Democratic Consequences of Hostile Media Perceptions
The Case of Gaza Settlers

Yariv Tsfati and Jonathan Cohen

In this article, the authors examine the consequences of the hostile-media phenomenon and advance the argument that people's perceptions of hostile coverage shape their trust in mainstream media institutions. Media trust in turn affects trust in democracy and willingness to accept democratic decisions. These ideas are tested on a sample of Jewish Settlers in the Gaza Strip, in the weeks before a Likud Party vote on Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's plan to pull out of the Gaza Strip and evacuate settlers from their homes. Findings show that hostile media perceptions were negatively related to settlers' trust in media and that trust in media was positively related to trust in democracy, which, in turn, affected settlers' intentions to forcefully resist Sharon's evacuation plan. No direct association was found between hostile media perceptions and intentions to forcefully resist evacuation.

Keywords: *hostile media perceptions; trust in media; trust in democracy; Gaza settler*

Democracy serves as a mechanism for solving disputes between opposing ideologies and groups through debate and discourse. This mechanism encourages people to obey laws they disagree with and that go against their individual interests in the name of majority rule and of the collective good. In this sense, democracy replaces the use of force as a coordinating principle, allowing the conduct of social life. News media are central to this process, both as forums for exchanging views—outlets for attempting to persuade a majority of the people—and tools for disseminating information necessary for collective deliberation. Though people are often critical of news coverage and are aware that the information provided by the media is not always perfect, the media remain an important social institution for democratic deliberation.

Press/Politics 10(4):28-51
DOI: 10.1177/1081180X05280776

In complex societies, the information one requires for seriously considering a variety of social and political issues is impossible to gather and confirm individually. News organizations, then, are needed to summarize large amounts of important information necessary for individuals to generate opinions and cultivate the expertise needed to understand complex and often technical matters. Thus, the function of media sources in democracy is to bridge the gap between what we must know to be informed citizens and what we can know (Warren 1999). Because democratic decisions are collective, it is important not only that citizens believe their own democratic decisions to be based on comprehensive and accurate information but that their fellow citizens base their decisions on similarly valid information. Because the news media are central to the gathering and disseminating of information, our trust in news sources as fulfilling their democratic function is crucial. Hence, the trust citizens place in journalists to present information honestly and to act as fair moderators in the public sphere is a necessary component of the public's trust in the functioning of democracy. This trust may become especially crucial for democratic goodwill when citizens are highly involved, perceive themselves to be highly informed about a particular topic, and experience uncertainty about the personal consequences of a democratic decision. Under these conditions, the belief that media are being fair in informing their fellow citizens, and more generally the democratic process, may be a key factor in the willingness of citizens to abide by democratic norms.

In essence, trust is necessary where verification is most difficult; therefore we generally trust information provided by media without being able to verify it directly. Paradoxically, trust that is most easily generated based on shared interests is most necessary where conflicts of interest arise. Thus, trust in media sources is rarely complete, and people seek opportunities to validate their trust. Though trust in media is clearly part of a larger set of beliefs about democratic institutions (Tsfati 2002), it varies as a result of what people see and hear in media coverage and in social discourse about media (Watts et al. 1999). Especially, opportunities to reevaluate our attitudes toward media and our trust in them arise when news about our own surroundings or the groups or issues we are involved in appears in media sources. When people perceive that they are treated unfairly by the news media, when they perceive that their point of view does not receive fair and unbiased treatment in news coverage, their trust in media may decline. Because media are perceived as playing a pivotal role in the democratic process, citizens' trust in democracy and their willingness to accept democratic decisions with which they disagree may also decline if they find media coverage unfair.

In this article, we examine the association between people's perceptions of hostile, negative coverage of the group to which they belong and their willingness to resort to violence to protest democratic decisions they perceive as illegitimate. A model examining a direct association between these constructs, as well

as an indirect association mediated through trust in media and trust in democracy, is presented and tested. This is done in the rather unusual and dramatic context of Jewish settlers in the Gaza Strip and their reactions to the May 2004 Likud Party referendum on Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's disengagement plan.

Audience Perceptions of "the Hostile Media"

Media scholars, social psychologists, and many other observers have long noted that partisans tend to perceive media coverage as unjustly slanted against their point of view. This is the case even when coverage is relatively evenhanded. In a landmark article, Vollone et al. (1985) exposed American students, pro-Israeli and pro-Arab, to identical U.S. network coverage of the 1983 Beirut massacre and found that both groups perceived the televised segments as biased against their side. This pattern of findings was dubbed "the hostile media phenomenon." Perloff (1989) replicated these findings and interpreted them as stemming from ego-involvement—rather than personal relevance or salience—of participants with the topic. Supposedly, high involvement with a topic enhances the cognitive processes that underlie the hostile media perception (HMP) (e.g., by making schema-discrepant information more salient and memorable; Perloff 1989). Later research (Gunther and Liebhart 2005) showed that the greater the ego-involvement of respondents with the topic, the higher the bias they perceived in news articles.

Later research also replicated the hostile media findings in other contexts, using data from probabilistic national samples, as well as experimental data (Christen et al. 2002; Gunther and Chia 2001). It was also found that HMPs are particular to media materials: When the news story was manipulated and presented as a student essay, experimental subjects perceived it as fair, compared with subjects who read the very same story presented as a newspaper article (Gunther and Schmitt 2004). Subsequent research using a similar design (Gunther and Liebhart 2005) found that the perceived bias of a message results from two independent beliefs about the message: that the article was written by a journalist and not a student and that the message will have wide rather than limited circulation.

While the initial Vollone et al. (1985) design used relatively balanced news clips as the stimulus material, the findings were extended to cases in which the media are clearly imbalanced (Gunther et al. 2001). Research has documented a relative hostile media phenomenon "in which each group perceives news coverage to be either more hostile to, or at least less agreeable with, their own point of view than the opposing group sees it" (Gunther and Chia 2001: 690). Thus, when it is widely believed that media favor one group, members of that group may not see the coverage as actually hostile to their position. According to the relative hostile media hypothesis, they would merely judge the coverage of their own group to be more unfair than would the opposing group.

Although research has documented the extent to which individuals perceive media coverage as negative, and has probed the cognitive mechanisms underlying such perceptions (Giner-Sorolla and Chaiken 1994), relatively little research has examined the consequences of people's perception that coverage of their group or of the issues they believe in is slanted. Research examining the consequences of HMPs has focused on effects of people's assessments of public opinion (e.g., Gunther 1998; Gunther and Christen 2002). In the following pages, we advance the argument that the perception of hostile coverage is also related to trust in mainstream media institutions and, thus, that such perceptions also indirectly affect trust in the democratic process and willingness to accept democratic decisions.

Perceiving Hostile Coverage and Mistrusting the Media

According to Fukuyama (1995), trust is the expectation of regular, honest, and cooperative behavior, based on commonly shared norms. "Those norms can be about deep 'value' questions like the nature of God or justice, but they also encompass secular norms like professional standards and codes of behavior" (p. 26). Trust in the institutions of journalism and the news media is thus the expectation that journalists will live by their professional standards (Liebes 2000). If media institutions promise their audiences fair, reliable, and objective information—and these are indeed the main principles of professional journalism—then audience trust in media is the perception that journalists will provide such coverage. As Tsfati and Cappella (2003: 506) claimed, the relationship between journalists and audiences always involves uncertainty, which is a prerequisite for trust. Audiences never know for sure whether journalists are the honest watchdogs they claim to be or whether they are simply promoting their personal agendas; this uncertainty is what makes trust germane.

If media trust is the expectation of audiences that mainstream media institutions will provide fair, accurate, and evenhanded coverage, then those who perceive that their group is treated unfairly by the media should become less trusting of the media. The more people believe their group is being mistreated by the news media, the more they should think they cannot trust the media to perform their democratic roles. They might say to themselves, "If media are doing such a lousy job when covering my group, they must be doing as badly when covering other issues. In general, I don't think I can trust them."

While generalized interpersonal trust arguably reflects deeply held values and worldviews rooted in early childhood and, as such, is resistant to change and relatively stable, media trust falls under the category of institutional trust, which is much more malleable and based on experience (Uslaner 2002). When our experience with an institution involves unfairness and deprivation, our future

expectations of that institution will be less trusting. This perhaps explains research demonstrating only modest stability in audience trust in media (e.g., in panel data, the variance explained in media trust by the same measure taken three months earlier is less than 40 percent; Tsfati 2003: 162), or findings showing that changes in media trust could be attributed to elite cues (Watts et al. 1999). It follows, then, that the perception that one's group has been deprived in the past of fair treatment and equal access by the news media should contribute to expectations that journalists will provide this same group with unfair treatment in the future, thus betray their professional responsibilities. Expectations like these constitute mistrust.

Trust in News Media Institutions and Trust in Democracy

Our trust in democracy is our mutual confidence that no party in the democratic exchange will exploit another's vulnerability (following Sabel 1993: 1133). It is the expectation that the democratic process will be fair and that democratic competition and decision making will take place within the boundaries of agreed upon norms and principles (Misztal 2001: 383). People cannot view the democratic process as fair unless they believe they have a fair chance of influencing public opinion by voicing their arguments. It is impossible to trust democracy unless one perceives that the electorate is well and fairly informed, possessing an accurate picture of the issues at hand.

The classical democratic model regards government, press, and citizens as interrelated components of the democratic process. Liebes and Ribak (1991) reminded us that all three are supposed to play their roles in a fair and responsible way. The news media's role, according to this model, is both to inform the citizenry in a fair and balanced way and to hold the government accountable for its actions. Without trust in the conduit of political information, trust in the fairness of collective decision making is likely to be undermined.

Indeed, some have argued that cynicism toward the institutions of the press is part of a syndrome of alienation and mistrust in modern societies (Liebes and Ribak 1991). Perhaps this is why trust in the news media has been found to correlate with trust in other democratic institutions (Tsfati 2002). In the World Values Surveys (Inglehart et al. 2000), containing data from ninety-three nations and territories, confidence in the press was positively correlated with confidence in government ($r = .26$, $p < .001$), confidence in Parliament ($r = .32$, $p < .001$), and confidence in the judicial system ($r = .37$, $p < .001$). The same patterns of correlation, and of similar magnitudes, were found in large sample data in the United States (e.g., National Opinion Research Center 1999) and in Israel (e.g., Chaim Herzog Institute for Media, Politics and Society 2003).

Trust in news media becomes particularly salient and important for general democratic trust when an individual is directly and personally implicated in a contested issue (e.g., farmers facing cuts in agricultural subsidies). The reason is that, in such cases, the perception that others are ill informed because the news media are not providing them with access to the truth (as one sees it) is frustrating and detrimental to the belief that political decisions are being made in a fair and just way. Hence, in situations of high involvement, trust in news media is an especially crucial component of trust in democracy.

Trust in Democracy and Violent Protest

Gurr (1970) has argued that violent protest arises from dissatisfaction and frustration with a specific situation and stems mainly from the belief—based on comparison with other groups or individuals—that a group or individual is entitled to receive more substantive and symbolic resources than they are currently allocated. Recently, Pedahzur et al. (2000) have suggested that political illegitimacy, and not perceptions of relative deprivation per se, is the factor affecting violent protest, and especially support of violent protest at the individual level. Intimately, almost synonymously, linked with a sense of political illegitimacy is a sense of mistrust in the democratic process. Hence, when people mistrust the democratic process and believe its results to be unjust, they are less likely to see themselves as bound by the rules of democratic conduct. Under these circumstances, people are more likely to support the use of force to protest decisions they perceive to be unfair and illegitimate.

Hypotheses

A model summarizing our arguments is presented in Figure 1. First, we hypothesize (H1) that perceptions of hostile coverage will negatively influence trust in media. Second, we hypothesize (H2) that respondents' trust in news media will positively affect their trust in democracy. Third, we hypothesize (H3) that trust in democracy will be negatively related to intentions to resort to force when protesting democratic decisions. Finally, because negative coverage may in itself provoke angry and violent responses, we examine (research question 1): Beyond their indirect effects on intentions to use force, through their negative impact on trust, do perceptions of hostile coverage directly affect intentions to use violent protest?

In contrast to the causal logic depicted in Figure 1, it can be argued that the causal direction flows from more general attitudes to more specific perceptions. Arguably, trust in democracy—stemming from a deep-seated attitude, possibly beginning at a young age—shapes consequent, more specific perceptions regarding the political world, including perceptions of media. In turn, trust in



Figure 1
An Outline of the Proposed Model
Note: H1-H3 = hypotheses 1-3, respectively; RQ1 = research question 1.

media (again, arguably, a stable attitude) shapes perceptions about the coverage of specific issues (this causal reasoning was suggested by Giner-Sorolla and Chaiken 1994). In a sense, the model depicted in Figure 1 follows a more rational, bottom-up conception of attitude formation and change in reaction to changing realities, and the reverse-causation argument stems from consistency theories that focus on ego-motivated biases that result in attitude persistence. Possibly, the relationship between the general and more specific constructs in our model works both ways, and hence the possibility of reciprocal associations has to be examined.

The following pages describe a test of our theoretical model (depicted in Figure 1) and reciprocal alternatives in the context of Jewish settlers in the Gaza Strip and their reaction to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's disengagement plan, which includes a proposed evacuation of the settlers from their homes.

Settlers in the Gaza Strip and Ariel Sharon's Disengagement Plan

Heavily populated by Palestinians (currently more than 1.3 million, according to the *CIA World Factbook* 2004), the Gaza Strip was conquered by Israel from

Egypt during the 1967 war. Jewish Israelis settled the Gaza Strip, as they did the West Bank, in twenty-one small settlements that, at present (2005), are occupied by some seven thousand settlers. Established by right-wing groups and Israeli governments, beginning in the 1970s, these settlements were created to fulfill geopolitical and ideological goals. Though the settlement movement was made up of several groups, it was, at its core, committed to the idea of inhabiting the greater land of Israel as part of a process of messianic redemption (Sprinzak 1985).

In the aftermath of the 1967 victory and expansion of Israel's borders, the settlement movement originally enjoyed widespread support by Israeli public opinion, including parts of the political elite. Its relationship with Israeli governments, both Likud and Labor, however, has oftentimes been strained (Sprinzak 1985). Beginning in the 1980s, and especially during the 1990s, the settlements were at the heart of heated political debates in Israel. They were presented by parts of the Israeli Left (including cabinet ministers) as a burden rather than an asset to Israel's image and prospects of peace, as a financial drain, and as a reason for many of Israel's problems. In the context of this debate, the settlers have come to be regarded in Israeli public opinion as socially and politically peripheral (though oftentimes disproportionately politically powerful), and their image is associated with manifestations of political extremism and violence against their Arab neighbors.

Coverage of the settlements in mainstream media has focused on "disorder news" (Avraham 2001). The issues most frequently covered have had to do with the Israeli-Arab conflict, attacks on Palestinians, political extremism, and conflicts with Israeli governments. The coverage disregarded other aspects of life in the settlements, such as economic development, industry, and culture. Journalists treat settlers as the "others," using an "us versus them" frame and presenting residents of the settlements as having different characteristics from mainstream Israelis. Media coverage often described the settlements as a lawless "Wild West" that did not contribute to society. As Avraham (2001: 124) maintained,

> The settlers were blamed for everything bad, as negatively affecting "all of us" in all aspects of our lives, as different from the public at large. . . . [T]here was no tendency among most editors and journalists to adopt the group's point of view, or even its terminology for its name, the name of the area it lives in and so on.

The disengagement plan was proposed by the Sharon government in December 2003 as a response to increasing international pressure to advance the peace process; it was also prompted by the government's conviction that no deal was possible with the current Palestinian leadership. The plan included unilaterally withdrawing the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) from the Gaza Strip after relocating all sixteen hundred families from the settlements within this area. According to

Sharon, the disengagement was meant to decrease the friction between the Palestinian population, the settlers, and army personnel who were stationed in the area to protect the settlers. The plan was also meant to decrease international pressure on Israel, alleviate the financial burden of securing the settlements, and provide a testing ground for the feasibility of Palestinian sovereignty. In essence, it would provide the Palestinians with a small area (360 square kilometers) in which they would be free of Israeli occupation, while easing political pressure on Israel to withdraw from other occupied territories.

Sharon was pressured into taking the plan to a referendum among Likud Party members by senior Likud politicians and settlers, who argued that it represented a break from the party's traditional hawkish policy. The settlers and their supporters campaigned against it, canvassing door-to-door, protesting, and calling on Likud members to vote against the plan, which they named "the expulsion plan." The plan enjoyed widespread support among the Israeli public at the time of study, and up until April 29, 2004 (three days before the referendum), opinion polls conducted among potential referendum voters and published in the Israeli media predicted that Sharon's plan had a solid majority among Likud members. However, the April 29 surveys predicted a majority of voters would oppose disengagement at the polls, and eventually, Sharon failed to gain the support of a majority of his party members at the polls.[1]

While, as noted earlier, coverage of the settlements in the mainstream Israeli media tends to be negative, a content analysis of the coverage of the debate over the disengagement plan, in the weeks preceding the May 2, 2004, referendum, revealed that coverage to have been relatively evenhanded. Sheafer (2005) analyzed the content of 534 news and editorial items discussing the disengagement plan or the referendum that were published in the three leading Israeli newspapers between March 30 and May 2, 2004. Results of his analysis showed a relatively balanced news treatment, with Sharon and his plan enjoying slightly more positive coverage in the earlier stages of the campaign and his opponents enjoying more supportive coverage in the last week.

Data for the current investigation were collected from Gaza settlers in the days leading up to the Likud Party's referendum. Most of the respondents were interviewed before the polls predicting the plan's failure had been published. All of the settlers were interviewed under rather extreme conditions of uncertainty, that is, while faced with the threat of being removed from their homes. The context in which the settlers were interviewed was considered one of high "ego-involvement," since they were a highly ideological group, more so because of the threat of being removed from their homes. Borrowing from Sherif et al. (1965), Perloff (1989: 241) suggested that ego-involved attitudes are "linked to the person's central values and constructs and ordinarily consist of strongly held commitments to family, politics or religion." It was in this atmosphere that we examined settlers' perceptions of negative media coverage and its indirect as well as

direct influence on their willingness to accept, or intention to violently resist, a possible evacuation.

Method

Sample

The data for this study were collected by the University of Haifa Survey Research Center, using telephone surveys conducted during the last weeks of May 2004. The population consisted of all 1,267 households in the Jewish Settlements in the Gaza Strip listed in the Bezeq (Israeli national phone service provider) phone directories at the time of survey. The list of phone numbers was randomly ordered. Fifteen attempts were made to contact each household, in case of a busy line or no answer, and each household from which there was no response was replaced by the next household. This procedure was employed until more than 400 interviews (the predetermined quota) were completed. Within households, adults older than seventeen were selected, with attempts to balance the number of men and women. Interviews were conducted in Hebrew. The American Association for Public Opinion Research's (AAPOR's) response rate was RR1 = .52.

The sample consisted of 413 individuals. The average age of respondents was 36 (*SD* = 11.96), and 57 percent of them were female. In terms of religiosity, the self-reported distribution was approximately 67 percent religious, 18 percent secular, and 9 percent traditional (the rest did not report their religiosity). Most (60.5 percent) classified themselves as belonging to a Mizrahi ethnic group (Jews of Asian or North African descent), 29.2 percent were of Ashkenazi (European) origin, and the rest were of mixed ethnic backgrounds. On average, respondents had 14.81 years of education (*SD* = 4.38) and had been living in the Gaza Strip for 13.14 years (*SD* = 7.01).

Measures

Except where otherwise specified, all measures were based on Likert-type items measuring agreement with statements. Answer categories ranged from *strongly disagree* (1) to *strongly agree* (5).

HMPs. The settlers' perceptions regarding media coverage of the settlements were measured using six items. Subjects were asked to respond to the following statements: "The media address only the negative aspects of the settlements in Gaza without mentioning the positive ones," "The media present Gaza settlers as more extreme than they really are," "The media overrepresent security problems in the Gaza settlements," "The media exaggerate when presenting the cost of Gaza settlements and their security to the national budget," "The media downplay the importance of the settlements in Gaza to the security of the State of Israel," and "The media present people living in the Gaza settlements as though

they were all the same." Perception of negative coverage was constructed as a latent variable influencing these items (Cronbach's $\alpha = .73$, $M = 4.29$, $SD = 0.74$).

News media trust. Respondents' trust in the news media was measured using a single survey item worded, "In general, I have great trust in Israeli media." This item had a very low mean of 1.58, with a standard deviation of 0.96 (in a similar manner to the previous HMP measure), suggesting a consensus among Gaza settlers—probably stemming from their high involvement with the topic, especially given the highly charged context—that the coverage is slanted against them and that media cannot be trusted.

Trust in democracy. Respondents' trust in democracy was again measured using a single survey item: "I have great trust in Israeli democracy." The average response was 2.29, with a standard deviation of 1.40.

Intention to violently resist a possible evacuation. The item measuring intention to use force to resist the possible evacuation was worded, "If they come to evacuate me from my home, I will use force to resist." The item had a mean of 2.20 and a standard deviation of 1.63. Note that this item had a relatively low mean and a relatively high dispersion, indicating that many of the settlers did not report intentions to forcefully resist evacuation, as opposed to a small minority expressing strong intentions to violently protest.

Covariates. As explained above, trust in media, trust in democracy, and the tendency to justify and ultimately use political violence are likely to be affected not only by people's perceptions of the coverage of the settlements as unfair but also by various demographic and ideological beliefs. Thus, as detailed in Figure 2, and following the work of Pedahzur et al. (2000), our model controlled for four variables: nondemocratic beliefs ("I would be interested in a government that would lead in the right way, even if it is not democratic"; $M = 2.33$, $SD = 0.98$); religious, antidemocratic ideology ("Rabbis' opinions are no less important than those of the political leadership"; $M = 3.87$, $SD = 1.59$); belief in the importance of settling the entire land of Israel ("Without the right to settle in all parts of the land of Israel, there is no point to the existence of an independent Jewish state"; $M = 3.28$; $SD = 1.77$); and security-based arguments against the disengagement plan ("If the Gaza Strip is evacuated, terrorism would only increase"; $M = 4.63$, $SD = 1.01$).

Also included in the model were variables representing respondents' involvement in, and attachment to, their settlements, and a construct measuring respondents' level of news exposure. To tap involvement, a predictor of HMPs, settlers were asked to respond to the following: "To what extent do you like living in (your settlement)?" ($M = 4.83$, $SD = 0.55$); "To what extent do you feel



Figure 2
Standardized Maximum Likelihood (ML) Estimates for the Structural Component, Model 1
$^{**}p \leq .05$. $^{****}p \leq .001$.

you belong in (your settlement)?" ($M = 4.01$, $SD = 0.98$); "I have many friends in the Gaza Strip settlements" ($M = 4.75$, $SD = 0.04$); and "How many years have you been living in the Gaza Strip?" ($M = 13.14$, $SD = 7.01$). These items did not scale together and, hence, were entered into the model separately. The high means and low variability in some of these variables, probably stemming from the highly charged context of this study, are also noteworthy.

The news media exposure construct was created as the average of four items tapping the frequency with which respondents read newspapers or were exposed to news on television, radio, or on the Web ($M = 3.03$, $SD = 0.93$) on a scale ranging from 1 *(never)* to 5 *(every day)*.

Model Specification

The structure of the model, model 1, is presented in Figure 2. In accordance with standard representation, we depicted the observed variables as rectangles and the latent variables as ovals. For simplification purposes, indicators influenced by the latent variables, error terms, and covariances between exogenous variables were omitted from the figure.[2] The model allows for all correlations between exogenous variables.

The endogenous variables in the model are HMPs, trust in media, trust in democracy, and intention to use violence to resist the possible evacuation. Guided by past findings on the hostile media phenomenon (Christen et al. 2002; Vollone et al. 1985), we modeled the perceived hostile coverage construct as an endogenous variable affected by demographics, the involvement and the ideological variables.

In accordance with H1, we modeled trust in media as affected by perceived hostile coverage. In accordance with H2, we modeled trust in democracy as

affected by trust in media. In accordance with H3, we modeled intentions to forcefully protest the likely evacuation as affected by trust in democracy. To assess the net effect of the central components of our model, other variables potentially affecting the endogenous variables were included: all equations control for demographic variables, including secularity, ethnic origin, age, education, and sex. All equations also control for the ideological variables mentioned above, and for news media exposure.

However, given the possibility of reciprocal relationships between the main constructs in our model, we constructed three additional models (depicted in Figure 3) that were identical in all respects to our main model, with the exception that they included reciprocal paths: model 2 included a path for a possible reciprocal effect of trust in media on HMPs; model 3 included a path for a possible reciprocal effect of trust in democracy on trust in media; finally, model 4 contained reciprocal effects for both pairs of variables: HMPs and trust in media, and trust in media and trust in democracy.[3]

Results

The first stage of our analysis was designed to select the best-fitting model. Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimates for the four models were calculated using AMOS. Results are depicted in Figure 3.[4] In all three alternative models, the coefficients for "reverse causation" paths (that is, the paths from trust in media to HMPs and from trust in democracy to trust in media) were not statistically significant. In other words, the results presented evidence in favor of paths from HMPs to trust in media, and from trust in media to trust in democracy, but no evidence was found supporting the reverse paths.

While many of the fit indices (normed fit index [NFI], Tucker Lewis Index [TLI], relative fit index [RFI], and root mean square error of approximation [RMSEA]) were identical for all four models, the chi-square scores could be compared across nested models, using the chi-square difference test (Kline 1999: 132–33). Comparison of our original model (model 1) with the alternative models showed that none of the alternative models resulted with significant fit improvements (for the comparison with model 2: $\chi^2 = 0.17$, $df = 1$; for the comparison with model 3: $\chi^2 = 2.87$, $df = 1$; and for the comparison with model 4: $\chi^2 = 3.06$, $df = 2$), although the p-value was borderline significant for the comparison with model 2 ($p = .09$). However, a comparison of the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) suggested that the preferred model should be model 3 (the one with the lowest AIC value), though the differences in AIC between model 3 and model 1 were minor.

Given the borderline p-value and relatively minor differences in AIC values, it is not clear whether we should select model 1 or model 3. However, the substantive results of both models are identical. Both provide evidence that trust in



	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
NFI	0.988	0.988	0.988	0.988
TLI	0.982	0.982	0.982	0.982
RFI	0.969	0.969	0.969	0.969
RMSEA	0.057	0.057	0.057	0.057
χ^2	283.49	283.32	280.16	280.43
df	117	116	116	115
AIC	697.49	699.34	696.61	698.43

Figure 3
A Comparison of the Recursive Model to Three Alternative Nonrecursive Models
Note: NFI = normed fit index; TLI = Tucker Lewis Index; RFI = relative fit index; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; AIC = Akaike Information Criteria.

media affects trust in democracy and not the other way around, given the null result for the reciprocal path. Since the path that was added to the model was not statistically significant, it is possible to stay with the simpler model, model 1.[5]

Figure 2 presents standardized estimates for the paths relevant for our discussion in model 1, and Table 1 presents unstandardized estimates and standard errors for these paths. The appendix presents the results for the control variables. Table 1 also presents the results for model 1 without any controls. The pattern of results was similar with or without statistical controls. When using controls the model explains 33 percent of the variance in HMPs, 20 percent of the variance in trust in media (8.2 percent in the uncontrolled model), 27 percent of the variance in trust in democracy (14.8 percent in the uncontrolled model), and 19 percent of the variance in intentions to use violence (7.1 percent in the uncontrolled model).

Table 1
Maximum likelihood (ML) estimates for model 1

Structural Component	With Controls	Without Controls
Hostile media perceptions → Trust in media	–.32 (.14)**	–.60 (.13)****
Trust in media → Trust in democracy	.36 (.06)****	.52 (.06)****
Trust in democracy → Intention to use violence to resist evacuation	–.24 (.06)****	–.31 (.06)****

Note: Table entries are unstandardized coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. **$p \leq .05$. ****$p \leq .001$.

The first equation predicted HMPs. Results for this equation showed that the only demographic variable borderline significantly affecting HMPs was age, with younger settlers perceiving more hostile coverage. Most attachment variables did not predict HMPs. The only exception was the item tapping respondents' feeling that they belong in their settlements. In line with research on the hostile media phenomenon, the more respondents felt they belonged in the Gaza settlements, the more they felt news media coverage of the settlements was unfair and biased ($b = .14$, $SE = .06$). Among the ideological involvement variables, respondents believing in the right of Jews to settle the entire land of Israel and respondents thinking that terrorism would increase in case of an evacuation were more likely to perceive coverage of the settlements in Israeli media to be hostile. Mainstream news media exposure also predicted HMPs (but this association was only of borderline statistical significance). The negative coefficient for this variable means that the higher the respondents' exposure to mainstream media, the less likely they were to perceive that the coverage of the settlements was hostile.

The second equation predicted trust in Israeli mainstream media. Results for this equation demonstrate that ethnicity was the only demographic variable which had a borderline-significant relation to this construct (with Mizrahim more trusting than Ashkenazim). The associations between the ideological factors and mainstream media trust were mostly weak and insignificant, with the exception of the item tapping respondents' security-based arguments against disengagement. Perhaps reflecting settlers' belief that Israeli news media are more concerned with Palestinian human rights than with Israeli security, the more respondents believed the evacuation would increase terrorism, the less likely they were to trust news media. As in past research (Tsfati and Cappella 2003), exposure to mainstream media was positively and significantly associated with mainstream media trust. The higher the level of respondents' mainstream news exposure, the more they trusted the media.

Over and above these effects, and as expected by H1, news media trust was also significantly influenced by respondents' HMPs ($b = –.32$, $SE = .14$, $p <$

.05). The more respondents perceived news media coverage of the settlements to be negative and unfair, the less they trusted media coverage. Based on comparison of the absolute values of the standardized coefficients in the model, HMPs were among the best predictors of trust in media (with a standardized coefficient of $\beta = -.15$, second only to mainstream news exposure with $\beta = .20$). It is likely that this finding is an underestimate of the real relationship in the general population because in the current study's context the variance in HMP is artificially reduced.

The third equation predicted trust in democracy. Secularity, nondemocratic beliefs and beliefs that rabbis' opinions are no less important than those of the political leadership were significantly and negatively related to trust in democracy. News media exposure was positively and significantly related to trust in democracy, all other things being equal. After controlling for these effects, and as expected by H2, trust in media was positively, substantially and significantly related to trust in democracy ($b = .36$, $SE = .06$, $p \leq .001$). Comparing the absolute values of the standardized coefficients, trust in media was the strongest predictor of trust in democracy ($\beta = .27$), but the standardized coefficient of the next predictor in line (nondemocratic beliefs) had a similar magnitude ($\beta = -.25$).

The fourth equation predicted settlers' intention to forcefully resist the likely democratic decision to evacuate them from their homes. As expected, intentions to use force were associated with demographic and ideological variables. Younger and more educated respondents were more likely to report intentions to use force (with the latter effect only borderline significant). Both the belief in the right of Jews to settle the entire land of Israel and the belief that the opinions of rabbis are no less important than those of political leaders positively predicted intention to use violence to resist the disengagement plan. Mainstream news exposure was also a positive and significant predictor of intentions to violently resist evacuation.

H3 predicted that over and above these effects, trust in democracy would be negatively associated with intention to resort to violent protest to resist evacuation. Indeed, results suggested that all other variables in the model being equal, the more respondents trusted democracy, the less likely they were to intend to resist forcefully the likely democratic decision regarding disengagement ($b = -.24$, $SE = .06$). This effect was highly significant ($p \leq .001$). Again, comparing the absolute values of the standardized coefficients, trust in democracy was among the best predictors of intention to use violence ($\beta = -.21$), second only to the ideological factor of belief in Jews' right to settle the entire land of Israel ($\beta = .27$).

In addition to examining the indirect effects of HMPs on intention to use violence, research question 1 inquired about the possibility of a direct link between these two constructs. To examine the possibility of a direct impact of the former on the latter construct, we added the corresponding path to all models. Results

for all models showed no evidence of a direct effect of HMPs on intention to use violence. That is, the coefficient for this path was not statistically different from zero in all possible constellations of the structural relationships of the main variables. In our data, at least, the association between HMPs and intentions to resort to violent protest is not direct but rather mediated through media trust.

Discussion

Democracy requires institutional and social trust, and these are seriously challenged when one perceives a central democratic institution such as mass media as biased, imbalanced, and antagonistic. Our data show that such perceptions are indeed associated with mistrust in media, which is related to mistrust in democracy, and, under the extreme conditions of the current investigation, also to intentions to resist majority decisions through undemocratic means. All of these effects hold over and above stringent statistical controls for demographic and ideological factors.

While statistically significant, the indirect effect of HMPs on intentions to use violence was rather small (the indirect $b = -.32 \times .24 \times -.36 = .028$). The indirect effect of HMP on trust in democracy was substantially higher (indirect $b = -.32 \times .36 = -.12$), but still not a very large effect. Intentions to use violence are hard to predict, and what we show is that some of the best predictors of intentions to use violence (of those we measured) are themselves predicted by media-related processes and perceptions: HMPs were among the best predictors in our model of trust in media, and trust in media was among the best predictors in our model of trust in democracy. The most important implication of our findings is that HMPs are not merely cognitive and perceptual artifacts but rather that they have concrete consequences for people's belief systems and even behavioral intentions. Thus, while empirically small, the contribution of HMPs to the process we described is theoretically important.[6]

Our findings not only allow for an examination of probable outcomes of HMPs but also broaden our understanding of their antecedents. Literature in this area emphasizes the role of involvement with an issue as a precondition for HMPs. All respondents in our data were deeply involved with the issue at hand—Sharon's plan to evacuate them from their homes—but even within this group, there were varying degrees of involvement. Since our survey contained several involvement variables, tapping emotional, ideological, and social involvement, the model predicting HMPs presents us with an opportunity to examine the kind of involvement most intimately related to perceptions of hostile coverage. Results demonstrate that items tapping emotional involvement ("I feel I belong in . . . ") and ideological involvement—belief in the right of Jews to settle the entire historic land of Israel ("If the Gaza Strip is evacuated, terrorism would only increase")—were strongly related to HMPs, while items tapping

social involvement, tenure of residence in the settlements, and perceptions of the settlements as good places to live in were not statistically related to HMPs. The settlers are being offered compensation and individual or collective relocation; thus their resistance is motivated more by ideological and emotional factors rather than social and other factors. It is also possible that the high levels of involvement and low variance in all involvement variables (those that were found to be significant predictors of HMPs as well as those that were not) attenuated these variables' associations with HMPs.

An additional finding worth noting is related to the effects of mainstream media exposure. This construct was significantly related to less HMPs and more trust in media and democracy. The likely interpretation is that settlers are selective in their media exposure so that they are exposed to more supportive media outlets, and hence, the more they are exposed the less they perceive media as negative and the more they trust in media and therefore in democracy. The direct effect of mainstream news exposure on intentions to forcefully resist evacuation was positive: more exposure was related to stronger intentions of violent resistance. Two possible explanations can be offered. First, perhaps exposure to mainstream news that is often focused on conflict and often portrays the success of unpeaceful protest might have convinced audiences in the settlements that uncivil protest is the approach they should use to thwart the disengagement plan.[7] Alternatively, it is possible that selecting to watch more supportive news coverage leads to increased resolve and stronger beliefs in public support and justification for forceful resistance.

Our survey was in the field just days before a crucial vote to decide on whether respondents were going to be removed from their homes. It is rather clear that results are not generalizable to every minority-majority context. The settlers were responding to an issue with which they were highly and most personally involved. For some, the conflict is not only about preserving their homes and lifestyle but also about a deeper set of ideological beliefs. Many settlers came to the Gaza Strip settlements because they believe they are fulfilling God's will as part of a process of salvation of the Jewish people. Evacuation for them goes against God's will and is perceived as a threat to their messianic redemption. While these conditions are rather extreme, it is important to note that in other contexts extremists also perceive media coverage as biased and that many social conflicts involve highly committed groups holding strong beliefs. Possibly, under such extreme conditions, the salience of media coverage is so high that the way it is perceived can affect more general media trust, whereas under more usual conditions, the causal mechanism is reversed. This accounts for the difference between our findings and those offered by Giner-Sorolla and Chaiken (1994).

Other scholars might have used our data to advance a different argument. They might have argued that people who intend to use force would blame democracy, mainstream media, and the media's representation of them to justify

their violent intentions, when these intentions are actually influenced by other factors. Indeed, while our analysis offers some evidence favoring our causal interpretation, structural equation modeling never offers us decisive causal evidence, and thus our analysis cannot completely negate the possibility of reverse causation. However, the causal mechanism depicted in our model is (1) based on theory and logic, (2) enjoys the support of the comparison to alternative models (though this approach can only be used to compare our model with nonrecursive models, not to a model specifying a reverse causation), and (3) offers a more complete explanation for the behavior of settlers. That there exists an association between measures of involvement with the Gaza Strip and trust in media and democracy, despite the fact that no logic for direct effects of this kind can be articulated, suggests that this association is carried from involvement to HMP to trust in media and then to trust in democracy.

Furthermore, if lack of trust is merely an excuse for resisting democratic decisions, we are left wondering what the real reasons are. For example, we would expect other variables in our data (e.g., sex, ethnicity, or secularity) to predict intentions to resist forcefully, and they do not. The "excuse theory" may be an alluring alternative explanation and a potential rebuttal of our argument, but it offers little in the way of explaining the phenomenon under investigation. Nonetheless, regardless of causal ordering, merely establishing the statistical associations between HMPs and media trust, between media trust and trust in democracy, and between trust in democracy and intentions to use force offers an important contribution to our understanding of social conflicts and political processes.

Finally, several methodological limitations should be acknowledged. Because we used a telephone survey that, of necessity, was limited in length, and because the complexity of the case we studied demanded the inclusion of numerous variables, many of the variables were measured using single items. It is likely that we did not capture all the dimensions of variance that could have been captured by multiple items. We were also unable to determine the reliability of these single-item measures. It is also possible that negative phrasing of items measuring HMP biased the results—given the long-standing discourse of settlers against the media, we worried that positive items would set off strong reactions that might have biased the study as a whole.

The practical implication of the present findings for adherents of democratic values is perhaps that media systems should aim at correcting perceptions of negative and biased coverage and of media power over society. One way of doing so is perhaps to provide groups, including minorities, with the feeling that they are receiving fair media access, or at the very least that their arguments are fairly represented in media coverage. Research on the HMP, however, demonstrates that even when a group is treated relatively fairly, or even when a group's coverage is arguably positive (as was the case in the context of the Likud Party vote over

Sharon's plan, according to Sheafer's [2005] analysis), members of that group perceive the coverage as more hostile than do others outside the group.

If HMPs cannot be mitigated, then perhaps there is some point in asking if it is possible to maintain trust in the media despite the perception that one's group is treated unfairly. Perhaps efforts to increase awareness of media production practices, the inevitability of minimal biases resulting from such practices, and the fact that feelings of bias are shared by practically all political groups may facilitate more realistic expectations of news coverage. It is a difficult challenge to change public trust in media, given what we know about perceptions of hostile media coverage, but our findings suggest that it is an important and necessary challenge.

Acknowledgment

This research was supported by the Israel Science Foundation (grant no. 897/03).

Appendix
Maximum Likelihood (ML) Estimates for Control Variables, Model 1

	Hostile Media Perceptions	Trust in Media	Trust in Democracy	Intention to Use Violence
Demographic variables				
Age	–.01 (.00)*	–.01 (.00)	–.01 (.01)	–.01 (.01)**
Secularity	–.05 (.09)	.19 (.16)	–.52 (.21)**	.10 (.27)
Ethnicity	.00 (.05)	.18 (.09)*	.06 (.12)	.18 (.16)
Sex	.06 (.05)	.07 (.10)	.10 (.12)	–.18 (.17)
Education	.01 (.01)	–.01 (.01)	–.02 (.02)	.04 (.02)*
Variables tapping respondents' attachment toward their settlements				
Is a good place to live in	.04 (.05)			
I feel I belong in	.14 (.06)**			
I like living in	.08 (.07)			
Number of years in the Gaza Strip	.00 (.00)			
I have many friends in the Gaza settlements	–.04 (.04)			
Ideological variables				
I would like a government that would lead in the right direction, even if it is not democratic	–.02 (.02)	–.04 (.03)	–.22 (.04)****	.05 (.06)
Rabbis' opinions are no less important than those of political leaders	.02 (.02)	–.07 (.04)	–.19 (.05)****	.17 (.07)**
Belief in the right of Jews to settle the entire historic land of Israel	.06 (.02)****	.01 (.03)	.01 (.04)	.23 (.05)****
If the Gaza Strip is evacuated, terrorism would only increase	.08 (.03)***	–.11 (.06)*	–.08 (.07)	–.09 (.09)
News media exposure	–.06 (.03)*	.23 (.06)****	.20 (.07)***	.22 (.10)**

Note: Table entries are unstandardized coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
*$p < .10$. **$p \leq .05$. ***$p \leq .01$. ****$p \leq .001$.

Notes

1. One hundred and four respondents were interviewed on April 29, 2004, after the poll results were published by the news media. Incorporating a dummy variable for being interviewed on the 29th did not affect the pattern of results reported henceforth. Interestingly, however, after controlling for all covariates, respondents interviewed after the publication of poll results expressed significantly higher trust in Israeli media ($b = .35$, $p < .05$) and more willingness to use violence ($b = .43$, $p < .05$). The former finding is in line with research findings demonstrating that people are more trusting of media when media tell them what they want to hear (Tsfati 2001). The latter finding probably indicates that the supportive poll strengthened the settlers' resolve and their feeling that Sharon's plan was advanced using nondemocratic means.
2. The first listed indicator was set as a reference variable for each latent term.
3. These models were identified given the set of "involvement" variables that were modeled as affecting hostile media perceptions (HMPs) but not the other endogenous variables. These variables functioned as instrumental variables.
4. Unfortunately, the nonrecursive models we tested did not meet all conditions mentioned in the statistical literature (e.g., Wong and Law 1999) for obtaining the best estimates from nonrecursive models. In particular, due to lack of adequate additional instrumental variables in our data set, we could not specify that the error terms of the variables simultaneously affecting one another were correlated (such a specification would have resulted in an unidentified model). But Wong and Law (1999) showed that estimating models without correlated errors of the endogenous nonrecursive variables attenuates the chances to detect unidirectional relationships. Despite this attenuation, we found evidence for a unidirectional relationship in the data.
5. A simpler test of directionality, rather than the nonrecursive structural equations modeling, can be achieved by examining the correlation of the instrumental variables with the dependent variables. Since variables such as emotional or social involvement in one's place of living are not supposed to affect trust in media and trust in democracy, but are known to affect hostile media perceptions (through ego-involvement), significant correlations between such involvement variables and the dependent variables must go through hostile media perceptions and, hence, provide some evidence supporting the directionality assumed in model 1 (though such correlations do not necessarily negate reciprocal relationships). Indeed, such significant correlations were found in our data. For example, trust in democracy and trust in media were both significantly correlated with the items, "To what extent do you feel you belong in . . . ?" (for trust in media: $r = .17$, $p < .001$; for trust in democracy: $r = .20$, $p < .001$) and "I have many friends in the Gaza Strip settlements" (for trust in media: $r = –.10$, $p < .05$; for trust in democracy: $r = –.09$, $p = .07$).
6. The indirect effect size is probably attenuated because of the restricted variance in hostile media perceptions, resulting from the fact that our sample included highly involved respondents (settlers facing evacuation) only.
7. This idea is especially plausible since the specific item we used asked about resisting evacuation by force and not about explicit use of violence. Respondents may also perceive passive resistance as a form of force.

References

Avraham, Eli. 2001. *The Hidden Israel: The Kibbutzim, Jewish Settlements, Development Cities and Arab Towns in the Israeli Press* [in Hebrew]. Jerusalem: Academon.

Chaim Herzog Institute for Media, Politics and Society. 2003. Media Trust Index: Survey Number 1. <http://www.tau.ac.il/institutes/herzog/mediah.html> (accessed Jan. 14, 2005).

Christen, Cindy T., Prathana Kannaovakun, and Albert C. Gunther. 2002. "Hostile Media Perceptions: Partisan Assessments of Press and Public during the 1997 United Parcel Service Strike." *Political Communication* 19:423–36.

CIA World Factbook. 2004. The Gaza Strip. <www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/gz.htm> (accessed Oct. 19, 2004).

Fukuyama, Francis. 1995. *Trust: Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity*. New York: Free Press.

Giner-Sorolla, Roger, and Shelly Chaiken. 1994. "The Causes of Hostile Media Judgments." *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 30:165–80.

Gunther, Albert C. 1998. "The Persuasive Press Inference: Effects of Mass Media on Perceived Public Opinion." *Communication Research* 25:481–99.

Gunther, Albert C., and Stella Chin-Yun Chia. 2001. "Predicting Pluralistic Ignorance: The Hostile Media Effect and Its Consequences." *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly* 78:689–701.

Gunther, Albert C., and Cindy T. Christen. 2002. "Projection or Persuasive Press? Contrary Effects of Personal Opinion and Perceived News Coverage on Estimates of Public Opinion." *Journal of Communication* 52:177–95.

Gunther, Albert C., Cindy T. Christen, Janice L. Libehart, and Stella Chin-Yun Chia. 2001. "Congenial Public, Contrary Press, and Biased Estimates of the Climate of Opinion." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 65:295–320.

Gunther, Albert C., and Janice L. Liebhart. 2005. "Broad Reach or Biased Source? Decomposing the Hostile Media Effect." Paper presented to the Mass Communication Division of the International Communication Association, New York, May.

Gunther, Albert C., and Kathleen Schmitt. 2004. "Mapping Boundaries of the Hostile Media Effect." *Journal of Communication* 54:55–70.

Gurr, Ted R. 1970. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Inglehart, Ronald, et al. 2000. World Values Surveys and European Values Surveys, 1981-1984, 1990-1993, and 1995-1997 [Computer File]. ICPSR version. Ann Arbor, MI: Institute for Social Research [producer], Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor].

Kline, Rex E. 1999. *Structural equation modeling*. New York: Guilford.

Liebes, Tamar. 2000. "Inside a News Item: A Dispute over Framing," *Political Communication* 17:295–305.

Liebes, Tamar, and Rivka Ribak. 1991. "Democracy at Risk: The Reflection of Political Alienation in Attitudes toward the Media." *Communication Theory* 1:239–52.

Misztal, Barbara A. 2001. "Trust and Cooperation: The Democratic Public Sphere." *Journal of Sociology* 37:371–86.

National Opinion Research Center. 1999. General Social Survey 1972-1996 [Cumulative File; Computer File], 2nd ICPSR version. Chicago: National Opinion Research Center [producer]; Storrs, CT: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut / Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributors], 1999.

Pedahzur, Ami, Badi Hasisi, and Avraham Brichta. 2000. "A Proposed Model for Explaining Political Violence in Israel." *World Affairs* 163:18–27.

Perloff, Richard. M. 1989. "Ego-Involvement and the Third Person Effect of Televised News Coverage." *Communication Research* 16(2):236–62.
Sabel, Charles F. 1993. "Studied Trust: Building New Forms of Cooperation in a Volatile Economy." *Human Relations* 46:1133–70.
Sheafer, Tamir. 2005. "Detecting Campaign Effects in Imbalanced Campaigns: The Likud's Intraparty Referendum over Sharon's Disengagement Plan." *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics* 10:85–93.
Sherif, Carolyn W., Muzafer Sherif, and Roger E. Nebergall. 1965. *Attitude and Attitude Change: The Social Judgment-Involvement Approach*. Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders.
Sprinzak, Ehud. 1985. "The Iceberg Model of Political Extremism." In *The Impact of Gush Emunim, Politics and Settlement in the West Bank*, ed. David Newman, 27–45. London: Croom Helm.
Tsfati, Yariv. 2001. "Why Do People Trust or Mistrust Media Pre-election Polls? Evidence from the Israeli 1996 Elections." *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 13(4):433–41.
Tsfati, Yariv. 2002. "The Consequences of Mistrust in the News Media: Media Skepticism as a Moderator in Media Effects and as a Factor Influencing News Media Exposure." Dissertation presented to the faculties of the University of Pennsylvania. Available through UMI Digital Dissertations database, AAT 3043970.
Tsfati, Yariv. 2003. "Does Audience Skepticism of the Media Matter in Agenda Setting?" *Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media* 43(2):157–76.
Tsfati, Yariv, and Joseph N. Cappella. 2003. "Do People Watch What They Do Not Trust? Exploring the Association between News Media Skepticism and Exposure." *Communication Research* 30:504–29.
Uslaner, Eric. M. 2002. *The Moral Foundations of Trust*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Vollone, Robert P., Lee Ross, and Mark R. Lepper. 1985. "The Hostile Media Phenomenon: Biased Perception and Perception of Bias in Coverage of the Beirut Massacre." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 49:577–85.
Warren, Mark E. 1999. *Democracy and trust*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Watts, Mark D., David Domke, Dhavan Shah, and David Fan. 1999. "Elite Cues and Media Bias in Presidential Campaigns." *Communication Research* 26(2):144–75.
Wong, Chi-Sum, and Kenneth S. Law. 1999. "Testing Reciprocal Relations by Non-recursive Models Using Cross-Sectional Data." *Organizational Research Methods* 2(1):69–87.

Biographical Notes

Yariv Tsfati is a lecturer in the Department of Communication at the University of Haifa in Israel. His research focuses on audience perceptions of news media.

Address: University of Haifa, Mt. Carmel, Haifa 31905 Israel; e-mail: ytsfati@com.haifa.ac.il.

Jonathan Cohen is a senior lecturer in the Department of Communication at the University of Haifa in Israel. His research focuses on media effects and on parasocial relationships and audience identification with media characters.

Address: University of Haifa, Mt. Carmel, Haifa 31905 Israel; e-mail: jcohen@com.haifa.ac.il.