

“America’s Crowded Statehouses: Measuring and Explaining Lobbying in the U.S. States.”
Codebook for Replication

This codebook contains brief descriptions of each of the variable names in “Statehouses.dta,” the dataset used for replicating results from the manuscript.

Variables:

1. **year** – year in which the observation occurred
2. **state** – the U.S. state in which the observation was recorded
3. **abbr** – the abbreviation of the U.S. state in which the observation was recorded
4. **fips** – Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) code assigned to U.S. state in which the observation was recorded
5. **dyads** – total unique lobbyist-client dyads or pairings registered in state and year
6. **dyads000** – **dyads** / 1,000
7. **clients** – total unique clients or interest groups with registered lobbyists in state and year
8. **clients000** – **clients** / 1,000
9. **lobbyists** – total unique lobbyists registered in state and year
10. **lobbyists000** – **lobbyists** / 1,000
11. **bowen** – measure of funding for legislative staff resources, in thousands of dollars, as measured by Bowen and Greene (2014)
12. **bowen000** – **bowen** / 1,000
13. **ncslstaff** – sheer number of permanent legislative staff persons, as provided by the National Conference of State Legislatures (2016). Figures are provided only every few years, with observations repeated over multiple years.
14. **definitions** – total number of lobbyist registration criteria based on scale of Newmark (2005), with measurements provided by Strickland (2018)
15. **prohibitions** – total number of ethics laws and campaign finance restrictions based on scale of Newmark (2005), with measures provided by Strickland (2018)

16. **reports** – scale of reporting requirements for registered lobbyists based on Newmark (2005), with measures provided by Strickland (2018)
17. **defpro – definitions * prohibitions**
18. **defrep – definitions * reports**
19. **initiativestate** – a dichotomous indicator for whether a state allowed for direct democracy techniques, including if constitutional amendments may be initiated by citizens. If a state allowed direct democracy, it was scored “1.” If not, then it was scored “0.”
20. **foldedranney6yr** – folded Ranney (1976) index based on legislative partisan division of previous six years in each U.S. state, with measures provided by Klarner (2015)
21. **termlimit** – a dichotomous indicator for whether legislative term limits were in effect within a state. If term limits were in effect in a state, it was scored “1.” If not, then it was scored “0.”
22. **genexp** – government expenditures during state and year, excluding utility, liquor store, and social insurance trust expenditures. These statistics were provided by Klarner (2015).
23. **lnexp** – $\log(\text{genexp})$
24. **firmreport** – a dichotomous indicator for whether a state allowed lobbyists to register as members of firms in the given year. If a state allowed lobbyists to register as members of firms, then the state was coded “1.” If not, then the state was coded “0.”
25. **noexpire** – a dichotomous indicator for whether registered lobbyist-client dyads did not expire during each legislative session in a given year (hence, there would be additional dyads within the list from previous years, which might not represent active lobbyists). If registrations did not expire every session within a state, then the state was coded “1.” If not, then the state was coded “0.”

For replicating Figure3, use “Figure3.dta.”

26. **ci95** – from “Figure3.dta,” this is the upper boundary of the 95-percent confidence intervals for various predicted **dyads**, at different values of **definitions** and **reports**
27. **ciminus95** – from “Figure3.dta,” this is the lower boundary of the 95-percent confidence intervals for various predicted **dyads**, at different values of **definitions** and **reports**

References

- Bowen, Daniel C. and Zachary Greene. 2014. "Should We Measure Professionalism with an Index? A Note on Theory and Practice in State Legislative Professionalism Research." *State Politics and Policy Quarterly* 14, no. 3: 277 - 96.
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- National Conference of State Legislatures. 2016. "Size of State Legislative Staff." NCSL.org. National Conference of State Legislatures. <http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/staff-change-chart-1979-1988-1996-2003-2009.aspx>, accessed December 11, 2017.
- Newmark, Adam J. 2005. "Measuring State Legislative Lobbying Regulation, 1990 – 2003." *State Politics and Policy Quarterly* 5, no. 2: 182 – 191.
- Ranney, Austin J. 1976. "Parties in State Politics." In Herbert Jacob and Kenneth Vines (eds.), *Politics in the American States*, p. 51 – 94. 3rd ed. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Strickland, James. 2018. "A Paradox of Political Reform: Shadow Interests in the U.S. States." *American Politics Research*. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X18788049>.