 below.
18. The particle *oún* is often used to mark the transition from “backgrounded” passages in narrative back to the event-line. Outside narrative, it is used to indicate that a speaker is coming “to the point”, for example, a request after an introductory, foundation-laying passage. Compare *or* in French and see Kroon (1989: 236-8) for a similar account of the discourse marker *igitur* in Latin.
19. Cf. also Chafe’s (1984: 444) analysis in which preposed adverbial clauses “serve as a kind of “guidepost” to information flow, signaling a path or orientation in terms of which the following information has to be understood.”
20. Notice that cases like (22) have been adduced as paradigm examples of “adversative” *dé* with supposedly a meaning only slightly “weaker” than *allá* (‘but’, ‘aber’: Kühner-Gerth 1904: 262).
21. *Dé* and the anaphoric demonstrative *hoútos* have a natural affinity for one another (*hoútos dé* ‘this one, then’). *Dé* typically occurs in recapitulating statements and other backward-oriented discourse environments. This is in line with the original function of *dé* as an evidential (see note 4).
22. Cf. Chafe’s (1980) discussion of what he calls “centers of interest”.
23. Cf. Reintges 1991.

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