**Beyond *Being and Time*:On Heidegger’s Concept of Transcendence**

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What has been published so far of the investigations on “Being and Time” has no other task than that of a concrete projection unveiling *transcendence*.[[1]](#footnote-1)

The aim of this essay is to explicate Heidegger’s concept of transcendence in *Being and Time*.

I will first characterize the account of transcendence given in the late Marburg period as published in *Being and Time* and its more systematic treatment in the summer lectures of 1927 and 1928, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* and *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*.[[2]](#footnote-2) I will then sketch Heidegger’s two attempts to ground transcendence in the ecstaticcharacter of temporality.[[3]](#footnote-3) Finally, I will evaluate William Blattner’s, Margot Fleischer’s, and Graham Harman’s objections, which claim that Heidegger fails to ground Dasein’s transcendence in temporality. I agree with the objectors, but not because temporality itself is groundless or superfluous, as William Blattner and Margot Fleischer respectively would have it. Instead, Heidegger’s account of transcendence points us towards a temporality that is a feature of things themselves and not unique to Dasein. Transcendence is constitutive of entities just as it is constitutive of Dasein and the world. So understood, Heidegger’s concept of transcendence provides support

**The ordinary conception of transcendence**

Heidegger distinguishes between three conceptions of transcendence: ordinary, philosophical, and his own. In his own conception, transcendence is another name for being-in-the-world.[[4]](#footnote-4) Heidegger wants to turn back the clock, as it were, and recapture the term from its restricted Kantian and philosophical usage as ‘conditions of possibility.’ Heidegger sees his transcendence in stronger affiliation with its ordinary conception as ‘going-beyond,’ ‘stepping-over,’ and ‘surpassing.’[[5]](#footnote-5) Other conceptions of transcendence, Heidegger claims, derive from his. An ontologically clarified notion of transcendence explains these confused (yet necessary) degenerations.[[6]](#footnote-6) As many scholars note, it is difficult to overstate the influence of transcendental philosophy on the young Heidegger.[[7]](#footnote-7) This is borne out at the end of BP, in which Heidegger claims that philosophy must become a science of transcendental temporality.[[8]](#footnote-8) The concept of transcendence is both central to the writings of this period and is understood by Heidegger to be radically different from that of his predecessors.

Much of the secondary literature on Heidegger’s concept of transcendence focuses on its relation to Husserl’s phenomenological intentionality. Indeed, as Theodore Kisiel explains, Heidegger’s conception of transcendence is the *end* of a “chain of formal indications” starting from the “triple-sensed schematism of intentionality in 1920” and continuing to the “ex-sitence” of the SZ drafts.[[9]](#footnote-9) This is supported by Heidegger’s claim that intentionality is “ontic transcendence.”[[10]](#footnote-10) Authors who focus on the relationship between transcendence and intentionality often take it back from Heidegger, denying Heidegger’s claim that his transcendence is a radical break from Husserl’s. However, the focus of this paper is elsewhere. I begin by granting Heidegger’s his claim that transcendence is a radical break from intentionality, and bracket the question of how much intellectual debt is owed to Husserl. I make the additional assumption that the concept remains more or less consistent during this period. My questions are instead: What is Heidegger’s concept of transcendence? What resources are there, within the conceptual environment of *Being and Time* and shortly thereafter, for linking transcendence with temporality?

**Heidegger’s conception of transcendence**

Let us begin with Heidegger’s conception of transcendence. As I have already mentioned, transcendence is another name for being-in-the-world. However, its emphasis differs from the analysis of being-in-the-world given in Division One of *Being and Time*. Heidegger introduces four novel features of transcendence: (1) the formal structure of transcendence, (2) transcendence is constitutive of subjectivity, (3) transcendence reveals beings in-themselves, (4) transcendence is constitutive of the world. In examining these features, we will bring out what is new in this concept that is only implicit in being-in-the-world.

Transcendence has a specific formal structure not unlike that of the *Seinsfrage.*[[11]](#footnote-11) There are at least three blanks that need filling in when talking about transcendence. First, what is doing the ‘surpassing’, ‘going-beyond’, or transcending (*ein* *Befragtes*, “that which is interrogated”)? Next, what is being passed over (*sein* *Gefragtes*, “that which is asked about”)? Finally, what towards-which does the surpasser move (*das* *Erfragte*, “that which is to be found out by theasking… what is really intended”)? Heidegger answers all three questions directly. Dasein is that which transcends and that which goes-beyond. Things, objects, and the merely extant are not transcendent.[[12]](#footnote-12) Transcendence is characteristic only of Dasein’s existence. That which is transcended are beings themselves: cars, temples, jugs, bridges, etc. Finally, the world is the towards-which Dasein transcends. In short, Dasein is that which transcends, beings are that which are transcended, and the world is the towards-which of Dasein’s transcendence.

**Heidegger’s conception of the subject of transcendence**

Not only is Dasein the transcendental subject, transcendence itself is a necessary and sufficient condition of subjectivity. Transcendence is the defining feature of subjectivity; transcendence is constitutive of any subjectivity whatsoever. “Transcendence is… the primordial constitution of the subjectivity of a subject. The subject transcends qua subject; it would not be a subject if it did not transcend. To be a subject means to transcend.”[[13]](#footnote-13) The subject’s transcendence signifies, first, that it oversteps the entities in front of it. In this sense, transcendence means to distance oneself from one’s immediate surroundings.[[14]](#footnote-14) The subject’s transcendence, so understood, is the condition of possibility of its capacity for reflection. Scientific knowledge makes this distance explicit in its thematization of things. Science isolates things from their pragmatic circumstances. Theory are knowledge are possible because, in transcending, a subject can abstract and objectify beings. As Graham Harman notes, this kind of transcendence is equally necessary for practical activity. The activity of a subject presupposes a distance between it and the entities it encounters. Otherwise, “we would be stupefied in every moment by the immediate data of our senses.”[[15]](#footnote-15)

The subject’s transcendence signifies, in addition, that the subject is always already outside itself. It is ecstatic. This “crossing over outside itself” is never an addition or achievement to an otherwise existing subjectivity.[[16]](#footnote-16) In other words, a subject which is *not* from the beginning outside itself is not a subject at all. While such a claim may sound strange at first, it is simply a restatement of Dasein as being-in, in which my involvement with the ready-to-hand takes precedent over my conception of myself as, say, a Cartesian *cogito*.[[17]](#footnote-17) Moreover, the subject of transcendence must not be thought as a center which is then carried away. To take Dasein as a centered kind of thing which lacks “any being-carried-away,” would be to take it incorrectly as “something present on hand unecstatically.”[[18]](#footnote-18) Rather, the subject of transcendence is centerless in the sense that it is always already carried away.

The transcendence of the subject is also its absolute individualization. “The transcendence of Dasein’s being is distinctive in that it implies the possibility and the necessity of the most radical *individuation.*”[[19]](#footnote-19) In stepping over entities and other subjects, the transcending subject is removed and isolated from them; the subject recognizes the ontological difference themselves and things. It is in this respect that transcendence must be related to Heidegger’s account of anxiety and the nothing.[[20]](#footnote-20) In his inaugural 1929 Freiburg lecture “What is Metaphysics?” Heidegger characterizes a subject’s transcendence as “holding itself out into the nothing.”[[21]](#footnote-21) Insofar as transcendence is an act of individualization and distancing, the subject of transcendence is surrounded by no-thing and thus stands over the abyss: “In transcendence Dasein surpasses itself as a being; more exactly, this surpassing makes it possible that Dasein can be something like itself. In first surpassing itself, the abyss [Abground] is opened which Dasein, in each case, is for itself… the abyss of being-a-self is opened up by and in transcendence.”[[22]](#footnote-22) Transcendence thus contains Heidegger’s account of individuation and anxiety.[[23]](#footnote-23)

Throughout these passages, we have seen Heidegger repeatedly and uncharacteristically use the term ‘subject’ rather than ‘Dasein,’ and I have followed him. We should read Heidegger’s use of ‘subject’ as making a stronger claim about subjectivity than those raised about Dasein as being-in found in SZ. The claims made here on subjectivity apply to all subjects whatsoever, Dasein or otherwise. But, we should ask, why so? Is subjectivity not itself conceivable independent of its environment and without transcendence? No. As is so often the case in SZ, to do so would be to misunderstand Dasein’s kind of being, the real aim of talk of subjectivity. Therefore, Heidegger is here appropriating the concept of subjectivity. His point is not that all transcendent Dasein must look like subjects, but that all subjects must look like transcendent Dasein.

**Heidegger’s conception of that which is transcended**

That which Dasein passes over are beings themselves. As passed over, individual entities become enmeshed in a contextual web. In other words, they become equipment and acquire immediate purpose, their ‘towards-which’, and a localized system of meaning. Dasein does not step over a “gap or barrier ‘between’ itself and objects,” but instead acquires a perspective on the things it was always already dealing with, a perspective that is latent Dasein’s activity. As already mentioned, transcendence grounds theory and knowledge. But the point is stronger yet. As transcended, things reveal themselves *as they are in themselves*. Only as in-themselves are they possible objects of knowledge.[[24]](#footnote-24) Equally overstepped is nature, including the nature of Dasein: “Dasein is thrown, factical, thoroughly amidst nature through its bodiliness, and transcendence lies in the fact that these beings, among which Dasein is and to which Dasein belongs, are surpassed by Dasein. In other words, as transcending Dasein is beyond nature…. Dasein is something alien to nature.”[[25]](#footnote-25) Heidegger’s point here is the same as before. In overstepping entities, Dasein submits its surroundings to a contexture of functionality determined by its own concern. Concern is ultimately determined by genuine possibility, and is thus never reducible to (and so alienated from) the actuality of nature. Surpassed entities are revealed in-themselves as correlates of the possible.

It is only through transcendence that we realize the true depth of surpassed entities. “Transcendence,” writes Graham Harman, “is rising above entities in the world such that we realize that entities hold ‘more in reserve’ than what we see on their surfaces.”[[26]](#footnote-26) This is a divergence from the analysis of Dasein as being-in-the-world. As being-in-the-world, the depth of entities alluded to by Harman is only the depth of Dasein. Entities have depth (i.e. a genuine past and future) only insofar as they play a role in our own potentiality-for-being (*Seinkönnen*). However, as transcended entities, the depth shifts to the side of the things themselves. Transcended entities *are* as they are in-themselves.[[27]](#footnote-27) As transcended, entities are recognized as always *more* *than* how they immediately appear, as *more* *than* their present. The source of their depth is no longer strictly our own possibilities. It is not coincidental that the section on Dasein’s transcendence in the MFL is prefaced by Heidegger’s only published discussion of metaontology.[[28]](#footnote-28) “Meta” here refers to *metabole,* the change associated with an “overturning.” Metaontology, as the “turning-around [*Kehre*]” of ontology, would be a return to the things themselves. In other words, metaontology is “where ontology itself expressly runs back into the metaphysical ontic in which it implicitly always remains.”[[29]](#footnote-29) Transcended entities begin to make something like metaontology possible.

**Heidegger’s conception of that which is transcended towards**

The world is the towards-which of transcendence. “Dasein transcends beings, and its surpassing is surpassing *to* world.”[[30]](#footnote-30) This is the obscurest of the three positions within the structure of transcendence. We know from discussions early in SZ that the term “world” has at least four meanings.[[31]](#footnote-31) By the time of the 1929 summer lectures, the privileged ontological-existential concept of world has become the transcendental concept of world, while, however, retaining the same meaning. In both cases, world “designates the wholeness of beings in the totality of their possibilities” which is “essentially related to human existence, and human existence taken in its final goal.”[[32]](#footnote-32) The world is not a “*wherein* a factical Dasein as such can be said to live,” but is rather the totality of all functionality.[[33]](#footnote-33) In other words, the world is strictly distinct from any encounterable being; the world cannot be encountered. World, ontologically understood, is the whole of significance as expressed in the totality of its relations, the in-order-to’s and the for-the-sake-of-which. Insofar as world “indicates ontologically to the metaphysical essence of Dasein as such,” it is transcendence.[[34]](#footnote-34)

What, then, does it mean for Dasein to transcend towards the world? We can arrive at an answer by interpreting a pair of cryptic statements found in §69c: “Dasein *is* its world existingly” and “world is transcendent.”[[35]](#footnote-35) If we add another of Heidegger’s favorite assertions from SZ, that Dasein is its possibilities, then we see that he has created a weird string of equivalences: Dasein = world = transcendent = possibility.[[36]](#footnote-36) I suggest that one way of making sense of this copulation is to understand Heidegger’s “is” as asserting a shared and interlocking set of behaviors and dependencies between his concepts. Under this view, the equivalence becomes more like a biconditional. The terms become what Heidegger calls “equiprimordial”; one term always implies or co-constitutes the others.[[37]](#footnote-37) Talk of Dasein already brings with it (and is itself an element of) the concepts of transcendence, possibility, and world. This, of course, differs from interpreting the “is” as strict equivalence. In this case, we could simply replace all occurrences of “world”, “transcendence”, and “possibility” with the term “Dasein.” It goes without saying that this would destroy the intelligibility of Heidegger’s thought.

The weaker conception of “is” makes Heidegger’s claim intelligible. The “world is transcendent” in the sense that, like Dasein, the world always is more than its factuality. It is *more* *than* the sum of its component entities and their relations. Thus, the world ‘goes beyond’ and ‘surpasses’ the beings encounterable within it, just as Dasein does. The world is all-encompassing yet always a ‘*more than’*; it is “not the immanent.”[[38]](#footnote-38) And “Dasein is its world existingly” in the sense that nothing is, or is possible, for existing Dasein other than its world as potentiality-for-being.

The weaker conception of the “is” has the benefit of avoiding clearly inappropriate conclusion about nature of Dasein. Unbeknownst to the equivalence interpretation, the word ‘Dasein’ reveals something other than the word ‘world’. Moreover, Dasein’s transcendence is not understood as some kind of asymptote. It is out of place to think of Dasein as always approaching the world but never quite getting there. Rather, what Dasein’s transcendence towards the world means is: (1) Dasein is co-constitutive and equiprimordial with its world, and, as a result, (2) Dasein is always already outside of itself and ecstatic. We can further interpret the towards-which as signifying: transcendence is momentum (*Schwung*) and constitutes an “upswing” (*Überschwung*). The transcendent world is “oscillation” (*Schwingung*) between the interlocking concepts of Dasein, its possibilities, and its world.[[39]](#footnote-39) This metaphor invokes a continuously circulating world oriented towards an ecstasis and possible beings, and so also invokes temporality.[[40]](#footnote-40) The world as the towards-which of transcendence is the most explicitly temporal position within the structure of transcendence.

In sum, Dasein’s transcendence is Heidegger’s new way of describing Dasein’s “ex-sistence.” It emphasizes Dasein’s being-in-the-world and that Dasein is not a *cogito*. Transcendence is the ‘standing outside’ and ecstatic character of Dasein itself. The entities which are transcended are revealed to Dasein as in-themselves and genuine possibilities, and therefore as deeper than their surface actuality. Insofar as the world “is” (in some sense) Dasein, the world is transcendent too. The transcendent world is made possible by ecstatic temporality. Therefore, a complete account of Heidegger’s concept of transcendence must also explicate ecstatic temporality and how it makes transcendence possible. The remainder of this paper will focus on this second task.

**How does temporality ground transcendence? The primacy of the future and the understanding of being.**

The ecstatic-horizonal character of temporality is continually and uniformly singled out as the ground of transcendence across all three texts under consideration.[[41]](#footnote-41) The question now becomes how the specific ecstatic-horizonal character of temporality can ground Dasein’s transcendence. However, identifying the argument justifying this claim is difficult. Nevertheless, Heidegger sketches two distinguishable lines of argumentation connecting transcendence with ecstatic temporality, each mapping generally but not exclusively to a lecture course. The first is found in MFL and seeks to associate Dasein’s transcendence with the primacy of the future, and the second is found in BP and seeks to associate Dasein’s transcendence with its understanding of being.

Transcendence, as being-in-the-world, is intimately related to the for-the-sake-of. For-the-sake-of describes the fact that Dasein is concerned with its own being and its *Seinkönnen*.[[42]](#footnote-42) The for-the-sake-of takes up possibility, and thus primarily futural.[[43]](#footnote-43)As we have seen, Dasein’s transcendence is foremost its *escape* from the factual present, i.e. the immediate, actual environment. As transcendent, Dasein rises above beings and deals with them in terms of its own future possibilities. Such being-in-the-world is ultimately a being-towards-oneself. Being-towards-oneself, in turn, is possible only because of an original future.[[44]](#footnote-44) The future, unlike the other “structural moments of time”, is “intrinsically ecstatic.” In MFL, Heidegger states that transcendence “means nothing other than” the primacy of the future of original temporality.[[45]](#footnote-45) The primacy of the future makes the for-the-sake-of possible. Therefore, the primacy of the future demonstrates, somehow, one way of grounding transcendence in temporality.

Transcendence is also intimately related to Dasein’s understanding of being. Such a connection is hinted at in the introduction to SZ: “Being and the structure of being lie *beyond* every entity and every possible character which an entity may possess.”[[46]](#footnote-46) Being, like transcendent Dasein, passes over beings. In BP, Heidegger argues that Dasein’s transcendence provides it with direct access to an understanding of being, and that this access is missing in temporality.[[47]](#footnote-47) Transcendence thus has a close relation to *Temporalität*, Heidegger’s version of temporality that corresponds to the timeliness of being as opposed to the timeliness of Dasein (*Zeitlichkeit*). Both transcendence and *Temporalität* are said to make possible the understanding of being.[[48]](#footnote-48) However, *Temporalität* is more primordial; transcendence “is rooted in temporality and thus in Temporality [*Temporalität*].” Heidegger suggests that transcendence is instead the link between *Zeitlichkeit* and *Temporalität*. Therefore, transcendence has some sort of temporal foundation.

**Objections. Temporality does not ground transcendence.**

Reconstructing these two lines of argumentation is difficult, and we have only attempted a sketch. However, we are not without good company. There is no consensus within Heidegger scholarship on exactly what the Heidegger of this period takes to be as his argument for the claim that temporality is the ground of transcendence. If Lee Braver’s recent anthology on the unpublished Division Three is of any indication, there is plenty of room for *interpretative* disagreement.[[49]](#footnote-49) We have seen that transcendence is essentially ecstatic. However, it remains unclear how this ecstasy is temporal. Scholarly commentary is equally divided in its *evaluation* of the success of grounding Dasein’s transcendence in temporality. While its focus is often on other problems within the sphere of temporality, such as original time, *Temporalität*, and horizonal schemata, its arguments generalize to the problem of grounding transcendence in temporality. William Blattner, Margot Fleischer, and Graham Harman all object to Heidegger’s claim that temporality can ground transcendence. However, their reasons vary. William Blattner sees temporality as itself groundless, Margo Fleischer sees temporality as superfluous (yet not necessarily groundless), and Graham Harman sees temporality as necessary but in need of generalization.

William Blattner argues that temporality cannot be the grounds for transcendence.[[50]](#footnote-50) His argument is founded on his prior assertion that Heidegger’s account of temporality is itself never justified. Blattner’s focus is Heidegger’s claim that ‘Dasein is its world.’ Blattner gives two readings of this claim similar to our earlier discussion. However, he asserts that both readings must fail: no grounding is possible on temporality, as the argument which grounds temporality itself fails. Put briefly, Blattner sees *Temporalität* as the sole guaranteer of the temporal analysis of Dasein. In the absence of a satisfactory account of how *Temporalität* *des Seins* grounds *Zeitlichkeit des Daseins*, the entire temporal analysis is incorrigible. Therefore, transcendence cannot be grounded in temporality. However, this criticism of transcendence is not insightful for our purposes. Is it not the case that even if temporality is groundless, the grounding of Dasein’s transcendence in temporality may itself be valid? The deeper question at hand is entirely immanent to Heidegger’s concepts: given the general correctness of temporality, does it indeed add anything to the account of Dasein’s transcendence already described?

Margot Fleischer raises a stronger objection against the grounding of transcendence in temporality.[[51]](#footnote-51) She argues that transcendence cannot be grounded in temporality because temporality itself is not fundamentally constitutive of Dasein. She denies that temporality plays a central role in Dasein’s being, although admits that it plays some role. Transcendence needs no recourse to temporality at all, as Dasein’s transcendence is actually more primordial than Dasein’s temporality.[[52]](#footnote-52) This reading, however, is too dismissive of Heidegger’s concept of temporality. Fleischer’s outcome is the same as Blattner’s: temporality must be wholesale dismissed as a viable ground of transcendence.

Graham Harman takes up the question of the relationship between transcendence and temporality in a more interesting way. He argues that temporality is necessary for the success of Heidegger’s account of transcendence, but that transcendence is a feature of all entities and not just Dasein.[[53]](#footnote-53) Entities are always already a part of the contexture of equipment (i.e. the world), and so, Harman argues, are also already outside of themselves, both ecstatic and transcendent.[[54]](#footnote-54) To say as much is just to restate that entities are not just present-at-hand.[[55]](#footnote-55) “Ecstatic temporality turns out to be nothing but another name for the global tool-system [world] and its reversal into distinct elements.”[[56]](#footnote-56) Transcendence is “an ecstasis of things.”[[57]](#footnote-57) As we showed earlier, it requires only a bit of smudging to see that transcendence reveals to us the temporal depth of entities themselves. Entities, like Dasein, never just encounter one another in a chain of efficient causes (what Harman calls Billiard Ball Realism), but must always put up with a world in its ontological totality. In other words, entities too must transcend.[[58]](#footnote-58)

In conclusion, we ought to take Harman’s account of transcendent entities seriously. Unlike Blattner and Fleischer, Harman attempts to reconcile Heidegger’s concept of transcendence with temporality. His account, on the one hand, credits Heidegger with correctly assessing the centrality of temporality in his concept of transcendence. On the other hand, it captures the main features of any transcendent entity: it is ecstatic and always more than its presence or present. Harman shows us that Heidegger’s account of transcendence points us towards a temporality that is a feature of things themselves and not unique to Dasein, despite Heidegger’s explicit claims to the contrary. Transcendence is constitutive of entities just as it is constitutive of Dasein and the world.

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1. Martin Heidegger, “On the Essence of Ground,” in *Pathmarks*, 371. Heidegger makes a similar claim about the importance of transcendence for fundamental ontology on p. 141 of *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*: “The basic intent of the analysis [of Dasein] is to show the intrinsic possibility of the understanding-of-being, which means at the same time the possibility of transcendence.” [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Hereafter SZ, BP, and MFL. All page numbers correspond to the English translations, except those given for SZ which correspond to the German pagination. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. The claim that ecstatic-horizonal temporality grounds and makes possible Dasein’s transcendence is made several times throughout *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*: 302, 307, 314, 318. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. MFL 166, 168, 170: “Transcendence is being-in-the-world.” The claim is also made in BP. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. BP 298-9, MFL 160. See also Daniel Dahlstrom’s discussion of Heidegger’s combination of Kantian and Scotistic transcendence in “The End of Fundamental Ontology,” 84-5, especially footnote 9. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. The so-called “degeneration thesis” (Blattner) is articulated in SZ 334, BP 271, and BP 308. For Blattner’s discussion, see his “Temporality,” 317-8. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. See, for example, Steven Crowell’s and Jeff Malpas’s introduction in *Transcendental Heidegger*, 1-3. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Cf. Section 22b: Temporality [Zeitlichkeit] and the objectification of beings (positive science) and of being (philosophy), 320-324. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Theodore Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time*, 450. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. MFL 135. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. SZ 5-6. Emphasis removed in the following quotations. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. MFL 166. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. MFL 165. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. MFL 220. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Graham Harman, *Heidegger Explained: From Phenomenon to Thing*, 46. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. MFL 165: “Dasein does not sort of exist and then occasionally achieve a crossing over outside itself, but existence originally means to cross over.” [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. SZ 89-91. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. MFL 207. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. SZ 38. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Harman, *Heidegger Explained*, 83-4. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Marin Heidegger, “What is Metaphysics,” in *Basic Writings*, 103. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. MFL 182. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. By additionally equating Dasein’s transcendence with its freedom in MFL*,* Heidegger likely intends to account for Dasein’s possibility for authenticity as well. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. MFL 166. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. MFL 166. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Harman, *Heidegger Explained*, 75. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. MFL 153. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. MFL 157-9. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. MFL 182. Emphasis mine. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. SZ 64-5. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. MFL 180. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. SZ 65, BP 291. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. MFL 180. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. SZ 364, 366. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. SZ 145. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. SZ 230. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. MFL 160. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. For Heidegger’s account of the oscillation and momentum of primordial temporality, see MFL 208-9. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. MFL 208: “Temporality is nothing other than the temporal condition for the possibility of *world* and of the world’s essential belonging to *transcendence.* For transcendence has its possibility in the unity of ecstatic momentum. This oscillation of the self-temporalizing ecstases is, as such, the upswing, regarded as swinging toward all possible beings that can factically enter into a world.” [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. For example, BP 302, MFL 212, SZ 419. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. MFL 186. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. In characterizing the potentiality-for-being, Heidegger writes: “self-projection upon the ‘for-the-sake-of-oneself’ is grounded in the future and is an essential characterizing of *existentiality*. *The primary meaning of existentiality is the future*” (SZ 327). [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. BP 301-2: “*Being-in* as *toward*-itself, as for-the-sake-of itself, is possible only on the basis of the *future*, because this structural moment of time is intrinsically ecstatic.” [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. MFL 212: “We have finally brought to light the essential connection between transcendence and temporality… the stepping-beyond beings in transcendence, which is carried out toward all dimensions, is grounded in the ecstatic constitution of temporality. Stepping-over to world means nothing other than that the ecstatic unity of temporality has, as the unity of being-carried away, a horizon temporalized primarily out of the future, the for-the-sake-of: the world. To transcend is to be-in-the-world.” [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. SZ 38. Emphasis mine. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. MFL 192. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. BP 302. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. See, for example, the Graham Harman’s essay “The Beings of Being: On the Failure of Heidegger’s Ontico-Ontological Priority” and Daniel Dahlstrom’s essay “The End of Fundamental Ontology” in *Division Three of Heidegger’s* Being and Time: *The Unanswered Question of Being,* ed. Lee Braver. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. William Blattner, *Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism,* 271-6. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. Fleischer’s view is taken solely from Daniel Dahlstrom’s description in “Heidegger’s Concept of Temporality.” Whether Fleischer holds this exact view is of little importance for the point I am making here. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. For a defense of the necessity of temporality in the analysis of Dasein, see Daniel Dahlstrom, “Heidegger’s Concept of Temporality”, Ricahrd Polt, *Heidegger: An Introduction*,85-112and Françoise Dastur, “The ekstatico-horizonal constitution of temporality.” [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. Graham Harman, *Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects*, 92. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. Ibid., 61-2. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. Ibid., 146. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. Ibid., 63. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. Harman justifies his interpretation of transcendence by dismissing Heidegger’s recourse to ever further horizons (as, for example, the whither of the ‘removal to…’ of an ecstasis). Horizons, according to Harman, cannot be “distinct from the elements that populate it.” In other words, there is no place to *be* other than the world. Horizons must lie within the totality of meaning, just like equipment. And so, horizons are just more equipment. Therefore, if an ecstasis *is* at all, it *is* the equipment. And so, equipment must transcend too—transcendence is simply another moment of the totality of functionality (Harman, *Tool-Being*, 60-1). [↑](#footnote-ref-58)