Beyond niche news: Multilevel examination of audience overlap and social news cycle effects on ideological news consumption

*Working RQs*

RQ1: Based on a network projection, what are the potential patterns of niche news consumption?

RQ2a: How does the ideology of the audience within one’s news niche related to ideological news consumption?

RQ2b: How does the ideology of the organizations within one’s news niche related to ideological news consumption?

RQ3a: How are individual’s various uses of social media related to ideological news consumption?

RQ3b: How is audience engagement with the news on social media during a news cycle related to ideological news consumption?

RQ3b: How is the sentiment of the news on social media during a news cycle related to ideological news consumption?

**Methods**

**Design and Data**

The study employs a linkage design based on two datasets. First, respondent-level observations were obtained from a 17-wave, rolling cross-sectional survey administered in the United States (*N* = 1,965). Respondents were recruited by Qualtrics and completed the survey online between September 3 and November 1, 2020 (Incidence Rate = 100%; Cooperation Rate (CR3) = 70%; AAPOR, 2016). Each survey wave (i.e., sampling frame) was balanced according to quotas for age, race, gender, and census region according to the 2018 American Community Survey (Table A1 in the online appendix). These data were weighted by non-quota demographics including education and income (see Table A2 online). Missing values were imputed using a chained equations technique (Fully Conditional Specification; see van Buuren & Groothuis-Oudshoorn, 2011). Each sampling frame also coincides with bi-weekly, constructed news cycles, offering the study the ability to link survey responses to social media content circulating just before the response occurred. Thus, the second dataset comprises this social media content, which was collected from a list of the most popular news outlets on Facebook during the data collection period (27 outlets according to News Whip, 2020) (Table B1 online). The study team filtered the most prominent stories from these outlets (top 98th percentile) as determined by a weighted average engagement metric for each story. This metric reflects Facebook’s own weighting scheme as indicated by their proprietary data collection platform, CrowdTangle, which privileges comments (our weight = 3) over shares (our weight = 2) over likes (our weight = 1). URLs and engagement metrics for the posts were then collected for all eligible stories in each time frame using Crimson Hexagon (King et al., 2012). Finally, these social media data were linked with survey responses in the next survey wave, so that story circulation immediately precedes the survey responses with a maximum lag of 3 days.

**Measures**

***Open-Ended News Use Questions***

Survey respondents were asked three times to “write the name of a news outlet (e.g., The New York Times or nytimes.com, Fox News or foxnews.com, WBRC Birmingham) that you used in the past week.” These open-ended news use measures require respondents to engage in free recall, which is more cognitively demanding than close-ended measures that rely on cued recall (Kruikemeier et al., 2018). But because of this additional demand, open-ended news use measures likely reduce random measurement error arising from patterned response or poor recall associated with close-ended news use measures (Prior, 2009). The responses were cleaned and categorized to indicate discrete news outlets (e.g., “*New York Times*” or “Fox News”), with broader categories created for responses where data reduction reduced noise and enhanced clarity (e.g., television call letters, channel numbers, or network affiliations were combined into a “local television” category). In all, respondents named XX distinct outlets/categories (see Table B2 online for a list).

***News Ideology***

*News ideology* is the primary outcome of interest, and it is measured at both the organizational and individual levels. At the organizational level, the news outlets named in the open-ended measures described above were coded for ideology (-3 = *Very Liberal*, 0 = *Neutral*, 3 = *Very* *Conservative*) by three trained coders (Krippendorf’s alpha > .90 for 10% of the list). Based on prior literature (Barnidge et al., 2020; 2021; Stroud, 2008), coders were instructed to adhere to a hierarchical guideline for coding organizational ideology: (1) the outlet’s ideology as identified by existing scholarship (e.g., Budak et al., 2016; Niculae et al., 2015; Otero, 2018); (2) if not identified in prior literature, the outlet’s stated ideology; (3) if not stated, the balance of candidate endorsements dating back to 2012; (4) if no endorsements, ideological stances in editorials about gun control, abortion, immigration, and same-sex marriage. If coders could find no information based on these criteria, the outlet was assumed to be neutral. The final organizational-level variable ranges from -2.0 to 2.2, with a mean of -0.1 (*SD* = 0.8).

At the individual level, each respondent was assigned up to three coded ideology scores based on the outlets they named. These scores were then averaged for each respondent, creating an index of individuals’ news ideology as indicated by their named outlets (*M* = -0.1, *SD* = 0.8).

***Individual Ideology***

Individuals’ political ideology was measured with three survey items asking respondents to place themselves on an 11-point, L-R scale (-5 = *Liberal*, 0 = *Neutral*, 5 = *Conservative*). These item has a mean of 0.2 (*SD* = 3.0).

***Social Media Variables***

***Individual level*.** Several social media variables were measured at the individual level. First, *frequency of use* was measured in terms of time spent with social media per day (single item, 6-point scale where 1 = *Less than 10 minutes per day* and 6 = *More than 3 hours per day*). The variable has a mean of 3.5 (*SD* = 1.6). *Network size* was measures by asking respondents how many people or accounts they are “friends with, follow, or subscribe to” across six platforms (7-point scales where 1 = *None* and 7 = *More than 2,000*). Responses were averaged for each respondent (Cronbach’s alpha = .91, *M* = 2.3, *SD* = 1.3). *Network diversity* was measured using a validated scale from prior literature (XXX). The scale is designed to tap into socio-structural diversity by asking respondents whether they are connected to (1 = *Yes*, 0 = *No*) people holding 22 different occupations. Responses were averaged for each respondent (Cronbach’s alpha = .92, *M* = 0.3, *SD* = 0.3). *News follows* was measured with 3 items asking how often respondents follow accounts because they are interested in what those accounts post about news or current affairs, politics, social or community events (5-point scale where 1 = *Never* and 5 = *Very often*). The three items were averaged for each respondent (Cronbach’s alpha = .91, *M* = 2.7, *SD* = 1.2). *Incidental news exposure* was measured by multiplying two scores. The first is an average of 6 items (Cronbach’s alpha = .96) asking respondents how often they encounter political information on social media (1 = *Never* and 5 = *Several times a day*). The second is a follow-up question asking respondent to clarify how much of that exposure is intentional versus accidental (1 = *Always intentionally* and 5 = *Always accidentally*). A square-root transformation was applied to the product to retain the original scaling (*M =* 2.8, SD = 0.80. Finally, *algorithmic categorization* was measured by asking respondents to navigate to the ad preferences page of the Facebook settings. Once there, respondents were asked whether their preferences include politics or specific news organizations (1 = *Yes*, 0 = *No*). These items were combined and recoded so that *Either* = 1 and *Neither* = 0 (42% either).

***News cycle (contextual) variables***. Additionally, two variables characterizing the social media data were included in the analyses, which represent the constructed news cycles linked to the survey responses. Based on prior literature (Soroka & Young, 2015), the analysis includes *audience engagement* and *net sentiment*, both of which are averages of the news stories. For the former, the weighted engagement metric described above was calculated for stories in each niche in each frame. The resulting metric was rescaled from 0 to 1 to ease model convergence (*M* = 0.4, *SD* = 0.2). For the latter, we employed LIWC (Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count) to count the number of positive and negative words in the story headlines, and then rescaled the balance of the two from 0 to 1 to create the final metric (*M* = 0.6, *SD* = 0.2).

***Control Variables***

Regression analyses control for demographics, including *age* (*M* = 3.0, *SD* = 1.6 where 1 = *18-24* and 8 = *85 or older*), *gender* (51% female, including 1 non-binary respondent), *race* (40% persons of color, not including white-identifying Hispanics), *education* (*M* = 4.5, *SD* = 1.8 on a 7-point scale where 1 = *No high school* *diploma* and 7 = *Post-graduate degree*) and *income* (*M* = 4.7, *SD* = 2.3 on an 8-point scale where 1 = *Less than $15,000* and 7 = *More than $150,000*). Finally, analyses control for *political interest*, which was measured with three items asking how interested respondents are (1 = *Not at all* and 5 = *Very*) in politics, news, and community (*M* = 3.5, *SD* = 1.0).

**Analysis and Results**

**Audience-Network Projection and Niche Detection**

Following previous work on audience overlap studies (e.g., Kzsiak, 2011; Mukerjee et al., 2018), we constructed a network projection of audience overlap from the open-ended news use measures. Defining audience overlap as the extent to which the audience for one news organization is contained within the audience of another, the network projection is constituted by individual respondents who are connected via shared attention to news organizations, which occurs when two or more respondents name the same news organization. Thus, news organizations act as nodes in the network, and a respondents names two organizations, the projection creates an edge between the two nodes. The more frequently the organizations are co-mentioned, the larger the edge weight of the connection between them. Based on recommendations from prior literature, the projected network was filtered to reduce systematic measurement error by removing connections with an edge weight < 2 (Barnidge et al., 2021). While studies of audience attention networks employing close-ended survey measures use other filtration methods designed to reduce non-systematic measurement error (Mangold & Scharkow, 2020), open-ended data present a different problem, that of systematic measurement error, which arises from systematic tendencies to over- or underestimate phenomena of interest (King et al., 1994). Therefore, we rely on filtration methods specifically tailored to this measurement issue.

After filtering the network, we ran a series of clustering algorithms on the projection that: a) best fit the theoretical assumptions for audience fragmentation; and b) produced the most consistent results. Louvian clustering met these criteria, producing three stable “news niches” (see Figure 1), which we have labeled according to the organizations they comprise (see Table 1): (1) *right-leaning cable* *and television*, which is characterized by high levels of attention to television news (both national broadcast and cable news on the left and right), as well as prominent right-wing or right-leaning digital news organizations (e.g., Breitbart and the *New York Post*); (2) *left-leaning elite press*, comprising prominent coastal prestige newspapers including the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*, along with left-leaning digital news organizations such (e.g., Huffington Post and Politico);and (3) *local—aggregators*, which features heavy reliance on news aggregators, local media, and social media in addition to prominent centrist newspapers (e.g., *USA Today* and the *Chicago Tribune*). After obtaining these categories from the cluster analysis, respondents were assigned a nominal code representing their news niche based on the extent to which their responses to the open-ended news attention measures aligned with one of the categories (cable: *n* = 905; elite: *n* = 195; local: *n* = 344). Respondents whose answers did not fall cleanly into one of the three categories were considered to have no niche (*n* = 564).

[Insert Figure 1 and Table 1 about here]

**Individual and Contextual Effects of Ideology**

Having identified the three news niches, one-way ANOVA was used to assess the between-group and within-group variance in news ideology at both the organizational and individual levels. A visual inspection of the projection network shows considerable overlap among news niches (see Figure 1), which raises the question of whether there are differences between the niches in terms of news ideology. The answer to this question is unequivocally yes. At both the organizational and individual levels, the between-group variance is substantially larger than the within-group variance (see Table 2), resulting in significant *F*-statistics (at the organizational level, *F* (2) = 5.19, *p* = 0.011; at the individual level, *F* (2) = 81.20, *p* < 0.001), which can be interpreted as the ratios of between-group to within-group variance. These results indicate that the differences between the news niches are larger than differences among individuals within each niche. A closer inspection of the means for news ideology show that at both levels, the mean of the *elite* group is different from the means of the other two groups (see Figure 2), with a significantly more liberal news ideology (*M =* -0.79 versus a grand mean of -0.10 at the organizational level, and *M* = -0.73 versus a grand mean of -0.10 at the individual level). Meanwhile, the other two groups have similar means, but different variances. The *local* group displays a relatively small variance estimate with cases tightly clustered around the mean (*Var*. = 0.09 at the organizational level and *Var*. = 0.15 at the individual level), whereas the *cable* group displays a relatively large variance estimate with cases widely dispersed around the mean (*Var.* = 1.88 at the organizational level and 0.79 at the individual level). Thus, the three niches are substantially different from one another: The elite niche is solidly liberal with both individuals and organizations ranging from left-leaning to solid left; the local niche is primarily centrist, with individuals and organizations tightly clustered around the neutral point; and the cable niche is the most ideologically diverse, with a centrist average but also a broad array of individuals and organizations on either side.

[Insert Table 2 and Figure 2 about here]

Next, we used multilevel modeling to assess the effects of individual ideology (i.e., political preferences) on news ideology (i.e., the valence of news exposure), while also accounting for how those effects are shaped by the news niches. Because the time-ordered and grouped data structure could produce measurement invariance, it is necessary to include both sampling frame and news niche as grouping variables (3 niches x 17 frames = 51 groups). Level-one predictors are centered on the group mean to ease interpretation of the fixed effects. Results are shown in Table 3. The first model in the table shows the baseline fixed and random effects of individual ideology. The fixed effect is positive and statistically significant (*b* = 0.06, *SE* = 0.01, *p* < 0.001). But while the intercept for news ideology does vary between groups (*Var.* = 0.09), the random effect of individual ideology is close to zero (*Var.* = 0.00), resulting in a relatively low ICC of 0.17. These result indicate that while the mean for news ideology may vary across groups, the effect of individual ideology on news ideology is relatively stable.

[Insert Table 3 about here]

The next two models in the table layer on contextual effects for audience ideology and organizational ideology. These can be interpreted as characteristics of news niches: Audience ideology is calculated as the group mean of individual ideology within each niche, and organizational ideology is calculated as the group mean of news ideology within each niche. Thus, the former captures the effects of *the ideology of other people within a niche*, and the latter captures the effects of *the ideology of organizations with a niche*. As shown in the table, both effects are statistically significant and also substantially larger than the effect of individual ideology. For audience ideology, the effect is *b* = 0.43 (*SE* = 0.04, *p* < 0.001), and for organizational ideology, it is *b* = 1.02 (*SE* = 0.09, *p* < 0.001). These effect sizes are compared in a dot-and-whisker plot in Figure 3, which clearly shows that the organizational effect is the largest and the individual effect is the smallest, with the audience effect in between. Therefore, these results show that while an individual’s own ideology matter when it comes to shaping the ideological valence of their news exposure, the ideologies of organizations and other audience members within their news niche has a larger effect.

[Insert Figure 3 about here]

The final two models in Table 3 test whether individual ideology interacts with audience ideology and/or organizational ideology. Results show a marginal but non-significant interaction with audience ideology (*b* = 0.02, *SE* = 0.01, *p* < .10), and a statistically significant interaction with organizational ideology (*b* = 0.08, *SE* = 0.03, *p* < .01). These conditional effects are plotted in Figure 4, which shows that the positive effect of individual ideology is stronger where it aligns with audience and organizational ideology (with the caveat that the interaction with audience ideology is marginal).

[Insert Figure 4 about here]

**Individual and Contextual Effects of Social Media Use**

In the final stage of the analysis, the effects of the social media variables were assessed by layering these variables onto the models described above. Results are reported in Table 4. Generally, they show limited effects of the individual-level social media variables. Only network size is related to news ideology, and the coefficient is negative (*b* = -0.05, *SE* = 0.02, *p* < 0.05), indicating that people with bigger social media networks are more likely to report exposure to liberal news organizations. By contrast, a much larger effect is observed for one of the contextual variables: audience engagement (*b* = 0.80, *SE* = 0.14, *p* < .001). This positive effect suggests that when the audience is more engaged, exposure tends to be more conservative—a result that likely arises from the prominence of Fox News on Facebook. Finally, the analysis also tests whether individual ideology interacts with the news-cycle variables (audience engagement and net sentiment), and we find significant effects for both. For audience engagement the interaction effect is *b* = 0.08 (*SE* = .02, *p* < .001). A visualization shows that the effect of ideology is stronger where the audience is more engaged (see Figure 5). For net sentiment, the interaction effect is *b* = 0.07, *SE* = 0.03, *p* < .05), effect of ideology is stronger where sentiment is more positive.

[Insert Table 4 and Figure 5 about here]

**References**

**List of Tables and Figures**

Figure 1

*Network Projection from Cluster Analysis*

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|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Table 1  *Organizational Niche Membership* | | | | | |
| **Niche 1** | | **Niche 2** | | **Niche 3** | |
| *Right-Leaning Cable & TV* | | *Left-Leaning Elite Press* | | *Local/Aggregators* | |
| ABC\*  BBC\*  Breitbart  CBS\*  CNBC\*  CNN\*  Fox | LA Times\*  MSNBC\*  NBC\*  Newsmax  NY Post  OAN  Right Sphere  Univision\* | Huffington Post  NY Times  Washington Post  Politico  NPR\*  Buzzfeed  International Media\*  Wall Street Journal\*  New Magazines\*  PBS\*  Left Sphere |  | Aggregators  Chicago Tribune  Local Paper  Local Radio  Local TV  Local Web  MSN  Neutral Sphere  Social Agg. | USA Today  Yahoo |
| *Note:* \* Indicates deviations from theoretical expectations. | | | | | |

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| Table 2  *Means and Variances for News Ideology at the Organization and Individual Levels* | | | | |
| Statistic | Local/Aggregators | Elite | Cable | Full Sample |
| **Organizational Level** | | | | |
| Mean | -0.10 | -0.79 | 0.41 | -0.10 |
| Variance | 0.09 | 0.27 | 1.88 | 1.08 |
| *N* | 11 | 11 | 15 | 37 |
| Between-Group Variance | 4.57 | | | |
| Within-Group Variance | 0.88 | | | |
| Test Statistic | *F* (2) = 5.19, *p* = 0.011 | | | |
| **Individual Level** | | | | |
| Mean | -0.07 | -0.73 | 0.03 | -0.10 |
| Variance | 0.15 | 0.15 | 0.79 | 0.62 |
| *N* | 344 | 195 | 905 | 1,444 |
| Between-Group Variance | 41.29 | | | |
| Within-Group Variance | 0.51 | | | |
| Test Statistic | *F* (2) = 81.20, *p* < .001 | | | |
| *Note*: Response variable has theoretical range of 6 (Min. = -3 ‘far left’ and Max. = 3 ‘far right’) and an observed range of 5.0 (Min. = -2.0, Max. = 3.0). Data weighted by education and income. | | | | |

Figure 2

*Boxplot of News Ideology at the Organizational and Individual Levels*



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| Table 3  *The Predictors of News Ideology at the Individual, Audience, and Organizational Levels* | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|  | Model 1 | | | Model 2 | | | Model 3 | | Model 4 | | Model 5 | |
| **Fixed Effects** | *b* | | *SE* | *b* | *SE* | | *b* | *SE* | *b* | *SE* | *b* | *SE* |
| Intercept | -0.21\*\*\* | | 0.05 | -0.14\*\*\* | 0.03 | | 0.00 | 0.03 | -0.14\*\*\* | 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.03 |
| Age | -0.04\*\*\* | | 0.01 | -0.04\*\*\* | 0.01 | | -0.04\*\*\* | 0.01 | -0.04\*\*\* | 0.01 | -0.04\*\*\* | 0.01 |
| Gender (1 = Female) | 0.01 | | 0.04 | 0.00 | 0.04 | | 0.00 | 0.04 | 0.00 | 0.04 | 0.00 | 0.04 |
| Race (1 = Person of Color) | -0.15\*\*\* | | 0.04 | -0.15\*\*\* | 0.04 | | -0.16\*\*\* | 0.04 | -0.15\*\*\* | 0.04 | -0.15\*\*\* | 0.04 |
| Education | -0.01 | | 0.01 | -0.01 | 0.01 | | -0.01 | 0.01 | -0.01 | 0.01 | -0.01 | 0.01 |
| Income | 0.00 | | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.01 | | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.01 |
| Political Interest | -0.04\* | | 0.02 | -0.04\* | 0.02 | | -0.04\* | 0.02 | -0.04\* | 0.02 | -0.04\* | 0.02 |
| Individual Ideology | 0.06\*\*\* | | 0.01 | 0.06\*\*\* | 0.01 | | 0.06\*\*\* | 0.01 | 0.06\*\*\* | 0.01 | 0.07\*\*\* | 0.01 |
| **Contextual Effects** | *b* | | *SE* | *b* | *SE* | | *b* | *SE* | *b* | *SE* | *b* | *SE* |
| Audience Ideology |  | |  | 0.43\*\*\* | 0.04 | |  |  | 0.44\*\*\* | 0.04 |  |  |
| Organization Ideology |  | |  |  |  | | 1.02\*\*\* | 0.09 |  |  | 1.03\*\*\* | 0.09 |
| **Interactions** | *b* | | *SE* | *b* | *SE* | | *b* | *SE* | *b* | *SE* | *b* | *SE* |
| Individual Ideology \*  Audience Ideology |  | |  |  |  | |  |  | 0.02# | 0.01 |  |  |
| Individual Ideology \* Organization Ideology |  | |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  | 0.08\*\* | 0.03 |
| **Random Effects** | *Var*. | | | *Var.* | | | *Var.* | | *Var.* | | *Var.* | |
| Intercept Niche:Frame | 0.09 | | | 0.01 | | | 0.01 | | 0.01 | | 0.01 | |
| Individual Ideology | 0.00 | | | 0.00 | | | 0.00 | | 0.00 | | 0.00 | |
| Residual | 0.45 | | | 0.44 | | | 0.44 | | 0.44 | | 0.44 | |
| **Fit Statistics** |  |  | |  | |  |  |  |  | |  | |
| LR | -1,720.00 | | | -1,686.47 | | | -1,685.37 | | -1,688.34 | | -1,684.30 | |
| ICC | 0.17 | | | 0.02 | | | 0.02 | | 0.03 | | 0.02 | |
| *Notes*: Cell entries are parameter estimates from multilevel models (MLM) with random slopes and intercepts.  *N* = 1,444. Groups = 51 (3 niches by 17 frames). #*p* < .10,\**p* < .05, \*\**p* < .01, \*\*\**p* < .001. Data weighted by education and income. Variables are group-mean centered. | | | | | | | | | | | | |

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| Table 4  *Effects of Social Media Variables on News Ideology* | | | | | | |
|  | Model 6 |  | Model 7 |  | Model 8 |  |
| **Fixed Effects** | *b* | *SE* | *b* | *SE* | *b* | *SE* |
| Intercept | -0.51\*\*\* | 0.09 | -0.48\*\*\* | 0.09 | -0.46\*\*\* | 0.09 |
| Age | -0.05\*\*\* | 0.01 | -0.05\*\*\* | 0.01 | -0.05\*\*\* | 0.01 |
| Gender (1 = Female) | -0.01 | 0.04 | -0.01 | 0.04 | -0.01 | 0.04 |
| Race (1 = Person of Color) | -0.15\*\*\* | 0.04 | -0.14\*\*\* | 0.04 | -0.148\*\* | 0.04 |
| Education | -0.01 | 0.01 | -0.01 | 0.01 | -0.01 | 0.01 |
| Income | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.01 |
| Political Interest | -0.03 | 0.02 | -0.03 | 0.02 | -0.03 | 0.02 |
| Individual Ideology | 0.07\*\*\* | 0.01 | 0.04\*\* | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.02 |
| Frequency of Use | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.01 |
| Network Size | -0.05\* | 0.02 | -0.04 | 0.02 | -0.05\* | 0.02 |
| Network Diversity | 0.07 | 0.09 | 0.07 | 0.09 | 0.07 | 0.09 |
| News Follows | -0.03 | 0.02 | -0.02 | 0.02 | -0.02 | 0.02 |
| Incidental News Exposure | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.03 |
| Algorithmic Categorization  (1 = Interested) | -0.02 | 0.04 | -0.02 | 0.04 | -0.02 | 0.04 |
| **Contextual Effects** | *b* | *SE* | *b* | *SE* | *b* | *SE* |
| Audience Engagement | 0.80\*\*\* | 0.14 | 0.75\*\*\* | 0.15 | 0.78\*\*\* | 0.14 |
| Net Story Sentiment | 0.17 | 0.16 | 0.12 | 0.17 | 0.08 | 0.17 |
| **Interactions** | *b* | *SE* | *b* | *SE* | *b* | *SE* |
| Individual Ideology \* Audience Engagement |  |  | 0.08\*\*\* | 0.02 |  |  |
| Individual Ideology \*  Net Story Sentiment |  |  |  |  | 0.07\* | 0.03 |
| **Random Effects** | *Var*. | | *Var.* | | *Var.* | |
| Intercept Niche:Frame | 0.03 | | 0.04 | | 0.03 | |
| Individual Ideology | 0.00 | | 0.00 | | 0.00 | |
| Residual | 0.45 | | 0.45 | | 0.45 | |
| **Fit Statistics** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| LR | -1,715.61 | | -1,713.07 | | -1,715.70 | |
| ICC | .06 | | 0.08 | | 0.06 | |
| *Notes*: Cell entries are parameter estimates from multilevel models (MLM) with random slopes and intercepts.  *N* = 1,444. Groups = 51 (3 niches by 17 frames). #*p* < .10,\**p* < .05, \*\**p* < .01, \*\*\**p* < .001. Data weighted by education and income. Variables are group-mean centered. | | | | | | |

Figure 3

*Dot-and-Whisker Plot Showing Effects on News Ideology at the Individual, Audience, and Organizational Levels*



Figure 4

*Conditional Effects of Individual Ideology at Various Levels of Audience and Organizational Ideology*

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Figure 5

*Conditional Effects of Individual Ideology at Various Levels of Audience Engagement and Net Story Sentiment*

